

INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS IN
Political Studies

(Est. 1993)

**CONFRONTING
THE AUTHORITARIAN CHALLENGE**

30th Annual Edition
27-29 June 2022



International Meetings
in Political Studies
(Est. 1993)

Este trabalho é financiado por fundos nacionais através da
FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., no âmbito
do projeto UIDB/04597/2020.

Title International Meetings in Political Studies (Est. 1993)
Confronting the Authoritarian Challenge
30th Annual Edition of the Estoril Political Forum
27-29 June 2022

Collection Ideias e Estudos Políticos

© Universidade Católica Editora

Proofreading Francisco Silva Pereira

Cover Design Velcrum.pt

Graphic Design,

Printing and Binding Sersilito-Empresa Gráfica, Lda.

Legal Deposit 517404/23

Date June 2023

Print run 300

ISBN 9789725408995

DOI <https://doi.org/10.34632/9789725408995>

Universidade Católica Editora,
Sociedade Unipessoal, Lda.
Palma de Cima 1649-023 Lisboa
Tel. (351) 217 214 020
uceditora@ucp.pt | www.uceditora.ucp.pt

Estoril Political Forum, 30, Estoril, 2022
International Meetings in Political Studies (Est. 1993) : confronting the
authoritarian challenge / 30th Annual Edition of the Estoril Political Forum
27-29 June 2022. – Lisboa : UCP Editora, 2023. – 192 p. ; 23 cm. – (Fora de
coleção). – ISBN 9789725408995
I – Tít. II – Col.
CDU 32(042)

International Meetings in Political Studies (Est. 1993)

Confronting the Authoritarian Challenge

30th Annual Edition
of the Estoril Political Forum
27-29 June 2022

Índice

9 *Foreword: ideas Matter*
JOÃO CARLOS ESPADA

12 *Opening Address*
RITA SEABRA BRITO

I – Introduction

15 *Message from the President of the Portuguese Republic*
H. E. MARCELO REBELO DE SOUSA

18 *Opening Address*
ISABEL CAPELOA GIL

22 *Opening Address*
CARLOS CARREIRAS

II – Confronting the Authoritarian Challenge

27 *Confronting the Authoritarian Challenge*
MARC F. PLATTNER

III – The Dahrendorf Memorial Lecture: “Ukraine’s Resistance and the Future of Democracy”

33 *Ukraine’s Resistance and the Future of Democracy*
CARL GERSHMAN

43 *Ukraine’s Resistance and the Future of Democracy: Lessons Learned*
GHIA NODIA

49 *Ukraine’s Resistance and the Future of Democracy*
WILHELM HOFMEISTER

IV – Winston Churchill Memorial Dinner: “Churchill and Russia”

- 55 *Churchill and Russia*
ALLEN PACKWOOD

V – Russia, Ukraine, and the West

- 65 *The Future of Europe is at stake in Ukraine. Why and How to contain Russia’s “Strategic Assertiveness”. From “Strategic Containment” to “Strategic Stability”*
LUÍS DE ALMEIDA SAMPAIO
- 75 *Russia, Ukraine, and the West*
DÓRA GYÓRFFY
- 80 *The evolution of the political role of the Russian Orthodox Church (1991-2021)*
OLENA KOLODIY

**VI – Charles de Gaulle Memorial Luncheon:
“In Defence of an Ethics of Deference in Unhappy Times”**

- 109 *In Defence of an Ethics of Deference in Unhappy Times*
CATHERINE MARSHALL

**VII – Democracy and Governance in a Context
of Global Recession of Democracy**

- 119 *Reflections on Democracy and Governance Studies at Georgetown University*
DANIEL BRUMBERG
- 126 *Educating Thought Leaders in Democracy Studies in the Context of Democratic Erosion*
ELTON SKENDAJ

**VIII – Edmund Burke: “Edmund Burke on Confronting
Authoritarianism – The Spirit and the Letter”**

- 129 *Scraping the Barrel? Burke, Rousseau, and the Roots of Authoritarianism*
IAN CROWE
- 136 *Burke, Rights of Man and the Magna Carta*
IVONE MOREIRA

IX – George Washington Memorial Dinner:**“George Washington – A Man for Our Time, and All Times”**

- 141 *George Washington: A Man for Our Time – and All Times*
WILLIAM GALSTON

X – The Future of NATO

- 147 *NATO’s Past, Present & Future*
GARY J. SCHMITT

XI – Luigi Einaudi Memorial Luncheon:**“The Light That Fails? The Present Debate in Italy
on the War in Ukraine”**

- 155 *The Light that Fails? The present debate in Italy on the war in Ukraine*
GIANDOMENICA BECCHIO

XII – Konrad Adenauer Memorial Dinner

- 159 *Confronting the authoritarian Challenge*
LUDGER GRUBER

Appendix

- 165 30th Edition of the Estoril Political Forum’s Programme
171 About the Contributors

Foreword: ideas Matter

João Carlos Espada

This book brings together most of the papers presented at the 30th edition of the International Annual Meetings in Political Studies (now called Estoril Political Forum), which started in 1993, in Arrábida. This 30th edition took place on June 27-29, 2022, at the Palácio Estoril Hotel – the hotel of the Anglo-American allies during World War II. The general title was “Confronting the Authoritarian Challenge”.

On the topic of our tradition of annual meetings in Arrábida and in Estoril since 1993, the main point I would like to make is that all these 30 years were not the result of a plan, or of a trick, or of a plot, or of a conspiracy.

Petty minds nowadays fill the so-called ‘social media’ with insidious stories about conspiracies. I am delighted to say two things about this: first, I don’t use social media; I just rely on good friends who keep me aware of what is going on over there; second, I am particularly delighted to say that our tradition of annual meetings since 1993 has nothing to do with plans, plots, conspiracies, or power politics.

We were fewer than 20 participants in Arrábida in 1993. In June 2022, at the Palácio Estoril Hotel, our 30th edition, we have had 749 registered participants. How did this happen? Very simply, in my view, by the excitement of ideas. We came together in 1993 because we shared an attachment to, and a curiosity about, some ideas that were not vulgar. And our meetings have grown because more and more people have been attracted by these ideas. The same ideas have been the source of the launch of our Institute for Political Studies (IEP) at

the Universidade Católica Portuguesa in 1996: we had 40 students at the MA program that we launched in 1996. We now have more than 400 students within our BA, MA and PhD programmes.

Ideas indeed were at the root of the launching of all these undertakings. In 1993, I was invited to promote a week-long course in Political Theory in Arrábida by Bernardino Gomes – a Portuguese Atlanticist socialist that I had vaguely met through another Atlanticist socialist, the then President Mario Soares (to whom I had been political adviser in his first presidential mandate, 1986-1991). But we were not close – and I was certainly not a socialist. Bernardino Gomes simply may have found some common ground on our mutual attachment to the Western tradition of liberty under law.

In 1996 I was invited to launch a program in Politics at the Universidade Católica Portuguesa by Mário Pinto – whom I barely knew, and I was not a member of the Universidade Católica. Mário Pinto may simply have thought that there was common ground between us, mainly because of my liberal opposition to jacobinism and the so-called ‘enlightened despotism’, as well as my liberal opposition to post-modern nihilism.

Also in 1996 I met Marc Plattner – who kindly decided to come to Portugal to attend a lecture by Samuel Huntington, whom I had invited to launch a Lecture series called ‘The Democratic Invention’, which was the inauguration of the Mário Soares Foundation. I had never met either Huntington or Plattner – but a deep friendship with Marc emerged from that encounter. Marc even kindly decided to replicate ‘The Democratic Invention’ lecture series in Washington a couple of years later.

All these three encounters happened obviously not because of plans, but because of ideas. It is difficult to define the ideas that have generated this tremendous excitement – and we should always be skeptical about definitions, as Karl Popper, one of our great mentors, used to say. I would nevertheless tentatively submit three main topics:

In the first place, a clear and uncompromising attachment to liberal democracy, including market economies, checks and balances, and

personal liberty – basically defined as absence of coercion by others, as Isaiah Berlin, another of our great mentors, has recalled.

Next, a clear and uncompromising attachment to the Atlantic Alliance as the bulwark of liberal democracy and the Free World. We have from the outset been very clear about our attachment to the Western Tradition of Liberty under Law; and we have always made clear that this pluralistic tradition is rooted in Athens, Rome and Jerusalem. And it undoubtedly includes the great American liberal democracy – as Alexis de Tocqueville, another of our great mentors, has taught us.

Last but certainly not least, we have always made clear our attachment to the classical understanding of the Idea of a University as a place of learning – as Michael Oakeshott, another of our great mentors, used to say. This means the understanding of a University as a place for the pursuit of Truth, the Good and the Beautiful – and not as a place of propaganda. This means the stern defence of Free Speech and the stern refusal of tribalism and of collectivism. This also means the engagement in an on-going pluralistic conversation and the refusal of ideological warfare among “unfortunate dichotomies,” as Ralf Dahrendorf, another of our great mentors, used to say.

To conclude, and to put a long story short, **Ideas Matter**. And the **Idea of a University** matters above all. Please allow me to conclude therefore with a brief quotation from John Henry Cardinal Newman in his classical work *The Idea of a University*, which we always quote in the presentations of our Institute for Political Studies of the Universidade Católica Portuguesa:

“A University is a place where inquiry is pushed forward and discoveries verified and perfected, and rashness rendered innocuous, and error exposed, by the collision of mind with mind, and knowledge with knowledge.”

Opening Address

Rita Seabra Brito

It was with great pleasure that we once again organized a very special programme for the 30th edition of the Estoril Political Forum. It is a very extensive programme about which I invite you to learn more, both within the conference materials and on our website.

This year's central topic, *Confronting the Authoritarian Challenge*, will be discussed in various panels throughout the programme. The debate on this topic will be launched directly in the next session through a video by Her Excellency the Ambassador of Ukraine in Portugal, in a session with the participation of José Manuel Durão Barroso, very well known by everyone for his role carried out as Portugal's Prime Minister and President of the European Commission, but also as director of the Centre for European Studies of our Institute; Marc Plattner, founding co-editor of the *Journal of Democracy* and President of the International Advisory Board of our Institute, and William Galston, from the Brookings Institution.

We were informed last week that our guest speakers Charles Moore and Raymond Plant will unfortunately not be able to join us this year.

The conference work will proceed with the Ralf Dahrendorf Memorial Lecture, which will be delivered by Carl Gershman, Founding President of the US National Endowment for Democracy. This session's topic will be *Ukraine's Resistance and the Future of Democracy*, a topic we consider of the utmost importance given the remarkable

example the Ukrainian people have been giving the world, on the values of freedom and democracy.

The Garden Reception *Celebrating the 650th Anniversary of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance*, will follow, in which we will have the honor of welcoming HRH Dom Duarte, Duke of Bragança.

According to our tradition, throughout the programme we will have the Raymond Aron and Luigi Einaudi Memorial Luncheons as well as the Winston Churchill, George Washington and Konrad Adenauer Memorial Dinners. During the Konrad Adenauer Memorial Dinner, we will welcome the participation of our Academic Association and the Lisbon Swingers.

It is a great pleasure to count on the participation of our International Advisory Board members, Professors: Anthony O' Hear, Catherine Marshall, Clifford Orwin, Hartmut Mayer, James Muller, Paul Flather and Zdzislaw Mach.

Our programme would not be possible without the support of many friends and sponsors, some of them will join us for the next days. I would like to express our deepest gratitude to:

Fundação Amélia de Mello, which sponsors scholarships and various events and programmes at the IEP, will be represented by Jorge Quintas, its secretary general.

Jerónimo Martins/Biedronka which sponsors scholarships for students from polish universities to participate in the conference. This company was presided by Alexandre Soares dos Santos, to whom we had the privilege to assign the Faith and Liberty Lifetime Tribute in 2014.

This prize was also assigned to Father João Seabra in 2017. Father João Seabra left us last June. We will profoundly miss him.

We are also deeply grateful to the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, which will be represented by Ludger Gruber, director for Portugal and Spain and who will be guest speaker at the closing dinner. We will have the pleasure of having among us Wilhelm Hofmeister, former director for Portugal and Spain of the Foundation and a long-time friend of the Institute.

We would also like to thank Jakub Klepal, host of the *Prague Appeal for an International Coalition for Democratic Renewal* and President of Forum 2000, launched by Václav Havel.

Last but certainly not least, we are profoundly grateful to the Township of Cascais and to Mayer Carlos Carreiras, who have kindly supported us since 2011.

Dear Guests,

On behalf of the Institute for Political Studies of the Universidade Católica Portuguesa, I would like to thank you all for coming to this 30th edition of the Estoril Political Forum.

The EPF is a kind of club of friends of liberty that has grown over the years. It was not built on a central decision, or a central command. It has grown. It has evolved gradually through the free interaction and cooperation of free and decentralized individuals and institutions that have felt at home and have enjoyed these annual meetings.

Some of our Portuguese colleagues from other Universities are sometimes surprised by the success of this unplanned evolution of what has become a great institution of friends of liberty. However, whenever they join us at the Estoril Political Forum, they too, are touched by the atmosphere of orderly liberty which we celebrate in these meetings.

We may well be facing today new threats to liberty, but we remain confident on its charm and strength.

I – Introduction

Message from the President of the Portuguese Republic

H. E. Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa

Mr. Mayor of Cascais,
Madam Rector Magnificent of the Universidade Católica Portuguesa,
Mr. Director of the Instituto de Estudos Políticos,
Distinguished speakers,
Distinguished guests,
Dear teachers,
Dear students,

It is not every day that the 30th edition of an international academic meeting is celebrated. Congratulations are therefore due to Universidade Católica Portuguesa, its Instituto de Estudos Políticos and its notable master and Churchillian emeritus, Professor João Carlos Espada, who has been promoting this event for 30 years.

Bearing in mind the topics addressed in previous editions, there is an indelible trait, a constant concern that runs through them: the defence of and militancy for the values of liberal democracy and the democratic rule of law. It is therefore not surprising that the theme of this year's edition is "Confronting the Authoritarian Challenge". It is not a circumstantial option at the moment, but a natural and consistent option with what is already the legacy of Instituto de Estudos Políticos. To study and debate how we should face the challenges of the so-called authoritarianisms, or authoritarian populisms, and promote the virtues of liberal democracies and their assertion in a

changing world, which constitutes one of the greatest challenges of our time for us, democrats.

It was already a challenge before the pandemic and the war, for internal and external reasons. For internal reasons, and I will just briefly mention a few, the obvious crisis in many European party and social partner systems; the crisis, also obvious, in legitimation and political representation in some of them; the even more obvious crisis in the context of the new mass media, namely the digital ones; the crisis in the perception and framing of new forms of inorganic social contestation that do not fit in with existing partners.

But there are also external or, if you like, semi-internal and semi-external reasons. The combination of these European crises with the signs of crisis in the North American political system, and especially in its relationship with European allies during the previous presidential administration. The objective convergence between this distancing between the previous US presidential administration and the European Union and the European political systems and even actions of comfort to European populisms by American sectors, the convergence of this with the Russian attention in cyber-intervention and in the support for anti-systemic positions in Europe marked four years of the life we all live, and with effects until today. The conjunction of political causes with the economic and social crises from 2008 to 2015. The dilution of the vision of the main strategic adversary in NATO, became more quickly ISIS or DAESH and not the Russian Federation. The slowness to integrate China and its role in NATO's Strategic Council. All of this, plus a slowness in assuming, but really assuming, the relevance of NATO's southern flank and relations with other continents, starting with Africa, created the context in which the pandemic occurred, first, and the outbreak of war in Ukraine with the invasion by the Russian Federation. All of this also allowed China to pursue its global economic strategy, and the Russian Federation to rush its reassertion as more than a regional power, as happened with the violation of ethics and law in Ukraine.

The pandemic has revealed global weaknesses, but also the limits of autocracies and dictatorships to prevent, dominate and economically restart them. War has tested the capacity of European unity,

transatlantic unity, sharing with other continents, persuasion of public opinion, overcoming fatigue, lassitude, indifference, in the face of values and principles, the ability to respond and the sustained legitimation in the democracies in which we live. This test, and in particular the war test, had very promising initial results. But it is still ongoing, on a military course, a political course, a diplomatic course, an economic, financial, and social course. The most difficult has proven well, but the essential remains to be proved. What is essential? What is essential is our resistance, as democracies, in the face of long, complex, exhausting challenges, of great ethical and institutional demands, of sustainable legitimacy, of non-demobilization in the face of economic, financial, and social costs. This is the most difficult test, and it is the one that lies ahead. There could be no greater test for everyone in the world, but above all for everyone who lives in the democratic world that is ours. Defending and promoting democracy now is much more than theorizing it, studying it, institutionally strengthening it, halting immediate offensives, containing subsequent ones, going further in cyber defence or proxies. It is all of that, but so much more. It is fighting not to lose by arms the fight for values. But it is also not losing in souls, because you only truly and sustainably win in arms when you win in souls. And all this in good time and knowing that there is more to the world than the one we are used to having as definitively conquered.

In democracy, as in everything in life, nothing is definitively conquered. That is why your meeting today is, allow me to say, perhaps one of the most important of the last 30 years. I am sure you know. Thank you for having it, as always, in Portugal. The ocean and its horizons will certainly inspire the threshold of your ambition.

Opening Address

Isabel Capeloa Gil

Dear participants of the Estoril Political Forum, distinguished guests, I am delighted to welcome you once again to the Estoril Political Forum and to this extraordinary venue in Estoril.

The Institute for Political Studies of the UCP continues to be a reservoir for a world-class education and informed debate in the increasingly tense environment of political activity. The Institute is an honest broker of democratic thought in Portugal, leveraging the debate and educating citizens capable of thinking strategically and responsibly about the future. Allow me to congratulate the Director of the Institute, Prof. João Carlos Espada, and his team, who, with foresight and wisdom, have consistently emphasized the need for a solidly informed political debate so that the quality of our democracy is strengthened. In order to survive in the face of the prevailing autocratic threats, a free and informed education is required, and this is the mission that Universidade Católica Portuguesa has been affirming in Portugal since its inception in 1967.

This year, the Forum confronts the authoritarian challenge, a challenge both of macro and micropolitics. A challenge of the grand scheme of things and of the minor practices of the everyday.

Education is the key to unleash the potential for transformation that is necessary, if our common home is to have a future. The war in Ukraine has crushed the great accomplishments of late modernity:

peace, the right to nourishment, to education, to shelter, the rule of law and political pluralism. Basically, the war in Ukraine disrupts the basic right to have rights which supports the modern democratic order. In these trying times of need, our reflections in this assembly are seismically connected with the tragedy of our times and to the responsibility carried by those who defend true freedom to raise their voices and act systematically and consistently against the nepotic narcissism of authoritarianism.

Our current predicament materializing in all-out war, corporate greed and the worsening of the climate crisis, intolerance and social disruption derives from the buildup of a dissonant reasoning, that places the use function of everything before its intrinsic value, that subsumes value to monetization and instrumentalizes humanity to short term objectives. In an essay written during the occupation of Poland in II World War, writer Czeslaw Milosz saw that more than the raw violence unleashed upon his fellow compatriots, the most corroding element of the occupier's actions lay in the disruption of a structured system of knowledge, behavior and belief, jettisoned by an anti-intellectual agenda. "From contradictions rooted deep in our system of knowledge," he wrote, "a conviction has arisen about the fundamental unknowability of the world, along with an understanding of truth with limited responsibility, truth for human use, with no pretensions whatsoever to being eternally binding." (Milosz, 2005:70) Democracy rests on the empowerment of individuals to make reasoned choices, substantiated by the rule of law, political pluralism, and the basic freedoms guaranteeing human dignity and the tolerant coexistence of respectful difference. Democracy is never accomplished because it rests on the possibility of individuals to reason and to think, to choose and to dissent. It rests on potential – to understand and make informed choices – and trust. Hannah Arendt claims in the *Origins of Totalitarianism* that "The ideal subject for totalitarianism is not the nazi or the communist, but the person for whom the distinction between fact and fiction (that is, real experience), and the distinction between true and false (that is, the patterns of thought) no longer exist."

Democracy requires the ability to select and distinguish. Political action cannot be subsumed to simplification. It requires a

commitment to different perspectives, to antagonist views, to plural understandings of reality, as diverse as the situations of our motley humanity, to complexity, in fact. If we are to honor a common interest for each other, or as Pope Francis writes in *Fratelli Tutti*, to honor a common debt (FT, 35) and responsibility, then there is no other way than to mobilize against demeaning, degrading and unjust social combinations that persist in limiting the rights of some groups to access the rights of a few others. There is a certain vernacular right to narration, to tell one's story and to memory, no matter how contradictory the past and how diverse the present, that underlies Hannah Arendt's fundamental claim of 'the right to have rights'. On the contrary, authoritarian predispositions cannot be bothered by complexity. They instill simple narratives as we've witnessed on different occasions, from the life-threatening actions in Russia against Putin's war on Ukraine to the Jan. 6th 2021 attack on the U.S. Capitol. Authoritarianism, as political scientist Anne Applebaum argues, is an attack on complexity (Applebaum, 2021:106).

The fight against complex social narratives occurs on all sides of the political divide and is both traversed by nostalgia for a past that never was or activism for an as yet unscripted future. The current situation does not take us out of the loop of responsibility. The failure of liberal democracies to close the inequality gap, to choose dignity over profit despite the scientific and financial possibilities of doing so, to articulate self-interest with the common good, have dangerously discredited the system. The rise of the incongruous concept of 'illiberal democracy' and the growing attempts to showcase the success of authoritarian capitalism over its democratic counterparts, on the one hand, and on the other the inability of democracies to build coalitions grounded on values and to act, even in support of self-defense, when action is of the essence, suggests that the 'pharisaism of democracy' (Milosz, 2005:85) Czeslaw Milosz saw at work in the League of Nations in the 1920s still abounds.

But for us all there is hope. This is what moves us forward and will allow us to advance. Democracy is far from a perfect system, but it is still the best to the exclusion of all others. In the words of the American poet Amanda Gorman, "While democracy can be periodically delayed,/It can never be permanently defeated," its

greatness lies in the purpose of living together in harmony, respectful of all. And that is a goal that the false glitter of the authoritarian spectacle may defer but never conquer. May we all, and you all, do our bit to confront the challenge!

Opening Address

Carlos Carreiras

Madam Rector Manificent of the Universidade Católica Portuguesa,
Professor Isabel Capelo Gil,
Madam chair of the Estoril Political Forum, Dra. Rita Seabra de Brito
Director of the IEP, dear friend Professor João Carlos Espada,

Dear students and professors from the IEP and international
universities who are joining us these days...

Ladies and gentlemen,

Welcome to Cascais and, especially, to Estoril.

I say a very special welcome to Estoril, not just because we are
physically gathered here.

I highlight this above all because almost eight decades after the great
conflicts in our history, Estoril – and Cascais – are once again the
home of many who flee war in search of peace, freedom, and hope.

For 80 years, Estoril welcomed kings without crowns, aristocrats
without titles and anonymous citizens from all over Europe. They
were all equal in suffering at the hands of inhuman ideologies,
criminal revolutions, and relentless fanaticism.

The beacon of humanity and pluralism that never went out in this
land is now, in 2022, a light of shelter for those escaping from the war
in Ukraine.

Over the next few days, Hotel Palácio will serve as a platform for academics, military personnel, and analysts to debate the great challenges of war and peace, democracy, and authoritarianism, which we are facing.

As the only Mayor on the program, I want to enjoy my status and give you a different perspective of the barbarism that the Kremlin brought to Europe.

A radically humanist perspective.

When this war started, there were three ideas that were clear in my head:

The first idea is that this could never be a time for ambiguity in democratic societies. Political leaders were required to take clear positions on a war of conquest, fought based on false arguments and supported by clear and constant violations of International Law and the Universal Charter of Human Rights.

The second idea is that despite the differences that still separate Lisbon from Kyiv today, Ukrainians are fighting for us, for our values and for our way of life. Therefore, if in the extreme east of the continent the Ukrainian army is the front line, and we, in the westernmost tip of Europe, have a moral duty to be its rear line. I want to emphasize this point strongly: Ukraine's place is in the European Union. I know there are many (and valid) arguments to the contrary. But Ukraine's place is in the EU because Ukrainians deserve it.

The Russian invasion and the heroic Ukrainian resistance confirmed that the people is willing to make the most demanding sacrifices in order to dream of a life like ours. The country's attachment to freedom was tested again and again.

In 1991, when Kyiv told the world it wanted to be the master of its own destiny – away from Moscow. In 2004, when hundreds of thousands of people defied the merciless winter to maintain the momentum of the Orange Revolution. In 2014, when thousands of blue flags with yellow stars were repressed, brutalized, and imprisoned in “Euromaidan”

Ukraine's place is in the EU because, in contrast to Russian propaganda, Ukraine is an ancient, Western-inclined nation that has never failed to resist Tsarist oppression.

A struggle embodied in men like Taras Shevchenko, the great poet of the Ukrainian motherland.

Ukraine's place is in the EU because our history is one of a community of life and destiny, which federates rather than excludes, which is made of unity in diversity, which is light instead of darkness, which is Democracy and Law against tyranny and oppression.

The third idea is that we, municipalities, at our scale, would also have to respond. If the concerns of the world are increasingly being decided by cities, then we, mayors, would also have to give a war response.

In Cascais, the guidelines I gave the teams were crystal clear. "If the war was with me, if it was with my family, what support, what comfort would you like to have thousands of kilometers away from home?"

The question got a notable response from the teams.

Suddenly, Cascais was organizing rescue missions in refugee camps in Romania, we were building temporary centers for displaced people, and we were preparing to send tons and tons of humanitarian aid that, at the peak of the war, reached martyred cities like Bucha and Irpin – nowadays sister cities of Cascais, with twinning agreements forged in wartime.

So, I ended up getting to know the other face of war.

The war in the face of Oksana, who traveled to Cascais with her 5 twins and 6 children, leaving behind a comfortable life and career. The war in the face of Oleksander, a Crimean cyclist who lived in Mariupol and who lost his hearing and his bicycle in the bombing of Kramatorsk Station. In Cascais, he recovered both and hope.

The war in the face of Mika, a sophisticated woman from Bucha who reports the brutality of indiscriminate rapes, summary executions of civilians and the Russian army's concern to plunder everything of value and destroy everything that can't be stolen. The war in the

face of my friend the Mayor of Irpin, the heroic city that was Kiev's shield against the Russian invasion, who told me how civilians died in his arms as he evacuated the city under enemy fire; or how deadly phosphorus bombs covered pretty Irpin in ashes; or how he survived three assassination attempts organized by the invaders.

Stories like this are punches in the stomach. Blows with which we learn to live in city management in insane times of war.

Which, in the case of Cascais, from one moment to the next has a community of Ukrainian guests of around three thousand people.

Many Ukrainians ask me why our community does all this for them.

I respond with a message that also echoes in the corridors of this university: we do what is our duty. Or, to recover the sacred words, we love our neighbor as ourselves.

Our efforts are a drop in an ocean of tragedy. But if each one of us does his part, if each one of us, in his own scale, contributes to humanity and solidarity, then yes, we can aspire to change something.

If everyone does what they must, we will be closer to winning this brutal war that is being waged in Ukraine, against everything we are.

Thank you very much and you are always very welcome to Cascais.

II – Confronting the Authoritarian Challenge

Confronting the Authoritarian Challenge

Marc F. Plattner

I want to begin with a few thoughts about the title of both this session and our conference as a whole: “Confronting the Authoritarian Challenge.” This brief phrase does not explicitly indicate *who* must confront this challenge. The answer to this question can be left unstated because it is taken for granted. Those facing this challenge are, of course, the world’s liberal democracies.

The authoritarian challenge to liberal democracy has two key dimensions: It is in part a geopolitical or security threat, but it is also a competition in the realm of political principles, values, and ideas. While it is sometimes helpful analytically to treat these two dimensions separately, they are closely intertwined and their interrelationship should never be overlooked.

The key word in our title is “authoritarian,” and it is worth briefly tracing how the meaning of this term has evolved. During the Cold War, the term “authoritarianism” was used most often in contrast with “totalitarianism.” The eminent political scientist Juan Linz wrote an important 1975 book entitled *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes*. The basic distinction Linz drew was between regimes like those of the communists and Nazis, which sought total control over all facets of social and political life, and regimes that were autocratic but were willing to leave their people some spheres of independent activity. President Reagan’s UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick built upon this difference in a famous 1979 article, entitled “Democracy and Double Standards,” that focused on the features separating

traditional right-wing authoritarian regimes from revolutionary communist totalitarian regimes.

Since the end of the Cold War, however, the meaning of the term authoritarian has gradually been widened to encompass all forms of nondemocratic government. So today, even countries that once unquestionably would have been labeled as totalitarian are commonly referred to as authoritarian, a category that now embraces regimes as different as those of Singapore and North Korea. I should also mention here the word “autocratic,” another label that is widely applied to nondemocratic regimes. As far as I can tell, there is no significant distinction in current usage between the terms authoritarian and autocratic. The Biden administration, for example, seems to use autocracy and authoritarianism interchangeably in its speeches and documents.

Beginning with his inaugural address, President Biden has regularly invoked the opposition between democratic and autocratic (or authoritarian) countries. What is more, he has presented this divide as the critical fault-line of world politics and hence a key to U.S. foreign policy. One of the signature initiatives of his presidency has been the Democracy Summit, aimed at fostering cooperation among democracies and enhancing their solidarity in the competition with authoritarianism. In his opening statement to the first Democracy Summit in December 2021, Biden called the defense of democracy “the defining challenge of our time.”

He reaffirmed this framing of the global struggle in his March 2022 Warsaw speech in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Biden spoke of “the great battle ... between democracy and autocracy, between liberty and repression, between a rules-based order and one governed by brute force.” Noting that “the forces of autocracy have revived all across the globe,” he issued a call for “absolute unity ... among the world’s democracies.”

The Biden administration so far has done an impressive job of maintaining democratic unity within NATO and among other U.S. allies. But it also has been discovering anew how difficult it is to maintain such unity on a global basis. As the Biden team learned

in dealing with the invitation list during the run-up to the inaugural Democracy Summit, it is often difficult at the margin to determine which countries deserve to be included in the democratic camp. Efforts to create global democratic clubs have invariably been plagued by the question of their criteria for membership.

This problem had already been highlighted with the founding of the Community of Democracies in 2000. This intergovernmental organization, whose creation was spearheaded by U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Polish Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek, was launched with 106 countries approving its founding document, the Warsaw Declaration. Two decades later, the Community of Democracies has a permanent secretariat and continues to hold regular meetings, but its website, while naming the states that compose its Governing Council, does not list the organization's full roster of member-states. In any case, the Community of Democracies is little known, and it is hard to discern any significant impact that it has had on international politics.

The problem of where to draw the boundaries for a club of democracies is not easily resolved. If one draws the lines strictly, it will lead to a group that is disproportionately Western and mostly European. But if one goes too far in the direction of flexibility, the body that results will include countries whose democratic credentials range from dubious to laughable, undermining its legitimacy and thus its capacity to make the case for democracy.

The principles that unite full-fledged or aspiring democracies are relatively clear. In his Warsaw speech President Biden cited "the rule of law; free and fair elections; the freedom to speak, to write, and to assemble; the freedom to worship as one chooses; freedom of the press." By contrast, it is not easy to identify the principles around which the authoritarians rally. If one looks at the 2001 charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, probably the leading body founded by autocracies, one can find language endorsing the UN Charter, international peace and security, and even human rights and fundamental freedoms. But it gives pride of place to "mutual respect of sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity of

States and inviolability of State borders, non-aggression, [and] non-interference in internal affairs,” a list of principles that its leading members conspicuously fail to heed in practice. Exhibit A is Russia’s unprovoked aggression against Ukraine.

Indeed, the bonds uniting the authoritarians at first seem somewhat mysterious. After all, the ideologies of the leading authoritarian states are wildly disparate – in Russia, a kind of updated Czarism backed by the Russian Orthodox Church; in China, rule by an atheistic Leninist party; in Iran, radical Shiite Islam; in Venezuela, twenty-first-century socialism; and in Saudi Arabia, traditional Sunni Islamic monarchy. Yet most of these countries have been increasing their levels of mutual collaboration, both by establishing new organizations and by working with one another in long-established intergovernmental agencies. This trend is sketched out in a 2016 *Journal of Democracy* book entitled *Authoritarianism Goes Global*.

To repeat, today’s autocracies obviously are not united by joint allegiance to any universalist ideology. They are brought together instead by a common hostility to liberal democracy. In a recent article former Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev referred to them as the “Antidemocracy International.” They do not worry about external invasion by democratic powers. What scares them is the prospect that successful liberal democracy in their respective regions will offer an attractive model for their domestic opponents. Indeed, the rulers of the leading authoritarian powers have explicitly stated their concern that liberal democratic ideas will infect their societies and lead to internal efforts to overthrow their regimes.

I think it is wrong, however, to conclude that these regimes, because they do not subscribe to a common ideology, are not linked by shared notions of how governments should be run. This point was forcefully argued by Robert Kagan in his prescient 2008 book *The Return of History and the End of Dreams*, in which he proclaimed that the world was heading to an era of “growing tensions and sometimes confrontation between the forces of democracy and the forces of autocracy.”

In the immediate post-Cold War moment, my own view had been that liberal democracy could be successfully challenged only by a powerful alternative ideology, and apart from radical Islam no such ideology appeared to be on the horizon. Kagan contended, however, that “Chinese and Russian leaders are not just autocrats... They believe in autocracy.” By this he meant not a modern-style mobilizational ideology, but a form of government with a long historical pedigree that emphasizes the importance of unified and centralized government, of order and stability, and of the strong rule at home that is needed for nations to be strong and well-respected internationally. “[The] global competition between democratic and autocratic governments,” Kagan predicted, “will become a dominant feature of the twenty-first-century world.” And so far, at least, he seems to have been proven correct.

The real question is what form that competition will take. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there can no longer be any doubt that autocratic powers present a grave security challenge to the democratic world. There is an asymmetry here. In the rivalry between autocrats and democrats, the biggest threat to the authoritarians is in the realm of ideas. The biggest threat to the democracies, on the other hand, is in the military and security sphere. China, Russia, and Iran, the three most powerful authoritarian regimes, are also the most aggressive internationally, and they possess or (in the case of Iran) are seeking to acquire nuclear weapons.

The democracies have been slow to recognize the gravity of the security threat they face, but Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has awakened them to the dangers ahead. To a considerable extent, they seem to have learned the lessons Putin has unwittingly taught them, and they seem prepared to increase their military spending and preparedness. It remains to be seen, however, how long these new attitudes will prevail, especially if the conflict in Ukraine turns into a protracted stalemate.

The brave Ukrainian resistance to Putin’s invasion has inspired many people in the democratic world and has given them a sharper sense of what is at stake in responding to the authoritarian challenge. Ukrainians constantly affirm that they are not simply defending their native soil but are fighting to secure their right to govern themselves and to live in freedom. The geopolitical competition is at the same

time a conflict over contending moral and political principles. As our colleague Ghia Nodia wrote in 2014 of the struggle for Ukraine's future direction that had already long been under way, "[one] cannot say where democracy promotion ends and geopolitics begins: They are inseparable."

