Measuring unilateral effects in partial horizontal acquisitions

Brito, Duarte; Ribeiro, Ricardo; Vasconcelos, Hélder

http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/14488

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Authors

Brito, Duarte

Ribeiro, Ricardo

Vasconcelos, Hélder

Abstract(s)

Recent years have witnessed an increased interest, by competition agencies, in assessing the competitive effects of partial acquisitions. We propose an empirical structural methodology to examine quantitatively the unilateral impact of partial horizontal acquisitions. The acquisitions may be direct or indirect, and may or may not correspond to control. The proposed methodology simulates the effects on prices, market shares, firm profits and consumer welfare. It can deal with differentiated product industries and nest full mergers as a special case. We provide an empirical application to several acquisitions in the wet shaving industry.

Keywords

Antitrust Unilateral effects Partial acquisitions Oligopoly Differentiated products Demand estimation

URI

http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/14488

Citation

Brito, D., Ribeiro, R., & Vasconcelos, H. (2014). Measuring unilateral effects in partial horizontal acquisitions. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 33(1), 22-36. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2013.12.003