



CATÓLICA
INSTITUTO DE ESTUDOS POLÍTICOS

LISBOA

DISSERTATION

Emerging threats to Nigeria's National Security

Case Study: Boko Haram

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Lisbon, October 2022

Approximate Total Word Count:22,500

Bibliography:2,417

Appreciation

I would like to appreciate everyone who contributed to the success of my Masters program, from the commencement to its completion.

A special thank you my supervisor, Professor Francisco Proença Garcia who was with me all the way and for his immense support during these months of research and writing.

And to my loving husband, Nuno Queiroz who eagerly encouraged me to pursue this program knowing I could do it, thank you love. I appreciate your support and sacrifices especially leaving your workplace in faraway Africa earlier than scheduled to return to Portugal so I could attend my in-person exams. Also, to my wonderful children, Miguel, Mel and Emma, thanks for being my motivation. Mel, at 11, you took responsibilities as an adult. Thanks for making dinner for your siblings while I had classes either via zoom or at the university.

To my parents, Mercy and Izzy and siblings – Chichi, Nono, Obinna, Iyke (RIP), Orji and Okechi, you all are the best family anyone could ask for. Thanks for the constant prayers and unflinching support throughout this academic adventure. Iyke, your spirit lives on. I know you are proud of me from above knowing I did it!

Finally, to the friends I made while at school, João Payne Arantes, Rui Moital, Mariana Pacheco, Noemi Nagy, amongst others. Thanks guys. We will sure keep in touch.

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Abstract

Boko Haram, the deadly terrorist sect has gained an international sensation and there is “*no stopping them*”. From the 2011 UN building bomb attack to the 2014 abduction of over 270 Chibok girls which brought about the hashtag *#bringbackourgirls*, there have been uncountable loss of lives and properties.

Over the years, despite its split into various factions, this has neither disintegrated, slowed them down in their deadly executions nor mitigated their widespread tentacles in recruiting members both in Nigeria and across its neighbouring states.

This emerging security threat has hampered the sustainable development of Nigeria affecting its very hem both in the economic, social, and political sectors, as well as education, thereby creating animosity in ethnic and religious cleavages which have resulted to clashes and conflicts.

This thesis aims to analyse emerging threats to Nigeria’s national security and to investigate the growing security challenges that have progressed beyond national borders. From the North-East to the South-South geopolitical regions of the country, the nation is facing a very difficult task to curb terrorism and insecurities that are threatening its foundations.

The Boko Haram insurgency, banditry, kidnapping, farmer/herdsmen conflicts, destruction of the country’s oil facilities by the Niger Delta militants, human trafficking, child abduction, cultism, etc will be analysed in this work to better comprehend its consequences in the Nigerian State.

Chapter 1

1.1 Introduction

Threats and insecurity are not new terms in the global arena. They are actually the most commonly used terms prominent in the world today, proving that no nation state is immune to any form of threat or insecurity be it manmade or natural climatic threat.

Contemporary discussions in Nigeria have centered mainly on issues surrounding insecurity, militancy, insurgency, and terrorism due to their linkages with economic, social, and political activities, with spiraling effect on regional and international relations.

In 1999, Nigeria returned to a democratic rule and has encountered an upsurge in violent activities especially by Boko Haram, being at the forefront. The Boko Haram faction has become a huge threat to Nigeria and its neighbours as their activities have spread, thereby prompting internal and international security concerns. With consistent violent attacks on security forces, civilians, schools, churches, mosques, farms, media houses as well as international bodies such as the United Nations office in Abuja in 2011, it has further compounded several challenges already faced by the country; especially in the northeast (Adedoyin, 2013).

Talking about these emerging threats in Nigeria, we are faced with various questions as seen below.

Research Questions

- What is security and what is a threat?
- What are the implications of insecurity in Nigeria?
- What are the existing and emerging threats in Nigeria?
- What are the root causes of insecurity in Nigeria?
- What are the remedies to the security challenges in Nigeria?

For this purpose, this work channels its aim to achieve the following: -

Objectives of the Study

- Identify the existing and emerging threats in Nigeria.
- Highlight the causes of insecurity in Nigeria.
- State the implications of insecurity in Nigeria.
- Proffer remedies to security challenges in Nigeria.

State of the Art

Despite its boundless human and economic potential, Nigeria is faced with menacing socioeconomic, governance and security challenges. The intense insecurities faced in Nigeria have been of immense concern and have been growing fiercer with the years.

To understand the security challenges faced in Nigeria, one ought to first comprehend the exact national problems faced in Nigeria. These security threats can encompass national security, international security as well as individual security. All these intertwined with the other, tend to question the role of military power and disarmament in apparent intelligence of the state's national defence.

According to Chinua Achebe: "Whenever two Nigerians meet, their conversation will sooner or later slide into a litany of our national deficiencies. The trouble with Nigeria has become the subject of our small talk in much the same way as the weather is for the English" (Achebe, 1984).

Nigeria's top security, governance, and socioeconomic challenges are not just "national deficiencies," as Achebe described, but rather complex, overlapping, and deep-seated impediments keeping Africa's most populous country and largest economy from realizing its immense potential. (Campbell & Page 2018)

1.2. Concepts of Security and Threats

Analysing individual security is crucial because people represent in one sense, the irreducible basic unit to which the concept of security can be applied (Buzan, 1983). Security encompasses in its entirety every measure designed to safeguard and protect the citizens of any given state. It stretches beyond to the protection of the resources of its people, groups, businesses, and the nations against any violent occurrence or sabotage.

Every society, group and individual on earth has its way of dealing with questions of human security. Nobody is immune. Non-believers often assume that religious people have a greater existential security than they do themselves, but such a generalisation is unwarranted. If one belongs to a religion with a notion of hell, or divine intervention, or both, then one had better mind one's step (Eriksen et al, 2010).

Conventionally, the concepts of threat and security are so broad as they contain ideological elements making it difficult to arrive at widely accepted definitions.

Several scholars have tried to define security, but this has resulted to different conceptual meanings according to numerous academicians. Security and development are undeniably linked as insecurity is a breeding ground for stagnation and poverty.

Human security according to the United Nations Development Programme, is about living free from want, free from fear and free from indignity. It is about protecting what we humans care most about in our lives (UNDP, 2022).

Security is about the pursuit of freedom from threat (Waever et al, 1993). The authors further argued that security is always relative as the degree of security increases if threats are of low intensities and vulnerabilities few while it decreases as threats become more intense and vulnerabilities more numerous.

Similarly, security according to Alamika (2006:1) connotes the “absence of threats to (i) the sovereign powers and territorial integrity of a nation; (ii) the capability of a country’s government (iii) safety of the people and their property; and (iv) freedom of citizens from oppressive rule, economic exploitation, discrimination and exclusion, diseases, homelessness, starvation, ignorance and illiteracy, environmental degradation, and all forms of structural and criminal violence. It is further regarded as protection from danger, violence, fear and want that harm or is capable of impairing the full development and wellbeing of citizens.

Security can therefore be considered as an interplay between the vulnerabilities of the unit, in this case the state and the threats it faces (Waever et al, 1993)

Likewise, security is in both objective and subjective dimensions. While the objective dimension indicates the extent of security or insecurity of individuals, families, communities, societies, classes and nations, the subjective dimension of security shows the feeling of security or insecurity by individuals, groups, and nations. Nevertheless, the two dimensions are interrelated (Dowrick, Dunlop & Quiggin, 2003).

Because security is a core concept in any nation state, the lapse of it can create a vacuum thereby leading to threats which in other ways can destabilize the state in various ways.

In general, threats are without boundaries and are interconnected. Every threat to international security enlarges the risk of other threats. (UN, 2004)

To achieve a widely accepted term for the definition of a threat, the UN recognised the six clusters of threats as (i) economic and social threat including (poverty, infectious diseases, and environmental degradation), (ii) inter-State conflict, (iii) internal conflict including (civil war, genocide, and other large-scale atrocities), (iv) nuclear (radiological, chemical, biological weapons), (v) terrorism and (vi) transnational organised crime.

Thus, threat in this context can be said to be any event or process that leads to large-scale death or lessening of life chances and undermines States as the basic unit of the international system. (UN, 2004)

The security of a society can be threatened by whatever puts its 'we' identity into jeopardy. (Buzan in Waeber et al, 1993)

Out of the six clusters of threats recognised by the UN, it can be easily identified, four of these threats imminent in Nigeria - economic and social threat, internal conflict, terrorism, and transnational organised crime.

Furthermore, Barry Buzan stated that social threats come in a wide variety of forms, but there are four obvious basic types: physical threats (pain, injury, death), economic threats (seizure or destruction of property, denial of access to work or resources -unemployment), threats to rights (imprisonment, denial of normal civil liberties), threats to position or status (demolition, public humiliation). (Buzan, 1983). Likewise, from the above assertion of Buzan, one can also deeply identify the prevalence of these forms of social threats in Nigeria proving that it is a country facing various forms of threats. In Campbell (2018), the authors cited that "Nigeria's socioeconomic challenges are deep rooted and multifaceted. They include rapid population growth, a lack of public services and Nigerians' over-reliance on subsistence agriculture and petty trading to make ends meet" (Campbell & Page 2018).

