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Sequential cross-border mergers

dc.contributor.authorFumagalli, Eileen
dc.contributor.authorVasconcelos, Hélder
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-18T11:52:59Z
dc.date.available2010-11-18T11:52:59Z
dc.date.issued2009-06
dc.description.abstractThis paper proposes a sequential merger formation game to study how trade policy can influence firms' choice between intra-national and cross-border mergers in an international Cournot oligopoly with a cost structure à la Perry and Porter [Perry, M. and Porter, R.H., 1985. Oligopoly and the Incentive for Horizontal Merger. American Economic Review 75(1), 219–227.].We find that the equilibrium market structure depends heavily on: (i) the level of trade costs; and (ii) whether or not active antitrust authorities are incorporated within the sequential merger game. In addition, it is shown that whenever mergers occur in equilibrium, they occur in waves and the merger wave comprises at least one cross-border merger.por
dc.identifier.citationFUMAGALLI, Eileen; VASCONCELOS, Hélder - Sequential cross-border mergers. International Journal of Industrial Organization. ISSN 0167-7187.Vol. 27 (2009), p.175–187por
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.ijindorg.2008.06.002
dc.identifier.eid59149103960
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/3487
dc.identifier.wos000264002900005
dc.language.isoengpor
dc.publisherElsevierpor
dc.subjectEndogenous mergerspor
dc.subjectMerger policypor
dc.subjectTariff-jumping FDIpor
dc.subjectEndogenous split of surpluspor
dc.titleSequential cross-border mergerspor
dc.typejournal article
dspace.entity.typePublication
rcaap.rightsrestrictedAccesspor
rcaap.typearticlepor

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