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Regulating artificial intelligence

dc.contributor.authorGuerreiro, João
dc.contributor.authorRebelo, Sérgio
dc.contributor.authorTeles, Pedro
dc.date.accessioned2026-06-26T14:54:33Z
dc.date.available2026-06-26T14:54:33Z
dc.date.issued2026-05-01
dc.description.abstractAdvances in AI offer substantial benefits but also pose societal risks. We analyze optimal regulation under uncertainty about societal costs, differing expectations regarding risks, and opportunities to reduce uncertainty through beta testing. Pigouvian taxes fail to achieve the first-best outcome due to heterogeneous beliefs about risks and the regulator’s inability to observe developers’ expectations. We propose a two-stage optimal policy: first, deciding between immediate release or sandbox experimentation; second, using gathered information to determine whether to publicly release or withdraw the algorithm. This approach achieves the socially optimal outcome.eng
dc.identifier.doi10.2139/ssrn.6880902
dc.identifier.other6177bd30-7da0-4c15-9754-9331df4ded49
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/58320
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherSSRN
dc.rights.uriN/A
dc.subjectAIeng
dc.subjectRegulationeng
dc.subjectRegulatoryeng
dc.subjectSandboxeseng
dc.titleRegulating artificial intelligence
dc.typepreprint
dspace.entity.typePublication
oaire.versionhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85

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