



CATÓLICA  
LISBON  
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS

# Public Policy, Policy-Making and Social Entrepreneurship – The Case of Portugal and the UK

Isabel Oliveira Santos

Dissertation written under the supervision of Prof. Marta Bicho

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of requirements for the MSc in  
Business, at Universidade Católica Portuguesa

June 2018

## **Abstract**

**Title of the dissertation:** Public Policy, Policy-Making and Social Entrepreneurship – The Case of Portugal and the UK

This study aims to explain how governments engage in policy-making and construct public policy for social entrepreneurship, based on the experiences of two countries, Portugal, and the UK. Also, it explains how different policy scopes influence the country's policy.

Social entrepreneurship is increasingly drawing attention from researchers, communities, and policy-makers. Government's support has been key for developing social entrepreneurship in Portugal and UK, which actively implement policy and institutional frameworks regarding this phenomenon. However, research has yet to explain how they engage in public policy and policy-making for social entrepreneurship.

We've collected and analysed more than 200 policy documents from Portugal and the UK, in order to build a conceptual framework, as well as gather data to determine the policy scope. The findings suggest that public policy and policy-making for social entrepreneurship comprise four dimensions: policy-making, government action, social entrepreneurship legitimacy and social entrepreneurship sustainability. Both countries present different levels of policy development, with the UK on a mature stage, and Portugal on a growing path.

Findings also suggested the UK focuses on primary public policy and Portugal on secondary public policy for social entrepreneurship. This study contributes to theory and practice since it establishes for the first time a comprehensive conceptual framework explaining how public policy and policy-making are done at the national level. The conceptual framework also contributes for social entrepreneurs to better understand the process and allows them to do

more informed decision-making on the long-term, as well as establishing a starting point for future research.

**Author:** Isabel Oliveira Santos

**Keywords:** social entrepreneurship, social enterprise, social innovation, public policy, policy-making, public management

## **Resumo**

**Título da dissertação:** Políticas Públicas, Decisão Política e Empreendedorismo Social – O Caso de Portugal e do Reino Unido

O objectivo deste estudo é explicar como os governos decidem e constroem políticas públicas para empreendedorismo social, assim como o seu âmbito, baseando-se na experiência de Portugal e do Reino Unido.

O empreendedorismo social tem atraído atenção de investigadores, comunidades e decisores políticos. Os governos têm sido chave para o desenvolvimento deste fenómeno em Portugal e no Reino Unido, ativos na implementação de quadros institucionais e políticos para empreendedorismo social. Contudo, o trabalho de investigação ainda não explicou como é que estes governos decidem e criam as suas políticas públicas para empreendedorismo social.

Foram reunidos e analisados mais de 200 documentos relativos às políticas de Portugal e do Reino Unido, com o objectivo de construir um quadro conceptual, assim como determinar o âmbito destas políticas. Os resultados sugerem que o processo de decisão e criação destas políticas tem quatro dimensões: decisão política, acção governamental, legitimidade e sustentabilidade do empreendedorismo social. Estes países apresentam níveis diferentes de desenvolvimento das políticas públicas, com o Reino Unido numa fase mais madura, e Portugal num caminho de crescimento. Os resultados também sugerem que o Reino Unido se foca mais em políticas públicas primárias e Portugal em políticas secundárias para o empreendedorismo social.

Este estudo estabelece pela primeira vez um quadro conceptual abrangente sobre a forma como políticas para empreendedorismo social são formuladas e criadas. Este quadro

permite também que aos empreendedores sociais tenham uma melhor compreensão do processo e tomem decisões mais informadas a longo prazo, estabelecendo um ponto de partida para futura investigação.

**Autor:** Isabel Oliveira Santos

**Palavras-chave:** empreendedorismo social, empresa social, inovação social, políticas públicas, decisão política, gestão pública

## **Acknowledgements**

To Marta, for being the best adviser I could ask for and believing in my work, even when I didn't.

To Laura, Filipe, and Margarida, for taking the time to answer all my questions.

To my aunt Gina, my uncle Rui, and my godparents, Pedro and Zé, for all the patience and wonderful life advice.

To my grandmothers, Concha and Emília, for showing determination and wit beyond their age.

To my grandfathers, Pedro and José, for keep setting the example, even if they're not here anymore.

To my brother Pedro, for all the tough love.

To Catarina, for being there since the beginning and never give up on me.

To Ana, Dário, Inês, Joana, João and Raquel, for proving me I was not the only weirdo in the world.

To Bel, for her *beirã* realness.

To Irina and Patrícia, for the journeys passed and the journeys ahead.

To Inês, for all the pasta dinners, adventures, and endless support.

To Bea, Alessandra, Tony, Mariana, Ian, and all the others who made my Católica experience worth it.

To Isabel and our Galveias team, for all the conversations, dreams, and motivation.

To FCSH, for making who I am.

To the true heroes, my parents Isabel and Carlos, for everything.

*Governments never learn. Only people learn.*

**Milton Friedman**

## Index

Abstract .....	i
Resumo.....	iii
Acknowledgements .....	v
List of Figures .....	ix
List of Tables.....	ix
1. Introduction.....	1
1. Literature Review.....	4
1.1. Social Enterprise, Social Entrepreneurship and Social Innovation.....	4
1.1.1. Social Enterprise versus Social Entrepreneurship .....	4
1.1.2. Social Innovation.....	5
1.2. The Challenges of SE.....	6
1.3. Public Policy and Policy-Making for SE .....	8
2. Data and Methodology.....	11
2.1. Research Setting.....	11
2.1.1. SE in Portugal and the UK .....	11
2.1.1.1. Public Policy and Policy-Making for SE in Portugal and the UK.....	14
2.2. Methodology .....	18
2.2.1. Data collection.....	18
2.2.2. Data analysis.....	21
3. Findings and Discussion .....	23
3.1. Policy-Making for SE.....	25
3.2. Government Action for SE.....	28
3.3. SE Legitimacy .....	32
3.4. SE Sustainability .....	34
3.5. The SE Policy Framework .....	34

4. Conclusion .....	38
4.1. Managerial and Theoretical Implications.....	41
4.2. Limitations and Future Research.....	41
5. Appendixes .....	43
Appendix 1 – Portugal’s Data Sample .....	43
Appendix 2 – UK’s Data Sample .....	47
Abbreviations .....	62
References List.....	63
Bibliography.....	75

## **List of Figures**

Figure 1 – Data Structure .....	24
Figure 2 – UK's Policy Scope .....	27
Figure 3 – Portugal's Policy Scope.....	28
Figure 4 - SE Policy Framework.....	37

## **List of Tables**

Table 1 – Common legal forms used by UK’s social entrepreneurs.....	13
Table 2 – UK’s social entrepreneurship policy.....	15
Table 3 – Portugal’s social entrepreneurship policy .....	16
Table 4 – Interviews Data .....	19
Table 5 - Data sample characteristics.....	20
Table 6 - Public Policy Scope .....	21

## 1. Introduction

In 2014, a third of Fortune 500 companies saw social impact as a core strategy (Mennel & Wong, 2015), and by 2016, 59% of millennial entrepreneurs stated that their drive is to have a positive impact in their communities (Ting, 2016). Nowadays, society looks for more economically, socially, and environmentally sustainable ways to do business (Haigh & Hoffman, 2012). This has been important to bring social entrepreneurship from fringe to mainstream idea (Demos, 2017), at the same time tackling important social issues, where markets fail and governments are inefficient (Santos, 2012). It also impacted policy-makers, who found themselves obliged to rethink policies and regulation on several levels, including self-restructuring to accommodate social entrepreneurship in the public sector (Vining & Weimer, 2016). Also, in recent years, theorization on the phenomenon increased (Short *et al.*, 2009), with 500 new articles on social entrepreneurship appearing in a variety of different disciplines, only between 2010 to 2015 (Bosma *et al.*, 2015). Moreover, research has demonstrated how important social entrepreneurs can be for tackling social issues in an innovative way (Zahra *et al.*, 2009).

Being in the spotlight of policy-makers, regulatory activity aimed at organizations like social enterprises grew significantly (Battilana & Lee, 2014). The fact is, public policy can help alleviate the tension between state, market and community in which social entrepreneurship operates (Billis, 2010). For example, one of the first challenges for the sector's organizations is to define their legal status. Of critical importance, this is the first stage of legitimacy given by regulatory agencies (Battilana & Lee, 2014). Along with other issues such as organizational conflicts (Santos *et al.*, 2015), financing access (Nicholls & Pharoah, 2008), or the need for favourable tax frameworks (Gorovitz, 2017), a whole new scope for the development of public policy is inaugurated.

Research proved that specific legal forms and regulation for social entrepreneurship can help organizations grow (Eldar, 2017; Rawhouser *et al.*, 2015), which has been the subject of continued discussion among entrepreneurs (Kennedy *et al.*, 2015). This reinforces the idea of public policy as a concern for all stakeholders. Furthermore, policy is key to any entrepreneurial system (Autio *et al.*, 2014; Casanovas & Bruno, 2013), thus being of everyone's interest to invest and get involved. If a country wishes to better understand and improve its policies, it's necessary to develop more knowledge on the subject.

Thus, the purpose of this study is to understand the dimensions which make up policy-making and public policy for social entrepreneurship. In particular, our research will focus on the Portuguese and on the UK cases. In order to do that, we address the following questions:

*RQ1: What is the scope of public policy in each country?*

*RQ2: How are governments in each country approaching public policy?*

The first question will help us understand how policies targeting scopes like social enterprises, social innovation, social economy or the third sector influence the way governments produce public policy. The second question will allow us to understand the governmental process and dynamics of addressing social entrepreneurship as a policy issue. By answering both research questions, we intend to propose a public policy framework, to clearly explain what is done at the national level, give social entrepreneurs better understanding of the process and allow them to make more informed decisions, as well as establishing a starting point for future research.

The research is based in the Portuguese and UK cases due to the fact they are among the seven countries in the world to actively stimulate *social innovation* through policy and institutional frameworks (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2016), as well as having interesting levels of social entrepreneurship activity – 4,5% in Portugal, and 5,2% in the UK (GEM, 2015).

Moreover, specific the countries' specific contexts, make them even more relevant. Back in 2014, the managing director for *Banco de Inovação Social*<sup>1</sup> in an interview to a Portuguese radio station stated that the Portuguese law was not prepared for social enterprises (Noutel, 2014), and the legal framework was not friendly towards social entrepreneurship overall. However, and despite being only 22<sup>nd</sup> on the Social Innovation Index (2016), Portugal is pioneer in initiatives like mapping its social entrepreneurship ecosystem, as well as being the first country to channel a big slice of European funding (circa 150€ million) to promote social innovation. This is remarkable taking into account the country went through a financial adjustment program followed by large spending cuts, and where entrepreneurial finance levels, R&D transfer, and government policies, tax, and bureaucracy, are insufficient (GEM, 2016).

---

<sup>1</sup> *Social Innovation Bank* launched by SCML along with 27 national partners and more than 1€ million raised.

On the other hand, the UK places 2<sup>nd</sup>, only after the USA, in the Social Innovation Index (2016), and it's first in terms of policy and institutional framework. UK policy has a successful track record and history of being used as an example by other countries who wish to develop their own (Bland, 2010; Park & Wilding, 2013).

For this purpose, we gather secondary data like policy documents that we will analyse in terms of public policy for social entrepreneurship in both Portugal and the UK. Furthermore, primary data like interviews to key actors in Portugal and in the UK were undertaken, that led us to further comprehend and analyse the public policy of each country.

This study makes theoretical contributions because (i) it analyses the current state of public policy for social entrepreneurship in two countries, and (ii) builds a public policy framework, overlooked by previous research (Terjesen *et al.* 2016), which only focuses on specific issues like policy transfer (Park *et al.*, 2017), public procurement (Loosemore, 2016) or legal frameworks (Catherall, 2012). It also contributes to practice by (i) helping governments reproduce the best practices to build a solid entrepreneurial ecosystem, (ii) guide policy-makers to avoid mistakes and inefficiencies in public policy, (iii) granting *social entrepreneurs* deep policy knowledge, which allows them to make more informed decisions and engage in policy advocacy.

The thesis is structured includes one a literature review on *social entrepreneurship*, *social enterprises*, *social innovation*, and respective challenges, as well as *public policy for social entrepreneurship*; a chapter on data and methodology which comprises the research setting, the methodology, the data collection, and data analysis; the findings and respective discussion; and the conclusion along with managerial and theoretical implications, and limitations and future research.

## 2. Literature Review

### 2.1. Social Enterprise, Social Entrepreneurship and Social Innovation

Do *social enterprises* constitute the only way of doing *social entrepreneurship*? And are they the sole responsible for *social innovation*? The fact is when one or more of these terms are used, it is difficult to understand exactly what they're referring to, hence the need for clarification. The issue is that these terms are interconnected and are sometimes interchangeable. For example, when referring to the origin of each of these phenomenon's, different authors have the same reference – the development of cooperatives and mutuals the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Bland, 2010; Mulgan *et al.*, 2007). But what we will see is different approaches to this differentiation.

#### 2.1.1. Social Enterprise versus Social Entrepreneurship

When talking about *social enterprises* it usually comes to mind initiatives like the microfinance (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Yunus *et al.*, 2010) or WISE's (Eldar, 2017; Ramus *et al.*, 2017). Battilana & Lee (2014, p.399), for example, define *social enterprise* as the perfect form of *hybrid organization*, which combine multiple organizational identities, organizational forms, or institutional logics. *Social enterprises*, they argue, represent an “*extreme idea*” in which conflict has the most potential to arise, and differ from cooperatives or mutualists. Overall, *social enterprises* are seen as more than a “patch” for social problems, promoting sustained and empowering change (Santos, 2012), as well transacting with their beneficiaries, instead of just giving (Eldar, 2017).

On the other hand, Dacin *et al.* (2010) compile and compare 37 different definitions related to *social entrepreneurship*. And while some are broader, and others more restrict, it is possible to distinguish between two types of concepts. One, associated with the definition of what makes a *social entrepreneur* (Austin *et al.*, 2006; Mair & Martí, 2006; Martin & Osberg, 2007), focusing on the individual's characteristics and its mission, while not specifying how this type of entrepreneurship is accomplished. The other, associated with the *social enterprise* concept (Haugh, 2006; Thompson & Doherty, 2006), focuses on the organizational side, which merges social purposes with business-like strategies. Yet, all definitions of *social entrepreneurship* are

linked to the idea of an activity which “*increase[s] social value*”, like suggested by Peredo & McLean (2006, p. 59). The disagreement lies, they argue, in the location of social goals in the enterprise’s or entrepreneur’s mission. Also, it can be argued that these definitions imply the idea of some kind of innovation in social terms.

In general, *social entrepreneurship* is seen as a concept that is too wide and has no clear boundaries (Battilana & Lee, 2014). And while some make the case for *social entrepreneurship* as a separate discipline (Santos, 2012), some agree on analysing this phenomenon through already existing frameworks in entrepreneurship (Dacin *et al.*, 2010). Most of all, *social entrepreneurship* is about “*creating new industries, validating new business models, and re-directing resources to neglected societal problems*” (Santos, 2012, p. 335), meeting the idea of O’Toole & Vogel (2011) of *conscious capitalism*, and contributing to a more sustainable economy (Shah, 2009).

### **2.1.2. Social Innovation**

Other approach to conceptualization comprehends authors who primarily address *social innovation* (Mulgan *et al.*, 2007; Phills *et al.*, 2008; Pol & Ville, 2009). Here, concept definition heavily relies on differentiating it from *social enterprise* or *social entrepreneurship*.

Mulgan *et al.* (2007, p.8) define *social innovation* as the “*innovative activities and services that are motivated by the goal of meeting a social need and that are predominantly developed and diffused through organisations whose primary purposes are social*”. Phills *et al.* (2008, p.36) describe it as “*a novel solution to a social problem that is more effective, efficient, sustainable, or just than existing solutions and for which the value created accrues primarily to society, rather than private individuals*”. Both clearly link the idea of *social innovation* with inventing a solution for a social issue that fills a void or improves exiting reality. Still, this is different from *social innovation* as a change in culture, norms or regulations, caused by other type of innovation such as cultural or technologic (Hämäläinen & Heiskala, 2007).