This suggests that the foreign policy of the liberal democracies in confronting the authoritarian challenge needs to proceed both at the level of geopolitics and the level of ideas. For the most part, the defense of our security interests and the defense of democracy complement each other. But it must be acknowledged that there are sometimes serious tensions between them. These are most acute in our dealings with countries whose cooperation is needed for security reasons but who fail to measure up in terms of democracy. This is an old and familiar story. During the Cold War some called it the issue of "friendly tyrants."

Dealing with this issue can require unpleasant compromises. Nearly everyone accepts that in situations of dire jeopardy, where the survival of democracy itself is ultimately at stake, it may be necessary to swallow our revulsion at partnering with regimes that we abhor. The classic example is, of course, the World War II alliance between the democracies and Stalin's Soviet Union. As Winston Churchill famously put it, if Hitler invaded Hell, he would be ready to ally with the Devil.

But less extreme cases raise thornier questions. My guess is that in the coming years a number of these will center upon India, which is increasingly viewed as a backsliding or illiberal democracy. Yet because of its size and its key location in the Indo-Pacific, it is widely regarded as an essential partner in the effort to counter authoritarian China. India was a participant at the Democracy Summit, and it is hard to imagine that it will be excluded from future global democracy initiatives, or that excluding it would serve the long-term goal of advancing democracy.

So, confronting the authoritarian challenge will demand from the liberal democracies not only firmness and resolve, but also nimble diplomacy and an intelligent assessment of the inevitable tradeoffs that defending democracy entails.

III – The Dahrendorf Memorial Lecture: “Ukraine’s Resistance and the Future of Democracy”

Ukraine’s Resistance and the Future of Democracy

Carl Gershman

I doubt that there’s anyone among us today who’s not aware that the world has changed drastically in the past few months as a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24 and the unexpectedly fierce Ukrainian resistance. The invasion came at a moment of deep and widespread pessimism about the future of democracy. In an article published in the *Journal of Democracy* just a month before the invasion, Larry Diamond warned that “This is the darkest moment for freedom in half a century,” with democracy imperiled by a “global resurgence of authoritarianism” and increased collaboration to advance authoritarian norms and interests. This apprehension peaked on February 4 when Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping signed a Joint Statement that formally established a “no limits” strategic partnership between Russia and China to expand their global influence in what they called – ironically, as it would soon turn out – “a new era...of profound transformation.” They had no way of knowing, of course, that the invasion of Ukraine, which Putin delayed launching as a favor to Xi until immediately after conclusion of the Beijing Olympics, would give the idea of a new era a very different meaning than the one they had intended.

And so it did. As Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky told a joint session of the U.S. Congress in March, Russia’s aggression unleashed “a terror that Europe has not seen for 80 years.” The invasion transformed the geopolitics of Europe. It revitalized the

NATO alliance, whose defensive *raison d'être* had been questioned since the end of the Cold War. It united the United States and its European allies on an agenda of aiding Ukraine, imposing sweeping financial and economic sanctions on Russia, and ending Western dependence on Russian oil and gas. And it impelled Germany to break with almost seven decades of military diffidence and perpetual rapprochement with the Soviet Union – and later with Putin's Russia – by dramatically increasing its defense spending and agreeing to provide Ukraine with heavy weapons and other military equipment. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz called the invasion a *Zeitenwende*, a watershed moment that signified the turning of an era.

If the Russian invasion signaled the beginning of a new era of greater vigilance in defending Western security, Ukraine's courageous resistance to the invasion had the effect of reviving democratic morale after an extended period of democratic crisis and seemingly inexorable authoritarian advance. Instead of appeasement and backsliding, which had been the standard response to authoritarian bullying and aggression until now, the Ukrainian people stood up and fought back, with far more courage, resilience, and success than anyone had expected. Just two weeks into the war, Francis Fukuyama boldly, if perhaps a bit prematurely, predicted that Ukraine would win the war, and that "a Russian defeat will make possible a 'new birth of freedom' and get us out of our funk about the declining state of democracy. The spirit of 1989 will live on," he said, "thanks to a bunch of brave Ukrainians." Larry Diamond, who was more cautious but also far more hopeful than he had been earlier, said that if the United States and other democracies provided Ukraine with sufficient support and took certain other steps to strengthen their democracy and security, the present moment "could represent a possible hinge of history" as significant as 1989 and "launch a new wave of democratic progress." And Lucan Way, writing in the *Journal of Democracy*, proclaimed that the invasion and resistance had given the world's democrats renewed unity, purpose, and resolve and "could ultimately strengthen the liberal world order." The renewed hopefulness was such that Alexander Cooley took to the pages of *Foreign Affairs* to warn against a new "irrational exuberance" that overlooked many continuing obstacles to liberal change.

Ukraine's Zelensky quickly emerged as the most powerful and eloquent voice linking Ukraine's struggle for survival to the defense of universal democratic values. "This is not a war of two armies," he said. "This is a war of two worldviews." He has spoken about this war in universal terms, telling the U.S. Congress that "the Ukrainian people are defending not only Ukraine; we are fighting for the values of Europe and the world, sacrificing our lives in the name of the future."

I think that Ralf Dahrendorf would have strongly supported Ukraine's struggle against dictatorship and aggression, and he would have appreciated its universal significance. He was sent by the Nazis to a German concentration camp in Poland when he was just 15 years old for having engaged in anti-Nazi activities. As a young sociologist, he was torn between scholarly detachment and political engagement, but Dahrendorf eventually resolved that modern sociologists had both the theoretical task of considering "how a modern, open, civilized society should look and what paths lead to it," as well as the moral responsibility "to take part in the processes of transforming reality." I believe that he not only would have strongly supported Ukraine's resistance but would also have understood the relationship between its success on the battlefield, such as it has been until now, and its commitment to democracy and an open society.

An example of this relationship is the importance that Ukraine's military attaches to the principle of subsidiarity, which Dahrendorf considered to be an essential feature of an open society. Subsidiarity means that the central authority should perform only those tasks that cannot be performed at a more local level – essentially, it's decentralization. In the military context, this principle translates into training soldiers to think for themselves so that they can adapt quickly to the situation on the ground. It also involves noncommissioned officers serving as links between commanders and ground forces, as well as something called mission command, where the senior officers set combat goals and then devolve tactical decisions as far down the chain of command as possible.

This principle is established doctrine in Western militaries, and as *The Wall Street Journal* reported recently, eight NATO countries have

introduced this principle into Ukraine's military by training 10,000 Ukrainian troops annually since the first phase of the war began in 2014 with Russia's intervention in the Donbas in the aftermath of the Euromaidan uprising and Putin's seizure of Crimea. The frontline battle experience of the Ukrainians, according to the *Journal* report, made them "sponges for NATO training," and the result was that Ukraine's military was transformed over the last eight years from a rigid, top-down, Soviet-styled army, where the troops at the bottom are treated as cannon fodder just taking orders from above, into an agile force that has been able to out-manuever the Russian aggressors. The Ukrainian historian Serhii Plokhii, whom you will hear from tomorrow, called this transformation "the miracle on the Dnieper" that produced "an army that no one ever knew existed fighting the most feared army in the world and winning."

It's now more than four months into the war, and we need to ask if Ukraine is, in fact, winning, and if it will be able to expel the Russian aggressor over the longer term. It's widely agreed that Ukraine didn't just win the first three months of the war but that Russia lost it in what Anders Aslund called "one of the most spectacular failures in contemporary military history." A searing briefing on the war in *The Economist* called the invasion "a disaster for Russia's armed forces," which lost 15,000 troops in the first two months of the war, according to British intelligence, as many as were lost in Afghanistan over an entire decade. Describing "just how rotten" the Russian army has been," *The Economist* noted that much of Russia's large defense budget is "squandered or stolen," that senior army officers were kept in the dark about Putin's invasion plans "reflecting a crippling lack of trust," that "disaffected troops...have deserted their vehicles," that "units have tortured, raped and murdered only to be honored by the Kremlin," and that Russia's frustrated generals, "wallowing in corruption" and "unable to foster initiative or learn from their mistakes," have fallen back on the barbaric practice of "flattening cities and terrorizing civilians." This report didn't even mention that twelve of these generals have been killed – an unheard-of number – because they didn't, like the Ukrainians, have a noncommissioned officers corps and therefore had to deploy to the frontlines to command their troops. It is this inept and criminal war that led the Russian diplomat

Boris Bondarev to resign his post last month, saying that he had never been “so ashamed” of his country, and that Putin’s aggressive war “is not only a crime against the Ukrainian people, but also... against the people of Russia.”

With the Russians having failed to take Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Mykolaiv, which blocked their path to Odessa, Putin decided to change course in April. He gave the reins of military operations in Ukraine to Aleksandr Dvornikov, a.k.a. the “butcher of Aleppo” who had been involved earlier in razing the Chechen capital of Grozny; and he regrouped his tired and battered forces by concentrating them in the east with the goal of occupying the entire Donbas region. Such a definitive if more limited victory, it was hoped, would reverse the momentum of the war, send the message that Russia had recovered its strength, and break the will of the Ukrainian resistance and its Western backers. But this gambit has also failed.

The New York Times reported last month that senior U.S. officials believe that “The Russian military, beaten down and demoralized after three months of war, is making the same mistakes in its campaign to capture a swath of eastern Ukraine that forced it to abandon its push to take the entire country.” Despite having an overwhelming advantage in artillery that they used to level Severodonetsk and pummel its Ukrainian defenders, the Russians never succeeded after more than two months of fighting of encircling the Ukrainians, and whatever success they’ve had in pushing them back has cost the Russians dearly. According to former U.S. general and CIA director David Petraeus, Russian losses every day in the Donbas have been greater than the U.S. and all the coalition forces suffered during the worst month of the siege in Iraq. Brookings military specialist Pavel Baev has said that Russian tactical gains may actually “bring strategic defeat closer,” a view shared by Petraeus who predicted on CNN recently that Ukraine would launch a counter-offensive after Russia had spent its forces in the Donbas, and that Ukraine would ultimately win the war. In May Putin dismissed Dvornikov amid reports of his excessive drinking and lack of trust among Russian forces, in addition to the ongoing dysfunction in the Kremlin’s conduct of the war.

Russia's troubles should in no way deflect from Ukraine's almost unimaginable suffering in this war. It has lost thousands of soldiers, many of them the most devoted of its youth who embodied hope for the country's future. Tens of thousands of civilians have also been killed, and many millions of others have become refugees or been internally displaced. The economy, of course, has also been shattered and is expected to contract this year by almost one-half. This has taken a terrible toll on Ukraine's military and society, but its will to resist hasn't flagged. It has a 30-day waiting list of people wanting to enter military service and is actually having trouble training all the new recruits. Meanwhile, Putin has been unable to repair his damaged war machine and didn't use his May 9 so-called victory speech to order a general mobilization to replace heavy personnel losses because he knew that such a move would be deeply unpopular in the major cities. There have been dozens of arson and Molotov cocktail attacks on military induction centers, and Russian milbloggers have documented judicial proceedings against soldiers and officers who have deserted or refused orders to fight.

Such severe morale and manpower problems raise questions about Russia's ability to sustain a war of attrition. Though Ukraine is much smaller and has suffered so badly, it can sustain such a war because it is fighting a whole-of-society struggle for national survival. Its frontline troops are backed up by partisan warriors in occupied areas in the south whose acts of sabotage and assassination include even a seemingly friendly old lady in Izyum who (according to an *Economist* report) killed eight Russian soldiers by feeding them poisoned pies. Ukraine also has a vibrant civil society that is doing everything from documenting war crimes to coordinating humanitarian assistance. Civil society has even been able to work on the front lines, as in the case of one activist early in the Donbas siege, when many wounded Ukrainian soldiers were dying of blood loss, who got ahold of NATO standard first-aid kits, taught medics how to use them, and thereby helped reduce Ukrainian losses.

The war could now be reaching a turning point since the Ukrainians have only just received – and been trained to use – the first of twenty multiple-launch rocket systems that will give them the ability that they haven't had until now to target and destroy the artillery that

Russia has amassed in fixed positions. It's expected that Ukraine will launch a major counter-offensive sometime this summer with the goal of reversing the gains that Russia has made in the Donbas and liberating the territories that Russia has occupied in the south. They can win this war, but only if the West remains solidly behind them, providing the military aid they need in sufficient quantity and sustained over time that will enable them to regain the momentum that they had in the conflict's initial phase.

Portugal's role has been exemplary. Prime Minister Costa's visit last month to Irpin, which like Bucha suffered unspeakable atrocities, was an important act of moral and political solidarity. He not only condemned what he called "the barbaric Russian invasion" but pledged continued military and humanitarian support and offered to help in the reconstruction of Ukraine's schools and kindergartens. Speaking with emotion, he declared that "Portugal stands for Ukraine" and that Ukraine's European choice must be greeted "with open arms."

That choice has now been affirmed by the European Union, which last week made Ukraine an official candidate to join the block. While it will take years of negotiations before Ukraine becomes a member state of the EU, this is already a major defeat for Russia, which started the war against Ukraine in 2014 because the Revolution of Dignity decisively signaled Ukraine's determination to become part of Europe. By giving Ukraine candidate status, Europe is now tied to that determination as it never was before, and it has a stake in Ukraine's joining not as a broken country crippled by frozen conflicts in Russian-occupied territories, but as a secure, sovereign, and democratic state.

When I attended a conference in Ukraine shortly after the Euromaidan revolution, I was struck when the Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt called Ukraine "the epicenter of the global struggle for democracy." He didn't elaborate on the point, but I've quoted it many times since and think it's even more relevant today than it was then. Ukraine's vote for independence in December 1991 precipitated the collapse of the Soviet Union, which Putin famously called "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century." Putin and the current Russian establishment hope to reverse that catastrophe and restore the Russian

Empire, even to expand it, which Putin once suggested is his larger aim when he said that “The borders of Russia never end.”

The restoration of the Russian and Soviet empire in the post-colonial era seems like an insane goal, especially now that Russia is not only a shrunken power but is politically isolated, economically in decline, militarily far weaker than had been previously assumed, and facing an existential demographic crisis that has been intensified by the flight since February 24 of hundreds of thousands of young people and middle-class professionals. Yet it remains a danger to its neighbors and international security, using its energy resources for political leverage and nuclear bullying to paralyze opposition to its expansion.

An independent Ukraine has always been the principal obstacle to Russian imperialism. Zbigniew Brzezinski said many times that Russia cannot be an empire without Ukraine, and Putin made clear in his essay last July on “The Historical Unity of Russia and Ukraine” that an independent Ukraine “is comparable in its consequences to the use of weapons of mass destruction against us,” meaning that Russia cannot survive as a country and a civilization if it does not control Ukraine. There is simply no compromise solution to end this war that will last. If Russia is allowed to remain in control of any territories occupied by the invasion, this will defeat the principle that aggression doesn’t pay, that might does not make right, and that rules and laws matter. A Russian-controlled grey zone in Ukraine would be a launching pad for future acts of aggression, and not just against Ukraine.

A Russian defeat would also have broad political implications for the future of democracy. It would weaken Russia, which Lilia Shevtsova once called “an advance combat unit of the new global authoritarianism.” It would set back, if not cripple, the axis of autocracy between Russia and China. It could possibly set in motion changes within China itself, where the CCP’s performance legitimacy is being eroded by the sharp drop in economic growth, and Xi is coming under criticism in the lead-up to the 20th party congress in November for his “no limits” deal with Putin and harsh isolation procedures of his “zero-COVID” policy. Ukraine’s successful resistance could also embolden democrats in other regions, as Anne Applebaum has suggested, and

it possibly even reverse the 16-year decline of democracy that has been chartered by Freedom House. Samuel Huntington noted in his famous book on the Third Wave of Democratization that the second wave began in 1943, when the tide of battle in Europe began to change in favor of the Allies. Major wars can have that effect since they shift the political and geopolitical currents in the world that affect the struggle for democracy. This war, as Larry Diamond has said, has the potential to be “a hinge of history.”

Aside from Ukraine, no country will be more affected by this war than Russia. At the present time, attitudes toward Russia in Europe are understandably very negative. A new report from the European Council on Foreign Relations, based on a pan-European opinion poll, suggests that the break with Russia is irreversible, according to the report's co-author Ivan Krastev. The pent-up hostility toward Russia in some countries has been vividly expressed by the messages inscribed on munitions provided to Ukraine. Missiles from the Czech Republic. The inscription on the missiles from the Czech Republic reads “For the execution of the Prague Spring of 1968.” The Dutch have written “Revenge for MH17” on the shells they've sent. And the Poles have signed ammunition with the bitter rebuke – “For Katyn.”

But we have to leave open the possibility that Russia can change and that its traumatic defeat – because this can happen no other way – will lead to a new reckoning with history and the enduring legacy of Russian imperialism, which was made more inhuman when communist totalitarianism separated Russia from its rich cultural, religious, and intellectual traditions that the communists considered the reactionary residue of the country's feudal past. Is it not possible that Russians can come to the realization that stoking the “embers of empire,” in the words of Kenya's ambassador to the UN Martin Kimani, will lead to the country's total ruin? Surely Europe and the United States can remember that Russia has produced great writers and heroes like Andrei Sakharov, whose name is enshrined the European Parliament's human rights award, and that dissidents like Alexei Navalny and Vladimir Kara-Murza, whom Putin has poisoned and imprisoned and who have defined moral courage for a new generation of Russians, can play a role in shaping their country's future?

Such hopeful possibilities, which I know are just possibilities, and the security threat that Russia continues to pose indicate the enormity of the stake that the West has in the outcome of the war. Putin is counting on the resolve of the U.S. and E.U. to weaken in the months ahead as energy prices rise and inflation and food shortages get worse, and Boris Johnson has already warned of “Ukraine fatigue.” The danger is real, but given the stakes, and the fact that it is Ukraine, as Zelensky said, that is paying the ultimate price to defend our values and common future, this is a test that the West can and must meet. The alternative, as Johnson correctly said, would be “a disaster.”

This nightmare can end. Ukraine can be rebuilt. It must be rebuilt. And Russia, with the example of a democratic Ukraine just across the border, can conceivably become over time a normal country and part of a Europe that is whole and free. This vision can come to pass if we stay the course, and may it show that the suffering and sacrifice of the brave Ukrainian people have served a higher purpose for Ukraine, for Europe, and for the benefit of us all.

Ukraine's Resistance and the Future of Democracy: Lessons Learned

Ghia Nodia

What the advocates of democracy have learned or should learn from the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the latter's resistance, and the larger international response to it?

First of all, Ukrainians have reminded us that democracy and freedom are something you are supposed to fight for, something that requires passion and readiness to sacrifice.

Obviously, this is not a new idea. However, in the last decades, we have got used to seeing the spread of democracy as something more rational, more cerebral, if you wish. Democratization, the spread of democracy could be presented as a rationally designed process, as a set of "reforms" implemented by reasonable people following well-tested models.

However paradoxical this may sound, one might link this to the worldwide decline of democracy, including in the countries where institutions of democracy appeared to have been firmly entrenched. There are many different attempts to explain why that happened but none of them are satisfactory. I may propose an additional explanation: democracy was taken for granted. It was seen as a default system, something you don't need to fight for.

I don't intend to deliver another punch at Francis Fukuyama's much-derided (often, unfairly) idea of the "end of history," but in a way, this vision did contribute to this excessively rationalistic view that from now on, liberal democracy is the only political system that reasonable

people may be expected to support. This did not imply that democracy would thrive everywhere, but it was implied, that democracy could only be resisted by atavistic forces of nationalism and religion or held back due to general underdevelopment. One might infer from this that democrats had reason and the power of persuasion on their side, while it were enemies of democracy who were motivated by passions. There was no real need for the passion for democracy: you cannot be passionate about something that is taken for granted.

However, without passion, the spirit of democracy decayed. Democracy was reduced to a set of mechanisms and techniques. It became something boring, and boring is not appreciated in our culture. For people who look for change and innovation, democracy did not have much to offer.

The Ukrainians show passion, and readiness to sacrifice, and this somehow reignited emotional support for the moral foundations of democracy among Europeans and Americans. We don't know how long this will last, and what will the enduring effects of this moment be (if any). But some momentum for the strengthening international solidarity for democracy has been created, and it is not unreasonable to hope that something good will come out of it in the longer term as well.

Secondly, it is important to note that the passion for democracy is combined with the passion of patriotism, or civic nationalism, whatever you call it. There is nothing new about this as well: Historically, democracy has been successful where it is underpinned by patriotic passion, and vice versa, where patriotic passion declines, democracy declines too.

Ukrainians fight for their country, for their country's right to exist, something that Putin denies. But at the same time, this is a fight for democracy, because Ukraine is only viable as a democracy, or it was democracy that made the Ukrainian nation viable. To be sure, it has been a very imperfect democracy, but imperfection is endemic to democracies. Ukrainians do not distinguish between these two, nationhood and democracy. It was similar when Britons had to resist the attacks from the Nazis: they defended the freedom of their island,

but they also defended their free institutions, and there is no way to distinguish between these two aims.

Currently, the interrelation between values of liberal democracy and those of civic patriotism happens to be one of the hottest topics in western democracies. This is a complex problem, and there are no simple recipes for how to combine civic patriotism and the ethnocultural diversity of contemporary democracies. But without finding some way to combine these two, further decline of democracy is unavoidable. One cannot have passionate support for democracy without civic patriotism.

Thirdly, there is an issue of interrelation between soft and hard power. Apparently, for the reasons mentioned above, all champions of democracy, but especially those living in the West, overestimated the soft power of democracy. The advantages of democracy appear so obvious that few countries would dare to openly go against democracy as such, even though governments in authoritarian and semi-authoritarian countries will cheat on the rules and try at least to keep some democratic appearances. Somehow, at the end of the day, the obvious attraction of democracy should win people over.

This overestimation worked on both sides of the Atlantic, though it was even stronger in Europe. We remember that fifteen or twenty years ago people referred to Europe (meaning the European Union) as the “normative empire,” a qualitatively new kind of polity that somehow believed its soft power to be irresistible, so expected everybody else to willingly transform themselves in its image. These years of European triumphalism and overconfidence are long gone, but there was residual thinking that the soft power radiated from the European norms and institutions would somehow be sufficient for that continent to survive. To be sure, there was an increasing awareness of numerous problems and challenges, but none of the kind that would have to be handled through the old-fashioned hard power. Some people wanted to achieve Europe’s “strategic autonomy,” whatever that means, but without significant new investments into hard power.

I still believe that democracies have much greater resources in soft power. The democratic way of life is more attractive to many people

who live in autocratic and semi-autocratic countries, and this is proven by the fact that they often vote by their feet trying to relocate to democracies. However, the Ukraine war forced the West to recognize that soft power is not sufficient, it should be adequately backed up by hard power. It was the combination of western hard and soft power that defeated Communism, and this combination is still the only way to success. If democracies do not have enough hard power and political will to defend the values and institutions of themselves and their friends, they also lose credibility, and lack of credibility is something that undermines their soft power as well.

This issue is directly linked to the motives of Russia, or Putin when he decided to do what he is doing in Ukraine. I will say nothing new if I say that starting from the 2008 invasion of Georgia to the invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and now in 2022, Putin was testing the West, checking how much can he get away with, and each time it escalated its actions. Admittedly, this time Putin has miscalculated, and the western response proved more muscular than before. I hope this will be the lesson learned from the story of the 2022 invasion, and this time Russia will be forced to pay a high enough price so that it will have to change its stance. However, it is still too early to say.

But the perception that the West has effectively given up on hard power – at least when confronting a nuclear state like Russia – and its bluff may be easily called is only one thing that may explain Russia's motives. There may be a deeper one, and it is *ressentiment* regarding its own soft power deficit in comparison with western democracies. There have been many publications on Russia's "soft power," and some authors decided that this is a sign of Russia's normalization: relying on the soft rather than hard power is something that people in the West understand as "normal." In truth, however, Russia suffers from an acute deficit of soft power. And the word "suffers" should be understood in a literary meaning here: Russians are traumatized by the understanding that their country is utterly unpopular, especially in its neighborhood, among people with whom she has long historical ties. This was especially painful that Ukrainians, whom Russians see as their closest kin, are not attracted to Russia, and prefer western models instead. What is often described as Russian soft power is in

fact its surrogate, a simulation of the soft power: Chris Walker and Jessica Ludwig aptly called these simulations “sharp power.”

The main point here concerning the invasion of Ukraine is that Russia's hopeless deficit of soft power breeds resentment, or *ressentiment*, and this *ressentiment* breeds aggression that goes as far as it remains unpunished. This *ressentiment* is caused by the success of western democracies; western soft power stimulates not just a wish to emulate, but destructive rage as well. In this sense, it is true that the West is responsible for its invasion of Ukraine, but not because it expanded NATO closer to its borders: the West provoked Russia by making its model of development more attractive for Ukrainians (and not only them), and Russia is powerless to do anything about it. The West could not help doing that; however, one might argue whether this creates some moral responsibility to protect those inspired by its own example.

To be sure, there are numerous complexities related to the application of hard power by the West. There is something one might call an Iraq syndrome: a near consensus has been shaped that in Iraq, the United States and its allies miscalculated and overshot; therefore, any muscular activism in support of democracy is declared a wrong thing. I also believe that in the case of Iraq, an important mistake was made and at its root was an over-optimistic assumption that democracy is easy, that it is a default kind of a political regime – something I discussed above. This created an expectation that once you help a people to topple a dictator, the people will almost automatically opt for democracy and develop its institutions rather than anything else. This obviously did not happen, and lessons ought to be learned. However, it is one thing to hope for the institutions of democracy that had no record of making a successful effort to democratize, and a very different one – to support a nation that has already made a choice in favor of democratic institutions, even if rather imperfect, and fights at a great sacrifice to defend them. I think these are radically different situations, and policies and attitudes should be different.

One last point I want to make is a somewhat awkward one. The reactions towards the war in Ukraine brought about a relatively high level of unity of the West, and this is a very welcome development indeed

(we want many more, but we should appreciate what has happened). However, unfortunately, it also highlighted deep differences between western democracies (“western” in both geographical and cultural sense) on the one hand and almost everybody on the other – with Japan and South Korea considered exceptions. The mapping of countries who joined sanctions against Russia, or refused to do so, shows this very clearly. Therefore, it is right to say that the war created a more or less united front of western democracies, rather than democracies in general.

What can one make of this? The most obvious and important inference from this is that it undermines the effectiveness of the sanctions regime. But this is the result; the root cause is that outside the geographical or cultural West, few people share a moral consensus of indignation towards the Russian actions in Ukraine. This issue is not easy to address. Apparently, too many nations still see liberal democracy as some kind of western imposition. This view is wrong and more has to be done to confront it, but the reality is what it is. The only thing I can say is that this should strengthen rather than weaken the resolve of western democracies to defend their values; this is the only way to maintain credibility and respect, as well as strengthen chances for liberty everywhere in the world, not to speak countries of Europe that may be next targets of the Russian *ressentiment*.

Ukraine's Resistance and the Future of Democracy

Wilhelm Hofmeister

1) The war in Ukraine and the future of European democracy

That the brave Ukrainians in their resistance to the Russian invasion are defending not only their own country but also what we understand to be the values of liberal democracy is a widespread conviction – shared, however, primarily only in Europe, North America (USA and Canada) as well as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia and New Zealand. Therefore, Europeans and North Americans have supported the Ukrainians in their resistance politically and, above all, by strengthening their capacities of military defence. There is no doubt that first and foremost the US under President Biden are leading this support from the beginning with its clear stance and have thereby returned to their former role as the leading power in the promotion and defence of democracy, which has suffered greatly in the eyes of world public opinion in recent years through the form of the withdrawal from Afghanistan and other politically and militarily dubious operations. Some European countries – and this unfortunately includes my own country, Germany – took a moment longer to realise that the previous attitude of appeasement and containment towards Russia was guided by false assessments and expectations. Germany, which in this case means above all the German Federal Government, even took much longer than most of its European neighbours and partners to recognise the dimension of the war in Ukraine and the resulting consequences and necessary reactions. German President

Steinmeier has admitted this years-long misjudgment in an interview on 5 April when he said:

We have failed in our efforts to build a common European house – Gorbachev’s great vision – we have failed in our efforts to integrate Russia into a European security architecture, we have failed in our efforts under the Charter of Paris to take Russia along with us on the path towards democracy and human rights. This is a bitter balance sheet that we are facing, and this bitter balance sheet also includes the misjudgement that we – and I – thought that even a Putin of 2022 would not ultimately accept the total political, economic and moral ruin of the country for his imperial dreams or his imperial delusions.

Finally, after the joint visit of Chancellor Scholz together with French President Macron, Italian Prime Minister Draghi and Romanian President Johannis to Kiev on 16 June, the Europeans had agreed on a significant common political response to the invasion of Ukraine and have apparently also pledged further military support to strengthen that country’s defence capability. These four heads of government had sent an important political signal with their pledge to work for Ukraine and also Moldova to be granted the status of a candidate country to the European Union. This has been confirmed by all EU member countries during the session of the European Council on June 23-24. They now share the same status as Albania, the Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey. Even if it is to be expected that the EU will possibly conduct the accession negotiations somewhat faster and more decisively in the case of Ukraine and Moldova, the reference to the example of the other accession candidates shows that admission to the EU will by no means be a quick process. All candidates must fulfil the so-called “Copenhagen criteria” (free democracy, market economy, adoption of the *acquis Communautaire*, the common rules of the EU).

The war in Ukraine is thus permanently changing the political map of the EU. This will have far-reaching consequences for all member countries of the community, because the processes of negotiating and admitting new members will not be possible without far-reaching reforms within the European Union. The war in Ukraine may thereby become the decisive catalyst of reforms for which the political will has so far been lacking.

The war and the reaction to it also have recalled a central founding motive of European integration: the first objective of community building was to ensure the freedom and security of its members and to guarantee stability to Europe. Economic cooperation has supported this goal, and social achievements have further stabilised the community. But the defence of freedom and democracy are the essential founding motives that must now reorient all efforts to expand the Union.

2) The consequences of the war in Ukraine for the development of democracy worldwide

The North Americans' and Europeans' view that the Ukrainians are defending the values of Western democracy is by no means shared by most countries of the world, or even by the democratically organised countries. This is shown by the voting behaviour of democratic countries in the United Nations and also by the attitude towards the sanctions imposed on Russia. The growing global supply crisis as a result of the war not only provides authoritarian rulers with a welcome excuse to defend their power, but also feeds doubts in many countries with a democratic order about the willingness of Western democracies to assist them in dealing with the crisis. In addition, the Europeans themselves are now noticeably more "flexible" in dealing with authoritarian regimes than was the case just a few months ago. Referring again to the example of Germany, only a few months ago the now governing party "The Greens" called for a boycott of the World Cup in Qatar because of the human rights violations of the regime there. Now the Minister for Economic Affairs from the same party, Mr Habeck, travelled to Qatar to conclude new supply contracts for gas and oil in order to be able to further cut off supplies from Russia. This is largely unanimously shared by all parties in Germany, but it is undoubtedly also a problematic signal to all those who expect a more critical attitude towards authoritarian regimes. Authoritarian regimes probably will be treated even more "gently" in the future if democratic countries pursue their own economic advantages or the supply of important goods in dealing with them.

Also worthy of consideration in this context is the attitude of important countries considered to be democracies (even if increasing doubts about the attitude of their governments to the defence of the principles of liberal democracy have recently become justified). This applies above all to the “big” democracies India, Indonesia, South Africa, Nigeria, Brazil and Mexico. We are witnessing an indifference to the war in Ukraine that is surprising and worrying – at least from the perspective of defending democratic values. We know that the governments of some of these countries are not very conscientious about the institutions and principles of democracy. Attention will now have to be paid to whether, in the slipstream, so to speak, of the war in Ukraine, there is a flamboyant treatment of democratic principles and institutions there. This applies above all to the handling of a basic element of democracy, free, equal and secret elections.

3) Tasks and perspectives of democracy promotion

Today we are living in a situation where, for the first time in this century, there are more non-democracies than democracies among countries with more than one million inhabitants. The causes and manifestations of this situation cannot be discussed here, but can be read about in the relevant publications (e.g., *Journal of Democracy* and others).

Despite all setbacks, however, one thing is certain: democracy continues to be the model of government preferred by a majority of people. Even if they are harshly critical of their governments and vote for populist and anti-democratic candidates and parties out of disappointment or despair over their government’s lack of performance and mismanagement, most people want one thing above all: better democracies. Even many autocrats recognise this desire of citizens for democracy by maintaining, at least formally, some democratic procedures; this applies especially to elections (even if they manipulate their conduct and distort their results).

For democracy to work, it requires a variety of elements. These include not only its five “cornerstones”: free and fair elections, responsible government, equal political participation of all citizens, respect for political and civil liberties, rule of law and independence

of the judiciary, but also respect for the spirit of democracy by the relevant groups and actors of a country, not least its political, social and economic elites. Populists and authoritarian leaders rarely come to power without the support of at least part of the social elites. In addition, the functioning of the mediating institutions between state and society is important. On the one hand, this refers to the media, whereby the critical media today, in the context of the cacophony of social media, have considerably lost their ability to structure and orientate public debate. On the other hand, it relates to the role of political parties, which have considerable difficulties in effectively exercising their role of representing societal interests all over the country, which has undoubtedly become more complicated in the face of more fragmented societies. However, this does not absolve the parties from efforts to play their role for democracy more effectively.

The promotion of future social elites who defend not only the institutions but also the spirit of democracy, as well as the strengthening of critical media and functioning parties are and remain crucial tasks of democracy promotion. In this context, the Estoril Political Forum fulfils an important function, because it prepares future decision-makers for their role and responsibility in preserving democracy.

IV – Winston Churchill Memorial Dinner: “Churchill and Russia”

Churchill and Russia

Allen Packwood

You have asked me to speak about Churchill and Russia, but you have also only given me 15 minutes. I think if Winston were here he would have demanded longer.

Churchill’s most famous quotation about Russia, is that the country was ‘a riddle wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma’.

He said those words on 1st October 1939. They formed a key passage in his first wartime broadcast over the BBC. He was not yet Prime Minister, having just been brought back into the Cabinet by Chamberlain as First Lord of the Admiralty but that – characteristically – did not stop him ranging more widely over the world scene.

And let me remind you that Russia was at this point – in 1939 – allied with Nazi Germany, through the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, signed a few weeks earlier in August, and that Stalin and Hitler had just devoured Poland.

It is worth quoting Churchill’s famous passage in full. What he said was: ‘I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma; but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest.’ Churchill was actually arguing that it was not in Russian interest to allow German domination of Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the Baltic States and that there remained a community of interests between England, France and Russia that effectively created an Eastern Front. It was a perceptive remark, deployed no doubt to help raise British morale, but also correctly anticipating that any German advance in the East might

bring Russia into the allied camp. Though of course it would take a further twenty-one months for this to happen.

Churchill was sixty-four at the beginning of the Second World War. This was a man who was born, shaped and schooled in the Victorian era – the age of European empires – and who was consequently a lifelong believer in ‘realpolitik’ and in great men deciding the fate of great nations (and indeed great nations deciding the fate of lesser nations). It was in his DNA to think in terms of national interests.

At first glance, his relationship with Russia can be seen as changeable and contradictory. And while Churchill did say that ‘To improve is to change; so to be perfect is to have changed often’, what I am going to argue is that – though he undoubtedly changed his approach – it was always consistent with his understanding of what the Russian national interest was at that point, and – more importantly – with his view of how that impacted on the British national interest.

