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Master Dissertation**

The Resurgence of the Conflict in Mozambique between the FRELIMO- Led Government and RENAMO: 2013 to the present day

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Abstract:

26 years have passed since RENAMO and FRELIMO signed a General Peace Agreement putting an end to a bloody civil war that devastated Mozambique, causing enormous suffering to Mozambican people.

Mozambique was considered one of the most successful cases of post-conflict transition in the world. However, after more than 20 years of a relative Peace a new conflict emerged in Mozambique in 2013 between the same actors of the past Civil War: FRELIMO and RENAMO. Although the current low-intensity conflict does not have the brutal dimension of the Civil War, this conflict does represent an important threat for Peace, therefore deserving consideration and analysis. Thus, the present dissertation focus on its political context, rooted in the evolution of the three major parties in Mozambique and also in the socioeconomic dimension, with a special attention to the regional asymmetries existing in Mozambique. In coincidence with the resurgence of the conflict, Mozambique became also known all over the world by the boom of the natural resources that were discovered in the northern part of the country. Despite the boom of the natural resources, Mozambique is one of the poorest countries in the world, with 60% of the population living in extremely poverty. Thus, our main purpose it is to identify the causes of the resurgence of this low-intensity conflict and to demonstrate that unless the conflict between FRELIMO and RENAMO is correctly solved on the basis of a truly and genuine reconciliation, the conflict can persist for more years in an even more violent scale.

Keywords: Civil War, Peace Agreements, Political Parties, Armed Conflict, Regional asymmetries, Poverty and Natural Resources

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List of Abbreviations

ANC African National Congress

CNE National Electoral Commission

FRELIMO Mozambique Liberation Front

GPA General Peace Agreement

HDI - Human Development Index

HRW Human Rights Watch

IESE Economic and Social Studies Institute

IMF International Monetary Fund

MANU Mozambique National African Union

MDM The Democratic Movement of Mozambique

MFA Armed Forces Movement

ONUMOZ United Nations Operation in Mozambique

RENAMO Mozambican National Resistance

UCDP Uppsala Conflict Data Program

UDENAMO National Democratic Union of Mozambique

UNAMI National African Union of Independent Mozambique

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Introduction

The 1992 General Peace Agreement (GPA) signed in Rome between the Mozambique Liberation Front (*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*: FRELIMO) and the rebel group Mozambican National Resistance (*Resistência Nacional Moçambicana*: RENAMO) put an end to a long and bloody Civil War, and paved the way for Mozambique to become widely regarded as one of the most successful post-conflict cases of the world.

The international community played an important role regarding the end of the Civil War. According to Benno J. Ndulo and Stephen A. O'Connell, African political regimes followed three stages "consolidation of authoritarian rule by the mid-1970s, crisis management under authoritarian rule to the late 1980s, and an outburst of democratization starting in 1990".¹ Mozambique was no exception. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the world went through enormous transformations, and democracy and capitalism were understood as having triumphed over totalitarianism and socialism. On the one hand, it was during that period that FRELIMO, changed its nature from a party inspired in the Marxist-Leninist ideology and underwent a democratic transition, and ultimately contributed to the democratization of national politics. This period in Mozambique was, to some extent, characterized by what Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle understand as 'regime transition, "a shift from one set of political procedures to another from an old pattern of rule to a new one".² On the other hand, coupled with the GPA, the end of the Apartheid, and the democratization period in South Africa, played a major role in RENAMO's transformation from a guerrilla movement into a political party; by resulting in the rebel party's deprivation of a major source of financial, military and political support.

Overall, the global shockwaves of the disintegration the Soviet Union's disintegration, as well the end of the Apartheid regime, allowed for democratic transition in Mozambique and, therefore, it's the

¹ Ndulo, Benno, J., and Stephen A. O'Connell. 1999. "Governance and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 13(3): p.45

² Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle. *Democratic Experiments in Africa. Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge University Press. 1997. p10

country's first multiparty elections in 1994. The period that encompassed Mozambique's democratic transition occurred during Samuel Huntington's "The Third Wave of Democratization", which had its starting point in the 25 April 1975 revolution in Portugal and ended in 1990. In fact, Mozambique's democratization had its climax with the 1990 Constitution, when the ruling party, FRELIMO, officially abandoned the Marxist-Leninist ideology and multiparty politics were introduced.

FRELIMO won a parliament majority in the first multiparty elections in 1994 and has been in power even since. However, FRELIMO's development into a democratic political party raises some questions, since nowadays FRELIMO and the constitutional government are regarded as being one and the same. The FRELIMO-Led government has strong parallels with what Kenneth F. Greene describes as dominant party systems, which are "hybrids that combine genuine elections with continuous executive and legislative rule by a single party for at least twenty consecutive years or four consecutive elections. These systems' key feature is that elections are meaningful, even though systematic biases in partisan competition make them substantially unfair".³

This is a fact in the eyes of RENAMO, which, despite having transformed from a guerrilla movement into a political party and stakeholder, has repeatedly argued that FRELIMO's electoral victories have been fraudulent. Given the blurred lines between the FRELIMO-led government and the party itself, together with the sequence of allegedly fraudulent electoral victories, RENAMO has insisted on the need to maintain bellicose capabilities in order to protect itself from FRELIMO's overwhelming control over national affairs and counterweight it.

Given the apparent context of a dominant party system in Mozambique, RENAMO began retraining war veterans in 2012 and sought to capitalize on the generalized popular perception that the political system fails to be inclusive and that tangible economic development is restricted to areas controlled by FRELIMO.

RENAMO's reassertion in national affairs and economic development become particularly relevant when considering that, in same year, large reserves of natural gas and oil were discovered in the

³ Kenneth F. Greene. Creating Competition: Patronage politics and the Pri's Demise. Working paper #345. Kellogg Institute. 2007. P.2

northernmost province of Cabo Delgado. From an economic perspective, that event brought forward two main, and largely opposing, consequences. Foreign investors have exerted pressure on the government to find a solution to the conflict, so as to safeguard their investments which, in return, will allow for the development of the industry and, therefore, have positive impacts in socioeconomic terms. On the other hand, oil and gas production prospect represent an important factor in conflict dynamics, especially as those resources are located close to RENAMO's areas of influence. In this regard, as in many African countries, like Angola or Congo, a link exists between armed conflicts and natural resources. According to Philippe Lebillon's study on the war-natural resources link, "in some cases violent traditions and a radicalization of ideologies have turned them into full-scale civil wars. Growing opposition to economic and increased demand for raw materials is likely to increase such adversarial politics and the need for more effective dialogue".⁴ Such context is compounded by steep contrasts between poverty and misery, and concentration of large revenues in the pockets of the elites and government.

Hence, the aim of this dissertation is to understand the causes of the resurgence of the conflict between RENAMO and the FRELIMO led-Government⁵ in 2013 and how political and socioeconomic perspectives influence its dynamics. In addition, the conflict analysis will also take into consideration two particular quantitative parameters that differentiate Civil War from domestic conflict: Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler understand Civil War as an internal conflict resulting in at least 1,000 deaths per year⁶, while Themnér and Wallensteen establish a minimum of 25 deaths per year as a criteria for singling out a domestic conflict.⁷

From a political standpoint, the dissertation will focus on the evolution of the main political parties in Mozambique since the democratic transition and the GPA, in the 90's. Chapter I will seek to

⁴ Philippe Lebillon. The Political Ecology of War and Resource Exploitation. *Studies in Political Economy* 79, Spring 2003; pp.59-95. p.86

⁵ The expression 'FRELIMO-led Government' will be applied throughout the dissertation as a reference to the blurred distinction between the ruling party and government.

⁶ Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. *Greed and grievance in civil war*. Centre for the Study of African Economies. Oxford University Press 2004. Available at: <https://www.econ.nyu.edu/user/debraj/Courses/Readings/CollierHoeffler.pdf>. p.565

⁷ (Themnér & Wallensteen 2011).UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook 1. Uppsala Conflict Data Program. p.1 Available at: http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/63/a_63324-f_Codebook_UCDP_PRIO_Armed_Conflict_Dataset_v4_2011.pdf

provide a historical contextualization, starting from independence until the 1977-1992 Civil War, in which external and internal dynamics of the conflict will be analysed. Chapter II will give emphasizes to the democratic transition, from the changes implemented with the 1990 Constitution, followed by the GPA signed in Rome 1992, and the first multiparty elections in 1994. This Chapter will seek to understand the evolution and transformation of FRELIMO, RENAMO and the Democratic Movement of Mozambique (*Movimento Democrático de Moçambique*: MDM) – which was created in 2009 by a RENAMO dissident, Daviz Simango. The subchapter on the political parties will address their nature and the general elections of 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009.⁸ In Chapter III, the focus will be on the socioeconomic perspectives of Mozambique. For one hand, it will be explained the regional asymmetries within Mozambique rooted on the political divisions and consequently poverty inequalities among Mozambicans. For the other hand, it will be explained the newfound of Natural Resources in the northern province of Cabo Delgado. This new discovery not only can play an important role within the conflict as well as can bring the Dutch Disease Phenomenon that is the casual relationship between the increase in the economic development of a specific sector resulting in the decline of other sectors. Last but not least, Chapter IV pretends to answer the main question of this dissertation: (1) why did tensions escalated to armed clashes between the two long-time foes? (2) Why in 2013?

The main goal of the thesis is not only to underline the principal causes of the resurgence of the conflict in 2013 but also to prove that if not solved correctly, it can persist, on an even more violent scale, for many more years.

⁸ The 2014 elections are analysed in Chapter IV, since it helps understand the drivers of the resurgence of the Conflict.

Methodology and State of the Art

This dissertation is pillared on two particular questions: (1) why did tensions deescalate into armed clashes between the two Civil War foes? (2) and why in 2013? The search for answers will be undertaken via qualitative research methods.

Regarding Chapter I, and in order to understand the causes of the Civil War, we used books about the history of Mozambique, of which Christian Geffray's work, "*La Cause des Armes au Mozambique*"⁹, was an essential part. The author presents a perspective on the causes of the 1977-1992 Civil War in Mozambique that differs from other authors, the likes of whom focused on the role played by Ian Smith's regime in Rhodesia and the Apartheid Regime in South Africa in the creation of RENAMO as a guerrilla movement. Geffray, despite also recognising the importance of the international system for understanding the conflict and its causes, believed that the main causes were rooted on politico-cultural and economic factors. Chapter I will address these factors. Moreover, Alex Vines provides a more recent overview of RENAMO and its leader, Afonso Dhlakama, in which he states that, although having been the main opposition party in Africa until 2002, its influence and power decreased overtime, "due to exclusion politics by the party of government FRELIMO, and because of tactical mistakes by Afonso Dhlakama, RENAMO'S leader for 33 years"¹⁰.

Chapter II addresses the democratic transition in Mozambique and the 1992 GPA. In view of exploring this theme, the chapter will touch on some ideas presented by Eric Berman¹¹ regarding the Peacekeeping Operation of the United Nations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). Legal documents, such as the General Peace Agreement and the 1975 and 1990 Constitutions, will also be used. Public expressions regarding the principal actors of the Civil War and the current on-going tensions based on their comments

⁹ Geffray, Christian. *A Causa das Armas. Antropologia da Guerra Contemporânea em Moçambique*. Edições Afrontamento, 1991.

¹⁰ Alex Vines. *Renamo's Rise and Decline: The politics of Reintegration in Mozambique*. *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.20, No.3, June 2013, pp.375–393. p.375

¹¹ Eric Berman. *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Mozambique*. United Nations Publications, 1996

in public articles will also be used. Research papers will also be among the main sources of information, especially papers written by Maputo-based IESE (*Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos*), an independent research organization.

As secondary resources, we will use statistics and databases from International Organizations such as United Nations and World Bank, on economic, political and social matters, so as to support arguments and facts and, as importantly, help us have a better perception of past and current challenges, which will be the core of Chapter III.

One particular obstacle that we met during the writing of this dissertation was the fact that events are currently ongoing, which means that there is a shortage of publicly available information about recent developments. Given such limitations, in Chapter IV we will seek to answer the two main dissertation questions as per the aforementioned methodological tools together with recently-produced information sources.

For two months, in August and September 2017, we had the opportunity to conduct a considerable number of interviews in Portugal and in Mozambique. These interviews also provided relevant information to the understanding of the existing situation and, consequently, to the answers to the main questions of the dissertation.

I. Historical Contextualisation

Colonial Period and Independence

Following the end of the Second World War, and encouraged by the creation of the United Nations in 1945, most of the European colonies in the African Continent stepped up their demands for self-determination, paving the way for the independence wave throughout the 1950's and 1960's. At that time, in sub-Saharan Africa, only Ethiopia, Liberia and South Africa existed as independent nations while elsewhere in Africa, European colonial control was essentially unchallenged. Between the 1950's and 1960's, a total of 34 colonies and protectorates of Great Britain, France and Belgium became independent. This was not the case, however, with the African territories under the rule of Portugal, whose regime sought to maintain its colonies at all costs, ultimately deploying military forces, as resistance to the colonial power grew stronger within the colonies. That was a time when the international system was polarized around two global powers – the United States of America (USA) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) –, the Cold War period. The USSR regarded the African liberation movements as windows of opportunity to extend its sphere of influence into the continent and, accordingly, provided political, diplomatic, financial and military support. That was particularly noted in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Somalia, “where the strategic interests of the Cold War powers involved them directly or indirectly in the military contests for power after 1974”.¹² The USSR's efforts to extend its influence and implement its ideology in Africa, which was largely expressed in the form of economic aid and arms transfers, was a game-changer for the independence movements, particularly regarding the balance of power towards the colonial forces and, as importantly, international legitimization. In this chapter, we will analyze the emergence and development of independence movements in Mozambique, followed by the beginning of post-independence and the Civil War.

¹²Benno J.Ndulu and Stephen A. O'Connell. Governance and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. Journal of Economic Perspectives - volume 13, Summer 1999. p.48

On 9 December 1961, Tanganyika gained independence and, after the unification with Zanzibar, became known as Tanzania. As liberation movements stepped up their anti-colonial discourses and initiated military activities in several regional countries, especially in Angola, it did not take long for Mozambique to join the momentum and begin its own struggle for independence. Coupled with the regional growing pro-independence wave, the acute socioeconomic disparities, lack of infrastructures and generalized low-living standards and underdevelopment, represented a spark for Mozambique's own liberation initiative. Aware of the regional context, Mozambican nationals in countries such as Tanzania, Malawi, and Zambia – where anti-colonial resistance movement had been growing – began establishing their own organized liberation movements. The first movement – the National Democratic Union of Mozambique (União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique: UDENAMO) – was born in former Rhodesia, today's Zimbabwe, in 1960, by 20-year-old Adelino Gwambe. UDENAMO was comprised of individuals from the provinces of Manica, Sofala, Gaza, and Lourenço Marques (now Maputo). In 1961, the Mozambique National African Union (MANU) was formed in Tanzania, it was headed by Matthew Mmole and mainly consisted of members of the Makonde ethnic group – the dominant ethnicity in the northeast of Mozambique.¹³ A third organization emerged in 1961, in Malawi, the National African Union of Independent Mozambique (União Nacional Africana de Moçambique Independente: UNAMI). Founded and led by Baltazar da Costa Chagonga, it was mostly comprised by individuals originating from the region of Tete (Baltazar da Costa Changonga was from Tete) but exiled in Malawi.

As pointed out by Professor Francisco Proença Garcia, the first President of FRELIMO, Eduardo Mondlane, believed that the 16 June 1960 massacre by Portuguese authorities of more than 600 farmers peacefully demonstrating against colonial rule, in Mueda, Cabo Delgado province, spurred “the biggest resentment towards the Portuguese”¹⁴ and drove the three liberation movements – UDENAMO, MANU and UNAMI – to merge and establish the Mozambican Liberation Front (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique: FRELIMO) on 25 June 1962, under the influence of the President of Tanzania, Julius

¹³ The Makonde are an ethnic group in southeast Tanzania and northern Mozambique. The *Maconde* (Portuguese word) People in Mozambique always resisted the Portuguese colonial rule.

¹⁴ Francisco Miguel Gouveia Pinto Proença Garcia. *Análise Global de Uma Guerra (Moçambique 1964-1974)*. (Porto, Outubro 2001) Available at: http://ultramar.terraweb.biz/Livros/FranciscoGarcia/Analise-global-de-uma-guerra_.pdf p.80

Nyerere. FRELIMO was established in Ghana's capital city, Accra, with the purpose of achieving independence and end colonialism in Mozambique. The headquarters of FRELIMO were in the Tanzanian capital, Dar-es-Salaam, and Eduardo Mondlane assumed the presidency and Uria Simango the vice-presidency. According to Eric Berman, FRELIMO was marred with divisions and differences since its inception,¹⁵ including on the part of vice-president Uria Simango, which were mostly associated with how independence should be pursued. In short, there were those who believed that independence could be achieved via a negotiating and political approach; while others thought that FRELIMO would only be able to assert its right through prolonged guerrilla warfare and strong popular mobilization.¹⁶ Regardless of the divisions, the ultimate goal, independence, was consensual. Not even the assassination of Eduardo Mondlane, on 3 February 1969, deterred FRELIMO from it.¹⁷

Between 1970 and 1974, the war between FRELIMO and the Portuguese Armed Forces intensified and it was the period when the infamous massacres of Mucumbuna, Chawola, Juwau, and Wiriyaumu (1972) took place. The massacre of Wiriyaumu gained worldwide notoriety when Adrian Hastings, a Roman Catholic priest, who had fought colonialism and oppression from Africa to the Balkans, denounced it in the English newspaper "The Times".¹⁸

In 1973 and 1974, FRELIMO made military advances into the central provinces of Mozambique, a time when Portugal was not only "losing the hand for the battle in Mozambique but also for Guinea-Bissau and Angola", which "had become the major cause of the officers' coup in Portugal 1974"¹⁹. The Armed Forces Movement (Movimento das Forças Armadas: MFA), which overthrew the Portuguese Prime Minister, then Marcelo Caetano and his regime, had as its main motto "Democratization, Decolonization and Development".

