

An Encounter by Another Name
O Último Dia de Leão as a 'beyond' and 'before' experience

The experience of an *encounter* populates Tim Ingold's 2011 book *Being Alive: Essays on Movement, Knowledge, and Description*. Although Ingold decisively critiques premediated colonial encounters of the human mind and proposes a grounded approach for postcolonial encounters, his insights fall short of addressing the experience within the technological condition. Through a posthuman critique, the articulation of the experience from being purely in the physiologically *here and now* has seen a marked shift towards the transversal capacity of it trespassing linear temporal-spaces but also political, ecological, and social intersections (Ingold 2011; Haraway 2016; Braidotti 2018).

However, while work in the field of postcolonial and posthuman studies has aimed to highlight the very aggression that has manifested in the mechanisms of the Modernity/ Coloniality project – delineating the encounter as a *strategy* primarily as acts of violence, a theoretical transgression through Sara Ahmed allows me to elaborate the experience as mediations that demonstrate the partial perception of encounters. With a reading of *O Último Dia de Leão (Leo's Last Day)*, a performance by Nany Dayanne, set within the condition of linguistic incommunicability, I present the mediated gesture of the experience, one aided with Ahmed's understanding of it as an ethical 'before' and 'beyond', and present a proposition for an encounter by another name.

Keywords: Encounters, Post-human subjectivity, Mediation, Ethics, Performance

Bionote

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1. Introduction

The following paper, as the title suggests, is a proposition to find, construct, or perceive the experience of an encounter in another way. By addressing key articulations of what the experience does, or, what it can and must do, I suppose that, although influential, the employment of the term *encounter* may not hold ground to understand the experience that emerges. The contours of an encounter by another name are being drawn with the help of literature from the fields of urban studies, anthropology, ecoculture, posthumanities, and feminist studies. While, I have paid attention to it through a decolonial lens in the past, through this presentation I hope to be able to articulate why the encounter, a strategy employed in physical, intellectual, and embodied warfare for the colonial project could be a) understood through other fields in Culture Studies that critique coloniality b) how insights provided by them allow the experience to be considered through a different epistemic, and c) that contemporary theatre is one kind of format that helps elucidate the new epistemic.

In what follows, I begin by a reading a description of *O Último Dia de Leão*, a performance by a Brazilian DJ and musician Nany Triângulo, to flesh out the central assumption – *that the phenomenon of encountering, while presenting certain similarities to its colonial counterpart, transforms into a different phenomenon when passed through a different assemblage*. Aiding the reading of this performance are writings that help reconstruct the assemblage which constitutes the experience: Tim Ingold's book *Being Alive: Essays on Movement, Knowledge, and Description* (2011), Rosi Bradotti's writings around posthuman subjectivity and knowledge (2013:2019), and chapters from Sara Ahmed's *Strange Encounters: Embodied Others in Post-Coloniality* (2001).

O Último Dia de Leão (Leo's Last Day) was performed for the second time during the Alcantara Festival 2023 in Lisbon, Portugal by Nany Triângulo. A story in seven parts, the showing-ceremony-theatre was a sharing of the monumental moments in her life, each initiated through the act of uttering 'the first time I...', followed by the telling and performance of the stories which defined who she was to become. Employing a non-linear progression in relation to calendar dates, the ordering of the narrative is done in a way to weave her personal experiences – spanning across the years from her childhood to a couple of years before the show, between Brazil and Portugal, and in spaces shared, borrowed, and escaped from – with the public, by ordering the narrative construction through *firsts*.

The narration expressed by her during the show, while largely escaping my vocabulary, provided some anchorage:

A primeira pessoa [...] puta foi minha mãe....

...A primeira [...] preta...

...A primeira [...] comi Cheesecake...

...A primeira [...] gata...

...A primeira [...] corpo...

...A primeira¹...