When distinguishing *social innovation* from other concepts, Phills *et al.* (2008) use the case of microfinance. They argue that *social entrepreneurship* looks to how we can “*identify and find more individuals like [Mohammed] Yunus*”, *social enterprise* looks at “*how to design,*

*manage, fund, and self-sustaining social purposes entities*”, and *social innovation* looks at the innovative solution created, in this case *microfinance*. Because *social innovation* focuses on the mechanism, authors argue it’s a more inclusive concept.

The fact is, *social innovation* can be born outside *social entrepreneurship* (Phills *et al.*, 2008) – CSR for example –, and it can be carried out by individuals, social movements, or organizations. Mulgan *et al.*, (2007) weight in on the role of both civil society and governments in driving *social innovation* in different moments of history. They argue that *social innovation* does not happen without a favourable external context, and like *social entrepreneurship*, requires ideas, scaling up, learning and evolving (Mulgan *et al.*, 2007). Moreover, it requires the role of for-profits, non-profits and governments to hybridize, and to create a mix models that enhance these solutions’ sustainability (Phills *et al.*, 2008). Well-known examples of *social innovation* might include fair trade, microfinance, socially responsible investing, or even open source like Wikipedia (Mulgan *et al.*, 2007; Phills *et al.*, 2008).

## **2.2. The Challenges of SE**

Regardless of the conceptual approach one choses, *social enterprises*, as well as other organizations within *social entrepreneurship*, much because of their hybrid nature, are regarded as “*fragile organizations*” (Santos *et al.*, 2015, p. 37). Engaging in any kind of *social entrepreneurship* activity entails several challenges. Further research on the subject can constitute a good opportunity to rethink business overall (Santos *et al.*, 2015), and even public institutions have developed their own knowledge on the matter.

For example, the EC identified the challenges of *social entrepreneurship* within the EU borders (EC, 2018). According to them, organizations and people in this field tend to struggle issues regarding (i) visibility, recognition, and identity (legitimacy), (ii) the legal and regulatory environment, (iii) development, and growth (sustainability and support), (iv) lack of needed skills in human capital, and (v) access to financing. And while they’re based on one specific geography, they’re the same challenges addressed throughout literature. The same literature which also regards trade-offs and mission-drifts (Ramus & Vaccaro, 2017), and access to markets (Wildmannová, 2017) as challenges to be considered in *social entrepreneurship*.

For instance, the absence of legitimacy towards policy-makers, the general public, or even researchers, might lead to governance issues (Lallemand-Stempak, 2017). In fact, as *social entrepreneurship* tends to fall outside established forms and social categories, the conceptual dilemma on what constitutes *social entrepreneurship* tends to represent one of the first challenges faced by *social entrepreneurs* as well as governments in what regards public policy (Battilana & Lee, 2014). A good example is also the lack of legal forms to support social activities. Thus, it's key to find new organizational models and new ways of financing (Santos *et al.*, 2015; Weerawardena & Mort, 2006). Some of the "old" of structures are provided by legal forms inherited from last century. These structures are neither cheap nor easy enough to allow organizations with social and financial purposes to set up their operations (Snaith, 2007). New legal forms have been created since, such as the *benefit corporation* in the US or the CIC in UK, but they still raise some brows (Rawhouser *et al.*, 2015). They're said to be vague, and that's probably why they don't have the desired efficiency (Eldar, 2017). So, for the time being, many organizations still find balance with more conventional legal forms (Haigh *et al.*, 2015).

Another issue is financial autonomy and sustainability (Weerawardena & Mort, 2006). Seeking investment has never been easy due to the lack full-bodied governance structures, skilled human capital, as well as the right business tools such as business plans (Hazenberg *et al.*, 2015; Hines, 2005; Howard, 2012). There's a perception in the market that *social entrepreneurship* initiatives are not "investment ready" (Hazenberg *et al.*, 2015). Furthermore, the insecurity of the funding context (Kickul & Lyons, 2016), a lack of resources, and aggravated perceived risk (Battilana & Lee, 2014), as well policies and regulations ill-suited to create a supportive environment for both investors and investment-seekers (Bugg-Levine & Emerson, 2011), tend to lead to the inexistence of a social investment market (Wildmannová, 2017).

Organizations within *social entrepreneurship* are still subjected to some kind of regulation, even if they don't have an official definition (Wildmannová, 2017). This legal vacuum tends to push organizations to a place where they have difficulties to fulfil obligations towards regulatory agencies (Lallemand-Stempak, 2017), once again bringing us back to the legitimacy issue. Like stated by Wildmannová (2017), the absence of official definition for concepts and activities, and what they represent, makes it harder to move forward on the subject of legitimacy. That's why the need for public and regulatory policy has been highlighted (Battilana *et al.*, 2012; Markman *et al.*, 2016; Rawhouser *et al.*, 2015). Efficient regulation for tax, profit

distribution, raising investment, governance, ownership, or partnerships can be a way to empower *social entrepreneurs* and award them the flexibility they need (Austin et al., 2006; Haigh, et al. 2015).

### **2.3. Public Policy and Policy-Making for SE**

Lasswell & Kaplan (1970) define *public policy* as “a projected program of goals, values, and practices”. Eyestone (1971) states that “in a broad sense, public policy is the relationship between governmental organs and their environment”, and Colebatch (2005) argues that the main paradigm in policy is the one that sees as “process in which the government solves a problem”.

Good public policy is effective in the long-term, efficient, pays attention to the process and is inclusive of all stakeholders, focuses on the outcomes, it’s based on previous experience and evidence, and keeps learning as it progresses (Curtain, 2001). Regardless, the basic rule of policy comes down to making choices, when a clear problem is addressed (Colebatch, 2006). First, outsiders to the government advise policy, then the government acts as decision-maker, and finally policy is implemented. (Colebatch & Radin, 2006).

Through time, there have been several approaches and outlooks to *public policy* and *policy-making*, and even *public management* (Parsons, 2004). One approach emerged, deeply influencing the way policy is done in most western countries. Although it dates back from the 1980’s and 1990’s, due to its characteristics it gave momentum to *social entrepreneurship*. We’re referring to the New Public Management (NPM).

NPM emerged in Thatcher’s UK and some municipal governments in the US, who suffered most from economic recession, resisted heavy taxation, and were generally dissatisfied with traditional models of *welfare state* (Gruening, 2001). The basic assumption of NPM is that the public sector will be more successful if managed like the private sector (Kapucu, 2006). Along with this, there was an important shift from “government” to “governance”, raising new concerns and demands (Colebatch, 2005; Evans & Veselý, 2014). For example, there was a new concern with the importance of *steering* i.e. policy-making effectiveness (Parsons, 2004). In this context, the UK government published several cabinet office documents pushing towards

*public policy* “more focused on outcomes and results” (Parsons, 2004, p. 47). NPM became a very important policy management tool and spread across western democracies, pushing for more efficient governments running on less costs (Kapucu, 2006).

As consequence, new solutions to put these ideas in practice, ended up creating a market for *social entrepreneurship*. That’s why literature has establish a connection between NPM and the development of *social entrepreneurship* in the public sphere (Hulgård, 2010; Muñoz, 2009). Furthermore, it has demonstrated how *social entrepreneurship* is overlapping public policy research, though its boundaries are yet to be define (Short *et al.* , 2009).

Contextual factors are important for social entrepreneurship (Sekliuckiene & Kisielius, 2015), hence the key role of government and public institutions (Park & Wilding, 2013; Seelos & Mair, 2005). Even government failure creates opportunity for the surge of *social entrepreneurship* (Santos *et al.*, 2015). The changes in western models of welfare (Roper & Cheney, 2005) have make it more likely for *social entrepreneurship* initiatives to become welfare service providers of government (Mazzei & Roy, 2017). The reformulation of public procurement allowed these organizations to compete with traditional business (Weerawardena & Mort, 2006).

*Social entrepreneurs* have been demanding from governments clearer definitions of *social entrepreneurship*, better financial support, changes in public procurement, raising of public awareness, and better allocation to a government department (Wildmannová, 2017). Thus, it seems that many challenges faced in *social entrepreneurship* are linked to government intervention. The *social entrepreneurship* movement has indeed increased regulatory activity (Battilana & Lee, 2014), which that one of the unique things to *social entrepreneurship* study is how it weighs on external context, such as “*macro-economy, regulatory structure, social infrastructures [...], and taxation*” (Dacin *et al.*, 2010). In fact, several European countries have developed in the last few years policies aimed at *social entrepreneurship*, though they tend to focus on capacity building or in creating specific legal frameworks (Hulgård, 2010). And while many things can affect how a country produces policy (Anheier, 2005), inefficient or non-existing policy is still a big concern, seemingly linked to that the lack of understanding from policy-makers towards *social entrepreneurship* (Eldar, 2017).

Literature has indeed explored the relationship between public policy and *social*

*enterprises* (Jones *et al.*, 2007; Laville *et al.*, 2006), but most of the times it focuses on legal forms' issues (Haigh *et al.*, 2015; Rawhouser *et al.*, 2015). Despite only a small group of countries have legislated specifically for *social enterprises* (Park & Wilding, 2013), more nations are engaging with this issue, including migrating these concerns to an European level (Defourny & Nyssens, 2010).

Overall, few research and consistent findings and generalization have emerged on the field of public policy and social entrepreneurship (Terjesen *et al.*, 2016). Most analysis focus on specific parts of governments' influence on *social entrepreneurship* like how policy-making can be accomplish through policy transfer (Park *et al.*, 2017), the inclusion of social clauses in public procurement (Loosemore, 2016) or removal barriers to entry (Shah, 2009), how social enterprises can be an alternative to subsidies based-initiatives or service providers (Eldar, 2017), *social entrepreneurship* within the public sector (Roper & Cheney, 2005), analysing regionals contexts (Mazzei & Roy, 2017; Roy *et al.*, 2015), or even how *social enterprises* don't need a special legal framework to develop (Catherall, 2012).

Therefore, if we want to find real efforts towards producing consistent knowledge on this policy type, we need to look outside academia. Institutions like the EC, OECD, the World Bank or even the Economist have analyse overall policy, compare geographies, and advise on future action (Agapitova *et al.*, 2017; GECES, 2016; Noya, 2013; OECD, 2010; Thomley *et al.*, 2011). It's possible this happens due to differences in *social entrepreneurship* prevalence, as well as different legal regulatory conditions, and access to markets and financing (Terjesen *et al.*, 2016). Inclusive, Terjesen *et al.* (2016) argued that literature development has only reached the following conclusion: high level of policy development fosters *social entrepreneurship*.

In the end, initiatives of policy-making should matter not only to governments and investors, but also society and entrepreneurs, despite the differences in perspectives (Muñoz, 2009). It has been proven that those who wish can influence policy (Rawhouser *et al.*, 2015). It is known that well-coordinated support programs can help the development of the entrepreneurial ecosystems (Spigel, 2016), which can be leveraged by *social entrepreneurs* (Roundy, 2017). Thus, we're going to look into how public policy and policy-making for social entrepreneurship are currently being accomplished, through the examples of Portugal and the UK.

### 3. Data and Methodology

#### 3.1. Research Setting

##### 3.1.1. SE in Portugal and the UK

Portugal and the UK are among the few countries who actively stimulate *social innovation* through policy and institutional frameworks (The Economist, 2016). *Social entrepreneurship* activity levels are considerable – 4,5% in Portugal, and 5,2% in the UK (GEM, 2015). Still, internal market development is different between countries. UK places 2<sup>nd</sup> in the Social Innovation Index (2016), while Portugal is only 22<sup>nd</sup>. Between 2005 and 2007, the UK had 62.000 social enterprises contributing with £24 billion of GVA to the economy (Williams & Cowling, 2009). Nowadays, 74% of British social enterprises earn more than 75% of their income from trading, and more than half are profitable and a fifth broke even (SE UK, 2017), showing the strength of the UK's social entrepreneurship market.

Still, both countries have long histories of social sector progress. Portugal has pre-historic forms of social entrepreneurship in XV century *welfare charity*, predominant in *misericórdias*, an important organisations' type in today's third sector (Parente & Quintão, 2014). In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, new mutual organisations arise, attracting many citizens once protected by “*relief aid* (socorrismo)” (Costa, 1986). Also, the cooperative movement was key for the development of Portugal's social movement. The country was second in the world to have a cooperative law in 1867 (EC, 2014a), and in 1976 recognized the social and cooperative sector in its constitution.

Cooperatives are also at the heart of the *social entrepreneurship* movement in the UK. In 1894 a consumers' cooperative was created to provide affordable quality food in poor factory conditions, still running today (EC, 2014b). And in 2000, cooperatives were the main subscribers of SEL, created to support the *social enterprise* movement (Teasdale, 2012).

By 1997, the UK already had an encouraging environment for social entrepreneurship. After being elected prime-minister, Blair promised to back “*thousands of social entrepreneurs [...] who bring to social problems the same enterprise and imagination business entrepreneurs bring to wealth creation*” (Smith, 2000). An already established activity, *social entrepreneurship*, was brought to the mainstream discourse at this time by policy-makers (Leadbeater, 1997). But it was only in 2002 that the government publish its *Social Enterprise:*

*A Strategy for Success*, along with extensive funding to the third sector, provided by quangos (Alcock, 2010).

In Portugal, we don't find similar initiatives. The parliament's *Basic Law for Social Economy*, while setting a legislative framework, it has nothing on a future policy agenda for the sector (Lei n.º 30/2013 de 8 de Maio). Our exploratory observations and interviews suggested that Portuguese political leaders have no interest in making deeper commitments with a *social entrepreneurship and innovation* agenda in Portugal, making the sector mainly market-led. Yet, it's curious how that one of the main issues in Portugal seems to be a small initiatives' pipeline.

UK's strategy document was important to help recognize what's a *social enterprise* and give it legitimacy. The government defines it as "*a business with primarily social objectives whose surpluses are principally reinvested for that purpose [...]*". By focusing the discourse on the business side, the government emphasized the way organizations are managed, their efficiency, and financial sustainability. This created a gap with *social entrepreneurs*, who claim to find their legitimacy in local and social morality (Parkinson & Howorth, 2008). Nevertheless, the government has been leading *social entrepreneurship* development in the UK (Park *et al.*, 2017).

Unlike the UK, the *social enterprise*, in Portugal, lacks overall agreement about its meaning. Discussions undergoing essentially revolves around what is *social economy* (EC, 2014a). Experts inside and outside the government describe the conceptual debate as "*useless*" and stated that their organizations have moved on from this from this discussion. One of them said, "*social enterprise is a concept present in the Portuguese social entrepreneurship imaginary but has no real legitimacy in reality*". Another stated, "*social innovation and entrepreneurship does not really require the existence of a specific social enterprise legal form; thus, the government having no interest in pursuing this issue*". Perhaps because of that, *social enterprises* were purposefully left out of the *Basic Law for Social Economy*.

In fact, the UK is one of the few countries in the world with a specific legal form for *social enterprises*. Even so, like in Portugal, the evolution of *social entrepreneurship* has been made through a variety of legal forms and governance models (Bland, 2010).

