Asymmetric Collusion and Merger Policy

Publication

dc.contributor.author	Ganslandt, Mattias
dc.contributor.author	Persson, Lars
dc.contributor.author	Vasconcelos, Hélder
dc.date.accessioned	2018-07-30T11:05:59Z
dc.date.available	2018-07-30T11:05:59Z
dc.date.issued	2007
dc.description.abstract	In their merger control, EU and the US have considered symmetric size distribution (cost structure) of rms to be a factor potentially leading to collusion. We show that forbidding mergers leading to symmetric market structures can induce mergers leading to asymmetric market structures with higher risk of collusion, when rms face indivisible costs of collusion. In particular, we show that if the rule determining the collusive outcome has the property that the large (eficient) rm bene ts su¢ ciently more from collusion when industry asymmetries increase, collusion can become more likely when are moderately asymmetric.	pt_PT
dc.description.version	info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion	pt_PT
dc.identifier.citation	Ganslandt, M., Persson, L., Vasconcelos, H. (2007). Asymmetric Collusion and Merger Policy. Working Papers: Economics. N.º 15, 32 p.	pt_PT
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/25298
dc.language.iso	eng	pt_PT
dc.peerreviewed	no	pt_PT
dc.subject	Collusion	pt_PT
dc.subject	Cost Asymmetries	pt_PT
dc.subject	Merger Policy	pt_PT
dc.title	Asymmetric Collusion and Merger Policy	pt_PT
dc.type	working paper
dspace.entity.type	Publication
rcaap.rights	openAccess	pt_PT
rcaap.type	workingPaper	pt_PT

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