According to Kofi Annan, "Human security, in its broadest sense, embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his or her potential. Every step in this direction is also a step towards reducing poverty, achieving economic growth, and preventing conflict. Freedom from want, freedom from fear, and the freedom of future

generations to inherit a healthy natural environment -- these are the interrelated building blocks of human – and therefore national – security.” (UN, 2000)

The relevance of individual security which cannot be overemphasized is crucial in any given state and is that link between the individuals (citizens) and the state, the latter being responsible for the protection of the former while guaranteeing the security of their properties as well.

Human security according to Thomas (2000) describes a condition of existence in which basic material needs are met and in which human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the community can be met. Thus, while material sufficiency lies at the core of human security, in addition, the concept encompasses non-material dimensions to form a qualitative whole. Human security is oriented towards an active and substantive notion of democracy and is directly engaged with discussions of democracy at all levels, from the local to the global (Thomas, 2000).

Although some other types of threats which are not man-made like climate crisis, pandemics (COVID 19 or EBOLA), natural disasters, poverty etc exist, the focus here will be individual security as it relates to social threats which stem from unavoidable circumstances like economic, social, and political factors.

Chapter 2

2.1. Nigeria: One State Many People

The history of Nigeria stretches far back into antiquity. Nigeria is home to about 250 different ethnic groups with over 500 distinct languages all identifying with a wide variety of cultures and a population of more than 200 million inhabitants. In 1960, it gained its independence from British colonial rule and is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural country. Travelling from border to border in Nigeria, one will be amazed at the cultural and social diversity found especially from the marked facial expressions in individuals, dressing, buildings, languages, religious practices amongst others (Harmon, 2001). With this diversity, English language was made the official language for ease of communication.

The Nigeria we know today existed as many independent heterogeneous societies before the 1914 amalgamation by Sir Frederick Lugard. Amalgamation in Nigerian context is a fusion of people of different ethnic/tribal origin, geographical, religious, and cultural background to bear one name under a foreign colonial government. This union has been described by some scholars as a forced brotherhood and sisterhood; thus, the country has since been faced with the challenges of accommodating diversities, fostering inclusiveness, and promoting national unity amongst its diverse ethnic groups which makes up the Nigerian nation – state (Okolo, 2014; Osman, 2004). This implies that the union was to the wishes of majority of the forerunners of the various independent societies who should be referred to as nationalists. They demonstrated this through their continued loyalty and solidarity to their primordial ethnic origins than the newly born nation-state called Nigeria (Arowolo, 2011).

In 1914, Nigeria became a geographical entity and half a decade it has been faced with loss of lives and properties as a result of ethnolinguistic and religious differences (Falola, 1998). According to the author, when the country won its independence in 1960, the most destabilizing factor it faced was ethnicity. Nigeria was so ethnically, religiously, and linguistically complex that even some of its leading politicians

initially doubted it could constitute a real country. It was infamously referred to as “the mistake of 1914”. (Siollun, 2001)

Nigeria has three major ethnic groups. The largest ethnic groups in the north of country, Hausa-Fulani, are traditionally and socially conservative who are Muslims while the south is dominated by two competing ethnic groups: the Yorubas in the south-west, and the Igbos in the south-east (Ibid, 2001). Following this amalgamation, the country was divided into three regions i.e., Eastern, Western and the Northern regions. Prominent politician, Obafemi Awolowo stated that “Nigeria is not a nation; it is a mere geographic expression. There are no ‘Nigerians’ in the same sense as there are English or Welsh or French. The word ‘Nigeria’ is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not.” (Awolowo, 1947)

2.2. Ethnolinguistic Differences

Nigeria, one of the largest and most important countries in Africa and especially on the world stage has been in the news as a major theatre of ethno-linguistic and religious differences resulting to ethnic and religious violence and aggression. The country’s diversity makes it a task to identify a single Nigerian culture as it is home to between 200 and 250 ethnolinguistic groups (Falola & Genova, 2009).

According to Eriksen (1994), ethnicity is an aspect of social relationship between persons who consider themselves as essentially distinctive from member of other groups of whom they are aware and with whom they enter into relationships.

Ethnicity, the most destabilizing factor faced by the country especially after it gained its independence in 1960 has resulted to several hindrances in the growth and unity of the nation and has lingered till date.

According to Falola & Heaton (2008), the fear that emerged in the 1960s was that of “domination.” Southerners feared that government representing the interests of the Northern Region would divert resources to the north, cut southerners out of their positions in the administration and the military, and gradually Islamize the country. Northerners feared that southern “domination” would allocate resources to the more developed Western and Eastern Regions, which would prevent the north from ever developing in a competitive way. They also feared that southern “domination”

would mean that southerners would come to control the civil service and educational institutions of the north, since northerners would continually be denied the resources to develop an educated class to compete on merit with southerners. These fears of “domination” clouded any sense of national unity in Nigeria in the 1960s, as residents in each region increasingly came to fear that other regions intended to use the political system to enrich themselves at the expense of their Nigerian “brothers” in other regions (Falola & Heaton, 2008).

These differences without a doubt led to the first and most deadly civil war in the 1960s which is also known as the Biafra war. Till date, Nigeria continues to be troubled with the shadows of the footprints of its past. Religion and politics have been bedfellows throughout Nigerian history (Falola, 1998).

Ethnicity is a social phenomenon that is evidenced in interactions among people of different ethnic groups within a political landscape where language and culture are very prominent attributes. The formation of dialects within languages was among the ways in which ethnicity – both small-scale and large-scale – became fixed in Nigeria (Uzodike & Whetho, 2011). Although there are over 500 languages in Nigeria, only three are considered major while others are considered minor languages. However, the spread of these languages is directly proportional to both political and socio-economic power; hence the language group to which one belongs defines one’s status in the society.

Historically, identities have performed significant roles in the Nigerian political process both in the colonial and post-colonial era. During the colonial period, the administrators permitted the emergence and aggravation of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ syndrome, where Muslims were pitted against Christians, Northerners against the Southerners, Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo against each other and so on (Okpanachi, 2010). Both religious and ethnic differences became major factors in instituting and executing socio-economic strategies and applications. Thus, the differentiating outcomes of colonialism became the catalyst of the socio-economic disequilibrium among the different regions, and this became a crucial factor in the stimulation of identity awareness so as to effectively ‘divide and rule’ (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Nevertheless, as a counter argument, it should be noted that internal

factors are more determinant than the external ones in creating the cleavages in Nigeria, just as in many other nations. These internal factors have continuously been the subjects for ethnic conflicts faced in Nigeria. Stavenhagen in Gurr stated that a conflict is ethnic if the contending actors or parties identify themselves or one another using ethnic criteria. (Stavenhagen in Gurr, 2000)

According to Harff and Gurr, in state governance, conflicts which often escalate into wars can be as a result of constitutional restraint and absent political guarantee or other groups being unwilling to work out a compromise. Consequently, four important types of politically active ethnic groups coexist with modern states: ethnonationalists, indigenous peoples, ethnoclasses and communal contenders. (Harff & Gurr, 2018). The authors stated that these distinctions are important because they summarize a great deal of information about the history, societal states, and political agenda of the people.

With emphasis on the first two ethnic types, they argued that they are peoples who once led a separate political existence and want autonomy or independence that rule them today. This instance can be linked to the Nigerian 1967 civil war when the eastern region proclaimed an Independent Republic of Biafra and fought an unsuccessful war of secession (ibid, 2018). Fast forward to date, the same stance remains as many Ibos are agitating for the separation of the Indigenous People of Biafra from Nigeria.

Furthermore, with the restoration of democratic rule, ethnic identity and mobilization in the Nigerian political landscape have frequently resulted in political instability. Thus, between 1999 and 2013, over 11,000 deaths have occurred due to more than five hundred incidents of communal violence. (Soludo, 2007). Ethnic violence is seen in almost all regions in the country; particularly in the Niger Delta, the Muslim Northeast, Northwest and along the middle-belt (Uzodike & Whetho, 2011). The spate of insecurity which has been experienced in the post-military era is considerably higher than that witnessed during the three hundred and sixty months of military rule that culminated in 1999. Again, it is assumed that there are stable identities in Nigeria and consistent group motives in the approach to ethnic

politics. However, recent uprising of ethnicity in Nigeria tend to show otherwise (Rotberg, 2002).

2.3. Ethnoreligious Differences

In Nigeria, religion is an integral part of identity as it is something citizens tie so much importance to. Statistical data from the National Population Commission (NPC, 2015) places Nigeria as the most populated African country with about 200 million people. However, it is observed that almost half of the country's population are Christians while the other half are Muslims (Paden, 2007). Nevertheless, there is uncertainty concerning the exact percentages; hence, various sources give different figures. For instance, the Pew Research Center in 2010 stated that the 1963 Census certified 36% Christians, 48% Muslims and 16% others. However, the Demographic and Health Survey of 2008 gave 53% Christians, 45% Muslims and 2% others. Likewise, Afrobarometer found 56% Christians, 43% Muslims and 1% others, also in 2008. Yet still, Pew Forum (2010) declared 46% for Christians, 52% for Muslims and 1% for others in 2009. Whatever the exact percentages constitute, it is evident that Nigeria is a country with very large Christian and Muslim populations (Olojo, 2014).