Legal structure	Key points	% adopting the structure
Unincorporated Association	Organization with no separated legal identity other than its members	1%
Company Limited by Guarantee (CLG)	Limited company with no share capital where members act as guarantors (usually for a nominal amount) if the company is wound up	51%
Charitable Incorporated Organization (CIO)	New legal structure with limited liability which only needs to register with the Charity Commission, not Companies House	New
Company Limited by Shares (CLS)	Standard structure for a for-profit company. The liability of the shareholders to creditors of the company is limited to the capital originally invested	12%
Industrial and Provident Society (IPS)	Legal form of co-operative regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority and adopted by Credit Unions among others	19%
Community Interest Company (CIC) Limited by Shares	Limited company whose social purpose is enshrined and where there is a limit on the amount of profit that can be distributed other than for its social purpose	17%
Community Interest Company (CIC) Limited by Guarantee		
Public Limited Company	Company limited by shares which can be traded publicly on a stock exchange	1%

Table 1 – Legal forms used by UK’s social entrepreneurs. From Richardson (2015)

In Portugal, the closest one to the EU’s concept of *social enterprise* is IPSS. However, at the core of IPSS is not the idea of mixing social goals with market-oriented activities, but to be a non-profit public service provider dependent on donations and government subsidies (EC, 2014a). There’s a correlation between legal forms and the need for investment, making Portuguese *social entrepreneurship* heavily subsidy dependent, preventing professionalization and organization’s sustainability and development (Parente & Quintão, 2014). Yet, good signs come from not just pioneering in the use of European funding for social investment, but also by being the first country in the world to map its social entrepreneurship ecosystem, by having the first social business school, IES, and by hosting for the first big conference on *social innovation* promoted by the EC.

Portugal is a country in a development phase, where small projects exist but still need to be capacitated (EC, 2014a). Although capacitating social investment is the government’s main priority, financing access is still difficult. Even the UK, with a more mature environment, we find an “*underdeveloped and fragmented social investment market*” (Shah, 2009, p.108), reflecting the need for capital and favourable tax for investors. Still, in 2011/12 the size of social investment market in the UK was already of £220 million (Cabinet Office, 2013), confirming

the need for countries to put market set-up in their priorities.

### **3.1.1.1. Public Policy and Policy-Making for SE in Portugal and the UK**

20% of UK's *social enterprises* have the public sector as main responsible for their income. Percentages increase to 59% if we refer to those with over £5 million turnover (SE UK, 2017). Having already constructed a solid path on public policy for *social entrepreneurship*, the UK policy focuses, just like in Portugal, on the wider context of *social economy* (McCabe & Hahn, 2006; Parente & Quintão, 2014). The UK is among the oldest welfare states in the world, particularly in post-war, with “*state [seen] as [the] direct service provider*” of welfare (Newman, 2001, p.13). However, some changes towards more market-oriented policies during the Thatcher period have partially redone this idea (Newman, 2001). The UK turned to the marketization of welfare provision (Aiken, 2006), and the state went from provider to purchaser of social services (Kendall, 2000).

The potential of *social enterprises* to tackle social exclusion was recognized in the 1990's (HM Treasury, 1999), but until 2000 no specific policies were produced, though it created an environment for the sector to advocate for more government support (Park & Wilding, 2013). *Social entrepreneurship* moved from the periphery to the centre of political concerns, after the 1997 election of the Labour Government and the introduction of Third Way (Haugh & Kitson, 2007), a critical shift in public governance and public policy (Newman, 2001). There was an interest in building capacity to provide services in certain areas (Kendall, 2000), and members from SEC took advantage of the Third Way policy drivers like competitiveness, modernisation and social inclusion, to secure more government support, leading to bottom-up policy-making (Park & Wilding, 2013).

Lobby from field practitioners and policy entrepreneurs inside the government (Aiken, 2006) helped take policy a step further in the second Blair government (Lyons, 2002). In 2001, the DTI created the SEU, and in the following year the social enterprise strategy was launched in agreement with the sector (Park & Wilding, 2013). The strategy provided a delimitation of social enterprise, intended to be a definition for policy-making purposes, and not for legal purposes (Bland, 2010). New funding partners facilitated this strategy (Alcock, 2010), helping create a normalization of *social entrepreneurship* (Carmel & Harlock, 2008).

Another paper by the Cabinet Office, “*Private Action, Public Benefit*”, help created the CIC legislation (Snaith, 2007). CIC’s were established in 2005, as an attempt to move *social enterprises* away from the third sector, and give them more flexibility to incorporate business-like features (Dunn & Riley, 2004). A year later, the SEU merged with ACD and formed the Office of the Third Sector. The move away from the DTI open *social entrepreneurship* to include the non-profit/voluntary sector (Park & Wilding, 2013). Park & Wilding (2013) argue that this increased the numbers of *social enterprises* in the UK, along with the government’s greater use of them as public services providers.

	1997-2000: Period 1	2001-2005: Period 2	2005-2010: Period 3	2010- : Period 4
	First Blair government	Second Blair government	Blair/Brown	Cameron/May
<b>Public Policy</b>	The Third Way	Strategy for Social Enterprise CIC Legislation	Our health, our care, our say (DH, 2006)	Big Society
<b>Main governmental department</b>	Treasury	DTI	Office of the Third Sector	Office for Civil Society
<b>Main policy partners/Policy tool</b>	Cooperatives and voluntary sector organizations/ Community development and contracting out	Voluntary sector organisations and social businesses/Contracting out	Earned-income for non-profits	VCSE
<b>Target beneficiaries</b>	Housing, social care, leisure centres, communities, work integration	Third sector as a whole	Third sector as a whole and NHS	Civil Society
<b>Policy field</b>	Business/voluntary sector	Business/voluntary sector	Voluntary sector/NHS	Business/voluntary sector
<b>Target problem</b>	Social exclusion/service provision	Service provision	Service provision/NHS inefficiency	Social cohesion

Table 2 – UK’s SE policy. Adapted from Park & Wilding (2013)

Also important was the expansion of the sector as service provider to the NHS – a new unit for *social enterprises* was created within the DH, in order to support workers who wish to leave the NHS and provide their services through these organizations (Park & Wilding, 2013).

In 2010, the new Conservative government launched the Big Society programme, which wanted to “*give citizens, communities and local government the power and information they need to come together, solve the problems they face*”. This meant more focus on VCSE, with *social enterprises* becoming more of an instrument than an end itself (Teasdale *et al.*, 2012). At this time, tensions arise between spending cuts and the drive to boost VCSE’s role as public service providers, as well as the need for state intervention, especially on the investment side (Blond, 2009; Singh, 2010).

The Portuguese history is much shorter, though. Before 2011, the IPSS and the cooperative

movement dominated the social sector. IPSS are non-profits who deliver social services, that can't be deliver by central government or local authorities (Segurança Social, 2018). They're an extension of the state, which is their only main financier, but also their main client (Parente & Quintão, 2014). Cooperatives growth (EC, 2014a), led to the creation of specific legislation and regulation like CASES (2010). CASES, for example, a “*public interest cooperative*”, was important to solidify the accountability and partnership between the state and social economy representatives (EC, 2014a).

In, 2010, the *Basic Law for Social Economy* was approved by the Portuguese parliament, setting the legal framework for *social economy*. The law establishes which organizations belong to the sector, but purposely leaves *social enterprises* out. It also sets the goals for social economy and some measures that should be taken to promote the sector, as well as establishing a satellite account for the social economy. The big issue, however, is that it's too general.

	<i>Before 2011: Period 1</i>	<i>2011-2015: Period 2</i>	<i>2005-2010: Period 3</i>
		Passos Coelho	Costa
<b>Public Policy</b>	IPSS legislation Co-operatives legislation	Portugal Inovação Social Lei de Bases da Economia Social	Portugal Inovação Social
<b>Main governmental department</b>	Ministério da Trabalho	Presidência do Conselho de Ministros	Presidência do Conselho de Ministros
<b>Main policy partners/Policy tool</b>	The third sector	Local government, private companies and foundations	Local government, private companies and foundations
<b>Target beneficiaries</b>	Third sector as a whole	Third sector as a whole/IIES	IIES
<b>Policy field</b>	Welfare policy	Social innovation policy	Social innovation policy
<b>Target problem</b>	Social welfare	Social welfare	Social welfare

Table 3 – Portugal's SE policy Based on Park & Wilding (2013) framework.

The shift towards more specific public policy for *social entrepreneurship* in Portugal happen under the leadership of Passes Coelho, when the government took the decision to use 150€ million of European funding in a program for social investment. In 2014, EMPIS was created under the umbrella of the Portuguese Cabinet Office. The mission would be to “*assure technical management and coordination of the execution of the initiative Portugal Social Innovation*”. PIS comprises 4 financial instruments, and aims to create a *social investment* market in Portugal (PIS, 2017). The initiative was set-up based on recommendations made by the *Portugal Social Investment Taskforce*. PIS also introduced for the first time government defined concepts like *social entrepreneurship*, *social innovation*, or *social investment*.

Regarding PIS, our exploratory research suggests two things. The first, that is currently the main and only government's policy tool directed at *social entrepreneurship*, more specifically at *social investment*. Taking this into consideration, other initiatives like proposing a specific legal form are not to be considered in the future. The second thing is that, cross-leadership continuity in terms of *social entrepreneurship* policy, and the promotion and development of policy itself, as much to do with the existence of policy entrepreneurs within Passos Coelho and Costa governments. Namely, the former and current Minister for the Cabinet Office.

## 3.2. Methodology

The research methodology to be adopted should be chosen according to the main research objectives and questions (Crabtree & Miller, 1999). Given that the research field of public policy and social entrepreneurship is yet in construction (Terjesen *et al.*, 2016), we choose qualitative research. Qualitative research is used when the topic is underdeveloped or at an early-stage (Stern, 1980). This type of research is inductive and exploratory, relies on using several data sources and the understanding the researcher makes of them, and allows a more holistic view of the problem to be developed (Creswell, 1998).

In the case, both primary data and secondary data are used. Primary data is original, collected by the researcher, for a specific research problem (Hox & Boeije, 2005), and As one of the main data collection methods used in qualitative research (Legard *et al.*, 2003), we used in-depth interviews to gather primary data. They were used in an exploratory perspective, to obtain further contextualization on the topic and help construct the next steps of this research. Primary data was also useful do determine which theoretical concepts would be relevant, and which secondary data should be collected for further analysis. This secondary data is all data previously collected by others or for a different initial purpose (Hox & Boeije, 2005). Secondary data collected for this investigation includes legislation, policy documents, reports, scientific articles, news articles, and speeches.

### 3.2.1. Data collection

This analysis focuses on public policy produced for *social entrepreneurship* in Portugal and the UK. Based on the literature review, we choose to refer only to *social entrepreneurship*. The concept allows us to be used as umbrella for others like *social enterprise* or *social innovation*. When referring to *public policy for social entrepreneurship*, we're also referring to policy that promotes *social enterprises* or *social innovation*.

By choosing two countries for this analysis, we developed a *cross-national comparative research study*, which provides “contextual framework”, and helps “*testing theories, drawing lessons about best practice [...], [and] gaining a better understanding of how social processes operate*» (Hantrais, 1999, p. 93).

The two cases – Portugal and the UK – were chosen based on their similarities but also their differences. Both Portugal and the UK are high income countries<sup>2</sup> and, until the Brexit vote, were both full members of the EU. Both countries have been mentioned as leading efforts on *social entrepreneurship* practices and environment and were considered by The Social Innovation Index two of the seven countries to actively stimulate *social innovation* through policy and institutional frameworks. Furthermore, the *social entrepreneurship* ecosystem in the UK, as well as its public policy for the sector, are one of the most well-developed in the world (The Economist, 2016). This means the UK is good candidate to help compare and analyse a less studied case, as is the Portuguese.

The research first step was to collect primary data. Semi structured interviews were conducted, audiotaped, and transcribed (Creswell, 1998). The interviewees were chosen by purposeful sampling, i.e. individuals were chosen based on their specific experiences (critical case sampling) or expertise (key informant sampling) (Miles & Huberman, 1994). This sampling method allowed us to select “*information-rich cases[...] from which we can learn a great deal about issues of central importance to the purpose of the research*” (Patton, 1990, p. 181).

	<b>Role</b>	<b>Institution</b>	<b>Type of Institution</b>	<b>Country</b>
A	Secretariat	UK NAB	Policy Advisory and Advocacy	UK
B	President	EMPIS	Public Institution	Portugal
C	Analyst for Public	Maze	Impact Investment Intermediary	Portugal

Table 4 – Interviews Data

Overall, we collected 3 interviews. The interviews were conducted personally, at place of the interviewees choice, or through Skype. Interviews were 30 to 60 minutes long. The interviews were recorded and then transcribe in order to be analysed. Each interview had protocol (Creswell, 1998) covering the following topics – the institution, the institution’s work and contribution, social entrepreneurship in country, and social entrepreneurship public policy.

Then we start collecting secondary data, with the help of information provided by primary data. We identified through archive and internet research all available policies that could

<sup>2</sup> GNI per capita of US\$12,000 or more (World Bank, 2018)

influence the development of any kind of *social entrepreneurship* initiative. All documents collected were then sampled according to the research needs. Since we're doing a national level analysis, only national-level policy was considered, while European and local policy were left out.

For the UK policy sample, we started by collecting documents from 2010-2018 available on the official government website (GOV.UK) under the categories *social enterprise* and *social investment*. We've refined the sample by excluding documents with repeated information or referring to policies already replaced by another ones. Data pre-2010 was collected based on literature references and official policy information provided by the government. Since we were able to establish the temporal starting point of sector-specific policy-making in 2002 (*Social Enterprise: a strategy for success*), data previous was not considered for this sample.

For the Portuguese policy sample, it wasn't possible to establish such starting point, thus, and based on literature and primary data, we've considered all policies potentially influencing *social entrepreneurship*. Data collected spans from 1976 (constitutional recognition of cooperatives) to current days. All documents can be found across official government webpages, such as *Diário da República Electrónico*.

The following documents were collected:

	<i>UK</i>	<i>Portugal</i>
Consultation Guide	22	-
Correspondence	1	-
Evaluation report	10	-
Guide	25	1
Legislation	8	22
Official Webpage	12	1
Policy paper	41	-
Policy paper/Guide	2	6
Press release	58	1
Regulation	1	1
Research	16	-
Speech	17	-
<i>Total</i>	199	32

*Table 5 - Data sample characteristics*

All data was catalogued according to document's name, type of document, institution

responsible for the document and/or policy, year, and country ([Appendix 1](#) and [Appendix 2](#)).

**3.2.2. Data analysis**

We used the Gioia methodology for data analysis, which is based on inductive grounded theory, and relies on a well-constructed research question, several data sources, and semi-structured interviews (Gioia *et al.*, 2012). The three-step procedure was followed in order to identify (i) general first-order categories, (ii) second-order themes, and (iii) aggregate dimensions.

In the first step of the analysis, to identify the first-order categories, we used the qualitative software NVIVO, in order to keep track of all emerging categories, and start coding. The first information collected at this stage was used to answer to *RQ1*

After gathering all possible scopes found in data, we draw a word cloud for each country, to better help determine which concept(s) were dominant. After that, we went back to the theoretical part and developed the following classification:

<b>Concepts</b>	<b>Classification</b>
<i>social entrepreneurship, social enterprise, social innovation, social entrepreneur, social business, social investor, social investment, impact investment, impact measurement, investment readiness, impact philanthropy, mission-led business, IIES, social finance, social venture, VCSE</i>	Primary public policy
<i>social economy, third sector, sustainable development, co-operative, foundation, IPSS, mutual, non-profit, social challenge, social change, social impact, social issue, social value, social problem, social purpose, social action, social sector, socially responsible investment, voluntary sector</i>	Secondary public policy
None of the above terms were found	Tertiary public policy

*Table 6 - Public Policy Scope (Author)*

In some cases, policies encompass more than one of the previous categories. When this happens, only the highest category is considered, i.e. if a policy refers both to *social economy* (secondary public policy) and *social enterprises* (primary public policy), we consider it to be

*primary public policy*. Furthermore, and despite not mentioning it directly, the scope of policy related to CIC was considered to be *social enterprise*.

After the first step, we reduced the number of first-order categories, to second-order themes so that we can better work (Gioia *et al.*, 2012). In the second order analysis we tried to establish similarities between the previous categories. Axial coding was performed (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) with the help of in-development data and existing literature (Gioia *et al.*, 2012).

In the third step, we move towards creating aggregate dimensions from the second-order themes. Once again, we relied on previous theory to build a data structure that shows how different categories, themes and dimensions relate to each other (Gioia *et al.*, 2012).

Finally, we develop a conceptual framework based on the data structure and systematize all the findings, as well as discussing them, answering *RQ2*.