For young Churchill, Russia was a rival Empire – the opponent in the Great Game, threatening Britain’s interests in India through Afghanistan. The Crimean War, when Britain and France had fought to prevent Russian control over that still disputed, was very much within living memory. It was a campaign that Churchill is likely to have studied in detail, both at school and at Sandhurst, the officer training academy he attended before joining a British cavalry regiment at the age of 20.

And as a young cavalry officer he fought on the Indian North-West Frontier, in some of the very valleys that both the West and before us the Russians have more recently abandoned. To the British in India, Russia was the unseen foe, arming and inciting the Afghan tribesmen. Churchill would have imbibed these views in the officer’s mess, but they would not have been new to him. Indeed, they were already instilled in him from his study of his father’s political speeches. Lord Randolph Churchill had served as Secretary of State for India and had consistently advocated a forward policy in Afghanistan to counter Russian ambitions.

So, if the Russian national interest was expansion in areas that would lead to conflict with the British Empire, then Churchill was

opposed to it. But there were exceptions. In 1897 when Britain stood by as the Turks suppressed the Greek national uprising on Crete, Churchill went through a decidedly anti-Turkish phase, expressing the view that the Russians should be allowed to take Constantinople. It is noteworthy that the Russians tend to be described as Europeans when Churchill is in favour of their actions, and as Slavs when he is not.

As a young politician, Churchill believed in social reform at home and Empire abroad. Both of which stood in opposition to Russian Tsarist autocracy.

A recurring theme in his speeches is the contrast between civilisation and barbarism. He was certainly aware of Russian pogroms against the Jews and others and was an opponent of the 1904 Aliens Bill which sought to restrict Jewish immigration from Russia into Britain. For much of the Edwardian period, however, Churchill is focused on domestic or colonial affairs.

It is the First World War which changes his relationship with Russia. Initially, the conflict brings the two countries closer together as they become allies against Germany, the Austro-Hungarian empire and ultimately Turkey. As First Lord of the Admiralty Churchill is desperate to find a way to bring the Navy into the conflict and stop the troops chewing barbed wire (as he puts it) on the Western Front in France and Belgium. Russia is also under huge pressure and desperate for a second front. The strategy of attacking Constantinople by sailing a fleet through the Dardanelles Straits is conceived as a plan that will meet all of these objectives. It is the sort of grand concept that Churchill loves, and there is no doubt that he is its leading advocate in the British Cabinet, but it is also flawed. The straits prove to be too well defended by forts and mines to be forced, thereby necessitating allied landings on the rugged Gallipoli Peninsula. The Turks and the terrain then combine to halt the Allied forces leading to a costly abandonment of the operation and to Churchill's removal from office. This was the first major setback in his meteoric rise and the cry 'what about the Dardanelles' would haunt him for years to come. His wife, Clementine, thought he would die of grief.

In the event, he refused to give in, took up painting, and commanded a battalion on the Western front before ultimately returning to politics. But he now found himself in a subordinate position, serving as Minister for Munitions in Lloyd George's coalition government from 1917. This had not been the war he had wanted, and its aftermath changed his political outlook – and nowhere more so than in his response to the Russian revolution.

Churchill abhorred the 'foul baboonery' of bolshevism, famously comparing the German transportation of Lenin into Russia by sealed train as being like the importation of a plague bacillus. As Secretary of State for War in 1918-19 he tried unsuccessfully to push for British military intervention in support of the White Russians fighting the Red Army.

To Churchill communism was a challenge to so much of what he stood for: a challenge to Empire, monarchy, nation states, free trade and paternalistic control of the working classes.

Events in Russia drove Churchill to the right and thereafter he saw the spectre of Moscow everywhere: behind the growth of socialism and militant trade unionism in the United Kingdom, behind the General Strike of 1926, and behind plots to destabilize the British Empire overseas. This new element in his world view was a key factor in driving him away from the Liberal Party and back into the Conservative fold in 1924, allegedly allowing him to remark that "anyone could rat, but it took a certain ingenuity to re-rat." Though to his pleasure and surprise he was rewarded by Prime Minister Baldwin with the post of Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Minister in charge of the Nation's finances, and traditionally the second most important position in the Government.

Russia's national interest, or rather that of the Soviet Union, was now the antithesis of what he saw as the British national interest. This led Churchill to express support for Mussolini as bulwark against communism and to be ambiguous about Franco in the Spanish Civil War. But all of this was about to change again. The rise of Hitler and the emergence of his new brand of militant nationalism in Germany posed a new and greater threat to the international order; one which – as Churchill articulated in his October 1939 broadcast – threatened

Stalin and Russia as much as Britain. Prior to the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, he argued unsuccessfully for the recreation of the Anglo-Franco-Russian great power alliance as a means of containing Germany. And when Hitler finally turned on Stalin and launched his invasion of the Soviet Union, codenamed Operation Barbarossa in June 1941, Churchill saw and seized his opportunity to bring the two countries back into alignment.

Initially, he was faced with a dilemma. How much support should he give to Russia? He could simply have allowed events to take their course, knowing that any German operation against Russia, would be likely to delay further action against the United Kingdom and would, at the very least, lead to the short-term destruction of some German troops and aircraft without loss to British and Imperial forces. Instead, he saw an opportunity to reach out to Stalin. The longer the Russians could be kept fighting, the greater the pressure on Germany, and the greater the likelihood she might be worn down by having to fight on so many fronts. Psychologically, Britain and the Empire would no longer be waging war alone.

He put it more memorably, on the eve of the German invasion of Russia, while walking with Jock Colville on the Chequers croquet lawn. His private secretary had teased him that in offering support to the Soviets he might be betraying his principles, to which Churchill replied:

I have only one purpose, the destruction of Hitler, and my life is much simplified thereby. If Hitler invaded Hell I would make at least a favourable reference to the Devil in the House of Commons.

In the summer of 1941, he did not know how long the Russians would hold; he did not know how long the Americans would wait. He knew he had no choice but to embrace both. However, it was also clear that the American and Soviet attitudes to the post war settlement, and especially to the fate of the Balkan and East European countries that bordered on Russia, were going to be very different. At that moment, in 1941, those problems were hypothetical, and subordinated to the need to obtain military victory, but as the war progressed Churchill would inevitably find himself caught between the contrasting attitudes of his two allies. How would he be able to reconcile the high principles

of Roosevelt's Atlantic charter, with the realpolitik of soviet policy in Eastern Europe? The truth of course was that the only thing worse than fighting with allies was fighting without them.

Still, real attempts were made to support the Russians. Churchill insisted on the hazardous Arctic convoys, which took military supplies to Archangel. His wife Clementine became the head of the Red Cross Aid to Russia Fund which raised huge sums from the British public. It is a largely forgotten fact that the reason she was not at Churchill's side on VE Day in May 1945 was because she was on a tour of Russia, as a guest of Stalin, where she was awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Lenin. The only thing Churchill consistently refused to give Stalin was a Second Front in France. Scarred by the memory of the Dardanelles and favouring a peripheral strategy that would better protect the British Empire he held out against that major operation until he was ultimately outvoted by Stalin and Roosevelt at Tehran in November 1943.

Generally, however, Churchill worked tirelessly to build and sustain the Grand Alliance against fascism. Here again we can see his belief in realpolitik. He believed that history was made by great men at great moments, and he loved nothing more than face to face diplomacy, even if it took a terrible toll on his health. In August 1942 he described travelling to Moscow to tell Stalin that there would be no Second Front in 1943 as akin to taking a block of ice to the North Pole. In 1944 he concluded the infamous percentages agreement with the Russian dictator, in which the two men literally carved up the Balkans into spheres of influence.

Churchill believed in his own ability to negotiate, and he clearly believed he had established a personal rapport with Stalin (one that was literally established in their cups). The problem was that the Russian leader kept sending him conflicting signals. One moment Stalin was friendly and offering fulsome Russian hospitality; the next he was castigating the British army for their refusal to fight. Friendly telegrams would be juxtaposed with terse demands and calls for action. Churchill chose to interpret this as being indicative of Stalin's weakness. He concluded that there must be other shadowy forces at work in the Kremlin interfering with his personal relationship. He

could not see that this was a deliberate Russian tactic to keep the British and Americans guessing and confused. In this he was not alone. The same tactics were applied to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman and continued into the Cold War.

In a letter to Churchill of 14 October 1947, President Truman reflects: “Our Russian ‘friends’ seem most ungrateful for the contribution which your great country and mine made to save them. I sometimes think perhaps we made a mistake – and then I remember Hitler. He had no heart at all. I believe that Joe Stalin has one but the Politbureau won’t let him use it.”¹

With hindsight this seems like an incredible thing for the American President to write but it was actually very difficult for the British Prime Minister or the American President to know what was going on in Moscow.

Churchill may have misjudged or misunderstood the nature of Stalin, but his understanding of Russian national interest led him to become increasingly fearful about Soviet intentions at the end of the war. Britain had gone to war with Nazi Germany over Poland but by 1945 the Red Army was dominating the country and Stalin was in no mood to compromise over political control. We can see Churchill’s language changing in his private telegrams and correspondence. Even before the German surrender he starts to use terms like ‘iron curtain’ and ‘third world war’. In May 1945 he asks the British Chiefs of Staff to draw up war plans against the Soviet Union. The project is codenamed ‘Operation Unthinkable’. And it is clearly unthinkable. It lacks US support and both British and American public opinion still regards the Soviet Union as an ally. Moreover, there is clearly no way of containing the Russians in Europe without it escalating into all-out war, and nobody wants that in the summer of 1945 – with the war against Japan still raging in the East.

Thereafter, any attempt by Churchill to develop a stronger line against Russia was temporarily thwarted by his election defeat in July 1945. But that did not stop him for long and he famously used the platform given to him by President Truman at Westminster College,

¹ Truman to Churchill, 14 Oct 1947. CHUR 2/158/46.

Fulton, Missouri to make a dramatic call for continued and greater Anglo-American alliance in the face of Russian aggression. On 5 March 1946, he warned that ‘From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent.’ The speech helped relaunch Churchill and is now seen as a defining moment in the transition to Cold War. To Churchill, Russian national interest was once again in conflict with that of Britain; a conflict that was made far more dangerous by the advent of nuclear weaponry. He did not shy away from the potential of this new technology arguing that the Americans had a window of technological supremacy during which they could use the bomb to force concessions from Russia. All that of course ended with the Soviet Union’s first successful nuclear test in 1949.

In the new atomic age, the threat of Russia influenced all aspects of Churchill’s foreign policy. Both his calls for greater Anglo-American union and closer European union have to be seen in the context of Stalin’s domination of Eastern Europe. They are not mutually exclusive, but rather two sides of the same coin. Two ways of building alliances and bulwarks against Russia.

Churchill continued to wrestle with these problems, returning for a second term as British Prime Minister in 1951. And there is evidence that he believed that there was some hope, if only a way could be found of resurrecting the wartime dialogue with Stalin. In Edinburgh in 1950 he called for another talk with the Soviet Union at the highest level, referring to such a conference as a “*parley at the summit*” (thereby coining the term for such modern high-level gatherings).

The mutual respect shared by Churchill and Eisenhower is not in question, but their relationship between 1952 and 1955 was strained by differences of opinion. At the Bermuda Summit in 1953, after the death of Stalin, Churchill pushed for a summit meeting with the Russians. Jock Colville’s diary, held in our archives, reveals just how dismissive Ike was of the proposal. Using language that was deliberately undiplomatic and unambiguous Eisenhower rejected a summit meeting on the grounds that Russia was like a woman of the streets, it did not matter whether her clothes were old or new, it was still the same whore underneath.

With London in the Russian firing line, Churchill was increasingly horrified by the huge destructive potential of the hydrogen bomb. But it was now too late. Aged 80, with his health failing, he finally succumbed to the inevitable and retired. His final advice to his Cabinet was not to abandon the Americans, which Eden immediately ignored resulting in the Suez debacle. But he remained optimistic that communism would ultimately fail in Russia and – of course – one of his last actions was to found Churchill College in Cambridge to train the next generation of Cold War scientists and engineers.

His approach to Russia was consistent and based on British national interest. He had no truck with communism, but he believed he could work with Stalin. Ultimately, he felt jaw jaw to be better than war war, but it was better to jaw jaw from a position of strength – not appeasement. For him that did not mean the United Nations, it meant a strong and united West and specifically the Anglo-American alliance and NATO.

V – Russia, Ukraine, and the West

The Future of Europe is at stake in Ukraine. Why and How to contain Russia’s “Strategic Assertiveness”. From “Strategic Containment” to “Strategic Stability”

Luís de Almeida Sampaio*

Ukraine was invaded by Russia once again on February 24, 2022, and barbarously attacked through military actions that international institutions, governments and observers do not hesitate to consider may constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Many voices¹, with political, intellectual and academic responsibilities believe that the future of Europe is at stake in Ukraine.

Those voices argue that everything should continue to be done (within the limits imposed upon Ukraine’s friends by the Treaties that govern the EU and NATO, for example) to ensure that Ukraine can assert its *right to self-defence*² and its *right to self-determination*³.

I count myself amongst those voices.

N.B: This text is the sole responsibility of its author and does not necessarily reflect official positions of the Portuguese government.

* Ambassador of Portugal in Prague, Czech Republic.

¹ For example, most of the political leaders of the Central European countries, the British Prime Minister at the time of the conclusion of this article, major figures of the US Administration, including President Biden, intellectuals and academics such as Francis Fukuyama.

² As enshrined in Art. 51, Chap. VII of the UN Charter.

³ As enshrined in Art. 1 (no. 2) Chap. I, of the UN Charter.

At the same time, there is no shortage of other voices,⁴ with unquestionably equal political responsibility and intellectual and academic credentials, which insist on the urgent need for a swift negotiated solution to the conflict, even if this means that Ukraine must make concessions.

In their view, those concessions should be primarily territorial, with the implication that they would impair Ukraine's sovereignty and right to self-determination.

Those voices also seem to believe that the West must find ways and mechanisms to accommodate Russian pretensions and demands, which underlie the narrative used by the Kremlin to justify the invasion.

In a sentence, the voices in favour of *containing* Russia faceoff those that promote *accommodating* Russia.

It is still too early⁵ to know which of these two currents of thought – now transmuted into political and diplomatic courses of action – will ultimately prevail, just as it is still too early to predict how much longer the war imposed on Ukraine by Russia will last.

Moreover, it is not possible to exclude alternative scenarios.

These range from a myriad of possibilities, which go from:

- a frozen conflict;
- an agreement guaranteeing Ukraine its full territorial sovereignty and its full right to self-determination;
- military annihilation and the consequent total occupation of Ukraine by Russian armed forces;
- a Ukrainian military total victory;
- the spreading and internationalization of the conflict with unpredictable consequences, etc.

⁴ Although with nuances and equally as examples, the French President, the German Chancellor, American politicians, intellectuals and academics such as Henry Kissinger.

⁵ On June 28, 2022, the date I used this text (afterwards first published in the magazine “*Nova Cidania*” no. 77 of May-September 2022) to open the session “*Russia, Ukraine and the West*” of the 30th edition of the *Estoril Political Forum*.

In any case, it is very difficult to predict significantly beyond the present moment, not only from a temporal perspective but also in conceptual terms. However, we have to recognize that this is usually the case in circumstances where dynamics of strategic nature are at stake.

Indeed, dynamics of strategic nature they are, with the international order shattered by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, not only now but already since 2014 with the Russian annexation of Crimea and repeated hybrid warfare interventions in the Donbass.

The impact on the international order and the geostrategic shockwaves unleashed by Russia's invasion of Ukraine will leave deep scars on the international relations, namely on the relationship between the West and Russia, for decades to come.

Despite this, I will try to argue here that, at the end of the day, the difficult relationship between the West and Russia will again confront the problem of how to build the foundations for a new "strategic stability."⁶

I think it is possible, although very difficult, to identify a political framework that makes clear that a "strategic stability" between the West and Russia is a preferable alternative to either a full-scale military conflict or the crystallization of a relationship (political, military and economic) identical to the one that prevailed during the "Cold War."

With one basic condition: Russia should not, must not, "get away with it" in Ukraine.

Russia's strategic assertiveness

The biggest problem, the greatest difficulty, starts with the understanding that both West and Russia have of "strategic stability," and the way, or ways, to achieve it.

⁶ For example, see "Strengthening Strategic Stability with Russia", Christopher S. Chivvis, Andrew Radin, Dara Massicot and Clint Reach, Rand Corporation (2017); or also "Advancing Strategic Stability and Reducing Nuclear Risks in the Euro-Atlantic Region", Euro-Atlantic Security Leadership Group (EASLG), 4 August 2020.

From Moscow’s perspective, at least for as long as the regime in power at the Kremlin lingers – regime which may well survive Vladimir Putin and those around him – “strategic stability” with the West falls within the dogmas set by the “Primakov doctrine.”

In the immediate post-Soviet world Yevgeny Primakov⁷ was the person best able to articulate Russian ambitions in terms of political science and their transposition into political *praxis* and military doctrine.

His doctrine is based on the premise that Russia should be able to avoid a unipolar world, that is, to achieve the dilution of the power and influence of the West, primarily that of the United States.

The Primakov doctrine sits on five essential axes:

- Russia as an inescapable actor in global politics;
- a foreign policy based on a multipolar vision of the world;
- the affirmation of Russia’s primacy in the post-Soviet space (starting with the reestablishment of the Russian sphere of influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia);
- the uncompromising opposition to any further expansion of NATO;
- the strengthening of the strategic partnership with China.

This is what Putin seizes from Primakov and publicly proclaims as his own in February 2007 in a famous speech at the Munich Security Conference.⁸

From then on, Russia’s international behaviour characterizes by a marked “strategic assertiveness.”⁹

⁷ Yevgeny Maksimovich Primakov (October 29, 1929 – June 26, 2015) was a Russian politician and diplomat. During his long career, he was Prime Minister (1998-99), Foreign Minister, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, head of Secret Services, and member of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

⁸ Vladimir Putin’s speech took place on February 10, 2007, at the Munich Security Conference. The echoes of the Primakov doctrine are evident: Putin criticized what he called the United States “monopolistic dominance in global relations,” and its “almost uncontained hyper use of force in international relations.”

⁹ It is important to clarify, also for methodological reasons, what I mean here by “strategic assertiveness.” “Assertiveness” enters the modern vocabulary, first in English, in the 70s of the 20th century, by the hand of behavioural psychology.

Russia started to play a more relevant role on the international scene, making it clear that it is no longer content with the position of “*junior partner of the West*” that had marked its foreign policy during the 1990s and refusing the subordinate position exacerbated by the events of Spring-Summer ‘99 in the Western Balkans.

In fact, although after the events in Serbia-Montenegro and Kosovo it was already possible to see some Russia’s actions intended to recover the status of “Great Power” that it had lost with the collapse of the Soviet Union, this transformation was not immediate.

Even after the “democratic colour revolutions” in the territory of the former USSR between 2003 and 2005, that transformation was not immediately evident.

An illustrative example is a 2004 interview in which Putin declared that the integration of Ukraine in the EU would be not only possible but also desirable for Russia.

Everything begins to change with the 2007 Munich speech.

From then on, Russia’s territorial incursions in Georgia (in August 2008) and Ukraine (2014) reveal another pattern, a new “assertiveness,” demonstrating the intention to reconquer its traditional zone of influence.

After 2014, there is no shortage of examples, both in Russia’s closest vicinity as well as in the “not so close” one (as demonstrated by the intervention in Syria from September 2015), including by cyber-attacks, disabling actions and attempts to interfere in elections, bringing the “hybrid warfare” decisively into the vocabularies of NATO and the European Union.

It is relevant to emphasize in this context the importance of hybrid warfare actions that accompany Russia’s incursions in Georgia and

Becomes common in Portuguese, as well as in other languages, in the last decade. In political language, essentially as reflecting the quality of an emphatic statement, but in many cases, wrongly and by distortion, as a synonym of something considered correct. Thus, “strategic assertiveness” associated with the characterization of contemporary Russian international posture represents nothing fundamentally new. It is only an “emphatic assertion,” albeit a strategically emphatic one.

Ukraine, as well as the continued Russian interferences in elections in other countries and attacks on critical infrastructures in Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans.

Underpinned by new technologies, namely cyber, hybrid tactics allowed Moscow to profit from internal EU tensions and problems, from those linked to political instability due to widespread economic crises – first the sovereign debt crisis and then the impact of the pandemic associated with COVID-19 – to flows of immigrants and the concomitant rise in popularity of radical political parties.

It is important to recognize that the West's response to these threats and challenges has been far from perfect.

The introduction of new technologies, especially when related to cyber security, while revealing new realities, brought major new technical and legal complexities.

International cooperation among states, even among NATO members, to create a unified anti-hybrid defensive plan has proven that vulnerabilities remain, particularly in key areas such as counterintelligence, energy security and cyber security.

Therefore, Western countermeasures adopted in the meantime tend to reflect these concerns, and require, to be effective, a political will that does not always exist.

Moreover, it is essential to recognize that Moscow's objectives go far beyond hybrid warfare actions or merely limited territorial gains for the Russian Federation.

We need to say it loud and clearly: what is fundamentally at stake, as Primakov has always argued, is the revision of the post-Cold War security architecture and, through it, the transformation of Europe's political architecture, in order to create a strategic context more favourable to Russia.

Only once this new strategic context achieved will Russia be willing to contribute to building "strategic stability" with the West.

Many argue that Russia's *strategic assertiveness* is doomed to diminish in intensity in the face of the growing structural instability of its

economy, the global health problems it faces, the challenges of an unpromising demography, etc.

I am unconvinced by these arguments.

I believe that the Kremlin is aware of these problems and challenges, and that, precisely for this reason, it is committed to recovering Russian influence in the Soviet space as quickly as possible, as the invasion of Ukraine abundantly demonstrates.

It is through those lenses that must be interpreted Putin's speech at the *International Economic Forum* in St. Petersburg on June 17, 2022, in which he proclaimed once again that the international order has collapsed and with it, the unipolar world¹⁰.

It is telling that this speech coincided with the visits of Macron, Scholz and (one day after) Boris Johnson to Kiev.

The Kremlin is interested in strategically changing the international order to make it more favourable to Russian interests.

The Kremlin knows perfectly well that the world has not been unipolar for some time. Indeed, it was unipolar only during the brief interval between the "fall of the Berlin Wall" and the dawn of the disintegration of Western hegemony at the beginning of the 21st Century, with the failure of the American strategy in the Middle East and the financial crisis, that irreparably undermined international confidence in the stability of the American economy.

It was only unipolar, therefore, in the brief interval that corresponds to Fukuyama's thesis and whose limits he himself would eventually recognize.^{11, 12}

¹⁰ "...the era of the unipolar world order is over..."

¹¹ Vladimir Putin had already said this at the World Economic Forum, in Davos, on January 27, 2021: "the era linked with attempts to build a centralized and unipolar world order has ended. To be honest, this era did not even begin. A mere attempt was made in this direction, but this, too, is now history. The essence of this monopoly ran counter to our civilization's cultural and historical diversity."

¹² Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 1992, and *After the End of History: Conversations with Francis Fukuyama*, 1992.

From strategic containment to strategic stability

Faced with this scenario, both NATO and the European Union must be aware that they need a coordinated coherent strategy to contain Russia's growing assertiveness.

Here is where the main difficulties lay.

There are many persistent voices in favour of accommodating to Russian interests as the best way to project stability.

Those voices refuse to see the implications of Putin's 2022 St. Petersburg speech, in the same way that they devalued the strategic implications of the 2007 Munich speech.

Those voices are not convinced that the future of Europe is at stake in Ukraine. Those voices accept the idea of Russian *spheres of influence*. Those voices do not believe that Russia would dare to test the resolve of the NATO Allies to resort to the collective defence enshrined in Article V of the Washington Treaty.

Those voices are not prepared to assume the consequences of a real containment policy.

How to counter those voices?

Almost everything will depend on the development of the military and diplomatic situation in and around Ukraine.

It will be essential:

- to maintain military and economic support to Ukraine;
- to maintain firmness in the application of sanctions against Russia;
- to pursue energy independence from Russia;
- to counter political and public opinion fatigue if the conflict drags on;
- to fight its economic and financial repercussions;
- to cope with the size of the Ukrainian refugee flows towards European countries;
- to ensure food security and to remedy its effects on African countries;

- to promote the consensus or majorities in favour of Ukraine in the broader international community.

Given this simple list, it is easy to conclude that the odds that the heralds of accommodating (of not “humiliating”) Putin could prevail are very high.

If Putin would prevail, the West would renounce the opportunity to create the conditions for achieving, on its own terms, real *strategic stability* with Russia.

In this scenario, the West would trade real *strategic stability* for a precarious *equilibrium* acquired recognizing that Primakov was right, and that European security and the relationship of the West with Russia have no alternative but the *realpolitik* of “spheres of influence.”

Fortunately, there are those who believe that the only way to repair the international order based on rules and values, to protect the territorial integrity of states and the right of peoples to self-determination, is to contain Russia and its ambitions, now, in Ukraine.

Those also believe that this is the only way to restart the difficult and often painful journey toward building a long lasting *strategic stability* between the West and Russia not based on the Primakov doctrine but instead founded on the principles of freedom, democracy and shared security.

Building a strategy with these objectives is a major challenge.

Firstly, because threat perceptions are not univocal in Western public opinion, since they are the result of geography and history and, particularly in Central and Eastern European countries, are part of a heated internal political debate.

Then, because there remain, both in the United States and in Europe, geo-political priorities competing with the containment of Russian *assertiveness*. China, Indo-Pacific, the fight against terrorism, until recently Afghanistan, etc., are only part of this long list.

Moreover, a strategy to contain Russia’s *strategic assertiveness* cannot be achieved merely by adapting NATO’s conventional military posture – even with a more robust and permanent presence in the Baltics

and Poland – nor only by adopting a new NATO *Strategic Concept*, complemented by the EU's *Strategic Compass*.

A real *strategy of containment* will require above all prioritizing and strengthening deterrence, including its nuclear dimension and its ballistic missile defence component, which will raise extremely delicate internal political problems in many of the Allied countries.

Furthermore, it will also be indispensable to coordinate between the European Union and NATO, but also with other partners – in the Mediterranean, in the Indo-Pacific region, in Africa, in Latin America – the appropriate political responses to the challenges that Russia poses to the international order.

From this perspective, neither should be any illusions as to the difficulties, perhaps insurmountable, in obtaining China's support for this *desideratum*, nor should we ignore that China is not only a challenge, a competition and an opportunity, but also an inevitable actor in the preservation or destruction of the international order.

In any case, it will always be crucial, above all, to maintain and strengthen the vitality of the transatlantic relationship, which we can only achieve within the framework of NATO, relying primarily on the United States and the United Kingdom, in close coordination and complementarity with the European Union.

Only then, with the perseverance of a policy of true “strategic containment,”¹³ it will be possible to counter Russia's political and military ambitions, thus paving the way for the promotion of the *minimum* conditions required for a better dialogue, for greater predictability, for more transparency and for more effective risk reduction.

Then, only then, slowly but surely, we will be able to start building a “strategic stability” based on the respect for international law¹⁴.

September 2022

¹³ Also in the sense of George E. Kennan and his famous, though anonymous, article in *Foreign Affairs*, July 1947.

¹⁴ I refer here, obviously, to the United Nations, but thinking also of the OSCE.

Russia, Ukraine, and the West

Dóra Györffy

Throughout the past few years, we have discussed at the Estoril Political Forum the threats of authoritarianism to the rules-based international order and the transatlantic alliance. These dangers were always diffuse. There were ample reasons to consider the internal failures of Western democracies rather than focus on the ongoing hybrid warfare Russia had already been waging against the West. After February 24, the war is out in the open. We should have no illusions: the unjustifiable attack on the freedom and sovereignty of Ukraine is an attack on the West and everything it represents. As Nicholas Tenzer put it¹: “What Putin wants to destroy is the very idea of humanity, and what goes with it: freedom, beauty, nobility of feeling, generosity, altruism, joy, everything that represents something like a form of greatness. (...) [H]e intends to show (...) that the supposed forces of reason, morality and justice will never be strong enough to resist the steamroller of devastating liberation from any rule.” This nihilist project must be soundly defeated, Ukraine must win, and the West must help in the military, political, economic, and humanitarian spheres.

While the war brought moral clarity, Putin still counts on Western failures to live up to its own ideals. His cynical belief about the decline of the West is not simply a delusion, but it is also informed by personal experience with Western actors. His widespread success in corrupting Western officials and businessmen could give him the

¹ <https://tenzerstrategies.substack.com/p/russian-mass-crimes-in-ukraine-a?s=r>

impression that everyone is for sale and references to values are just empty slogans without real commitment. He had agents working for him in politics and the business world in the US, the UK, and the European Union. One can get an accurate picture of the ecosystem in the Western business and legal profession by reading the recently published book *Freezing Order* by Bill Browder², Putin's archenemy and promoter of the Magnitsky legislation worldwide. Russia also has influence over Western governments, and Putin signals confidence in his ability to sow division in the transatlantic alliance³. While he cannot succeed in convincing Western actors about the justifiable nature of his war, supporting various appeasement narratives is a clear Russian propaganda objective with a much greater chance of success.

It is only natural that people want peace, especially Ukrainians, but appeasers hide behind emphasizing their desire for peace over the crimes of Russian aggression. In Hungary, the simple message of "we want peace" led to another constitutional majority for Viktor Orbán in the April elections, while the united opposition, which aimed to provide support for Ukraine, was painted as a warmonger and a threat to the security of Hungary. Obscuring and relativizing the responsibility for the war, desensitizing the public to the ongoing genocide in Ukraine, advocating for compromise and concessions is a distinct Russian strategic narrative⁴, which shifts responsibility for its criminal enterprise to those who resist its power. However, one of Churchill's famous quotes applies to appeasement: "Each one hopes that if he feeds the crocodile enough, the crocodile will eat him last. All of them hope that the storm will pass before their turn comes to be devoured. But I fear greatly that the storm will not pass. It will rage and it will roar ever more loudly, ever more widely."⁵ We do not have to go back to 1938 and Munich to find truth in the analogy – in

² Browder, Bill (2022): *Freezing Order: A true story of money laundering, murder and surviving Putin's wrath*. London and New York: Simon and Schuster.

³ Belton, Catherine (2022): Putin thinks West will blink first in war of attrition, Russian elites say. *Washington Post*, June 3. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/06/03/russia-putin-economy-attrition-war/>

⁴ <https://tenzerstrategics.substack.com/p/how-the-kremlins-narratives-are-still?s=w>

⁵ Text of Churchill's Speech on War Prospects, *New York Times*, 1940 January 21.

2014 a neutral Ukraine made concessions about the Crimea and the Donbas regions only to find that a few years later Russia wants to eradicate Ukraine and Ukrainians from the map.

Beyond the desire for peace, rising energy prices, inflation and an approaching recession are also likely to lead to sanctions fatigue in the West or at least Putin strongly expects so. He aims to exacerbate this situation by blocking the Black Sea ports to prevent Ukrainian grain exports. This could cause famine in the Middle East and North Africa, thus threatening Europe with another migration wave. Putin's condition for unblocking the ports is sanction relief – through this blackmailing, he is again shifting responsibility for his own crimes to those who resist his aggression. The explicit condition of sanction relief however indicates that another widespread Russian strategic narrative about the ineffectiveness of sanctions is false – sanctions are painful for the Russian economy and cause much more severe disruption than the Russians like to admit. In the West it should be recognized that there is no way back to the pre-war era and economic relations with Russia – if the West does not include certain elements in the sanctions packages because the costs would too great, it will be Russia, which uses the measure as a punishment for other sanctions. The instability of gas supplies to Europe since last Fall is a case to this point. While sanctions will not stop Putin in the short-term – the war itself shows that his motives cannot be interpreted in a strictly rational framework – they are indispensable in wearing down the Russian war machine.

While the longing for peace and economic stability are valid sentiments in the face of war, there are more sinister factors behind the calls for appeasement. For over a decade Putin has successfully employed various methods of hybrid warfare against the West – strategic corruption, various channels of propaganda and the financing of extremist parties in Europe, Left and Right. While sanctions are making it increasingly difficult to continue these activities, we should have no doubts that a decade of mischief cannot be undone in a couple of months. Russian dark money in the West is hidden behind layers of anonymous shell companies thus measures such as confiscated yachts of wealthy oligarch are only scratching the surface. Political actors, who have been corrupted by Russia in the past decade

can still worry about compromats in case they do not assist Russian objectives. While the official propaganda channels of RT and Sputnik have been blocked, there are plenty of other possibilities for Russia-friendly actors to spread the messages of appeasement and confusion. In Hungary, around 80% of the media are basically controlled by the government, and they keep presenting Russian narratives and prospects of certain Russia victory. The most popular Facebook pages are also openly rooting for Russia. Grayzone media networks spreading similar messages have been uncovered in other Central European countries as well.⁶

The pressures towards appeasement are exacerbated by institutional weaknesses. This is particularly severe in the European Union given the unanimity rule in foreign policy, which gives veto power to every member state. A single leader can act as a Trojan horse for Putin⁷ and soften or delay painful sanctions. As the Hungarian government has shown in the past months, the veto power can be greatly abused and used for blackmailing the community. Getting rid of the veto is indispensable for the EU to become a powerful global actor in foreign policy. Behind this problem however lies a conflict over basic values – and the ability of the European Union to reinforce its founding principles as elaborated in Article 2 of the EU Treaty – the respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and human rights. Compromising on these values within the European Union, appeasing authoritarianism eventually dismantles the European project and makes it impossible for the EU to become a serious geopolitical actor. Appeasement does not work with autocrats outside or inside the EU a sense of weakness only emboldens them. This is the case with Putin and Orbán as well.

Still, with all these vulnerabilities the West has greatly surprised Russia with its unity and support for Ukraine. Putin does not believe that this support can last, and we should be prepared to all the

⁶ Political Capital Institute (2022): *Shadow Forces: Hidden malign domestic and foreign “grey zone” media influence in the Czech, Hungarian and Serbian election campaigns*. Available: https://www.politicalcapital.hu/pc-admin/source/documents/PoliticalCapital_Grey_Zone_CEE_20220529.pdf

⁷ Orenstein, Mitchell and Daniel Kelemen (2017): Trojan Horses in EU Foreign Policy. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 55: 87-102. doi: 10.1111/jcms.12441.

methods he will use to break it. The West must prove him wrong again. An optimal end of this war is a much weaker Russia, a more careful China vis-à-vis Taiwan, a reinvigorated transatlantic alliance, a unified West, and a strengthening of liberal values across the world. I am hopeful this can be achieved, but it is a long road, and we should be mindful of all the difficulties that lie ahead. As Ukrainians are willing to die for the ideals of the West, the West should demonstrate that it is still worth fighting for.

Thank you for your attention!

The evolution of the political role of the Russian Orthodox Church (1991-2021)

Olena Kolodiy

Abstract

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union (USSR) in 1991, communism as an ideology and economic model appeared to lose its appeal worldwide. However, the attacks on liberal democracy, individual freedoms and universal human rights promoted by the USSR remained, now from a different actor within the post-Soviet sphere: the Orthodox Church.

This paper aims to contribute to a better understanding of the Russian Orthodoxy and Politics in the Putin Era. The methodology used is mainly qualitative: using as its main sources various documents by the Russian Federation, the Russian Orthodox Church, and various academic and news articles.

