Reis, RicardoQueiroga, Diogo Silva2015-03-092015-03-092014-11-142014http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/16846With significant equity incentives in its compensation structure, stock option expensing approval affects the compensation structure in the US high-tech industry. A large sample analysis shows that in response to FAS 123R in 2005, the proportion of options offered to CEOs and Top 5 Executives at high-tech firms has decreased, with significance. This in turn does not seem to change, significantly, risk-taking incentives, measured by vega, of CEOs and Top 5 Executives in this industry. Following the same tendency, a small sample of 10 US high-tech companies presents that non-named executives and employees have suffered a decrease in options offerings from 2002 to 2006 accompanied by the introduction of restricted stock units (RSUs) and the introduction (in some cases) of a binomial option-pricing model. Contradicting this tendency non-employee directors have seen an increase in the level of options granted in the light of FAS 123R.engFAS 123RUSHigh-techStock optionsCEOsTop 5 ExecutivesNon-named Employee executivesNon-employee directorsmaster thesis201124980