#### 4. Findings and Discussion

One of the aspects demonstrated by our analysis is that a gap exists between what is the Portuguese policy and the UK policy for *social entrepreneurship*. In the UK only, we were able to identify almost 100 policy initiatives, even if we exclude existing legal forms, advisory and research initiatives, evaluation reports and public consultations. While for the Portuguese case, the number wouldn't even reach 20.

Building our data structure was only possible with the inclusion of the UK case, due to its development level. UK's policy allowed us to identify every 1<sup>st</sup> order category from our data structure. Thus, the Portuguese case presented itself more as a validation mechanism, rather than a theory builder. There was no category found in Portuguese policy that we couldn't identify in the UK case. The other way around is not true; Portuguese policy lacks some of the identified categories in UK policy

We have identified 4 aggregate dimensions – *Policy-Making for Social Entrepreneurship*, *Government Action for Social Entrepreneurship*, *Social Entrepreneurship Legitimacy*, and *Social Entrepreneurship Sustainability*. The last two dimensions are not novelty. They validate some of *social entrepreneurship's* challenges identified in literature, and it is proof governments are addressing them. The first dimension is also not entirely new, and follows the process described before – outsiders advise policy, the government acts as decision-maker, and policy is implemented. The difference is that we were able to develop and deepen the process. Finally, the fourth dimension is perhaps the novelty, and it can be described as the way governments engage regarding *social entrepreneurship* public policy.




Figure 1 – Data Structure

#### 4.1. Policy-Making for SE

Regardless of the sector we're referring to, the first step is always to start developing policy to be implemented. Given the novelty of the phenomenon being addressed, well-informed policy is key to help leverage the *social entrepreneurship* sector. Building a *policy knowledge-base* requires, for example, *identifying good practices* in both civil society and within the sector, as well as *identifying the problems*. We can find this practice whether in a strategy document, or legislation itself. In Portugal, the latter is more common because, for example, strategy documents are non-existent.

Other way of building knowledge is by promoting *policy research and advisory*. In the UK, advisory groups have been set-up to contribute with policy recommendations for issues like better support for mission-led business or on how individuals can make social impact with their investments. Here, the government tends to *engage with stakeholders*, specially within the sector. Different representatives are invited to these groups, which run for a short period of time, and finish with report containing their insights. *Sector contribution to policy* is specially important if the government wants to avoid being disconnected with the *social entrepreneurship* reality. In Portugal, we know that, when a certain legislation is created, it identifies which stakeholders have been heard. Also, one of the competencies of bodies like CNES or CASES is to advise on *social economy* policy, though there aren't publicly available outcomes from these actions. Apart from these, the Portuguese government doesn't engage in any other official policy advisory initiative.

This is also true if we look into *policy research*. It is unknown if the Portuguese government produces or incentivates it. In the UK, both advisory groups, and the government itself, through policy papers like *Private Action, Public Benefit*, engage in *policy research*. Moreover, the UK government initiated several *public consultations* on issues like charities audit, new policy directions for Big Lottery Fund, or even its civil society strategy. While *public consultation* is a widely used tool in UK, it has become key to gather precious insights on *social entrepreneurship*.

Finally, we have *policy evaluation and impact measurement*, which is both at the beginning and at the end of the policy-making cycle. *Evaluation* is both applied to existing policy as well as newly introduced one. *Impact measurement*, on the other side, is usually made during and at

the end of policy implementation, as it helps to understand if goals or metrics previously established are being met. This step is crucial to understand what is working or not, what still needs to be done, as well as improve overall policy efficiency. For example, the UK government establishes very specific metrics like measuring the increase in number of *social enterprises* or people's awareness on the subject, in establish the success of the *Social enterprise action plan: Scaling new heights*.

The fact is, in UK, “*by law, all public bodies are required to assess the impact that changes to policies, procedures and practices could have on different equalities*”, showing two things. One is that, the way things have been done as a great influence on how new phenomena are approached. The second is that, one of the reasons the UK policy is so developed it's because of its culture of constant monitoring and improvement. Which can't be said about the Portugal. If policy evaluation and impact measurement exist, it's not widely available to the public. Although, this is not itself an issue for policy monitoring, it creates an accountability and transparency problem. We have no follow-up on policies like *INOV-Social*, the application of *Fundo de Restruturação Social*, or the financial instruments of PIS.

This question is not so important if we talk about policy models that have been previously used, like creating a sector-specific day, or if a policy recommendation is implemented. However, it's a requisite if the government wants to replace a policy for an improved one, or it want to know if an innovative policy, which has no track-record what so ever, works. *Big Society Capital* is good example of that. Being an innovative enterprise (world's first social investment wholesaler) which has raised many questions when it was announced (Timmins, 2011), probably had its success (O'Donohoe, 2014) benefiting from several progress updates from the British government on the growth of the social investment market.

After all, *evaluating policy*, especially if implies some kind of innovation, can be very important for others looking forward to using the same tools. Portugal, for example, was the first country to ever apply *European funding* to social investment. Having a measurement of impact for this initiative could be the right incentive for others to use the same mechanisms.

This type of *cross-borders policy* is usually beneficial, especially if we're talking of a recent or an underdeveloped issue like *social entrepreneurship*. Through literature, we know that counties like South Korea have looked into well-developed public policies like the UK's, to





Figure 3 – Portugal's Policy Scope

Even if we agree that some of the previous terms are synonyms, it's clear the overall scope of Portuguese policy is much smaller than the UK's. And unlike the UK, the main scope of public policy for *social entrepreneurship* is *IPSS*. Is not surprising given the role of these institutions in the government's social welfare policy. The fact is Portuguese policy does not refer to *social enterprises* but rather to *social entrepreneurship*, *social innovation* or *IIES*. The expression *social enterprise* is only used twice in two financial instrument's applicant guides. The usage seems more of a language crutch, than a policy scope. This way, the government distances itself from commit *social entrepreneurship* within any specific organizational type. The use of *IIES* term also shows that the government chooses to refer to initiatives and projects, rather than organizations or the people who development them. Besides, it's possible to observe that, despite *social economy* still being a dominant scope, recent policy as shown a move towards *social entrepreneurship* and *social innovation*. This means a shift towards a government which expects social problems to be address by the civil society in a more innovative and sustainable way. And while no social problem is off limits, many *policies are specifically designing to target* young people and children, aging population, employment, environment and sustainability, health improvement, people with disabilities, local communities, as well as social welfare and cohesion.

#### 4.2. Government Action for SE

The governments' expectations mentioned above regarding *social entrepreneurship* are

commonly stated in policy documents. We've establish that, the most frequently mentioned *outcomes expect from social entrepreneurship* are *innovation, long-term sustainability, and a cross with traditional business*. As matter of fact, and while not explicitly, we could say that growing social entrepreneurship *acquisition of traditional business tools* is not only an end, but also a mean towards already mentioned outcomes, as well more *autonomy, empowerment, efficiency, and democracy*. Furthermore, *governments expect some kind of return* when they invest their capabilities in policy-making for *social entrepreneurship*. It's clear that *social entrepreneurship* is a tool for governments to improve *public sector efficiency* and *cut on public expense*.

This type of clarification can be very important when establishing a well-functioning relationship between the public sector, the *social entrepreneurship* sector, and overall civil society. Hence, the importance of governments to *clarify their role and strategy*. All stakeholders should be aware of the scope of governments' intervention, as well as how it intends to pursue it. On the managerial side, this information grants a higher perspective towards stability and allows long-term planning. Governments' strategies don't have to be limited to specific policy papers and can also be included in other type of documents, such as legislation itself.

In that sense, the UK government has been a pioneer, and has been working on this regard since 2002, when it first published *Private Action, Public Benefit*, which is known to have originated the CIC and CIO legislation. It also published *Social enterprise - Strategy for Success*, which not only presented the government's definition for *social enterprise* but established a policy agenda as well as identifying good practices in the sector. Since then, strategy documents have been a common tool among different political leaderships. Just take the examples of *Partnership in Public Services: An action plan for third sector involvement* in 2006, still during the Labour Government, or even *Building a stronger civil society - a strategy for VCSE's* (2010), and *Social investment: a force for social change - UK Strategy* (2016), all produced by Conservative governments. Some of these documents are as detailed as including dates and targets for strategy implementation, as well as responsible organizations. This type of commitment from the UK government is not new, however. In 1998, *The Compact on Relations between Government and the Voluntary and Community Sector in England* (or simply *The Compact*) set the framework agreement for how the government and the sector should work together. In recent years, it has been extended to include *social enterprises*, changing its scope

the *VCSE*.

In Portugal, no strategic documents have been produced. As stated before, the *social entrepreneurship* movement is market-led, hence the absence of this type of steering. While the government's main role at this moment is to establish and develop the *social investment* market, and policies are currently in place to achieve this, no further specification on future action is made. Still, both the *Basic Law for Social Economy* and *Decree n.º 120/2015* establish how the partnerships with the social sector and social economy should be done. *Decree n.º 172-A/2014* goes further in affirming that the state should move from a tutelage role to a partner role.

In general, *partnerships with civil society* are very important for governments being able to develop, implement and manage public policy. In the case of *social entrepreneurship*, a lot of expertise lays outside the public sector, becoming crucial for the state to leverage it. For example, academia can help create skills development programmes or help grow research on *social entrepreneurship*. In the UK, ICRF, P2P Impact Fund, and IRF are funded by the Cabinet Office and managed by SIB, an organization that manages one of the largest social investment portfolios in the country. This interaction model is widely used for funds, grants and other instruments in *social investment* involving government funding. In Portugal, financial instruments from PIS, also use this method. *Social investment* is the policy area which tends to include more types of partnerships, whether it's with the financial sector, intermediaries, social investors, or even local government.

Local government, on its side, was revealed to have an extremely important role on driving *social entrepreneurship*. Being closer to communities and best understanding their problems, local authorities find themselves on the eye of the hurricane. They're the ones quicker reach individuals and groups in need of help. Hence, the central government recognizing the need to *decentralise competencies* and funding. In the UK, this trend was made clear in the *Social enterprise action plan*. As for Portugal, and regarding PIS financial instruments, city councils and parish councils also find themselves in the role of social investors. Facing funding cuts and lack of response from central government, they look to *social entrepreneurship* and *social investment* as an innovative solution to the problems they wish to address.

In fact, the government's institutional engagement to apply public policy, goes much beyond than just partnering with external actors. In the UK, the government counts on its own

staff to engage in *social entrepreneurship within the public sector*. Programmes like *Pathfinder mutual* and the *Mutuals Support Fund* “*help staff-led mutual organisations set up and spin out from the public sector*”, while still delivering public services and creating social impact.

Other bodies and organizations, though government-sponsored, are already born outside the state. These *spin-offs* while still compromised with the public policy, are autonomous organizations, with legal personality, and under the same accountability principals as any other enterprise. These bodies and organizations tend to provide funding, like *Big Society Capital* (UK), or FRSS (Portugal), give support to *social entrepreneurship* initiatives, like CASES, or even establish themselves as permanent advisory and representative bodies, like CNES.

The governmental body responsible for creating these initiatives tends to vary, according to the policy scope. FRSS and CASES, which cover *social economy*, were created through Ministry of Labour and Welfare legislation. On the other hand, CNES was put forward by the Portuguese Cabinet Office, and *Big Society Capital* was promoted by its British counterpart. It's clear that both Cabinet Offices are leading the efforts on *social entrepreneurship public policy*, being responsible for many of the initiatives. This choice allows governments to better coordinate this policy area, as it features wide *cross-government cooperation*. Due to the hybrid nature of *social entrepreneurship* and its intervention on different issues, other governmental departments like those responsible for labour, treasury, trade, health, and even foreign policy, are required to give their contribution. In Portugal, the *social investment* initiative PIS is under the umbrella of the Cabinet Office. However, it counts on the Ministry of Justice or the Ministry of Education to determine the goals *IIES* are required to achieve under initiatives like the Social Impact Bonds.

In the UK, where the level of policy development is more advance, a *specific department for social entrepreneurship* exists. The SEU was first created within DTI, which implies a more business-driven view by the government. The SEU was to “*act as the focal point for this co-ordination and [...] assist the development and implementation of new policies and programmes*”. Later, it became part of the Cabinet Office, gaining a pivotal role, first under the name of Office for the Third Sector, then changing to Office for Civil Society. In 2016, the office moved again, this time to the DDCMS. Concerns existed on the side of the social enterprise lobby regarding the peripheral role of DDCMS and what that meant for OCS (Wilding, 2016). However, that didn't shine thorough policy. Furthermore, a SEU was set up

by the DH, to support the development of *social enterprises* in health services delivery. Needless to say, no such initiative yet exists in Portugal.

The OCS, “*responsible for policy relating to young people, volunteers, charities, social enterprises and public service mutual*”, consistently *shares information and guidance* with the organizations under its responsibility, as well as *informing on its policies*. As we’ve discussed before, *accountability and transparency* are needed if the public sector wishes to build a solid and fruitful relationship with the civil society. Moreover, when new policies, and especially innovative policies, are implemented, it is likely that social enterprises and other similar organizations don’t know how to use them. Portuguese and English policy initiative are equipped with extensive guidance on how to take advantage of them. But government guidance can go far beyond its more obvious forms. For example, when the Conservative leadership prepared to make big spending cuts (BBC, 2010), the government helped local authorities and VCSE’s prepare, with the publication of two guides, *Exposure of VCSE to Cuts in Public Funding* and *Better Together - Preparing for local spending cuts to the VCSE sector*.

In the UK, it’s relatively easy to find all necessary information. The government makes available all policies (and not just for *social enterprises* or *social investment*) through its webpages, as well as publishing comprehensive documents informing on all policies developed within a certain period (*2010 to 2015 government policy: social enterprise*). In Portugal, information is scarce, which makes it difficult for the government to be completely accountable and transparent.

#### **4.3. SE Legitimacy**

*Information sharing* also plays an important part on giving *official recognition* to the *social entrepreneurship* sector, thus contributing to build its legitimacy. Many documents provided by governments are accompanied by *official definitions* of realities like *social enterprise*, *social investment*, *social entrepreneurship*, *social innovation*, or *social impact*. Definitions like this, at the same time they clarify stakeholders, they also inform on what is expected from them. Governments can also offer their *sponsorship to a concept definition* establish by a civil society actor, or even state their *positioning regarding one specific matter or subject*.

*Recognition* is also made by bringing in the *sector to government action*. While both countries do it, they do it in different ways. In Portugal, representatives gather in CNES, which has among its responsibilities to propose legislation and debate issues regarding *social economy*. In the UK, the OCS Strategic Partners funds 8 VCSE responsible not only for “*represent the sector to government*”, but also for “*support partners to become independent*” and “*run training and development activities*”. The type of interaction is much more comprehensive and aims to produce very specific results beyond just simple representation.

As mentioned before, these partners often propose new legislation and regulation for the sector, like the *Charities Act* (UK) or the *Basic Law for Social Economy* (Portugal). In Portugal, even the constitution contains references to the *social economy* and social welfare. But sometimes what happens is, instead of governments introducing new regulation, they *improve on what already exists*, or engage in *removing unnecessary bureaucracy*. The *Red Tape Challenge* in the UK aimed to do just that. As it came to force, it opened up the opportunity for the civil society to contribute with ideas to cut red tape, many of them being implemented after.

But perhaps the most innovative type of legislation is the introduction of *specific legal forms* like the CIC, a type of *social enterprise* which uses its profits and assets for the public good. CIC’s are not charities, combining typical for-profit features with special features for community benefit, and even having a special regulator. The UK is one of the few countries in the world to have this type of legal framework. Other countries like Portugal (and even the UK) still have their organizations using *traditional legal forms* like charities, mutuals, cooperatives, for-profit, or a combination of the previous. Even so, because most of these legal forms are used for social welfare initiatives, they usually come with special *tax reliefs*, though fiscal incentives like CITR or those associated with Social Impact Bonds can also be used to promote *social investment*.