With a limited vocabulary in Portuguese at the point, ‘a primeira’ presented itself as signposts, not unlike academic headers, curtain calls, signal lights, class bells, church bells, and other gestures that order temporality. It ordered the experience of what I knew about Nany not through her identity, not through her career, but through the first time she experienced something, requiring me to consider everything that followed as a new experience in her life. In that, she had never been called a whore by her mother before, never tried cheesecake, never knew a cat, or had a cat or something about a cat, and never knew her *self* as a black body. Never had she perceived herself in the manner she would hereon, and I was there to see how she dealt with these realisations.

Keeping in mind the limited access to the language, constructions of Nany’s identity through the clothes, media, sound, and lights, afforded the construction of a “new figuration of subjectivity in a multidifferentiated non-hierarchical way” (Braidotti 1994, 146). Additionally, this experience was not just encountering the information I already had about her but was tuning into the movements my own body had undergone during the first time I realised that I was a brown body, the first time I recognised the body of a cat, the first time I had realised the dichotomy of women perceived as a whore or a mother.

Lastly, while I couldn’t understand the verbal narration except for those written above, and while the semiotic space created by the props overlapped in some capacity with my own semiotic knowledge, I believe that the kind of encounter that took place allows for a transcendence of what Sara Ahmed calls ‘stranger fetishism’ (Ahmed 2000, 168). According to her, a truly feminist encounter, a face-to-face with the before and beyond, rather than highlighting the *particular other*, disallows an absolute assimilation of the other and thereby opens “the encounter up, to fail to grasp it” (145).

¹ The first time [...] whore called my mother

The first time[...] black

The first time[...] ate cheesecake

The first time[...] my cat

The first time[...] body

The first time

The above translation is my own based on the lack of linguistic knowledge during the performance.

Let me consider this by discussing the third chapter of the show and demonstrate the inconclusiveness of the experience. The preceding scene, which I partially understood to be about the first time Nany realized that she was a black body², ends with a *Semazen* or Sufi like twirling on stage, making Nany, her violin, her gown, and her music twirl upward into nothingness. As the music slows down, the image dissolves into the fading light, and Nany slips out of the green gown, picking up a pink dress that alludes to a kind of sensuality that the previous scene, despite the presence of nudity, had escaped. She looks into an invisible mirror, touches up her face, and turns to begin a third monologue. But only the following sticks with me,

A primeira - Cheesecake ----- The first ... cheesecake

She sits on the arm of an office chair, rotating in place, slowly, intentionally, as her voice gets deeper, more inviting. She brings out a cake, a cheesecake I presume. She is still speaking, and yet all I have gathered as of now is that it had to do with the first experience of some kind which *she* had with the cheesecake,

A primeira - Cheesecake ----- The first time I...cheesecake

She brings the cheesecake to the centre of the chair. As she continues her story, she licks the sides of the cake. She is still speaking, but this time another word stays,

A primeira – comi Cheesecake ----- The first time I...eat cheesecake

As she continues the story, which as far as I could sense, was still about the first time she ate a cheesecake, she stops revolving around the chair, halts at the front of it, lifts the bottom of her dress and sits on the cake and stops talking. In the silence during which the touch between her body and the cheesecake got more pronounced, I reconsidered two things. First, that she could be talking about her first-time eating something more than a cheesecake, and second, that at least a large part of the audience had realized this at the same moment I had.

At this point Nany gets up, picks up the cake, walks in the direction of the watchers who oscillated between being spectators and voyeurs and offers them the cake. While most decline, someone from the front row calls out to her and cuts a piece off for themselves, and by touching the cake with their body, at once, disrupts the spatial distance, the scenography, the temporality, and the meaning of the piece. By offering the cake there was an opening in the

² Since watching the show, Nany and I have met multiple times. During these meetings, other than clarifying certain interpretations I made, I have also conducted interviews at a later stage that allowed me to gain access to the script of the performance along with explanations from Nany regarding certain scenographic and performative decisions. While the interview is not a material for analysis in this essay, I do examine it for a different version of the paper. The decision to leave out the interview is partially due to the length of this paper but also as the focus of this paper is limited to the re-evaluation of the elements that constitute an encounter.

assemblage that made up the scene until now, and by reaching out and accepting a piece, the audience member had, for themselves and the rest of us, introduced themselves into it, while also accepting Nany and us into theirs.