Thus, Nigeria comprises three major religious identities: Christianity, Islam, and traditional religions (Osaghae & Suberu, 2005). The traditional religions are the most politically inactive of the three groups, numbering several hundreds of ethnic groups and sub-groups, villages, clans, and kin groups as well as encompassing the worship of different gods and goddesses. On the other hand, Christian and Muslim identities have continued to be the epicenter of religious disparity and conflict (Lewis & Bratton 2000). Also, within the wide Christian and Muslim categories, there lies many sub-cleavages and intra-group conflicts which have either been politically active in the past or have a potential of being important in the future. Hence, among the Christians, sub-cleavages include the Protestants (Anglican 10%, Baptist 8%, Methodist 5%, and Lutheran 5%), the Catholics 15%, the Evangelical Church of West Africa 2%, Jehovah's Witnesses 5%, Pentecostal churches 30% and other locals (Cherubim and Seraphim, Aladura, Celestial Church of Christ, etc 20%) (Osaghae & Suberu 2005).

Religion plays a prominent role in Nigerian society and has expressed itself as a strong force in the country's geopolitical development. This force which has been used to unite Nigerians is the same force that has led to numerous conflicts in the country (Shehu, 2011). Nigeria has been engulfed in numerous religious conflicts since 1980. Due to their tendency to expand into other areas after an initial stage in one area, ethno-religious conflicts have gained notoriety as the most violent crises in Nigeria (Warner, 2012). Majority of these conflicts happen in the middle-belt and along the culturally borderline states of the predominantly Muslim North as well as between Hausa-Fulani groups and non-Muslim ethnic groups in the South. In conflicts of this magnitude, it is commonly very cumbersome to tell the differences between religious and ethnic crises since the dividing line between them is slimmer than thin (Osagie & Suberu, 2005). Instances of such ethno-religious conflicts are the Kafanchan-Kaduna crisis that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s, the Kaduna Sharia riots of 2000, the Jos riots of 2001 and the current Boko Haram insurgency in the Northern States including Borno, Kaduna, Jigawa and Bauchi. Several hundred lives were lost during the Kaduna crisis of 2000 and the Jos insurrection of 2001 which caused violent ripple effects that spread beyond Kaduna and Jos. Till date, Nigeria is still grappling with the Boko Haram insurgency group and their evil agenda, which has claimed over 13,000 lives (Enukora, 2005)

More contemporary ethno-religious conflicts include the July 1999 conflict among the Oro cultists at Sagamu in Ogun state who claimed that the Hausa women had come outside when they were in the street with their gnome. What resulted were arguments that finally turned into a full-blown crisis. Many Yoruba and Hausa people were killed before a dusk to dawn curfew was imposed on the Sagamu town. Even as the infamy was being put under check, reprisal attacks continued in Kano, in Hausa city, leading to deaths and destruction of property worth billions of Naira (Kura, 2010).

Another ethno-religious conflict that touched Nigerians was the October 2000 Lagos-Kano (Idi-Araba/Oko-Oba) conflict which was elicited due to misconception between the Hausa inhabitants and the Yorubas living in Lagos over the use of a convenience by a Hausa man. The mayhem resulted in the death of many Yorubas. Consequently, the O'dua People Congress (a Yoruba militia) was formed and

worsened the situation as the violence later spread southwards to Kano (Enukora 2005).

Also, in September 2001, ethnic friction between the Tivs and the Junkuns in the Plateau state reached its climax due to 'mistaken identity'. What this implies is that some Tivs took some nineteen soldiers to be Junkuns in fake army uniform. The Tiv youths captured and slaughtered them one by one. The Nigerian army then embarked on a devastating reprisal attack in Saki-Biam (Kura, 2010). According to some reports, at least a hundred people died in the reprisal attacks. Thereafter, violence spread to Jos plateau; particularly after a Christian was appointed as a Local Council Chairman. By the time the problem was resolved, about 200 lives had been lost (Human Rights Watch, 2001).


It is also noteworthy to point out a developing story where in Sokoto state, a young lady named Deborah Samuel was stoned to death and body later set ablaze for alleged blasphemous comment against the prophet of Islam (Reuter, 2022).

Chapter 3

3.1. Nigeria's Institutional Design

To accommodate all religions and ethnicities and to avoid further communal conflicts, the Nigerian government took measures to ensure that unity is achieved to prevent future conflicts. Power was gradually strengthened at the centre of a federal system so as to keep together the country's diverse ethnic components. The three major political and geographic regions north, east, and west were further subdivided and consequently weakened (Falola, 1998). Due to the ethnic differences and diversity in the country, the 6 geopolitical zones were created during the regime of the then Head of State, General Sani Abacha. This was an important factor in determining ethnic groups that culturally share a semblance. It is also regarded as an administrative division of the country. Consequently, the country's economic, political, and educational resources are often shared across these zones (FGN, 2020).

According to Omenma (2019), the six zones were not entirely carved out based on location but rather states with similar ethnic groups and/or common political history. On the strength that Nigeria comprises approximately more than 250 ethnic groups and 500 languages, there was a need for the government to merge similar groups for effective allocation of resources. In recent years, many groups and individuals in Nigeria have suggested that the present six political zones be recognized in Nigeria's constitution and be strengthened to function as federating units in the new structure for Nigeria (Punchng.com, 2014). The attempts of these eminent Nigerians further encourage the devolution of powers so that the geopolitical zones can become autonomous and manage the resources within their territories in a Federal Nigeria.



Source: Wikipedia

Thus, six geopolitical zones in Nigeria and the states that make up each of them are:

North Central	North East	North West	South West	South East	South South
Kwara	Adamawa	Kaduna	Ondo	Abia	Rivers
Kogi	Yobe	Jigawa	Ekiti	Anambra	Delta
Nasarawa	Bauchi	Kano	Lagos	Imo	Edo
Benue	Taraba	Katsina	Osun	Ebonyi	Akwa Ibom
Plateau	Gombe	Zamfara	Oyo	Enugu	Cross Rivers
FCT	Borno	Kebbi	Ogun		Bayelsa
Niger		Sokoto			

3.2. Federalism in Nigeria

Federalism as a political system in Nigeria was adopted to ensure that the state's sovereignty is constitutionally divided between a central governing body and constituent political units e.g., provinces or states (Edigin, 2010). It can be used to describe the relationship between central government and regional/state/local governments.

Some basic features that distinguish a true federal system from other political systems include; (i) there should be at least two levels of government as well as the division of power and authority between the two i.e. federal/central and regional/state governments, (ii) each of the level of government is coordinated and independent, (iii) both the federal and state governments derive their powers from the constitution which is not only written but also rigid, (iv) the supremacy of the constitution, (v) in amending the constitution, no any level of government should have undue advantages over the other, (vi) existence of bicameral legislature (vii) existence of independent judicial institutions to interpret the constitution to justly and fairly settle disputes, among other functions; and (vii) duplication of organs of government at both levels. (Chukwuma, 2014; Anyaele, 2003).

From the above assertion, Nigeria can be classified as such as it runs a 3-tier government; Federal, State and Local governments which are equally independent, derive their powers from the constitution and uses a bicameral legislature- the Senate and the House of Representatives.

For easy administration however, as some writers claimed, the colonial administrators commenced journey to federalism as a political mechanism to manage the system and this culminated with the Lyttleton Constitution of 1954 that led to the true structure of federalism in Nigeria (Edigin, 2010). According to Osifeso (2011), the British merged the geographic north and south together in 1914 but failed to unite its people; hence the British policies of indirect rule through divide-and-rule further polarized the people along not only tribal lines but also spilled into social life with Christianity and western educationally disposed south on one side while the north was literally guarded against possible contamination by the south.

An excursion into the distant past shows that at the terminal period of colonialism, Nigeria saw a relative self-government in the three administrative provinces – Northern, Eastern and Western provinces as well as the colony of Lagos. The Lyttleton Constitution of 1954 ensured the sharing of powers between the central and provincial governments and during independence; these provinces became regions and formed the basic federal administrative structure of the country, since the Independent Constitution of 1960 inherited the federal structure of the Lyttleton Constitution of 1954 (Kayode, 2015). History indicates also that the federating units continued to expand after independence. This is why in 1963 when Nigeria became a Federal Republic, an additional region was created, making them four. Similarly, the federating units increased to 12 states in 1967; 19 states in 1976; 21 states in 1987; 30 states in 1991 and 36 in 1996 (Varma, 2005; Ammani, 2014). During the last national conference in 2014, 18 additional states were recommended due to unending agitation for states to balance the lopsided and unequal geopolitical zones.

Since independence, federalism has remained Nigerian's form of government except for the period between May-September 1966 under the first military regime that attempted a unitary state; with some little modifications (Osifeso, 2011). However, federalism in Nigeria was a conflict regulating mechanism which has not been very effective. In support of this view, Osaghae (2002), asserted that "the management of Nigeria's ethnic, language and religious diversity, which necessitated the adoption of federal system of government has been rendered less effective by intense politicization of these cleavages"; giving rise to affirmative action policies that strengthen elite domination by ethnically-based fractions of the country's political class. The seeming ineffectiveness of federalism is due partly to the character of competition to control the Nigerian state, taking advantage of some noticeable cleavages of inequalities; hence the introduction of the federal character principle (FCP) in 1979 (Eniola, 2015).

Unfortunately, the policies of FCP in fostering national integration as well as enhancing national development in Nigeria has been very difficult and controversial. The problem is that in spite of the adoption of the federal character principle, meritocracy and equality which are fundamental ideals of federalism have eluded the country. Likewise, the reoccurrences of ethno-religious crisis, group

insurgencies and other related agitations in various parts of the country indicate the failure of the principle/system.