The last step on granting full *legitimacy* to social entrepreneurship is by *raising awareness* for the sector. The policy strategies identified do not differ very much from what we usually see being made in other areas. First of all, it is required that the governments consistently *gather data and evidence*, for better understanding the phenomenon and its characteristics, which can also be useful to measure the sector, and help build policy agendas. Governments can help build *awareness campaigns*, *promote public debate* on the issue, and even given its *sponsorship to*

*good practices* within the sector. And while the UK as promote several of these, such as the *Social Investment Research Council*, the *Social Investment Awards*, the *Buy Social Corporate Challenge*, or the *Social Enterprise Day*, no similar activities of this kind exist Portugal. Thus, we're able to say that *raising awareness for social entrepreneurship* does not constitute a priority of the Portuguese government.

#### **4.4. SE Sustainability**

Finally, we look into the fourth dimension, *sustainability*, which incorporates *capacity-building*, *social investment market set-up* and *market development*. These are perhaps the most predictable themes, as we've previously identified them all in the literature. In that sense, the activities in which the governments engage in this dimension have been well documented.

We can conclude that there is a big commitment from the Portuguese government with *setting-up a social investment market* in the country. Portugal went as further as having *regulation for the social investment market*, though it only establishes goals but not mechanisms. Unlike other dimensions, this one checks all boxes, with innovative initiatives being put forward. *Capacity-building* on its side is definitely not a government concern, although PIS financial instruments *promotion of outcomes-based commissioning*. *Capacity-build* is more in the expertise of the private sector than of the government.

*Social investment* is also a key issue for the UK government, as we've seen before. By 2016, there were already 32 Social Impact Bonds in the UK, many of them having drawn financing thanks to the *Dormants Account Act*. Yet, the British also put a lot of emphasis on *capacity-building and market development*. In the UK, the public sector provides not only services but also vast funding to promote *skills development*, *infrastructure building*, *network development*, or *voluntary action*. *Market development*, on its side, is heavily driven by improvements in public procurement like removing barriers to entry or providing training both to commissioners and *social enterprises*.

#### **4.5. The SE Policy Framework**

In short, we developed a *policy framework for social entrepreneurship* (Figure 4) which comprises four important dimensions: *policy-making, government action, legitimacy, and sustainability*.

First, the government *engages with stakeholders*, through *public consultation and sector contributions*, in order to build a *policy knowledge-base*. The knowledge base is constituted by “bricks” like *good practice and problem identification, policy research and advisory, and policy evaluation and impact measurement*. Based on this, *policy recommendations are implemented*, and further knowledge is used to *improve existing policies* or create *innovative models*. Policies are developed based on their *scope and target population* and can be influenced by *cross-borders policy-making* like *European funding and/or legislation, the inclusion of international standards and international cooperation initiatives*.

No policy-making or public policies are implemented without specific *government action*. To support this action, government tend to *define their strategy and role* regarding *social entrepreneurship*, which is also helpful to determine *government expected outcomes for and from entrepreneurship*. Then, the government needs to commit with *institutional engagement* to develop, implement and manage public policy. This is accomplished by having the public sector interacting with the civil society by *establishing partnerships to implement and manage policy*, by *decentralising competencies* to local authorities, by *promoting cross-government action*, by *creating a sector-specific department, spin-off organizations and bodies* to operate independently, and even *allowing social entrepreneurship within the public sector*. *Institutional engagement* can only be successfully achieved if the government commits with *accountability and transparency*, by *sharing official information, guidance and letting the public know which policies are being implemented*.

Finally, specific public policy can have fall into one of two categories: *social entrepreneurship legitimacy or sustainability*. *Legitimacy* is achieved by *officially recognize* the sector through *defining concepts or sponsoring outside definitions*, having the sector represented in *government action* or *making an official position regarding any social entrepreneurship issue*; by *raising awareness through awards giving, data and evidence collection, official government sponsorship to private initiative, public debate promotion* and other *any type of campaigns*; and by *producing legislation and regulation* for the sector like *legal forms, tax incentives* or even *bureaucracy removal*. On its side, *sustainability* can be

achieved by *building capacity through providing suitable governance mechanisms, requiring accountability and transparency, promoting network development, incentivising voluntary action, helping develop skills, providing and promote the supply of business support and incubation, as well as contributing to infrastructure development; by developing the market for SE through public procurement, outcomes-based commissioning and increasing demand; and by setting-up a social investment market through establishing awarding criteria, legislation and regulation of social investment, direct social investment or supply increase of social investment financing, promote intermediaries, and help social entrepreneurship become investment ready.*




Figure 4 - SE Policy Framework

## 5. Conclusion

The goal of this study is to put forward a more comprehensive analysis on the subject by looking at the full collection of public policy produced by the governments of two countries, and answer the following research questions – *RQ1: What is the scope of public policy in each country?* and *RQ2: How are governments in each country approaching public policy?* Specifically, this problem is analysed through the Portuguese and UK cases. Portugal and the UK were chosen due to their social-economic context and due to the fact they are part of a group of seven countries in the world who actively stimulate *social innovation* through policy and institutional frameworks (The Economist, 2016). To the purpose, primary and secondary data was gathered, namely interviews to sector experts and policy document from Portugal and the UK,

This is a study important to conduct for many reasons:

First, *social entrepreneurship* is born when market failure and inefficient public policy are unable to deal with social issues (Santos, 2012). After its first surge with the cooperative and mutuals movement in the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Bland, 2010), and with a new boost with the social movements from the 1970's and 1980's (Defourny & Nyssens, 2010), *social entrepreneurship* has been ever since a subject of great interest.

Second, researchers interest, who've identified the need for further theory building (Santos, 2012), and are currently in ongoing debates over what makes of *social entrepreneurship* (Dacin *et al.*, 2011). From traditional business, which increasingly have social impact as their core strategy (Mennel & Wong, 2015), and look at organizations within *social entrepreneurship* for more sustainable models of doing business (Haigh & Hoffman, 2012).

Third, policy-makers interest, who find themselves obliged to rethink public policy and regulation on several levels to accommodate this new phenomenon and give it legitimacy (Battilana & Lee, 2014).

Also, *social entrepreneurs* and their organizations face challenges like legitimacy issues towards markets, state and community, legislation and regulation, business support, human capital, access to financing, trade-offs and mission-drifts or market access (EC, 2018; Ramus & Vaccaro, 2017; Wildmannová, 2017). These troubled context, enhances the relevance of

government as stakeholder and demonstrates shows its key role on helping solve many of these problems (Park & Wilding, 2013; Seelos & Mair, 2005). As a provider of social welfare and redistributor of wealth (Gruber, 2005), the state is forced to engage in public policy, which should be effective in the long-term, efficient, and focusing on what's good, what works, and keeps learning as it progresses (Curtain, 2001).

The relationship between public policy and *social enterprises* has been explored before (Jones *et al.*, 2007; Laville *et al.*, 2006), but studies tends to concentrate on legal issues (Rawhouser *et al.*, 2015;). Existing work focuses on very specific parts of government influence (Eldar, 2017; Loosemore, 2016; Mazzei & Roy, 2017; Park *et al.*, 2017; Roper & Cheney, 2005; Shah, 2009), but suffers from lack of further research and consistent findings and generalization (Terjesen *et al.*, 2016), a gap this study intended to cover.

To discover this issue, and by comparing two countries' public policy of social entrepreneurship, we were able to:

First, answer *RQ1*, establishing that different policy scopes predominate in the two countries. In the UK, what we call *primary public policy* is the key focus of government, with policy initiatives mainly aimed at *social investment*, *social enterprises* and *VCSE*. This means that the UK government is mainly concerned with organizations and their mechanisms to develop and scale. It also confirms the suggested idea that the British government values the business-like side of these institutions. On its side, Portugal still holds a majority of *secondary public policy*, especially regarding *social economy* and *IPSS*, which constitute the state's main service providers. Nevertheless, recent data reveals that Portugal is moving towards developing *primary public policy* focused on *social entrepreneurship*, *social investment*, and *social innovation*. This means that the Portuguese government is more interested in promoting sustainable solutions for social problems, rather than the organizational side of *social entrepreneurship*.

Second, answer *RQ2*, determining how each government creates and develops public policy. Despite different scopes, public policy dynamics, we argue, are rather the same in both countries. While having their specific goals, all policies are aimed at either improving *social entrepreneurship legitimacy* or *sustainability*. In this case, legitimacy is achieved by official recognition, given by the government through concept definition or sector representation, by

legislation and regulation for social entrepreneurship, and by raising awarded through campaigns, awards, research, sponsorship, and public debate. Of course, the way public policy and policy-making are done has much to do with the national political system and culture. In the UK, public consultations and policy evaluation and impact measurement are present, and even mandatory, across all public departments and institutions. This indicates that, what has been done before has a great influence on the government's approach to on a new policy area. Unfortunately, this also means that, if a category is not present in Portuguese policy, we can't be certain if it's because has yet to be developed, or if it's because it's specific to the UK context, making the category unsuitable for a universal policy framework. We've seen then that, for the specific case of Portugal and the UK, relevant differences exist, especially at policies' development level. While both countries have advanced and well implemented initiatives on social investment market set-up, only the UK checks every box from the conceptual framework. And not only fills all the standards, but shows all themes proved to have solid policy initiatives. Because of that we're able to say that UK's public policy for social entrepreneurship is at a mature level.

The same can't be said about Portugal. If we look at each dimension of Portuguese policy, we're able to state that while the social investment component is made of mature policy initiatives, the same can't be said about institutional engagement, which at a growing level, or about awareness raising and strategic engagement, with early-stage development. We could this is related to the priorities of the Portuguese government and how it looks at social entrepreneurship. By prioritizing *social innovation*, the government focuses on mechanisms that enable it, like social investment, but disregard themes like a specific legal form for social enterprises. This disparity makes it difficult to classify the Portuguese as a whole, though we can consider it between an emerging phase and a growing phase, depending on the dimension you look at.

Finally, based on our analysis, we've proposed a policy framework made of four dimensions: policy-making, government action, social entrepreneurship legitimacy and social entrepreneurship sustainability. First of all, we establish the process of policy-making for social entrepreneurship, which involves stakeholder engagement, building policy knowledge, defining policies' target and scope, cooperating internationally, and define to ways of implementing policy. The second part of the all process is about action taken by the government to materialize policy. This includes defining the strategy and the role of the public sector, establish

partnerships with civil society, engage in cross-government action, decentralise competencies to local authorities, create a sector specific department or spin-off organizations and bodies, which should operate independently. Also, at this stage, public institutions should be concerned with providing guidance and informing the public, not only on government policy, but also on expected outcome for and from social entrepreneurship.

### **5.1. Managerial and Theoretical Implications**

Terjesen *et al.* (2016) had already complained about the lack of consistent findings and generalization regarding public policy for social entrepreneurship. Furthermore, policy frameworks proposed by independent organization (Agapitova *et al.*, 2017; GECES, 2016; Noya, 2013; OECD, 2010; Thomley *et al.*, 2011; Wolk, 2007) are not only simplistic and fail to explain how dimensions interact between themselves, but also they're based on a unrepresentative sample of one or two policy initiatives from a very small group of countries. In that sense, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first qualitative research that a more comprehensive approach on the subject, by analysing the whole of public policy and policy-making of two national units. Thus, it significantly contributes to the theory, as now such perspective exists in literature.

The study also contributes to show how the way government look at social entrepreneurship defines the scope of public policy, as well as the dimensions in which it engages. By establishing a framework, it allows social entrepreneurs to get better knowledge on the process, which could help them understand their own role, possible areas of intervention, as well as giving them tools for stability and long-term planning, by predicting to a certain level the government's behaviour. It also allows policy-maker, who wish to improve some aspect of their own national policy, to understand and identify possible areas of intervention. Finally, and given relative degree of success the social entrepreneurship sector and the government's contribution to that success, insight could be taken to apply in other fields of public policy.

### **5.2. Limitations and Future Research**

The first limitation is the sample. The analysis is limited to two countries, which could

skew the results, and could prevent us from identifying possible categories that, some for reason, are not present in Portugal and the UK. For example, we know through literature that Korea build its social entrepreneurship policy through policy transfer (Park *et al.*, 2017). However, we were not able to identify this mechanism in the sample of this study. Hence the need to add more countries to a future analysis, as well as allowing for a bigger refining of the framework. The interview sample also lack representativity, as no filed practitioner or member of legislative bodies were heard.

The second limitation is the qualitative nature of this study. Analysis and result interpretation in qualitative research's is very much limited by the researcher's personal interpretation of the data. A re-evaluation of the data by other researches could result in different conclusions. Also, the analysis does not validate if this conceptual framework is specific to social entrepreneurship public policy and policy-making, or if it can be used other policy areas.

Furthermore, this study does not explore the regional differences within countries hinted by literature (Roy *et al.*, 2015). We also lack knowledge of initiatives at European level, and what influence do they have in national units. As such, comparisons with data from countries outside Europe could be useful. In the USA, discourses on social entrepreneurship vary (Hulgård, 2010), which could influence the way policy is done.

## 6. Appendixes

### Appendix 1 – Portugal’s Data Sample

#	Document's Name	Type of Document	Institution	Year	Country	Notes
1	Constituição República Portuguesa	Legislation	Assembleia Constituinte	1976	Portugal	
2	Estatuto das IPSS e Misericórdias (Decreto-Lei nº 119/83)	Legislation	Presidência do Conselho de Ministros	1983	Portugal	
3	Dispensa de Escritura para IPSS (Decreto-Lei nº 402/85)	Legislation	Ministério do Trabalho e Segurança Social	1985	Portugal	Change to DL nº 119/83
4	Regimes Isenções das IPSS (Decreto-Lei nº 9/85)	Legislation	Presidência do Conselho de Ministros	1985	Portugal	Change to DL nº 119/83
5	Código das Associações Mutualistas (Decreto-Lei n.º 72/90)	Legislation	Ministério do Emprego e Segurança Social	1990	Portugal	
6	Estatuto Fiscal Cooperativo (Lei n.º 85/98)	Legislation	Assembleia da República	1998	Portugal	
7	INOV-Social (RCM n.º 112/2009)	Legislation	Presidência do Conselho de Ministros	2009	Portugal	
8	Conselho Nacional para a Economia Social (RCM n.º 55/2010)	Legislation	Presidência do Conselho de Ministros	2010	Portugal	
9	Cooperativa António Sérgio para a Economia Social	Legislation	Presidência do Conselho de Ministros	2010	Portugal	
10	Programa de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento da Economia Social (PADES) (RCM n.º 16/2010)	Legislation	Presidência do Conselho de Ministros	2010	Portugal	
11	Revisão da composição e o funcionamento do Conselho Nacional para a Economia Social (RCM n.º 103/2012)	Legislation	Presidência do Conselho de Ministros	2012	Portugal	

12	Fundo de Reestruturação do Setor Solidário (Decreto-Lei n.º 165-A/2013)	Legislation	Ministério da Solidariedade, Emprego e Segurança Social	2013	Portugal	
13	Lei de Bases da Economia Social (Lei n.º 30/2013)	Legislation	Assembleia da República	2013	Portugal	
14	Glossário do Portugal Inovação Social	Official Webpage	Conselho de Ministros/Estrutura de Missão do Portugal Inovação Social	2014	Portugal	
15	Operacionalização do funcionamento do Fundo de Reestruturação do Setor Social (Portaria n.º 31/2014)	Legislation	Ministério da Solidariedade, Emprego e Segurança Social	2014	Portugal	
16	Portugal Inovação Social (RCM n.º 73-A/2014)	Legislation	Presidência do Conselho de Ministros	2014	Portugal	
17	Reformulação da definição de IPSS devido à Lei de Bases da Economia Social (Decreto-Lei n.º 172-A/2014)	Legislation	Ministério da Solidariedade, Emprego e Segurança Social	2014	Portugal	Change to DL n.º 119/83
18	Clarificação do Financiamento do Fundo de Reestruturação do Setor Solidário (Decreto-Lei n.º 44/2015)	Legislation	Ministério da Solidariedade, Emprego e Segurança Social	2015	Portugal	Change to DL n.º 165-A/2013
19	Código Cooperativo (Lei n.º 119/2015)	Legislation	Assembleia da República	2015	Portugal	Revokes Lei n.º 51/96   Specific sectorial legislation existis
20	Princípios orientadores e o enquadramento a que deve obedecer a cooperação entre o Estado e as entidades do setor social e solidário (Decreto-Lei n.º 120/2015)	Legislation	Ministério da Solidariedade, Emprego e Segurança Social	2015	Portugal	