This paper is divided in three main sections: The first section concerns the political role of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in promoting the so-called “spiritual renewal of Russia” and “moral development of society” (National Security Concept). To achieve the goals previously referred to, the official statements of the President of Russian Federation and the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church will be scrutinized.

The second section is divided in two subsections. The first subsection will focus on the role of the Russian Orthodox Church as an instrument and as a form of power in the hands of the Russian

government to expand its influence abroad and undermine the values of liberal democracy at the domestic level and abroad. The second subsection will discuss the ROC as a conservative entity that refuses to conform to new realities. It surmises with the thought that for Putin, Patriarch Kirill is rather a government minister than a religious leader. The third subsection will focus on the ROC and its important role in the increasing militarization of Russian society. It endorses the idea that nuclear weapons can serve as a protection of Russia from the Western influence.

The third section will draw an analysis of the *Russkiy Mir* quasi-ideology and its connection to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. The relevance of this symbiosis for the Patriarchate of Moscow will be analyzed and the role played by the ROC in the ideological campaign led by Moscow against Kyiv will be reviewed. Finally, the article aims to reflect on the medium to long-term effects of the 2019 schism and the future challenges of the ROC.

1. Historical Background

*“So long as man remains free, he strives for nothing so incessantly
and so painfully as to find
someone to worship.”
Fyodor Dostoyevsky¹*

The Soviet Union considered itself as the vanguard of the worldwide liberation of the proletariat. USSR had a mission to attack the “enemies of the working class,” which were the capitalist countries². In this propaganda³ narrative, religion had no place.⁴

¹ Dostoyevsky, Fyodor in *The Brothers Karamazov*, Book V, Pro and Contra, page 72.

² Western block.

³ In the Soviet Union, where propaganda was an essential part of the regime’s activities, existed an agitation and propaganda department in the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

⁴ In the article: “Down with God! How the Soviet Union took on religion”. Available at: Down with God! How the Soviet Union took on religion – in pictures | Art and design | *The Guardian*.

In the aftermath of the October revolution, special propaganda units were formed (as the People’s Commissariat for Enlightenment).⁵ In the years that followed, Christian intellectuals were persecuted and sent to labor camps.⁶ Churches and monasteries were destroyed.⁷ Their land and properties were expropriated. Thousands of bishops, monks and the clergy in general were systematically murdered.⁸

Religion was considered a false consciousness. In the words of Marx, it was the “opium of the people” and, in Lenin’s words, “opium for the people.”⁹ According to Van Herpen, “Religion promised heaven in an afterlife and prevented the workers from making the Revolution” that aimed at technologic and scientific progress.¹⁰ Soviet communism¹¹ as a project was deeply invested in viewing its own ideology as genuinely scientific¹², rejecting not proven facts as the religious.

The Soviet intellectuals, campaigning against the Communist rule, found common ground with the religious believers in demanding freedom of speech and freedom of assembly alongside freedom of religion. To open a new Church, if such was possible, was “to hammer one more nail into the coffin of Soviet power” (Alexander Baunov).¹³

The Soviet Union was far from the equal and just society it claimed to be and was based in an economic model that unmasked state-run communism as a failure. In this context, Mikhail Gorbachev’s

⁵ Was established to remove all references to religion from school curriculums.

⁶ Also known as “Gulags”.

⁷ While in Western countries, churches were open and free to visit, in the Soviet Union, they were shuttered and demolished by the Soviet authorities.

⁸ In the article: “Russians Are Getting Sick of Church”. Available at: [Russians Are Getting Sick of Church – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace \(carnegiemoscow.org\)](http://Russians Are Getting Sick of Church – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (carnegiemoscow.org))

⁹ The Political Role of the Russian Orthodox Church | *The National Interest*.

¹⁰ In the article: “Why the Soviet attempt to stamp out religion failed”. Available at: Why the Soviet attempt to stamp out religion failed | Giles Fraser | The Guardian.

¹¹ Many scholars interpreted Stalinism as “political religion” or as a secular religion.

¹² In the article: “Religion, Science, and Political Religion in the Soviet Context”. Available at: RELIGION, SCIENCE, AND POLITICAL RELIGION IN THE SOVIET CONTEXT | Modern Intellectual History | Cambridge Core

¹³ Following the article “Russians Are Getting Sick of Church”.

decision to loosen the Soviet burden on the countries of Eastern Europe created an independent, democratic momentum.¹⁴

The reforms¹⁵ implemented by Mikhail Gorbachev began a slow process of democratization that contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Following the May 1990 elections, Gorbachev faced increasing internal political pressures: Boris Yeltsin and the pluralist movement advocated democratization and rapid economic reforms while the hard-liner Communist elite wanted to obstruct Gorbachev's reforms.¹⁶

2. The political role of the Orthodox Church

2.1. Russian State and the Orthodox Church: Traditional Values

On December 25, 1991, the Soviet hammer and sickle flag¹⁷ was lowered for the last time over the Kremlin¹⁸, discarding simultaneously the 74-year-old Communist system and the 500-year-old imperial legacy. Earlier in the day, Mikhail Gorbachev resigned his post as President of the Soviet Union, leaving Boris Yeltsin as President of the newly independent Russian state.

Throughout the transition of Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic to Russian Federation, Yeltsin remained in office. His Presidency was characterized by an ideological void. The old ideals and values had disappeared, and new ideals and values had not yet been developed. It was in this tumultuous context that Vladimir Putin emerged¹⁹ in the political arena.

¹⁴ Momentum that led to the collapse of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, and then the overthrow of Communist rule throughout Eastern Europe.

¹⁵ To allow elections with a multi-party system and create a presidency for the Soviet Union.

¹⁶ In the site: "Office of the Historian". Available at: Milestones: 1989–1992 – Office of the Historian (state.gov)

¹⁷ The union of the hammer (workers) and the sickle (peasants) represented the victorious and enduring revolutionary alliance.

¹⁸ Thereafter, replaced by the Russian tricolor.

¹⁹ Putin was first elected as the Russian President in 2000 with 53 percent of the votes.

Putin's first activity was to repair the ideological void by reshaping the Foreign Policy to regain Russia's place in world affairs, as he had proclaimed before the Duma²⁰ on August 16, 1999: "Russia has been a great power for centuries and remains so. It has always had and still has legitimate zones of interest (...) We should not drop our guard in this respect, neither should we allow our opinion to be ignored."²¹ That statement turned out to be a policy declaration for years to come.

Vladimir Putin embraced pre-Soviet themes including the Russian Orthodox Church and Russian writers and philosophers.²² Putin's domestic view blends Czarist glories, selected elements of the USSR and a racial-geographic Russia (Kruglov, 2019).²³

Soon after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia longed to become a part of the Western world and bring about a systemic change unto Western-type liberal democracy and market economy with the help of Western political support and large-scale economic and technological assistance.

By the end of 1992 Russia's economic misfortunes had multiplied and political uncertainties persisted. Western assistance proved to be inadequate to deal with the post-Soviet challenges. In that context, Russian elites failed to recognize the United States leadership.²⁴

The Russian elite expressed the preference for a multi-polar world where Russia, a great power, is one of the influential poles in the

²⁰ As he sought their approval for his prime ministership.

²¹ In the article: "Putin's plan to slowly reclaim Russia's lost empire". Available at: Putin's plan to slowly reclaim Russia's lost empire – *Asia Times*.

²² Most Russian authors are primarily philosophers. The most know Russian fiction writers, such as Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky are also known as philosophers. Russian philosophy emerged during the XIX century with the *Westernizers*, advocating that Russia should follow the Western political and economic models and the *Slavophiles*, insisting on developing Russia as a unique civilization (early founders of Eurasianism). The discussion of Russia's place in the world has since become the most characteristic feature of Russian philosophy.

²³ Following the article: "Putin's plan to slowly reclaim Russia's lost empire".

²⁴ Because it implied disregarding Russia's great-power status and global ambitions.

international system (according to Russia's National Security Concept of December 1997)²⁵.

The National Security Concept of 1997²⁶ stated that Russia would continue to develop constructive partnership with the following states/organizations: the United States of America, the European Union, China, Japan, and India.

The Security Concept²⁷ did not claim Russia's special interests in the former Soviet space, unlike the 1993 Military Doctrine which emphasized Russia's exclusive role as the guarantor of peace and security in the region. Subsequently, Moscow proceeded to follow a more balanced policy towards the West and the East. Due to its unique geopolitical location, Russia could emerge as a bridge between Europe and Asia.

In 1998 Boris Yeltsin appointed Putin as Director of the Federal Security Service (FSS)²⁸. On December 17, 1999, the new National Security Concept²⁹ was approved by the President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin.³⁰

Vladimir Putin, who was simultaneously the director of the FSS and the Secretary of the National Security Council of the Russian Federation, had influence on the formulation of the new Security

²⁵ A document that portrays the national interests of the country in terms of the interests of the individual, society, and the state.

²⁶ In the article "Russia's National Security Concepts and Military Doctrines: Continuity and Change. Available at: Russia's National Security Concepts and Military Doctrines: Continuity and Change (columbia.edu)

²⁷ The Security Concept is a document that primarily reflects the direction of Russia's political trajectory aimed at strengthening the country's defense, internal integrity and political stability, modernization of economy and development of industrial potential, as well as strengthening the sovereignty of Russia and thereby its ability to carry out domestic and foreign politics without external pressure.

²⁸ The follow-up organization of the former KGB (*Committee for State Security*).

²⁹ In "National Security Concept of the Russian Federation", Full English Translation from *Rossiiskaya Gazeta*, January 18, 2000. Available at: Global Beat: National Security Concept of the Russian Federation (fas.org); (Russian version of the same document: "О Концепции национальной безопасности Российской Федерации". Available at: Указ Президента РФ от 10.01.2000 N 24 "О Концепции национальной безопасности Российской Федерации" (legalacts.ru)).

³⁰ Two weeks later, Yeltsin would abdicate in favor of Putin.

Concept built around completely new ideas. For instance, safeguarding the national security of the Russian Federation should include “the spiritual renewal of Russia”³¹, and that “the state should encourage the (...) spiritual and moral development of society”³².

The conception of the Russian Federation as a distinctive (Eurasian) civilization implied the definition of a distinctive set of values in opposition to the West. In the Russian tradition, Western values are not always synonymous with European ones. In the Russian narrative, the country is occasionally presented as the defender of the old and true (orthodox) European values, which have been gradually eroded in Western societies.

In September 2013, at the Valdai Discussion Club Summit, Putin compared Russia, a country faithful to traditional values, with the Euro-Atlantic States that have abandoned their true moral, highlighting that Western values pose a serious threat to the Russian World: “today Russia’s national identity is experiencing not only objective pressures stemming from globalization, but also the consequences of the national catastrophes of the twentieth century, when we experienced the collapse of our state two different times. The result was a devastating blow to our nation’s cultural and spiritual codes; we were faced with the disruption of traditions and the consonance of history, with the demoralization of society, with a deficit of trust and responsibility.”³³

³¹ Full quote: “The spiritual renewal of society is impossible without the preservation of the role of the Russian language as a factor of spiritual unity of all peoples of the multinational Russian Federation and as the language of inter-state communication of the peoples of countries members of the Commonwealth of Independent States.” Source: *National Security Concept of the Russian Federation 2000*, IV. The Insurance of the National Security of the Russian Federation.

³² Full quote: “The state should encourage the creation of equal conditions for the development and growth of competitiveness of enterprises irrespective of their form of ownership, including the development of private enterprise in all spheres where this would facilitate the growth of social prosperity, the progress of science and education, spiritual and moral development of society, and the protection of the rights of consumers.” Source: *National Security Concept of the Russian Federation 2000*, IV. The Insurance of the National Security of the Russian Federation.

³³ In the article: “[Putin at] Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club [Partial Transcript]”. Available at: TRANSCRIPT: [Putin at] Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club [partial transcript] – Johnson’s Russia List.

According to Vladimir Putin, Russian traditional values should correspond to Russian Orthodox values as the efficiency of Russian modernization depends on the revival of tradition, which is identified with the Orthodox religion. Anchoring Russia's national identity in these religiously conservative values enhances Russia's *bona fides* as the vanguard of an anti-West coalition committed to contesting International Human Rights norms³⁴.

On May 26, 2011, the World Russian People's Council³⁵ issued "The Basic Values: The Fundamentals of National Unity"³⁶, a document created to identify Russian traditional values. There are 17 values present in the Fundamentals of National Unity: faith; justice ("the rightful place of a nation in the international community"); peace; freedom (limited by moral obligations); unity (of different ethnic groups, social classes, political groups); morality; dignity; honesty; patriotism (defined as love for the homeland, nation, culture, respect for history; readiness for self-sacrifice); solidarity; mercy; family; culture and national tradition (characterized as respect for one's own culture and the tradition of others); prosperity (material and spiritual); diligence; self-limitation (resignation from consumption); and devotion (to the homeland and nation). The Russian Federation even has distinguishing holidays to celebrate traditional values. On July 8 Russia celebrates the Day of Family, Love and Fidelity. This holiday was established in 2008 on the initiative of deputies of the State Duma.

Russian traditional values have found their place also in the agenda of the Russian Parliament. The Duma approved a legislation that aimed to protect the sensibilities of the Orthodox believers from information they deem harmful and contradictory to the religious doctrine, for example, the legislation that had been passed in Russia

³⁴ In the article: "The Organization of Islamic Cooperation's (OIC) Response to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Rights: A Challenge to Equality and Nondiscrimination Under International Law", *Transnational Legal and Contemporary Problems* (2019).

³⁵ For more information, visit: "World Russian People's Council: Reviving the Nation" at: World Russian People's Council: Reviving The Nation (gorthodox.com)

³⁶ In the article: "Russian values as the basis of Russian culture". Available in russian at: Русские ценности как основа русской культуры | Я русский (iamruss.ru)

in March of 2012 under the federal law prohibiting propaganda portraying LGBT relations³⁷ as equal to heterosexual ones.

Such initiatives and laws were condemned by Western institutions such as Freedom House, a democracy watchdog, that calls Putin's anti-LGBT rants "state-sponsored homophobia" used to control Russia and reports that "Regulating gender and sexuality remains at the forefront of Russia's domestic and international political agendas"³⁸.

This Russian propaganda law has been found to violate international law principles of freedom of opinion and expression, as well as principles of equal treatment, by the European Court of Human Rights, the Venice Commission and the European Parliament.

Putin's circle alludes to a culture war³⁹ between Russia and the West to negatively frame the intentions of the United States and European Union in Ukraine. This rhetoric was in place at the time when Russia first began aggressively imposing anti-LGBT propaganda laws, in 2013.⁴⁰

According to this, only Russia can prevent the West's effort to impose global "ultra-liberalism." In Putin's words, "efforts are being taken today to (...) destroy the traditional values (...)"⁴¹ The West thus poses a strategic threat to Russia's geopolitical interests⁴².

³⁷ In the article: "March of 2012 under the federal law prohibiting propaganda showing LGBT". In Russia passes law banning gay 'propaganda' | Russia | *The Guardian*.

³⁸ In the article: "Dismantling LGBT + Rights as means of control in Russia". Available at: Dismantling LGBT+ rights as a means of control in Russia | Freedom House.

³⁹ The cultural dichotomy of 'liberal values' and the 'conservative' or 'traditional' values is known as the rhetoric of a "culture war" between the West and Russia. This concept is used by Russian elite to present itself as the guardian of conservative religious values on the international sphere.

⁴⁰ In the article "Briefing on Russian Federal anti-propaganda law". Available at: Briefing_on_Russias_federal_anti-propaganda_law.pdf (humandignitytrust.org)

⁴¹ In the article: "Putin Address to World Russian People's Council". Available at: <http://lilin.ru/events/president/news/59013>.

⁴² The documents (Russian National Security Concepts 1997 and 2000) acknowledged that Russia's position in the international system had become less influential as some states were trying to weaken Russia's position in the political, economic, military, moral and other spheres.

In 2007, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov remarked that the Church and his ministry “worked hand in hand (...) doing together one big work very necessary for the country.”⁴³ The symbiosis between the Kremlin and the Orthodox Church emerged after 2012, when Putin returned to the Kremlin. The Russian Government began to portray itself as a defender of conservative values from the ‘decadent Western liberalism’. Additionally, Vladimir Putin has pledged that one of the tasks of Russia’s Foreign Policy will be to defend Christianity and Christians.⁴⁴

2.2. The Orthodox Church: A Hybrid Church

The Orthodox Christianity is often portrayed as a highly conservative entity that refuses to conform to new realities. This has led the Church to become a pole for current conservative “identity politics”⁴⁵. Indeed, societies in predominantly Orthodox countries are very secularized.

For the conservative positioning, the Kremlin and the Church have different motives. For the Kremlin, it was an opportunistic political move: an attempt to marginalize liberal constituency in Russia and to build up defenses against an increasingly critical West, by reaching out to anti-liberal fringe groups.

The conservative vision was not fully rooted in traditional values: Russia is not a particularly conservative country, nor a very religious

⁴³ In the article: “The Political Role of the Russian Orthodox Church”. Available at: [The Political Role of the Russian Orthodox Church | *The National Interest*](#).

⁴⁴ Referring to the true Christianity and the Orthodox Christians.

⁴⁵ According to Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “identity politics” has come to signify a wide range of political activity and theorizing founded in the shared experiences of injustice of members of certain social groups. Rather than organizing solely around belief systems, programmatic manifestos, or party affiliation, identity political formations typically aim to secure the political freedom of a specific constituency marginalized within its larger context. Members of that constituency assert or reclaim ways of understanding their distinctiveness that challenge dominant characterizations, with the goal of greater self-determination. Source: Identity Politics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).

one. According to Brian Grim⁴⁶ “Orthodox Christianity views itself very much as the religion of a geographic territory, rather than as a faith of individual people or congregations,” that suggested the “Orthodox leaders have become major political players, pushing for policies that can discourage the growth of newer faith groups.”⁴⁷

On 27 January 2009, Patriarch Kirill I, or Cyril I (secular name Vladimir Mikhailovich Gundyayev), was elected as Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus by the Russian Orthodox Church Local Council. Patriarch Kirill I is one of the most powerful religious dignitaries in the world, heading a Church that has 36,000 parishes and more than 100 million faithful.

The Patriarch of Moscow inherited a clergy with a kaleidoscopic spectrum of opinions on religious and secular issues. According to *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, the Orthodox community is divided in three main groups: modern liberals, pragmatic traditionalists, and nationalist fundamentalists. The modernist liberals propose to “modernize Orthodoxy” by reforming religious practice, laicizing Church Administration. At the opposite pole are the nationalist fundamentalists, who defend traditional religious practice, episcopal authority, and conservative values. In between the two antinomies are the pragmatic traditionalists, who value the traditional but are willing to change if needed to achieve the overriding goal of ensuring salvation. While Liberals welcome Globalization, the fundamentalists condemn it, and the moderates engage it (critically).⁴⁸

The data from Russia provided support for the post-secularist paradigm that now prevailed among sociologists of religion. Significantly high rates of self-described religiosity accompany abysmally low rates of

⁴⁶ Brian J. Grim, PhD, is president of the Religious Freedom & Business Foundation (RFBF) and a leading expert on how faith and business build a better world. He is also the Global Chairman of the Biannual Business & Interfaith Peace Awards and Symposium.

⁴⁷ In the article “The Fate of Religious Freedom in the Former USSR, 25 years after its collapse”. Available at: *The fate of religious freedom in the former USSR, 25 years after its collapse – Deseret News*.

⁴⁸ In the article “Russian Orthodoxy and Politics in the Putin Era”. Available at: *Russian Orthodoxy and Politics in the Putin Era – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*.

church membership.⁴⁹ According to the study “*Russians Return to Religion, but Not to Church*”⁵⁰ by the Pew Research Center although 70 to 80% profess to be Orthodox, less than 15% attend services more than once a month, only 5% once a week, and a mere 1-2% belong to a parish.

Church attendance among the Orthodox population is much lower than among Catholics.⁵¹ The differing trends in predominantly Orthodox and Catholic countries may reflect political geography. The Orthodox countries in the region are further toward the east, and many were part of the Soviet Union, which prohibit church attendance. The Catholic countries are further toward the west where people enjoyed religious freedom.

According to a Pew survey⁵² conducted in 2017, Church attendance in Orthodox countries in central and Eastern Europe averages 10%.⁵³

The Patriarch of Moscow supports the legitimacy of Putin’s Regime and recognizes the existing State Order⁵⁴, explicitly stipulated in the Foundations of the Social Conceptions of 2000,⁵⁵ which in return allows him to extend his influence on society through the defense of traditional values.

⁴⁹ In the book: DAVIE, Grace, (1994), “Religion in Britain Since 1945: Believing Without Belonging”, Oxford, Institute of Contemporary British History.

⁵⁰ In the article: “Russians Return to Religion, But not to Church”. Available at: Russians Return to Religion, But Not to Church | Pew Research Center.

⁵¹ In the article: “Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe”. Available at: Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe | Pew Research Center.

⁵² Following the article: “Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe”.

⁵³ Church attendance stands at 21% Romania; 17% in Georgia; 12% in Ukraine; 6% in Serbia; 6% in Russia; and 5% in Bulgaria. In Catholic-majority countries in the same region, attendance reaches 25%; it is 45% in Poland and 43% in Ukraine.

⁵⁴ The largest chapter in Foundations of the Social Conceptions of 2000 was “Church and State,” but many other chapters also concerned the “state” (the Russian word, as noun or adjective, appearing 271 times throughout the document).

⁵⁵ The Russian Orthodox Church and Social Doctrine: A Commentary on “Fundamentals of the Social Conception of the Russian Orthodox Church”. Available at: The Russian Orthodox Church and Social Doctrine: A Commentary on Fundamentals of the Social Conception of the Russian Orthodox Church (georgefox.edu)

The Foundations portrays Kirill's experience and views, providing the Program for his Patriarchate. The 90s deeply reinforced Kirill's skepticism of the West based on the decline of state and society, the destruction of the economy and politics, as well as the downfall of the country, widely shared by his compatriots.

The Patriarch Kirill has made his mission to bring back a Church that, during the Soviet era, almost disappeared both in Russia and around the globe. Kirill's main challenges include reestablishing Church Governance, recruiting and educating clergy and restoring the network of parishes.

Consequently, the Church established its first official *website* in February 1997 and since then it significantly increased the number of sites.⁵⁶ As recent studies emphasize, these sites constitute "the most important source of information about religion for Russian Orthodox believers" with the major sites recording more audience than the print media. The President's "near abroad"⁵⁷ is only half of the Patriarch's transnational domain.

The first step in the Kremlin's plans to give the Russian Orthodox Church a global reach was to reach the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia.⁵⁸ Putin's proposal for a reconciliation between the two Churches was accepted.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ The leading Orthodox sites are "Pravoslavie i mir" pravmir.ru (translation: "The Orthodoxy and the World"), "Pravoslavie Ru" (translation: "Orthodoxy Russia") pravoslavie.ru, "Azbuka very" (translation: "The alphabet of the faith") azbuka.ru, the official church site "Patriarkhiia Ru" (translation: "Russian Patriarchate") patriarkhia.ru, the charity site Miloserdie Ru (translation: "Mercy Russia") miloserdie.ru, and the extreme-right "Russkaia narodnaia liniia" (translation: "Russian National Line") ruskline.ru. Other sites include the portal for the Moscow Theological Academy (bogoslav.ru) as well as many small sites run by dioceses, parishes, monasteries, and individual clerics.

⁵⁷ Russia's "near abroad" encompasses not only the physical Arctic lands to Russia's north, but under Putin his country also is becoming more politically and militarily active in the entire region. Considering the potential economic benefits and natural resources, this should give the West cause for concern.

⁵⁸ In September 2003 Putin contacted the leader of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia (ROCOR), a Church founded by Russian *emigrants*.

⁵⁹ The Act of Canonical Communion was signed in May 2007.

The merge of the Russian Orthodox Church with the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia brought one million church members in thirty countries under Moscow's control in the USA alone this included a network of 323 parishes and 20 monasteries.

President Vladimir Putin offers the Patriarch political and financial support. "For Vladimir Putin, religion serves social order and family morality. In exchange, the Church and its Patriarch bring religious discourse to the ideology in place," stated Jean-François Colosimo.⁶⁰

While Putin, professes himself to be religious, he does not necessary views Kirill as a religious guide, "Patriarch Kirill is like a government minister for Putin," according to the analyst Aleksei Makarkin,⁶¹ implying that the President regards the Patriarch a mere political official more than as a religious authority.

Russian Orthodox Church is a Hybrid Church: on one hand it is a religious institution, on the other hand it functions as a State's institution. For instance, in 2015 the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry threw its support behind a so-called Orthodox Financial System developed under the tutelage of the Moscow Patriarchate and resembling the Islamic financial system⁶². Based on Russian law, Orthodox morals and Russian business traditions, the Orthodox Financial System is designed to be resilient to world crises and help reduce Russia's reliance on the Western banking system.

⁶⁰ Historian, orthodox theologian and essayist in *L'Apocalypse russe : Dieu au pays de Dostoievski* (poche LeXio, 2021).

⁶¹ Alexey Makarkin is a political analyst, first vice-president of the Center for Political Technologies.

⁶² In the article: "Orthodox Church Calls for Alternative Financial System in Russia". Available at: Orthodox Church Calls for Alternative Financial System in Russia – *The Moscow Times*.

2.3 Russian Orthodox Church and the Nuclear Missiles

“There is no sin, and there can be no sin on all the earth, which the Lord will not forgive to the truly repentant! Man cannot commit a sin so great as to exhaust the infinite love of God. Can there be a sin which could exceed the love of God?”

Fyodor Dostoyevsky⁶³

For the Patriarch Kirill, the collaboration with the Kremlin is a way to protect the freedom of the Church. According to Father Hovorun⁶⁴ “it seems that under his tenure as the Patriarch, the Church ended up in a situation of captivity.”⁶⁵ Steadily, the line between church and state blurred.

The Church not only supported the Kremlin’s ideological offensive abroad but also played an important role in the increasing militarization of Russian society.⁶⁶ In the past, Patriarch Kirill has described the Kremlin’s military campaign in Syria as a “holy war.”⁶⁷ Such ideas had been fused into a radical ideology described as “Atomic Orthodoxy”⁶⁸ by Yegor Kholmogorov.⁶⁹

⁶³ Dostoyevsky, Fyodor in *The Brothers Karamazov*, Book II, An Unfortunate Gathering.

⁶⁴ Father Hovorun is a Professor of Ecclesiology, International Relations, and Ecumenism at University College Stockholm.

⁶⁵ In the article “The Russian Orthodox Leader at the Core of Putin’s Ambitions”. Available at: [The Russian Orthodox Leader at the Core of Putin’s Ambitions – Godfrey Times](#).

⁶⁶ In the article: “Blessed Be the Nukes? Russian Orthodoxy Recommends End to...”. Available at: [Blessed Be the Nukes? Russian Orthodoxy Recommends End to... | News & Reporting | Christianity Today](#).

⁶⁷ In the article: “The Real Reason the Russian Orthodox Church’s Leader Supports Putin’s War”. Available at: [Why Patriarch Kirill of the Russian Orthodox Church Supports Putin in Ukraine \(foreignpolicy.com\)](#)

⁶⁸ In the article: “St. Seraphim of Sarov: Patron Saint of Russia’s Nuclear Arsenal”. Available at: [ST. SERAPHIM OF SAROV: PATRON SAINT OF RUSSIA’S NUCLEAR ARSENAL | ORTHODOXY IN DIALOGUE](#).

⁶⁹ In the article: “Russian Nuclear Orthodoxy”. Available at: [Russian Nuclear Orthodoxy | Center for Strategic and International Studies \(csis.org\)](#)

While Churches in the West⁷⁰ emphasize the need to promote peace and are in favor of nuclear disarmament, the Russian Orthodox Church support the development of new strategic weapons.⁷¹

The *dictum* of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces: “After us, silence”⁷² alludes to the end of the World that corresponds with the apocalyptic view of the Orthodox Church, for which to defend Holy Russia and its traditional values⁷³ all means are permitted.

Nuclear weapons⁷⁴ were perceived as necessary to preserve “Orthodox civilization” as “only nuclear weapons protect Russia from enslavement by the West” (Chaplin, 2019).⁷⁵ Nuclear missiles even have its own patron, Saint Seraphim.⁷⁶

⁷⁰ In the article: “Russian Orthodox Church Considers Ending Blessings From Nuclear Weapons”. Available at: Russian Orthodox Church Considers Ending Blessings For Nuclear Weapons – *Eurasia Review*.

⁷¹ In the article: “How the Russian Church Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb Orthodoxy’s Influence on Moscow’s Nuclear Complex”. Available at: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2019-06-14/how-russian-church-learned-stop-worrying-and-love-bomb>

⁷² Original in Russian: “после нас тишина” (posle nas tishena).

⁷³ In the article: “Weapons in the Hand of God: The Russian Orthodox Church and Russia’s Nuclear Weapons Establishment”. Available at: Weapons in the Hand of God: The Russian Orthodox Church and Russia’s Nuclear Weapons Establishment – Nuclear Network (csis.org)

⁷⁴ During the Syrian war, Russian orthodox priests have sanctified S-400 surface-to-air missiles, nuclear submarines, tanks, and fighter jets.

⁷⁵ Vsevolod Chaplin, an influential priest and former spokesman for the Patriarch, told the *Vzglyad newspaper* that nuclear weapons were the country’s “guardian angels” and necessary to preserve “Orthodox civilization. Source: “Russian Orthodox Church considers a ban on blessing weapons of mass destruction”.

⁷⁶ Whose remains were discovered in 1991 in a disused monastery in Sarov, a small town in central Russia that was home to key nuclear facilities in the Soviet era.

3. Russian World (*Russkiy Mir*) and its effects on the Orthodox Church

3.1 Russian and Ukrainian Orthodox Churches – Analysis

“The awful thing is that beauty is mysterious as well as terrible. God and the devil are fighting there and the battlefield is the heart of man.”

Fyodor Dostoyevsky⁷⁷

In recent years, Patriarch Kirill aspired to expand his Church’s influence, pursuing an ideology consistent with the idea of Moscow being a “Third Rome,” a reference to a 15th-century concept of Manifest Destiny for the Orthodox Church, in which Putin’s Russia would become the spiritual center of the true Church after Rome and Constantinople.

It was the Orthodox monk Philotheus who called Moscow the *Third Rome* for the first time. In 1523-1524 he wrote letters to the Grand Duke of Moscow urging him to fight against heresies. In the monk’s view, the Duchy of Moscow, remained the last bastion of the true faith: “All the Christian Kingdoms have come to an end and have converged in the single Kingdom of our sovereign (...) Two Romes fell, a third stands, and there will not be a fourth one,”⁷⁸ Philotheus wrote in one of the epistles.⁷⁹

Third Rome is a grand project that merges neatly with Putin’s mystically tinged imperialism of a “*Russkiy Mir*.” The political concept *Russkiy Mir*⁸⁰ political concept gained importance in the 2000s, after Vladimir Putin started using it in his public speeches, making an appeal to the “compatriots” abroad.⁸¹ With *Russkiy Mir* Putin’s Russia attempts

⁷⁷ Dostoyevsky in *The Brothers Karamazov*, Chapter IV, The Confession of a Passionate Heart – in Anecdote.

⁷⁸ In the article: “Three Romes: A Stark Warning”. Available at: Three Romes: A Stark Warning (orthodoxengland.org.uk)

⁷⁹ In the article: “Why do Russians call Moscow the Third Rome?” Available at: Why do Russians call Moscow the Third Rome? – Russia Beyond (rbth.com)

⁸⁰ Traditional Values were followed by the concept of the Russian World (*Russkiy Mir*)

⁸¹ In the article “Russia and Ukraine: “One People” as Putin Claims? Available at: Russia and Ukraine: ‘One People’ as Putin Claims? | Royal United Services Institute (rusi.org)



≡ José Manuel Durão Barroso, Wilhelm Hofmeister and João Carlos Espada



≡ Opening Session with Isabel Capelo Gil, Rector of UCP and Carlos Carreiras, Mayor of Cascais



≡ Opening Session with Special Message by The President of the Republic of Portugal, HE Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa



≡ Isabel Capelo Gil and João Carlos Espada

Panel “Confronting the Authoritarian Challenge” ≡





≡ William Gaston, James Carrafano and Bridgett Wagner



≡ The Dahrendorf Memorial Lecture: *Ukraine's Resistance and the Future of Democracy*



≡ The Dahrendorf Memorial Lecture: *Ukraine's Resistance and the Future of Democracy*



≡ Garden Reception: *Celebrating the 650th Anniversary of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance with HRH Dom Duarte, Duke of Braganza, HE Ross Matthews, Manuel Braga da Cruz and Maria João Araújo.*





Winston Churchill Memorial Dinner:
“Churchill and Russia”



After Dinner Conversation with IEP Alumni Club



Panel China and the West



Thucydides Society Garden Session



Xiao Qiang





≡ Panel "Russia, Ukraine, and the West"



≡ Joint Panel MA's at the Universidade Católica Portuguesa & Georgetown University:
A Conversation on Democracy and Governance in a Context of Global Recession of Democracy.





⚡ Europaeum Special Debate: *The Russia-China Partnership – Will It Weaken or Grow Stronger?*





≡ Luigi Einaudi Memorial Luncheon:
*The Light That Fails? The Present Debate in Italy
on the War in Ukraine*

≡ The Future of NATO



≡ Book Presentation: José Cutileiro “*Podia ter sido Pior – Escritos 1953-2020*” (Dom Quixote, 2022)

Panel “Portugal: The Challenges Ahead”



Breakout Session, IEP Research Centre (CIEP): *Confronting the Authoritarian Challenge*



Garden Cocktail

Group Photo Session





≡ Konrad Adenauer Memorial Dinner



Dancing with the Lisbon Swingers |||



to establish itself as a civilization-forming state and as a leading geopolitical actor.⁸²

In Patriarch Kirill's words "*Russkiy Mir* is a community based on the Orthodox faith and the Russian culture and language, as well as a common historical memory and a model of socio-economic development." In other words, *Russkiy Mir*⁸³ is Russia's sphere of cultural influence whose borders correspond to the post-Soviet territory.⁸⁴

It is a worldview that holds the Kremlin to be the defender of Russia's Christian civilization, and therefore justified in seeking to dominate the countries of the former Soviet Union and Russian empire. According to the Rev. Cyril Hovorun,⁸⁵ these ideas emerged in the aftermath of communism's collapse, when the Russian state sought to fill an ideological void while the long-persecuted Russian Orthodox Church asserted itself in a newly open public square.

The most relevant consequence of the USSR collapse was the splitting of the core of the ancient Russian State and the emergence for the first time in modern history, of independent Ukrainian and Belarusian states. The process of Russo-Ukrainian separation has been particularly painful for the Russian elite. The Kremlin finds intolerable that a Ukrainian state, whose sovereignty it immediately recognized in 1991, could have a government seeking integration into NATO and the European Union and actively promote the "nationalization" of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine.

⁸² In the article: *Russkiy Mir*: "Russian World". Available at: *Russkiy Mir*: "Russian World" | DGAP.