¹⁵ Eric Berman. *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Mozambique*. (New York and Geneva. United Nations Publications. 1996) p.10

¹⁶ Jacinto Veloso. *Memórias em Voo Rasante. Contributos para a História Política Recente da África Austral*. (Papa Letras. 2007). p.65

¹⁷ Eric Berman. *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Mozambique*. (New York and Geneva. United Nations Publications. 1996) p.10

¹⁸ Madalena Sampaio. *Cronologia 1970-1974: Da intensificação da luta armada à Revolução dos Cravos*. (DW. 2013) Available at: <http://www.dw.com/pt-002/cronologia-1970-1974-da-intensificacao-da-luta-armada-a-revolucao-dos-cravos/a-17280935>

¹⁹ John S.Saul. *A difficult Road. The Transition to Socialism in Mozambique* (South Africa. November, 1985). p.10

In 1974, following the troubled period of the Colonial War, and thanks to the important role played by the international community, Mozambican and Portuguese stakeholders began a period of negotiations in view of ending the war, terminate colonial rule and establish independence. The negotiations took place in the capital city of Zambia, Lusaka, and culminated with the President of FRELIMO, Samora Machel, and the Portuguese Foreign Minister, Mário Soares, signing the “Lusaka Agreement” on 7 September 1974. On that same day, “angry settlers [in Lourenço de Marques] seized the radio station and called for a Rhodesian-style unilateral declaration of independence, sparking off anti-white riots in the black suburbs”.²⁰ More than 400 people died in these confrontations. Nevertheless, the Lusaka Accord allowed for the Portuguese government to transfer power to FRELIMO and thus, on 25 June of 1975, Mozambique became independent, with Samora Machel as the first head-of-state. On that occasion the charismatic leader addressed the nation with the famous "Message to the Mozambican People":

Mozambicans,

Militant Comrades and Combatants of FRELIMO,

With the Transitional Government, a new era of our history starts, the era of the final march for Independence. Today, we assume the Government Directive in our country in the transitional period, which will take Mozambique to the Independence on 25 of June of 1975, the birthday of FRELIMO.²¹

²⁰ Human Rights Watch. *Conspicuous Destruction: War, Famine and the Reform Process in Mozambique* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992). p.19

²¹ Samora Machel. *Mensagem ao Povo de Moçambique*. (Edições Afrontamento, Abril de 1974). p.5

The Sixteen Years Civil War

One of the main original goals of independence movements was the elimination of everything related to colonialism and capitalism. However, at the moment of independence, as the skilled Portuguese population left the country, there were only a few educated Mozambicans left to govern the country. The ruling FRELIMO realized that it had to rule over 13 million people, 90% of whom were illiterate. In view of creating a new society under socialism, FRELIMO created the “Reeducation Program”. The government launched an anti-opposition repression campaign, arresting anyone deemed to be against the new regime, while submitting them to reeducation programs. FRELIMO also sought to overhaul the country’s economic and social structures aimed at achieving a greater level of state control. Accordingly, following independence, the State nationalized education and health services, as well as properties owned by Portuguese nationals, a context that created significant challenges for the new authorities

These challenges were compounded by the fact that the government had to govern a large territory with deep socioeconomic asymmetries, especially between regions and also rural and urban areas. Such divisions were particularly deep in economic terms, particularly in regional terms, as the south was considerably richer than the northern and central regions. Economic cleavages within a country are often followed by social discontent and disgruntlement, which can in turn lead to the emergence of guerrilla movements. These are generally “organized in environments of extreme rural poverty where economic mismanagement at the national level was reflected in a bias against providing public goods and investments in the very regions from which the rebellions emerged”.²² After ten years of Colonial War, the country had “a mortality rate of children under five estimated at 298 per thousand, an illiteracy rate of 70 percent, and a per capita income of about \$150, [making it] one of the poorest nations in the world. By any calculation, at least 60 percent of its people live in absolute poverty”²³, and signs of an internal armed

²² Jeremy M. Weinstein. *Inside Rebellion. The Politics of Insurgent Violence.* (Cambridge, 2007) p.55

²³ Human Rights Watch. *Conspicuous Destruction: War, Famine and the Reform Process in Mozambique* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992). p.10

struggle re-emerged, leading to the so-called period of the sixteen years Civil War (1977-1992). Two key factors led to the Civil War, which can be roughly analyzed as external and internal.

External factors - International influence

A thorough understanding of the Civil War and political dynamics during that period requires an analysis of international influence and the geopolitical context throughout the history of Mozambique in the XX century. As Christian Geffray stated in “The Cause of the Arms”,²⁴ geography represented an important factor in the dynamics of the Mozambican Civil War. Mozambique was then bordered by the white-settler regimes of Rhodesia and South Africa, the likes of which played key roles in the Mozambican internal conflict. With the advent of independence in the Portuguese colony, some land-locked neighboring countries feared they could lose access to Mozambique’s seaports and thereby becoming unable to export and import goods overseas. Some Portuguese and anti-communists found in Rhodesia an opportunity to establish a movement that could counter-balance FRELIMO. This was the case with Andre Matsangaissa, who in 1976 had escaped from a re-education camp and became the first president of RENAMO. Matsangaissa was a former fighter of FRELIMO, just like his successor and current head of that political force, Afonso Dlakhama.

In 1976, president Samora Machel implemented the sanctions decided by the United Nations against Rhodesia and closed the borders. The UN sanctions, dated from May 1968, were introduced to condemn and punish “Ian Smith's white-supremacist regime in Rhodesia, which has been deplored as an international renegade ever since it broke away from British rule 13 months ago”.²⁵ The Independence unilateral declaration of Rhodesia was in November 1965. Mozambique’s decision negatively impacted Rhodesia, since the country had lost railway access to international markets, and thereby was unable to

²⁴ Christian Geffray, *A Causa das Armas. Antropologia da Guerra Contemporânea em Moçambique*. Edições Afrontamento. 1991

²⁵ Time. United Nations: Sanctions Against Rhodesia. (December, 1966) Time. Available at: <http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,840760,00.html>

export and import from overseas. Thus, those who were compromised with the Ian Smith's regime, "Frustrated and resentful proceeded to recruit, organize and train a mercenary troop, consisting essentially of the former demobilized Mozambican soldiers of the colonial army immigrated in Rhodesia with only one know-how - the one of war".²⁶ That was key for increasing RENAMO's support base. In 1976, with the death of Andre Matsangaissa in Gorongosa and Afonso Dhlakama's rise to RENAMO's leadership, the first signs of the re-ignition of armed conflict started to emerge in Mozambique. In the following year, the conflict reached the central region of the country and, by 1980 the war had attained greater proportions, driven by the independence of Zimbabwe. On 18 of April of 1980, which had resulted in RENAMO losing support from the extinct Rhodesian regime and finding an alternative further south, in the apartheid regime of South Africa. On the other hand, South Africa regarded its alliance with RENAMO as an opportunity to counter-balance FRELIMO, which was supporting the African National Congress's (ANC) claim to end the apartheid regime.²⁷ South Africa stepped up military support to RENAMO, by increasing its troops from 1000 soldiers to 8000 soldiers in just two years (Human Rights Watch, 1994 p.8). In 1982, the war reached the southern province of Gaza and was knocking at the door of the capital city, Maputo.

In sum, within the context of the Cold War that allowed for secondary wars, external intervention played an important role in the Mozambican Civil War. These "secondary wars" consisted of civil wars influenced by an increasingly bipolar world. In essence, the Soviet Union found in Africa an opportunity to extend its ideology, ultimately helping to establish and strengthen liberation movements, including FRELIMO, and promote its soft-power, particularly by deploying medical staff, engineers, professors and skilled people, mainly from Cuba, the Soviet Union, East Germany and North Korea.²⁸

²⁶ Christian Geffray. *A Causa das Armas, Antropologia da Guerra Contemporânea em Moçambique*. (Edições Afrontamento Porto. 1991). p.12

²⁷ *Ibid*, p.12

²⁸ *Ibid*, p.12

Internal factors - lack of identity recognition

With the adoption of a Marxist-Leninist ideology,²⁹ FRELIMO sought to deepen and expand state intervention in the economic and social domains. In “The cause of the arms”, Christian Geffray demonstrates that, by the end of colonialism, the territory of Mozambique was characterized by sharp differences between provinces. In fact, the author argues, FRELIMO “was incapable of determining how to build a Nation without erasing the diversity and heterogeneity of the history concrete to each social group. So, they intended to unite and integrate those into one unique identity, the Mozambican citizen”³⁰ in a country divided by deep economic and identity differences. FRELIMO attempted to create “Communal Villages”, wherein 80% of the population had to leave their homes and join those communities to work in collective camps and cooperatives. This initiative was based on a policy of dissolution or decentralization of the population in rural villages, ultimately aimed at investing the accumulated wealth into modern goods of production and finance public services, such as education and health³¹. The problem lied on cultural roots, as many Mozambicans did not want to leave their homes or their camps of cultivation due to specific historical and cultural identities; in Mozambique, just as in other African countries, the concept of local community is a key bonding factor. Nevertheless, almost overnight, millions of Mozambicans were forced to leave their tribal communities, farms, villages and homes. According to Christian Geffray, these developments played a major role in the history of RENAMO. Most of the people forced to leave their homes never felt integrated into the Communal Villages, something that worked in favor of RENAMO, since the opposition political force upheld the respect for identity and traditional areas as strategic principles. While FRELIMO tried to control the population from rural areas, RENAMO regarded it as an opportunity to persuade those people to join it. Geffray noted that, “all the reports, without any exception, referred to the question of the Communal Villages as an explication of the entrance to the war in the side of RENAMO. RENAMO knew about this

²⁹ Marxist-Leninist Ideology is based on political and economic theories that were used as the doctrine of the Soviet Union

³⁰ Christian Geffray. *A Causa das Armas, Antropologia da Guerra Contemporânea em Moçambique*. (Edições Afrontamento Porto. 1991) p.15

³¹ *Ibid.*,p.15

crisis and their military action was just against the habitations of the Communal Villages to encourage their habitants to come back to their homes”.³²

Coupled with lack of recognition and respect for cultural diversification, socioeconomic factors also contributed to the outbreak and evolution of the Civil War. In fact, it was by capitalizing on socioeconomic driven grievances, that RENAMO managed to gradually win over more regions between 1984 and 1986. According to Jeremy M. Weinstein, “economic change may also result in violence if it is more detrimental to some social groups than to others” as well if it favours one region to another.³³ Weinstein adds that economic change is a characteristic of guerrilla movements, the likes of which “organize in environments of extreme rural poverty where economic mismanagement at the national level was reflected in a bias against providing public goods and investments in the very regions from which the rebellion emerged”.³⁴

Throughout the course of the Civil War, three particular groups were more susceptible to join the RENAMO guerrilla: local chiefs, people forced to leave their homes, and young people who did not feel integrated in urban areas. In fact, as Geoffrey argues, the issue of “identity” and lack of recognition of Mozambique’s social and economic differences were key at the onset, and during, the conflict. The author states that the war was a consequence of the humiliation of the leaders of the villages, as well as the destruction of places of worship such as trees and *Machamba* (small farms) by FRELIMO³⁵. Regional asymmetries were present in Mozambique since the colonial period, when social and economic cleavages shaped cultures and identities. Those were key drivers of the civil war and, to a certain extent, influenced the geographic orientation of the two antagonists: FRELIMO forces were concentrated in the south essentially in urban centres, while RENAMO focused its efforts in rural areas in the centre and north of the country. It is important to note that despite the lack of identity recognition by FRELIMO, FRELIMO

³² Christian Geffray. *A Causa das Armas, Antropologia da Guerra Contemporânea em Moçambique*. (Edições Afrontamento Porto. 1991).p.24

³³ Jeremy M. Weinstein. *Inside Rebellion. The Politics of Insurgent Violence*. (Cambridge, 2007) p.35

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p.56

³⁵ *Machambas* is a Mozambican dialect word related with the cultivation camps.

had ambitious education and health programs in which the number of primary school students doubled in just a few years, receiving wide international acclaim.³⁶

Impact of the Civil-War

According to the 1992 Human Rights Watch Report “Conspicuous Destruction: War, Famine and the Reform Process in Mozambique”, the years between 1977 and 1992 were characterized by authoritarian rule on the part of the FRELIMO, and human rights violations and atrocities by RENAMO rebels.³⁷ According to Jeremy M.Weinstein (2007), a rebel group tends to make more indiscriminate violent acts when supported by external actors and/or when it has access to revenues from natural resources³⁸. According to the HRW report, the two belligerent parties were “responsible for human rights abuses in the course of the war, though the evidence conclusively shows that RENAMO has committed the large majority of gross abuses”.³⁹ In fact, “RENAMO is an unusual, possibly unique, example of an insurgent group which has been able to mount a successful military campaign without attempting to gain the active support of the population, contrary to the textbook principles of guerrilla warfare”.⁴⁰

There were four main domains where the conflict impacted the most. The first one pertains to strategic physical violence against civilians. Although both sides conducted violence, it was more frequent on the part of RENAMO. Secondly, forced relocation and war resulted in 40% of the Mozambican population being displaced⁴¹. The third point relates to recruitment of new fighters, particularly by RENAMO, which often resorted to violence and child recruitment. According to the Human Rights Watch Children’s Rights Project, RENAMO recruited children aged fourteen or less, who were forced to participate in the war in return for food or even sent to local villages to demand food

³⁶ Human Rights Watch. Conspicuous Destruction: War, Famine and the Reform Process in Mozambique (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992). p.23

³⁷ Ibid., p.23

³⁸ Jeremy M.Weinstein. Inside Rebellion. The Politics of Insurgent Violence. (Cambridge, 2007) p.7

³⁹ Human Rights Watch. Conspicuous Destruction: War, Famine and the Reform Process in Mozambique (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992)p. 5

⁴⁰ João Mosca. S.O.S ÁFRICA (Instituto Piaget. 2004). p.99/100

⁴¹ Ibid., p.99

supplies for RENAMO forces.⁴² One of the main features of guerrilla movements is the impact on populations in the areas where they operate, particularly by extorting food resources and other supplies to support their activities. The two sides of fight also kidnapped several people. There were many cases where troops forced people to commit horrific atrocities, and then told them that they could not return home because of what they had done. Finally, the fourth is the impact that the conflict had in terms of famine. The Human Rights Watch showed that famine was caused by destruction of infrastructures, including farms and local markets. The widespread famine, regarded as a wholly artificial food crisis, “was an inevitable and predictable consequence of their military strategies pursued by other reasons”.⁴³ In other words, far from being related to natural phenomena, such as droughts, the food crisis was a consequence of the conflict.

In short, during the sixteen-year civil war (1977 - 1992), almost 600,000 lives were lost due to “war, hunger and disease”⁴⁴; as afore mentioned, 40% of the population was displaced between 1980 and 1986; GDP decreased by more than 30%; external debt spiked almost 500% between 1984 and 1992; 23% of the shops and 27% of the railways were destroyed; and, by 1991, 57,8% of the schools were shut down or destroyed.⁴⁵ The civil war was extremely violent and had dramatic economic and social consequences. Education was virtually non-existent, the population lacked even the basic life conditions, while socioeconomic development was absent.

As Christian Geffray argues, “the war was also fed by political and social ruptures of the rural societies in Mozambique”, leading to “the loss of social and family articulation that [have an impact on] poverty and criminality. (...) Last but not least, the conflicts left several individual and community psychological damage that can endure for generations”.⁴⁶

In 1984, Samora Machel and the President of South Africa, Pieter Botha signed the Nkomati

⁴² Children in Combat. Human Rights Watch Children’s Rights Project. January 1995. p.15

⁴³ Human Rights Watch. *Conspicuous Destruction: War, Famine and the Reform Process in Mozambique* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992). p.5

⁴⁴ Human Rights Watch. *Conspicuous Destruction: War, Famine and the Reform Process in Mozambique* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992). p.3

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p.3

⁴⁶ Christian Geffray, *A Causa das Armas. Antropologia da Guerra Contemporânea em Moçambique*. Edições Afrontamento. 1991p.25

Accord. The agreement was essentially aimed at ending the Mozambican civil war, according to which the South African government would cease to support RENAMO, and the government of Mozambique would do the same regarding the African National Congress (ANC). However, the accord failed to be respected, as RENAMO continued to receive support, and the Civil War endured, until 1992, when the Rome Peace Agreement was signed. President Joaquim Chissano, on the Mozambican side, who had succeeded Samora Machel following his death on a plane crash in South Africa on 19 October 1986, signed the peace agreement. That day marked one of Mozambique's post-independent key moments. Thirty years following the death of Samora Machel, Mozambicans hold a high esteem for the country's first head-of-state. As the famous Mozambican writer, Mia Couto, put it: "He was really a fantastic man, an extremely universal man, someone who had solved all the possibilities of resentment, someone who was capable of understanding different worlds because he did not need to prove he was an authentically Mozambican."⁴⁷ The next chapter will analyze the hard years that followed.

⁴⁷ Tânia Reis. *A minha Pátria é Moçambique*. Editora Guerra & Paz. 2017. p.55

II. Democratic Transition in Mozambique

How to end a long Civil War?

Following the previous chapter, we could see that the Civil War was essentially fuelled by external support. Hence, as it is explained in the Journal of Economic Perspectives “Governance and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa”, “African political regimes tended to evolve in three stages: consolidation of authoritarian rule by the mid-1970s, crisis management under authoritarian rule to the late 1980s, and an outburst of democratization starting in 1990”.⁴⁸ This pattern is applicable to Mozambique. However, and contrary to the majority of political regimes in the African continent, Mozambique, in this period, was widely regarded as success story and, in fact, one of the most successful post-conflict transitions in Africa. But, why the resurgence of the conflict? What justifies this statement? How and why the Civil War ended in the 90’s?

In 1984, Mozambique was experiencing social and economic difficulties, not only due to the war but also to the decision by donors to suspend aid. The United States of America (US), for instance, suspended aid partly due to the fact that “inside the American Congress, there were supporters of RENAMO who saw it as the ‘liberal’ counterpart to FRELIMO (Cohen 2000). While the US Congress never approved proposals to officially give support to RENAMO, in practice there was a compromise”.⁴⁹ In fact, Cold War dynamics were essential in this regard, since many international actors regarded RENAMO as an important counter-weight vis-a-vis the FRELIMO’s Marxist-Leninist ideology. Following the US decision, many international organisations suspended aid.