21	Regime Jurídico do Investimento em Empreendedorismo Social (Lei n.º 18/2015)	Legislation	Assembleia da República	2015	Portugal	
22	Regulamento do Investimento em Empreendedorismo Social (Regulamento da CMVM n.º 3/2015)	Regulation	CMVM	2015	Portugal	
23	Introdução de Ajustamentos ao Fundo de Reestruturação do Setor Solidário (Decreto-Lei n.º 68/2016)	Legislation	Ministério da Solidariedade, Emprego e Segurança Social	2016	Portugal	Change to DL n.º 165-a/2013
24	Programa de Parcerias para o Impacto 2016 - Concurso para apresentação de candidaturas	Policy paper/Guide	Conselho de Ministros/Programa Operacional de Inclusão Social e Emprego	2016	Portugal	
25	Títulos Impacto Social 2016 - Concurso para apresentação de candidaturas	Policy paper/Guide	Conselho de Ministros/Programa Operacional de Inclusão Social e Emprego; Instituto da Segurança Social; Direção Geral de Saúde; Centro de Estudos Judiciários; Direção Geral de Reinserção e dos Serviços Prisionais and Instituto do Emprego e Formação Profissional	2016	Portugal	
26	Fundo para a Inovação Social (Resolução do Conselho de Ministros n.º 157/2017)	Legislation	Presidência do Conselho de Ministros	2017	Portugal	
27	Incentivo fiscal para Títulos de Impacto Social	Press release	Conselho de Ministros/Estrutura de Missão do Portugal Inovação Social	2017	Portugal	
28	Programa de Capacitação para o Investimento Social - Concurso para apresentação de candidaturas	Policy paper/Guide	Conselho de Ministros/Programa Operacional de Inclusão Social e Emprego	2017	Portugal	

29	Programa de Parcerias para o Impacto 2017 - Concurso para apresentação de candidaturas	Policy paper/Guide	Conselho de Ministros/Programa Operacional Capital Humano	2017	Portugal	
30	Títulos Impacto Social 2017 - Concurso para apresentação de candidaturas	Policy paper/Guide	Conselho de Ministros/Programa Operacional Capital Humano and Direção-Geral de Estatísticas da Educação e Ciência	2017	Portugal	
31	GovTech	Guide	Conselho de Ministros/Agência para a Modernização Administrativa; PME Investimentos and Instituto Camões	2018	Portugal	
32	Programa de Parcerias para o Impacto 2018 - Concurso para apresentação de candidaturas	Policy paper/Guide	Conselho de Ministros/Programa Operacional de Inclusão Social e Emprego	2018	Portugal	

## Appendix 2 – UK’s Data Sample

#	Document’s Name	Type of Document	Institution	Year	Country	Notes
1	Private action, Public benefit	Policy paper	Cabinet Office/Strategy Unit	2002	UK	
2	Social enterprise - Strategy for Success	Policy paper	Department of Trade and Industry	2002	UK	
3	Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004	Legislation	UK Parliament	2004	UK	Introduces CIC Legislation
4	Community Interest Company Regulations 2005	Legislation	UK Parliament	2005	UK	
5	Big Lottery Fund - Statement of Financial Requirements	Regulation	Department for Culture, Media & Sport	2006	UK	
6	Community Participation	Official Webpage	Cabinet Office/Office of the Third Sector	2006	UK	
7	Improving financial relationships with the third sector: Guidance to funders and purchasers	Policy paper	Cabinet Office and HM Treasury	2006	UK	
8	National Lottery Act 2006	Legislation	UK Parliament	2006	UK	
9	Partnership in Public Services An action plan for third sector involvement	Policy paper	Cabinet Office/Office of the Third Sector	2006	UK	
10	Social Enterprise Action Plan Consultation	Official Webpage	Cabinet Office/Office of the Third Sector	2006	UK	
11	Social enterprise action plan: Scaling new heights	Policy paper	Cabinet Office/Office of the Third Sector	2006	UK	
12	Social Enterprise Day	Official Webpage	Cabinet Office/Office of the Third Sector	2006	UK	
13	The Eden Project - a new generation of social entrepreneurs can change lives	Press release	Cabinet Office/Office of the Third Sector	2006	UK	

14	Third Sector Review	Official Webpage	Cabinet Office/Office of the Third Sector	2006	UK	
15	Review of the Social Enterprise Strategy	Evaluation report	Small Business Service	2007	UK	
16	Social Investment Bank – its organisation and role in driving development of the third sector	Research	Cabinet Office	2007	UK	
17	Dormant Bank and Building Society Accounts Act 2008	Legislation	UK Parliament	2008	UK	Set up Big Society Capital
18	Third Sector Research Centre	Official Webpage	Cabinet Office/Office of the Third Sector	2008	UK	Together with other institutions
19	Working in a consortium: A guide for third sector organizations involved in public service delivery	Policy paper	Cabinet Office	2008	UK	
20	Barrier Busting service	Press release	Cabinet Office	2010	UK	
21	Better Together - Preparing for local spending cuts to the voluntary, community and social enterprise sector	Guide/Policy paper	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2010	UK	
22	Big Society	Policy paper	Cabinet Office	2010	UK	
23	Big Society De-Regulation Taskforce	Press release	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society and Department for Business, Innovation and Skills	2010	UK	
24	Building a stronger civil society - a strategy for voluntary and community groups, charities, and social enterprises	Policy paper	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2010	UK	
25	Exposure of VCSE to Cuts in Public Funding Guide	Policy paper/Guide	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2010	UK	
26	Futurebuilders Fund	Policy paper	Cabinet Office/Office for Third Sector	2010	UK	

27	Minister for Civil Society	Press release	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2010	UK	
28	National Survey of Charities and Social Enterprises	Press release	Cabinet Office	2010	UK	
29	Pathfinder mutuals	Press release	Cabinet Office	2010	UK	
30	The Compact	Policy paper	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2010	UK	
31	The Compact Accountability Guide	Policy paper	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2010	UK	
32	The role of the voluntary sector in public service delivery	Official Webpage	HM Treasury	2010	UK	
33	Transition Fund	Press release	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2010	UK	
34	Big Society Investment Fund - £3.1 million from dormant bank accounts investment	Press release	Cabinet Office	2011	UK	
35	Charities Act 2011	Legislation	UK Parliament	2011	UK	
36	Growing the social investment market: a vision and strategy	Policy paper	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2011	UK	
37	Mutual Support Programme	Press release	Cabinet Office and Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government	2011	UK	
38	National Evaluation of the Office for Civil Society Social Enterprise Business Support Improvement Programme	Evaluation report	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2011	UK	
39	Open public services White Paper	Policy paper	Cabinet Office	2011	UK	
40	Social Impact Bonds	Press release	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2011	UK	
41	Sunderland Homecare: a model for Big Society public services	Press release	Cabinet Office	2011	UK	
42	The voluntary, community and social enterprise sector	Official Webpage	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2011	UK	

43	Boost to help most vulnerable young adults and the homeless	Press release	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2012	UK	
44	CIC business activities: forms and step-by-step guidelines	Guide	Office of the Regulator of Community Interest Companies	2012	UK	
45	Civil Society Red Tape Challenge	Press release	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2012	UK	
46	Funding Central website	Press release	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2012	UK	
47	Growing the social investment market: HMG social investment initiatives 2012	Policy paper	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2012	UK	
48	Growing the social investment market: update on progress 2012	Evaluation report	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2012	UK	
49	Health and Social Care Act	Legislation	UK Parliament	2012	UK	
50	Impact Measurement Conference	Speech	Cabinet Office	2012	UK	
51	Making it easier for civil society to work with the state - progress update 2012	Policy paper	Cabinet Office	2012	UK	
52	Making it easier to set up and run a charity, social enterprise, or voluntary organisation: progress update	Policy paper	Cabinet Office	2012	UK	
53	Masterclasses for VCSE	Press release	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2012	UK	
54	Not-for-profit advice services in England	Research	Cabinet Office	2012	UK	
55	Public Services (Social Value) Act 2012	Legislation	UK Parliament	2012	UK	
56	Social Incubator Fund	Press release	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2012	UK	
57	The Centre for Social Impact Bonds	Policy paper	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2012	UK	
58	The Charitable Incorporated Organisations (General) Regulations	Policy paper	Cabinet Office	2012	UK	

59	Background analysis on the UK social investment market	Research	Cabinet Office	2013	UK	
60	Big Society Capital FAQs	Guide	Cabinet Office	2013	UK	
61	Big Venture Challenge	Official Webpage	Big Lottery Fund	2013	UK	
62	Co-mingling Funds	Policy paper	Cabinet Office	2013	UK	
63	Co-mingling Funds - Summary of terms	Guide	Cabinet Office	2013	UK	
64	Community Investment Tax Relief (CITR)	Policy paper	Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy and HM Revenue & Customs	2013	UK	
65	Cross-government reforms benefiting charities and mutuals	Press release	Cabinet Office/Ministry Justice	2013	UK	
66	Deputy Prime Minister opens new start-up accelerator	Press release	Prime Minister's Office	2013	UK	
67	Extending Charity Commission's powers to tackle abuse in charities Consultation	Consultation guide	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2013	UK	
68	G8 factsheet: social investment and social enterprise	Policy paper	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society; Department for Business, Innovation & Skills; Department for International Development and Department for Work and Pensions	2013	UK	
69	G8 Social Impact Investment Conference	Speech	Department for Work and Pensions	2013	UK	
70	G8 Social Impact Investment Forum Outputs and Agreed Actions	Policy paper	Cabinet Office	2013	UK	
71	Global co-operation to grow market for social investment	Press release	Cabinet Office	2013	UK	

72	Global Learning Exchange	Press release	Cabinet Office	2013	UK	
73	Government response to recommendations on the legal framework for charities	Policy paper	Cabinet Office	2013	UK	
74	Growing the social investment market: 2013 progress update	Evaluation report	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2013	UK	
75	Growing the social investment market: HMG social investment initiatives 2013	Policy paper	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2013	UK	
76	Growing the social investment market: the landscape and economic impact	Research	Cabinet Office	2013	UK	
77	Issue briefing: volunteering and charitable donations	Policy paper	HM Revenue & Customs	2013	UK	
78	National exemption order scheme	Guide	Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport	2013	UK	
79	Rehabilitation Social Action Fund: FAQs	Guide	Cabinet Office	2013	UK	
80	Skills & Leadership in the VCSE Sector	Research	Cabinet Office	2013	UK	
81	Social enterprise: market trends 2013	Research	Cabinet Office	2013	UK	
82	Social Impact Bonds Guidance	Guide	Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport/Office for Civil Society	2013	UK	
83	Social Impact Investment Forum	Press release	Cabinet Office and Prime Minister's Office	2013	UK	
84	Social investment collaboration between banks and charitable foundations	Press release	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2013	UK	
85	Social Investment Research Council	Official Webpage	Cabinet Office	2013	UK	Together with other institutions
86	Social investment roadmap	Guide	Cabinet Office	2013	UK	

87	Status of the social impact investing market	Research	Cabinet Office	2013	UK	
88	Boost for Social Investment Sector	Press release	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2014	UK	
89	Commercial Skills Masterclass for Public Service Delivery	Guide	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2014	UK	
90	Consultation on charity audit and independent examination	Consultation guide	Cabinet Office	2014	UK	
91	Cooperative and Community Benefit Societies Act	Legislation	UK Parliament	2014	UK	
92	Delivering Differently for Young People: programme prospectus	Policy paper	Cabinet Office and Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government	2014	UK	
93	Fund to help vulnerable young people	Press release	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2014	UK	
94	Gift Aid	Guide	HM Treasury	2014	UK	
95	Giving community organisers the power to create real change	Speech	Cabinet Office	2014	UK	
96	Growing the social investment market: 2014 progress update	Evaluation report	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2014	UK	
97	Impact Readiness Fund - £1.5 million grant fund to help social ventures	Press release	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2014	UK	
98	Information and activities on the Cabinet Office Mutuals Support	Guide	Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport/Office for Civil Society	2014	UK	
99	Investment and Contract Readiness Fund	Press release	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2014	UK	
100	Making it easier for civil society to work with the state - progress update 2014	Policy paper	Cabinet Office	2014	UK	

101	Minister for Civil Society speech at the Foundation for Social Improvement Annual Conference	Speech	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2014	UK	
102	Minister for Civil Society Speech on Giving Tuesday reception	Speech	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2014	UK	
103	New fund to support the sustainability of voluntary, community and social enterprise sector organisations Consultation	Consultation guide	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2014	UK	
104	Open Public Services: 2014 progress report	Evaluation report	Cabinet Office	2014	UK	
105	Organising a voluntary event: a 'Can do' guide	Guide	Cabinet Office	2014	UK	
106	Public Services (Social Value) Act - one year on	Policy paper	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2014	UK	
107	Research shows public appetite for businesses with a conscience	Press release	Cabinet Office and Department for Business, Innovation & Skills	2014	UK	
108	Social finance in the UK: designing the experience for ventures	Research	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2014	UK	
109	Social housing and social investment	Research	Cabinet Office	2014	UK	
110	Social investment market: new specialist sources of capital	Research	Cabinet Office	2014	UK	Together with other institutions
111	Social Investment Tax Relief	Policy paper	HM Revenue & Customs	2014	UK	Based on the legislation from the Finance Bill
112	Social investment tax relief guidance	Guide	Cabinet Office and HM Treasury	2014	UK	

113	Social investment: an introduction to the government's approach	Policy paper	Cabinet Office	2014	UK	
114	Social Value Act: information and resources	Guide	Cabinet Office	2014	UK	
115	Start a public service mutual	Guide	Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport	2014	UK	
116	The role of government in social impact investing	Speech	Cabinet Office; Department for Work and Pension and Ministry of Justice	2014	UK	
117	Transforming Local Infrastructure	Evaluation report	Cabinet Office	2014	UK	Together with other institutions
118	Using a total impact approach to achieve social outcomes	Research	Cabinet Office	2014	UK	
119	Youth Engagement Fund	Press release	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society, Department for Work and Pensions, Ministry of Justice	2014	UK	
120	Youth Engagement Fund: prospectus	Guide	Cabinet Office	2014	UK	
121	2010 to 2015 government policy: social enterprise	Policy paper	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2015	UK	
122	2010 to 2015 government policy: social investment	Policy paper	Cabinet Office and HM Treasury	2015	UK	
123	Amendment to the Charities Bill	Press release	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society and Prime-Minister's Office	2015	UK	
124	Charity Fundraising	Press release	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2015	UK	
125	Community Organisers programme	Press release	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2015	UK	
126	Crowdfunding investment	Press release	UK Research and Innovation/Innovate UK	2015	UK	

127	Delivering Differently for Young People	Policy paper	Cabinet Office and Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government	2015	UK	
128	Dormant Assets Commission	Press release	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society and Independent Dormant Assets Commission	2015	UK	
129	Fundraising summit 2015	Speech	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2015	UK	
130	Global campaign to promote the UK social economy	Press release	Cabinet Office and UK Trade & Investment	2015	UK	
131	Impact Readiness Fund	Press release	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2015	UK	
132	Investment and Contract Readiness Fund evaluation	Evaluation report	Cabinet Office	2015	UK	
133	Investment fund brings social finance to the arts	Press release	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2015	UK	
134	Joint open data initiative "game changer" for social enterprise industry	Press release	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2015	UK	
135	Local Sustainability Fund	Press release	Cabinet Office	2015	UK	
136	Minister for Civil Society speech at Access - The Foundation for Social Investment	Speech	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2015	UK	
137	Minister for Civil Society speech on Giving Tuesday 2015	Speech	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2015	UK	
138	Minister for Civil Society speech on the Centre for Social Justice 'Social Solutions' report	Speech	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2015	UK	
139	Minister of Civil Society speech on building civil society together	Speech	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2015	UK	
140	P2P Impact Fund	Press release	Cabinet Office	2015	UK	