3.3. The Federal Character Principle

The Federal Character has been considered the best solution to solving some of the flaws and fundamental problems of Nigerian lopsided federal system. The essence of the Nigerian federalism few years after independence has been shaken; first culminating into the civil war from 1967-1970. Some of these challenges were neither realized nor envisaged by some of the nationalists before independence (Eniola, 2015). It was clear for instance, that the political boundaries inherited at the independence did not cut across tribal lines. This elucidates the political behaviours in the First Republic. The ethnic groups were divided along history, beliefs, customs, religions, languages or tribal lines affinity (Osifeso, 2011). Subsequently, party politics became increasingly polarized along ethnic and tribal lines while the political elites represented and defended their ethnic and tribal groups rather than national unity; thus, encouraging ethnic accentuations which instigated the first military coup and countercoup in the country and the Biafran civil war (Chukwuma, 2014).

The Federal Character Principle works on fairness; attempting to bring all parts of the country into one federating unit. This means that every region and state is considered in the scheme of things in the country; be it in employment, allocation of resources, welfare, etc. For instance, a new democratically elected government at the national level is expected to source for competent people from all parts of the country to assist in governance (Edigin, 2010).

Now, beside state creation as a mechanism for ensuring and preserving unity in diversity, the late General Murtala Mohammed brought up the idea of Federal Character in his address to the opening session of the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) on Saturday the 18th of October 1975. Subsequently, the CDC in its report of 1977 in Ammani (2014) defines Federal Character as:

“The distinctive desire of the peoples of Nigeria to promote national unity, foster national loyalty and give every citizen of Nigeria a sense of belonging to the nation notwithstanding the diversities of ethnic origin, culture, language or religion which may exist and which it is their desire to nourish, harness to the enrichment of the Federal Republic of Nigeria”.

It was an attempt to address the unbalanced structure and ethnic domination in government in order to attain national integration. That is, it was targeted at reducing ethnic conflict arising from competition for political power, government appointments, employment into public organizations, citing of public industries and institutions, etc. (Ammani, 2014). In recognizing its essence, General Sani Abacha established the Federal Character Commission for the implementation of the policy in Nigeria. This is appropriately illustrated in Section 14 Subsection 3 of the 1979 Constitution:

The composition of the Government of the federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and to command national loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnics or other sectional group in that government or any of its agencies.

Nowadays, different groups in Nigeria are contending for their own share of power at the center and this has brought to the fore the suitability and effectiveness of the various national policy interventions; particularly Federal Character Principle toward ensuring national stability in the country. People who reside together never agree about everything; however, if they are to continue to live together, they cannot continue to wholly disagree in their aims. These groups have some sort of political strategies that help them in their daily activities; especially toward achieving national integration. Thus, an understanding of this interplay and group dynamism will advance to an understanding of the peculiarities and realities of the implementation of Federalism and Federal Character Principle in Nigeria (Kayode, 2015).

The application of Federal Character Principle since its inception has so far shown that it is not capable of resolving the problem of national suspicion among the ethnic groups in the country. For example, it has failed in its objective of redressing the imbalance in the structure and ethnic domination in government and other public institutions. It has also failed to prevent inter-ethnic conflicts and centripetal agitations in Nigeria. An instance is the Boko Haram group on the North East. There is also the *Arewa Consultative Forum*, for the Hausa/Fulani among others in the North; from the South-South, there are “Ex-Agitators/militants and the Ijaw Youth

Council (IYC); from the West, you find the *Afenifere* and *Oduduwa People Congress* (OPC) who speak for the Yorubas, even as *the Ohanaeze-Ndigbo* represents Igbo's interest. Also, both the Movement for the Actualization of Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and the Independent People of Biafra (IPOB) are in pursuit of the actualization of the Biafra nation.

In analyzing the defect in the FCP, Osifeso (2011) argued that the principle is engendering federal instability rather than integration that it was supposed to serve. Thus, the policy appears to have merely promoted ethnic and sectional consciousness. Moreso, unity may be difficult to achieve in the country where the application of the principle discriminates against one group and favours another. Its main objective is to achieve distributive justice, the equality of states.

Another factor that militates against the effectiveness of the FCP is the fear of domination arising from competition for political power at the center and control of administrative system. This is supposed to be addressed by its institutionalization; hence, ensuring fairness in public service and addressing ethnic domination. Sadly, its application seems incapable of resolving the problem it was meant to solve. Its opponents argue that the Federal Character Principle sacrifices merit for mediocrity and promote factors that disunite citizens such as language, religious and ethnic affiliation superiority (Ojo, 2009; Osman, 2004). Consequently, for FCP to be effective, everyone has to be ready to make sacrifices in terms of fully supporting it. This implies that merit should come first before ethnic considerations just as Osinbejo and Bruce in Eniola (2015) stated:

Nigeria must make progress though tribe and tongue may differ. The only way to do this is by saying goodbye to ethnicity and hello to merit... consider the progress that Nigeria made before the quota system (1960-66) and the retrogression we have made since 1960 till date. The difference is clear. Federal character cannot make an electrical power station work, it can't make refinery work. Only merit can ensure this. As a result of federal character Nigeria Airways went from 30 aircrafts to bankruptcy and a debt of over \$60m by the year 2000. Quota system and federal character led to a sense of entitlement in beneficiaries and resentment in others. Merit is a better way of life.

Again, there appears to be wide consensus among scholars that federalism offers a linkage of peoples and institutions in consideration of mutual consents, without the sacrifice of their individual identities such as tongue and tribe as well as their religion. Little wonder federalism is thought to be an appropriate framework for governing a pluralistic state like Nigeria. It should act as a balance between national unity and sub-national diversity and should be a cure for problem dissension disintegration and friction arising in a multi-ethnic state like Nigeria. Moreso, it should be an effective political and constitutional design for managing governmental problems that are associated with ethnic and cultural diversity (Asaju, Samuel & Mukoila, 2014).

Chapter 4

4.1. Emerging Threats

Nigeria's security crisis threatens the very fabric of the Nigerian society. The level of Nigeria's growing security challenges has progressed beyond national borders. From the Northeast to the South-south regions of the country, it is no more news that the country is facing a quasi-impossible task to curb the terrorism and insecurities that are threatening the survival of the country. To further apprehend the above assertion, the vital point is to understand the causes of insecurity in Nigeria and to investigate the sources of this social disorder or instability. These sources of insecurity in Nigeria have been traced to a number of factors and have different explanations by different people. From ethnic disparities to poor governance, the fragility of the country has threatened its very own existence.

Garcia (2019) states that "due to the fragility of a state or state failure, cases of terrorism tend to be on the rise as a result of bad governance ... social deregulation, lack of infrastructure and public services, the inability to enforce the rule of law or to end internal conflict". (Garcia, 2019).

The above statement buttresses a salient point by the UN that terrorism flourishes in environments of despair, poverty, extremism, and human rights abuse; it also flourishes in contexts of regional conflict and foreign occupation and profits from weak states capacity to maintain law and order. (UN, 2004).

To opine the concept of state fragility or state failure, one ought to first define a state. In international law, a given 'state' exists when a political entity is recognised by other states as the highest political authority in a given territory and is treated as an 'equal' among the international 'community' of states. (Di John, 2010)

The above definition however likewise, complements (Brown & Ainley, 2005) stance on a state as a territorially based political unit characterized by a central decision-making and enforcement machinery (a government and an administration) having constituent elements of a territory, people, and sovereign political power (Garcia, 2019).

4.2 Concept of the Failed State

The phenomenon of state failure is under-researched and therefore the idea of failed state has been met with various scholastic debates with each viewing it differently.

State failure according to Zartman occurs when the basic functions of the state are no longer performed in a situation where the structure, authority... and political order have fallen apart. (Zartman in Di John, 2010). This lack of consensus regarding the definition of state failure has created significant obscurity over the concept of state failure and what it refers. (Ezrow & Frantz, 2013)

Furthermore, Rotberg asserts that “nation states fail when they are consumed by internal violence and cease delivering positive political goods to their inhabitants. Their governments lose credibility, and the continuing nature of the particular nation state itself becomes questionable and illegitimate in the hearts and minds of its citizens”. (Rotberg, 2004)

State failure according to Di John (2010) noted the idea of “resource curse” as a factor which affects developing nations as the abundant natural resources or minerals can hinder growth in such states. In developing countries where states are usually fragile, security poses a big challenge as there are present, structural problems like patronage corruption as they oftentimes aggravate tensions around national resources, inequality and exploitation thereby causing communal conflicts. (Bates, 2005)

Nigeria in this case is a country rich with natural resources in minerals like gold, lead, coal, timber to oil and gas. However, the consequences of an opaque leadership or governance has led to the inability of the political system to address the nation’s problems and the progressive alienation of non-elite Nigerians (the people). Failing and fragile states have created a belt of insecurity stretching from Nigeria to its neighbouring West African countries like the Chad, Cameroun, and Niger.