With the loss of international support and a dramatic humanitarian situation during the 80’s, FRELIMO realised it was losing leverage regarding RENAMO. As the economy collapsed, Samora Machel, driven by pragmatism, began efforts to make fundamental changes and, in 1985, initiated a

⁴⁸ Ndulu, Benno, J., and Stephen A. O’Connell. 1999. "Governance and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 13(3): p.45

⁴⁹ Roberta Holanda Maschietto. *Beyond Peacebuilding. The Challenges of Empowerment Promotion in Mozambique.* University of Coimbra. 2016. p.101

process to change the party's ideology, towards making it more opened to a multi-party system and market economy.⁵⁰ Following the death of president Samora Machel, his successor, Joaquim Chissano, continued efforts to alter the party's ideology. FRELIMO joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, due to the country's urgent need for financial aid. In 1989, during the fifth FRELIMO Congress, under Joaquim Chissano, the party decided to abandon the Marxist-Leninist ideology and adhere to a liberal democratic political and economic system⁵¹. The shift towards the West allowed for foreign investments to start pouring into the country. Furthermore, this shift also represented a major blow for RENAMO, since it could not anymore uphold the fight for liberal democracy as a justification for its operations and foreign support from the West. Additionally, the end of the Apartheid, in 1991, resulted in RENAMO losing its main financial supporter.

As a result of external and internal dynamics, both FRELIMO and RENAMO realised that the war could not produce a total victor and, therefore, the latter "initiated efforts to transform itself into a political party".⁵² In 1989, RENAMO held its first party Congress "kick-starting its progressive transformation from an armed faction into a political organization (Venâncio and Chan 1998; Manning 2002)".⁵³ By the late 1980's, the antagonists sought to reach a political solution to the conflict and, in 1989 both sides began peace talks, culminating in 1990 with the Constitutional Reform known as the Constitution of Mozambique. The 1990 Constitution differs dramatically from that of 1975, namely in democratic terms.

Comparing the Constitution of 1975 and 1990 there are enormous important differences, democratically speaking. In the Constitution of 1975, where the government had as slogan "*A Luta Continua*" (The struggle has to continue), the first article asserted "The People's Republic of Mozambique, as a result of secular resistance and the heroic and victorious struggle of the Mozambican people under the leadership of FRELIMO against Portuguese colonial domination and imperialism, is a

⁵⁰ Eric Morier-Genoud. Mozambique since 1989. Shaping Democracy after Socialism. p.153

⁵¹ Ibid., p.153

⁵² Alice Dinerman. Revolution, Counter-Revolution and Revisionism in Postcolonial Africa. The Case of Mozambique, 1975-1994. (Routledge, New York. 2006). p.60

⁵³ Roberta Holanda Maschietto. Beyond Peacebuilding. The Challenges of Empowerment Promotion in Mozambique. University of Coimbra. 2016. p.121

Sovereign, Independent and Democratic State”⁵⁴ comparing with the Constitution of 1990 where it affirmed that “The Republic of Mozambique is an Independent State, Sovereign, Democratic and with Social Justice” it is possible to see that the ideology changed. When comparing both Constitutions, it is inevitable to note that FRELIMO disappears as the only force of the state. It is also useful to note that there was a remarkable shift from the key objectives in the Article nº4 of 1975 and in the Article nº6 of 1990. That is to say that in the 1975 Constitution, the goals changed from a more post-colonial perspective, with the objectives were essentially about eliminating all signs of colonialism and reinforcing a democratic popular power, comparing with the Constitution of 1990. In 1990, the Constitution did not make a reference to the Colonialism or popular power. Instead, it focused essentially about the defence of Mozambique Independency and consolidating national unity. The Constitution goals of 1990 also mentioned Democracy, Human Rights and Liberties, another important change when compared with the 1975 Constitution where the references were essentially about the continuation of the struggle against colonialism and imperialism. Finally an important road to Democracy in the Constitutional Reform was the change in the Article nº47 of the 1975 Constitution which stated that the “President of The Republic of Mozambique is the President of FRELIMO” to “Until the realisation of the General Elections, the President of Mozambique is the President of FRELIMO”.⁵⁵ Moreover, the Constitution of 1990 contributed to the introduction of a democratic atmosphere in Mozambique. With the implementation of a Democratic Rule of Law, separation of powers and Pluralism in the Constitution, “FRELIMO took its time in opening direct negotiations with RENAMO, thus ensuring that it was in an optimal position at the negotiating table and giving itself time to define the details of the political system as events unfolded”⁵⁶ and also opened space for the first multiparty elections in the following years.

This chapter seeks to analyse the transition from war to peace and the democratic shift in Mozambique, by answering the following questions: What was agreed upon in the peace talks of the final

⁵⁴ Constitution of Moçambique 1975. “*A República Popular de Moçambique, fruto da resistência secular e da luta heróica e vitoriosa do Povo Moçambicano, sob a direcção da FRELIMO, contra a dominação colonial portuguesa e o imperialismo, é um Estado Soberano, Independente e Democrático*”

⁵⁵ Constitution of Mozambique 1975; Constitution of Mozambique 1990

⁵⁶ Eric Morier-Genoud. Mozambique since 1989. Shaping Democracy after Socialism. p.155

General Peace Agreement signed in Rome? The Rome Peace Talks began in July 1990 to put an end the Civil War in Mozambique. What was the role-played by international organisations in Mozambican politics? Why was Mozambique's democratic transition considered one of the most successful in the world?

The General Peace Agreement

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the end of the Cold War and the Apartheid regime impacted over the financial support for RENAMO and FRELIMO. Coupled with this, in “the context of global shift toward neoliberal economics and democratization, the parties had little choice but to negotiate”⁵⁷. The first phase of the negotiation was the Nkomati Non-Aggression Pact, as explained in the previous Chapter. However, this pact had limited impact, since South Africa Apartheid continued to finance RENAMO. The second phase of negotiations began in 1989, following the end of the apartheid and the Cold War. The then famine crisis also contributed to drive both antagonists towards starting peace talks. In 1988, the civil society, namely the Mozambican churches, with the help of neighbouring governments, played a key role by promoting negotiations. President Joaquim Chissano allowed church leaders to take part in the talks with RENAMO. The Catholic Church's leaders wanted by themselves to participate in the negotiations of peace mainly because they "wanted to see if an end could be put to the armed conflict. We had not been asked by the government to do this, but we contacted various people who could help us in this mission”.⁵⁸ The president of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, and his Kenyan counterpart, Danial Arap Moi, were the facilitators between RENAMO and the Church, which “led to a significant breakthrough in February 1989 when church leaders returned from talks in Kenya with a clear message that RENAMO

⁵⁷ Conciliation Resources. *An International Review of Peace Initiatives Accord. The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective* (London, 1998) p.7

⁵⁸ *Religious Leaders meet with MNR.* (September, 1989) Available at: http://www.mozambiquehistory.net/history/peace_process/89/09-10/19890900_religious_leaders_meet_mnr.pdf

too was tired of war and open to negotiations”.⁵⁹ After the Nairobi talks, Joaquim Chissano announced that RENAMO would be allowed to run in elections. Nevertheless, the talks faced an even greater challenge: how to transform a guerrilla movement into a political party with a viable ideology and how to convince FRELIMO to accept it as a multi-party system? Following several months of negotiations hosted by the San Egidio Catholic Community, and always through intermediaries, a partial ceasefire was reached in December. On 4 October 1992, the General Peace Agreement (GPA) was signed in Rome between the President of the Republic of Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano, and the leader of RENAMO, Afonso Dhlakama, ending the Civil War.

The GPA, on 4 October 1992 had its foundations in seven protocols signed between October 1991 and October 1992. Protocol I, signed on 18 October 1991, and defined the basic principles for a peace agreement. Protocol II signed on 13 November 1992, was essentially about the formation and recognition of political parties and plurality, in which it was stated that “at the conclusion of their talks, the parties agreed on the necessity of guaranteeing the workings of a multi-party democracy in which the parties would freely cooperate in shaping and expressing the will of the people and in promoting democratic participation by the citizens in the Government of the country”.⁶⁰ Protocol III, signed on 12 March 1992, comprised electoral procedures. Freedom of press, return of Mozambican Refugees and displaced persons. On 4 of October 1992, when the Rome Peace Accord was finally signed, Protocol IV, V, VI and VII were also agreed on, and were essentially pillared on military affairs, guarantees, and ceasefire. It was also agreed to hold a conference of donors and international organisation aimed at obtaining much-needed funding and support for the transition and the conclusion of the peace process. Mario Raffaelli, representative of the Government of the Italian Republic, led the GPA’s team of mediators. The Archbishop of Beira, Jaime Gonçalves, and two members of the Rome-based Community of San Egidio, Andrea Richard and Matteo Zuppi, were part of the team. Although the final peace agreement was penned down by Joaquim Chissano and Afonso Dhlakama, that seven protocols were previously signed between

⁵⁹ Conciliation Resources. An International Review of Peace Initiatives Accord. The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective (London, 1998) p.14

⁶⁰ General Peace Agreement. October 1992. P.8 Available at https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/sites/default/files/accords/Mozambique_Peace_Agreement.pdf

the then Minister of Transport and Communications and head of the government's delegation in the negotiations, Armando Guebuza, and the head of RENAMO's External Relations Department – also the party's delegation chief –, Raul Manuel Domingos⁶¹. One of the weak points of the General Peace Agreement was the fact that allowed RENAMO the detention of a military capacity, although limited, even if the GPA generally stipulated that all armed forces should be demobilised under the supervision of the United Nations. The GPA also established that presidential and parliamentary elections should be supervised and monitored by the UN.

ONUMOZ - Implementation of the General Peace Agreement

The UN was present at the GPA Process. The Secretary General appointed a representative whose mission was to locally, overview and ensure the integration and full implementation of the GPA. The United Nations mission to Mozambique was named ONUMOZ (United Nations Operations in Mozambique) and was scheduled to start operating in October 1993.

Initially, Zimbabwean and Malawian troops were deployed to Mozambique, mainly to ensure that their exports and imports would continue circulating. Zimbabwe, FRELIMO's closest ally, is a landlocked country that depends on access to coastal regions in Mozambique to export and import goods. Accordingly, authorities in Zimbabwe sent troops to protect the logistics corridor to Beira, Sofala province, so as to safeguard access to international markets. On the other hand, Malawi enjoyed good relations with Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa, and provided support for RENAMO, in the form of safe-havens and bases for members of the guerrilla, from which they could make incursions into Mozambican territory. However, alike Zimbabwe, the deployment of military forces was aimed at ensuring the security of trade routes across Mozambique. When Malawian and Zimbabwean troops were fully removed from Mozambique, ONUMOZ arrived to verify the ceasefire. However, as Eric Barman

⁶¹ General Peace Agreement. October 1992. Available at https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/sites/default/files/accords/Mozambique_Peace_Agreement.pdf

explains in his essay “Managing Arms in Peace Processes”, the FRELIMO government was not interested to have the United Nations participate in the transition process from war to peace⁶². In particular, the government lacked trust in Aldo Ajello, the special representative of the Secretary-General for Mozambique, whom they thought “to be abrasive and disrespectful - not just toward the Government, but toward the terms of the General Peace Agreement and UN’s mandate as well”.⁶³

On December 1992 the ONUMOZ arrived to help implementing the GPA. The UN mission had five key components. The first, was a political one, “to provide technical assistance and monitor the entire electoral process”.⁶⁴ However, according to Eric Berman, pursuing “these goals proved to be difficult as there was substantial mistrust between the parties which resulted in a relatively slow progress towards the elections held in October 1994”.⁶⁵ The second component, was had a military nature and had three elements: separation and concentration of forces; demobilisation; destruction of weapons; monitoring and ensuring the complete withdrawal of foreign forces; ensure security along logistic corridors (Malawian and Zimbabwean had withdrawn their troops); and monitoring and verifying the dissolution of private and irregular armed groups. During the process, there were a number of cease-fire violations, but on a small scale and with limited impact.⁶⁶ The third, encompassed police forces, namely “to investigate and assess Mozambican national police performance, something achieved with more ease in some of the government-controlled areas than those controlled by RENAMO (Reed 1997)”⁶⁷. The fourth component was to "coordinate and monitor humanitarian assistance operations, in particular those relating to refugees, internally displaced persons, demobilized military personnel and the affected local population”⁶⁸. Last but not least, the fifth component was related with electoral issues. The main role of ONUMOZ in this particular issue was electoral supervision and provision of technical assistance.

⁶² Eric Berman. *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Mozambique*. (New York and Geneva. United Nations Publications. 1996) p.25

⁶³ *Ibid*,28

⁶⁴ United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Mozambique. ONUMOZ Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/onumozFT.htm#Early>

⁶⁵ Eric Berman. *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Mozambique*. (New York and Geneva. United Nations Publications. 1996) p.33

⁶⁶ United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Mozambique ONUMOZ. Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/onumozFT.htm#Early>

⁶⁷ *Ibid*

⁶⁸ *Ibid*

Despite criticism from FRELIMO towards ONUMOZ, the mission deployed with “6,625 troops and military support personnel, 354 military observers and 1,144 civilian police; there were also some 355 international staff and 506 local staff; during the polling, ONUMOZ deployed approximately 900 additional electoral observers”.⁶⁹ According to Eric Barman, “Venâncio (1998) who, though acknowledging criticism against ONUMOZ, concludes that “the operation achieved what was an initially daunting mandate and played a central role in the establishment of long-term peace and democratic rule in Mozambique (1998:98)”.⁷⁰ Nonetheless, as argued by the same author, the successful operation was also possible due to the population itself, which was tired of war, and changed its feelings and posture towards reconciliation.

Besides criticism regarding the mission’s activities, such as those regarding sexual abuses by its soldiers, the ONUMOZ was widely successful, mainly due to the financial support direct at the transformation of the RENAMO from a guerrilla movement into a political party. The ONUMOZ mission was terminated when stable conditions for the first multi-party elections in 1994 were created.

The Democratic Transition in Mozambique: First Multiparty-Elections

The Democratic Transition in Mozambique occurred in the period of what Samuel Huntington famously named as “The Third Wave of Democratization”. According to the author, five major factors stood up in their contribution to the third-wave transition to Democracy. In the case of Mozambique, two of those factors were particularly present: “1) The deepening legitimacy problems of authoritarian regimes in a world where democratic values were widely accepted, the consequent dependence of these regimes on successful performance, and their inability to maintain "performance legitimacy" due to economic (and sometimes military) failure”, and 2) “Changes in the policies of external actors, most

⁶⁹ United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Mozambique ONUMOZ. Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/onumozFT.htm#Early>

⁷⁰ Eric Barman. *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Mozambique*. (New York and Geneva. United Nations Publications. 1996) p.33

notably the European Community, the United States, and the Soviet Union".⁷¹ As already mentioned, with the changes in the international context, namely following the collapse of the Soviet Union, both belligerent parties lost international support. As in most African countries, economic crisis helped shape democratic transitions in Africa, in light of the need by governments to turn to the West to seek aid and support aimed at relieving the economy. Following the demise of the Soviet Union, the main donors of African countries shifted a larger share of their attention to human rights and democratisation. In this context, transition to a liberal democracy was widely recognised as a key condition to obtain international aid and, to some extent, attract international investments, which would, in turn, help avert the dramatic humanitarian crisis that had resulted from the war.

However, sometimes the transition to Democracy in Mozambique is confused with the transition from War to Peace. Mozambique is considered one of the most successful cases of post-conflict transition in the world due to, not the fact that the transition was achieved and consolidated, but also pertaining to the transition from war to peace. Indeed, the democratic transition was only possible due to the transition from war to peace, which began with the constitutional changes enacted in 1990, allowing for the integration of RENAMO into the political arena and paving the way for the peace talks. Moreover, the United Nations mission was, according to Carrie Manning, also promoting democratic values, since democracy has intrinsic value for the construction of a durable peace and a viable state in the wake of civil war"⁷². In fact, ONUMOZ played a key role in the materialisation of the final achievement of the democratic transition in Mozambique, i.e. the first multiparty elections held on October 1994.

The National Electoral Commission (Comissão Nacional de Eleições: CNE) monitored the elections while the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (Secretariado Técnico de Administração Eleitoral - STAE) administered them. The elections were considerably successful, free and fair, with Joaquim Chissano (FRELIMO) winning 53.3% of the votes, while Afonso Dhlakama (RENAMO) obtained 33.7%. Overall, 87.0% of the voters threw their support behind FRELIMO and RENAMO,

⁷¹ Samuel P. Huntington. *Democracy's Third Wave*. Journal of Democracy. Spring 1999. P.13

⁷² Carrie Manning. *The Making of Democrats_ Elections and Party Development in Postwar Bosnia, El Salvador, and Mozambique*. p. 13

which is a clear demonstration of how willing the Mozambican people were to participate in the new democracy. The democratic transition was accompanied by a strong democratisation of the political parties, meaning that FRELIMO abandoned its authoritarian structures and RENAMO transformed itself into a political party⁷³. In the 1994 and 1999 elections, Mozambique showed a relative balance between FRELIMO and RENAMO in the electoral results. The democratic transition has been widely considered successful, as it combined a transition from a war context into peace and the transformation of the authoritarian regime into a multi-party system. It can perhaps be considered that the democratic transition was inevitable due to the pressure of the international community towards the adoption of democratic values, as well as economic reasons. These two arguments are connected in the sense that the only way to avert the economic crisis was with the help and support of international donors. In addition, it also relates with the need to end a Civil War in a context when international backing was largely undermined by the fall of the Soviet-Union and the South-Africa democratization.