141	Police and crime commissioners and civil society	Policy paper	Cabinet Office; Home Office	2015	UK	
142	PowerUP scheme	Press release	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2015	UK	
143	Progress against the eight recommendations made by the Taskforce to governments	Correspondence	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2015	UK	
144	Rapid response vehicles for medical purposes: charities grant scheme	Press release	Cabinet Office	2015	UK	
145	Remember A Charity in Your Will' week	Press release	Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport/Office for Civil Society and HM Treasury	2015	UK	
146	Scaling community lenders: the role of social investment	Research	Cabinet Office	2015	UK	
147	Small Charities Fundraising Training Programme	Guide	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2015	UK	
148	Social enterprises: export the good you do as well as the goods you produce	Press release	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society and UK Trade & Investment	2015	UK	
149	Social investing in the UK	Guide	Cabinet Office and Department for International Trade	2015	UK	
150	Social Value Act Review	Evaluation report	Cabinet Office	2015	UK	
151	Social Value Awards	Press release	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2015	UK	Together with other institutions
152	Starting a social venture in the UK	Guide	Cabinet Office and Department for International Trade	2015	UK	
153	Support for Social action on Giving Tuesday 2015	Press release	Cabinet Office and Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government	2015	UK	

154	VCSE Review: Discussion Paper on the Voluntary Sector Investment Programme	Official Webpage	NHS	2015	UK	
155	Youth Social Action Fund	Press release	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2015	UK	
156	About the Office for Civil Society	Official Webpage	Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport/Office for Civil Society	2016	UK	
157	Acting High Commissioner to Zambia speech at Prudential Life Assurance in Zambia	Speech	Foreign and Commonwealth Office	2016	UK	
158	Advisory Group to look at how individuals can make a social impact with their investments	Press release	Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport/Office for Civil Society	2016	UK	
159	Advisory Panel Report on Mission-led Business	Policy paper	Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport/Office for Civil Society	2016	UK	
160	Assessment of Social Incubator Fund Outcomes	Evaluation report	Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport/Office for Civil Society	2016	UK	
161	Buy Social Corporate Challenge	Official Webpage	Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport/Office for Civil Society	2016	UK	
162	Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Act	Legislation	UK Parliament	2016	UK	
163	Commissioning Academy	Press release	Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport/Office for Civil Society	2016	UK	
164	Consultation on new policy directions for the Big Lottery Fund	Consultation guide	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society and Big Lottery Foundation	2016	UK	
165	Conversion to a Charitable Incorporated Organisation Consultation	Consultation guide	Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport/Office for Civil Society and The Charity	2016	UK	
166	Fundraising Week 2016	Speech	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2016	UK	

167	Growing the social investment market: update on SIFI social investment	Research	Department for Work and Pensions	2016	UK	
168	Law Commission to look into pension funds and social impact investment	Press release	Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport/Office for Civil Society	2016	UK	
169	Life Chances Fund	Guide	Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport/Office for Civil Society	2016	UK	
170	Life Chances Fund - £80 million boost	Press release	Cabinet Office	2016	UK	
171	Local Authorities receive funding for youth services	Press release	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2016	UK	
172	Local charities and community groups match fund	Guide	Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport/Office for Civil Society	2016	UK	
173	Local Charities Day	Press release	Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport/Office for Civil Society	2016	UK	
174	Local Sustainability Fund Successful Applicants	Press release	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2016	UK	
175	Minister for Civil Society speech at the ACEVO Annual Conference	Speech	Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport/Office for Civil Society	2016	UK	
176	Minister for Civil Society speech on Buy Social Corporate Challenge	Speech	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2016	UK	
177	Minister for Civil Society speech on the growth of social investment in the UK	Speech	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2016	UK	
178	NHS Procurement & Commercial Standards	Policy paper	Department of Health	2016	UK	
179	Review to increase the economic and social impact of mission-led businesses in the UK economy	Press release	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2016	UK	
180	Social enterprise: market trends 2016	Research	Cabinet Office	2016	UK	

181	Social Investment Awards	Press release	Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport/Office for Civil Society	2016	UK	
182	Social investment: a force for social change - UK Strategy 2016	Policy paper	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2016	UK	
183	Social investment: UK as a global hub - international strategy 2016	Policy paper	Cabinet Office	2016	UK	
184	The future of the UK social investment market	Speech	Cabinet Office/Office for Civil Society	2016	UK	
185	Charities Audit and Independent Examination Consultation	Consultation guide	Cabinet Office	2017		
186	Dormant Assets Commission: final report to government	Policy paper	Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport/Office for Civil Society and Independent Dormant Assets Commission	2017	UK	
187	Life Chances Fund - New Round	Press release	Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport/Office for Civil Society	2017	UK	
188	Mutuals Interim Support Fund	Guide	Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport/Office for Civil Society	2017	UK	
189	Public Service Mutuals Guide	Guide	Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport/Office for Civil Society	2017	UK	
190	Research into the Public Service Mutual Sector	Research	Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport/Office for Civil Society	2017	UK	
191	Big Society Capital and Big Lottery Fund - £330 million from dormant accounts	Press release	Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport/Office for Civil Society and Big Lottery fund	2018	UK	
192	Civil society strategy consultation	Consultation guide	Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport/Office for Civil Society	2018	UK	

193	Financial Inclusion Statement of Intent	Policy paper	Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport/Office for Civil Society; Department for Work and Pensions and HM Treasury	2018	UK	
194	Government Response to Commission on Dorman Assets	Policy paper	HM Treasury and Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport	2018	UK	
195	Inclusive Economy	Guide	Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport/Office for Civil Society	2018	UK	
196	Mutuals Partnership Support Programme	Guide	Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport/Office for Civil Society	2018	UK	
197	Mutuals Support Programme 2	Guide	Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport/Office for Civil Society	2018	UK	
198	Public Service Mutuals funding	Press release	Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport/Office for Civil Society	2018	UK	
199	Public Service Mutuals: State of the Sector 2018	Research	Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport	2018	UK	

## Abbreviations

ACD - Active Communities Directorate

CASES – Cooperativa António Sérgio para a Economia Social (*Cooperative António Sérgio for Social Economy*<sup>3</sup>)

CITR – Community investment tax relief

CNES – Conselho Nacional para a Economia Social (*National Council for Social Economy*<sup>3</sup>)

CSES – Conta Satélite da Economia Social (*Satellite Account for Social Economy*<sup>3</sup>)

DDCMS – Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport

DH – Department of Health

DL – Decreto-Lei (*Decree*)

DTI – Department of Trade and Industry

EMPIS – Estrutura de Missão do Portugal Inovação Social (*Portugal Social Innovation's Mission Structure*<sup>3</sup>)

EC – European Commission

EU – European Union

FRSS – Fundo de Reestruturação do Sector Solidário (*Social Sector's Restructuring Fund*<sup>3</sup>)

GEM – Global Entrepreneurship Monitor

GNI – Gross National Income

GVA – Gross Value Added

ICRF – Investment and Contract Readiness Fund

IES – IES-Social Business School

IIES – Iniciativa de Inovação e Empreendedorismo Social (*Social Entrepreneurship and Innovation Initiative*<sup>3</sup>)

IPSS – Instituição Particular de Solidariedade Social (*Private Institution of Social Welfare*<sup>3</sup>)

IRF – Impact Readiness Fund

NHS – National Health Service

NPM – New Public Management

OCS – Office for Civil Society

PIS – Portugal Inovação Social (*Portugal Social Innovation*<sup>3</sup>)

QUANGOS – Quasi-autonomous governmental organizations

SCML – Santa Casa da Misericórdia de Lisboa (*Lisbon's Holy House of Mercy*<sup>3</sup>)

SE – Social Entrepreneurship

SE UK – Social Enterprise UK

SEC – Social Enterprise Coalition

SEL – Social Enterprise London

SEU – Social Enterprise Unit

SIB – Social Investment Business

SRI – Socially Responsible Investment

UK – United Kingdom

UK NAB – United Kingdom National Advisory Board on Impact Investment

VCSE – Voluntary, community and social enterprise

---

<sup>3</sup> Author's translation

## References List

- Agapitova, N., Sanchez, B., & Tinsley, E. (2017). *Government Support to the Social Enterprise Sector: Comparative Review of Policy Frameworks and Tools*. Washington: The World Bank.
- Aiken, M. (2006). Towards market or state? Tensions and opportunities in the evolutionary path of three UK social enterprises. *Social Enterprise: At the Crossroads of Market, Public Policies and Civil Society*, 259–271.
- Alcock, P. (2010). A strategic unity: defining the third sector in the UK. *Voluntary Sector Review*, 1(1), 5–24.
- Anheier, H. K. (2005). *Nonprofit Organizations: Theory, Management, Policy*. *Social Policy* (Vol. 2). Retrieved from [http://books.google.com/books?id=s\\_uzg-KoVyIC&pgis=1](http://books.google.com/books?id=s_uzg-KoVyIC&pgis=1)
- Austin, J., Stevenson, H., & Wei-Skillern, J. (2006). Social and commercial entrepreneurship: same, different, or both? *Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice*, 30(1), 1–22.
- Autio, E., Kenney, M., Mustar, P., Siegel, D., & Wright, M. (2014). Entrepreneurial innovation: The importance of context. *Research Policy*, 43(7), 1097–1108.
- Battilana, J., & Dorado, S. (2010). Building Sustainable Hybrid Organizations: The Case of Commercial Microfinance Organizations. *Academy of Management Journal*, 53(6), 1419–1440.
- Battilana, J., & Lee, M. (2014). Advancing Research on Hybrid Organizing - Insights from the Study of Social Enterprises. *Academy of Management Annals*, 8(1), 397–441.
- Battilana, J., Lee, M., Walker, J., & Dorsey, C. (2012). In search of the hybrid ideal. *Stanford Social Innovation Review*, 10(3), 50–55.
- BBC. (2010). Spending Review 2010: George Osborne wields the axe. Retrieved May 17, 2018, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-11579979>
- Billis, D. (2010). *Hybrid Organizations and the Third Sector: Challenges for Practice, Theory and Policy*. (D. Billis, Ed.). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Bland, J. (2010). Social enterprise solutions for 21st century challenges: the UK model of social

enterprise and experience. *Helsinki: Publication of the Finish Ministry of Employment and the Economy—Strategic Projects*, 25, 2010.

Blond, P. (2009). *The ownership state*. London: NESTA/ResPublica.

Bugg-Levine, A., & Emerson, J. (2011). Impact investing: Transforming how we make money while making a difference. *Innovations: Technology, Governance, Globalization*, 6(3), 9–18.

Cabinet Office. (2010). *Building the Big Society*. Retrieved May 12, 2018, from [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/78979/building-big-society\\_0.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/78979/building-big-society_0.pdf)

Cabinet Office. (2013). *Background analysis on the UK social investment market*.

Carmel, E., & Harlock, J. (2008). Instituting the 'third sector' as a governable terrain: partnership, procurement and performance in the UK. *Policy & Politics*, 36(2), 155–171.

Casasnovas, G., & Bruno, A. V. (2013). Scaling Social Ventures an Exploratory Study of Social Incubators and Accelerators. *Journal of Management for Global Sustainability*, 2, 173–197.

Catherall, R. (2012). A legal framework is not necessary for social enterprise development. Retrieved April 11, 2018, from <https://www.theguardian.com/social-enterprise-network/2012/jul/27/legal-framework-social-enterprise>

Colebatch, H. K. (2005). Policy analysis, policy practice and political science. *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, 64(3), 14–23.

Colebatch, H. K. (2006). What work makes policy? *Policy Sciences*, 39(4), 309–321.

Colebatch, H. K., & Radin, B. A. (2006). Mapping the work of policy. *The Work of Policy: An International Survey*, 217.

Costa, F. F. da. (1986). *As Cooperativas e a Economia Social*. Lisbon: Livros Horizonte.

Crabtree, B. F., & Miller, W. L. (1999). *Doing qualitative research*. SAGE Publications.

Creswell, J. W. (1998). *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches*. SAGE Publications.

Curtain, R. (2001). Good Public Policy Making: How Australia Fares. *Agenda: A Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform*, 8(1), 33–46.

Dacin, M. T., Dacin, P. A., & Tracey, P. (2011). Social Entrepreneurship: A Critique and Future Directions. *Organization Science*, 22(5), 1203–1213.

Dacin, P. A., Dacin, M. T., & Matear, M. (2010). Social Entrepreneurship: Why We Don't Need a New Theory and How We Move Forward From Here. *The Academy of Management Perspectives*, 24(3), 37–57.

Defourny, J., & Nyssens, M. (2010). Social enterprise in Europe: At the crossroads of market, public policies and third sector. *Policy and Society*, 29(3), 231–242.

Dunn, A., & Riley, C. A. (2004). Supporting the Not-for-Profit Sector: the Government's Review of Charitable and Social Enterprise. *The Modern Law Review*, 67(4), 632–657.

The Economist. (2016). *Social Innovation Index 2016*. Retrieved from [https://www.eiuperspectives.economist.com/sites/default/files/Social\\_Innovation\\_Index.pdf](https://www.eiuperspectives.economist.com/sites/default/files/Social_Innovation_Index.pdf)

Eldar, O. (2017). The Role of Social Enterprise and Hybrid Organizations. *Columbia Business Law Review*.

European Commission. (2014a). *A map of social enterprises and their eco-systems in Europe - Portugal case*.

European Commission. (2014b). *A map of social enterprises and their eco-systems in Europe - UK case*.

European Commission. (2018). Social Economy in the EU. Retrieved May 2, 2018, from [http://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/social-economy\\_pt](http://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/social-economy_pt)

Evans, B., & Veselý, A. (2014). Contemporary policy work in subnational governments and NGOs: Comparing evidence from Australia, Canada and the Czech Republic. *Policy and Society*, 33(2), 77–87.

Eyestone, R. (1971). *The threads of public policy: A study in policy leadership*. Ardent Media.

GECEs. (2016). *Social Enterprises and the Social Economy Going Forward*. European

Commission. Retrieved from [http://ec.europa.eu/growth/content/social-enterprises-and-social-economy-going-forward-0\\_en](http://ec.europa.eu/growth/content/social-enterprises-and-social-economy-going-forward-0_en)

GEM. (2015). *GEM 2015 special report on social entrepreneurship. Global Entrepreneurship Monitor.*

GEM. (2016). Portugal - Entrepreneurial Behaviour and Attitudes. Retrieved May 18, 2018, from <https://www.gemconsortium.org/country-profile/100>

Gioia, D. A., Corley, K. G., & Hamilton, A. L. (2012). Seeking Qualitative Rigor in Inductive Research: Notes on the Gioia Methodology. *Organizational Research Methods, 16*(1), 15–31.

Gorovitz, E. (2017). Public Health and Politics: Using the Tax Code to Expand Advocacy. *Journal of Law Medicine & Ethics, 45*(1, SI), 24–27.

Gruber, J. (2005). *Public finance and public policy.* Palgrave Macmillan.

Gruening, G. (2001). Origin and theoretical basis of New Public Management. *International Public Management Journal, 4*(1), 1–25.

Haigh, N., & Hoffman, A. J. (2012). Hybrid organizations. The next chapter of sustainable business. *Organizational Dynamics, 41*(2), 126–134.

Haigh, N., Kennedy, E. D., & Walker, J. (2015). Hybrid Organizations as Shape-Shifters: Altering Legal Structure for Strategic Gain. *California Management Review, 57*(3), 59–82.

Haigh, N., Walker, J., Bacq, S., & Kickul, J. (2015). Hybrid Organizations: Origins, Strategies, Impacts, and Implications. *California Management Review, 57*(3), 5–12.

Hämäläinen, T. J., & Heiskala, R. (2007). *Social innovations, institutional change and economic performance: Making sense of structural adjustment processes in industrial sectors, regions and societies.*

Hantrais, L. (1999). Contextualization in cross-national comparative research. *International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 2*(2), 93–108.

