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Public–private collusion

dc.contributor.authorMota, Filipa
dc.contributor.authorCorreia-da-Silva, João
dc.contributor.authorPinho, Joana
dc.date.accessioned2023-06-30T11:00:28Z
dc.date.available2023-06-30T11:00:28Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.description.abstractWe study collusion between a public firm and a private firm facing linear demand and quadratic costs. We characterize the collusive outcome that results from Nash bargaining and compare it to the non-cooperative outcome. If the public firm’s taste for consumer surplus is mild, both firms reduce output (as in a private duopoly). If it is intermediate, while the public firm reduces output, the private firm expands output to such an extent that total output increases. If it is strong, the private firm’s output expansion does not compensate for the public firm’s output contraction, and thus total output decreases. We also characterize collusion sustainability, and assess the impact of relative bargaining power, degree of cost convexity, public firm’s taste for total surplus, and cost asymmetry. We conclude that, by reducing the productive inefficiency that is caused by the public firm being more expansionary, collusion may lead to higher profits and consumer surplus.pt_PT
dc.description.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionpt_PT
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11151-023-09903-3pt_PT
dc.identifier.eid85162940979
dc.identifier.issn0889-938X
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/41495
dc.identifier.wos001013846400001
dc.language.isoengpt_PT
dc.peerreviewedyespt_PT
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/pt_PT
dc.subjectCollusionpt_PT
dc.subjectPublic firmspt_PT
dc.subjectMixed oligopolypt_PT
dc.subjectNash bargainingpt_PT
dc.titlePublic–private collusionpt_PT
dc.typejournal article
dspace.entity.typePublication
oaire.citation.endPage417
oaire.citation.startPage393
oaire.citation.titleReview of Industrial Organizationpt_PT
oaire.citation.volume62
rcaap.rightsopenAccesspt_PT
rcaap.typearticlept_PT

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