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Advisor(s)
Abstract(s)
In pharmaceuticals markets, sellers of branded drugs sometimes sell
generic versions of their own branded products, either directly or through licenseagreements. Although claims that these pseudo-generics may have anti-competitive effects are not unusual, the theoretical literature on this issue is limited and not conclusive. This paper uses a model that combines horizontal and vertical product differentiation, to explain how those effects may occur. We show that the producer of the branded product will not sell the pseudo-generic unless faced with competition
and that, if she does so, in some circumstances, all prices rise to the benefit of all sellers and the detriment of consumers.
Description
Keywords
Pseudo-generics Product differentiation Pharmaceutical pricing
Pedagogical Context
Citation
RODRIGUES, Vasco ; GONÇALVES, Ricardo ; VASCONCELOS, Hélder - Anti-Competitive Impact of Pseudo-Generics. Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade. ISSN 1573-7012. Vol. 14, N.º 1 (2014,), p. 83-98
Publisher
Springer