The sharing of the eating process of a cheesecake that had directly touched Nany, the acceptance of it by another, the relieved laughter that followed the acceptance, and the shift in the spatiality of the show after this moment, engulfed me into a particularity of a micro-encounter within the broader encounter(s) that the experience was and further situated within. That the performance, a narration of Nany's own life, was expressed in a language foreign to me, is a critical condition for loaning insights from author's mentioned earlier in this paper. It is also the condition that frames the experience of the show and my proposition for a new term. For, it is through this very linguistic *incommunicability between two migrant bodies* that I examine the emergence of an encounter by a different name. To reach Ahmed's understanding of the encounter as a *beyond and before*, I will now draw a trajectory of the experience as a colonial strategy up until its manifestation in the contemporary technological condition.

2. Theoretical Detours

In the chapter *Culture on the Ground: The World Perceived Through the Feet*, Tim Ingold provides an astute and elaborate genealogy of the human body, its evolution from quadruple to bipedal creatures, and the significance of this physiological development – one different from other animals and *things*– for the success of Modernity. Namely, the disproportionate enlargement of the brain in relation to the size of humans, the development of opposable thumbs, and a “suite of anatomical changes” that resulted in bipedality (33). Historically, “the rebalancing of the head upon the neck, the characteristic S-shaped curvature of the back, the broadening of the pelvis and the straightening of the legs”, theatrically illustrated in *Man's Place in Nature* (1863) by T.H. Huxley, has been correlated to the higher potential offered by the hands (34). Referring to the subsequent ‘physiological division of labour’ – that separates at the waist, the functions of the hand and torso from the legs and feet – Ingold describes how the divide contributed to the relegation of the hand as the employee of the human mind – “Above all, bipedal posture liberated the hands for the use and manufacture of tools” (ibid.), released the material (lower) body from “the powers of intellect” (35), and thus the idea of Man being able to produce their reality – “his pre-eminence in the animal kingdom” (33). Such a perception presupposed an idea of the rest of the environment by humans, subsequently proceeding to encounter that which is already predetermined.

According to Maan Barua, such propositions largely concern colonial endeavours, within which “that building precedes dwelling, with only humans bearing the capacity to build or to ‘produce’ space; that humans and animals are not inhabitants but occupants of an already furnished world; that the ‘in here’ of society is separate and purified from the ‘out there’ of nature” (Barua 2015, 268). The experience of encounters, within such a project, disposes off the possibility of the inconceivable or forthcoming qualities. It defines, by restricting the possibilities that the other has to offer, and as a result encloses that which sits outside the conceptions of the mind, into strict hierarchies.

2.1.2 Dismantling the dualism – towards embodied postcoloniality

As noted by Ingold, the above physiological separation, resulted in the construction of at least three binaries and therefore hierarchies; the human mind over the human body, the Western Man over the rest of humanity, and the human body strategically higher in the evolutionary chain than the rest of the ecology. That humans had departed, even if partially, from crawling through nature to walking over it, and had done so due to their inherent ‘coupling of the hands and the brain’ (35), suggested a subscription to the idea that the body vis-à-vis the feet, lack a cerebral potential. Moving through nature was considered at a lower level of intelligence, if at all, compared to the capacity of manipulating and working on the material environment. The ideal human emerges as follows:

Marching head over heels – half in nature, half out – the human biped figures as a constitutionally divided creature. The dividing line, roughly level with the waist, separates the upper and lower parts of the body. Whereas *the feet, impelled by biomechanical necessity*, undergird, and propel the body within the natural world, the *hands are free to deliver the intelligent designs or conceptions* of the mind upon it: for the former, nature is the medium through which the body moves; to the latter it presents itself as a surface to be transformed (35 emphasis added)

These divisions, and subsequent hierarchies, are, according to him circumstantial rather than immanent to humans alone, and according to him, it is by thinking through the feet, by returning to the ground, and by recognizing that it is the movement of the feet that provides a different kind of conception, one that perceives humans to dwell in rather than walk over the environment. Thereby grounding encounters, as embodied and embedded experiences, with a “fundamental orientation to the ground” (Ingold 2011, 45). For Ingold, the argument that the feet and their footwork are imperative to the development of humans is closely tied to the idea that the locomotive capacity of the lower body divulges a perceptive potential that is postcolonial. While the Modern/Colonial project declares the primacy of the hands and its relationship to the brain for the subsequent rise of civilizations, Ingold points out that the

“primary tactile contact” between the environment and the body happens through the movement afforded by the (body) feet (Ingold, 16), thereby putting it in direct relation to the moving ground.