However, several questions emerge from the democratic transition in Mozambique, the likes of which will be the focus of this dissertation. More than three decades ago, Samuel Huntington stated “one potentially significant political obstacle to future democratisation is the virtual absence of experience with democracy in most countries that remained authoritarian in 1990. Twenty-three of 30 countries that democratised between 1973 and 1990 had had some history of democracy, while only a few countries that were nondemocratic in 1990 could claim such experience”.⁷⁴ As such, how can a country become democratic when it has never experienced democracy in its history? Additionally, how essential are economic factors for the democratisation process? Samuel Huntington argues “in poor countries, democratization is unlikely; (...) as countries develop economically and move into the transition zone, they become good prospects for democratization. (...) Poverty is a principal obstacle to democratic development”⁷⁵. Mozambique has found itself in the 181st position of the Human Development Index

⁷³ Carolina Rocha da Silva. *As eleições e a democracia moçambicana*. Available at: http://janusonline.pt/images/anoario2015/1.13_CarolinaSilva_DemocraciaMocambique.pdf

⁷⁴ Samuel P. Huntington. *Democracy's Third Wave*. Journal of Democracy. 1991. P.12

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p.31

2016.⁷⁶ As clearly put by Samuel Huntington, “most poor societies will remain undemocratic so long as they remain poor”.⁷⁷

From 1992 to 2002, Mozambique enjoyed its first free of armed conflict decade since independence in 1975 and has become one of the few success stories of United Nations intervention in the African continent. Did anything change from 2002 onwards? Is today’s Mozambique more than an electoral Democracy? The next chapters seek to answer these questions through a theoretical approach to the consolidation of democracy, while analysing recent events in Mozambique.

The Evolution of the Three Major Parties

Nowadays, the success of immediate post-conflict transition in Mozambique raises some questions, particularly since the re-emergence of the conflict in 2013. As already explained in the previous chapters, FRELIMO transformed itself from a Marxist-Leninism ideology party into a democratic and pluralist one, while the largest opposition force, RENAMO, evolved from a guerrilla movement into a political party, although maintaining an armed dimension. The purpose of this sub-chapter, it is to assess the extent to which FRELIMO has become a fully democratic political party, and how successful and complete was RENAMO’s transformation from a guerrilla movement into a political party?

When Ian Smith’s regime in Rhodesia helped to establish RENAMO, the goals of the guerrilla movement were focused on fighting the Marxist-Leninist ideology, as adopted by FRELIMO. However, after the fall of Ian Smith’s regime and with the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, RENAMO lost its main sponsor and, the South Africa’s Apartheid regime became the new sponsor and, consequently, the movement changed its goals towards destabilizing Mozambique and its government, which backed the African National Congress against the Apartheid regime. Before the 1992 General Peace Agreement, RENAMO was a guerrilla movement without a specific ideology, and responsible for horrible human

⁷⁶ UNDP. Human Development Index 2016. Available at: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI>

⁷⁷ Samuel P. Huntington. Democracy’s Third Wave. Journal of Democracy. 1991 p.33

rights abuses. However, as Michel Cahen warns, despite all the media coverage about the Civil War, which tended to call RENAMO “armed bandits”, the guerrilla was “in fact disciplined and strategically a very centralized army”⁷⁸. Under the General Peace Agreement (GPA), the demobilization period began in 1994 with the integration of the combatants – 15,000 people from each warring side – into the Mozambique Defense Armed Forces (Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique). The GPA stipulated that the demobilization should be equally applied to both parties, but the low level of education of RENAMO combatants was an obstacle to the complete implementation of that goal. Yet, “by 1996, 87 per cent of demobilized soldiers had been integrated into society and most of them had secured food supply or small guaranteed income”.⁷⁹ Moreover, the most difficult achievement of ONUMOZ was the official disarmament process. According to Vines, the majority of the weapons collected by the authorities were not destroyed, especially those from the RENAMO side because RENAMO did not fully accept the disarmament process. In fact, this remains a contentious issue in present days and is one of the major threats to peace, the fact that RENAMO is an armed party. The nature of RENAMO’s transformation into a political party is especially worth analyzing. According to Alex Vines, RENAMO was the largest opposition party in Africa between 1994 and 2002, namely on the occasion of the 1994 and 1999 elections, which were two closely fought ballot processes. Despite the fact that RENAMO had committed several human rights abuses in its area of dominance, the population continued to vote for them, thus making us to question the reason behind the popular adherence to the political party, taking also into consideration the fact that more than half of RENAMO soldiers were recruited by force. Forceful recruitment was one of RENAMO’s strategies during the war.

Until 1999 the electoral results had been balanced between the two largest political forces. FRELIMO obtained most of the votes essentially in the southern and northern region, while RENAMO dominated the central provinces of Manica and Sofala, thus “indicating how regional and ethnic politics

⁷⁸ Michel Cahen. “Dhlakama é Maningue Nice”. An Atypical Former Guerrilla in the Mozambican Electoral Campaign. (1998). p1

⁷⁹ Alex Vines (2013) Renamo's Rise and Decline: The Politics of Reintegration in Mozambique, International Peacekeeping, p.379

played a role”.⁸⁰ The role of regional asymmetries had been visible particularly during the Civil War, which, in fact, was a war between rural and urban areas. Therefore, one could argue that FRELIMO had created its own country with its own elites, whereas the areas under Dhlakama’s influence were mostly correspondent to the economic and political marginalized people. Notwithstanding, FRELIMO allowed for the integration of the marginalized, as Michel Cahen points out, “but could never recognize them as ‘Others’ who were themselves legitimate political actors”⁸¹. FRELIMO began developing and asserting itself into the party of the state, after the aftermath of the 1999 elections that represented the beginning of RENAMO’s decline in national politics, namely throughout the subsequent electoral processes, and the rise to prominence and, to certain extent, hegemony of FRELIMO. According with Salvador Forquilha and Aslak Orre, FRELIMO is seen as an authoritarian dominant party as a synonym of a hegemonic party⁸². Hegemonic party, according with Carbone (2007) is the party who achieves the power in a context of poor electoral competition and the inexistence of the possibility of an alternative party.⁸³ In this sense, and as Forquilha and Orre demonstrate in their article, this could be seen especially in the IX Congress held in November 2006, in which the active militancy in the workplace became obligatory for the members, especially in the state institutions.⁸⁴

On the other hand, RENAMO’s loss of popular support can roughly be attributed to two particular drivers, pillared on economic reasons and on the party’s own strategy. The ruling FRELIMO benefited from Mozambique’s positive economic performance – the GDP grew 7.1% in 2011, thereby allowing the party to channel resources for socioeconomic projects and militant recruitment. On the side of RENAMO, the endemic poverty, lack of education, health and other basic services, including in the areas where most of its popular support came from, led many to grow disgruntled with Dhlakama’s party. Associated with this, RENAMO failed to ensure the provision of basic conditions, therefore missing the opportunity to fill

⁸⁰ Alex Vines. *Renamo's Rise and Decline: The Politics of Reintegration in Mozambique*, International Peacekeeping, (2013) p.382

⁸¹ Michel Cahen. “Dhlakama é Maningue Nice”. *An Atypical Former Guerrilla in the Mozambican Electoral Campaign*. (1998) p.5

⁸² Salvador Cadete Forquilha and Aslak Orre. *Conselhos Locais e Instituições Democráticas em Moçambique*. IESE. (2012) p. 334

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p.334

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p.335

a space left empty by the government and FRELIMO, and the resulting growth in popularity. RENAMO has low numbers of qualified people: in 1995 “only 6 per cent of RENAMO deputies have a university degree compared to 24 per cent for FRELIMO, and 11 per cent of RENAMO deputies have less than a fourth-grade qualification compared to 3 per cent of FRELIMO deputies”⁸⁵. Coupled with the low academic qualifications in RENAMO’s ranks, the party leadership never allowed government-linked professors and other qualified professionals to exert functions in the provinces the party dominated. Regarding the strategy used by RENAMO, Vines (2013) points that the “inability of Dhlakama to transform from an insecure, centralizing guerrilla leader has contributed significantly to RENAMO’s rapid decline”⁸⁶. Also, Cahen pointed out that the main reason of poor campaigning was the “highly centralised and personalised aspect of the party”⁸⁷, which was essentially based on a strategy to keep the leader, Afonso Dhlakama, in power. When RENAMO transformed from a guerrilla movement into a political party, “the political structures of the former rebels were still fragile, the internal procedures of the new party hardly effective, its presence on the ground was rather unorganized, its policies were in all evidence poorly articulated, and its personnel was totally inexperienced in modern politics and administration”⁸⁸. In addition, throughout the country’s three presidential elections, Dhlakama held the RENAMO’s presidential ticket. This Dhlakama’s desire to stay in power fomented tensions and disagreements in the party, and even dissensions and expulsions.

Due, in part, to RENAMO’s internal affairs, a new political party emerged in 2008, the Mozambique Democratic Part (*Movimento Democrático de Moçambique*: MDM), under the leadership of a former RENAMO member, Daviz Simango, who was expelled by Dhlakama in 2008 due to his candidacy as an independent candidate to the autarchies to the municipality of Beira. In 2003, Daviz Simango was elected mayor of Beira, in Sofala province, and retained the seat in the 2008 elections.

⁸⁵ Alex Vines. *Renamo's Rise and Decline: The Politics of Reintegration in Mozambique*, International Peacekeeping. (2013) p. 382

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, P.385

⁸⁷ Michel Cahen. “Dhlakama é Maningue Nice”. *An Atypical Former Guerrilla in the Mozambican Electoral Campaign*. (1998).p25

⁸⁸ Giovanni M.Carbone. *Emerging Pluralist Politics in Mozambique: The Frelimo-Renamo party system*. Crisis States Program. LSE. (2003) P.5

These developments were highly significant, since they meant that a new political party had emerged, and was indeed consolidating its position in a political arena dominated (since the independency) by two political powerhouses. Alex Vines (2013) argued that, despite being a weak and fragile political force, in 2011 MDM asserted itself as a major threat to FRELIMO, namely due the election of Manuel de Araújo, a MDM representative, as mayor of Quelimane, in Zambézia province. The rise of MDM occurred at the time when Dhlakama found himself increasingly isolated and weakened in national politics, namely following Armando Guebuza's election as president in 2004, who had begun "efforts to ensure total FRELIMO domination of Mozambican politics".⁸⁹ MDM's rise was also followed by the won of seats in the Parliament. MDM was established in Sofala province, that is a province politically connected with RENAMO, where they have a base and where Afonso Dhlakama was born. According with Sergio Chichava (2010), MDM was essentially a product of RENAMO members who had grown disgruntled and tired of Dhlakama's leadership, and were consequently expelled from the party. Apart from being a splinter party and having affirmed itself in the national political arena, MDM stands out for its bold proposals, among which "to transform the Constitutional Council into a Constitutional Court; another one is the proposal to appoint the President of the Courts, (Supreme, Administrative and Constitutional) as well as the Attorney General of the Republic, through a contested overseen by the Parliament".⁹⁰

Different proposals were also set up by MDM like the question of the rectors of the public universities, that MDM believes that should not be anymore designated by the President of the Republic. MDM's discourse was also focused on youth promotion and reduction of regional imbalances.⁹¹ Nevertheless, as stated by Sergio Chichava, MDM does not represent an immediate major threat for FRELIMO, both in terms of popular support in electoral processes and also, as the author says, that MDM's discourse have not presented a different alternative from the other parties.⁹² In 2013, in the municipal elections, MDM managed to win in the municipalities of Beira in the Province of Sofala and in

⁸⁹ Alex Vines (2013) *Renamo's Rise and Decline: The Politics of Reintegration in Mozambique*, International Peacekeeping, p.389

⁹⁰ Sérgio Chichava. *MDM: a new political force in Mozambique?* (IESE, Maputo: 2010)

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 10

⁹² Sérgio Chichava. *MDM: a new political force in Mozambique?* (IESE, Maputo: 2010) p.10

Quelimane, in the Province of Zambézia.

The 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009 Parliamentary Elections

The 1994 and 1999 elections represented positive milestones in terms of democratic consolidation, recording a small percentage of abstention in two internationally recognized peaceful and fair elections. : In 1994, 88% of registered votes and in 1999 the number slightly declined to 74%. However, by 2004, the “democratic euphoria disappeared and the electoral process were characterized by high abstention, fraud and violent distrust, which expressed a serious democratic crisis”.⁹³ As Luís de Brito explains, this abstention is representative of a crisis in the democratic process, and represents a phenomenon worth paying attention to in Mozambique’s electoral processes.⁹⁴ As the author shows, the percentage of abstention was largely stable in neighboring African countries over the years. In fact, in previous years, three African countries – Namibia, Malawi and also Mozambique – showed a declining trend in the abstention percentage across successive elections. However, Namibia and Malawi recorded a declining trend in that percentage of abstention whilst Mozambique saw the percentage of abstention increasing over the years. With a percentage of participation of 88% in 1994, ten years later, in the 2004 elections, only 36% of the population voted. This means that popular participation in Mozambique’s democratic process has been decreasing over the years.

Luís de Brito shows how abstention was higher in the areas dominated by RENAMO. Especially, that the population felt distrust regarding the political parties in the post-war context, considering them as “generally undemocratic and centralized political groups around a leader, as it is the case of RENAMO that defends a revolutionary ideology with lack of coherence. They are parties with lack of resources and with inexperienced politicians, with little interest in democracy but more in the power and richness that

⁹³ Carolina Rocha da Silva. As eleições e a democracia moçambicana. Janus. 2015-2016. Available at: http://janusonline.pt/images/anoario2015/1.13_CarolinaSilva_DemocraciaMocambique.pdf p.34

⁹⁴ Luis de Brito. A Democracia à Prova das Urnas. Elementos para um Programa de Pesquisa sobre a Abstenção Eleitoral em Moçambique. IESE. 2007. P.4. Available at: http://www.iese.ac.mz/lib/publication/Brito,Luis%20de_ADemocraciaAProvaDasUrnas.pdf

this may bring”.⁹⁵ When people voted in 1994, they were voting for peace but over the “honeymoon” years of the democratic process, that perspective had started to disappear. The elections held on October 2004 were generally peaceful but “technical problems and a lack of transparency in the final tabulation of national results delayed the announcement of results and undermined the credibility of the process”⁹⁶, according to The Carter Center.⁹⁷ Armando Guebuza (FRELIMO) was elected President of Mozambique with more than 60% of the votes, while Afonso Dhlakama obtained 31.7%. The 2004 Elections strengthened FRELIMO’s hold in parliament and RENAMO lost seats in the legislative chamber – from 117 in 1999, to 90 in 2004. Given the threat that the alleged irregularities posed to the democratic multiparty system, the Carter Center proposed a reform of the National Elections Commission (CNE), “aimed at establishing provincial and district election commissions which only function at the time of registration or elections”⁹⁸. The need for such a reform arose from the fact that the CNE has a structure that “is insufficient to ensure that electoral supervision is conducted in a manner that is nonpartisan, transparent, and of service to all Mozambicans regardless of party affiliation. A range of options to minimize the intromission of party politics into the CNE could be considered”⁹⁹. One of the obstacles to the consolidation and development of democracy is both parties’ awareness towards each one, including regarding the electoral processes, something that became particularly evident in the elections of 2009. On 28 October 2009 in the Presidential elections, Armando Guebuza was re-elected with 67.51% of the votes and Afonso Dhlakama got 14.77%, with 45% turnout. These elections were the first in which MDM participated, with its presidential candidate, Daviz Simango, obtaining 7.73% of the ballot. Consequently, these elections increased Guebuza’s position, whereas that of Dhlakama was weakened, namely in terms of his projection and influence in national politics. The results were considered fraudulent by RENAMO

⁹⁵ Carolina Rocha da Silva. *As eleições e a democracia moçambicana*. Janus. 2015-2016. Available at: http://janusonline.pt/images/anoario2015/1.13_CarolinaSilva_DemocraciaMocambique.pdf p.34

⁹⁶ The Carter Center. *Observing the 2004 Mozambique Elections*. Atlanta. 2005. p.8 Available at: <https://www.cartercenter.org/documents/2218.pdf>


⁹⁷ The Carter Center is a nongovernmental organization that helps resolving conflicts which works with elections observation. The Carter Center was invited by the National Elections Commission.

⁹⁸ Joseph Hanlon. *Post-Election Review of the Mozambique General Elections*. The Open University. 2009. P.1. Available at: <https://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk.technology.mozambique/files/files/Mozambique%2009%20election%20Hanlon%20EISA-1.pdf>

⁹⁹ The Carter Center. *Observing the 2004 Mozambique Elections*. Atlanta. 2005. p.63 Available at: <https://www.cartercenter.org/documents/2218.pdf>

and MDM, although Daviz Simango claimed the party would accept the results¹⁰⁰. The CNE was criticized in terms of its transparency, ‘flexibility’, and failure to meet deadlines. In addition, Joseph Hanlon argued that the CNE had “failed to provide a ‘level playing field’ and acted unfairly to the detriment of parties other than the two represented on the CNE”¹⁰¹ regarding FRELIMO and RENAMO. In line with this situation, the 2014 elections were relevant for the resurgence of the conflict between FRELIMO-Led Government and RENAMO, but this will be analyzed in Chapter IV.

Table 1 – Presidential Voting



Source: Joseph Hanlon. Post-Election Review of the Mozambique General Elections. Joseph Hanlon. The Open University. 2009. P.1. Available at: <https://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk.technology.mozambique/files/files/Mozambique%202009%20election%20Hanlon%20EISA-1.pdf>

* Opposition is regarding RENAMO, and since 2009, MDM and RENAMO

¹⁰⁰ União Europeia. Missão de Observação Eleitoral da União Europeia. Moçambique. 2009. P.38 Available at: http://macua.blogs.com/files/eu_eom_mozambique_2009_final_pt.pdf

¹⁰¹ Joseph Hanlon. Post-Election Review of the Mozambique General Elections. The Open University. 2009. P.9. Available at: <https://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk.technology.mozambique/files/files/Mozambique%202009%20election%20Hanlon%20EISA-1.pdf>

Table 2 – Parliamentary Seats in 4 Elections

	1994	1999	2004	2009
FRELIMO	129	133	160	191
RENAMO	112	117	90	51
OTHERS*	9	-	-	8

Source: Post-Election Review of the Mozambique General Elections. Joseph Hanlon. The Open University. 2009. P.1. Available at: <https://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk.technology.mozambique/files/files/Mozambique%202009%20election%20Hanlon%20EISA-1.pdf>

***Others:** 1994 –Democratic Union Party (UD) ; 2009 MDM Party.

As Giovanni M.Carbone explains in his paper, the strained relationship between “FRELIMO and RENAMO – as well as the competition between the two of them – have deep-seated historical origins and well-established regional roots. These are reflected in the current stability of electoral competition (which is shaped by the cleavage generated by the Civil War) and in the low fragmentation of the party system (which does not allow an easy entry to any third challenger)”.¹⁰²

The results of the 1994 elections by province (Table 3) showed that regional factors were, and still are, particularly relevant in Mozambique’s political scene, a topic that will be explored in Chapter III.