⁸³ According to the *Russkiy Mir* Foundation established by President Putin in 2007, *Russkiy Mir* refers to a community of ethnic Russians and citizens of the Russian Federation of non-Russian ethnic origin, the Russian diaspora, Russian speaking foreigners, and all the people who express concern about Russia's future.

⁸⁴ The post-Soviet states, also known as the former Soviet Republics and in Russia as the near abroad are the 15 sovereign states that were Union Republics of the Soviet Union; that emerged and re-emerged from the Soviet Union following its dissolution in 1991.

⁸⁵ a Ukrainian-born theologian and former adviser to Patriarch Kirill. For more information: Dr. Cyril Hovorun – Sankt Ignatios.

During the Sunday sermon that was delivered at the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow,⁸⁶ Kirill⁸⁷ highlighted: “May the Lord preserve the Russian land⁸⁸ (...) A land which now includes Russia and Ukraine and Belarus and other tribes and peoples.”

The Patriarch publicly praised the virtues of “the Russian world.”⁸⁹ He declared that: “Russia belongs to a civilization that is wider than the Russian Federation. We call this civilization the Russian world. This is not the world of the Russian Federation, nor Russian empire. The Russian world starts at the Kiev baptismal font. Russian, Ukrainians, Belarusians belong to it.”

Ukraine is an “overwhelmingly” Orthodox Christian nation, with 78% identifying as Orthodox compared with 71% in Russia, according to a 2015 Pew Research Center survey.⁹⁰ The “Gate of Europe”⁹¹ has 35 million Orthodox Christians, the third-largest Orthodox population in the world, after Russia and Ethiopia.

Additionally, Orthodox Christianity is closely tied to Ukraine’s national and political life. Half of all Ukrainians (51%) say it is at least somewhat important for someone to be Orthodox to be truly Ukrainian. The same is true for Russia, where 57% declare being Orthodox is important to being truly Russian. In both countries, about half say religious leaders have at least some influence in political matters, although most Ukrainians (61%) and roughly half of Russians (52%) would prefer if this were not the case.

Attitudes in Ukraine towards Russia’s political and religious leadership are also divided between the eastern and western parts of the country. Eastern Ukrainians have more positive attitudes towards Russia than

⁸⁶ On February 27, 2022.

⁸⁷ In the article: “Kirill, the extremely political Russian Orthodox Patriarch”. Available at: Kirill, the extremely political Russian Orthodox patriarch (la-croix.com)

⁸⁸ Rus’ was a medieval state, considered the ancestor of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus.

⁸⁹ “*Russkii mir*” is the concept used by the Russian media and political class to justify Russian political, military, and ecclesiastical activity in Ukraine.

⁹⁰ In the article: “Ukrainian, Russian Church split reflects political importance of Orthodox Christianity”. Available at: Ukrainian, Russian church split reflects political importance of Orthodox Christianity | Pew Research Center.

⁹¹ Book title by Serhii Plokhii, referring to the Ukraine.

do western Ukrainians. For example, the same 2015 survey found that over half of those living in the east (55%) say Russia has an obligation to protect Orthodox Christians living outside its borders. In western Ukraine, meanwhile, a majority (58%) disagree with this view.

The Patriarch of Moscow also receives higher support in eastern Ukraine than in western Ukraine. Western Ukrainians are more likely to look to their own national Patriarch as the highest authority of the Orthodox Church.⁹²

During Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, "Russian insurgents imagined themselves as participants in a broader 'Russian World' and their war as a defense of Orthodox values against the advance of the corrupt European West."⁹³ When it came to the escalation of hostilities in Ukraine from 2014 onwards, Patriarch Kirill attempted neutrality.

On 18 March 2014, gathered in the Kremlin, Putin and Crimean politicians signed the treaty on the "Accession of Crimea" to the Russian Federation.⁹⁴ Russian political, military, and business representatives was present. Yet Kirill was nowhere to be found.

It became clear that the Russian Orthodox Church would not be able to stand on both sides of a conflict that pitted its followers in Ukraine against its followers in Russia. Kirill offered neither the Kremlin nor Ukrainian believers the support they expected. As a result, he lost the trust of both.

As the war in Ukraine progressed throughout 2014, the Patriarch Kirill, endorsing Putin's line of argument, declared that an "internal political crisis" in Ukraine was threatening its territorial integrity⁹⁵

⁹² In the survey: "Ukrainian, Russian church split reflects political importance of Orthodox Christianity". Available at: Ukrainian, Russian church split reflects political importance of Orthodox Christianity | Pew Research Center.

⁹³ In "The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine" (Serheii Plokhyy), Chapter 27, The Price of Freedom.

⁹⁴ In "Agreement on the accession of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation". Available at: Agreement on the accession of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation signed President of Russia (kremlin.ru)

⁹⁵ In "Russian Orthodox Church signs from Putin hymn sheet on Ukraine". Available at: Russian Orthodox Church sings from Putin hymn sheet on Ukraine | Reuters.

and that “[the Russian intervention is] the peacemaking mission that should guarantee Crimean⁹⁶ citizens the right to self-determination”⁹⁷.

The context has changed since January 6th, 2019, when Metropolitan of Kyiv, Epiphanius I, received *tomos* from the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. This document granted autocephalous status⁹⁸ on Orthodox Church of Ukraine. For Ukrainians, autocephaly was a sign of their country moving towards greater independence from Russia, now in matters clerical as well as politically.⁹⁹

This ended 332 years of Russian religious tutelage over the Ukrainian faithful. It was a decision the Patriarchate of Moscow saw as an unbearable affront since Ukraine is considered the historical cradle of Russian Orthodoxy. With the schism, Russian Orthodox Church is set to gradually lose territory, believers, and a huge amount of symbolic power.

The Pew Research Center survey entitled “Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe” reveals a strong association between religion and national identity – the idea that being Orthodox is important to one’s national identity is supported by 70% of people in Orthodox-majority countries. This overlapping of church and nation means that the church retains soft power.¹⁰⁰ But it also explains the importance of establishing the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, as a function of “becoming” a nation-state.

The Moscow Patriarchate portrayed the Ecumenical Patriarchate as a “Western” institution due to its vast international network

⁹⁶ In “Crimea’s Separation from Ukraine: An Analysis of the Right to Self-Determination and (Remedial) Secession in International Law”. Available at: [Crimea’s Separation from Ukraine: An Analysis of the Right to Self-Determination and \(Remedial\) Secession in International Law | SpringerLink](#).

⁹⁷ In “Is the Russian Orthodox Church serving God or Putin?” Available at: [Is the Russian Orthodox Church serving God or Putin? | DW Learn German](#).

⁹⁸ Autocephaly means “property of being self-headed” is the status of a hierarchical Christian church whose head bishop does not report to any higher-ranking bishop. The term is primarily used in Eastern Orthodox and Oriental Orthodox churches.

⁹⁹ In “Ukrainian Orthodox Church, worldwide, is another front in Putin’s war”. Available at: [Ukrainian Orthodox Church, worldwide, is another front in Putin’s war – CSMonitor.com](#)

¹⁰⁰ The ability to co-opt rather than coerce (contrast hard power).

and ecumenical position regarding other Christian denominations. According to the expert Ksenia Luchenko¹⁰¹ “They associate Bartholomew I of Constantinople¹⁰² with the US – via the Greek diaspora in the US” (Luchenko, 2019).¹⁰³ Russian politicians also believe that the West instigated the Maidan protests in Kyiv¹⁰⁴ and other post-Soviet “color” revolutions have likely only reinforced this position¹⁰⁵.

Putin has openly accused the United States and Constantinople of working together to support the Ukrainian government to move towards Church independence. Paradoxically, with the election of Volodymyr Zelensky, a declared Jew, the Autocephalous Church of Ukraine may receive less open support from national politicians, which can be an opportunity for the Church to dissociate itself more successfully from various domestic political players.

4. Conclusion:

Russian exceptionalism is rooted in the isolation of an Orthodox country and its belief that Russia possesses the gift of a true (orthodox) religious faith. It has been strengthened by Russia’s successful defense of its state sovereignty. During his years in office, Vladimir Putin has transformed Russia back into a great power with global ambitions. One of his key tools in that transformation was the Russian Orthodox Church.

Many have written about the Orthodox Church in post-Soviet politics, generally emphasizing the resurgence not only of religiosity but of institutional power.

¹⁰¹ Ksenia Luchenko is a journalist specializing in church affairs. For more information: Ksenia Luchenko – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

¹⁰² is the 270th and current archbishop of Constantinople and Ecumenical Patriarch since 2 November 1991.

¹⁰³ 100 years on, Orthodox Church split over executed tsar’s remains.

¹⁰⁴ In the article: “Russia accuses West of plotting ‘provocations’ in Ukraine”. Available at: Russia accuses West of plotting ‘provocations’ in Ukraine | *The Independent*.

¹⁰⁵ In the article: “Russia and the “Color Revolution”. Available at: Russia and the “Color Revolution” | Center for Strategic and International Studies (csis.org)

Putin's use of traditional Christianity is calculated for political effect, taking into consideration religious trends in the region. Orthodox Christianity has notably enjoyed a revival in Eastern Europe in the last two decades. In Russia's regional neighboring states more than 70% of people identify as Orthodox.¹⁰⁶

In predominantly Orthodox societies, the Church is traditionally regarded as the bearer of national consciousness more so than the State. So far, the Russian Church under Kirill's Patriarchate has been the most influential promoter of traditional values.

The promotion of traditional values emerged in the aftermath of communism's collapse when the Russian state sought to fill an ideological void while the long-persecuted Russian Orthodox Church asserted itself in a newly open public square.

The Russian Orthodox Church considers religious faith the foundation of traditional values and defends that the European Union is imposing secular values on Russia. The Russian Orthodox Church has taken an active role in forging the ideology that braced up Putin's geopolitical ambitions.

However, the traditional thesis that portrays the Church as the compliant servant of the State is no more applicable to post-Soviet Russia than it was to imperial Russia. Rhetorically, the Patriarch and the President share common ideas and values,¹⁰⁷ most notably regarding patriotism, but each side serves the interests of their respective institutions.

Although operating on a cooperative basis, the Church is not a mere tool of state policy. Like all institutions, the Orthodox Church has its own interests, agenda, and sensitivities that it wants to protect. These do not always coincide with those of the State.

The ecclesiastical conflict caused by the split of the Ukrainian and Russian Orthodox Churches is part of a wider history of political

¹⁰⁶ according to Pew Research results (2017).

¹⁰⁷ Traditional values defined by the Russian Orthodox Church and by Putin's Government are a blend of freedom, unity, patriotism, family, and a sense of devotion.

tensions between Russia's geopolitical ambitions in the region and Ukraine's resistance to them.

In conclusion, the Russian Orthodox Church is not a mere political tool used by Putin's government. A long history of cooperation, overlapping sets of values, and shared resentment at the political and ecclesiastical loss of Ukraine, meaning that Putin and Kirill have the opportunity to strengthen the bilateral cooperation even more.

5. Bibliography/Web Sources:

BACZYNSKA, Gabriela, (2014), "Russian Orthodox Church sings from Putin hymn sheet on Ukraine". Available at: Russian Orthodox Church sings from Putin hymn sheet on Ukraine | [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com) (reuters.com)

BAKSHI, Jyotsna, (2008), "Russia's national security concepts and military doctrines: Continuity and change". Available at: Russia's National Security Concepts and Military Doctrines: Continuity and Change (columbia.edu)

BARNETT, Michael et al., (2015) "Faith, Freedom and Foreign Policy", Transatlantic Academy.

BAUNOV, Alexander (2019) "Russians Are Getting Sick of Church", Carnegie Endowment For International Peace. Available at: Russians Are Getting Sick of Church – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (carnegiemoscow.org)

BAZENKOVA, Anastasia, (2015), "Orthodox Church Calls for Alternative Financial System in Russia". Available at: Orthodox Church Calls for Alternative Financial System in Russia – *The Moscow Times*.

BEVILACQUA, Arnaud, (2022), "Kirill, the extremely political Russian Orthodox patriarch". Available at: Kirill, the extremely political Russian Orthodox patriarch (la-croix.com)

DALLAS, Kelsey, (2016), "The fate of religious freedom in the former USSR, 25 years after its collapse". Available at: The fate of religious freedom in the former USSR, 25 years after its collapse – *Washington Times*.

DAVID-FOX Michael, (2011), "Religion, Science, and Political Religion in the Soviet Context". Available at: Modern Intellectual History | Cambridge Core

DOSTOYEVSKY, Fyodor, (2005), *The Brothers Karamazov*, Dover Publications Inc.

ELSNER, Regina, (2021), "The Russian Orthodox Church and Modernity – A Historical and Theological Investigation into Eastern Christianity between Unity and Plurality", vol. 236, Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society.

FILATOV, Sergey, (2006), "Statistics on Religion in Russia: The Reality Behind the Figures", Research Gate. Available at: (PDF) Statistics on Religion in Russia: The Reality Behind the Figures (researchgate.net)

FRASER, Giles, (2018), "Why the Soviet attempt to stamp out religion failed". Available at: Why the Soviet attempt to stamp out religion failed | Communism | *The Guardian*.

FREEZE L., Gregory, (2017), "Russian Orthodoxy and Politics in the Putin Era". Available at: Russian Orthodoxy and Politics in the Putin Era – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

GVOSDEV K., Nikolas, (2018), "Here's what's really going on with the Orthodox Church in Ukraine and Russia", *The National Interest*. Available at: Here's What's Really Going on with the Orthodox Church in Ukraine and Russia | *The National Interest*.

HOLLIS, Andrew, (2019), "Weapons in the Hand of God: The Russian Orthodox Church and Russia's Nuclear Weapons Establishment". Available at: Weapons in the Hand of God: The Russian Orthodox Church and Russia's Nuclear Weapons Establishment – Nuclear Network (csis.org)

HOOPER, Melissa, (2016), "Russia's "traditional values leadership". Available at: Russia's 'traditional values' leadership – The Foreign Policy Centre (fpc.org.uk)

HOROWITZ, Jason, (2022) "The Russian Orthodox Leader at the Core of Putin's Ambitions". Available at: The Russian Orthodox Leader at the Core of Putin's Ambitions – *The New York Times* (nytimes.com)

Hybrid Warfare Analytical Group, (2021), "'Russkiy Mir' as the Kremlin's Quasi-ideology". Available at: "Russkiy Mir" as the Kremlin's Quasi-ideology | UACRISIS.ORG

JILGE, Wilfried, (2016), "Russkiy Mir: "Russian World". Available at: Russkiy Mir: "Russian World" | DGAP.

KNOX, Zoe, (2014), *Russian Society and the Orthodox Church: Religion in Russia after communism*, Routledge Curzon, London and New York, ISBN 9780415546164

KOLLNER, Tobias, (2013), "Businessmen, Priests and Parishes: Religious Individualization and Privatization in Russia", *Archives de sciences sociales des religions*, 162, no. 2.

KRUGLOV, Alexander, (2019), "Putin's plan to slowly reclaim Russia's lost empire". Available at: Putin's plan to slowly reclaim Russia's lost empire – *Asia Times*.

LIUK, Kadri, (2019), "Defender of the Faith? How Ukraine's Orthodox split threatens Russia?", European Council on Foreign Relations. Available at:

Defender of the faith? How Ukraine's Orthodox split threatens Russia – European Council on Foreign Relations (ecfr.eu)

MASCI, David, (2019), "Split Between Ukrainian, Russian churches shows political importance of Orthodox Christianity". Available at: Ukrainian, Russian church split reflects political importance of Orthodox Christianity | Pew Research Center.

Metropolitan of Smolensk (2000), Translation from Russian: The norm of faith as the norm of life ["Норма веры как норма жизни"], *Nezavisimaya gazeta*. Available at: Норма веры как норма жизни / Идеи и люди / Независимая газета (ng.ru)

MILLER LLANA, Sara et. al., (2022), "Centuries-old religious divide sharpens between Ukraine and Russia". Available at: Ukrainian Orthodox Church, worldwide, is another front in Putin's war – CSMonitor.com

MRACHEK, Alexis, (2019), "How Putin Uses Russian Orthodoxy to Grow His Empire". Available at: How Putin Uses Russian Orthodoxy to Grow His Empire | The Heritage Foundation.

ПАРКОВА, Irina, (2012), *The Orthodox Church and Russian Politics*, New York: Oxford University Press, Politics and Religion, Volume 5, Issue 3, December 2012.

PEW Research Center, (2014), "Russians Return to Religion, But Not to Church". Available at: Russians Return to Religion, But Not to Church | Pew Research Center.

PEW Research Center, (2017), "Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe". Available at: Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe | Pew Research Center.

PEW Research Center, (2019), "Split between Ukrainian, Russian churches show political importance of Orthodox Christianity". Available at: Ukrainian, Russian church split reflects political importance of Orthodox Christianity | Pew Research Center.

PIASECZYJ, Peter J., (2006), "The Origins of the Slavic Nations: Premodern Identities in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus". Available at: (38) The Origins of the Slavic Nations: Premodern Identities in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus | Peter J Piasecky – Academia.edu

ПЛОКНУ, Serhii, (2015), *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine*, Basic Books, ISBN13: 9780465050918

Report: “Russians Return to Religion, But not to Church”, (2014), Pew Research Center. Available at: [Russians Return to Religion, But Not to Church | Pew Research Center](#).

RICHTERS, Katja, (2013), *The Post-Soviete Russian Orthodox Church: Politics, Culture and Greater Russia*, Routledge, London and New York.

РОССА, Francis X., (2022), “‘Russian World’ Is the Civil Religion Behind Putin’s War”. Available at: [‘Russian World’ Is the Civil Religion Behind Putin’s War – WSJ](#).

Rossiiskaya Gazeta, (2000), “National Security Concept of the Russian Federation”, Full English translation from *Rossiiskaya Gazeta*, January 18, Available at: [Global Beat: National Security Concept of the Russian Federation \(fas.org\)](#) (National Security Concept of the Russian Federation in Russian: Указ Президента РФ от 10.01.2000 N 24 “О Концепции национальной безопасности Российской Федерации” (legalacts.ru))

РЫЗНКОВ, Vladimir (2015), “Russian Orthodox Church Facing Ukraine Split”, *The Moscow Times*. Available at: [Russian Orthodox Church Facing Ukraine Split – The Moscow Times](#).

SCHMITT, Caroline (2017), “Is the Russian Orthodox Church serving God or Putin?” Available at: [Is the Russian Orthodox Church serving God or Putin? | Europe | News and current affairs from around the continent | DW | 26.04.2017](#)

SEDDON Max (2019), “Putin and the Patriarchs: how geopolitics tore apart the Orthodox church”. Available at: [Putin and the Patriarchs: how geopolitics tore apart the Orthodox church | Financial Times \(ft.com\)](#)

SEDDON, Max, (2022), “War costs Russia its influence with Ukraine’s Orthodox believers”. Available at: [War costs Russia its influence with Ukraine’s Orthodox believers | News World Tick](#).

СОРОКА, George, (2013), “The Orthodox Church and Russian Politics”, Asia Studies, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. Available at: [The Orthodox Church and Russian Politics | Wilson Center](#).

СТАХЛЕ, Hanna, (2016), “Between the Homophobia and Gay Lobby: The Russian Orthodox Church and its Relationship to Homosexuality in Online Discussions”. Available at: [\[PDF\] Between Homophobia and Gay Lobby: the Russian Orthodox Church and its Relationship to Online Discussions | Semantic Scholar](#).

STICKLAND, John, (2013), *The Making of Russia: The Orthodox Church and Russian Nationalism before the Revolution*, Holy Trinity Publications, The Printshop of St Job of Pochaev, New York.

СТОЕЦКАЯ, Kristina, (2014), *The Russian Orthodox Church and Human Rights*, Routledge, London, 2014.

SUSLOV, Mikhail, (2015), "The Medium for Demonic Energies: 'Digital Anxiety in the Russian Orthodox Church". Available at: [PDF] The Medium for Demonic Energies: 'Digital Anxiety' in the Russian Orthodox Church | Semantic Scholar.

The Guardian, (2019), "Down with God! How the Soviet Union took on religion – in pictures". Available at: Down with God! How the Soviet Union took on religion – in pictures (e-nigeriang.com)

TRENIN, Dmitry, (2019), "Russia's Changing Identity: In Search of a Role in the 21st Century", Carnegie Endowment For International Peace. Available at: Russia's Changing Identity: In Search of a Role in the 21st Century – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (carnegiemoscow.org)

VAN HERPER, Marcel, (2019), "The Political Role of the Russian Orthodox Church", The National Interest. Available at: The Political Role of the Russian Orthodox Church | *The National Interest*.

WILLIAMS, Rowan, (2022), "Putin believes he is defending Orthodox Christianity from the godless West" Available at: Putin believes he is defending Orthodox Christianity from the godless West – *New Statesman*.

WILSON, Andrew, (2021), "Russia and Ukraine: 'One People' as Putin Claims?" Available at: Russia and Ukraine: 'One People' as Putin Claims? | Royal United Services Institute (rusi.org)

VI – Charles de Gaulle Memorial Luncheon: “In Defence of an Ethics of Deference in Unhappy Times”

In Defence of an Ethics of Deference in Unhappy Times

Catherine Marshall

I should explain straight away that I have just published a book on the concept of political deference entitled *Political Deference in a Democratic Age: British Politics and the Constitution from the Eighteenth Century to Brexit*¹. As the book is now completed, I have been wondering whether the use of political deference could be extended to other liberal democracies in the world.

So, what does deference mean? The most common definition is related to the French word “déférer,” in use since the 14th century, meaning to ‘yield or to comply’ with the opinion of another person and to show that person due regard as a form of submission. Yet, a much more refined definition was given by the Victorian thinker Walter Bagehot (1826-1877). His definition moved away from an elementary meaning to stress that deference to someone does not necessarily mean that this person is a superior to be yielded to or to be complied with. Deference could be an act of self-restraint for the common good which did not entail domination. Perhaps, more importantly for Bagehot, such a conception of deference to power took place within a hierarchical social structure which encouraged a certain moral code of conduct based on old ways of doing.

¹ Catherine Marshall. *Political Deference in a Democratic Age: British Politics and the Constitution from the Eighteenth Century to Brexit*, Cham, Palgrave, 2021.

In Victorian Britain, Deference facilitated the performance of ‘obligations’ and created ‘expectations’ between those in power and those who were governed. Consequently, to reduce deference to an act of submission was not recognizing its political value. Deference was an action which followed a ritualised rule of social conduct without which the structure of governance would not have been able to function smoothly. It referred to the political habits (the mores) of a given society and, in the case of Bagehot’s analysis, to the organic link which united the English and their uncodified constitution. To summarize, Bagehot pointed out that such a constitutional structure could only work if it relied on the political deference of its people, which was a glue to the system. Whether this is the case in the UK today is another story.

I would like to briefly make sense of Bagehot’s definition, secondly to analyse if it is incompatible with the working of our present democratic regimes, lastly, if political deference is not a useful disposition which has been mistakenly pushed aside in modern democratic societies. In conclusion, I hope to convince you that an ethics of deference could answer some of the ills that we are encountering in our unhappy times.

1. Bagehot’s definition?

In Bagehot’s 1867 seminal work *The English Constitution*, he explains how the English constitution and deference are linked – and why.² What could appear as an irrational love of the monarchy or a fondness for English political peculiarities was related to the deferential character of the nation for their ancient customs and traditions, i.e., their constitution. Here it is both the political and physical nature of the English nation that he was referring to.

² “Our constitution is not based on equality, or on an avowed and graduated adjustment to intelligence and property; but upon certain ancient feelings of deference and a strange approximative mode of representing sense and mind, neither of which must be roughly handled, for if spoiled they can never be remade, and they are the only supports possible of a polity such as ours, in a people such as ours.” Walter Bagehot, *The English Constitution*, from: Norman St John-Stevan (ed.), *The Collected Works of Walter Bagehot*, London, The Economist, vol. 5, pp. 408-9.

The problem for us today was that Bagehot was a man of his time. He was suspicious of the extension of the suffrage which was taking place in 1867 at the time of the second Reform Act. He appears to never have made up his mind whether to trust the new English voters (mostly working-class men), or whether the system was too fragile and needed to be protected from those he considered as a “mass.” His fear of what a real democracy could do to the constitution was shared, at the time, by such thinkers as John Stuart Mill or Tocqueville in France.

Bagehot was apprehensive because a desire for a full democracy would damage deference and without it, the British parliamentary system based on an uncodified constitution would not work properly. The greatest good of the English – Liberty – would no longer be guaranteed.³

Obviously, Bagehot was wrong: the advent of democracy – which was fully established in Britain after WWI – did not kill the parliamentary system, but he was underlining how certain deferential features of this regime are essential to its survival. He was also pointing out that a certain type of mediocrity could emerge from such a system if deference was lost. Moving on from Bagehot’s elitist understanding of political life, we are left to question whether deference is incompatible with the values of modern democratic regimes.

2. “Deference, a duty without rights”⁴?

Nearly 20 years ago was published in France a collective work on “Deference”.⁵ Sadly, but predictably, Bagehot’s definition of political

³ “In communities where the masses are ignorant but respectful, if you once permit the ignorant class to begin to rule you may bid farewell to deference for ever. [...] A democracy will never, save after an awful catastrophe, return what has once been conceded to it, for to do so would be to admit an inferiority in itself, of which, except by some almost unbearable misfortune, it could never be convinced.” Walter Bagehot, *The English Constitution*, from: Norman St John-Stevás (ed.), *The Collected Works of Walter Bagehot*, *op. cit.*, vol. 5, pp. 381-2.

⁴ Geneviève Koubi, « La déférence, un devoir sans droit ? », *Communications*, 69, 2000, pp. 201-214.

⁵ Claudine Laroche (ed.), « La déférence », *Communications*, 69, 2000.

deference was not mentioned but the American sociologist Edward Shils's definition was at the heart of the thirteen articles published on the subject.⁶ Shils's 1968 definition of deference – in its social understanding – has acquired quasi mythical status because, in an article of less than 30 pages, the sociologist was able to pin-point the essential elements of the concept. Deference for Shils was neither demeaning nor degrading: it meant “acknowledging” one “person's worth or dignity.”⁷

Shils did not deny that in western democratic societies there was a “attenuation” of deference, due to the equalising nature of the system. He added, however, another dimension which was to explain that no society could function without deference in the sense that men have a need to defer to something bigger than themselves, to have something to look up to. Even an anarchist will defer to the readings of the theorists he respects. It was a necessity in society.⁸ What Shils made clear was also that believing in true equality between people was impossible.

I find Shils' definition congenial and much more empowering because it recognised inequality but made it acceptable within a democratic frame. However much one would like to think that the advent of democracies should have abolished all types of ceremonialism, etiquette, titles, and deeds, which cemented a ritualised class structure, Shils shows that “the rituals of deference”⁹ are not related to a political regime but to individuals and their needs for respect and, perhaps more importantly self-respect.

Thus, rejecting deference on the grounds that it would be against the equalizing process of democratic societies is a mistake. It is a mistake on two grounds: firstly, because as Shils demonstrates, if there is a need in people to be motivated by “appreciation or derogation” then it has to be expressed in some way, including in egalitarian societies; secondly, because deference is a human disposition which acts like a

⁶ Edward Shils, “Deference” (1968), in *The Constitution of Society*, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1982, p. 142-175.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 175.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 159.

mirror effect – it shows one’s worth or the opposite and allows the person to act or react accordingly to gain better self-respect. In this story, deference to one’s past but also to one’s country’s past becomes very important.

In the 1970s and 1980s, such a meaning did not sit easily with political scientists who felt that if deference could not be measured, it had no analytical worth. That’s why in the last 50 years the term was dropped, and its meaning lost.

In Republican regimes, such as France, the term is seldom used or when it is, deference is immediately suspicious, verging on the paternalistic, believed to reinforce an invisible type of submission or feeling of domination which prevents “civic, public and social links”¹⁰. Basically, it is an impediment to the tenets of the French Republic based on equality. There would be a “duty” to defer to power without a right or rights to contest this very power. Such a narrow understanding misses the point made by Shils that deference, even in a very attenuated form, is a human necessity. In fact, misunderstanding equality for pure equality – leads to behaviours which are more often than not antagonistic, divisive and hostile to the social peacefulness of a given society.

3. Political deference as a useful disposition in democratic societies

The problem about the use of Deference in our times is perhaps the definition of what Democracy means and represents. Without stereotyping, one could say that from a French point of view since 1789, equality has theoretically come first in the sense that the majority is supposed to rule through direct democracy. From an Anglo-British point of view, the ideals of liberty have predominated, and leaders are expected to be accountable to those who have raised them to such positions. In the first case, direct democracy is expected, in the second, representative democracy prevails. This is essentially a difference of vision of what western democracies are supposed to

¹⁰ Geneviève Koubi, « La déférence, un devoir sans droit ? », *Communications*, 69, 2000, p. 213.

do and lead to. To use the expression of Thomas Sowell in his 1987 book, this is first and foremost, *A Conflict of Visions*.¹¹

Sowell describes how ethical and political questions are due to fundamental differences in people's views. He identifies two distinct outlooks: the "constrained" and "unconstrained" visions according to which people reason. Those who hold a "constrained" vision of men, understand human nature as something difficult to change and rather self-interested, meaning that their outlook of life and politics will be to focus on "trade-offs." For example, one will accept to give away a part of one's sovereignty to the State for it, in return, to guarantee that one can enjoy his "Life, Liberties and Properties"¹². On the opposite, those who hold an "unconstrained" view of life and politics will focus on a human nature which is "perfectible"¹³ and focus on finding "the highest ideals and the best solutions"¹⁴, as in Rousseau's idealised desire for a general will in politics. The "constrained" vision focuses essentially on evolution and pragmatic solutions to "limited and unhappy choices available"; the "unconstrained" vision focuses on grand designs based on "the conviction that foolish or immoral choices explain the evils of the world – and that wiser or more humane social policies are the solution."¹⁵

The disparity between both outlooks – one realist, one much more idealised – leads to two completely conflicting understandings of what our modern democracies ought to be and aim for. Hence the reason why those who believe in an idealised unconstrained view of the world will reject the idea of the existence of deference in modern democratic regimes. Their vision conflates deference with a leftover of an aristocratic past which is unacceptable.¹⁶ Conversely,

¹¹ Thomas Sowell, *A Conflict of Visions. Ideological Origins of Political Struggles*, New York, W. Morrow, 1987, 273 pages.

¹² Locke, John, *Two Treatises of Government*, Peter Laslett (ed.), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1960, xiv-521 pages.

¹³ Thomas Sowell, *A Conflict of Visions. Ideological Origins of Political Struggles*, *op.cit.*, p. 83.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 96-7.

¹⁶ See for example: Geneviève Koubi, « La déférence, un devoir sans droit ? », *Communications*, 69, 2000, pp. 201-214.

those who defend the much more pragmatic, constrained vision of society consider that the trade-offs they agree to make, in return for something else – let's say some of their freedoms in favour of security under the rule of law – can only take place because there is a trust in deference for the past and old ways of doing things.¹⁷

Both sides come to this conversation with their own ideals which make a common understanding of what is expected of western democracies very unlikely. Yet, this is surely where deference is needed – not only to allow the constrained vision of trade-offs to flourish, but also, perhaps, especially, regarding the “unconstrained” vision based on “the conviction that foolish or immoral choices explain the evils of the world.”

It is precisely because we all come to the political conversation with different sets of values that we should be able to accept Shils's definition of deference as a need that we all have within ourselves to recognize and be recognized whatever the values.

What do I really mean in practical terms? Transposed into the political arena, deference to one another becomes the language of civility, of conciliation and arbitration. It recognizes the value of communication and of vigorous debate to solve conflicts and does not trade in ready-made solutions, but in recognizing an opponent's worth and his own individual set of problems. “Deference,” understood in such a way then creates, for Pierre Ansart, a French sociologist, “[...] a specific meeting point in which a knowing space between partners allows a regulated and freely granted freedom. It is no longer this general obligation imposed by hierarchical societies. On the contrary, it is a rare and voluntarily discreet link which happens to be charmingly free.”¹⁸

What Ansart expresses here is the opposite of subdued respect and submission, the way in which deference is mostly understood today. And whatever his elitist mistakes, Bagehot had identified such a trend

¹⁷ See for example the French sociologist Eugène Enriquez, « L'effacement de la déférence dans les sociétés démocratiques », *Communications*, 69, 2000, p. 199.

¹⁸ My translation. Pierre Ansart, « La déférence ou le refus du pouvoir », *Communications*, 69, 2000, pp. 266-7.

in the English Victorian classical parliamentary system which made the nation respect and defer to their institutions – for different reasons and different values. By rejecting deference as a shameful relic of the past, especially after WWII, the country lost an asset which had held people together in their “conflict of visions,” their incompatible views of life in society. The present problems with Boris Johnson (which have led to his demise) and his refusal to deferentially agree to the historical conventions of the Anglo-British constitution can be seen as a consequence of such a loss of political deference.¹⁹ The problem is that as the historian, Peter Hennessy reminds us “in the absence of a codified constitution, Britain’s political system depends on the acceptance that “good chaps of both sexes don’t do certain things.”²⁰ I would add: because of their deference to the nature of the system. And Johnson certainly does not follow that idea. He operates within the constrained vision of trade-offs but because he rejects deference to Hennessy’s “good chap theory of government,” he ends up standing up for himself only, and his naked desire to remain in power. He only defers to himself.

Today, most western democracies have rejected deference – they do not even refer to the term – but perhaps the time has come to make clear what the concept means and retrieve its original meaning. An ethics of deference would be much more conducive to behaviours which would ease relations and re-evaluate the language of civility, not for social reasons only, but mainly for politically democratic reasons. The “unconstrained” vision leads to a number of views which are defended today such as the cancel culture or idealist narrow-minded visions imposing a reality on others.

In the end and in the words of another sociologist, Eugène Enriquez: deference “is essential as it refers to the mutual consideration, fellowship, etiquette and civility without which men become the opponents of all other men. They can no longer tolerate others except

¹⁹ One only needs to mention the proroguing of Parliament in August-Sept 2019, undermining the independence of the judiciary and the neutrality of the civil service, and trying to ignore the Northern Irish protocol.

²⁰ <https://www.ft.com/content/37a5b18a-77d0-4f17-ae0a-99802396ff36>. “He has overridden the advice of his ethics adviser and the House of Lords appointments commission; he has refused to resign despite allegations of misleading parliament.”

under a tutelary authority that dictates their behaviours and denies them their own sovereign power.”²¹

I am not making here a naïve appeal for a return to the past, long and sterile debates or unacceptable compromises but it seems to me that without political deference, democracy, as unsatisfactory as it may be, dies and the moderate contentment, freedom, and equality that it brings with it, dies too.

Eventually, political deference means accepting that democratic life is messy, faulty and full of grievances but, so far, nobody has thought about a better regime and that it might be better to learn how to operate within it than to break the mould completely when the times becomes bumpy change. Perhaps the unsatisfactory quest for the middle ground in liberal democracies is more important than reaching a utopian contentment. The “constrained vision” believing in trade-offs can only breathe and work with political deference but it is the same with the unconstrained vision too.

The final appeal in favour of an ethics of political deference is that, beyond all the problems, it offers the safe conditions for a successful democratic society in which free individuals can thrive and reach a form of self-respect each according to their level of enlightenment.²² And we may well ignore this at the peril of our own happiness in our unhappy times.

