Publication
Bank risk-taking and impaired monetary policy transmission
| dc.contributor.author | Koenig, Philipp | |
| dc.contributor.author | Schliephake, Eva | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-12-13T16:19:31Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2021-12-13T16:19:31Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2021-09-20 | |
| dc.description.abstract | We consider a standard banking model with agency frictions to simultaneously study the weakening and reversal of monetary transmission and banks’ risk-taking in a low-interest environment. Both, weaker monetary transmission and higher risk-taking arise because lower policy rates impair banks’ net worth.The pass-through to deposit rates, the level of excess reserves and the extent of the agency problem between banks and depositors are crucial determinants of monetary transmission. If the deposit pass-through is sufficiently impaired, a reversal rate exists. For policy rates below the reversal rate further interest rate reductions lead to a disproportionate increase in risk-taking and a contraction in loan supply. | pt_PT |
| dc.description.version | info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion | pt_PT |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.2139/ssrn.3925073 | pt_PT |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/36172 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | pt_PT |
| dc.subject | Monetary policy | pt_PT |
| dc.subject | Bank lending | pt_PT |
| dc.subject | Risk-taking channel | pt_PT |
| dc.subject | Reversal rate | pt_PT |
| dc.title | Bank risk-taking and impaired monetary policy transmission | pt_PT |
| dc.type | preprint | |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
| rcaap.rights | openAccess | pt_PT |
| rcaap.type | preprint | pt_PT |
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