¹⁰² Giovanni M.Carbone. Emerging Pluralist Politics in Mozambique: The Frelimo-Renamo party system. Crisis States Program. LSE. 2003. P.19

Table 3 – Number of Parliamentary seats won by FRELIMO and RENAMO by Electoral Constituency in the 1994 and the 1999 elections.

Electoral Constituencies	FRELIMO 1994	FRELIMO 1999	RENAMO (-EU)* 1994	RENAMO (-EU) 1999
Maputo City (South)	17	14	1	2
Maputo Province (South)	12	12	1	1
Gaza (South)	15	16	0	0
Inhambane (South)	13	13	3	4
Sofala (Centre)	3	4	18	17
Manica (Centre)	4	5	9	10
Tete (Centre)	5	8	9	10
Zambézia (Centre)	18	15	29	34
Nampula (North)	20	24	32	26
Cabo Delgado (North)	15	16	6	6
Niassa (North)	7	6	4	7
Total	129	133	112	117

Source: Giovanni M.Carbone. Emerging Pluralist Politics in Mozambique: The Frelimo-Renamo party system. Crisis States Program. LSE. 2003. P.9

* RENAMO-EU (Electoral Union) was an alliance of political parties in the General Elections of 1994 and 1999.

III. Socioeconomic Standpoint

Politics and Regionalism in Mozambique

As Table 3 shows, in the first two multi-party elections (1994, 1999), the results per province were quite stable and balanced. FRELIMO obtained most seats in all the southern provinces and also in Cabo Delgado, a northern Province, and in the 1999 Elections also in Niassa, another northern Province. Why did FRELIMO manage to retain electoral dominance in the south and in two provinces in the north? And why did RENAMO won essentially in the central provinces? With this in mind, how relevant are regionalism divisions on the antagonism between FRELIMO and RENAMO?

Mozambique is one of the most diverse countries in the world. With an area of 799,380 square kilometers, spread along 11 provinces, Mozambique population is formed by a myriad of diverse peoples (more than 20 ethnic groups), of which the most relevant are the Makonde, Makhuwa, Nyanja, Nsenga, Pimbwe, Yao, in the north, and the Shona, Tsonga, Chope and Bitonga, in the south. As the Mozambican well known writer, Mia Couto, explained in an interview conducted in August 2017, in order to understand what is going on in Mozambique, it is key to understand what is happening in the informal space, the space outside of urban areas. For instance, in the south, the word ‘President’ means God, leading people to vote in the president as being a divinity, someone who could not be questioned. In addition, the word ‘democracy’ itself is understood in a different way between the political class and citizens¹⁰³. This means that people from the south are very different from people from the center and north of Mozambique, and so are their respective perceptions regarding politics. Religious diversity is also important, with the south mostly comprised of people professing the Christian faith, while a Muslim majority characterizes the north. Nevertheless, religious diversity does not take the center stage in the list of reasons for armed violence. Instead, regional asymmetries, aggravated since the sixteen years Civil War constitute one of its most important triggers and drivers.

¹⁰³ Interview to Mia Couto in 23/08/2017 in Fundação Fernando Couto, Maputo.

As briefly mentioned in Chapter I, the history of FRELIMO and that of the post-colonial period, reveals that the ruling party's origins trace back to the National Democratic Union of Mozambique (UDENAMO), which was born in former Rhodesia and was essentially composed by natives from the southern and central regions of Mozambique. On the other hand, people from Tete, Zambézia and Niassa provinces formed the majority of members of National African Union of Independent Mozambique (UNAMI), which was part of FRELIMO's origin. The third organization that was merged into today's FRELIMO, the Mozambican African National Union (MANU), consisted of members from the Makonde ethnic group – the dominant ethnicity in the northeastern province of Cabo Delgado. Moreover, the first two heads-of state of independent Mozambique, were native from southern provinces – Samora Machel and Joaquim Chissano were both from Gaza province –, while the two other presidents, including Armando Guebuza and the current one, Filipe Nyusi, are native of northern provinces, Nampula and Cabo Delgado respectively, but grew up in the Capital. The regional origin of heads-of-state is far from being irrelevant to understand political, social and conflict dynamics in Mozambique. On one hand, the appointment of the new elected President Filipe Nyusi is also due to the need of a better balance of power, as it represents for the overall population that FRELIMO is trying to integrate the northern populations in the Government politics. On the other hand, the leader of the largest opposition party and historical foe of FRELIMO, Afonso Dhlakama, comes from the central province of Sofala. Sofala Province is where was located the principal military base of Dhlakama during the Civil War and the area to which he returned in 2013.

According to Calton Cadeado's thesis on ethno-political violence in Mozambique, despite multiple ethno-cultural identities, the "term ethnic group or tribe, normally, they are not grounded in racial, religious or traditional beliefs. They are grounded on differentiation of languages, accent and regions".¹⁰⁴ Much like other African countries, authorities feared the creation of political parties along the lines of 'identity politics', i.e., with a specific ethnic nature. That led FRELIMO to seek to deny and contain

¹⁰⁴ Why Ethno-Political Violence has become Absent in Mozambique?: Demobilization of Ethnicity. Calton Cadeado. Brandeis University. Master Thesis Dissertation. 2011. p.26 Available at: https://www.academia.edu/5303163/Why_Ethno-Political_Violence_has_become_Absent_in_Mozambique_Demobilization_of_Ethnicity

diversity – religious, ethnic, racial, political or social. The plans were to uphold and advance the idea of Mozambique as one single nation.¹⁰⁵ On the other hand, RENAMO sought to accept the diversity of all the Mozambicans, including the traditional chiefs that play an essential role in the rural areas of Mozambique.

The present chapter does not see to focus on ethnic or religious diversity because, as already mentioned, “Mozambique is not a country that is severely divided along ethnic or religious lines. People, in fact, coexist in a pacific way.”¹⁰⁶ Instead, on the focus will be on politics and regionalism, which is an undeniable reality in Mozambique and, above all, a major driver of Mozambican politics and socioeconomics. Of course, the possibility of violence motivated by ethnicity or racial issues cannot be out rightly dismissed, although it is unlikely to culminate in political violence, defined by the violence between the party of the state and an opposition party. Regional identity is, on the other hand, a more common driver and trigger of that kind of violence.

Since the colonial period, the groups from the south enjoyed more economic and social benefits than the ones from the center and north. One example of this trend may be the decision by colonial authorities to move the capital city from the Island of Mozambique to Lourenço Marques (today’s Maputo) in 1898, located in the southern tip of the country. One immediate consequence of that decision was the centralization of the economy in the south. However, this decision was also based on the fact that with Lourenço de Marques as the capital, Mozambique could interlock more closely to South Africa, exploiting that relationship in different areas of economy, namely the services, what could not occur in an Island in the northern part of the country. Colonial authorities transformed Mozambique’s economy into one based in services, as it was focused on exploring trade logistics with neighboring and international markets, i.e., which meant developing seaports and railways. A result of this shift in international trade was the lack of development of railways connecting the south and the north, which fed a growing

¹⁰⁵ Sérgio Chichava. Por uma leitura sócio-histórica da etnicidade em Moçambique. IESE.2008. p.7 Available at: http://www.iese.ac.mz/lib/publication/dp_2008/DP_01_ArtigoEtnicidade.pdf

¹⁰⁶ Why Ethno-Political Violence has become Absent in Mozambique?: Demobilization of Ethnicity. Calton Cadeado. Brandeis University. Master Thesis Dissertation. 2011. P.8 Available at: https://www.academia.edu/5303163/Why_Ethno-Political_Violence_has_become_Absent_in_Mozambique_Demobilization_of_Ethnicity

disparity between the economic and political center in the south, and the rest of the country¹⁰⁷. Such regional division promoted and fed discontent among the different groups from the center and north of Mozambique. At the time of independence, and with the creation of Communal Villages by FRELIMO, the failure to recognize the diversity of national identities was smartly exploited by RENAMO to gain support from the central and northern populations. In addition, and more important that the identity factor, FRELIMO's rejection of the legitimacy and role of traditional authorities was also key to promote regional divisions. According to José António Oliveira Rocha and Gonçalves Jonas Bernardo, in their study on local government development in Mozambique, this rejection was related, on the one hand, with the association of the traditional authorities with colonialism. On the other hand, the dominant Marxist-Leninist ideology envisaged the construction of a homogeneous country¹⁰⁸. Nevertheless, the democratization process that was initiated in 1990 launched a political and administrative decentralization, which incorporated the role of traditional chiefs into sociopolitical dynamics. In this context, Salvador Forquilha states that "the dynamics of the institutionalization commonly known as communitarian authorities shows that inherent to the discourse about decentralization and local participation lies a different reality: the fight to conquer political spaces in rural areas"¹⁰⁹. In other words, FRELIMO and RENAMO began using traditional authorities for their own political purposes, namely in terms of recognizing the local chiefs an intermediation role between their respective communities and the two main parties, allowing the political forces a facilitated and greater degree of access to rural areas. This trend was emphasized or reinforced by the Government after the 2004 Presidential elections won by the FRELIMO candidate, Gebuza.

The regionalism rooted in political divisions, as well as social inequality and injustice among the regional asymmetries, is still very much present in today's Mozambique. Furthermore, the conflict and

¹⁰⁷ Sérgio Chichava. Por uma leitura sócio-histórica da etnicidade em Moçambique. IESE.2008. P.5 Available at: http://www.iese.ac.mz/lib/publication/dp_2008/DP_01_ArtigoEtnicidade.pdf

¹⁰⁸ José António Oliveira Rocha et Gonçalves Jonas Bernardo. The local government development in Africa: The case of municipalities in Mozambique. Zavale. Caderno de Estudos Africanos. 2015. 13

Available at: <http://journals.openedition.org/cea/1879#entries>

¹⁰⁹ Salvador Cadete Forquilha. The Paradox of Articulation of Local State Organs: From the discourse on decentralization to the conquest of local political spaces. Cadernos de Estudos Africanos. 2009. P.91 Available at: <http://journals.openedition.org/cea/187>

the focus on establishing Communal Villages resulted in the failure by the State to modernize rural areas and, culminating with high levels regional and poverty inequalities within the country itself.

It can be assumed that Mozambique does not experience ethnic grievances or religion-based conflicts. What it does experience is significant regional tensions based on a dispute between the two major political parties – RENAMO and FRELIMO –, in which poverty plays a fundamental role. In this sense, it is identified the relation Politics-Regionalism as one important dynamic of the political conflict.

Regional tensions, political power and poverty pave the way for the analysis of an additional important factor in today's Mozambique: natural resources, the bulk of which are located in the north and center of the country. Calton Cadeado provides clear and succinct examples of the dynamics that led grievances to emerge between the more developed south and the center/north, where the majority of population is located and poverty and underdevelopment is more present: “

“Until mid of 2000s, the major examples of modernization - economic megaprojects such as Mozambique Aluminum (MOZAL) and the gas business - were located in the South. People from the Center and North claimed that they were benefiting marginally from the wealth generated by those megaprojects. But, in the meantime, the people from the South were the major beneficiaries of electricity generated by the mega dam of Cahora Bassa – located in the Central Province of Tete. Moreover, until 2006, people from the Center and North complained for the fact that there were no single public universities. Whoever wanted to pursue his/her higher education should go to Maputo, usually referred as the Nation (where all ethno-regional groups are represented and where the wealth is).”¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰ Calton Cadeado. Why Ethno-Political Violence has become Absent in Mozambique?: Demobilization of Ethnicity. Brandeis University. Master Thesis Dissertation. 2011. p.26 Available at: https://www.academia.edu/5303163/Why_Ethno-Political_Violence_has_become_Absent_in_Mozambique_Demobilization_of_Ethnicity

Economic Growth and Economic Development

Mozambique emerged from sixteen years of Civil War with a devastated economy, absence of infrastructures, endemic poverty, and a dramatic lack of provision of basic services, such as education and health. However, the period following the end of the war, in 1992, was characterised by remarkable achievements in terms of economic growth and poverty reduction. The former was essentially motivated by economic liberalization since joining the Bretton Woods Institutions (the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank), and investments in mega infrastructure projects, such as the Hydraulic Power Plant of Cahora Bassa, located in Tete, and Mozal, the aluminium producer based in Matola, near Maputo. Regarding poverty reduction, the 2008 World Bank Report called “Beating the Odds. Sustaining inclusion in Mozambique’s Growing Economy”, referred to a sustained growth that “reduced monetary poverty from 69% of the population in 1997 to 54% in 2003 and reduced the depth and severity of non-income poverty even more”.¹¹¹ The biggest achievement in this regard, the report added, was the successful investment in roads and education, which benefited from investments and financial aid from international donors

However, this trend was reversed from 2003 onwards, paradoxically due to the very nature of the investments that had previously contributed to poverty reduction. Those were “large, capital-intensive public and private investment projects with limited links to the rest of the economy”, which “benefited relatively few people living in urban areas and (...) accompanied by little sustained formal employment”¹¹². Poverty asymmetries therefore increased between rural and urban areas, with the former being more negatively impacted, while the latter, especially the capital city Maputo, benefited the most. The rural/urban unequal poverty reduction was evident, according to a 2016 World Bank report about Poverty in Mozambique, in the large discrepancies between the poverty rates in Maputo, in 2003 – 10% -, and Zambézia province – 73%. The same report shows that the central provinces of Manica, Sofala, and

¹¹¹ Louise Fox. Beating the Odds. Sustaining inclusion in Mozambique’s Growing Economy. World Bank. 2008. p.3

¹¹² The World Bank in Mozambique. An overview. Available at: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/mozambique/overview>

Zambézia together and by the exception with the southern province of Gaza, recorded a 70% poverty rate in 2009.¹¹³ Although rising poverty rates were essentially recorded in central provinces, poverty levels also increased among the poorest population segments in the city of Maputo. Oksana Mandlate, an investigator of the Mozambican Economic and Social Studies Institute (IESE), argues that this could be witnessed in the workers' strikes and civil violence that took place in 2008, 2010 and 2012¹¹⁴. These events were primarily motivated by growing disparities between the poor and rich, when economic growth failed to translate into poverty reduction and food prices had risen at an average yearly rate of 11.3% between 2002 and 2010¹¹⁵. As such, the poorest segments of the urban population are the ones of which do not have the conditions to produce their own food – contrary to the rural areas –, lost purchasing power and their living conditions generally deteriorated¹¹⁶. Despite the average annual GDP growth rate of 5% recorded between 2002 and 2010 – mostly driven by investments in mega infrastructure projects –, poverty reduction was negatively affected, job creation was scarce, and inflation increased at worrying levels. According to a 2014 IMF report, in comparison to other African economies with similarly high levels of growth, economic growth in Mozambique brought less benefits to the poorest segments of the society¹¹⁷. In 2014, Mozambique was one of the fastest growing economies in the world. Why, then, did it fail to translate into widespread poverty reduction? As Marc Wuyts puts it, “if the poorest people spend more of their income in food than the rich people do, the difference between price inflation and general inflation has a greater impact on the poorest than on the richest people”¹¹⁸, thus promoting an increasingly

¹¹³ The World Bank. *Moçambique: Relatório Analisa Pobreza e Suas Causas e Avança Recomendações*. World Bank. 2016. Available at: <http://www.worldbank.org/pt/news/press-release/2016/12/21/mozambique-report-discusses-poverty-trends-and-recommends-way-forward>

¹¹⁴ Oksana Mandlate. *Ideias nº80. Vulnerabilidade dos Estratos Urbanos Pobres: Caso da Pobreza Alimentar em Maputo. Economia, Recursos Naturais, Pobreza e Política em Moçambique - Uma colectânea de textos*. 2017, Maputo. P.237

¹¹⁵ Marc Wuyts. *Ideias nº35. Será que o crescimento económico é sempre redutor da pobreza? Reflexões sobre a experiência de Moçambique. Economia, Recursos Naturais, Pobreza e Política em Moçambique - Uma colectânea de textos*. 2017, Maputo. P.227

¹¹⁶ Oksana Mandlate. *Ideias nº80. Vulnerabilidade dos Estratos Urbanos Pobres: Caso da Pobreza Alimentar em Maputo. Economia, Recursos Naturais, Pobreza e Política em Moçambique - Uma colectânea de textos*. 2017, Maputo. P.237

¹¹⁷ Doris Ross. *Moçambique em ascensão: construir um novo dia*. Washington D.C. FMI, 2014. Available at: <https://www.imf.org/external/lang/portuguese/pubs/ft/dp/2014/afr1404p.pdf>

¹¹⁸ Marc Wuyts. *Ideias nº35. Será que o crescimento económico é sempre redutor da pobreza? Reflexões sobre a experiência de Moçambique. Economia, Recursos Naturais, Pobreza e Política em Moçambique - Uma colectânea de textos*. 2017, Maputo. P.229

deeper socio-economic inequality in a country where “around 60% of the population lives with less than 1,25 USD/day, and less than 20% live with 2 USD or more per day”.¹¹⁹

Having said this, the economic growth of 2014 – considering the current financial and economic crisis –, how can it be translated into poverty reduction? Unequal distribution of wealth has been a characterising feature of Mozambique since colonial times, but how can this trend be reversed? The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimates that 70% of the Mozambican population lives in rural areas in a country that it is ranked 181 out of 188 positions in the 2016 the Human Development Index, and remains one of the poorest countries in the world with a national poverty rate of 54%¹²⁰. In this context, the unequal distribution and misappropriation of national wealth will continue to increase poverty in rural and urban areas and, also importantly, widening the rich-poor gap, two factors with an immense potential to play a key role in the conflict between FRELIMO-led Government and RENAMO. If economic growth and improved state finances can be understood as a wager on the future of Mozambique and the well-being of its population – dismissing other important variables –, hopes are set on the 2009 discovery of natural gas reserves in the maritime area along the shores of Cabo Delgado province. Since 2009 that government authorities have regarded the natural gas reserves as a game-changer for the country’s finances and an opportunity to improve socioeconomic development. This topic will be analysed in the next sub-chapter.

