Publicação
On the political economy of nonlinear income taxation
| dc.contributor.author | Berliant, Marcus | |
| dc.contributor.author | Gouveia, Miguel | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-09-10T15:48:11Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-09-10T15:48:11Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2026-09-01 | |
| dc.description.abstract | The political economy setting of voting over general nonlinear income taxes with labor disincentives and information asymmetry in consumer/worker/voter types is considered. Agents do not communicate or coordinate with each other. The economy is the realization of a finite draw from a continuous distribution. The revenue required from a draw is determined by Pareto optimal provision of a public good for that draw. Assuming that the government must meet the revenue requirement for any possible draw, in other words the tax is robust, a majority rule equilibrium is shown to exist at the median voter’s preferred tax function out of this robust set. The key restrictions on utility are additive separability, quasi-linearity, and that utility from the public good is multiplicative in type. | eng |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.geb.2026.08.002 | |
| dc.identifier.eid | 105048891045 | |
| dc.identifier.other | 2aead2c4-bb5a-471a-ba84-5671110f15db | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/59327 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | |
| dc.peerreviewed | yes | |
| dc.publisher | Academic Press Inc. | |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | |
| dc.subject | Income taxation | eng |
| dc.subject | Public good | eng |
| dc.subject | Robustness | eng |
| dc.subject | Voting | eng |
| dc.title | On the political economy of nonlinear income taxation | |
| dc.type | research article | |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
| oaire.citation.endPage | 624 | |
| oaire.citation.startPage | 604 | |
| oaire.citation.volume | 159 | |
| oaire.version | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |
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