2.1.3 Bodies in Action

In a later chapter *Point, Line, Counterpoint: From Environment to Fluid Space*, Ingold asks a critical question that foregrounds the primacy of movement – “What kind of meaning can there be in the absence of symbolic representations” (77). Relieving himself from the realm of mainstream psychology, he wilfully resists the idea that every action is preceded by mental, semiotic, and cultural representations. From here he navigates the various ideas presented by James Gibson – where perception is that which comes to life in the process of use, supposing that the environment, already imbued with all possible qualities, is activated by the way in which it is specifically used (79) ; Jakob von Uexküll, who recognised that perception was built based on the need of the bodies in question, thereby ascertaining subjectivity (*Umwelt* – subjective universe) to perception; and Martin Heidegger who presents both of the above suggesting that humans perceive based on the body first and its reading of the object it encounters, and mentally intervenes only when there is a “loss of meaning that occurs when action fails” (81).

Not entirely satisfied, Ingold turns to Gilles Deleuze for whom life “is lived not within a perimeter but along lines” (83) forming a meshwork of different perceptions existing at different proximities and distances, and Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory that circumscribes agency and perception to be “distributed around all elements that are connected or mutually implicated in a field of action” (85). The former suggests lines along which bodies move towards or away from each other, the latter supposes lines to be the architectural highways of the network which is inhabited by the bodies. Despite reasonable argumentation, Ingold, while convinced by the idea that bodies as bundles of lines, move along lines, displays a preference for the understanding of life processes from a biological perspective “wherein boundaries [such as the ground and skin] are sustained only thanks to the continual flow of materials across them” (ibid.), moving towards but also interconnected.

2.1.4 Leaky things – Veins, Nerves, and Lines

According to him, perception occurs through the synchronicity of different kind of “material flows and movements contributing to their – and our – ongoing formation” (88). It is necessary to remember that he is thinking with the life processes that are informed by the biology of bodies, also known as “line of becomings [...] that prise an opening, even as they

bind the animal with its world” (83). Furthermore, observing a leaky quality in the skin of the body, Ingold believes that just as “in a material sense, lines are what organisms are made of” (86), so is the skin of the body which includes “bodily ‘tissues’, “nerve, muscle, blood vessels and so on” (Thomson in Ingold, 87). The permeability of the skin that is only a “semi-enclosure”, is also always entangling the inside to the outside and is of itself also always entangled with various matter. Here, his argument for perception through the feet can be further unpacked.

Through this, Ingold builds his argument towards an eco-cultural perspective. *Thinking with* is not simply the borrowing of a different methodology but a process for attuning to – “to perceive the environment is not to look back on the things to be found in it, or to discern their congealed shapes and layouts, but to join with them in their material flows and movements contributing to their – and our – ongoing formation” (88). For Ingold, the problems of modernity lie not just in the dualisms that it created, but also in the rhythmic disconnect of materials it contributed to. This is not to say that cultural representation can be entirely separated from the endeavour of synchronising with various lines of life, but more so to address the need for recognition of the material flows that inhabit us and the environment we inhabit. Not only does this reclaim the material from the colonial reputation it has held for so long, but also, makes space for ways of perception, tacit to the material world we inhabit – restoring perception to the movement of the ground.