²¹ Eugène Enriquez, « L’effacement de la déférence dans les sociétés démocratiques », *Communications*, 69, 2000, p. 199.

²² See: Philip Soper, *The Ethics of Deference. Learning from Law’s Morals*, Cambridge, CUP, 2002, pp. 168-183.

VII – Democracy and Governance in a Context of Global Recession of Democracy

Reflections on Democracy and Governance Studies at Georgetown University

Daniel Brumberg

Democracy and Governance Studies at GU: A Unique MA Program

Georgetown University's MA Program in Democracy and Governance was created in 2005. While there are other MA programs that include topics such as democracy, elections, human rights and governance, ours appears to be the only one in the US that focuses on democratization and governance. That said, the democracy and governance theme provides a broad canopy under which a large array of topics are included. The program's location in Washington DC provides an additional advantage that has been fundamental to our success

To set the stage for these reflections I would emphasize four other key issues regarding the program's intellectual and institutional provenance:

First, it grew out of the GU Government Department's PhD program in democracy studies headed up Professor Steven Heydemann. When that program ended Heydemann and I drew ideas and inspiration from the PhD program to create the DG MA. The MA focus on the link between theory and concrete practice reflects this legacy. Our guiding assumption that effective policy makers and activists working in the fields of democracy assistance, human rights, elections and the like require the ability to think and analyze conceptually and deductively. The goal of theory is to sharpen analysis rather than serve as an end in and of itself.

Second, this focus on theory and practice provided the basis for training a new generation of analysts and activists in a field that was expanding but which was marked by a lack of professionalization. Democracy assistance such as the National Endowment for Democracy, the International Republican Institute, the National Endowment for Democracy, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the State Department's related bureaus and programs were filled of talented men and women. But there was no center of intellectual and theoretical gravity – no core field of training – for the field. Our MA program addressed this need. We are proud to say that our graduates can be found in a wide range of DC based democracy assistance organizations in government, think tanks, private sector firms, and of course, in civil society NGOs in the Middle East, Africa, Southeast Asia, South America and other regions.

Third, the two founders of this MA program were scholars of comparative politics. Our conceptual and empirical focus has been the endurance of authoritarianism. This was perhaps an unusual orientation for the directors of a democracy program. And yet it turned out to be a vital element in the success of the MA for one simple reason: efforts to foster democracy must begin and clear understanding of autocracy and the factors that sustain and also make it vulnerable to internal and external pressures for change. Animated by the research we had undertaken in the Middle East and our knowledge of foreign languages (Arabic and French), or focus on autocracies gave the program a realism that was inspired by our normative commitments, but was *not rooted* in an evangelical vision of democracy studies. This made for a better program both in terms of the education we provide, but also in terms of the wide appeal of the program itself.

Fourth, the program was born in a particular historical moment defined by what appeared to be a rising tide of democracies in many regions, the geo-strategic decline of Russia, and the push in China for market reforms – a process that seemed to hold out the possibility of eventual political liberalization. The changes were all occurring in the context of what many assumed would be uni-polar system led by one superpower that was a democracy. While we have worked hard to avoiding “preaching,” we and our students drew inspiration from

an emerging world order in which democracy, pluralism and human rights all seemed on the ascendancy.

Keeping Up with A Shifting Global Landscape

Our program reflected and addressed this optimistic context by offering courses in comparative democratization, political development, social movements and democratic transitions. These courses highlighted dynamics and challenges that cut across time and space, in contrast to GU's long and well-respected tradition of regional studies. While not ignoring the many obstacles to it (not least of which is the path dependent nature of autocracy), our MA program focused on democratic change, rather than on the complex science (and art) or governance in emerging, new or established democracies.

I emphasize the above points because as we well know, the global system has changed dramatically since the inception of our program. We have worked hard to make changes in our curriculum that reflect these developments. The fact that we are a small two-year program, with an incoming class of 12-15 students each year, has helped. Still, with a small staff – which in Fall 2022 will see the positions of director and assistance director fused under the leadership of our current associate director Professor Elton Skendaj – it has often been a challenge to muster the time and resources to align our program with a changing global system and the increasingly important problem of governance in new and established democracies. Nevertheless, I believe we have done a good job retooling and reinventing our program. On this score I would emphasize the following four directions in our program:

First: Incorporating Governance Dynamics. Some five years into the MA – and working with our co-Director Sam Mujal-Leon, who many of you know – we endeavored to give more attention to governance. This was reflected not only in the new name of the MA, but in our efforts to include courses offered by the Government Department and other university arenas on issues such as the politics of economic reform, comparative constitutionalism, human rights law, security sector reform, and perhaps most importantly, comparative politics of corruption. That said, given the vast nature of the topic itself,

incorporating governance studies into our MA has always been and remains a challenge.

One new course I created four years ago that covers many governance related issues is “The Politics of Democratic Consolidation (and Deconsolidation).” The course highlights how the different democratic transition shape or undercut consolidation in a myriad of institutional, legal, social and economic arenas. Part and parcel of this course was a 10-day field study in Tunisia. In 2019 we partnered with the “Tunis Exchange” to bring 12 of our MA students to Tunis. They were joined by other students, policy analysts, government officials and journalists from many countries. The full group’s meetings with Tunisian leaders from diverse fields and ideological backgrounds provided a “hands on” way to explore the link between the theoretical topics that are featured in the course and the grass roots struggles in one country to consolidate democracy. Needless to say, the constitutional coup engineered by President Kais Saied, not to mention the Covid crisis, have tossed huge obstacles in our path and will probably prevent us from resuming the field study program in Tunis. Still, the course itself will continue, but in a revised format that will highlight the link between challenges to consolidation and democratic backsliding.

Second: Adding More Practice and Skills-Oriented Courses The Tunis course was one example of a growing trend in our MA – and many others MA programs at GU and other universities – to offer classes that highlight the practice element in our theory-practice formula. These include one and two credit courses on subjects such as program monitoring and evaluation, proposal and policy writing, election monitoring and anti-polarization strategies (on this see below). Students can take similar courses in the Conflict Resolution MA program, and in other GU departments.

Third: Addressing the Interplay of Between Conflict and Democracy The interplay of democracy and conflict has always been a key theme in our program. Indeed, I think it is fair to say that Elton and I teach democracy from a conflict perspective, as we see democratic institutions as vital to moving conflicts from the battlefield to the political realm. Elton teaches a course specifically on democracy and

conflict, while my course on “Theories of Political Development” and especially our “Gateway” course emphasizes the democracy/conflict nexus. In this spirit, we are seeking to expand cooperation between our MA program and GU’s Conflict Resolution Program.

Fourth: A Gateway Course on Democratization and Governance In Fall 2020 we added a new “Gateway Course” that is now required for all our incoming MA students. The course provides a comprehensive and challenging theoretical and practical overview of a myriad of topics that are essential to studying democracy and governance and to working in this vast field.

Fifth: Addressing the Interplay of Domestic and International Politics Our MA has long placed an emphasis on comparative political change. This made sense not only because all of our directors and associate directors of the MA have been scholars of comparative politics, but also because the social science literature demonstrates that the domestic realm of any country or political system sets the boundaries of foreign influence in both autocracies and democracies. That said, because the nexus between domestic and international politics is a vital issue, and because it has become even more important in the context of a multi-polar world that has witnessed the rising influence of China and Russia and the growth of populist nationalist movements in new and established democracies, we have tried to include courses that illuminate the impact of global politics on democratization and autocratization.

My course on “Globalization and Autocracy” highlights conceptual topics such as authoritarian cooperation, autocracy promotion, political learning and dynamics of ideological and institutional diffusion. These topics are explored in sections and readings on Eastern Europe, the Middle East, South America, and sub-Saharan Africa. Elton’s work on Eastern European politics, especially in the Balkans, and his own deep background in international relations, is adding much to this expanding focus on the interplay of national, local and global politics.

Part and parcel of our work on these global topics has been cooperation with a myriad of governmental and non-governmental institutions in DC. Moreover, and as many of you know, under the leadership

of our former co-director, Sam Mujal-Leon, we co-hosted several international conferences co-organized that were funded by FLAD. These meetings included the 2016 conference on “Forty Years of the Democratic Constitution,” and the 2018 conference on “Enduring Alliances.” FLAD’s ongoing sponsorship of a Visiting Professor from Portugal is an essential part of this fruitful relationship. On this score, we were delighted to host Professor Livia Franco at Georgetown in Spring 2021 and to have Professor Carlos Jallali this past Spring.

Populist Nationalist Movements, Democratic Backsliding and International Politics

As we well know, over the last five or so years the emergence of populist nationalist movements, parties and leaders has played a fundamental if malign role in eroding democracies and in fostering illiberalization – a dynamic which is ongoing and increasingly dangerous in the US. We have striven to include these issues in our program.

One result of this focus on right wing extremism is that we are giving far more attention to the challenges and dangers of political polarization both abroad and at home. I teach a wide-angle comparative course this largely conceptual in nature, and this past year, Elton and I launched a new course on polarization that highlights practical, grass roots strategies for countering polarization in the US and in other liberal democracies. This new course, “Countering Political Polarization,” includes several class sessions that draw from a multi-disciplinary project that I created in partnership with Professor Derek Goldman, the Director of GU’s Theater and Performance Studies Program. This project and its related course, “In Your Shoes,” uses theater and performance to foster communication and empathy across the cultural, social and ideological divides that fuels America’s polarized political landscape. This project, we are happy to note, has gained some national and international attention.

Our MA program looks forward to working with Professor Goldman and other colleagues at GU and beyond to advance these and other similar initiatives. We hope that these efforts shine a more encouraging light on the increasingly dark horizons of our national politics – and on a global arena that has been shaken to its core by multiple crises,

some which have come through the barrel of Russian guns and bombs in Ukraine, and some which have originated in the fraught landscape of democratic crisis in Western democracies, not least of which is the US where the specter of a violent coup attempt on January 6, 2021 put our very democracy in peril.

Educating Thought Leaders in Democracy Studies in the Context of Democratic Erosion

Elton Skendaj

How do we conduct productive research as well as teach and train future practitioners and thought leaders in democracy and governance? Democracy around the world is under attack, as we have seen declines in the quality of democracy and good governance in dozens of countries for the past seventeen years. Both new and consolidated democracies face challenges ranging from spread of fake news, rise of populist strongmen who attempt to dismantle rule of law institutions and foster toxic polarization, as well as autocratic threats. We need new thinking and tools to address these multiple challenges.

At Georgetown's MA in Democracy & Governance, faculty and students produce both leading academic research and applied analysis that bridges the divide between scholars and policymakers. While we have focused on international democracy promotion in the past, we are now also examining how to address democratic challenges in consolidated democracies, such as the US and European Community.

We are currently using a Designing the Future model to help students foster new ideas. In the Countering Polarization class, we use the following model. Students design a paper that develops a blueprint for an intervention: workshop/campaign/activity for campus or community.

What do we know about the causes and impact of political polarization? How does academic research and practitioner insights help us to understand cases of polarization in contemporary politics? In what ways might this inform our practice or policymaking? Each student is to identify a hypothesis that scholars and practitioners have examined in a polarization case study. Students will familiarize themselves with the state of research on that hypothesis and develop a blueprint for an intervention: workshop/campaign/activity for campus or community.

Students use the prompt to come up with creative interventions to address toxic polarization, such as parent-child mindfulness practice training, improv comedy for congress staff, using moral reframing to address the values of each community, dialogue, bridge building, investment in local media, civic curricula education. Students are making fascinating connections with insights from political science, psychology and neuroscience to address these challenges.

Similarly, in our Comparative Political Institutions class, students look at the potential and limits of institutional design. The final assignment in this course is a paper in which students tackle an issue of social or political concern and offer recommendations for institutional reform to address it. Students have to provide an overview of 2-3 possible institutional options, a recommendation of one option as a preferred course of action that includes, an explanation of how the institutional reform would impact the issue at hand, as well as evidence from other contexts that demonstrates the viability of this solution and a brief assessment of the political viability of the solution. Students have proposed institutional reforms to address the Catalan crisis, shifting to more proportional representation voting system in the USA and Iraq, or judicial sector reform to address transnational crime in Brazil. Some of these solutions are less likely to be political viable now, such as ending sectarian system in Lebanon. However, the students have to think about the coalitions of actors that would support and obstruct such institutional change.

As we notice erosion in both electoral and consolidated democracies, we need to synthesize new ideas and tools to address such global retreat of democracies. Our students are interested in international and local

tools to promote and sustain democracy. Using design principles, we can look back and forward to think collaboratively about how we want our future to look, and steps to take to achieve that future. International collaborations between different MA programs in Democracy studies can foster fruitful exchange of diverse ideas that will help grow the subfield of democracy.

VIII – Edmund Burke: “Edmund Burke on Confronting Authoritarianism – The Spirit and the Letter”

Scraping the Barrel? Burke, Rousseau, and the Roots of Authoritarianism

Ian Crowe

“I would have loved my fellow-men in spite of themselves. It was only by ceasing to be human that they could forfeit my affection.”

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Reveries of the Solitary Walker*.¹

In 1791, Edmund Burke wrote of the revolution in manners and morality that he detected shaping events in revolutionary France: “I am certain that the writings of Rousseau lead directly to this kind of shameful evil.”² Burke’s assessment of Rousseau’s influence on the French Revolution has inevitably come under critical scrutiny from historians, as have more recent attempts to connect that assessment, prophetically and instructively, to the emergence of the totalitarian state in the twentieth century.³ In this paper, I shall try to modify and update this perspective, and ask whether Burke’s analysis of

¹ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Reveries of the Solitary Walker*, trans. Peter France (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1979), 27.

² Edmund Burke, *Further Reflections on the Revolution in France*, ed. Daniel E. Ritchie (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1992), 53.

³ I am thinking here of works such as: Irving Babbitt’s *Rousseau and Romanticism* (1919); Robert Nisbet’s 1943 article “Rousseau and Totalitarianism” (*Journal of Politics* 5, no. 2 [May 1943]); Ross J.S. Hoffman and Paul Levack (eds), *Burke’s Politics: Selected Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke on Reform, Revolution, and War* (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949) – “All the rationalistic errors of the age of Rousseau and Paine came coursing back with the upsurge of socialism communism, and fascism ... “ (p. xxxiv); and, of course John Talmon’s seminal work *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy* (1952).

Rousseau as a man, and of Rousseau's elevation of the "goodness" of natural man above the morally corrupting influence of "civilization," may help us understand the related concept of modern political "authoritarianism" – arguably a more virulent and insidious threat to Western liberal democracy in our present century.

Burke's critique of Rousseau appears at its sharpest in his *Letter to a Member of the National Assembly*, published in May 1791. In this work, Burke presents to us a philosopher of some undoubted genius, venerated by members of the French legislative, but a peddler in paradoxes, whose character is defined by vanity and shamelessness: in short, and memorably, an "insane Socrates of the National Assembly."⁴ That reference is intended to remind us of Plato's description of Diogenes the Cynic as "[a] Socrates gone mad."⁵ Diogenes, we may recall, challenged Plato with a philosophy based upon the alliance of reason and nature (rather than metaphysics): "Table and cup I see," he remarked to Plato on one occasion, "but your table-hood and cup-hood ... I [cannot] see."⁶ In undermining the authority both of metaphysics and of convention, Diogenes' particular marriage of reason and primal nature expressed itself in those outrageous statements and public spectacles that drew upon him ridicule, pity, and admiration.

On one level, Rousseau – ridiculous, pitiable, and admirable – fits easily into the Cynic's barrel; and, while the "unexamined life" may, indeed, not be worth living, anyone who has perused Jean-Jacques' *Confessions* will appreciate that, to examine it to excess, however brilliantly, is to risk wallowing in paradox and madness. Rousseau's insanity, as Burke saw it, arose from the "paradoxical morality"

⁴ Burke, *Further Reflections*, 48. Burke had written a few sentences earlier that "madness is ever vitious and malignant" (47). Note also the comment in a review of *Emile*, published in the *Annual Register* for 1762, and probably written by Burke: by never knowing where to stop in his imaginative reasoning, Rousseau shows in his intellect and imagination how "[p]overty can hardly be more vicious than such an abundance." Edmund Burke, *Selected Writings and Speeches*, ed. Peter J. Stanlis (New York: Gateway, 19xx), 95.

⁵ The report can be found in Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers*, VI.2.54, and also in Aelian, *Varia Historia*, xiv. 33.

⁶ Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers*, VI.2.54.

that he employed to sever and then to reconstruct the relationship between human freedom and social virtue.⁷ Such a project, Burke remarks in the *Letter*, engenders principles that “are so inapplicable to real life and manners, that we [British] never dream of drawing from them any rule for laws or conduct, or for fortifying or illustrating any thing by a reference to his opinions. They have with us the fate of older paradoxes.”⁸ There follows a quotation from Horace extolling the vital relationship of *mos maiorum* to justice, fully in the spirit of that firm opponent of Cynicism, Marcus Tullius Cicero.⁹

Is there, though, anything more than a passing allusion in this parallel between two insane Socrates? Something in that reference to “older paradoxes,” perhaps, that might explain how a political revolution for liberty mutated into an authoritarian nightmare under the Jacobins? I think an answer may be found in an entry in Burke’s private *Note-Book* titled “Several scattered hints concerning philosophy and learning collected here from my papers.”¹⁰ It was composed in the 1750s, before Burke entered politics, and never published during his lifetime.

⁷ Rousseau writes, in Book 1, chapter 8 of the *Social Contract* (1762): “Man’s actions receive a moral character [in entering society] which was wanting to them before ... [F]rom a stupid and limited animal e now for the first time becomes a reasoning being and a man.”

⁸ Burke, *Further Reflections*, 53. Rousseau’s paradoxical statements in the *Social Contract* are familiar. Robespierre paraphrased one of the most famous in his report on *I floral, an II* (May 7, 1794), entitled “On the Connection between Religion and Moral ideas with Republican principles and national festivals”: “Nature tells us that man is born for freedom, and the experience of the ages shows us man enslaved.” (Quoted in Carol Blum, *Rousseau and the Republic of Virtue. The Language of Politics in the French Revolution* [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986], 241.)

⁹ The quotation from Horace praises utility as “naturally the mother of justice and right.” Cicero’s own understanding of “right reason” in relationship to nature (that is, *prudentia*) is expanded in his works *De officiis* and the *Academica* in particular, where one can also find expressions of his contempt for Cynicism as a philosophical system. See, e.g., *De officiis* 1.128, 148. For Ciceronian “right reason,” see *De re publica* 3. 22 – a crucial chapter in the Ciceronian *oeuvre*, which has clear resonance in the rhetoric of Burke’s famous prosecutorial speeches against Warren Hastings in the 1780s. The passage is also quoted at some length, in relation to the natural law tradition, in Raymond Plant, *Politics, Theology and History* (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 2001), 146.

¹⁰ H.V.F. Somerset (ed.), *A Note-Book of Edmund Burke* (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1957), 81-98.

Clear themes of continuity give these “scattered hints” an overall coherence: Burke esteems learning and curiosity, but praises a broad education above narrow specialism, since “the end of learning is not knowledge but virtue.” He recommends a moderate skepticism. “[D]oubts and uncertainties,” he notes, “affect our understandings as fermentation affects liquors – It disturbs them for a while, but it makes them both the Sounder and clearer ever after.” In short, the hints are thoroughly *Ciceronian*: reason respects custom, which is “a more sure guide than our Theories,” and advances hand in hand with humility and curiosity. Virtue is realized in action, and action proceeds by probability, not certitude.¹¹

Amid such reflections, Burke inserts the following anecdote about Diogenes the Cynic:

When Diogenes was dying, his friends desired to know how he would have his Body disposed of. ‘Throw it into the fields.’ Says he. They objected that it might be liable to be devoured by wild Beasts. ‘Then set my Staff by me to drive them off.’ One answered, ‘You will then be insensible and unable to do it.’ ‘So shall I be’ (sayd he) ‘of their injuries.’¹²

Burke’s response to the story is to admire the “vivacity of the Turn,” and then to declare the philosophy behind it “shewy” but “ha[ving] no substance,” since turning it into a general principle would result in obvious ill consequences. Then, expanding upon the theme, Burke turns to the subject of “funeral ceremonies,” arguing that such rituals “throw a decent Veil over the weak and dishonourable circumstances of our Nature. What shall we say to that philosophy,” he asks, “that would strip [that Nature] naked?”¹³

Well, why not call it a “philosophy of vanity,” since it elevates the authority of the individual’s reason above the social customs (the

¹¹ Ibid, 82, 89, 90.

¹² Ibid, 91. See also Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*, 1.43.

¹³ Ibid. “A man [not] anxious...about the fate of his body...never considers what a nuisance it would be to Society if it was exposed.” On this topic, see John Casey, “Our Duty to the Dead,” in Roger Scruton (ed.), *Conservative Thoughts: Essays from The Salisbury Review* (London: The Claridge Press, 1988), 173-80.

mos maiorum) that are, in fact, essential for its operation?¹⁴ We might also consider it a source of “paradoxical morality,” for Burke proceeds to show how the shamelessness released when “right reason” acts upon the instincts of Nature “strip[ped] naked” produces a new sense of shame when that same reason meets its actual limitations in attempting to master or comprehend those instincts. Applying a striking analogy, some (unnamed) authors, Burke comments, having reduced love and the social rituals of courtship to “mere procreation, [then] talk of the Generation of mankind as getting rid of excrement; who lament bitterly their being subject to such a weakness.”¹⁵ In the *Letter*, over thirty years later, Burke was to denounce Rousseau as a father who “casts away, as a sort of offal and excrement, the spawn of his disgusting amours.”¹⁶

The social and political consequences of embracing a “philosophy of vanity” in society, then, with its attendant “paradoxical morality” was not, in Burke’s mind, so much the liberation of natural man from the oppressive structures of shame as the emergence of a new kind

¹⁴ I am thinking here of the argument that right reasoning must proceed from a proper understanding of the “I” and “you” relationship. The philosopher Roger Scruton identifies the flaw in much modern thinking about this relationship when he remarks that, “One thing that is unacceptable in the political philosophies that compete for our endorsement today is their failure to recognize that most of what we are and owe has been acquired without our own consent to it.” (Roger Scruton, *On Human Nature* [Princeton: Princeton U.P., 2017], 126.) This highly Burkean observation Scruton explores with particular reference to the concept of “personhood.” “My freedom,” he writes elsewhere, “is not an uncaused eruption into the world of human events; it is a product of my social condition, and it brings with it the full burden of responsibility to the other and the recognition that the other’s voice has just as much authority as mine.” (Ibid, 110-11.) The significance of this line of thought for exposing the flaws of Cynic or Rousseauian thought is summed up in the following statement, from another of Scruton’s works: “[Religions] feed into the distinctively human emotions, like hope and charity, which lift us above the motives that rule the lives of other animals, and cause us to live by culture and not by instinct.” (Roger Scruton, *The Soul of the World* [Princeton: Princeton U.P., 2014], 27).

¹⁵ Ibid, 92. Adam and Eve’s awareness of their nakedness after their transgression may be interpreted as the shame induced by their sexual arousal that their procreative instincts and impulses remain beyond the control of their intellects. Rousseau’s shamelessness, in a kind of inversion of this frustrated wish to act as gods over their own created bodies, is revealed, Burke states, in his public reveling in a life that “he flings in the face of his Creator” (*Further Reflections*, 49).

¹⁶ Burke, *Further Reflections*, 49.

of shaming – designed this time not to cover the natural weaknesses of our nature, but to deny the limitations of an instrumental reason working upon an elemental human nature. It is in the denial, or *defiance*, of the paradox that the insanity resides, a point Burke clarifies in the next paragraph of those “scattered hints” where he turns to the logical distinction between a contradiction and a contrariety: “No man *in his Senses* can agree to a Contradiction,” he states, and then counters, (reflecting, again, his debt to Cicero) that a truly symbiotic marriage of reason and nature can be achieved only by factoring mystery and probability into our rational calculations above abstract theory and certitude – in a word, by embracing Contrariety, for “an apparent, nay a real, Contrariety in things, may not only be proposed and believed, but proved beyond any reasonable doubt.”¹⁷ Burke rounds out this gathering of thoughts with a powerful rhetorical question that could have served as an antidote to authoritarianism *avant la lettre*: “Why should I desire to be more than a man? I have too much reverence for our nature to wish myself divested even of the weak parts of it.”¹⁸

I see Burke here settling early in his career on the conviction that any system claiming to harmonize liberty and justice through human reason and natural instinct was doomed unless it embraced, also, the

¹⁷ Burke argues that, in assenting rationally to propositions concerning “abstruse matters,” people “don’t sufficiently distinguish between a Contrariety and a Contradiction” (*Note-Book*, 92). This may reflect acquaintance with the broad discussion over the legacy of Aristotelian and Scholastic logic, played out in the works of thinkers such as Locke, Hutcheson, Hume, Stewart, and Reid; but, more directly, we might note Burke’s reference as an undergraduate at Trinity College, Dublin, to the work of the “hideous” Burgersdijk, whose *Institutionum Logicarum Libri Duo* was a staple text of logic in the eighteenth century, designed to promote a unity between Aristotelianism and Ramist critiques in the teaching of logic to students. I have touched upon Burke’s encounter with Burgersdijk elsewhere – see Ian Crowe, “Echoes from Mulla’s Shore. Spenserian Currents and Edmund Burke’s Early Literary Career in London,” *Studies in Burke and His Time* 24 [2014]: 62-88 (especially 70-71). For Burgersdijk and the structure and influence of his work, see E.P. Bos and H.A. Krop (ed.), *Franco Burgersdijk (1590-1635): Neo-Aristotelianism in Leiden* (Amsterdam-Atlanta: Rodopi, 1993). Burke’s description appears in a letter of 24 May, 1744, to Richard Shackleton.

¹⁸ Burke, *Note-Book*, 92. Later, in the *Letter to a Member of the National Assembly*, Burke was to describe Rousseau, famously, as a “lover of humanity and a hater of his kindred” (50).

inescapable mystery of that harmony as mediated through custom and convention.¹⁹ That position rests upon the principle that human nature contains an essential transcendent dimension that prevents its own full disclosure to our reason – even *right* reason, and even when supposedly “stripped naked” for the purpose. If we apply that insight to the Rousseauian influences that Burke thought he saw working upon the French Revolution, we might reasonably deduce that authoritarianism feeds upon the weakening perception of that transcendent dimension by providing the necessary mechanism for action while denying the contradictions upon which such action must proceed.²⁰ Such a mechanism could comprise the acknowledgment of greater liberties for the people in certain areas of life combined with an expansive, ideological tightening of legal restrictions in other areas. It would be a bargain willingly entered into by many, since the weakening is itself a mark of pride, or vanity, by which shamelessness becomes a liberating sign of virtue.²¹ Any effort, then, to recover the authority of the transcendent, by an appeal to our social nature through custom or convention, becomes shameful, and its proclamation a vice that is literally seen as *inhumane*. Frustrated by the paradoxical claims of a liberating reason and the obstinate, ultimate unfathomability of our primal nature, we – the people – become complicit in a state-sponsored authoritarianism artfully designed to hide the contradiction that lies behind our own vain aspirations. As Diogenes is *also* reputed to have taught: “[F]or the conduct of life we need right reason *or a halter*.”²²

¹⁹ I have made this point elsewhere in relation to Burke’s early publication *A Vindication of Natural Society*.

²⁰ Is the alternative, then, inaction or potential gridlock? Not if one considers Burke’s argument that contrariety can be accepted as a basis for action proceeding from probability. Indeed, such an actualizing of a choice is, for Cicero and for Burke, the very summation of the virtuous life – the act of a prudent, and not just a wise, person: “*virtutis enim laus omnis in actione consistit*,” as Cicero remarked in *De officiis* – “The whole praise of virtue lies in action.” (Cicero, *De officiis*, I. 6.)

²¹ “The Revolution involved a war against religion: an attempt to re-create the world as a world uncreated.” Roger Scruton, *The Philosopher on Dover Beach. Essays* (Manchester: Carcanet Press, 1990), 197.

²² Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers*, VI.2.25.

Burke, Rights of Man and the Magna Carta

Ivone Moreira

It would be utterly unfair not to think of Burke as a parliamentarian who fought against authoritarianism. In fact, although Burke was accused of criticizing the rights of man, namely in the aftermath of his diatribe against the French Revolution, his entire parliamentary life and the great causes in which he was involved were fights for the rights of the most disadvantaged and against various types of authoritarianism. This is so in his defence of Catholic rights in his native Ireland; in his defence of the right of American colonists not to be taxed without being represented; in his impeachment of the first Governor General of Bengal, whom he accuses of exercising arbitrary power and tyranny towards the Indian people; and also in his fight against slavery through the elaboration of the Sketch of a Negro Code, the British version of the Code Noir.

Burke's statements on Warren Hastings' impeachment are, in a way, an illustration of the meaning of his entire political career:

“He cannot have absolute power by succession; he cannot have it by compact; for the people cannot covenant themselves out of their duty to their rights. If any, by conquest, by compact, or by succession, exercise power which, for the good of mankind, ought never to exist, those who gave that power and those who receive it, are alike criminal. And there is no man that is not bound to resist it, and who ought not so to do: Nothing but the fear of greater mischief, and the apprehension of absolute destruction, can justify men in the usurpation or endurance of it (...).” Burke (1816), Impeachment, February 16, 1788, *Speeches IV*, p. 358.

Resist authoritarianism is not something that one could choose not to do. In fact, the above quotation clearly states that consent to an authoritarian government and administering it are equally criminal, and that both the ruler and the people governed in such a way are required to rectify their ways, because both are disrespectful of human dignity. Burke's entire political career can be summed up in this duty to fight authoritarianism.

In view of his effort to correct disrespect for people's rights in Ireland, America or India, one might think that Burke was a critic of the British Empire. In fact, it is quite the opposite. He so valued the principles of liberty present in British institutions and principles of governance that he believed that being a subject of the King of England was a privilege – on condition, however, that the king did not forget that he should rule the Empire according to English principles, albeit respecting the liberties and idiosyncrasies of the people he administered. That he should rule in the spirit of English liberties and not by the letter of the law that proclaimed his abstract right of governing and taxing as a ruling power.

In fact, it is this same appeal to rule in the spirit of English liberties and not by the letter of the law, which leads Burke to appeal to moderation when discussing the situation of Catholics in Ireland with Sir Hercules Langrishe. Burke rightly observes that the Irish were in the position of belonging to a State while not being citizens of that State; but, while he does not approve of Ireland being ruled in this way, he does not encourage challenging the government in this particular case, because he feels that the situation of Ireland would be much worse if it ceased to be under English administration. In fact, when one thinks of the State as supreme government, not everyone belongs to the governing elite, and this is even its most common form and an acceptable mode of government, when it is kept within limits that respect the rights of the ruled.

In the dispute between England and the American colonists, Burke's initial struggle was aimed at getting the Crown to recover its primitive and fruitful relationship with the colonies, rejecting its abstract right to tax America. The colonists' refusal to being taxed without being

represented was based on principles of liberty that they had learned from England.

He felt that binding the peoples of America to the enjoyment of their rights under the protection of the British Crown was a mild tie that would prove as strong as iron chains and could guarantee the continuity of the British Empire. For the colonists, to claim freedom was to claim a fundamental right. Thus, if England endorsed the defence of the rights of colonists, this prudent measure would in the end justify British presence in America. The upholding of the same freedoms the English enjoyed in the motherland – freedoms inherited from Magna Carta – in the colonies would strengthen ties between England and the colonies, based on similar privileges and equal protection.

The difference between keeping the colony or losing it was played in choosing the abstract right to tax the colonies – which tax, however small, was an expression of the arrogance of the State – or opting instead for the governance that had been practiced until then and which had been advantageous for both parties.

George III was choosing a “speculative” right, whose theoretical perfection was linked to a practical fragility: it was literally a right, but in spirit, an abuse.

The right not to be taxed without being represented, which the English people enjoyed in their homeland and which should be extended to all the subjects throughout the Empire, was ratified by prescription, had historical realization on its side, was endowed with practical perfection and, for those reasons, was preferable in the context of a prudent political exercise.

By taking sides for the defence of human rights in a concrete and delimited way, Burke follows the ancestral practice of the British tradition. In fact, in his confrontation with authoritarianism in all the struggles in which he was involved, Burke recovered for the 18th century a much older tradition of civil rights, which had been reformulated and sustained in a different way by the radical commonwealthmen in 17th-century England.

In fact, in the 17th century, England had lived through a period where the claim for rights had been made in a different way from that upheld by Magna Carta, namely through the invocation of the abstract principles of the political contract. In the years going from 1646-7 to 1649, the *Clarke Manuscripts*, edited by Woodhouse, compile a series of interventions by the Puritans presenting the “leveller principles” they defended. Three decades later, in response to Filmer’s *Patriarch*, Algernon Sidney wrote *Discourses Concerning Government*, where he demanded for the community the same rights that Price will later request in his famous *Discourse On the Love of our Country*. Burke rebuts Price’s discourse in his *Reflections*; later, in his *Appeal*, he again rejects the revival of Republican ideas presented in Thomas Paine’s *Rights of Man*. Although anxious to repeal 17th century radical ideas of republicanism and rights, Burke is, nevertheless, as concerned with the independence of Parliament as those radicals were. To Burke, the stress is to be put on civil rights and their historical defence by prescription.

In Burke, we see the recovery and appreciation of the prudential dimension of governance and the enjoyment of rights. Looking at Magna Carta, it is easy to understand how Burke could support concrete rights while vigorously fighting the so-called abstract rights uphold by French revolutionaries. The rights supported by Magna Carta are civil rights, possible and protected within society, practiced and consolidated by prescription. According to William Sharp McKechnie, these rights were concrete remedies for concrete ills and aimed at restoring the degraded dignity of subjects. First of all, they restored the rights of the protesting nobility, but they also benefited the people. The rights claimed by the Barons in Runnymede were aimed at correcting concrete wrongs, and their scope at the time was perfectly practical.

These are precisely the kinds of rights that Burke repeatedly upheld. Thus, in his *Reflections*, he states that the claim and consecration of

¹ William Sharp McKechnie, *Magna Carta: A Commentary on the Great Charter of King John, with an Historical Introduction*, 2nd edition revised and in part re-written, Glasgow: James Maclehose, 1914, p. 120.

the rights of the English people was not made, in their most important documents, in the name of abstract rights:

“In the famous law (...) called the Petition of Right, the Parliament says to the king “Your subjects have inherited this freedom”: claiming their franchises, not on abstract principles, “as the rights of men,” but as the rights of Englishmen, and as as (sic) a patrimony derived from their forefathers. Selden, and the other profoundly learned men who drew this Petition of Right, were as well acquainted, at least, with all the general theories concerning “the rights of men” (...) but, for reasons worthy of that practical wisdom which superseded their theoretic science, they preferred this positive, recorded, hereditary title to all which can be dear to the man and the citizen to that vague, speculative right which exposed their sure inheritance to be scrambled for and torn to pieces by every wild, litigious spirit”. Burke (1865), *RRF*, Works III, p. 273.

To Burke, the virtue of political action and the most effective way to oppose authoritarianism is to opt for “practical wisdom” and to oppose abstract claims of rights. The English “Constitution,” not conceived by intellectual design, but grown from usages and customs was the guardian of this order.

