A carregar...
Projeto de investigação
Sem título
Financiador
Autores
Publicações
Horizontal mergers between multisided platforms: insights from cournot competition
Publication . Correia-da-Silva, Joao; Jullien, Bruno; Lefouili, Yassine; Pinho, Joana
This paper discusses the literature on horizontal mergers between multisided platforms and argues that the Cournot model can provide useful insights into the welfare effects of such mergers. To illustrate those insights, we develop a simple model in which two‐sided platforms offer a homogeneous service and compete à la Cournot, and derive the effects of “average‐marginal‐cost‐preserving” mergers on consumers on both sides of the market. We conclude with a discussion of several research avenues that could be explored to understand better the impact of horizontal mergers between multisided platforms.
Collusion in mixed oligopolies and the coordinated effects of privatization
Publication . Correia-da-Silva, João; Pinho, Joana
We study the sustainability of collusion in mixed oligopolies where private and public firms only differ in their objective: private firms maximize profits, while public firms maximize total surplus. If marginal costs are increasing, public firms do not supply the entire market, leaving room for private firms to produce and possibly cooperate by restricting output. The presence of public firms makes collusion among private firms harder to sustain, and maybe even unprofitable. As the number of private firms increases, collusion may become easier or harder to sustain. Privatization makes collusion easier to sustain, and is socially detrimental whenever firms are able to collude after privatization (which is always the case if they are sufficiently patient). Coordinated effects thus reverse the traditional result according to which privatization is socially desirable if there are many firms in the industry.
Unidades organizacionais
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Contribuidores
Financiadores
Entidade financiadora
Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia
Programa de financiamento
5876
Número da atribuição
PEst-OE/EGE/UI4105/2014