According to Campbell (2011), “Nigeria is run by competing and cooperating elites supported by their patron-client networks, ethnic interests, big business, and the military”. Political elites in Nigeria have always sought to reap advantages from ethno-religious conflicts; more so during electioneering periods and this has resulted in more conflicts and instability. Campbell and Page also asserted that “in terms of measurement of income, Nigerians are very poor with wealth from oil concentrated among a miniscule number of *ogas* or “big men” (Campbell & Page, 2018). It can be counted a handful of honourable exception in the elites whose behaviour is mostly self-interest, lacking a national focus, aiming for a short-term advantage, and is distorted by competition for oil wealth (ibid, 2018). This as a result encourages these elites to hang together as their main objective is ‘*politics of the belly*’. Kleptocracy is a main trait exhibited in Nigeria as wholesale looting of the state’s resources by members of the political class or in this case, the elites have been on the incline since the post-independence period. This trend has a corrosive effect on popular confidence in different governmental regimes and is among the most important hinderances to the nation’s economic and social development.

4.3. Nigeria, a Failing State?

Despite its adoption of democracy in 1999 following years of waves of alternating democratic and military rule, political leaders have been unable to address developmental issues which have led to the spring of ethnic militias thereby posing a threat to the nation’s security. The fragility in the nation’s security system has created a vicious cycle for the emergence of other security risks and threats such as poverty and food insecurity, illiteracy or poor educational system, feeble institutional structure, poorly equipped medical or health facilities, high rate of unemployment, illegal cross-border migration, separatism or secessionism, transnational organised crimes like drug and human trafficking, environmental degradation, cyber threats or cybercrimes, ethno-religious conflicts, social inequality, mistrust or conflict of perceptions between the government and the governed, contagious diseases, monetary devaluation or economic security, lack of infrastructural development etc.

State failure can occur in various aspects such as security, economic expansion, political representation, income distribution and others. A nation-state exists to

provide security, quality health system, education, maintaining the state's infrastructure, etc. Rotberg (2003) defined the hierarchy of positive state functions as (a) security, (b) institutions to regulate and adjudicate conflicts, (c) political participation; and (d) social service delivery, infrastructure, and regulation of the economy. These attributes are prevalent in strong states while weak states on the other hand demonstrate a mixed profile and failed states are a sub-category of weak states. (Di John, 2010)

Subsequently, Rotberg (2003) identified 3 important indicators necessary to assess state failure as (1) the persistence of political violence, (2) growth of criminal violence, (3) state's inability to control their borders or territory. From these indicators, need we say that Nigeria as a country is faced with persistent political violence as lives are lost at every electoral year. Either sponsored by elites or other mischief makers, thugs being paid to disrupt peaceful, free, and fair elections is as sure as the dawn. The second indicator of growth of criminal violence, is also a huge security challenge that has grown fierce with the years as there are present in the state, kidnappings, banditry and armed robberies or insurgencies by Boko Haram. All these security challenges that have been threatening the very root of the country can be said to be as a result of the state's inability to control its borders, thereby encouraging further terrorist acts due to the porosity of borders both internally and externally. Rotberg further stated that *"failed states are tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous and bitterly contested by warring factions. In most failed states, government troops battle armed revolts led by one or more warring factions"*. (Rotberg, 2003) Although contested by some scholars that his definition does not fully characterize a failed state, the hierarchy of positive state functions mentioned above can serve as a guide to the direction below of determining if Nigeria is a failing state.

Poverty and Poor Social Amenities/Infrastructure

Notwithstanding its abundant resources that are ubiquitous, Nigeria is not only poor but has a very high population that live in poverty, in addition to lacking essential social amenities and infrastructure. Also, despite the increasing government revenue in oil and gas, estimated to be over USD600 billion since independence in 1960, the population living in poverty has continued to rise. Thus, from 17.1 million in 1980, the population living in poverty rose to 34.7 million in 2010. These connote poverty

rates of 27.2 percent, 46.3 percent, 42.7 percent, 65.6 percent, 54.4 percent, and 69.0 percent in 1980, 1985, 1992, 1996, 2004 and 2010 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2010). They also show that the percentage of the total population living in poverty grew from 26 percent in 1980 to 68.7 percent in 2010. The available demographic indicators also paint a sorry picture of poor living conditions and availability of social amenities/infrastructure. In many localities, especially the rural areas where majority of citizens reside, such infrastructure/amenities are few. Roads have collapsed, the railways are not functioning optimally, and educational infrastructure has almost collapsed.

Corruption

It is not a secret that corruption is pervasive in Nigeria. More recently, the country has consistently ranked very high in the Transparency International Corruption Index (Alapiki, 2000; Agbu, 2004). When one considers the number of former political office holders and bank executives that are being prosecuted by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) for allegedly embezzling hundreds of billions of naira; the mind boggling billions of naira that were reported stolen or missing by the Senate and House of Representatives probes on the oil subsidy regime and the special Presidential Committee on Recovery of Oil Revenues; the House of Representatives probe on the power sector, among others, it shows how the Nigerian State has become very corrupt. Of recent, Oby Ezekwesili, former World Bank President for Africa and ex Nigeria's Minister for Education, was quoted to have stated that Nigeria has lost an estimated USD 400 billion to corruption and misapplication of funds since 1960 (Soniya, 2012; Watts, 2007); implying that over half of the about USD 600 billion generated from oil sales would have been lost to corruption. There are other various forms of corrupt practices that have pervaded the society and institutions such as the Civil Service, Universities, Police, Judiciary, Ministries, Armed Forces and Extra-Ministerial Departments at all levels of Government, which exposes the fragility of the state.

Migration

Due to declining economic fortunes, unemployment, poverty and unfavourable working conditions, Nigerians have been leaving the country in search of greener pastures, resulting in massive brain drain (human flight). Presently, Nigeria is ranked among 10 countries in the world; others being Ethiopia, Iran, Kenya, South-Africa, China, Mexico, Malaysia, Jamaica and England that are critically hit by human flight (Sekhar, 2010)

Data available shows that the country has about 20,000 medical doctors and 10,000 academics in the United States (Nutt, 2011). Other estimates show that between 1986 and 1990 alone, the country lost 10,000 academics to human flight, due to factors such as poor wages and working conditions, social unrest and conflicts, currency devaluation and inflation, and inadequate research facilities (Utile, 2008). The implications of these on national development could be imagined in a country that seriously is in dire need of medical doctors and academics.

Insurgency and Terrorism

Right from 1999 when the country returned to democratic rule, several ethno-religious and militia groups have emerged to compete with the Nigerian state through the application of violence or legitimate use of force. These groups include the Odua People's Congress (OPC), Movement for the Actualization of the Vigilante (NDV), Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Independent People of Biafra (IPOB) and Boko Haram. It is noticed that these groups either took over the State's duty of protecting lives and property or applied terrorism related violence as engagement tactics to express grievances and/or make demands on the State.

Unfortunately, the insurgency in the northern part of the country, spear headed by the Boko Haram group has brought to the fore, the deterioration of the Nigerian State's ability to maintain law and order, and therefore secure the citizens and their property (Dinneya, 2006). Likewise, the spate of attacks, the most acclaimed ones being the 2011 attacks on the Nigerian Police Headquarters and the United Nations building, both in Abuja and the abduction of 276 Chibok secondary school girls in Borno State on April 14, 2014, vindicate this point. The helpless response of security operatives to attacks on churches and mosques, security buildings including police

stations, offices of the State Security Services and military detachments/units by the Boko Haram sect and the seemingly intractable violence in Jos Plateau State also corroborate this viewpoint. Also, the frequency of commercial kidnappings, especially in the south-east; the duration victims are held as hostage; the sophisticated arms allegedly used by kidnappers, and the resort to the payment of ransom by victims to facilitate their freedom, sometimes with the alleged involvement of the Police in negotiations show the weak capacity of the State to maintain law and order (Omodia, 2009). Agreed that the North-east is the epicentre of the insurgency, its effect however, reverberates the entire country.

4.4. Insecurity in Nigeria

Currently, Nigeria's biggest sources of insecurity range from political, ethnic to religious clashes, Boko Haram insurgencies, armed robbery attacks, farmer/herdsmen conflicts, destruction of the country's oil facilities by the Niger Delta Militants, human trafficking, and child abduction (NSACC, 2021). Amongst others also are threats like cybercrime which is generally referred in Nigeria as *yahoo-yahoo* (US News, 2016), drug trafficking, property crime, human trafficking, kidnapping, document fraud, online trade on illicit goods and services have been more rampant with the years. Elemental factors such as unemployment, hunger, poverty, high level of illiteracy, corruption in the polity of kleptocracy are security challenges present in Nigeria which cannot be ruled out as they are issues that exacerbate human insecurity (Guardian Nigeria, 2021).

This insecurity has hampered the sustainable development of Nigeria as the country has continuously been bombarded with these incidences. (Ndubuisi-Okolo & Anigbuogu, 2019).

The seriousness of the security, humanitarian and economic threats that accompany the current insurgency remains a significant threat to the Nigerian government, the state, and its citizenry.

Most states, when faced with security threats stem from external factors. But in the case of Nigeria, security threats, can be traced to internal factors, meaning that these internal actors have been enhanced or strengthened by the presence of external forces. Boko Haram, in this case can be classified as an internal actor which gets its strength or support from external actors, the Jihadists (Sahara Reporters, 2022). The

Boko Haram allegiance to the ISIS cannot be ruled out as one of the main security challenges faced in Nigeria as well as the emergence of other threats confronted by the government and the peoples of the country. As part of Boko Haram's allegiance to ISIS, the group beheaded some Nigerian hostages in response to the killing of their leader in Syria by the US security forces (Sahara Reporters, 2022). These threats continue to emerge thereby creating a substantial impact on a global scale (Faluyi et al, 2019) It is against this backdrop that this study investigates emerging threats to Nigeria's national security with a view to proffering enabling counter measures in ending the Boko Haram menace.