¹¹⁹ António Francisco. Ideias nº47. Moçambique: entre estagnação e crescimento. Economia, Recursos Naturais, Pobreza e Política em Moçambique - Uma colectânea de textos. 2017, Maputo. P.195

¹²⁰ United Nations Development Programme. Human Development Report 2016. Available at: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/Dashboard2>

Natural Resources: An opportunity or a threat?

The 7.1% GDP growth rate recorded in 2011 came at a time when the discovery of natural gas reserves and corresponding revenue prospects were already making the headlines. Mozambique could become the world's biggest coal exporter, compared with Iraq.¹²¹

Mozambique has vast natural resource wealth, ranging from coal, precious stones, heavy sands, and natural gas. Paradoxically, in African countries, natural resources are generally associated with phenomena like the Dutch Disease¹²² and the Resource Curse, which include, and lead to, developments like rising poverty rates, endemic corruption, regression in economic diversification, mismanagement of revenues and, some times, armed conflicts. Does this general rule apply to Mozambique? How can the government create positive spill over effects from natural resource wealth? Can Mozambique become a success story in terms of managing wealth derived from natural resources?

According a 2012 study on the impact of natural resources on poverty by Katharina Hoffman and Adrian de Souza, the discovery of gas reserves raised questions regarding the future of Mozambique, particularly when departing from a comparative perspective regarding two other African countries that, despite having a vast natural resource wealth, failed to address high poverty rates and the expanding gap between rich and poor – Angola and Nigeria. The often-mentioned African exception on this regard is Botswana. As per the study, natural resources tend to lead to higher levels of corruption¹²³. Mozambique was ranked 120 out of 183 countries in the 2012 Transparency International Report¹²⁴, further deteriorating in 2016, when it ranked 142.¹²⁵ According to the 2012 study on natural resources in

¹²¹ Katharina Hofmann and Adrian de Souza Martins. *Descoberta de Recursos Naturais em Moçambique. Riqueza para poucos ou um meio para sair da pobreza?* Fundação Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Berlim, 2012. Available at: <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/09356.pdf>

¹²² Dutch Disease, is the casual relationship between the increase in a specific sector's weight and importance in an economy, to the detriment of other sectors. This phenomenon undermines the economic activity of other export sectors resulting in declining growth.

¹²³ Katharina Hofmann and Adrian De Souza Martins. *A descoberta de Recursos Naturais em Moçambique: Riqueza para poucos ou um meio de sair da pobreza?* , Fundação Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Berlim, 2012. P.1-5

¹²⁴ Ensuring Mineral Wealth is owned by the People - EITI in Mozambique. International Transparency. 2013. Available at: https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/ensuring_mineral_wealth_is_owned_by_the_people_eiti_in_mozambique

¹²⁵ Corruption Perceptions Index 2016. Mozambique. Transparency International. Available at: <https://www.transparency.org/country/MOZ>

Mozambique, once the government ceases to depend on tax collection from individuals and local businesses, to finance public accounts and, instead, that dependency is transferred to extractive industries, there is a risk of dissociating national authorities from the population's needs, a problem that is made worse with a weak institutional framework.¹²⁶

In fact, some of the world's biggest mining and oil/gas companies are already present in Mozambique but, as already mentioned, the mega-projects they invest in have failed to reduce poverty and ensure sustainable job-creation. Of course, that is not only associated with the capital-intensive nature of such investments, but also due to the demand for qualified professionals, which the local population lack. Mozambique is characterised by deep regionalism divisions rooted in the political divisions, especially between rural and urban areas. The discovery of natural gas in the north of the country will impact rural populations, to the extent that many have to be relocated to give way to construction sites for the extractive industry. Nevertheless, natural resource revenues can represent an opportunity, especially in terms of allowing for investment in socioeconomic infrastructures, promoting inclusive growth in terms of economy, and reducing dependency of foreign aid, which is currently extremely high¹²⁷. However, a recent study conducted by the Mozambican Economic and Social Studies Institute (IESE) shows that the government's strategy to concede substantial fiscal benefits to extractive companies in view of creating more attractive investment conditions, impacts on social responsibility. High corporate profits in the extractive industries, such as those of Mozal and Sasol, have failed to be substantially channelled for that purpose. In fact, less of 1% of both companies' accounts.¹²⁸ As a matter of fact, the international companies are who are benefiting more of the minerals extraction instead of helping reducing poverty. If this is a possible scenario for the oil extraction in the future of Mozambique's economy, it is also likely

¹²⁶ Katharina Hofmann and Adrian de Sousa Martins. *Descoberta de Recursos Naturais em Moçambique. Riqueza para poucos ou um meio para sair da pobreza?* Fundação Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Berlim, 2012. Available at: <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/09356.pdf> p.2

¹²⁷ Doris C.Ross. *Moçambique em Ascensão. Construir um novo dia.* Washington, DC: Fundo Monetário Internacional, 2014. p.128

¹²⁸ Virgílio Cambaza. *Ideias nº14 - Terra, Desenvolvimento Comunitário e Projectos de Exploração Mineira.* Economia, Recursos Naturais, Pobreza e Política em Moçambique. IESE. 2017. p.506

that Mozambique will increasingly suffer from the Dutch Disease that is so common in the other Africa States.

Apart from social concerns, large investments in extractive industries are likely to produce other undesired consequences, such as the infamous Dutch Disease, which is the casual relationship between the increase in a specific sector's weight and importance in an economy, to the detriment of other sectors. In other words the Dutch Disease is "the shrinking of a tradable-goods sector in response to a large influx of income (from a natural resource or other sources, such as foreign aid). The economy suffers long-term losses"¹²⁹. The Dutch Disease undermines the economic activity of other export sectors resulting in declining growth, which can also lead to a currency appreciation and a resulting loss of competitiveness of national exports of other goods.¹³⁰ Mozambique experienced "an investment boom in the nascent coal and gas sectors hoisted the metical by whopping 33 percent against the dollar from September 2010 to the end of 2011. It has since held on the bulk of those gains".¹³¹

Considering the deteriorating living conditions in Mozambique, mostly driven by high inflation and the current economic and financial crisis, as well as growing social disparity among the rural and urban areas, and among residents of Maputo, the eventual emergence of the Dutch Disease, driven by the recently-found natural gas reserves, and its impact on the agricultural sector – 70% of the population live in rural areas and depend on agriculture – is extremely worrying. This situation is compounded by the drought and flood vulnerability across the country.

Moreover, the revenue prospects associated with the exploration of natural gas can, not only, potentially increase already high levels of state corruption, but also create a fertile ground for political instability and armed clashes, especially between the long-time foes FRELIMO and RENAMO. In fact, the natural gas discoveries are located in Cabo Delgado; a province that is historically connected to FRELIMO and that is set to play an important role in national political dynamics. On the one hand,

¹²⁹ Harun Onder. Dutch disease: It's not just the oil; it's the oil barons. Available at: <http://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/dutch-disease-it-s-not-just-oil-it-s-oil-barons>

¹³⁰ Doris C.Ross. Moçambique em Ascensão. Construir um novo dia. Washington, DC: Fundo Monetário Internacional, 2014. P.166

¹³¹ Marina Lopes. Mozambique's cashews get dose of Dutch disease. Reuters. 2012. Available at: <https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE88K02V20120921?sp=true>

RENAMO can use the fact that the revenues deriving from the exploration of natural resources are not being fairly allocated to the central and northern provinces, for political confrontations. On the other hand, the transportation of natural gas will necessarily have to pass through those provinces that Afonso Dhlakama won in the 2014 legislative elections.

The discovery of natural gas occurred during the mandate of President Armando Guebuza, with whom the prospects of a new and highly appealing source of revenues began growing in the minds of the government and FRELIMO elites. Coupled with a strong economic growth driven by the extraction of natural resources¹³², Armando Guebuza's second term in office was also pillared on the belief that natural resource revenues, namely those of natural gas, would alleviate state finances and improve the country's debt profile. On his side, for Dhlakama this can also play an important role in the political dynamics. However, the global financial crisis, declining prices of commodities in international markets, and overly positive expectations contributed culminated in 2016 with the emergence of a debt scandal and suspension of financial aid by traditional donors.

Public Debt

In a context of considerable economic growth and discovery of natural gas reserves, the government focused state resources, and therefore public debt, to support mining and energy resources industries¹³³. Several projects were financed through the accumulation of public debt such as the Maputo-Katembe Bridge, the Nacala Airport and the National stadium of Zimpeto, who can also contribute for the Mozambican economy, such as the tourism sector.

As Carlos Castel-Branco and Fernando Massarongo clearly and rightly state, “the macroeconomic future of the country, including its ability to honor debt repayment, was reached in the dependency of the

¹³² Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2016 - Mozambique country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016. p.2

¹³³ Carlos Castel-Branco e Fernanda Massarongo (com a colaboração de Rosimina Ali, Oksana Mandlate, Nelsa Massingue e Carlos Muianga). Ideias nº85 - Introdução à Problemática da Dívida Pública: Contextualização e Questões Imediatas. Economia, Recursos Naturais, Pobreza e Política em Moçambique. IESE. 2017. p.22

expectations about the mineral-energy complex”¹³⁴. This argument emerges from a scandal that occurred in the years 2013 and 2014, when the Guebuza-led government had, granted two billion of USD in state-backed debt to three companies without the acknowledgement of traditional donors (namely the IMF) and the national parliament. In the aftermath of the disclosure, traditional donors suspended financial aid, the Metical (the Mozambican coin) devaluated and credit-rating agencies downgraded Mozambique’s debt profile to default. This context aggravated socioeconomic conditions. In a November 2017 visit to Maputo by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in November, the organization called on authorities to provide further clarification regarding the loans obtained by the Ematum, Proindicus and MAM.¹³⁵

According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, it is unlikely that other international donors resume financial aid before the IMF does and that is not expected to happen before the 2019 elections.¹³⁶ Such a scenario means that the government is likely to simultaneously stabilize the economy, addressing high poverty and unemployment rates, as well as contain or reverse inflation. As a result of current economic and financial conditions, the Government has begun cutting public expenditure, including in a wide array of essential services. The consequences for the political dispute seem obvious.

The Government accepted some of the exigencies of the FMI, and decided to contract an independent audit firm to evaluate the debts and contract the Kroll Audit Firm. The international audit firm Kroll did not find where the money was used and the report also says that there is a lack of information and consensus among the interviewed by the Consultant. João Mosca, a renowned Mozambican economist, clearly affirms that the Mozambican economy cannot generate enough resources

¹³⁴ Carlos Castel-Branco e Fernanda Massarongo (com a colaboração de Rosimina Ali, Oksana Mandlate, Nelsa Massingue e Carlos Muianga). *Ideias nº85 - Introdução à Problemática da Dívida Pública: Contextualização e Questões Imediatas. Economia, Recursos Naturais, Pobreza e Política em Moçambique*. IESE. 2017. p.22

¹³⁵ The Ematum, the company of tuna and fishing, the Mozambican Asset Management (MAM) a company of maritime repair and the Proindicus, a company of maritime security, are three Mozambicans companies headed by the same President, António do Rosário.

¹³⁶ Agência Lusa. *Moçambique sem ajuda dos doadores e do FMI até às eleições de 2019, diz Economist*. Observador. Dezembro, 2017. Available at: <http://observador.pt/2017/12/23/mocambique-sem-ajuda-dos-doadores-e-do-fmi-ate-as-eleicoes-de-2019-diz-economist/>

to pay the debt.¹³⁷ This scenario raises worrying questions regarding the future of peace and democracy in Mozambique.

¹³⁷ Economista João Mosca faz retrato negro da economia de Moçambique. DW. March, 2017. Available at: <http://www.dw.com/pt-002/economista-joão-mosca-faz-retrato-negro-da-economia-de-moçambique/a-38172596>

IV. The Resurgence of the Conflict between RENAMO and the FRELIMO-Led Government

Overall, Mozambique's democratic transition was developed in accordance with the pattern of other post-independence democratization processes in other Sub-Saharan African regimes. The likes of those processes "tended to evolve in three stages: consolidation of authoritarian rule by the mid-1970s, crisis management under authoritarian rule to the late 1980s, and an outburst of democratization starting in 1990".¹³⁸ In fact, the integration of the RENAMO guerrilla movement into the political sphere, albeit *de facto* limited, and FRELIMO's transformation into a democratic party, led the international system to regard the post-war transition as a great success. However, after more than 20 years of peace, tensions rose to critical levels between RENAMO and the FRELIMO-led government, leading to a renewed wave of armed clashes and violence. This final chapter seeks to analyze the extent to which the democratic transition and the 1992 General Peace Agreement influenced today's conflict. In order to achieve this goal, two particular and fundamental questions need to be answered: (1) why did tensions escalated to armed clashes between the two long-time foes? (2) why in 2013?

First, can the ongoing context in Mozambique be considered an armed conflict? The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) defines armed conflict as "a contested incapability that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, or which at least one is the government of a state, results at least 25 battle-related deaths".¹³⁹ Considering this definition, it is possible to argue that the number of deaths associated with armed violence between the FRELIMO-led Government and RENAMO – higher than 25 – justifies the current violence to be considered as an armed conflict, despite repeated denials of such by the government of Mozambique.

¹³⁸ Ndulu, Benno, J., and Stephen A. O'Connell. 1999. "Governance and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 13(3): 45

¹³⁹ (Themnér & Wallensteen 2011).UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook 1. P.1 Uppsala Conflict Data Program. Available at: http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/63/a_63324-f_Codebook_UCDP_PRIO_Armed_Conflict_Dataset_v4_2011.pdf

Afonso Dhlakama moved from Maputo to Nampula during the campaign for the 2009 general elections and, in 2011, called for demobilized soldiers to hold anti-government demonstrations.¹⁴⁰ Dhlakama's decision to settle at a Civil War era military base in the mountains of Gorongosa, in the central region of Mozambique, signaled that tensions had been increasing. In fact, 2013 brought an end to more than 20 years of peace, with the resurgence of a new low intensity conflict. In April 2013, RENAMO attacked a police station in Muxungue, Sofala province, in which RENAMO claimed to have killed 36 army soldiers and policemen. However, government officials reported that the number of casualties was considerably smaller: only four members of the police had died, while on the side of RENAMO one died and nine were injured.¹⁴¹ On August 2013, RENAMO announced that 35 government soldiers had been killed in "self-defense".¹⁴² Several other RENAMO attacks on security and defense forces were recorded throughout 2013.¹⁴³ RENAMO's guerrilla warfare strategy was also visible in the armed attacks conducted along National Road 1 (*Estrada Nacional* 1: N1). They were, in fact, a successful strategy because this is the main road connecting the south with the north, and with these attacks, RENAMO aimed to divide the country in two parts. In November 2013, RENAMO boycotted municipal elections and disrupted traffic along the railroad connecting the port of Beira, Sofala province, to the coalmines in Tete province, severely impacting exports of this mineral resource. In April 2014, RENAMO attacked a freight train carrying coal operated by Vale Mozambique, a subsidiary of the Brazilian mining company Vale, leading it to temporarily suspend coal exports. Most of the attacks on security and defense forces, as well as on logistical corridors, throughout 2013 were attributed to RENAMO.

¹⁴⁰ Joseph Hanlon. Mozambique News Reports & Clippings. The Open University. October, 2013. P.4 Available at: https://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk.technology.mozambique/files/files/Mozambique_231-Renamo%2Bkidnaps_27Oct2013.pdf

¹⁴¹ Times LIVE. 36 Mozambique soldiers, police killed: Renamo. August 2013. Available at: <https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2013-08-13-36-mozambique-soldiers-police-killed-renamo/>

¹⁴² Diário de Notícias. Cronologia das tensões entre Renamo e Frelimo desde 2012. Outubro de 2013. Available at: <https://www.dn.pt/globo/cplp/interior/cronologia-das-tensoes-entre-renamo-e-frelimo-desde-2012-3489354.html>

¹⁴³ Joseph Hanlon. Mozambique News Reports & Clippings. The Open University. October, 2013. P.4 Available at: https://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk.technology.mozambique/files/files/Mozambique_231-Renamo%2Bkidnaps_27Oct2013.pdf

After more than 70 negotiation rounds, in September 2014, a ceasefire agreement was signed between the government and RENAMO. The agreement was signed ahead of the October general elections, which RENAMO claimed to have been rigged by FRELIMO,¹⁴⁴ despite arguments otherwise. The Carter Center, for instance, stated that “the elections were more competitive, peaceful, and transparent than previous elections”.¹⁴⁵ FRELIMO’s presidential candidate, Filipe Nyusi, won 57 percent of the votes, against 37 per cent by RENAMO’s Afonso Dhlakama¹⁴⁶. Daviz Simango, leader of the third largest party MDM, got 6 percent of the votes, less than in the 2009 elections. Regarding the General elections elections, FRELIMO won in six of the country’s 11 provinces – Maputo City, Maputo Province, Gaza and Inhambane (all four in the south) and two in the North, Cabo Delgado and Niassa. RENAMO, for its part, obtained most votes in Sofala Manica, Tete, Zambézia and Nampula provinces, all in the center and north. From then on, RENAMO vowed to seize control over them. Moreover, the electoral results were characterized by a decline in abstention – from 64% in 2004 to 51% in 2014. Such decline is particularly interesting, considering that it did not negatively impact on Afonso Dhlakama and RENAMO. In fact, the results gave RENAMO a greater share of the ballot when comparing with the previous elections, from 16% in 2009 to 37% in 2014, a 37% increase. As Carolina Rocha da Silva and Michel Cahen argue, much like the 1994 and 1999 elections, “more than a democratic choice, the general elections represented a ‘vote for peace’, an attempt to settle disputes through politics, and not through war.”¹⁴⁷ In fact, coupled with the population’s intention to “vote for peace”, the growing political centralization and concentration of state revenues in the southern provinces driven by the ruling party, FRELIMO played an important role in RENAMO’s improved electoral results.

