| Nome: | Descrição: | Tamanho: | Formato: | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.26 MB | Adobe PDF |
Orientador(es)
Resumo(s)
When establishing constitutional rules that regulate political parties, liberal democracies struggle between civil liberties - thus tolerating anti-democratic parties - and potential threats of democratic breakdown, which can be reduced by prosecuting and prohibiting anti-democratic parties. We suggest that liberal democracies must balance false positives and false negatives by combining ex ante and ex post regulatory mechanisms. By making use of a unique dataset of thirty-seven liberal democracies collected by the authors, we find empirical results consistent with our positive theory. An extensive review of the normative debate and case law provides additional qualitative support.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Case law Civil liberties Democracy Democratic backsliding Empirical legal reasoning False positives and false negatives Militant democracy Normative debate Political parties