Chapter 5

5.1. The Boko Haram Threat

Boko Haram's violent activities have in recent years largely undermined human security. Gilbert (2014) noted that there has been over 12,000 deaths and 8000 persons maimed since the Boko Haram insurgency began. Also, food insecurity has worsened as farmers have deserted their farms for fear of being attacked in the northern region which according to Amalu (2021), is the main food-growing region in the country.

This insecurity may also trigger long-term consequences in the region since Nigeria serves as Africa's largest supplier of staples cereals (Vanguard Nigeria, 2014). Likewise, the health sector has also received its own share as the number of injured persons have increased, with little or no facilities to cater for them just as health workers are abandoning their post for fear of being killed (Borgen Magazine, 2017).

The killing and abduction of school children and college students by the sect has forced the closure of schools in many places and the withdrawal of children and wards by parents from those schools still operating; denying them access to education in the process. Furthermore, there are inadequate shelters for the internally displaced persons (IDPs), even as the number of IDPs in the country is increasing drastically (Aljazeera, 2014).

To better understand the insurgency rained by this group in the country, Faluyi stated that the distinguishing of terrorism and other criminals is the form of approach employed by the group considering its goals, objectives which squarely focuses on the change of status quo in the socio-political paradigm (Faluyi, 2019).

Furthermore, according to Whelan (2016), insurgency implies violence employed "to obtain political goals by an organised and primarily indigenous group using protracted, irregular warfare and allied political technique". For Boko Haram to be considered or referred to as a terrorist group, let us explore the term terrorism.

5.2. Defining Terrorism

Terrorism is a global phenomenon although not all parts of the world are as much troubled by terrorism as others due to enormous regional differences. Its definition on a general scope has been contested by many. What constitutes terrorism depends on one's orientation, ideological inclination, and standpoint of understanding. This has led to the diverse understanding and interpretation of the word terrorism and the classification of diverse terror sects (Faluyi et al, 2019)

The word terrorism has made headlines in the past decades and has a definition problem as what one individual defines as terrorism, another defines as a resistance movement. This definition problem is as a result of individualistic ideologies thereby posing a challenge to a consensus on the definition of terrorism.

The Global Terrorism Database defines terrorism as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation. (GTD)

Enemies of the state are considered terrorists as they engage in branded actions such as bombings, assassinations, child-abduction/child soldier, forced marriages, rape etc.

The complexity of terrorism stems from the times of the French Revolution and has metamorphosed over time. Robespierre during the French revolution had an ideology of purging the society of the corrupt elites with the use of terror.

He contended that in order to achieve a virtuous society, it was ideal to lead the people by reason and the people's enemies by fear (Israel, 2014). At the time of the French Revolution, terrorism was viewed as a positive action to demonstrate dissatisfaction with the government. The widespread view was that the resistance of the people against the government was legitimate in light of the atrocities the government committed against the people. The same ideals were played out during the American Revolution, which the French went on to borrow. However, because of the violence that took place during the French Revolution, the French concept of terrorism has come to represent the basic tenant of terrorism - violence against the government (Howard, 2016).

Historically, terrorism has been from time immemorial especially among the civilian population ranging from religious to political. Islamic radicalization is nothing new in history as many fanatics carry out campaigns just like Mohammed Yusuf of Borno State to accomplish the purification of Islam. This wave of terrorism also known as religious terrorism is marked by Islamic radicalization and emerged in 1979 according to David Rapoport.

Consequently, David Rapoport (2019) expatiated on the four waves of modern terrorism. Each wave with its own ingredients, different audiences, sympathisers, and supporters has its modus operandi meaning the way each group operates. Each of these waves last for a few decades after which they gradually fade out.

Alex Schmid identified the reasons for the different definitions of terrorism and argued that the act of terrorism itself has changed. The face and nature of the phenomenon are profoundly different with time; meaning that terrorism evolves. He also argued that terrorism is a contested concept and is linked to the legitimization and criminalization of certain groups while also asserting that there are many types of terrorism, each with a different form and manifestation (Schmid 2011).

Therefore, due to ideologies, individuals or groups are identified as terrorists and others as freedom fighters or liberty strugglers.

Yassar Arafat for instance was considered a terrorist by some while he was considered a martyr by Palestinians (Transnational Institute, 1998). He also won a Nobel Peace Prize on the other hand (TNP, 1994). This proves that based on ideologies it is difficult to agree upon on who should be labelled a terrorist or not.

Terrorism as connoted by Faluyi et al (2019) is not just an offshoot of political violence but is a manifestation of violence that is driven by socio-economic, religious and political consideration.

The essence of terrorism has a great impact on peace and security. Examining the Global Terrorism Index 2021, it is distinct to see the differences and the impact of terrorism showing a combination of incidents, fatalities, injuries, and property damage. In many countries terrorism is considered one of the biggest threats influencing relationships between countries but also between communities.

Terrorists' launch of attacks aims at attracting recognition by maiming their targets of opposition and the civilian populace. (Faluyi 2019)

This clear distinction asserted above by the author draws to the conclusion as classifying Boko Haram, a terrorist sect in Nigeria.

Boko Haram that began as an isolated sect has grown into the perpetrator of death and destruction that today is undermining the social fabric of Nigeria, and exploiting ethnic kinship in neighbouring countries like Chad, Cameroon, and Niger to extend its reach, spreading security threats and triggering a humanitarian crisis among already desperately poor local populations.

Meanwhile, over time Boko Haram has built and nurtured relations with Al-Qaeda's affiliates and sympathisers primarily, but not exclusively, in the continent, raising concerns among Western government and security services that something bigger may be brewing, a threat that goes beyond Nigeria's national borders and may—as in fact it did—see Westerners and other foreigners become victims of kidnappings and killings. Other terror groups like Al-Shabaab present in countries Somalia, parts of Kenya and East Africa have affiliations with Al-Qaeda. (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake, 2016)

In other words, be it Al-Qaeda, ISIS or the Taliban, they all focus on ridding the world from the threat, as they perceive it, that Western culture poses to Islam and aim at imposing their own strict interpretation of Islam of the Sharia law which is the legal system of Islam (Forces, 2021). This they achieve by capturing territories and transforming them into Islamic caliphates through the use of political violence against state institutions and civilian population.

Some scholars have looked into the history of terrorism and have tried to find certain characteristics for certain eras or tried to discover trends in terrorism. Subsequently, these trends over time have come to prove that international terrorist groups prey on weak states for sanctuary. Their recruitment is aided by grievances nurtured by poverty, foreign occupation and the absence of human rights and democracy; by religious and other intolerance; and by civil violence. (UN 2004)

5.3. How did Boko Haram Emerge?

The emergence of Boko Haram was not sudden but can be explained by several unresolved socio-political and economic issues events.

Due to religious views, BH all commenced in Borno State which is situated in the Northeast geopolitical zone of Nigeria. In 2001, Mohammed Yusuf, a charismatic religious cleric began preaching a strict interpretation of Islam. This gained him a lot of followers in the region as mostly young people were committed to the teaching of the prophet and holy war. The meaning of Boko Haram was then coined out of their belief against any western influence meaning “western education is forbidden or sinful”. This western “sinful” education, the followers believed produced a corrupt government and they tied the condition of the people to the type of education the corrupt leaders received. The sect owes its powerful resistance to anything western which it understands as humiliating Muslims and decided to root out any attempt to westernize the north that is predominately Muslims (Chothia, 2012).

From then on, they commenced fully in 2009 going all out confrontational against the state. In one of the confrontations against the group, their leader, Mohammed Yusuf was captured by security forces, handed over to justice and was summarily executed by the Nigerian police while in their custody without a fair trial. This execution led to the bitter retaliation that we see today as Abubakar Shekau took the reins of power, making demands from the government in exchange for their killed leaders and compensation of families of the dead fighters as well as rebuilding their Islamic schools and mosques (Matfess, 2017). BHⁱ has been such a complex threat to the Nigerian state although at its inception, it was a largely peaceful sect with the sole aim against the opposition of the corrupt ruling class. This fierce battle between BH and the state has further led to the formation of civilian task forces as the terror group is well equipped with sophisticated weaponry which hitherto could not be matched with the ill-equipped arsenal of the state. By the time the government started acquiring state of the art weapons, BH had far advanced their own arsenal. The sect can be compared to the Taliban or Al-Qaeda who have a primary aim focused on ridding the world from the threat, as they perceive it, that Western culture poses to Islam. (Faluyi et al 2019)

After a decade of killings by BH and the ongoing ethnic violence, kidnappings and robberies, many citizens are disenchanted with the way the government is handling this dire situation. Although the state is in combat against this sect, it initially had no prior experience against terrorism combat which thereby resulted to an issue of

capacity with the massive killing of many military soldiers with its highest rate so far being in 2019 (Statista, 2022).

Although BH was founded in 2002 in Borno State, its terroristic emergence was not sudden but was as a result of several unresolved socio-political, economic, and eventual factors. Apart from religious ideological factors, these other issues mentioned above as well as political context make part of the proliferation of this deadly sect.

