

CONGRESSO INTERNACIONAL

FACULDADE DE LETRAS  
UNIVERSIDADE DO PORTO



FILOSOFIA & LITERATURA

**NIILISMO**  
*Cruzando Fronteiras*

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PORTO, PORTUGAL

dele (Heidegger); por outro lado, a hermenêutica tentou dar resposta à crise da cultura ocidental pós-guerras por meio da afirmação da possibilidade da verdade advinda da experiência de outras instâncias, como da obra de arte e da historicidade (Vattimo). Por fim, desconstrutivismo (Derrida) se apresentou como um exercício interrogativo, de decomposição, crítico e de reorganização, dos alicerces estruturantes do pensamento abstrato ocidental desde Platão na antiguidade, até Freud passando por Hegel e demais teóricos da modernidade, considerados niilistas.

#### **16:15 – 17:15 – SESSÃO PLENÁRIA 4**

**Moderadora:** Sofia Miguens (IF-FLUP, U.Porto)

- **JOÃO CONSTÂNCIO** – FCSH-NOVA, Lisboa

##### ***Aspectos do niilismo em Nietzsche: naturalismo, perspectivismo e justificação estética***

O perspectivismo de Nietzsche defende que o mundo como um todo é “absurdo”, não tem uma meta, um valor, uma finalidade, um sentido, mas não defende que a condução de uma vida humana possa ser outra coisa que não um reger-se por metas, valores, fins, sentidos. Esta distinção é fundamental para que se compreenda que, por um lado, Nietzsche aceita a “verdade do niilismo” — aceita que o mundo é em si mesmo “absurdo”, o mundo não pode ser racionalmente justificado —, mas, por outro, entende que, num determinado tipo de cultura humana, o mundo pode ser justificado “enquanto fenómeno estético”. É esta possibilidade de uma justificação estética do mundo que faz do pensamento de Nietzsche uma “luta contra o niilismo”, na qual não se trata de reduzir todas as metas, valores, fins e sentidos a ilusões subjectivas, mas sim de ousar pensar uma “transvaloração de todos os valores”. A palestra considera, em particular, a crítica de Nietzsche ao niilismo do naturalismo positivista.

#### **17:30 – 18:30 – PAINEL VIII - PERSPETIVAS DO NIILISMO**

**Moderadora:** Sofia Miguens (IF-FLUP, U.Porto)

- 1 – **Martinho Moura** – Universidade Católica Portuguesa, Braga

##### ***A Study in the Ethics of Kant and MacIntyre***

In this brief essay, I intend to analyze, and contrast, two ethics. The ethics of Immanuel Kant, philosopher of the 18th century, and the ethics of the Aristotelian-Thomist Alasdair MacIntyre, one of the most distinguished moral philosophers of our days. Thus, I will contrast formalism with teleology; acting out of duty and being virtuous. For Kant, knowledge of metaphysics is not possible. Man knows

phenomena; he knows what his structure of perception allows him to know. Evidently, Kant does not fall into subjectivism – we all have the same structure of knowledge. Scientific knowledge is, therefore, valid knowledge, which results from a synthesis process operated by the transcendental subject. For the Thomist philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre, there is a telos, a purpose for life. Contrary to what happens with Immanuel Kant's philosophy of knowledge, it is not the subject that unifies reality. Unity is organic, it is organized; she is real. The subject thus has the ability – which necessarily goes beyond his/our understanding – to peer into the essence of an object. Human beings have a superior inclination, and the world is moved by the love of God. God acts according to a final cause, and this drift of love results from a typically human animality, which can only be accepted naturally. Bearing in mind that there are no great ideas that do not imply a certain vision of social order, we will reflect on the social and political visions that can only result from these two distinct ways of thinking.

2 - **João Silva** – IF-FLUP, U.Porto

### ***Representing something about nothing***

Representations (i.e., what can be true or false and can be thought and expressed), present things as being a certain way, and are usually representations of something real. The (potentially true or false, thinkable and expressible) content that France is north of Spain, for instance, is a representation of an existent, namely France, as being such that it is north of Spain, and following Frege we might say that the content can be decomposed into a fragment that determines France as a referent. However, the question arises whether there could be empty representations, about no being, containing a fragment with no referent. One important approach to intentionality holds that the representational content of mental states is grounded in the states' phenomenal character, i.e., the subjective aspect of the states or what it is like to be in them (Horgan and Tienson 2002, Pitt 2004, Farkas 2008). Assuming that phenomenal qualities are intrinsic and non-relational features of mental states, this approach implies that there is no metaphysically necessary connection between mental states having a certain content and the existence and presence of the objects referred by the fragments of the representational contents. Thus the states could have the same contents even if the objects did not exist. I think this approach has to be slightly modified. Based on some remarks by Frege (1918-1919), especially as interpreted by Kripke (2008), I hold that in some cases the circumstances that accompany the occurrence of the mental states contribute to the content. In particular, I think that the presence of the referred objects has that role. But, I will argue, the phenomenal character is enough to ensure the state has one or another complete representational