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Orientador(es)
Resumo(s)
The dominantformulationformodelingtheobjectivefunctionofmanagersofcompeting rms
withhorizontalshareholdinghasbeencritiquedforproducingtheresultthat,ifnon-horizontal
shareholdersarehighlydispersed,managerswouldmimictheinterestsofhorizontalsharehold-
ers eveniftheyownashareofthe rmthatdoesnotinducefullcontrol.Weshowthatthis
issuecanbeavoided(whilemaintainingtheremainingfeaturesofthedominantapproach)
withanalternativeformulationthatisderivedfromaprobabilisticvotingmodelthatassumes
shareholderswithhigher nancialstakeswilltakegreaterinterestinthemanagerialactions,
whichyieldstheresultthatmanagersmaximizeacontrol-weightedsumoftheshareholders
relativereturns.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Horizontal Shareholding Ownership Dispersion Manager Objective Function Proportional Control Banzhaf Control
Contexto Educativo
Citação
Brito, D., Elhauge, E., Ribeiro, R., Vasconcelos, H. (2018). Modeling horizontal shareholding with ownership dispersion. Working papers: Economics. N.º 1, 17 p.