Tactically, the group targets extremely poor areas promising them a better life out of abject poverty, and which has been a successful applied strategy for the group. Although BH over the years has split into many factions due to ideological differences, each having a different agenda, it has not weakened the strength of the group. Some other groups that were created from Boko Haram are ISWAP and ANSARU. Each group with its ideological leaning has a different agenda: -

- Boko Haram: All opposition to their agenda are targets
- ISWAP: Christians are their targets
- ANSARU: Foreigners are their targets (Faluyi, Khan, Akinola, 2019)

One can deduce from these several factions that what constitutes terrorism depends on one's orientation, ideological inclination, and standpoint of understanding.

Adesoji (2010) was able to trace the origin of Boko Haram to the Yan Tatsine violent outburst of lawlessness/clash of 1980s. He said that the aftermath of the Yan Tatsine riot was that some conservative Islamic groups began to emerge and gained popularity in Borno State. Amongst the scholars was Mohammed Yusuf, a school dropout. He undertook some religious studies in Chad and Niger Republics before returning to Maiduguri where he established a local mosque and religious school. Yusuf became the local head of a group called Jama atul Tajdidi Islam before leaving it due to dispute over its strategy and tactics (Danijibo, 2012). The followers of Yusuf assumed a powerful name in Islam – The *Jama'atul Alhul Sunnah Lidda Wati Jihad* which means those dedicated to the spread of Islam and Jihad as fashioned out by prophet Mohammed.

With complete hatred of western schooling, Yusuf criticized openly the so-called Islamic scholars of his day in that they combined Islamic teachings with western education. Due to this open condemnation of western education and the evil associated with it, Yusuf through his teaching was able to lure several persons in his area into joining his group to promote the public censure of western schooling. It was widely reported in 2004 by the Newswatch Magazine that students of certain technical colleges in Maiduguri and Damaturu tore their education certificates and dropped out of school just to embrace the teachings and lessons of Qur'an (Danjibo, 2012). In addition, the stand and pull of the insurgents rapidly grew which got to the notice of the local authorities. Some reports even have it that Ali Modu Sheriff, the then executive governor of Borno State was wooed to be a member of this monstrous group by his then Commissioner for Religious Affairs, Buji Foyi (Paden, 2008). Another school of thought has it that the origin of Boko Haram is traced to a local dispute in Borno State between the police and followers of Mohammed Yusuf who began this sect as a religious sect over the enforcement of a relatively insignificant motorcycle law that resulted to riots and eventually to the burning down of police stations (Nnoli, 2006). Within this period of uprising, over 700 persons were killed in clashes in Bauchi, Maiduguri and Potiskum; including Yusuf and Foyi who both died in police custody (Essam, 2014).

Reacting to this, Johnson (2011) pointed out that the primary objective of this group was to establish a Sharia government in Borno State under Governor Ali Modu Sheriff. The founder of this Jihadist group established a religious group that built Mosques and schools here and there in the city of Borno where a sizable number of indigent children from across Nigeria and bordering Niger and Chad got inducted in major Islamic tenets that resisted any effort by the state to suppress them. Numerous scholars considered this group as a fall out of Maitatsine Violence of the 1980s as well as the religious and ethnic forces that emerged at the end of 1990s (Schwartz, 2010).

5.4. Chronicles of Incidents Perpetuated by Boko Haram in Nigeria

Due to limitation of words, it would be impossible to place one after the other the heinous activities of Boko Haram in the northeastern part of Nigeria and other surrounding areas. The most publicized onslaught of this sect that attracted

international outcry was the abduction of 276 students of a Government Secondary School who were writing West African Examination Council (WAEC) exam in the town of Chibok in Borno State, Nigeria on the night of April 14, 2014. This singular act by the terrorists made Nigerians to be aghast and millions of people asked the question: How was it possible for this terrorist group to act with such impunity? It took nearly two weeks before the government could comment on the crime (Daily Sun, April 15, 2015).

Another instance was the dastardly act of December 25, 2011 where the Boko Haram terrorist group under one of their leaders by name Abubakar Dikko (A.K.A. Kabiru Sokoto) bombed St. Theresa's Catholic Church Madalla, Niger State near Abuja. Not less than 48 persons died in the attack while over 200 Christians were hospitalized. On Friday January 6, 2011, members of the sect had struck again in Mubi, Adamawa State, killing 20 Igbo men and women. At the end of such massacre, the deadly group issued a three-day ultimatum to southerners mainly Christians to leave northern Nigeria. Some efforts made to tract down these sects produced insignificant results, the reason being that Kabiru Sokoto escaped from Sokoto detention and as a result, could not come to make some useful statement that could expose their sponsors who were with the Nigerian Security Agencies and those in top positions in government (Newswatch magazine, January 30, 2012).

In June 17, 2012, three churches in Kaduna were bombed by Boko Haram causing havoc in that environment. This incident marked the beginning of a new dimension to the security crisis in the country as some reprisal attacks were made by Christians who had hitherto endured losing relatives and properties to Boko Haram bombings but could no longer keep quiet. Thus, the Christians in Kaduna spontaneously took up arms against Muslims due to the multiple bombings including that of the Shalom Church in Irikaniya where scores of Church members were killed; another blast on the roof of Christ the King Catholic Church, Sabon Gari, Zaria in Kaduna State; and also, another at the ECWADCC Church equally in Zaria leaving a good number of persons dead. These Christians had to barricade the Kaduna/Abuja Road and in the process, sorted out Muslim passersby and executed all they could lay their hands on (Bawa, 2014).

Again, no fewer than 70 persons died and more than 130 severely wounded in the reprisal attacks that occurred in June 19, 2012 in Kaduna State, Nigeria. Unfortunately, the police and army JTF that were ordered to curtail the serial killings could not match force with the Boko Haram sect as they appeared to have more sophisticated weapons and even seemed to be more trained in warfare than those sent to scare them from their areas of operation, (Danijibo, 2012).

In another incident, there was a mayhem in Kano State, north-western region of Nigeria. This time, the sect unleashed an attack on one Joshua Jegede, 25 years of age, a staff of Guaranty Trust Bank (GTB) as he was ordered out of his vehicle together with his friends and they were shot at a close range (Danijibo, 2012). In another part of Kano same day, Segun Tijoni, 20 years of age from Sabon Gari was shot by the deadly group and his corpse was found the next day with gun wounds on his body (Johnson, 2011).

Hundreds of people were killed in similar circumstances in Kano as the city practically became a war zone from the evening of Friday, January. 20, 2011 to the day in which multiple bomb blast rocked different areas of the metropolis. The government after the killings, placed the figure of the deceased at 185 but a source informed Newswatch that more than 200 persons were killed (Newswatch Magazine February 6, 2012).

Another North-eastern state of Nigeria under siege by Boko Haram is Yobe State. In Damaturu, the Yobe State Capital, a vicinity called New Jerusalem is a renown abode for Christians. Most Christians consider the place a safe haven to reside because many churches are also located there. It has the highest concentration of Christians and non-indigenes. Unsurprisingly, Boko Haram unleashed their mayhem on Damaturu and Potiskum on Friday November 4, 2011. It was one of the deadliest attacks ever carried out by Boko Haram; as it claimed more than 150 lives and rendered thousands of people homeless. Churches like St. Mary's Catholic Church, Living Faith also known as Winners Chapel, All Saints Anglican Church, Cherubim and Seraphim Church and the Evangelical Church of West Africa (ECWA) were all razed down (Dessert, 2011).

It was gathered that before the Boko Haram members did the bombing of New Jerusalem district, they first attacked the office of the Anti-Terrorist Squad (ATS) along Maiduguri Road near NNPC mega station at about 4.30pm on that fateful day. They were in a Posh Honda CRV Jeep loaded with explosives and attacked the force building where both the suicide bomber, and many others including the building were razed down (Newswatch November 21, 2011).

An unfortunate scenario in these serious events is that in both Maiduguri in Borno and Yobe States and some other affected areas, soldiers, and other members of Joint Military Task Force (JMTF) are themselves being bombed and killed. For instance, on Tuesday July 19, 2011, as peacekeepers patrolled the town, a gang of men suddenly threw bombs at their van around 7.40pm where three escaped death narrowly and some of the JTF were seriously wounded. Attacks of such magnitude is not restricted to the army alone. The blast also killed several people including visitors, drivers, and members of the Police Mobile Force (PMF) on stand-by at the Force headquarters as well as several people and contractors who milled around the vast parking lot. Another dark day was experienced in Abuja, in 2014 when a Sharan Volkswagen car filled with deadly explosives was parked at Nyanya Motor Park pretending to board passengers only to explode and kill over 110 people that had visited the park that early morning for a journey (Essam, 2014).

Furthermore, the insurgents put the Sallah festival of the Muslims in three villages in Adamawa State on October 4, 2014 in a pitiful state as they attacked and killed about 70 persons in Michika Local Government Area in a renewed attack. Their houses and farmlands were equally affected. Among the villages attacked is kuborshosho, the village of former governor of the state and minister of youth development, Mr. Boni Haruna. Another person was a 99-year-old man, who was slaughtered by the sect; the other villages they attacked were Kubi and Garta among others. During the attack, the family house of the former governor was razed down, four of his uncles, aged aunties, nieces and their siblings narrowly escaped death by the whiskers as good Nigerians evacuated them from the war-torn zone of Michika and its environs to Yola, the state capital. More villages were attacked, and the insurgents carried these attacks from Thursday night through Friday as those who escaped ran to the mountains (Essam, 2014). Warehouses and shops were all burnt down. The question

that remained unanswered is, during this period of attack that lasted for more than one day, where were the Nigerian Military and other law enforcement agencies posted to Adamawa? (Saturday Sun, October 4, 2014).