For Ingold, all movement “unfolds within the ‘network of movements’ in which the existence of every living being, animal or human, is suspended” (Leroy-Gourhan in Ingold, 60). What is earlier presented as rhythm is the coupling of movements that further couple with other movements or rhythms in action. But rather than suggesting consistency, ‘rhythmicity’ implies “imperfections in the system that call for continuous correction” or difference (60). However, he does not extend this rhythmic capacity to technology. Briefly touching upon the withering of technology due to the environment, his remorse with the advancement of technology seems to limit the recognition of the new attunements or attentions that the material of digital technologies afford. It could be assumed that his critique of technology if considered against the industrial revolution or capitalistic production, is towards the dismantling of technological advancements that seek to extract, colonise, and affect the continuity of flow. But enough has not been said by him about this topic. Therefore, I will now turn to those who seem to situate his observations within the current technological condition.

2.2 Beyond the human subject – subjectivity of feminist posthuman assemblages

In *A Cyborg Manifesto* (1984:2016), Haraway proposes a speculative figure of the Cyborg – as an intellectual and actual future. This cyborg is a “hybrid of machine and animal” (Haraway, 5), inhabiting both, our social reality and scientific fiction (6). Her proposition, directed towards a socialist feminist movement, sought to dismantle the anthropocentric bodily and embodied weight placed on the imagined borderlands between men and women, humans and machines, humans and animals, and humans and technology, towards an “effort to build an ironic political myth faithful to feminism” (5). By recognising the proliferation of technology, not only does Haraway recognise a future that disturbs monopolised power, specifically for the benefit of those who have been historically marginalised, but also recognizes the emergence of a different kind of becoming that is made possible by paying attention to different kind of intimacies. In a Haraway-ian world, the human-technology collaboration is being addressed similarly to Ingold’s human-becomings, animal-becomings, and plant-becomings.

Haraway’s figure, speculative for the time it was first written during, is not hard to imagine in contemporary times. Her figuration of the cyborg was drawn out of the will to evoke a different story from that which originated out of biological, western, and colonial classification. She believed, and continues to, that the dualisms that justified how the rational world was structured, were designed by and towards the benefit of a very minor, primarily western, male population. In what Ingold critiques and what Haraway is resisting, an overlap is hard to deny. Both argue against the ideal human (male, western, white) body and perception, both move away from the canon formed by the West, and both suggest that there is a need for a different story.

Hereon, Haraway takes it all apart and puts it back together to present the *cyborg* – a figure with no single origin story, thereby no singular homogenous past it is rebelling against. This figure transgresses not only spatial unities, but also historical-temporal, biological, and political commonalities. This blasphemous, “illegitimate promise” of the cyborg is an amalgamation of human, more-than-human, cultural, and technological. It has always been present but is easier to imagine with the development of medicine, digital technology, and globalization in the 20th century. Bereft of the innocence that Ingold ascribes to the grounded culture of Japan, Haraway’s cyborg is not simply a naïve ontological alternative to the West. Instead, this figuration, is an accumulated body, unbound by the skin of the human body, and loyal to disobedient gestures. A body born out of attention to a different physiology, attending to an equally mutative ecology.

The figuration must not be misinterpreted simply as a hybrid individual subject (think of Ex-machina, the sphynx, Ganesha, Stelarc) that is part human part non-human. A cyborg is less theatrical if understood through posthuman subjectivity. According to philosopher and feminist theorist Rosi Braidotti, when viewed through this lens, the figuration of the cyborg does not just transcend the universalist image of the 'Man' and human exceptionalism visually and biologically but affects at a deeper level, answers to who we are, how we think, and how we come together in the new reality. Critical to this is the proximity with digital technologies that have created new possibilities on at least two levels.

Firstly, that it offers the feminist movement access to each other, not simply as a social-political action for *women* ("There is nothing about being "female" that naturally binds women" (Haraway 2016, 16)), but as a way to affect the distances that separate the diverse feminisms. Secondly, that in its ubiquity, it has shifted linear processes of knowing to dissimilar, unequal, and knowing differently about different things at different times. So much so that by the time I encountered Nany, I already (partially) knew of the narrative she was going to share, had a face to her name, had time to read about the queer movement in Brazil, and recognise the overlaps between parts of her and parts of me – all afforded by the parts of her and me present online. She had escaped, in a deterministic fashion, to remain an object of curiosity.