Burke didn't think that, in certain historical circumstances, society could ignore the right to life, liberty or property. But his writings and the battles he fought make it clear that he thought the best way to uphold these rights is not by simply enunciate them in their theoretical perfection, but rather by endorsing them on the basis of their historical practical application and doing that within a strong and independent Parliament.

IX – George Washington Memorial Dinner: “George Washington – A Man for Our Time, and All Times”

George Washington: A Man for Our Time – and All Times

William A. Galston

Ronald Reagan was once asked whether he had learned anything as an actor that had been useful to him as a president. “There have been times in this office,” Reagan responded, “when I wondered how you could do the job if you hadn’t been an actor.”

George Washington would have agreed. He loved the theater and attended regularly. His friends said he would have gone every night if he could have.

His favorite play was one of the staples of the 18th century stage – Joseph Addison’s *Cato*, which pitted the last defenders of the Roman republic against the forces of Julius Caesar and the nascent Roman empire.

The play’s central theme is the duties of citizenship – specifically, what it means (and costs) to put the needs of one’s country ahead of personal considerations.

To us, today, these can demands appear extreme, almost inhuman. When Cato, the leader of the republican forces, receives the news that his son has been killed in battle, he asks only whether his son acquitted himself honorably. He refuses to express the private grief he might have felt.

In one of the play’s turning points, some of Cato’s troops mutiny, and in a dramatic confrontation, he alternatively threatens and shames them into reversing course. This scene evidently exercised a powerful

influence on Washington's imagination as he faced a comparable challenge. Here, in brief, is the story.

Toward the end of the Revolutionary War, many of Washington's veterans feared that they might not get what the Continental Congress had promised when they enlisted. As the months before the formal conclusion of the war dragged on, they grew increasingly impatient – and then angry.

In March of 1783, a group of disgruntled officers sought to convene a meeting in Newburgh, New York to consider a direct challenge to the Congress's authority. Washington opposed this proposal and called for a four-day delay to give his soldiers' passions a chance to cool. When the officers gathered, Washington, who had implied that he would not attend, made a dramatic entrance into the hall and asked for an opportunity to address them. He then made a speech that drew heavily on the themes that Cato had used in Addison's play.

The influence of the theater on Washington did not end there. Toward the end of his speech, Washington tried to read a supportive letter he had received. After squinting at it and stumbling through the first sentence, he paused, reached into his coat pocket, and drew out a pair of spectacles he had recently acquired. As he was putting them on, he remarked, "Gentlemen, you must pardon me. I have gone grey in your service and now find myself growing blind." At this theatrical gesture, any of the officers began openly weeping. Washington finished reading the letter, then folded it and made a dramatic exit from the hall although the meeting was still underway, implying (as one scholar has suggested) that any further defense of the call to mutiny was unthinkable.

And so it proved. The meeting quickly disbanded, but not before passing a motion of thanks for Washington's intervention. Transmitting to Congress a few days later a peaceful petition for the redress of his soldiers' grievances a few days, he went out of his way to praise their patriotism. Through his eloquence and theatrical sense, Washington had single-handedly quelled and dispelled a military revolt that could have strangled America's constitutional government in its cradle.

Washington's ability to lead rested on skill, but even more on character. Indeed, his entire life is proof that character matters in public as well as private life. Washington was a passionate man, but he learned to govern his passions. He did not lack ambition, but for him, virtue and honor were more important than power.

When an American visitor informed King George III of Washington's intention to resign his commission after the war ended, the king remarked that, "If he does that, he will be the greatest man in the world." And this is what Washington did. Consciously imitating the Roman hero Cincinnatus, he returned to his farm after leading his army to victory. After two arduous terms as president, his friends pleaded with him to continue in office, arguing (correctly, as it turned out) that if he left office, contention between the forces arrayed around John Adams and Thomas Jefferson could split the country and threaten the constitution. He refused and returned to his farm a final time, dying just two years later.

Washington's leadership conveys a lesson painfully relevant to our own time: Without good character, even the best designed institutions will not function well and may break down altogether. Even James Madison, who famously argued that well-designed institutions could limit the dangers of clashing interests and passions, conceded that constitutional republics needed civic virtue more than any other form of government. If we care about the perpetuation of constitutional democracy, we must pay more attention to the ways in which this virtue can be nurtured.

Washington also teaches us valuable lessons in the art of governance. He picked the most talented advisors he could find – Jefferson, Madison, and Alexander Hamilton, for example – even if they disagreed among themselves. Although most of his advisors were better educated than he was and more knowledgeable about the details of public policy, he was confident that he could use their skills – and their disagreements – to frame wise responses to public problems.

As Washington's contemporaries attested, his method of making decisions reflected this confidence. He invariably began by soliciting a wide range of views in writing. He worked hard to understand the best arguments on all sides, often asking one advisor to respond to

another's views. He deliberated carefully, which often meant more slowly than his impatient aides preferred. But once he made his decision, he executed it unswervingly, whatever the difficulties he encountered along the way. To maximize the chances of success, he insisted that all his subordinates speak with one voice in support of his decisions, whatever position they had taken before the decision was made. His record of accomplishment as president attests to the wisdom of these practices.

Washington's successful leadership rested, as well, on less tangible factors. He was able to distance himself from personal attachments to reflect calmly on the matters before him. He had a sense of what a specific occasion required, in tone and substance, and what the central task of the moment might be. He was always aware of the broader effects of his actions and decisions; he knew that he was setting precedents that would shape the institution of the presidency.

Washington was graced with intellectual virtues that cannot be taught, good judgment and foresight chief among them. Two examples will suffice. When he began reading the *Federalist* papers, he saw immediately that although they were written for an immediate practical purpose – securing the ratification of the Constitution – they would have an enduring influence on our understanding of constitutional institutions. And when the Marquis de Lafayette wrote him optimistic letters during the early days of the French revolution, he wrote back to warn his friend that initial moderation could give way to extremism that would prove hard to control.

I move, finally, from Washington's leadership and character to his principles. Despite the claims of some contemporary conservatives to the contrary, Washington was an defender of the Enlightenment – and of the central role of reasons and science in public affairs. And he was committed to the essentials of what we now call liberal democracy. Despite his aristocratic inclinations, he insisted that all legitimate authority rested on the consent of the governed. Despite his annoyance about unfriendly coverage in the opposition press of his times, he staunchly defended the freedom of the press. And perhaps most important, he championed religious liberty against its many skeptics.

I close with a story that exemplifies not only Washington's commitment to freedom of religion but also the enduring influence of Portugal on American society. After Rhode Island finally ratified the Constitution in 1790, Washington decided to reward the laggard with a visit. Moses Seixas, the leader of a community of Jews of Portuguese descent in Newport, Rhode Island, wrote a letter to Washington welcoming him to the state and praising his leadership. Washington responded with a letter that became a classic statement of religious liberty. He promised the Touro synagogue more than mere religious tolerance, asserting that "It is now no more that toleration is spoken of as if it were the indulgence of one class of people that another enjoyed the exercise of their inherent natural rights." The United States did not demand – or need – religious conformity, Washington explained. "The Government of the United States, which gives to bigotry no sanction, to persecution no assistance, requires only that they who live under its protection should demean themselves as good citizens in giving it on all occasions their effectual support."

Washington closed with an allusion to the prophet Micah that proved prophetic in America: "May the Children of the Stock of Abraham, who dwell in this land, continue to merit and enjoy the good will of the other Inhabitants; while every one shall sit in safety under his own vine and figtree, and there shall be none to make him afraid."

I hope that I will give no offense when I observe that Portugal's loss after 1496 was Washington's gain three centuries later, and the world's gain thereafter.

Analysis: Why actors make for better presidents | CNN Politics

Newburgh Conspiracy·George Washington's Mount Vernon

X – The Future of NATO

NATO's Past, Present & Future

Gary J. Schmitt

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has once again put NATO's relevance to European security front and center. Given the situation in Ukraine, the Black Sea, and Putin's behavior and statements about Russia's imperial destiny, it would be difficult, perhaps impossible, for anyone halfway sensible to somehow suggest now that the alliance is "obsolete." or will not remain relevant in the future.

The Past

Looking to NATO's past will help us understand its future prospects. To start, NATO has never been, as brain dead as France's president has suggested. Time and again, NATO has adapted to changing strategic landscapes – from the start of the Cold War, through the era of détente and the later stages of the policy of containment, the end of the Cold War, to Russia's current attempt to challenge the European security landscape.

When the United States has made new tactical and strategic demands, NATO has responded. Alliance partners have never notably constrained US leadership.

In fact, a look at past changes in America's strategic outlook shows just how responsive the alliance has been to US leadership:

In 1950, Truman proposed rearming Germany and by 1955 West Germany had been accepted into NATO with a re-established military.

Eisenhower, in the mid-50s laid down the “New Look” strategy, relying on nuclear weapons to deter the Soviets. When Kennedy came into office, he replaced “New Look” with “Flexible Response,” placing a renewed emphasis on conventional arms. In the late 1970s, NATO had to respond to Moscow’s deployment of the highly accurate SS-20 missiles. The Carter team and NATO agreed to a “Dual Track” approach that deployed American ballistic and cruise missiles despite Europe’s massive anti-nuclear movement... and eventually concluded with the Reagan Administration’s negotiation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

The Reagan team then created the “Air-Land Battle Doctrine,” which required NATO to adapt to new innovations in war fighting.

Following the end of the Cold War, NATO is told new missions will be “out of area” – that is, not confined to defending allied territory – and the alliance goes to the Balkans, Africa, and Afghanistan. And, at the same time, at Washington’s urging moves to eliminate a possible geo-political grey-zone by expanding NATO into Central and Eastern Europe.

Recent Past

Post-2014, NATO began to meet the challenge of a resurgent and aggressive Russia by creating new operational and logistic commands, putting forward new initiatives in cyber & hybrid warfare, pushing deployments into the Baltics and Southeast Europe, and tripling the size of its high-readiness, Joint Force to some 40,000 troops.

NATO has even made progress on its oft-criticized budgeting. The alliance across the board has increased defense spending for the past seven years straight – even with the global economic crisis of the pandemic.

Since 2014, US allies added more than \$200 billion to their defense budgets. In 2020, the last year NATO has hard figures for, ten allies spent more than the 2% minimum of their GDP on defense. It’s not great, but better than the three allies that met that target circa 2014.

Just as significant, 21 allies now spend at least 20% of their defense budget on procuring weapons and supplies – a huge jump from just

a few years ago when military personnel costs from adopting all-volunteer forces devoured the budget.

The Present

The present alliance agenda is obvious: increase deterrence across the Europe's eastern front. While Europe's state and societal resilience in case of conflict remain questionable, these issues are outside of NATO's wheelhouse. The authorities for addressing such issues lie with the EU and individual alliance members. For now, NATO needs to continue to focus on adequately articulating and addressing its core task of common defense.

NATO will announce a new NATO Strategic Concept at its summit in Madrid. In the decade since its last summit, the strategic environment has undergone considerable change. Members have avoided going through the painful process of producing a new Strategic Concept because of all the fights and disagreements the process inevitably engenders. However, resolving these disputes clears the path forward for an alliance that works through consensus. Agreeing on a vision makes it considerably easier for NATO to resolve future disputes on operations, budgets, and tactics.

While this can be a contentious process, there are some obvious steps to take to build deterrence on the eastern front. NATO will need a more robust and combat-ready forward presence with more pre-positioned equipment and supplies. But even if NATO has more fighting capability on paper, it remains short on logistics: air transport, electronic warfare, air defenses, ammunition stocks, and even roads and bridges capable of moving and handling large number of forces from Western and Central Europe to the East. Bottom line: allies will have to spend more.

Finally, the alliance will need to overcome Turkey's "hold" on Sweden's and Finland's membership applications. Unlike more recent additions to NATO, both countries will add to the security of the alliance. Both field serious militaries and provide increased capacity in the Baltic Sea region and the High North. They complicate Russian military planning, which obviously benefits NATO as a whole. And, while

formally neutral, both countries have been working with each other, NATO regional allies, and the US for several years now. NATO must move these applications along quickly, lest public opinion in the two countries reverts back to ambivalence on NATO membership, giving up an “own goal” to Putin.

The Future

The most pressing problem facing NATO in the years ahead is that, while the US military remains the world’s preeminent military, it no longer is decisively dominant.

Although the US increased its defense budget by \$90 billion in a two-year period (2018 & 2019), the increase only brought the budget back (in inflation-adjusted dollars) to its projected 2012 levels, from before the cuts and constraints mandated by the 2011 Budget Control Act. The 2012 budget came on the heels of the Pentagon and the Obama administration admitting that the US military would no longer have the capacity to handle two simultaneous major conventional wars. They made the case that, since Europe was no longer an arena of security competition and because the US would be pulling out of the Middle East, the US military could and would focus its attention to East Asia and China. Of course, those rosy predictions for Europe and the Middle East did not last long, but the trend line of US military capacity and budgets continued downward. Nor has the Biden administration substantially reversed course. The top line has been flat, and, now with inflation, the Defense Department’s spending power is decreasing by the tens of billions.

Given the cuts in military spending in the aftermath of the Great Recession of 2008-09 and the enactment of the 2011 Budget Control Act, the active-duty force today has not grown over the past decade. Because of self-imposed budget constraints and the intent to develop and procure even more advanced weapons in the 2030s, the Biden team has started cutting planes and ships from the force structure to save money. While there have been some qualitative improvements in weapon systems and platforms, the American military’s core capacity has remained largely stagnant for a decade even as the global security environment becomes appreciably worse. Quality of course matters

– having a fleet of F-35s, for example, is extremely important. But as many have noted, quantity has a quality all its own, and planes, ships, and men cannot be in two places at once.

Europe will need to fill the gap in American strategic posture and capabilities. And with uncertainty about whom might be elected US president in 2024, Paris has once again taken the lead in pushing for finally creating a real EU military and defense industrial capacity. (The irony is it was the French who, in 1954, killed the idea of a European army.) From the EU there are new calls to spend more and cooperate on defense investments. And a recently approved EU document aims to build up Union-wide capabilities in cyber, intelligence, space, and maritime security, along with developing a rapid response force of 5000.

However, the obstacles that have long frustrated the creation of significant EU “hard power” capacity have not, and will not, go away. Defense program cooperation is still largely determined by the interest of each nation’s industrial base, with fragmentation of development, work, and manufacturing still the norm. Brussels has no power to sort out programs for efficiency and priorities. And even if it possessed a real military force, the EU’s constitutional constraints would prevent its decisive employment.

In contrast, NATO has long operated under the planning guidance that an attack on a member state would be no surprise then that, facing the Russia’s militarized revanchism, Sweden and Finland turned to NATO rather than holding out hope that the EU would become something it has not ever been. Nor is it a surprise that Central and Eastern Europeans do not want to put their most important security eggs in the EU basket when the major EU military powers, France and Germany, even now have been hesitant in how to respond to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Considering the need for NATO’s European allies to assist with this current effort and other security crises that might (and inevitably) will pop up, will Germany, the continent’s largest economy, will step up to plate?

The answer is inconclusive.

On the one hand, in the aftermath of the first Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014-15, Germany has increased its defense spending by a third. Germany also headed one of the NATO multinational battlegroups deployed to the Baltic States and agreed to lead the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) on multiple occasions. It has also taken the lead in sponsoring NATO's Framework Nation Concept to drive multinational capability and formation development. Now, in the wake of the Russia's most recent invasion of Ukraine, the relatively new coalition government in Berlin announced a *Zeitenwende*, a historic turning point in its defense policy. To give substance to that change, the government moved to amend the German constitution to allow it to create a 100-billion-euro fund for new military investments and acquisitions. Among the announced acquisitions will be the American produced 5th generation F-35. This was a reversal of an earlier decision to postpone acquiring an advanced stealth jet until a European consortium had developed its own – a process that would not have come to fruition (at best) until the late 2030s. Filling in holes in supplies, ammo, air defense, and helicopter lift, Germany will be spending more than 2% of its GDP on defense for the first time since 1991.

On the other hand, with the 100 billion being special budget item, there has been little said about sustaining a buildup after this money is spent. Indeed, the extra-money will go rather quickly if the proposed acquisitions go forward – especially because much of the 100 billion could go just to digging the German military out of the readiness hole it is currently in.

A truly transformational change will require an equally significant shift in German political culture regarding military matters. Merkel avoided addressing the topic and, typically, handed the defense ministry to members of her cabinet with little political pull. In the aftermath of the first invasion in 2014, German elites spoke of a need for their country to step up and play a larger role in maintaining the international order Germany benefitted from. But Merkel's lack of leadership dissipated this so-called Munich Consensus. In 2023, the German government will produce what many are calling the country's first national security strategy. It could provide the roadmap to make *Zeitenwende* more than a word. Yet, without sustained resources and

political backing, it will be just another blip in post-war German history.

Germany of course is not alone in not doing enough to support its military. The fact is, other than the Poles, who recently announced their defense budget would increase to 3% of its GDP, the major military powers in the alliance, including the UK and France, fall substantially short of the monies to meet their own strategic plans. By any honest assessment, the NATO 2% mark should be seen as the bare minimum for member states, not a goal. Modern militaries are expensive and 3% of a nation's GDP ought not be seen as an unreasonable burden.

Now, none of the problems facing NATO are insurmountable and these problems are no greater or any less serious than past challenges. That said, Washington will need to interact with NATO much more directly moving forward. The Biden administration came into office saying that it wanted to reinvigorate transatlantic ties. However, whatever progress it made on that front was undermined by its precipitous decision to pull out of Afghanistan. And while the US has taken the lead in giving financial and military assistance to Ukraine, the President has not made a sustained and coherent public case to explain to the American public or allies why these sacrifices are in our mutual interest.

Undoubtedly, the White House is preoccupied with its failing marks on the domestic front and the upcoming November congressional elections. Indeed, one has the sense that instead of using the Ukraine crisis as an opportunity to show leadership, the White House political team is more worried that it will be seen by the public as an unnecessary diversion from troubles on the home front. Of course, it need not be either/or. An administration ought to be able to walk and chew gum at the same time. And a president has far more sway over public attitudes in foreign and defense policy when he or she makes an effort to do so. The sentiment for retrenchment in America is a problem but polls also show it is neither as widespread is sometimes bruited about nor, more importantly, deeply held. But it will not be overcome without the White House taking more of a lead than it has.

Conclusion

The alliance has much to do. And critics will undoubtedly observe, correctly to a point, that NATO is not nimble enough to fix all these gaps. But, based on how NATO has acted in the past, it will adapt enough to increase the alliance's capabilities and its deterrent posture *vis a vis* Russia. How fast or slow it does so will depend in no small measure on the leading European powers: Germany, France, and the United Kingdom.

NATO's reputation is largely defined, in public opinion, by its obvious problems and by the expectation that it should be more responsive and efficient in meeting security threats. We should be clear about what the alliance does and less critical of what it's not: an alliance that will always act in clear, immediate harmony. And, indeed, we take for granted existing alliance working relationships, forgetting that they had to be established, institutionalized, and become part of our transatlantic DNA. Does anyone think that Europe's response to the invasion of Ukraine, as uneven as it has been, would have been as substantial as it has been in the absence of those ties or the Article 5 security guarantee that underpins those ties?

We ought to understand that NATO is not some thoroughbred racehorse but, rather, a mule: often slow to move, often stubborn in its ways, but ultimately, with a persistent push from a lead hand – the United States in particular – it's capable of carrying much of the burden when it comes to transatlantic defenses.

XI – Luigi Einaudi Memorial Luncheon: “The Light That Fails? The Present Debate in Italy on the War in Ukraine”

The Light that Fails? The present debate in Italy on the war in Ukraine

Giandomenica Becchio

Two years ago, Krastev and Holmes published their book, *The Light that Failed: Why the West is Losing the Fight for Democracy*, a book about the fate of liberal democracy after the collapse of the Soviet Union especially by considering the consequences of the eastward spread of liberal democracy. Authors suggested that in thirty years since the end of Communism, the process of transforming former dictatorships into liberal democracies failed: a new age of autocracy started in those countries along with a wave of populism which involved western countries as well. Authors claimed that one of the main feature of this failure has been the resentment against the post-1989 process of ‘Westernization’. This resentment had especially involved old generations, either nostalgic of a never-ending dream (which actually was a nightmare) or stuck in a traditional anti-Americanism, as well as new generations who did not grow up during the communist regimes and actually cannot make any comparison between the two systems unless they would have been educated to understand and elaborate the complexity of concepts like freedom, individualism, and responsibility of being citizen in a political framework embedded in the system of the Rule of Law, in other words unless they have been educated to liberal democracy.

The present debate in Italy on the current war in Ukraine may shed some light on this disillusionment about the fate of Western civilization. Since the beginning of the Russian invasion, national

press, social media, and public debates in inner circles inside and outside academia have been frantically set up in order to discuss the military and political situation as well as any possible future scenario which will be hugely impacting European countries in the immediate future, not to mention the worrisome expectations about a possible worldwide military escalation.

The possibility of debating is always a good thing, since freedom of speech is a fundamental liberty in our liberal democratic Western systems: hooligans are never welcome and a balance of opinions, especially when provided by experts such as historians and political thinkers, is useful indeed. So, I'm not blaming the discussion per se, neither I am going to talk about negotiations, compromises, criminal acts perpetuated by Russians, Zelensky's attitude, prophecies of victory, and so forth. Neither I am willing to discuss what many commentators rightly began to wonder: what is the goal of Europe? In fact, it is evident that our governments, in the name of the unity of the West, are compact in following Biden and Johnson in their anti-Putin crusade, although our interests are different: sanctions inflicted on Russia might be catastrophic for us; any widening of the military conflict (including nuclear risks) as well as the duration of the war would dramatically affect us and hardly jeopardize Americans.

Nonetheless, I want to point out the fact that the debate which is occurring in Italy reveals a massive attitude of anti-Americanism often mixed with an inexplicable fashion for leaders like Putin, albeit we have been warned by several publications (think about Anna Politkovskaja's book) as well as testimonies about Putin and his inner circle's attitude and their way of operating: we are talking about former KGB agents previously in medium-lower positions who seized the power and exploited Russian people for twenty years and started wars, in Chechnia yesterday as well as in Ukraine today, in the name of the 'Holy Motherland Russia', a nationalistic and ethnical concept, old-fashioned, but still fashionable for laypersons, a concept which is nothing more than greed in disguise.

Why so? Why did we have a prime minister, Berlusconi, who was among Putin's best friends for ages? Why do we still have some political leaders, scholars, and a consistent part of public opinion

who are fascinated by Putin? Why do we have so many intellectuals on stage who are making their best efforts in order to blame NATO and to explain Russia's reasons for attacking Ukraine? We need to make some steps backward in order to understand that the despise of liberal democracy, which had shaped up our Western society, is directly related to the rise of populism. Against Sandel's view, according to which "the right-wing populism ascendant today is a symptom of the uncritical embrace of a neo-liberal version of globalization that benefits those at the top but leaves ordinary citizens feeling disempowered" (2018, 353), I argue that populism is the most recent transformation of authoritarianism, a challenge to liberal democracy aimed to drive a wedge between democracy and liberalism as if it would be possible to have a democratic system without cultural liberalism. Many scholars defined it the 'illiberal democracy' of 'the people', to be intended as a reaction against the 'undemocratic liberalism' of "the elites." This is the main deceit of populism, and this is the main fallacy of the present debate on the Russian-Ukraine war that is occurring in Italy.

Putin has always played the role of the ideal-type for populists in Europe, which converged, as the Russian leader has often claimed, towards a harsh critique to liberal democracies. This is a cultural, rather than a political stance. The mix of Italian populists who might be nostalgic either of Fascism or of Communism are called in Italy "rosso-bruni," a word that literally means "red-black": although they are situated on the opposite sides of the political spectrum, they share a suspicious and sometimes ferocious attitude against liberal democracy and free-market. They never stopped feeling the call of the tribe, as in Vargas Llosa's terms, no matter whether the color of their tribe is red or black; they never stopped feeling the urgency to find a leader/a party/a project to be intended as a universal problem-solver able to magically fix challenging and often dramatic situations of any matter.

This attitude does not affect Italy only: the Western society and culture has been attacked and blamed during the past thirty years everywhere.

I don't know if the light of liberal democracy has actually failed: indeed, it has faded and one of the reason might be the lack of

education aimed to reinforce the values of the open society, as in Popper's terms: a society based on individual freedom which, since the first revolutions during the modern era, had paved the way to liberal democracy. Liberal democracy is not a set of forever fixed rules rooted on general principles; neither a specific political program in a fixed agenda. Rather, it is a meta-culture: a set of procedures that in principle allows the coexistence of many different ways of thinking and living. Almost all ways of thinking and living, with the main limitation that no one should impose a specific one on others. It is a way of social interaction established by the Rule of Law, able to guarantee human, civil, political and social rights embedded in democratic procedures. It is simple but also hard to achieve and it has been too much taken for granted especially after the collapse of Communism.

The present debate in Italy on the war in Ukraine is an episode of this lack of education and it is time for western elites to make it clear: there is no future and prosperity without lighting up that light which is fading. The light of liberal democracy, which rests on civic egalitarianism, individual freedom, limitation and division of power, cannot be defended on a battlefield only though: it must be embedded in a major project of education aimed to transmit habits and practices of liberal democracy in order for people, especially young generations, to understand and appreciate their opportunities and responsibilities as free citizens. This is the main responsibility of each of us: without a serious commitment to education to freedom that light we mentioned earlier might actually fail. Please, allow me to conclude by quoting Luigi Einaudi's first Presidential speech: "Our Constitution affirms two solemn principles: to preserve all that is a guarantee of the freedom of the human person against the omnipotence of the State and against private arrogance; and to guarantee everyone the greatest possible equality in the starting points regardless of their lottery of birth. We all are called to collaborate in this sublime work of human elevation."

It looks like that Einaudi's words have been lately become a wishful thinking but it is our responsibility to make them back real again.

<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0191453718757888>

XII – Konrad Adenauer Memorial Dinner

Confronting the authoritarian Challenge

Ludger Gruber

Dear Audience, I have not only the honour of being a Speaker in this 30th Edition of the Estoril Political Forum. I'm even the last one.

To you, dear students, I would like to express my appreciation for your perseverance over the past days! You have almost made it! A very short time separates you from the start of the eagerly awaited party.

At the end of these three days, you hopefully draw the conclusion that your efforts of listening, taking notes and discussing were worth it. You have received important impulses on one of the most relevant topics of our time. Speakers and panelists from all over the world presented enlightening analyses. The interdisciplinarity and diversity of perspectives visible at this congress are unique. We need a profound analysis and reflection of what is actually happening.

Konrad Adenauer, the first chancellor of the German Republic and namesake of the foundation I represent, would have enormously appreciated this conference. The confrontation between freedom, democracy and authoritarianism was his lifelong concern.

We owe it to Prof. Espada and his wonderful, professional team that this conference is taking place at all. Dear Prof. Espada, I want to express my deep respect for the endurance of having organised the last 29 EPF-Conferences and for your foresight in putting the authoritarian challenge on the agenda of the thirtieth EPF. The fact that you set the topic long before the aggressive invasion of Ukraine

by the Russians proves that there was already disturbing evidence of the decline of democracy in our world before this terrible war.

In the past few days, our experts have worked out impressively, that the ideologies and processes behind the emergence of authoritarian regimes are very divers. And they have looked at different regions from Russia to China to Africa. I can very well build on this preliminary work this evening, opening up another perspective. Let's focus on the verb in the title of this conference. How can we confront the authoritarian challenge? How do we move from analysis to action? How can we prevent democracies from becoming authoritarian regimes?

Concerning established authoritarian regimes, our options for action are, at first glance, few. We can hardly change political systems from the outside. Every society must find its own way.

That's why we should focus on our existing democracies in Europe.

Neither of us in this room wants to even imagine a life in an authoritarian nor dictatorial regime. In our countries, we have historically gone through painful, bloody processes in the transformations from dictatorships to democracies. For us in Europe, the main goal/aspiration is „never again“ war or dictatorship. We appreciate the ability of our democracies to have created a historically unique balance between the political, economical and social order, despite all the weaknesses which might exist. We value too highly the freedom to shape our lives according to our individual preferences.

But: one of the most consequential mistakes we could make would be to take democracies for granted. The chairman of the Adenauer Foundation, former parliamentary president Prof. Norbert Lammert, is very concerned about this phenomenon and often refers to Steven Levitskys and Daniel Zielblatts book: *How Democracies Die*. Their core message is, that Democracies die less through revolutions and war, but because of their inner erosion.

In many societies in the middle of Europe, Germany included, we see too many signals of a minor acceptance concerning the institutions of the parliamentary democracies. There are many reasons for this, let me only list some of them.

Danger for democracies is imminent, when

- Elected politicians don't perform adequately,
- when economic inequalities become too big,
- when fundamental values are no longer shared,
- when compromises are denigrated as something bad, even weak,
- when intolerance towards dissenting opinions increases,
- when institutions are discredited or
- when media drift from critical journalism to scandalisation.

I guess, each of you could add to this list. Therefore, we observe a loss of confidence in politics and its institutions.

People are feeling powerless or – even worse – become indifferent. In wealthy, saturated European Democracies a too high proportion of people even don't vote anymore.

But democracy does not work without a minimum of commitment. This is the crucial difference: Democracy demands commitment while dictatorships punish citizens' commitment.

Dear audience:

With these preliminary considerations, the key question becomes a little clearer: Why can populists and extremists achieve any success in our democratically socialised societies? What can we do concretely?

Here are my three proposals:

First, we should improve our ability to recognise early signals of problematic developments. Authoritarian or even dictatorial regimes do not emerge overnight and certainly not by surprise. By the way, serious future analysts can prove that more than 90% of what is happening was predictable. The negative consequences arise because we are not able to realise the signals, because we don't weigh them correctly and because we are unwilling or too hesitant to draw the right conclusions.

Second, we need a little more self-criticism on the part of the responsible actors. By this I'm explicitly not only looking at the active politicians. I am addressing all responsible leaders in companies, trade

unions, NGOs, universities or newspaper editorial offices and other multipliers, who have a role model function in our democracies. All of them share responsibility for our democracy. They simply have to do a good job. If they do not, authoritarian regimes appear as a serious, better alternative in the eyes of many people. Because they can supposedly act faster and more consistently.

One complementary thought: I am furthermore convinced that we need a reform of our parliamentary democracies. I will mention only one issue. Many of our political processes date back to the period after the Second World War. I doubt if these processes can cope with the necessities of our fully digitalised world today. A world with a changing way of generating and consuming relevant political information, a changing political socialisation and a new way of forming political will. Adaption and reforms are necessary.

My third proposal, possibly the most important: To fight populism we need a massive expansion of political education in our countries to increase our democratic resilience!

As I already mentioned before, social discontent is an ideal humus for authoritarian leaders. I would even venture the thesis that authoritarian leaders and dictators are not at the beginning of developments that endanger democracy, but rather reinforce existing trends. They address real problems in a populist way. Authoritarian leaders and dictators of our time are rarely genuine political thinkers. They mix eclectically circulating, mostly extremist positions. They pose as the real voice of the people. They plant fake news. They denigrate institutions and parliamentary processes as slow and inefficient. Their simplistic messages are finding more and more adherents and – this is essential more and more supporters among academically educated elites. And they have realised earlier than democratic leaders the possibilities of the internet for their political work, or rather for their political manipulation.

That's why we urgently need more political education in our societies. After all, democracy is a form of government in which a few lead but many should participate voluntarily and, as an ideal, all citizens should understand what is happening politically. Democracy is the result of concrete action and behavior by many.

This means that political education can only succeed as a joint effort between the state institutions, the academia and the civil society with its numerous organisations.

Ladies and gentlemen, let me emphasize, that we need political education

- that does not manipulate and that does not ideologically overwhelm young people.
- that provides quality-assured political facts on a scientific basis.
- that organises debates on values on the basis of respect and deference and thus contributes to orientation in the flood of opinions and assessments.
- that encourages people to engage in politics and strengthens their ability to make political judgements.
- And a political education that qualifies those who are voluntary politically engaged. Democracies cannot have enough of them.

To sum up, we have many opportunities for action to make our democracies resilient and thus confront the authoritarian challenge: Foresight, Reforms and political education are essential. Like the tipping points in climate, there are also tipping points in the transition phases from democracies to authoritarian regimes, where developments can no longer be reversed.

So let us resist the beginnings. Let us be alert! It is worth it. Democracy is about the best of all political orders developed so far. Conferences like the Estoril Political Forum are indispensable. And the fact that you, dear students, have participated for three days at this conference gives me hope. You are our future! It's your future!

With this in mind, I wish you a bright future and for now an unforgettable party.

Appendix



CATÓLICA
INSTITUTO DE
ESTUDOS POLÍTICOS

LISBOA

2022
ESTORIL
POLITICAL
FORUM

30TH INTERNATIONAL MEETING
IN POLITICAL STUDIES
[EST. 1993]

30TH EDITION

[EST. 1993]

CONFRONTING THE AUTHORITARIAN CHALLENGE

27-29 JUNE
HOTEL PALÁCIO ESTORIL



COM O ALTO PATROCÍNIO
DE SUA EXCELENCIA

O Presidente da República

IN ASSOCIATION WITH:

American Enterprise Institute (Washington, DC); Brookings Institution (Washington, DC); CY Cergy-Paris Université (Paris); Charles University (Prague); Corvinus University (Budapest); EUROPAEUM (Oxford); European Partnership for Democracy (Brussels); Forum 2020 Foundation (Prague); Georgetown University (Washington, DC); Hoover Institution (Stanford); IDC, Interdisciplinary Center (Herzliya); International Forum for Democratic Studies (Washington, DC); International School of Causasus Studies (Tbilisi); Jagiellonian University (Krakow); Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (Berlin); LABO, PUC São Paulo (São Paulo); National Endowment for Democracy (Washington, DC); The Burke Society of America (Michigan); The Heritage Foundation (Washington, DC); Universidade Católica de Moçambique (Beira); University of Alaska (Anchorage); University of Toronto (Toronto); University of Virginia (Charlottesville); University of California at Berkeley, CA

JUNE 27

15:00-15:45 · Opening Session [AR]

Special Message by The President of the Republic of Portugal, HE **Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa**

Host: **Isabel Capelo Gil** (Rector, UCP, Lisbon).

Chair: **Rita Seabra Brito** (EPF Director, IEP-UCP, Lisbon).

Guest Speaker: **Carlos Carreiras** (Mayor, Cascais).

Welcome Address: **João Carlos Espada** (Director, IEP-UCP and Editor, *Nova Cidadania*, Lisbon).

15:45-16:00 · Break

16:00-17:30 · “Confronting the Authoritarian Challenge” [AR]

Host: **Guilherme d’Oliveira Martins** (Former Minister of Finance and Education; Member of the Board, Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian; SC, IEP-UCP, Lisbon);

Chair: **HE Ana Martinho** (Ambassador of Portugal).

Guest of Honour: **HE Inna Ohnivets** (Ambassador of Ukraine in Portugal).

Speakers: **José Manuel Barroso** (Former Prime Minister of Portugal; Former President of the European Commission; Director, IEP-UCP Centre for European Studies, Lisbon); **Marc Plattner** (Founding Co-Editor, *Journal of Democracy*, Washington, D.C.; Chairman, IEP International Advisory Board).

17:30-18:00 · Tea Break [G]

18:00-19:30 · The Dahrendorf Memorial Lecture: “Ukraine’s Resistance and the Future of Democracy” [AR]

Host: **Rita Seabra Brito** (EPF Director, IEP-UCP, Lisbon).

