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Abstract(s)
The paper argues that the ECB is far less an independent institution as Treaty provisions portray. This is due to the lack of institutional alternatives at the EU level to effectively and rapidly deal with complex situations make it the only credible solution, even if very imperfect. This state of affairs does not allow a comparative institutional analysis to be conducted, which is crucial to good public policy decisions. Significantly, the ECB has experienced two different periods: a frictionless and a complex one.The latter has been characterized by increasing monetary policy alignment with the European Council’s political decisions, having materialized in intervention in Member States’ bond markets during the financial and covid-19 crises. The overrelianceon the ECB has recently been consolidated, as it decided to address the issue of climate change from a monetary standpoint in order to speed up the climate transition. However, this trend may not be consistent with its primary mandate of maintaining price stability and, in different ways, may hinder its independence.
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Keywords
Monetary policy European Central Bank Climate transition Central Bank independence Price stability