While critics of posthumanism allude to a nihilism towards humanity (Habermas in Braidotti 2013, 2), or presume it to be a utopia that ignores the inhumanity that comes with the ascent of digital technologies (think social sorting, surveillance, or war technologies) posthumanism, unlike the common perception of being an evolution or extinction of the human, is in fact "normatively neutral [...] both situated and partial *and* a spectrum through which we can capture the complexity of ongoing processes of subject-formation" (5-6). It is already here; it has in some ways, always been here. The agenda of the posthuman is geared towards processes of thinking and perceiving, towards the concept of subjectivity as an "assemblage", and towards a *thinking with* as a *becoming with* non-humans. Rather than perceive subjectivity as the *I* that defines the postcolonial or decolonial rhetoric, or a subjectivity that is a hyphenated outcome of transhumanism, subjectivity in the posthuman suggests a condition that considers a relational *continuity* between nature-culture (ibid.).

Such a formation "lives without bodily boundaries", "troubles humans' epistemic arrogance of locating knowledge", "resists the desire to fix meanings" (Murriss and Bozalek 2019, 1506-1507), and considers "objectivity" insofar as it is "a matter of responsibility and not a matter of [rational] distancing [and separating] at all" (Barad, 57). Ingold's eco-cultural

critique and posthumanism seek to question the colonial endeavour to demarcate objects through material boundaries and instead actively paying attention to material flows between individuals. Both consider the need to find new ways of becoming with other individuals that disrupt the colonial classifications and capitalist individualism. Both seek to convey the importance of attunement with other individuals not as objects but as moving, inconcrete, inconclusive “openings” or “*outline of movements*” (Ingold 2011, 13, emphases added), “subject formations” (Braidotti 2013, 12), or “myth” of new social reality (Haraway 2016, 52), and a “*struggle for language and the struggle against perfect communication, against the one code that translates all meaning perfectly, the central dogma of phallogocentrism*” (57, emphases added).

Hereon, posthumanism takes Ingold’s bundle of lines that articulate the internal and external as entangled and moving with each other and suggests that there is something more happening. In that the proliferation of digital technologies requires attention to be paid to its material affordances. If the engagement with technology as put forth by Haraway and Braidotti is significant to the feminist movement but also to humanity and thereby the idea of the environment, there must be something said about the way perception is different if we consider how humans move with the lines of technological spatiality and temporality. Here may lie a possible answer as to how I comprehended what was being expressed by Nany without understanding what was being said. *Had perhaps these bodies, encountered each other differently at a different time? Had part of the encounter already happened and also in the making? Was there already a knowing or familiarity to the experience of being seated in the auditorium and watching Nany? Could such encounters be designed as a way to disrupt the here and now of encounters that are charged with colonial endeavours? Or would designing it take away from the contingency of posthuman encounters?* How does one conduct an enquiry into encounters that transcend boundaries? While the possibilities of this are as unlimited as imaginable, I sustain my enquiry through a phenomenological method adopted by Sara Ahmed, a scholar known infamously for her writings in feminist theory, affect theory, queer theory, and critical race theory.

Sara Ahmed addresses the practice of ordering in her book *Strange Encounters: Embodied Others in Postcoloniality* (2000). In the chapter *Close encounters: Feminism and/in ‘the globe’*, with a re-remembering of the day 30th of August, 1995 as a day that constitutes her birthday but also the day of the UN Conference of Women, Ahmed illustrates how the recognition of an overlap of the two events, one, a public, televised gathering and another a private periodical moment of time, is one way to unpack the intricacies of her argument for a

digital feminist movement. According to her, “feminism must encounter, not women who can be recognised as strangers or friends, but the very encounters that already mediate the relationship between different women who, as distant others, are always close by” (164). Her motivation to understand feminist encounters is to consider the transversal quality of feminist unities that is neither tied by the common idea of what it means to be a woman at a distance nor to be included only by being in physical proximity. For her, ordering narratives that bring together “what is already encountered” elsewhere (ibid.) can be a way to frame the encounter as a mediated, transversal, before, and beyond experience.