In 2015, as the conflict intensified, more than 10,000 people fled to neighbouring Malawi to seek asylum in the Kapise Camp (a transit refugee post), located in Mwanza district, at the border with

¹⁴⁴ Pascal Fletcher and Manuel Mucari. Renamo rejects Mozambique election result, African Observers endorse vote. October, 2014. Reuters. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-mozambique-election/renamo-rejects-mozambique-election-result-african-observers-endorse-vote-idUSKCN0160L620141017>

¹⁴⁵ The Carter Center. Presidential, Legislative, and Provincial Assembly Elections in Mozambique. P.54 Available at: https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/mozambique-finalrpt-061616.pdf

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., p.47

¹⁴⁷ Carolina Rocha da Silva. As eleições e a democracia moçambicana. Available at: http://janusonline.pt/images/anoario2015/1.13_CarolinaSilva_DemocraciaMocambique.pdf p.35

Moatize district, Tete province. A 2016 Freedom House report stated that refugees were moved further inland in Malawi, to the Luwani Refugee Camp, which was reopened in March 2016. The Luwani Camp had been active during the independence and the Civil War, and closed ever since the end of the conflict¹⁴⁸. All of the 2,500 refugees in the Camp had Mozambican nationality, 85% of those in the Luwani Refugee camp, were native from Tete province. The Freedom House Report adds that 98% of the refugees left Mozambique due to political motives and not poverty or droughts (that are frequent in Mozambique): “virtually all participants reported they left Mozambique because they felt targeted by FRELIMO soldiers via threats, assault, killing, burning, and rape or other forms of sexual violence”.¹⁴⁹ In March 2017, the UNHCR reported that 3,073 asylum seekers had checked in the Luwani Refugee Camp.¹⁵⁰ The government, however, denied the presence of refugees in Malawi.¹⁵¹

The escalation of tensions also encompassed targeted killings, particularly in 2015. According to a 2017 Human Rights Watch report, “at least 10 high-profile figures, including senior opposition members, state prosecutors and investigators, and prominent academics, were either killed or injured in apparently politically motivated attacks”¹⁵². In March 2015, the constitutionalist and university professor Gilles Cistac was killed in Maputo, allegedly due to the fact that he supported and constitutionally validated the establishment of autonomous provinces, in line with RENAMO’s demands for “autonomous governments” in the provinces where it claimed to have obtained the majority of votes in the 2014 elections.¹⁵³ In June that year, RENAMO insurgents ambushed government troops in the province of Tete (centre) and in the province of Inhambane (South). In September 2015, two vehicles of a convoy escorting Dhlakama in the Province of Manica, suffered an ambush injuring at least 7 people. On October

¹⁴⁸ Freedom House. Mozambique: Violence, Refugees and the Luwani Camp. December, 2016. Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FINAL_122016_Mozambique_Refugee_Research_ENG_compressed.pdf p.2

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p.9

¹⁵⁰ UNHCR. Operacional Portal Asylum Seekers Situation. Total Persons of Concern from Mozambique. Available at: <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mozambique>

¹⁵¹ Romeu da Silva. Governo moçambicano nega existência de refugiados no Malawi. February, 2016. Available at: <http://www.dw.com/pt-002/governo-moçambicano-nega-existência-de-refugiados-no-malawi/a-19036732>

¹⁵² Human Rights Watch. Mozambique, Events of 2016. Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/mozambique>

¹⁵³ Emmanuel de Oliveira Cortês. Porquê o conflito armado em Moçambique? Enquadramento teórico, dominância e dinâmica de recrutamento nos partidos da oposição. Observatório Político. Setembro, 2016. Available at: http://www.observatoriotpolitico.pt/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/WP_63_EC.pdf

of the same year, police stormed Dhlakama's residence in Beira, Sofala province, and detained his security guard. The governmental forces knew that Dhlakama was giving a press conference in Beira and surrounded his residence, the occurrence only ended after several hours of negotiations. After this occurrence, Dhlakama disappear once again.

Several members of RENAMO were killed: Aly Jane, a senior member in Inhambane; Juma Ramos, the leader of the party's bench in Sofala provincial assembly; and José Manuel, RENAMO's representative in the National Defense and Security Council. In January 2016, assassination attempts were also perpetrated against Manuel Bissopo, the Secretary-General of RENAMO, who had been shot, and Bento Sabão, a party member in Manica province¹⁵⁴. In October 2016, Jeremias Pondeca, a RENAMO senior official was killed in Maputo. Pondeca was a member of the Peace Talks Joint Commission comprised of government and RENAMO members that was preparing a proposal to review the legislation. The public prosecutor of Maputo, Marcelino Vilankulos, was killed in Maputo in April of 2016. Vilankulos had been investigating a wave of kidnappings in the capital city. In May 2017, the political analyst Jaime Macuane was kidnapped and shot.¹⁵⁵ In 2017, 120 dead bodies were discovered in a mass grave in Gorongosa area, but virtually no progress was made regarding who committed the atrocities, although there is a general suspicions that those killings were politically motivated.¹⁵⁶ In December 2017, Dhlakama announced that at least 8 dead bodies had been discovered in the central provinces of Mozambique¹⁵⁷. RENAMO claims that government and FRELIMO-backed death squads have been behind the killings and have called for authorities to open an inquiry into those alleged death

¹⁵⁴ Emmanuel de Oliveira Cortês. Porquê o conflito armado em Moçambique? Enquadramento teórico, dominância e dinâmica de recrutamento nos partidos da oposição. Observatório Político. Setembro, 2016. Available at: http://www.observatoriopolitico.pt/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/WP_63_EC.pdf p.4

¹⁵⁵ Agência Lusa. Processo autónomo sobre homicídio de procurador em Moçambique vai a julgamento. October, 2017. Available at: <http://observador.pt/2017/10/23/processo-autonomo-sobre-homicidio-de-procurador-em-mocambique-vai-a-julgamento/>


¹⁵⁶ Cátia Costa. Descoberta vala comum com 120 mortos em Moçambique. April, 2016. Available at: <http://www.sabado.pt/mundo/africa/detalhe/descoberta-vala-comum-com-120-mortos-em-mocambique>

¹⁵⁷ Agência Lusa. Dhlakama denuncia reativação de esquadrões da morte em Moçambique. December, 2017. Available at: <http://observador.pt/2017/12/26/dhlakama-denuncia-reativacao-de-esquadros-da-morte-em-mocambique/>

squads.¹⁵⁸ In a context of lack of progress in investigations by national authorities, growing political tensions and violence, the Freedom House gave Mozambique a “downward trend arrow”.¹⁵⁹

On 27 December 2016, RENAMO’s leader declared a one-week truce and, on 4 May 2017, this truce was extended for indefinite period, however Dhlakama told that it would not mean the end of the conflict.¹⁶⁰ Since then, no military attacks have been reported.

The low-intensity conflict forced more than 10,000 Mozambicans to seek asylum in neighboring countries, and raises questions regarding the widely regarded successful peace transition. Having analyzed recent developments in Mozambique throughout this sub-chapter, it is important to assess the reasons why the conflict reemerged in 2013. In general terms, two particular factors have played a key role: first, the impact of the democratic transition and the General Peace Agreement, alongside its implications for today’s political environment; Second, socioeconomic factors, rooted in regional discrepancies and poverty, as well as the natural resource wealth in the north of the country.



¹⁵⁸ Reuters. Mozambique opposition wants inquiry into possible police death squad. May, 2016. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mozambique-violence/mozambique-opposition-wants-inquiry-into-possible-police-death-squad-idUSKCN0Y92BT>

¹⁵⁹ Freedom House. Freedom in the World 2017 - Mozambique profile. Available at: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2017/mozambique>

¹⁶⁰ Lusa. Afonso Dhlakama anuncia trégua por tempo indeterminado. May, 2017. Available at: <https://www.dn.pt/mundo/interior/afonso-dhlakama-anuncia-tregua-por-tempo-indeterminado-7204859.html>

Map 2. Elections 2014 – Winners by Provinces




- FRELIMO
- RENAMO

Map 3. Armed Occurrences since 2013



- Islamist Attack in Mocimba da Praia
- Military Actions
- Political assassinations
- Mass Grave in Gorongosa
- Refugees leaving Tete
- Country divided between South and Central and northern provinces
- Natural Resources

Map 4. Mozambican Refugees Situation



Source: UNHCR. Available at: <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mozambique>

I. The Political Causes (Democratic Transition and the General Peace Agreement)

The resurgence of the conflict in 2013, involving the same actors of the 1977-1992 Civil War, brought with it ghosts of the past. What exactly failed in the democratic transition period? What changed in the political parties since the adoption of a multiparty system?

Prior to the signing of the General Peace Agreement, the two belligerent sides held several meetings aimed at ending the war, such as the unsuccessful Nkomati Talks. In the run-up to the General Peace Agreement, FRELIMO and RENAMO had been deprived from external support, the USSR and Apartheid South Africa, respectively. Moreover, in the early 1990's, the territory had been ravaged by the effects of the war and virtually all infrastructures destroyed. In the context of a destroyed economic fabric and lack of funding, the two sides realized that no one could out-rightly win the war and the best option was to reach a peace settlement. In other words, the General Peace Agreement was regarded as the only viable way to ensure each other's' survival. With the United Nations Trust Fund stipulated in the GPA to assist the former rebel group, RENAMO, to be integrated in the political sphere, both actors had a window of opportunity to play a part in a new Mozambique.

Nevertheless, as Luís de Brito explained, “the long period of the talks (around two years) and the postponement, up to the last minute, of the day in which the agreement would be signed, is revealing of how difficult it was to reach an agreement and of the sharp mistrust between both parties”.¹⁶¹ In fact, mutual mistrust is still, today, very much present in the both parties' dynamics and interactions. In addition, the General Peace Agreement itself made key contributions for the latest small-scale conflict in Mozambique, particularly by establishing that RENAMO could remain as an armed political party. The ONUMOZ mission was a key player in promoting the peace agreement and converting RENAMO into a political party. However, partly due to its focus on a political approach to the peace negotiations, and less so to a military one, RENAMO was allowed to keep part of its bellicose apparatus and, as a consequence,

¹⁶¹ Luís de Brito. Uma Reflexão sobre o Desafio da Paz em Moçambique. Desafios para Moçambique 2014. IESE. Available at: http://www.iese.ac.mz/lib/publication/livros/des2014/IESE-Desafios2014_01_DesPazMoc.pdf p.25

continued to be able to take up arms every time it wanted to make its voice heard and maintain a warmonger discourse.¹⁶² This was best exemplified in 2013, when Dhlakama returned to the Gorongosa Mountains.

Furthermore, the democratic transition was often followed by the ‘politics of silence’, meaning that political agents chose to forget rather than engage in true reconciliation.

Among the shortcomings of the GPA, it is also worth highlighting that the two sides of the Civil War were never fully converted, and committed, to democracy. According to Luís de Brito, FRELIMO was designed, at its inception, as the only party. In addition the 1990 constitutional changes towards implementing a multi-party democratic system were mostly driven by external pressures, and not by a transformation of the party’s political thought and rationale.¹⁶³ After President Joaquim Chissano’s tenure, during which electoral results were closely balanced between both parties, the election of Armando Guebuza was followed by some changes in FRELIMO’s structure. President Guebuza initiated a process that changed Mozambique’s political environment, by gradually blurring the distinction and separation between the government and the ruling party. As Luís de Brito explains, “after some years of hesitation, following the introduction of the multiparty system, what was really being built ahead of the presidential and legislative elections was a Party-State system”.¹⁶⁴ Under Guebuza’s leadership, FRELIMO had abandoned the compromise reached with the 1992 GPA and adopted a semi-authoritarian orientation¹⁶⁵, curtailing the political space that would otherwise allow opposition parties to actively participate in Mozambique’s democratization. In light of this semi-authoritarian shift, RENAMO lost space for political integration, thus undermining one of the main goals agreed upon in the GPA. That, in turn, meant that RENAMO became deprived of resources that could have potentially contributed to its transformation into a political party, thereby preventing the militarization and centralization that characterized RENAMO in the post-war period. On the other hand, access to resources could have

¹⁶² Luís de Brito. *Uma Reflexão sobre o Desafio da Paz em Moçambique*. Desafios para Moçambique 2014. IESE. Available at: http://www.iese.ac.mz/lib/publication/livros/des2014/IESE-Desafios2014_01_DesPazMoc.pdf p.23

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, p.25

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p.29

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p.30

provided RENAMO with better conditions to challenge FRELIMO during electoral campaigns.¹⁶⁶

RENAMO's centralized and militaristic nature, which has largely been driven by Dhlakama's personality, is exemplified by the isolation and expulsion of several party members who had been asserting themselves in the political arena, such as Daviz Simango. In 2008, when Dhlakama chose Manuel Pereira as the party candidate for the municipal elections in the city of Beira, Sofala province, instead of Daviz Simango, who had been Mayor for five years, the latter decided to run as an independent candidate and secured victory.

Both parties never truly sought to apply and consolidate the GPA and failed to become truly democratic. Afonso Dhlakama, who has been leader of RENAMO since its creation is known for his authoritarian personality, and for having retained a guerrilla mentality for 26 years. On the one hand, Dhlakama expelled and pushed aside several members of RENAMO who posed a threat to his leadership. On the other hand, RENAMO's resumption of armed action has been characterized by a return to the guerrilla tactics used in the Civil War.

Despite the similarities, the context, drivers and motivations behind the resurgence of the conflict have radically changed. The small-intensity conflict lags behind the dimension of the Civil War, in its brutality, violence and number of victims. Adding to this, today's conflict is not financed by external actors, at least not in the same proportions. The drivers and motivations have also changed. If, during the Civil War, Afonso Dhlakama claimed he was fighting for democracy and against Marxism-Leninism ideology, today's goals are pillared on making his, and the party's, voices heard, while using violence to gain an upper hand in terms of political demands, aimed at forcing the government to make concessions. In what pertains to FRELIMO, the party seeks to retain control and influence over national affairs, as it has done since independence, at least in official terms. Despite implementation of a multiparty system in 1990, democratization and the rule of law was never fully achieved. In fact, namely during Guebuza's presidency, the party increased and consolidated control over the country economic, political and social spheres. For instance, in 2017, Mozambique was ranked 93, out of 180 countries, in the Reporters

¹⁶⁶ Luís de Brito. Uma Reflexão sobre o Desafio da Paz em Moçambique. Desafios para Moçambique 2014. IESE. Available at: http://www.iese.ac.mz/lib/publication/livros/des2014/IESE-Desafios2014_01_DesPazMoc.pdf p.31

Without Borders' World Press Freedom Index. The organization claimed “the media suffer from a lack of resources and training and from widespread self-censorship, especially in rural zones. Journalists are often the targets of intimidation campaigns and lawsuits by government officials”¹⁶⁷.

The first cause identified for the present resurgence of the conflict is thereby understood in the context of the failure of both actors in the GPA compromise. In the side of RENAMO, the fact that it is still an armed party allow them to rise armed confrontations all the times they want to speak up. The leadership of Dhlakama is also a problem because it continues to be defined as a guerrilla type leadership, and as an authoritarian leader who most of all wants to keep himself in power in RENAMO. On the side of FRELIMO-Led Government, they also failed to assume the compromise of the GPA and of the Constitution on the multiparty system as well as on other basic democratic values. When Gebuza came to power he centralized all the democratic institutions under the FRELIMO-Led Government, excluding the possibility of a healthy democratic system with political inclusion. The consecutive ceasefire and peace agreements throughout the country's post-independence history, coupled with the aforementioned context, strongly suggests that “it is highly likely that a potential [new] agreement, similar to the GPA, will not be more than a temporary interruption in the [current] conflict, instead of the solution”¹⁶⁸. Moreover, understanding the GPA and democratic transition phases is key to assess the dynamics and developments within the context of the latest small-intensity conflict. As Carrie Manning puts it, “what is evident from the ending of this [latest] conflict was how deeply the norms of political interaction had become established during the first peacebuilding phase”¹⁶⁹.

¹⁶⁷ World Press Freedom Index 2017. Available at: <https://rsf.org/en/mozambique>

¹⁶⁸ Luís de Brito. Uma Reflexão sobre o Desafio da Paz em Moçambique. Desafios para Moçambique 2014. IESE. Available at: http://www.iese.ac.mz/lib/publication/livros/des2014/IESE-Desafios2014_01_DesPazMoc.pdf p.35

¹⁶⁹ Carrie Manning. Peacemaking and Democracy in Mozambique: Lessons Learned, 1992-2014. Available at: <https://africaplus.wordpress.com/2015/03/24/peacemaking-and-democracy-in-mozambique-lessons-learned-1992-2014/>

II. The Socioeconomic Drivers

Mozambique is characterized by regional divisions rooted on historically present political divisions. As the FRELIMO-led government under Guebuza's presidency gradually centralized and concentrated the economy and politics in the South, RENAMO re-entered active politics claiming that the central and northern provinces – where the party holds a considerable degree of influence and support – were being excluded. As Gustavo Plácido dos Santos explains, “these regional asymmetries, and the fact that RENAMO's rhetoric has somewhat been based on upholding the duty to integrate the northern and central peoples into the political and economic order – dominated by FRELIMO and the South, where the capital city, Maputo, is located –, have played a major factor in the party's assertive comeback in the 2014 elections”.¹⁷⁰ That author adds that “it is safe to assume that electoral and socio-economic divisions at the regional level represent a major supportive argument for RENAMO's calls to assume control over the six Provinces”.¹⁷¹

Regional asymmetries and high poverty rates – 70% of the population live in a situation of extreme poverty, according to a 2016 World Bank Report on Mozambique¹⁷² have contributed to growing distrust among the populations towards the government, which was emphasized by the lack of socioeconomic benefits, such as employment creation, derived from the large infrastructure projects. The development and spread of information technologies make it easier for the population to express their grievances and mobilize in anti-government protests.