Chair: **Vitor Bento** (Chairman of Portuguese Banking Association; Member of Board of Trustees of Universidade Católica Portuguesa).

Speaker: **Carl Gershman** (Founding President, The National Endowment for Democracy, Washington D.C.)

Discussants: **Clifford Orwin** (University of Toronto, Toronto); **Ghia Nodia** (Director, International School of Caucasus Studies, Tbilisi); **Wilhelm Hofmeister** (Former Director for Spain and Portugal, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Madrid).

19:45-20:15 · Garden Reception: “Celebrating the 650th Anniversary of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance” [G]

Hosts: **HE Ross Matthews** (Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of the UK in Lisbon); **Manuel Braga da Cruz** (Former Rector UCP; Member of the Board, IEP-UCP, Lisbon).

Chair: **HRH Dom Duarte, Duke of Braganza**

Guest-Speaker: **Maria João Araújo** (University of Oxford; President of the Coordination Committee, Portugal-UK 650).

20:15-22:00 · Winston Churchill Memorial Dinner: “Churchill and Russia” [ER]

in association with British Historical Society of Portugal, The Cambridge Club of Portugal, IEP Alumni Club, International Churchill Society of Portugal, Oxford Alumni of Portugal, Portugal-UK 650 and Royal British Club

Host: **HE Ross Matthews** (Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of the UK in Lisbon).

Chairs: **James W. Muller** (Chairman, International Churchill Society Academic Advisers; University of Alaska, Anchorage);

Speaker: **Allen Packwood** (Director of the Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge).

22:15-23:15 · After Dinner Conversation with IEP Alumni Club [TR]

Host: **Henrique Burnay** (President, IEP Alumni Club).

Chair: **Eugénia Gambôa** (IEP-UCP, Lisbon).

Speakers: **Ana Martins** (Oxford MA; *Alumna* and Project Manager, IEP-UCP); **Francisca Almeida Sampaio** (IEP *Alumna*; Operations Division, NATO, Brussels); **Laura Lisboa*** (IEP *Alumna*; Private Office of the Secretary General, NATO, Brussels).

JUNE 28

10:00-11:15 - China and the West [AR]

Host: **Luísa Leal de Faria** (FCH-UCP, Lisbon).

Chair: **José Pena do Amaral** (BPI, Lisbon).

Speaker: **Xiao Qiang** (University of California at Berkeley, CA).

Discussants: **James Jay Carafano** (The Heritage Foundation, Washington D.C.); **John M. Owen** (University of Virginia); **Martin Hála** (Charles University, Prague).

11:15-11:45 - Coffee Break [G] Thucydides Society Garden Session

Host: **Orlando Samões** (IEP-UCP, Lisbon)

Chairs: **Anthony O'Hear** (Editor, *Philosophy*, London); **Miguel Monjardino** (*Expresso*; IEP-UCP, Lisbon).

Speakers: **António Cebola** (IEP-UCP, Lisbon); **Mariana Setra** (IEP-UCP, Lisbon); **Telma Casimiro** (IEP-UCP, Lisbon).

11:45-13:00 - Russia, Ukraine, and the West [AR]

in association with the International Coalition for Democratic Renewal and Forum 2000, Prague; Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.; and EPD – European Partnership for Democracy, Brussels.

Host: **HE Luís de Almeida Sampaio** (Ambassador of Portugal in Prague)

Chair: **Jakub Klepal** (President, Forum 2000, Prague).

Speaker: **Serhii Plokhii** (Mykhailo S. Hrushevs'kyi Professor of Ukrainian History; Director, Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University), interviewed on-line by **Myroslava Gongadze** (Eastern European Chief, Voice of America).

Discussants: **Dóra Györfy** (Corvinus University, Budapest); **Ken Godfrey** (EPD – European Partnership for Democracy, Brussels); **Myroslava Gongadze** (Eastern European Chief, Voice of America); **Zdzisław Mach** (Dean of the Faculty of International and Political Studies, Jagiellonian University, Krakow).

13:15-15:15 - Charles de Gaulle Memorial Luncheon: *"In Defence of an Ethics of Deference in Unhappy Times"* [ER]

Host: **Céline Abecassis-Moedas** (CLSBE-UCP, Lisbon).

Chair: **HE António Monteiro** (Ambassador; Chairman, Fundação Millennium BCP, Lisbon).

Speaker: **Catherine Marshall** (CY Cergy-Paris Université, Paris).

16:00-17:00 - Meeting of the Transatlantic Working Group of the International Coalition for Democratic Renewal [TR] *[by invitation only]*

17:00-18:15 - Joint Panel MA's at the Universidade Católica Portuguesa & Georgetown University: A Conversation on Democracy and Governance in a Context of Global Recession of Democracy. [PS]

Host: **Margarida Mano** (Former Minister of Education; Vice-Rector, UCP, Lisbon).

Chair: **Nuno Crato** (Former Minister of Education; ISEG, Lisbon).

Speakers: **Daniel Brumberg** (Director, M.A. Program in Democracy and Governance, Georgetown University); **Elton Skendaj** (Associate Director, M.A. Program in Democracy and Governance, Georgetown University);

José Tomaz Castello Branco (Director, M.A. Program in Governance, Leadership and Democracy Studies, IEP-UCP, Lisbon); **William Hasselberger** (Director, Digital Ethics Laboratory and Professor, IEP-UCP, Lisbon).

17:00-18:15 - New Strategies for Peace in Cabo Delgado [AR] *in association with the LIPS Research Hub on Peace and Civil Society of the CIEP, IEP -UCP*

Host: **Mónica Dias** (LIPS-CIEP Coordinator, IEP-UCP, Lisbon).

Chair: **António Fontes Ramos** (General, IEP-UCP, Lisbon).

Speakers: **Cristina Sá Carvalho** (LIPS-CIEP, IEP-UCP and FT-UCP, Lisbon); **Lucie Calléja** (LIPS-CIEP, IEP-UCP, Lisbon); **Raul Tati** (MP, Angola; LIPS-CIEP, IEP-UCP, Lisbon).

Discussant: **Francisco Proença Garcia** (LIPS-CIEP, IEP-UCP, Lisbon).

18:30-20:00 · Brazil: On the Bicentenary of Independence [AR]
in association with LABÔ, Fundação São Paulo, PUC, São Paulo

Host: **HE João Paulo Ortega Terra** (Deputy Head of Mission,
Embassy of Brazil in Lisbon).

Chairs: **João Pereira Coutinho** (*Folha de S. Paulo*, S. Paulo;
IEP-UCP, Lisbon); **Victoria Jardim** (President, IEE, Porto Alegre).

Speakers: **Alejandro Chafuen** (Managing Director,
International, The Acton Institute for the Study of Religion and
Liberty, Michigan); **Fernando Schüller** (Inspere; Revista *Veja*, S.
Paulo); **Luiz Felipe Pondé** (Academic Director, LABÔ –
Laboratório de Política, Comportamento e Média, Fundação
São Paulo, PUC, *Folha de São Paulo*, S. Paulo);

18:30-20:00 · Edmund Burke: “*Edmund Burke on Confronting
Authoritarianism – The Spirit and the Letter*” [PS]
*in association with The Burke Society of America and The Russell
Kirk Center (US).*

Host: **Carlos Marques de Almeida** (IEP-UCP, Lisbon).

Chair: **Miguel Morgado** (IEP-UCP, Lisbon).

Speakers: **Ian Crowe** (Belmont Abbey College); **Ivone Moreira**
(IEP-UCP, Lisbon); **João Vacas** (IEP-UCP, Lisbon); **John G. Grove**
(Managing Editor of *Law & Liberty*, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis).

20:15-22:15 · George Washington Memorial Dinner: “*George
Washington – A Man for Our Time, and All Times*” [ER]

Host: **António Neto da Silva** (President, Associação Amizade
Portugal-EUA, Lisbon).

Chair: **Rita Faden** (President, FLAD – Luso American
Development Foundation, Lisbon).

Speaker: **William Galston** (Brookings Institution, Washington,
D.C.).

JUNE 29

10:00-11:15 · Europaeum Special Debate: *"The Russia-China Partnership – Will It Weaken or Grow Stronger?"* [AR]

Host: **Nuno Sampaio** (Adviser to the President of the Portuguese Republic and IEP UCP, Lisbon).

Chair: **Hartmut Mayer** (Europaeum, Oxford).

Speakers: Students from Europaeum (Oxford), Jagiellonian University (Krakow), IEP-UCP (Lisbon).

Discussants: **Inês Domingos** (Director, International Affairs Network; CLSBE and IEP UCP, Lisbon); **José Miguel Sardica** (FCH and IEP-UCP, Lisbon).

11:15-11:30 · Coffee Break [G]

11:30-13:00 · The Future of NATO [AR]

in association with The Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C.

Host: **Henrique Burnay** (President, IEP Alumni Club).

Chair: **Bridgett Wagner** (The Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C.).

Speakers: **Gary J. Schmitt** (Senior Fellow, American Enterprise Institute); **Lúvia Franco** (IEP-UCP, Lisbon); **Miguel Monjardino** (*Expresso*; IEP-UCP, Lisbon); **Mike Gonzalez** (The Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C.).

13:15-15:15 · Luigi Einaudi Memorial Luncheon: *"The Light That Fails? The Present Debate in Italy on the War in Ukraine"* [ER]

Host: **Raquel da Costa Gatta** (IEP-UCP, Lisbon).

Chair: **Nuno Severiano Teixeira** (Former Minister of Interior and Minister of National Defense; UNL, Lisbon).

Speakers: **Giandomenica Becchio** (Università degli Studi di Torino).

17:15-17:45 · Book Presentation: *José Cutileiro "Podia ter sido Pior – Escritos 1953-2020"* (Dom Quixote, 2022) [G]

with the presence of Myriam Sochacki Cutileiro

Host: **Duarte Bárbara** (Editor, Grupo LeYa).

Speaker: **Joana Fisher** (Adviser, Cabinet of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Lisbon)

17:45-19:00 · Portugal: The Challenges Ahead [ER]

Host: **Sónia Ribeiro** (IEP-UCP, Lisbon).

Chair: **Eduardo Marçal Grilo** (Former Minister of Education; Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos, Lisbon).

Speakers: **Henrique Monteiro** (*Expresso*, Lisbon), **Joana Reis** (*TVI/CNN*, Lisbon); **José Manuel Fernandes** (*Observador* and IEP-UCP, Lisbon); **Manuel Carvalho** (*Público*, Lisbon), **Teresa de Sousa** (*Público*, Lisbon).

17:45-19:00 · Breakout Session, IEP Research Centre (CIEP): *"Confronting the Authoritarian Challenge"* [PS]

Host: **André Azevedo Alves** (Dean for Research, IEP-UCP, Lisbon; St. Mary's University, London).

Chair: **Inês Gregório** (IEP-UCP, Lisbon).

Speakers: **Chãimã Habab** (IEP-UCP Erasmus student from CY Université, Paris); **Magda Robalo** (IEP-UCP, Lisbon); **Olena Kolodiy** (IEP-UCP, Lisbon).

Discussants: **Madalena Meyer Resende** (President, Portuguese Political Science Association; FCSH-UNL, Lisbon); **Paul Flather** (Research Associate, St. Antony's College, Oxford).

19:00-19:15 · Break [G]

19:15-20:00 · Garden Cocktail and Group Photo Session [G]

Sponsored by: PHTO Travel Consulting / 111 Wines

20:15-22:30 · Konrad Adenauer Memorial Dinner [AR]

Presentation **ASBAL Scholarship** for IEP-UCP Students: **Constantin Ostermann von Roth** (President of Associação São Bartolomeu dos Alemães, Lisbon).

Host: **Isabel Capeloa Gil** (Rector, UCP, Lisbon).

Chair: **HE Daniela Schlegel** (Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Germany in Lisbon).

Speaker: **Ludger Gruber** (Director for Spain and Portugal, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Madrid).

22:30 · Dancing with the Lisbon Swingers and AAIEP Awards

*TBC – To be confirmed

TBA – To be announced



CATOLICA
INSTITUTO DE
ESTUDOS POLÍTICOS

LISBOA

2022
ESTORIL
POLITICAL
FORUM

30TH INTERNATIONAL MEETING
IN POLITICAL STUDIES
(EST. 1993)

CONVENORS

Amichai Magen

IDC, Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya

Anthony O’Hear

Editor, *Philosophy*, London

Catherine Marshall

CY Cergy Paris Université

Hartmut Mayer

Chairman, *Europaem*, Oxford

James W. Muller

Chairman, International Churchill Society
Academic Advisers;
University of Alaska, Anchorage

João Carlos Espada

Director, IEP UCP and Editor,
Nova Cidadania, Lisbon

Marc Plattner

Coeditor Emeritus, *Journal of
Democracy*, Washington, D.C.;
Chairman, IEP International
Advisory Board

Paul Flather

Oxford

Raymond Plant

King’s College London and
House of Lords, London

Zdzislaw Mach

Jagiellonian University,
Krakow

Rita Seabra Brito

EPF Programme Director

RESIDENT

SCHOLARS

André Azevedo Alves

Bruno Garschagen

Carlos Marques de Almeida

Eugénia Gambóia

Francisco Proença Garcia

Henrique Burnay

Inês Gregório

Ivone Moreira

João Pereira Coutinho

João Vacas

José Tomaz Castello Branco

Leonor Durão Barroso

Livia Franco

Miguel Monjardino

Miguel Morgado

Mónica Dias Tischler

Nuno Sampaio

Oriando Samões

Pedro Ferro

Raquel Duque

Sónia Ribeiro

Teresa Clímaco Leitão

William Hasselberger

SINGLE FARES Price per person

Tuition The fee includes tuition,
documentation and coffee breaks

STANDARD

3 days 80€ / 2 days 60€ / 1 day 40€

STUDENTS

3 days 60€ / 2 days 45€ / 1 day 30€

IEP-UCP STUDENTS AND ALUMNI

3 days 50€ / 2 days 40€ / 1 day 25€

Meals at Palácio Estoril Hotel

1st Day Garden Reception: 10€

Lunch 45€ / Dinner: 50€ for general
public or 20€ per meal for IEP students

THE CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD AT

Hotel Palácio do Estoril

www.palacioestorilhotel.com

Method of Payment

Portugal Payment of fares in Portugal
should be made by cheque or MB Ref
International Payment of fares abroad
should be made by international bank
transfer to IBAN

Please contact us for more information
summerschool.iep@iep.lisboa.ucp.pt



iep.lisboa.ucp.pt

SPONSORS

CASCAIS

**Jerónimo
Martins**

**Jerónimo
Martins**



**FUNDAÇÃO
MILLENNIUM
BCP**

PALEACRY FORUM

**KONRAD
ADENAUER
STIFTUNG**

**FUNDAÇÃO
AMBRO DE NEBLO**

WITH THE SUPPORT OF:

NED NATIONAL
ENDOWMENT
FUND

111

FORUM 2000
Forum 2000 - The
People

FORUM

**Travel
Consulting**

FCT
Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia

MEDIA PARTNER

**Nova
Cidadania**
Lisboa e Universidade Nova

About the Contributors

Giandomenica Becchio



Giandomenica Becchio, (PhD University of Florence) is Professor of history of economic thought, methodology of economics, gender issues and theory of entrepreneurship at the University of Torino (ESOMAS Department), Italy.

Her research field includes Austrian economics, gender and feminism economics, methodology of economics. Supported by research fellowships she has been visiting scholar/professor at Duke University; Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo; VSE University, Prague; LSE, New School, NYC, Vienna University. Among her publications, one book on neoliberalism and economics, and another on the history of feminist and gender economics (Routledge, 2017; Routledge 2020).

Rita Seabra Brito



Rita Seabra Brito is the director of the Estoril Political Forum – The International Annual Meetings in Political Studies – of the IEP-UCP (The Institute for Political Studies at the Universidade Católica Portuguesa in Lisbon.) She holds an MA in Political Science (with a thesis on “The Free and

Virtuous Society in the Thought of John Paul II”) and was a Visiting Student at Oxford University (St. Antony’s College), through the IEP-UCP interchange programme, along with a scholarship from the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation. She is an Associate Researcher of the CIEP, and since 2010 she has been a Teaching Assistant, working with Professor Manuel Braga da Cruz in the BA courses: “Political Systems and Political Regimes”, as well as “Political Parties”.

In 2006, she attended a one-month seminar in Krakow, Poland, “Tertio Millennio Seminar on the Free Society”, organised by the Ethics and Public Policy Center of Washington D.C. Her main research fields include Catholic social teaching, political regimes and political systems, with a focus on political parties. She is a member of Instituto Mais Liberdade’s Board of Trustees.

Daniel Brumberg



Daniel Brumberg (PhD University of Chicago, 1991), is a professor in the Department of Government and the Director of the Democracy and Governance MA Program at Georgetown University. A former Senior Advisor at the United States Institute of Peace and a current Senior Non-resident Fellow at the Arab Center, he is the author of numerous articles and books on political and social change in the Middle East. Brumberg has also served as a consultant to the US Department of State and the US Agency for International Development, focusing on human rights, security-sector reform, and governance issues in the Arab world and Iran. He is on the editorial board of the *Journal of Democracy*, and is a regular contributor to *ResponsibleStatecraft.com* and other online publications focusing on international affairs.

Carlos Carreiras



Carlos Carreiras is the Mayor of Cascais since 2011 and co-chair of UCCLP – União das Cidades Capitais de Língua Portuguesa. He is a former vice-president of Social Democrat Party (PSD) and chaired the Francisco Sá Carneiro Institute – think tank linked to the social democrats. Carlos Carreiras soon began his political career in PSD and eventually reached several national level positions. Prior to serving as mayor, Carlos Carreiras acted as the municipality vice-president from 2005. Mr. Carreiras graduated in Accountability and Business Administration and managed the Brazilian and African divisions of Portuguese enterprises in the consumer goods and tourism sectors. In 2014 he was awarded the National Defence Medal, by the Portuguese Ministry of Defence, and he was also distinguished by the Romanian Government. In 2013 he was awarded the First Order Decoration, the highest civil recognition granted by the Moldavian Government.

Carlos Carreiras is a columnist at “I”, a daily Portuguese newspaper, and regular political commentator in national televisions. He was born in 1961 in Lisbon but lives in Cascais for about 50 years. He is married and has five daughters.

Ian Crowe



Ian Crowe studied Modern History at St. Catherine’s College, Oxford, and received his PhD from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He is associate professor of History at Belmont Abbey College, in North Carolina, Director of the Edmund Burke Society of America, and a senior fellow at the Russell Kirk Center for Cultural Renewal. He has published, as contributing editor, two volumes of essays on Edmund Burke, *Edmund Burke: His Life and Legacy* (1997), which was published in the United States under the title *The Enduring Edmund Burke*, and *An Imaginative Whig: Reassessing the Life and Thought of Edmund Burke* (2005). His monograph *Patriotism and Public Spirit: Edmund Burke and the Role of the Critic in Mid-18th-Century Britain* was published by Stanford University Press in 2012. He is managing editor of *Studies in Burke and His Time*, the annual journal of the Edmund Burke Society.

João Carlos Espada



João Carlos Espada is the director and founder (1996) of the Institute for Political Studies at the Universidade Católica Portuguesa. He earned his D.Phil from the University of Oxford (1990-94), under the supervision of (Lord) Ralf Dahrendorf, and he taught at Brown, Stanford and Georgetown Universities in the US (1994-96 and 1999/2000) as well as in the College of Europe, Natolin/Warsaw (2011-2013). He is the editor of the quarterly journal *Nova Cidadaia* (Est. 1998) and president of the Portuguese section of the *International Churchill Society/Churchill Centre*, as well as a member of the Editorial Board of the *Journal of Democracy*. He has contributed regular opinion columns to the press since 1985, presently having a weekly column at the daily digital newspaper *Observador*. He was political adviser to President Aníbal Cavaco Silva (2006-2011) and President Mário Soares (1986-91). He is the secretary of the *Oxford Society of Portugal* and the Liaison Officer of *St. Antony’s College Alumni Network* in Portugal.

His latest book is *The Anglo-American Tradition of Liberty: A View from Europe* (London/New York: Routledge, 2016/2018; Brazilian edition 2019, Portuguese edition 2022). João Carlos Espada was awarded a Honorary OBE by HM Queen Elizabeth II in September 2018.

William A. Galston



William A. Galston holds the Ezra K. Zilkha chair in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution, where he has served as Senior Fellow since 2006. The author of ten books and more than one hundred articles in the fields of American politics, public policy, and political theory, he also writes a weekly opinion column for the *Wall Street Journal*. He is a veteran of six presidential campaigns and was President Clinton's Deputy Assistant for Domestic Policy from 1993 until 1995.

Carl Gershman



Carl Gershman is the former President of the National Endowment for Democracy, a private, congressionally supported grant-making institution with the mission to strengthen democratic institutions around the world through nongovernmental efforts. In addition to presiding over the Endowment's grants program in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and Latin America for 37 years, he oversaw the creation of the quarterly *Journal of Democracy*, *International Forum for Democratic Studies*, the Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellows Program, and the Center for International Media Assistance. He also took the lead in launching in New Delhi in 1999 the World Movement for Democracy, which is a global network of democracy practitioners and scholars. In addition to encouraging other democracies to establish their own independent democracy foundations, Mr. Gershman has helped to build an international coalition of NGOs and intellectuals committed to the defense of liberal democracy.

Isabel Capelo Gil



Isabel Capelo Gil is the 6th Rector of the Universidade Católica Portuguesa (UCP) and President of the International Federation of Catholic Universities. She is a Full Professor of Culture Studies at the Faculty of Human Sciences. She studied in Lisbon (University of Lisbon), Munich (Ludwig Maximilian University) and Chicago and holds a PhD in German Studies from UCP. Previously, she was Vice-Rector for Research and Internationalization (2012-2016) and the Dean of the Faculty of Human Sciences (2005-2012), of the Universidade Católica Portuguesa.

Having grown up in China (Macao), Isabel Gil has a special interest in researching issues of diversity and conflict and has structured her work around the exploration of the disciplinary boundaries between literature, the arts and other disciplines. She is furthermore a passionate advocate of international education and has worked consistently to develop international research networks, exploring the different ways in which the practice of the arts and humanities is pivotal to advance a more sustainable and intellectually robust global education agenda.

She was a founding member and is a senior researcher at the Research Centre for Communication and Culture (CECC), where she coordinates the research group Culture, Art and Conflict (CAC). As an international scholar, Prof. Gil has held numerous visiting professorships at prestigious universities such as LMU University, Munich, Hamburg University, Ca'Foscari University, Venice, the Houston School of Film at the National University of Ireland, PUC Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), and USJ (Macao). She was a Visiting Fellow at the Wissenschaftskolleg (Berlin) and Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (U. Stanford). Amongst her honours are a Fulbright Fellowship, and DAAD, FLAD and Gulbenkian Scholarships.

Isabel Capelo Gil has been a regular consultant for research foundations such as the Danish Research Council, FAPESP (Brazil), the FCT and FLAD in Portugal as well as the Luso-American Commission (Fulbright). She was an evaluator of the prestigious Excellence Initiative of the German Federal Government and the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft and is Chair of the Humanities panel at the Danish Research Council. Furthermore, she is Honorary Fellow at the IGRS, School of Advanced Studies, University of London. In 2018, she became Chair of the Research Leadership Forum of the Global Federation of Competitiveness Councils. She is also a Member

of the European Council of Foreign Relations, as well as a member of the Advisory Board of the Gulbenkian Foundation. Since 2016, she has been the President of the Board of the UCP Foundation.

She firmly believes that global engagement in higher education is key to advance stronger values for a more equitable world.

Her research is currently published in Portuguese, English, German, French, Italian and Spanish. She is the author of over 182 publications, bridging cultural theory, interarts studies, visual culture and culture and conflict.

Ludger Gruber



Dr. Ludger Gruber, Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS), Director of the KAS Office Spain and Portugal (since 1 June 2022), studied (Ibero-Latin American) History, Philosophy, Economics and Public Law at the Universities of Bonn, Lyon, Madrid and Cologne. He has worked for the KAS for 30 years in various functions in Science and Management, e.g., Deputy Head of Department of Political Education, Head of Staff Division “Strategic Planning – Organisational, Development – Controlling” at the Executive Board, Deputy Head of Human Resources, Chairman of the KAS Works Council, Research on Parliamentarism.

Dóra Gyórfy



Dóra Gyórfy is Professor at the Department of Comparative and Institutional Economics at Corvinus University of Budapest. She holds a BA in Government from Harvard University, an MA and PhD in International Relations and European Studies from the Central European University and a Doctor of Science degree in Economics from the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. She is Chair of the Economics Committee of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Her research focuses on issues of European political economy with a particular focus on the post-communist member states. She has published extensively on the problems of distrust in economic and political decision-making including macroeconomic imbalances, financial crises, economic convergence and the rise of populism. Her major publications include *Institutional Trust and Economic Policy: Lessons from the history of the euro* (CEU Press, 2013), *Trust and Crisis Management in the*

European Union (Palgrave, 2018); “Financial Crisis Management and the Rise of Authoritarian Populism” in *Europe-Asia Studies* (2020), “The Middle-Income Trap in Central and Eastern Europe in the 2010s: Institutions and divergent growth models” in *Comparative European Politics* (2022) and “Legitimacy and Authoritarian Decline” (with József Péter Martin) in *Problems of Post-Communism* (2022).

Wilhelm Hofmeister



Senior political consultant of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) and president of AFOS Foundation for entrepreneurial development cooperation, Germany. 2016 until February 2022, Head KAS-Office for Spain and Portugal in Madrid, Spain. Previously, among others, Director of the KAS Regional Project “Political Dialogue with Asia” based in Singapore (2009-16), Director of the KAS Study Centre in Brazil (1999-2009), Deputy Head of the KAS International Cooperation Department in Germany and KAS Country Representative in Chile.

Author and editor of numerous books and articles on issues of political transformation and development in Latin America and Asia, the external relations of the European Union and issues of international politics.

Olena Kolodiy



Olena Kolodiy is a PhD student at the Institute for Political Studies (IEP) of Universidade Católica Portuguesa, the same institution where she earned her Master’s Degree in Political Sciences and International Relations: Security and Defense, with a Dissertation titled “Russian Policy for China: Its evolution in the context of strategic reorientation towards the Asia-Pacific Region (2000-2019)”. During this period, she worked at FAO-UN in Lisbon, Portugal (2018) and at the Embassy of Portugal in Ottawa, Canada (2020).

Olena also holds a BA in Political Sciences and International Relations from NOVA University of Lisbon. In 2017, while attending the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, she did an internship at the Embassy of Portugal in Russia.

Additionally, she speaks fluently Russian, Ukrainian, Romanian, Spanish, Portuguese, and English.

Catherine Marshall



Catherine Marshall is Professor of British Studies at CY Cergy Paris Université in France (formerly the Université de Cergy-Pontoise), Director of the AGORA research centre and of the MA Political Ideas in a Digital Age. Her research focuses on Victorian intellectual history. She also works on the development of political ideas in Victorian Britain and on their legacy in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. She is the co-editor, with Bernard Lightman and Richard England, of a 3-volume critical edition of *The papers of The Metaphysical Society (1869-1880)* (OUP, 2015) and *The Metaphysical Society. Intellectual Life in Mid-Victorian England* (OUP, 2019). She also co-edited, with Jean-Paul Rosaye, an issue of the journal *Philosophical Enquiries on L idéalisme britannique – British Idealism* (Editions Matériologiques, 2018) and co-edited with Stéphane Guy, *The Victorian Legacy in Political Thought* (Peter Lang, 2014). She has just published a monograph entitled *Political Deference in a Democratic Age. British Politics and the Constitution from the Eighteenth Century to Brexit with Palgrave* (2021). Her next project is on the role and the invisibility of classical Liberal women as well as their impact on mid and late Victorian Britain.

Ivone Moreira



Ivone Moreira has a PhD in Modern Philosophy by the Universidade Católica Portuguesa. Currently she is an invited professor at the Institute for Political Studies of the same university, where she is a coordinator of the Masters programme in Political Science and International Relations. Ivone Moreira has publications in Political Philosophy, Modern Philosophy and Portuguese Philosophy in Brazil, Cambridge-UK, Hungary, Portugal, Spain and United States. She is a member of the Research Centre of the Institute for Political Studies and of the Scientific Society of Universidade Católica Portuguesa.

Ghia Nodia



Ghia Nodia is a professor of politics at Ilia Chavchavadze State University in Tbilisi, Georgia. He is also the founder and chairman of the Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development (CIPDD), an independent public policy

think tank in Tbilisi, Georgia. In February-December 2008, he served as the minister for education and science of Georgia.

His most recent publications include *Democracy* (in Georgian, Tbilisi: Ilia State University Publishing, 2019), and articles “Democracy’s Inevitable Elites”, *Journal of Democracy*, January 2020, “The New Georgia: Politics, Economy and Society”, in: Galina M. Yemelianova and Laurence Broers (Eds), *Routledge Handbook of the Caucasus* (Oxon, New York: Routledge, 2020), and “The Uncertain State of Georgia’s Democracy” (Brussels: CEPS, 2020).

Allen Packwood



Allen Packwood BA, MPhil (Cantab), is a Fellow of Churchill College at the University of Cambridge, the Director of the Churchill Archives Centre, and a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society. He was awarded an OBE for services to archives and scholarship in the 2016 Queen’s Birthday Honours. His book, *How Churchill Waged War*, was published by Pen & Sword in 2018.

The Churchill Archives Centre is located in the grounds of Churchill College, and is home to the papers of Sir Winston Churchill, Baroness Thatcher, Sir John Major and almost seven hundred of their contemporaries: politicians, diplomats, civil servants, military leaders and scientists of the modern era. It is still collecting. Allen likes to joke that it is the equivalent of four American Presidential Libraries!

Marc F. Plattner



Marc F. Plattner is founding co-editor of the *Journal of Democracy*, a quarterly publication launched in 1989 that addresses the problems and prospects of democracy around the world. He is also co-chair of the Research Council of the International Forum for Democratic Studies at the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Until 2016, when he reduced his schedule to part time, he was vice president for research and studies at NED, where he had served as director of program from 1984 to 1989. He is also the chair of the International Advisory Board for the M.A. in Governance, Leadership and Democracy Studies at the Universidade

Católica Portuguesa. Dr. Plattner graduated summa cum laude from Yale University and received his PhD in government from Cornell University. He is the author of *Democracy Without Borders? Global Challenges to Liberal Democracy* (2008) and *Rousseau's State of Nature* (1979). He has also coedited thirty books on contemporary issues relating to democracy.

Luís de Almeida Sampaio



Luís de Almeida Sampaio was born in Porto, in 1957. Law Degree, University of Coimbra, 1982. Diplomatic Service, 1983. Portuguese Delegation to NATO, 1987. Deputy-Director of the Private Office of NATO's Secretary General (Manfred Wörner), 1990-1993. Diplomatic Adviser to the Portuguese EC Commissioner (João de Deus Pinheiro), 1995-1998. NATO's Political Adviser to the COMSFOR (Commander of the Stabilization Force, US General Eric Shineski and US General Montgomery Meigs) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1998-1999. Minister Counsellor at the Embassy of Portugal in Luanda, Angola, 1999-2002. President of the Portuguese Institute for Development Cooperation, 2003-2004. Ambassador in Algiers, September 2004-2008. Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) Coordinator for the Portuguese Presidency of the European Union, 2007. Ambassador in Belgrade, 2008-2012. Ambassador in Berlin, 2012-2015. Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Portugal to NATO, 2015-2019. Ambassador in Prague, since December 2019.

Gary J. Schmitt



Gary J. Schmitt is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where he studies issues related to the American presidency & topics in national security. A former minority staff director of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Dr. Schmitt was executive director of the President's Intelligence Advisory Board. Before joining AEI, he was executive director of the Project for the New American Century. Dr. Schmitt is the author, coauthor, editor, and coeditor of many books. In the area of national security his most book is *A Hard Look at Hard Power: Assessing the Defense Capabilities of Key US Allies and Security Partners* (2nd edition, 2020). Dr. Schmitt has a PhD & MA in political science from the University of Chicago and a BA in politics from the University of Dallas.

Elton Skendaj

Dr. Elton Skendaj is Associate Director of the Democracy and Governance Program and Assistant Teaching Professor in the Government Department at Georgetown University. His teaching and research focus on strengthening democracy and governance in diverse contexts. His research on democratization, civil society mobilization, security sector reform, legal transfers, and anti-corruption policies in the Western Balkans has been published in peer-reviewed journals such as *Global Governance*, *Problems of Postcommunism*, and *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*. Outside of his academic role, Dr. Skendaj has provided leadership and technical expertise on practitioner projects with the United Nations, U.S. Institute for Peace, Hague Appeal of Peace, Westminster Foundation for Democracy, and the Open Society Institute. He has also served as an analyst for Freedom House and as President of the Society for Albanian Studies. Dr. Skendaj holds a BA in Political Science from American University in Bulgaria, an MA in International Peace Studies from the University of Notre Dame, and a PhD in Government from Cornell University.

"In democracy, as in everything in life, nothing is definitively conquered. That is why your meeting today is, allow me to say, perhaps one of the most important of the last 30 years. I'm sure you know. Thank you for having it, as always, in Portugal. The ocean and its horizons will certainly inspire the threshold of your ambition."

H. E. MARCELO REBELO DE SOUSA
President of the Portuguese Republic

"The Institute for Political Studies of the UCP continues to be a reservoir for a world-class education and informed debate in the increasingly tense environment of political activity. The Institute is an honest broker of democratic thought in Portugal, leveraging the debate and educating citizens capable of thinking strategically and responsibly about the future."

ISABEL CAPELOA GIL
Rector, Universidade Católica Portuguesa

"For 80 years, Estoril welcomed kings without crowns, aristocrats without titles and anonymous citizens from all over Europe. They were all equal in suffering at the hands of inhuman ideologies, criminal revolutions, and relentless fanaticism.

The beacon of humanity and pluralism that never went out in this land is now, in 2022, a light of shelter for those escaping from the war in Ukraine."

CARLOS CARREIRAS
Mayor of Cascais

"We have always made clear our attachment to the classical understanding of the Idea of a University as a place of learning – as Michael Oakeshott, another of our great mentors, used to say. This means the understanding of a University as a place for the pursuit of Truth, the Good and the Beautiful – and not as a place of propaganda."

JOÃO CARLOS ESPADA
Director and Founder of IEP-UCP

"Some of our Portuguese colleagues from other Universities, are sometimes surprised by the success of this unplanned evolution of what has become a great institution of friends of liberty. However, whenever they join us at the Estoril Political Forum, they too, are touched by the atmosphere of orderly liberty which we celebrate in these meetings."

RITA SEABRA BRITO
Director Estoril Political Forum (Since 2008)

AUTHORS

MARC F. PLATTNER · CARL GERSHMAN · GHIA NODIA · ALLEN PACKWOOD
LUIS DE ALMEIDA SAMPAIO · DORA GYÓRFFY · OLENA KOLODIY · CATHERINE MARSHALL
DANIEL BRUMBERG · ELTON SKENDAJ · IAN CROWE · IVONE MOREIRA
WILLIAM GALSTON · GARY J. SCHMITT · GIANDOMENICA BECCHIO · LUDGER GRUBER