Her motivation to understand feminist encounters is to consider the transversal quality of feminist unities that is neither tied by the common idea of what it means to be a woman at a distance nor to be included only by being in physical proximity. For her, an encounter is a manner of ordering narratives that bring together “what is already encountered” elsewhere (ibid.). Ahmed believes that it is through these ordered, re-ordered, and disordered encounters – which reconciles the public ordering of time with the individual inhabitation of it – that we can find a sense of belonging and new forms of collective meanings (162). Furthermore, she goes on to consider the way such mediations may occur – via media, text, and stories, that bring together, actors at a distance and proximity, within the experience of an encounter. This paper has been a long route towards illustrating Ahmed’s proposition of encounters that are “ways of encountering what is already encountered” (ibid.) and a way(s) of being “in it” (167), that moves beyond “sameness and difference” (180).

While the degree of meaning-made is not the focus of this paper, the meaning(s) made afforded by the material dialogue that Nany has with the cake, that the audience has with the cake, that the presence of the cake does for the rest of the audience, that the eating of the cake by the audience, my knowledge about the queer movement in Portugal, my relation to it in India and the Netherlands, or even the mediated presence of Nany’s work online, our interactions after and since, is the assemblage I pay attention to. In that, my senses, in collaboration with the props, the atmosphere of the space, the lighting, and to an extent her movement, but also the person in the front row, their audacity to eat from the same cake, and the reaction of the crowd that cheered this gesture, were helping me attune to different rhythms that formed the experience. I was but a part of the subjectivity that was making meaning of this experience.

3. Partial Conclusions

According to Braidotti and Haraway, posthuman knowledge is partial, mutable, generative, ongoing, and accumulative knowledge, which doesn't force absolutism but seeks to find patterns of difference, through which new knowledge is formed. Ahmed operates under a similar belief, in that the experience of an encounter, produces not accumulative knowledge but partial perception, in which parts are ungraspable. Taking a step back, Ingold's Deluzean understanding of *things* as becomings or bundles of lines, that move with each other addresses also, how attentions move towards and away from each other. This leads me to believe that not only is there a continuity between Ahmed, Braidotti, Haraway, and Ingold, but also that there is something to say about the encounter when viewed through perception in motion. In other words, if an encounter is not only in the here and now, but also of "that which is 'beyond' and 'before' being" (Ahmed 2000, 138), is there a need to reconsider the etymological *in* and *contra* (*against*) of an encounter?

Specific but not limited to the cultural object examined in the paper, the contemporary times in performing arts – one mediated through various artforms, formats, languages, histories, and narrative styles – could facilitate a new vocabulary for the same. Nany, by intentionally opening up the invite to non-Portuguese speakers, demands attention towards the other expressions present in the show, engulfing at the same time expanding what is being said in a different manner. In some ways her intent harkens to Donna Haraway's call against a singular language. Through this non-unification, *O Último Dia de Leão* is a titular example of a humbler posthuman reality, one that doesn't subscribe to "the way of a Silicon Valley delusion, that this is a homogeneous or linear manner conducive to the composition of a more performative and enhanced pan-humanity" (Braidotti 2019, 228).

Although in a different paper I focus on the shift in what constitutes a body in the contemporary condition, this paper is not an attempt at a creatively and technologically new imaginary of the body. It is neither an abstract future towards which we move. This is a more mundane imagination towards a slower method of thinking with the assemblage we are a part of. It is, as observed by Haraway and Braidotti, our reality, towards which, not only do we need to invest attention, but a different kind of attention. Joining them in this pursuit is feminist and postcolonial scholar Sara Ahmed, who although doesn't position herself in the field of posthumanities, has provided a conceptually creative understanding of the experience. To even begin to propose a new vocabulary, there needs to be an intense and mutative recalibration in the understanding of who 'we' are and how we perceive where our bodies end and another begins. And through this, the experience of encounter which has been

contained heavily to the here and now, explodes into something that is *beyond and before being*.

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