The high levels of poverty, namely in the northern and central provinces of Mozambique, underdevelopment and power abuses by government forces against civilians, as the ones denounced by Mozambican refugees in Malawi, have provided a major contribution for the growing popular support for RENAMO. Afonso Dhlakama's party has claimed it upholds decentralization (from Maputo), in view of tackling poverty and economic inequality, and that the government failed to protect its citizens and their

¹⁷⁰ Gustavo Plácido dos Santos. Mozambique: present critical questions. Africa Defence & Security. Feb, 2017. Available at: <https://africadefesaeseguranca.wordpress.com/2017/02/15/mozambique-present-critical-questions/>

¹⁷¹ Ibid

¹⁷² World Bank Group. Mozambique Overview. Available at: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/mozambique/overview>

interests. In short, also driven by the government's weakened position due to the current economic and financial crisis, Dhlakama plans to rally support behind RENAMO ahead of the 2019 elections. As "The Perfect Storm: Mozambique's compounding crisis" article noted, Dhlakama's "demands are well aligned with the economic and political dimensions of the current crisis. They include the right to unilaterally appoint provincial governors in the provinces where RENAMO won an electoral majority in the 2014 elections".¹⁷³

The conflict's regional nature is based on a north/south and urban/rural disputes rooted on political divisions. The FRELIMO-led government deepened regional asymmetries with the concentration of economic and political activities in the South, which Dhlakama sought to capitalize in view of re-entering the political arena backed by popular support from the rural areas, as well as from urban areas outside of the southern political and economic core. One of the most relevant factors behind the regional asymmetries and the assertion of RENAMO, was the lack of social and economic inclusion following massive investments in infrastructure projects, and the perception – and indeed the fact – that wealth distribution was mainly allocated to the south. Mozambique is among the 10 poorest countries in the world, with 15 million people living with less than 1.90 dollars a day, and 60% in extreme poverty.¹⁷⁴ Two million people are in risk of starvation.¹⁷⁵

According with the World Bank's, World Development Report 2011(WDR), there is an interdependent relationship between conflict and poverty: if, on the one hand, violence causes poverty, on the other poverty promotes violence. As such, poverty has a great potential to become a key driver of armed conflicts.¹⁷⁶ With this in mind, Mozambique is a fertile ground for poverty to drive and feed the emergence of violent conflict. As mentioned in Chapter III, since 2003 poverty inequality increased, mostly driven by the centralization of the service economy in the south, which RENAMO sought to

¹⁷³ Gustavo de Carvalho, Jonathan Rozen and Lisa Reppell. The perfect Storm: Mozambique's compounding crisis. Institute for Security Studies. Jul, 2016. Available at: <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-perfect-storm-mozambiques-compounding-crises>

¹⁷⁴ World Bank. 2016. Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2016: Taking on Inequality. Washington, DC: World Bank. Available at: <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/25078/9781464809583.pdf> p.40

¹⁷⁵ Lusa. Moçambique: Dois milhões de pessoas em risco de fome. Mar, 2017. Available at: <http://expresso.sapo.pt/internacional/2017-03-05-Mocambique-Dois-milhoes-de-pessoas-em-risco-de-fome>

¹⁷⁶ World Bank Group. World Development Report 2011. Conflict, Security and Development. Washington, 2011. Available at: https://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/Resources/WDR2011_Full_Text.pdf pp.7-9

capitalize on by taking advantage of the socioeconomic inequalities, aimed at forcing the FRELIMO-led government to seat at the negotiation table, as well as to increase popular support. In fact, in a context of rising prices of staple goods – a trend that has been ongoing since 2008 –, the lack of benefits derived from natural gas projects to the population is fomenting disgruntlement and grievances towards the government, which likely were a reason for RENAMO's positive electoral results in 2014, when comparing to the previous ones. Following 21 years of Peace, Afonso Dhlakama put an end the GPA, begun a small-intensity armed conflict and increased the percentage of votes, mostly in the areas with the worst socioeconomic conditions, and which were largely under RENAMO's influence.

RENAMO's resumption of armed action is also particularly relevant when considering the year when it occurred, 2013. As it often happens, armed insurgencies are driven and fed by several variables, and the RENAMO case is no different. In fact, the party's recent insurgency campaign was not only based on political motives, but also due to the discovery in 2013 of large deposits of natural gas, – the largest find of the year, worldwide – in the northern Cabo Delgado province, namely off the coast at the Rovuma Basin.¹⁷⁷ The gas discoveries drove, to a large extent, RENAMO's assertive comeback in 2013 and, most importantly, motivated it to demand decentralization and control over the provinces where it claims to have obtained an electoral majority in 2014, as well as the constitutional possibility of selecting the province governors through elections. Given that the gas discoveries were made in Cabo Delgado province, which is politically controlled by FRELIMO – obtained a majority in 2014 – RENAMO's control over the six provinces – center and north, excluding Cabo Delgado – would mean that the largest opposition parties would have leverage to place the gas pipelines at risk, thereby undermining the government's access to a massive source of revenues.

Although decentralization could potentially be a vital element in conflict management, peace and democratization in Mozambique, as stated by Salvador Forquilha,¹⁷⁸ namely in light of the national

¹⁷⁷ Christopher Helman. The 10 biggest Oil and Gas Discoveries of 2013. Jan, 2014. Forbes. Available at: <https://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2014/01/08/the-10-biggest-oil-and-gas-discoveries-of-2013/#1deebb496a4c>

¹⁷⁸ Salvador Cadete Forquilha. The Paradox of Articulation of Local State Organs: From the discourse on decentralization to the conquest of local political spaces. *Cadernos de Estudos Africanos*. 2009. Available at: <http://journals.openedition.org/cea/187> p.94

diversity, the ruling party, FRELIMO, and the government have placed strong objections to the such an approach. Such objections are driven by the fear that the country could be divided in two, between the southern provinces, on the one hand, and the northern and central ones – where all most all the natural resources are located –, on the other. In fact, the majority FRELIMO-led Government has rejected all proposals in this regard submitted by RENAMO to the National Assembly.

As explained by Gustavo Plácido dos Santos, the resurgence of the armed conflict “coincided with the period of the discovery of large natural gas reserves in the Rovuma Basin. That said, Mozambique is a paradigmatic case of natural resources “motivating conflict” and increasing “the vulnerability of countries to armed conflict by weakening the ability of political institutions to peacefully resolve conflicts (Le Billon, 2001: 562).”¹⁷⁹

In addition to to this, the population understands what means the discovery of natural resources and they understand the international excitement over this, and they also see that the natural resources need to dislocate them and are not creating more jobs or improving life conditions.

The Dutch Disease phenomenon means “the shrinking of a tradable-goods sector in response to a large influx of income (from a natural resource or other sources, such as foreign aid)” through which “[t]he economy suffers long-term losses”.¹⁸⁰ The newly found natural resource wealth in Mozambique, requires an approach that diverges from the path taken by other natural resource-rich African States (with the exception of Botswana), where the poor suffer the most, due to job-destruction caused by disinvestment in other economic sectors, such as agriculture.

As stated in this essay, poverty, underdevelopment and regional asymmetries are key drivers of social disgruntlement and grievances in Mozambique, especially in the northern and central provinces. In response to this socioeconomic context, RENAMO has sought to capitalize from the general popular dissatisfaction to gain political legitimacy to the conflict’s resurgence.

¹⁷⁹ Gustavo de Carvalho, Jonathan Rozen and Lisa Reppell. The perfect Storm: Mozambique’s compounding crisis. Institute for Security Studies. Jul, 2016. Available at: <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-perfect-storm-mozambiques-compounding-crises>

¹⁸⁰ Harun Onder. Dutch disease: It’s not just the oil; it’s the oil barons. Available at: <http://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/dutch-disease-it-s-not-just-oil-it-s-oil-barons>

Economic and financial prospects associated with the natural resources boom caused the government's ability to honor its debt to become prisoner of mere expectations. In fact, significant gas production, not expected before 2025, is highly likely to have serious social repercussions. According to a recent article by Joseph Hanlon, with a 3.2% economic growth estimate in 2018 and resource extraction sector that fails to generate jobs "this is bound to create frustration and disappointment among youth" in a country where "one-third of the urban population is poor and inequality is increasing".¹⁸¹

In sum, the causes of the conflict are rooted in political and socioeconomic factors. Politically, the democratic transition was several times mistaken with the GPA that included democratic values, but was not truly followed by both actors of the Civil War. RENAMO has failed to comply with the demobilization clause established in the GPA, retaining a capability that allowed the party to take up arms every time it wants to urge for concessions. Dhlakama is still guided by a guerrilla way of thinking and has retained the party's leadership since its formation.

Regarding FRELIMO, they also failed to comply with the GPA, especially in the context of the implementation of a multi-party system under the 1990 Constitution. The FRELIMO-Led government blurred the dividing lines between party and state, controlling the political and economic spheres, and do not promoting inclusiveness. Coupled with FRELIMO's control over national affairs, the targeted assassinations of politicians and other individuals played a vital role in RENAMO's resumption of armed action.

In terms of socioeconomic factors, regional asymmetries, driven by endemic poverty, corruption and lack of benefits derived from the natural resource boom, particularly regarding the northern and central provinces, created the conditions for RENAMO to make a strong comeback in the 2014 elections. The newly found natural gas wealth fed, to a large extent, Dhlakama's demands to govern six of the 11 provinces, those in which RENAMO won a majority in 2014.

¹⁸¹ World Bank: secret debt devastating Moz economy - By Joseph Hanlon. January 2018. Available at: <http://clubofmozambique.com/news/world-bank-secret-debt-devastating-moz-economy-by-joseph-hanlon/>

All in all, political and socioeconomic exclusion are among the main reasons for the conflict's resurgence. As Carrie Manning argues, "political inclusion now means losing control over the natural resource boom and the spoils of the country's strong postwar economic growth"¹⁸².

¹⁸² Carrie Manning. Peacemaking and Democracy in Mozambique: Lessons Learned, 1992-2014. March, 2015. Available at: <https://africaplus.wordpress.com/2015/03/24/peacemaking-and-democracy-in-mozambique-lessons-learned-1992-2014/>

Conclusion

This main purpose of this dissertation was to understand what led the conflict between the FRELIMO-led Government and RENAMO to resume in 2013. Understanding the causes gains greater relevance when considering that not only the warring sides to the recent low-intensity conflict are the same of the 1977-1992 Civil War, but also that they also were the two centerpieces of a post-conflict transition widely regarded as a success story.

When analyzing the causes of the 1977-1992 Civil War between FRELIMO and the guerrilla movement RENAMO, it was possible to conclude that what drove the sixteen years Civil War is still very much present in the current political dynamics of the country. In fact, although the 'struggle for democracy' rhetoric has virtually disappeared from RENAMO's political discourse (as it was a pretext during the 70's), many of the motives that drove the guerrilla movement during the war remain very much alive, particularly the government's failure to ensure inclusive economic development and to address regional asymmetries. FRELIMO's Marxist-Leninist ideology, its dismissal of traditional chieftainship and attempts to create a homogeneous country, the rejection of inherent population diversity, and the establishment of Communal Villages, culminated in popular dissatisfaction and grievances, namely among the rural majority. This context gave RENAMO leeway to begin an insurgency, while rallying growing popular support around it.. The same pattern applied to the recent conflict, as RENAMO uses the argument of socioeconomic exclusion and southern elitism to strengthen its hand in national politics. Although, the Communal Villages had its influence, this do not happen anymore in Mozambique

As we saw throughout the dissertation, the democratic transition process and the *status quo* of today's political context are highly suggestive that the post-conflict transition in Mozambique was not as successful as many tend to assume. Both Civil War actors faced a growing lack of support due to the collapse of Soviet Union and the end of the Apartheid regime in South Africa. In such a context, the GPA was understood, on both sides, as the only alternative, since it was realized that no one would be able to

one-sidedly win the war. In sum, the GPA was, to a large extent, a last resort solution that, as such, did not mean that the warring sides were fully committed to peace and democracy. In fact, although the GPA established provisions aimed at achieving peace, none of the parties fully implemented them. Similarly, to the wartime *status quo*, the FRELIMO-led government has continued to be vying for control of the economic and political sphere, while maintaining a policy action over public sectors highly centralized in the South. On the other hand, RENAMO's disarmament was not concluded during the period of demobilization led by ONUMOZ. In fact, the largest opposition party remains armed and under a leader that has kept a guerilla way of thinking since the Civil War. Afonso Dhlakama is clearly aware that taking up arms is the best approach to make his voice heard and to force the government to sit at the negotiating table. An immediate outcome of that is the fact that, pre-election periods are often characterized by growing levels of politically-motivated violence, which are nevertheless promoted by both sides.

Furthermore, the resumption of the conflict coincided with the period when large reserves of natural gas were discovered in Cabo Delgado province. In addition, the discovery occurred a few years after RENAMO recorded a decline in its voting share and loss of parliament seats – and resulting financial losses – during the 2009 elections, the biggest one since the first multiparty elections. In addition, the 2009 elections were also characterized by the emergence of a third political force, MDM, which is comprised of RENAMO dissenters and secured seats in parliament. In light of this context, RENAMO's resumption of armed action can be seen to have been essentially driven not only by the need to regain popular support, but also by the intention to benefit from natural resource revenues.

FRELIMO, on its part, historically failed to promote economic development equally across the country, thus deepening regional asymmetries and socioeconomic disparities between the elites and southern provinces on the one hand, and the central and northern provinces on the other. The situation worsened during Armando Guebuza's two presidential terms. Popular perception of marginalization and gradually increasing prices of basic goods plays a fundamental role in every conflict. With 70% of the population living in rural areas, 60% in a context of extreme poverty, and considering political and social dynamics, Mozambique is no different.

In Chapter IV, we have concluded that the recent conflict in Mozambique is pillared on two main causes: political, derived from the period of the peace process and the democratization transition; and socioeconomic, related with regional asymmetries, lack of development, lack of inclusiveness in the political and economic sphere, and natural resource wealth. An additional factor is the fragile post-conflict transition and the presence of the ghosts of the past in today's national politics. During the years, the conflict was anaesthetized, instead of being object of a true reconciliation. Will the tensions remain high and the risk of conflict remain present? Only time will tell, although the current context is unlikely to be effectively addressed in the one-year outlook. Michael Cahen, an expert on Mozambican politics, has stated in a 2016 interview, "there will not be a Peace Agreement until 2019".¹⁸³ The author was likely referring to the 2019 presidential elections. Such as in 1994 and 2014, the 2019 elections are set to play an important role in Mozambique's near-future. In fact, peace agreements have been an integral part of a vicious cycle in national politics: political tensions, violent conflict, peace agreement, elections, and rejection of the results by RENAMO, tensions, and the cycle restarts.

When considering the impact of natural resources, particular the discoveries of large reserves of natural gas, on current political dynamics, the impact of a possible a Dutch Disease-like phenomenon should not be underestimated. From a comparative perspective, and taking Botswana as an example of efficient and good natural resource management, we infer that strong institutions, good governance, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption are key conditions for avoiding the Dutch Disease.¹⁸⁴ However, Mozambique is far from meeting those conditions, suffering from endemic corruption, a weak institutional framework, financial and economic mismanagement, and lack of transparency – as exemplified by the hidden debts scandal. Having said this, the newly-found natural gas wealth makes Dutch Disease a highly likely scenario in Mozambique.

Furthermore, socioeconomic inequalities and endemic poverty generate public discontentment towards authorities, essentially by the lack of accountability, abuse of force by security and defense

¹⁸³ Carmelino Cassessa. "Não haverá um acordo de paz em Moçambique até 2019"-Michel Cahen". Africa Monitor. 2016. Available at: <http://www.africamonitor.net/pt/politica/nao-havera-acordo-mocambique-2019-cc016/>

¹⁸⁴ Atsushi Limi. Did Botswana Escape from the Resource Curse? IMF Working Paper. 2006. p.9

forces, which in turn can become a key driver for armed conflicts. In October 2017, a group of armed individuals attacked a police station in Mocimba da Praia, Cabo Delgado province. The government stated that the assailants were part of a terrorist group affiliated with the Somalia-based Al-Shabaab. However, that proved not to be an isolated incident when, in mid-January 2018, armed individuals conducted fresh attacks in other localities in the province, closed to areas where oil and gas exploration projects are being developed. These latest attacks were characterized by reported thefts of food and medication. According to the Mozambican historian Yussuf Adam, “this scenario is part of a social crisis situation in which the rural population is responding to the government, that they perceive as having neglected them”.¹⁸⁵ Other researches, such as Chapane Mutua, argue that these attacks are also possibly related with the perception by vulnerable populations that they have remained poor, while other people prosper¹⁸⁶. Coupled with the natural resources boom, this situation of poverty, can potentially foster conflicts within population, thus placing at further risk the country’s stability and security.

Nevertheless, despite the ongoing tensions and bleak prospects, the incumbent head-of-state, Filipe Nyusi, has to some extent, improved the expectations for the ongoing peace talks between the FRELIMO-led Government and RENAMO, as he appears to be more open to negotiate and hear RENAMO’s demands. Yet, the negotiations will not inevitably lead to a final and stable peace agreement. In fact, even if president Nyusi brings fresh hopes for the negotiations, his predecessor, Armando Guebuza, continues to play an highly influential role in FRELIMO and in national politics. Lutero Simango, head of MDM’s parliamentary bench, said in a personal interview that Mozambique needs to overcome three big challenges: generalized corruption, the undisclosed debts, and the politics of exclusion, which are dividing the population.¹⁸⁷ Last but not least, as clearly put by the Portuguese General Luis Valença Pinto, “Reintegration is a helpful instrument for the sustainability of peace. Yet, reintegration must be conducted under the framework of a policy of inclusion extended to all dimensions, as well as a concern

¹⁸⁵Lusa. Moçambique: Revolta e manipulação na origem dos ataques em Mocímboa da Praia. DW. (November, 2017). Available at: <http://www.dw.com/pt-002/moçambique-revolta-e-manipulação-na-origem-dos-ataques-em-moc%C3%ADmboa-da-praia/a-41242985>

¹⁸⁶ Ibid

¹⁸⁷ Interview with Lutero Simango in the Mozambican National Assembly in Maputo, on 5/09/17.

that lasts over time. It is in fact a policy that can be greatly favored if preceded by a genuine reconciliation between the parts".¹⁸⁸ Conflict-prone tensions between the FRELIMO-Led Government and RENAMO can only be converted into a durable, solid and sustainable peace via a willing and committed reconciliation process.

In this regard, there is a potential positive scenario represented by the new generation of Mozambicans, who are not influenced by the ghosts of the past, and that, in the future will eventually be active in truly democratic institutions whether it is on FRELIMO, RENAMO, MDM or new political parties that can emerge, opening new and brighter horizons for Mozambique.

¹⁸⁸ Luis Valença Pinto. Violência e contenção da violência nas sociedades africanas do presente. Janus. 2014. Available at: http://janusonline.pt/images/anuario2014/3.29_LValencaPinto_ViolenciaContencaoAfrica.pdf

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