Haugh, H. (2006). Social Enterprise: Beyond Economic Outcomes and Individual Returns. In J. Mair, J. Robinson, & K. Hockerts (Eds.), *Social Entrepreneurship* (pp. 180–205). London:

Palgrave Macmillan UK.

Haugh, H., & Kitson, M. (2007). The Third Way and the third sector: New Labour's economic policy and the social economy. *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 31(6), 973–994.

Hazenberg, R., Seddon, F., & Denny, S. (2015). Intermediary Perceptions of Investment Readiness in the UK Social Investment Market. *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, 26(3), 846–871.

Hines, F. (2005). Viable Social Enterprise: An Evaluation of Business Support to Social Enterprises. *Social Enterprise Journal*, 1(1), 13–28.

HM Treasury. (1999). *Enterprise and social exclusion: National strategy for neighbourhood renewal*. London.

Howard, E. (2012). *Challenges and opportunities in social finance in the UK*.

Hox, J. J., & Boeije, H. R. (2005). Data Collection, Primary vs. Secondary. In K. Kempf-Leonard (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Social Measurement* (Vol. 1, pp. 593–599). Elsevier.

Hulgård, L. (2010). *Discourses of social entrepreneurship – Variations of the same theme?* (No. 10/01). *EMES Working Papers*.

Jones, D., Keogh, B., & O'Leary, H. (2007). *Developing the Social Economy: A Critical Review of the Literature*. Edinburgh.

Kapucu, N. (2006). New Public Management: Theory, ideology, and practice. In *Handbook of Globalization, Governance, and Public Administration* (pp. 885–898).

Kendall, J. (2000). The mainstreaming of the third sector into public policy in England in the late 1990s: whys and wherefores. *Policy & Politics*, 28(4), 541–562.

Kickul, J., & Lyons, T. S. (2016). *Understanding social entrepreneurship: The relentless pursuit of mission in an ever changing world*. Routledge.

Lallemand-Stempak, N. (2017). Rethinking hybrids' challenges: The case of French mutual insurance companies. *M@n@agement*, 20(4), 336–367.

- Lasswell, H. D., & Kaplan, A. (1970). *Power and Society*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Laville, J. L., Lemaitre, A., & Nyssens, M. (2006). Public policies and social enterprise in Europe: The challenge of institutionalization. In M. Nyssens (Ed.), *Social enterprise: At the crossroads of market, public policies and civil society* (pp. 272–295). London: Routledge.
- Legard, R., Keegan, J., & Ward, K. (2003). In-depth interviews. *Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers*, 138–169.
- Lei n.º 30/2013 de 8 de Maio. (2013). *Diário Da República N.º 88 - I Série*. Lisbon: Assembleia da República. Retrieved from <https://dre.pt/application/file/a/260705>
- Loosemore, M. (2016). Social procurement in UK construction projects. *International Journal of Project Management*, 34(2), 133–144.
- Lyons, M. (2002). Institutional Prerequisites for Successful Compacts Between Governments and the Third Sector or Why a Compact is not yet possible in Australia. In *Sixth Australian and New Zealand Third Sector Research Conference*. Auckland.
- Mair, J., & Martí, I. (2006). Social entrepreneurship research: A source of explanation, prediction, and delight. *Journal of World Business*, 41(1), 36–44.
- Markman, G. D., Russo, M., Lumpkin, G. T., Jennings, P. D. D., & Mair, J. (2016). Entrepreneurship as a Platform for Pursuing Multiple Goals: A Special Issue on Sustainability, Ethics, and Entrepreneurship. *Journal of Management Studies*, 53(5), 673–694.
- Martin, R. L., & Osberg, S. (2007). *Social entrepreneurship: The case for definition* (Vol. 5). Stanford social innovation review Stanford.
- Mazzei, M., & Roy, M. J. (2017). From Policy to Practice: Exploring Practitioners' Perspectives on Social Enterprise Policy Claims. *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, 28(6), 2449–2468.
- McCabe, A., & Hahn, S. (2006). Promoting Social Enterprise in Korea and the UK: Community Economic Development, Alternative Welfare Provision or a Means to Welfare to Work? *Social Policy and Society*, 5(03), 387.

- Mennel, J., & Wong, N. (2015). Driving corporate growth through social impact. Retrieved May 12, 2018, from <https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/operations/articles/driving-corporate-growth-through-social-impact.html>
- Miles, M. B., & Huberman, A. M. (1994). *Qualitative data analysis: An expanded sourcebook*. SAGE Publications.
- Mulgan, G., Tucker, S., Ali, R., & Sanders, B. (2007). *Social innovation: what it is, why it matters and how it can be accelerated*. Skoll centre for social entrepreneurship.
- Muñoz, S.-A., & Tinsley, S. (2008). Selling to the Public Sector: Prospects and Problems for Social Enterprise in the UK. *The Journal of Corporate Citizenship*, (32), 43–62.
- Muñoz, S. (2009). Social enterprise and public sector voices on procurement. *Social Enterprise Journal*, 5(1), 69–82.
- Newman, J. (2001). *Modernizing governance: New Labour, policy and society*. SAGE Publications.
- Nicholls, A., & Pharoah, C. (2008). The landscape of social investment: A holistic topology of opportunities and challenges.
- Noutel, H. (2014). Entrevista a Maria do Carmo Pinto. Portugal: TSF. Retrieved from <https://www.tsf.pt/economia/interior/lei-em-portugal-nao-incentiva-criacao-de-empresas-sociais-3614656.html>
- Noya, A. (2013). Policy Frameworks for Social Entrepreneurship and Social Economy. In OECD (Ed.), *UNECE International Conference: Entrepreneurship and Innovation* (p. 13). Dubrovnik.
- O'Donohoe, N. (2014). Big Capital Society is showing how successful social investment can be. Retrieved May 12, 2018, from <https://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/apr/30/big-society-capital-dormant-bank-accounts>
- O'Toole, J., & Vogel, D. (2011). Two and a Half Cheers for Conscious Capitalism. *California Management Review*, 53(3), 60–76.

- OECD. (2010). Social Entrepreneurship and Social Innovation. *SMEs, Entrepreneurship and Innovation*, 185–215.
- Pache, A.-C., & Santos, F. (2013). Inside the Hybrid Organization: Selective Coupling as a Response to Competing Institutional Logics. *Academy of Management Journal*, 56(4), 972–1001.
- Parente, C., & Quintão, C. (2014). *Empreendedorismo Social Em Portugal*. (Universidade do Porto - Faculdade de Letras, Ed.). Retrieved from <http://ler.letras.up.pt/uploads/ficheiros/12398.pdf>
- Park, C., Lee, J., & Wilding, M. (2017). Distorted policy transfer? South Korea's adaptation of UK social enterprise policy. *Policy Studies*, 38(1), 39–58.
- Park, C., & Wilding, M. (2013). Social enterprise policy design: Constructing social enterprise in the UK and Korea. *International Journal of Social Welfare*, 22(3), 236–247.
- Parkinson, C., & Howorth, C. (2008). The language of social entrepreneurs. *Entrepreneurship & Regional Development*, 20(3), 285–309.
- Parsons, W. (2004). Not Just Steering but Weaving: Relevant Knowledge and the Craft of Building Policy Capacity and Coherence. *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, 63(1), 43–57.
- Patton, M. Q. (1990). *Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods* (2nd ed.). Newbury Park, California: SAGE Publications.
- Peredo, A. M., & McLean, M. (2006). Social entrepreneurship: A critical review of the concept. *Journal of World Business*. JAI.
- Phills, J. A., Deiglmeier, K., & Miller, D. T. (2008). Rediscovering social innovation. *Stanford Social Innovation Review*, 6(4), 34–43.
- Pol, E., & Ville, S. (2009). Social innovation: Buzz word or enduring term? *Journal of Socio-Economics*, 38(6), 878–885.
- Portugal Inovação Social. (2017). Ecosystema. Retrieved March 13, 2018, from

<https://inovacaosocial.portugal2020.pt/index.php/ecossistema/>

Ramus, T., & Vaccaro, A. (2017). Stakeholders Matter: How Social Enterprises Address Mission Drift. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 143(2), 307–322.

Ramus, T., Vaccaro, A., & Brusoni, S. (2017). Institutional complexity in turbulent times: Formalization, collaboration, and the emergence of blended logics. *Academy of Management Journal*, 60(4), 1253–1284.

Rawhouser, H., Michael, C., & Crane, A. (2015). Benefit corporation legislation and the emergence of a social hybrid category. *California Management Review*, 57(3), 13–36.

Richardson, M. (2015). *Social Enterprise in the UK: Developing a Thriving Social Enterprise Sector*. Retrieved from [https://www.britishcouncil.org/sites/default/files/social\\_enterprise\\_in\\_the\\_uk\\_final\\_web\\_spreads.pdf](https://www.britishcouncil.org/sites/default/files/social_enterprise_in_the_uk_final_web_spreads.pdf)

Roper, J., & Cheney, G. (2005). Leadership, learning and human resource management. The meanings of social entrepreneurship today. *Corporate Governance*, 5(3), 95–104.

Roundy, P. T. (2017). Hybrid organizations and the logics of entrepreneurial ecosystems. *International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal*, 13(4), 1221–1237.

Roy, M. J., McHugh, N., Huckfield, L., Kay, A., & Donaldson, C. (2015). “The Most Supportive Environment in the World”? Tracing the Development of an Institutional ‘Ecosystem’ for Social Enterprise. *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, 26(3), 777–800.

Santos, F. M. (2012). A Positive Theory of Social Entrepreneurship. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 111(3), 335–351.

Santos, F., Pache, A.-C., & Birkholz, C. (2015). Making Hybrids Work: Aligning Business Models and Organizational Design for Social Enterprises. *California Management Review*, 57(3), 36–58.

Seelos, C., & Mair, J. (2005). Social entrepreneurship: Creating new business models to serve the poor. *Business Horizons*, 48(3), 241–246.

Segurança Social. (2018). Instituições particulares de solidariedade social. Retrieved May 26, 2018, from <http://www.seg-social.pt/ipss>

Sekliuckiene, J., & Kisielius, E. (2015). Development of Social Entrepreneurship Initiatives: A Theoretical Framework. *Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences*, 213, 1015–1019.

Shah, D. (2009). A UK policy perspective: thought piece from the UK Social Enterprise Coalition. *Social Enterprise Journal*, 5(2), 104–113.

Short, J. C., Moss, T. W., & Lumpkin, G. T. (2009). Research in social entrepreneurship: past contributions and future opportunities. *Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal*, 3(2), 161–194.

Singh, A. (2010). The Civil Effect: Bringing efficiency, innovation and community capability to our framework of public services commissioning. *London: NESTA/ResPublica*.

Smith, J. (2000). At the heart of the action. Retrieved May 20, 2018, from <https://www.theguardian.com/society/2000/may/24/guardiansocietysupplement7>

Snaith, I. (2007). Recent reforms to corporate legal structures for social enterprise in the UK: opportunity or confusion? *Social Enterprise Journal*, 3(1), 20–30.

Social Enterprise UK. (2017). *The Future of Business: State of Social Enterprise Survey 2017*. Retrieved from <https://www.socialenterprise.org.uk/the-future-of-business-state-of-social-enterprise-survey-2017>

Spigel, B. (2016). Developing and governing entrepreneurial ecosystems: the structure of entrepreneurial support programs in Edinburgh, Scotland. *International Journal of Innovation and Regional Development*, 7(2), 141–160.

Stern, P. N. (1980). Grounded theory methodology: Its use and processes. *The Journal of Nursing*, 12, 20–23.

Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1998). *Basics of Qualitative Research*. Beverly Hills, California: SAGE Publications.

Teasdale, S. (2012). What's in a Name? Making Sense of Social Enterprise Discourses. *Public Policy and Administration*, 27(2), 99–119.

- Teasdale, S., Alcock, P., & Smith, G. (2012). Legislating for the big society? The case of the Public Services (Social Value) Bill. *Public Money & Management*, 32(3), 201–208.
- Terjesen, S., Bosma, N., & Stam, E. (2016). Advancing Public Policy for High-Growth, Female, and Social Entrepreneurs. *Public Administration Review*, 76(2), 230–239.
- Thomley, B., Wood, D., Grace, K., & Sarah, S. (2011). *Impact investing: A framework for policy design and analysis*. Pacific Community Ventures. Retrieved from <http://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/uploads/files/88fdd93f-b778-461e-828c-5c526ffed184-impact.pdf>
- Thompson, J., & Doherty, B. (2006). The diverse world of social enterprise. *International Journal of Social Economics*, 33(5/6), 361–375.
- Timmins, N. (2011). Big Society Bank: Just the facts. Retrieved May 12, 2018, from <https://www.ft.com/content/89aaf79e-3848-11e0-8257-00144feabdc0>
- Ting, J. (2016). The millennial entrepreneur: a new generation motivated by impact. Retrieved May 1, 2018, from <http://www.hsbcprivatebank.com/en/discover/news-room/2016/millennial-entrepreneur>
- Vining, A. R., & Weimer, D. L. (2016). The challenges of fractionalized property rights in public-private hybrid organizations: The good, the bad, and the ugly. *Regulation and Governance*, 10(2), 161–178.
- Weerawardena, J., & Mort, G. S. (2006). Investigating social entrepreneurship: A multidimensional model. *Journal of World Business*, 41(1), 21–35.
- Wilding, K. (2016). The Office for Civil Society is moving. Retrieved May 15, 2018, from <https://blogs.ncvo.org.uk/2016/07/21/the-office-for-civil-society-is-moving/>
- Wildmannová, M. (2017). Barriers and Potential Challenges in Development in Social Businesses in the Czech Republic. *Scientific Papers of the University of Pardubice*, 40(2), 234–243.
- Williams, M., & Cowling, M. (2009). *Annual Small Business Survey 2007/08*. London.

Wolk, A. M. (2007). *Social Entrepreneurship & Government: A New Breed of Entrepreneurs Developing Solutions to Social Problems. The Small Business Economy: A Report to the President.*

World Bank. (2018). World Bank Country and Lending Groups. Retrieved April 16, 2018, from [https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519#High\\_income](https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519#High_income)

Yunus, M., Moingeon, B., & Lehmann-Ortega, L. (2010). Building social business models: Lessons from the grameen experience. *Long Range Planning*, 43(2–3), 308–325.

Zahra, S. A., Gedajlovic, E., Neubaum, D. O., & Shulman, J. M. (2009). A typology of social entrepreneurs: Motives, search processes and ethical challenges. *Journal of Business Venturing*, 24(5), 519–532.

## Bibliography

Bovaird, T. (2006). Developing new forms of partnership with the 'market' in the procurement of public services. *Public Administration*, 84(1), 81–102.

Demos. (2017). The Age of the Social Entrepreneur. Retrieved May 20, 2018, from <https://www.demos.co.uk/blog/the-age-of-the-social-entrepreneur/>

Dart, R. (2004). The legitimacy of social enterprise. *Nonprofit Management and Leadership*, 14(4), 411–424.

Dees, J. G. (1998). Enterprising nonprofits. *Harvard Business Review*, 76, 54–69.

Isenberg, D. J. (2010). How To Start an Entrepreneurial Revolution. *Harvard Business Review*, (June).

Kerlin, J. A. (2006). Social Enterprise in the United States and Europe: Understanding and Learning from the Differences. *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, 17(3), 246.

Lasprogata, G. A., & Cotten, M. N. (2003). Contemplating" enterprise": The business and legal challenges of social entrepreneurship. *American Business Law Journal*, 41(1), 67.

Leadbeater, C. (1997). The rise of the social entrepreneur. *Demos*.

EU Member States. (2017). *Best practices in the field of social clauses in public procurements in Europe*.

Santos, F. (2017, July 24). Vencer o desafio da inovação social. *Observador*. Retrieved from <http://observador.pt/opiniao/vencer-o-desafio-da-inovacao-social/>

Spear, R., Cornforth, C., & Aiken, M. (2009). The governance challenges of social enterprises: Evidence from a UK empirical study. *Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics*, 80(2), 247–273.