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How banking regulation affects collusion sustainability: a multimarket contact approach

dc.contributor.authorPrekwinkel, Laura
dc.contributor.authorBrito, Duarte
dc.contributor.authorVasconcelos, Helder
dc.date.accessioned2026-04-30T10:44:34Z
dc.date.available2026-04-30T10:44:34Z
dc.date.issued2026-06-01
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates how regulatory instruments affect collusion sustainability in banking within a theoretical framework where: (i) banks compete simultaneously in loan and deposit markets characterized by different degrees of product differentiation; (ii) strategic interaction occurs through an infinitely repeated game with Nash reversion strategies; and (iii) capital requirements, reserve ratios, and interbank rates alter the relative profitability of each market. We show that the impact of these instruments on collusion depends critically on relative market differentiation: the same regulatory instrument can either facilitate or hinder coordination depending on which market exhibits greater product homogeneity. This non-monotonicity implies that regulators must account for market structure when calibrating policy instruments to avoid unintended effects on competitive intensity.eng
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112962
dc.identifier.eid105036230550
dc.identifier.other64471ee6-7346-425a-975d-d0266f90ee96
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/57628
dc.language.isoeng
dc.peerreviewedyes
dc.publisherElsevier B.V.
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.subjectBankingeng
dc.subjectCollusioneng
dc.subjectProduct differentiationeng
dc.titleHow banking regulation affects collusion sustainability: a multimarket contact approach
dc.typeresearch article
dspace.entity.typePublication
oaire.citation.volume265
oaire.versionhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85

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