More so, the Jos bombing on Sunday 5th July, 2015 where Muslim worshipers were breaking their Ramadam fast at Yan Taya Mosque Dilimi Street off Bauchi road Jos and Shagalinku restaurant along Bauchi road Jos led to the death of 48 persons and several others injured and properties worth millions destroyed. It was another ugly incident that was hard to swallow. Also, on Tuesday 7th July, 2015, 14 persons were killed at Sho village in Barkin Local Government Area at noon when the victims were being escorted by the police. This was after a suicide bomber on the same day had killed 26 persons at the venue of verification centre, in Sabon Gari Local Government Area of Zaria in Kaduna State. This situation made the incumbent governor of Kaduna State, Mallam Ahmed El-Rufai to make an order that no street beggars and hawkers should be allowed to operate in Kaduna, metropolis as majority of the suicide bombers camouflage as beggars and hawkers to implement their wicked acts (Sun Newspaper, Thursday 9, 2015).

Also, there has been cases of farmers/Herdsman confrontations with some believing the herdsmen to be Boko Haram members. The sect continues to harm the society due to their devilish acts and there is urgent need to curb their activities (Adesoji, 2010; Emesunum, 2008).

Finally, on 5th June 2022, a group of armed men stormed the St. Francis church in Owo, Oyo State and killed dozens of worshippers including 4 children. This deadly attack is suspected by the government to be an act of the ISWAP but no group has claimed any responsibility of the attack yet (BBC, 2022)

5.5. Consequences of Boko Haram Acts in Nigeria

The activities of Boko Haram have brought harsh consequences to the country which are despicable and far-reaching. In analyzing its effect in our society, we shall consider some major sectors/areas such as food and nutrition, health, shelter, and education.

Food and Nutrition

Boko Haram insurgency has affected agriculture particularly in some of the country's main food-growing areas. States such as Yobe, Adamawa and Borno that are worst hit by the insurgency are known to produce cowpeas, millet, rice, tomatoes, yams, onions, sorghums corn, fish and livestock. Farmers are afraid to go to their farms as a result of fear of being attacked (Omolewa, 2010). Gambo, a lecturer in the University of Maiduguri, noted that no one can move a kilometer due to fear as most of the farmers have fled their homes. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee also stated that more than 1.5 million people, mostly farmers have been forced to flee their homes as Boko Haram intensified its insurgency in the past years (Emesonum, 2008).

Also, the trade routes between the north, east, west and the south are disrupted, making transportation and distribution of food extremely difficult. The Central Bank of Nigeria stated that the disruptions on food distribution due to the insurgency are among the largest inflationary risks faced by the economy. Eme, Onyishi, Uche and Uche (2014) further noted that Boko Haram has stopped the flow of beans. They equally noted that two food items, pepper and tomatoes particularly; which mostly come from the North and are used in most home is in short supply. Consequently, the prices of food have skyrocketed.

According to Osagie (2013), a basket of pepper that was sold at the rate of N4,000-N5,000 (about €10) doubled; including transport charges. Should these violent attacks by Boko Haram continue, it will plunge the country into a state of chronic food insecurity which is persistent and long-termed (Rouke & Boyer, 2004).

Thus, prices of food will continue to escalate, making it difficult for individuals and families to purchase sufficient and nutritious food for a healthy life. This will put individuals at the risk of hunger, malnutrition and even death. Malnutrition rates are high in areas worst hit by the insurgency and conflicts in general. Knowing that food and nutrition insecurity are among the fundamental threats to human security, the need to conquer this insurgency cannot be overemphasized.

Health

The health status of the people is very important in any society. The World Health Organization (WHO) Report on Violence and Health stated that each year, more

than a million lives are lost and many more experience non-fatal injuries as a result of various forms of violence (WHO, 2002). Boko Haram insurgency has destroyed so many lives and inflicted injuries on thousands of people. The increasing number of the injured has led to the overcrowding of healthcare centres and hospitals with so much pressure on machines leading to their breakdown as well as the health staff working overtime (Olojo, 2013; Adesoji, 2010).

The victims who are lucky to survive may still have memories of the violence which will disrupt normal life patterns (Briggs 2010). Equally, the sect has destroyed healthcare centres and facilities that are required for the health of citizens. Health workers themselves who are targets have fled from their offices. Very sadly, across the Northeast, affected populations are having increasing difficulty in accessing healthcare services. According to The UN-Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA, 2014), Boko Haram insurgents have attacked so many health facilities and health workers, implying that in large areas of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa, the health system is barely functioning.

According to the United States Agency for International Development USAID, (2014), an assessment in Chibok community, found that all health facilities had been damaged by armed groups; likewise, medical prescription stocks were either inadequate or unavailable in Adamawa. For those that are available, they charge fees; thus, limiting access for the poor population. Also, there are ascending cases of communicable diseases in the region and among the region's population displaced into the neighbouring states and countries (Musa, 2015). Sadly, all these have occurred in a region already under-resourced. If this insurgency is not nipped on the bud, health issues will continue; with a greater population of people being affected and possible outbreaks of diseases occurring consistently.

Shelter

Several houses have been destroyed by the Boko Haram insurgency and the number cannot be quantified (OCHA, 2014). This has left millions of persons displaced. According to International Organization on Migration (IOM) (2015), over 2.1 million people have been displaced in Nigeria by the Boko Haram insurgency. These internally displaced persons have migrated and now live in host communities; seeking for appropriate shelter and in the long-run resettlement.

The number of IDPs may increase further and drastically unless the evil sect is quickly curbed. Also, with the problems of shelter and accommodation becoming a critical security issue, the Humanitarian Needs Overview HNO (2014) noted that most internally displaced people are camped in schools, churches and makeshift accommodations which are mostly uncompleted buildings or derelict houses.

These communal and make shifts shelters are mostly overcrowded and unsuitable in terms of water and sanitation facilities, cooking and privacy; especially for women and consequently, the human security of the individual is threatened in these situations. Likewise, instances of theft and rape are commonly experienced; just as transmission of communicable diseases is high and, in most cases, women are seriously affected (Moore, 2007).

Education

The educational sector has been seriously affected by the Boko Haram sect; especially in Northern Nigeria. The sect has targeted schools and colleges with students and teachers injured, killed or abducted and facilities destroyed. According to the Humanitarian Needs Overview - HNO (2014:8), “conflict and insecurity have had a direct and compounding negative impact on children’s access to education, the availability of educational spaces, materials and the ability of teachers”.

The National President of the Nigerian Union of Teachers, on the 5th of October, 2015 affirmed that at least 600 teachers have been killed as a result of the Boko Haram insurgency (Pulse.ng, 2015). Also, as at August, 2013, all schools were closed in Yobe State (Awotu, 2015). On April 14, 2014, the abduction of 276 female students at the Government Girls Secondary School in Chibok has further discouraged parents from enrolling their children and wards in schools and those already in schools have been withdrawn (Hassan, 2014).

These have all occurred in a region that has been educationally backwards even before the insurgency and more attacks will further weaken the region and the educational sector generally in the near future. There will also be an increased number of school dropouts, illiterates and unemployed youths who will be vulnerable to being recruited as suicide bombers and terrorists; where the sect is not arrested/destroyed. Consequently, Awortu (2015:17) asserted that, “when the rate

of illiteracy and school dropout is high, there is tendency that violence will increase and persist in Nigeria”. Also, the disruption of educational system in the country will weaken its manpower base; hence, the development of the nation will be seriously threatened.

Chapter 6

6.1 The Role of International Organizations in Combating Boko Haram

Several international organizations like the United Nations, European Union, African Union, ECOWAS, have all ventured to combat the BH insurgency. The EU Member States for instance, have led counter-terrorism measures against Boko Haram. However, the focus here will be on African organizations and the role of Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS) and African Union (AU) as Nigeria is a member of both organizations.

6.2. BOKO HARAM, ECOWAS AND AU

In recent years, the sub-region of West Africa has faced this wave of terrorism, resulting in the death of thousands of people, destruction of public and private properties as well as the displacement of millions of people. The wave of terrorism has come in the forms of terrorist bombings, suicide attacks, hostage-taking, kidnappings, hijacking, wanton assassinations, mass murder, piracy and acts of sabotage of public and private properties, as well as the torching and desecration of religious and sacred places (ECOWAS, 2013).

In Nigeria, the terrorist organization Boko Haram has times without number, perpetrated premeditated violent attacks on people, state officials and infrastructure, government institutions and national and multi-national organizations; thus, undermining the peace, security, and stability of the country. Consequently, state and non-state actors in the West African sub-region, including the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in synergy with local and foreign actors (state and non-state), such as the USA, France, African Union (AU), European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN), have devised different strategies to counter and combat the threat. This raises the need to investigate how some of these actors such as ECOWAS and AU have responded; especially in terms of issues and challenges in the current political environment.

The operations of ECOWAS over the years apart from promoting economic integration and development, have expanded to include security concerns such as counterterrorism; knowing that peace, security, and stability are essential

ingredients for effective regional integration and socio-economic development. Consequently, the body: *has developed a number of binding instruments, including conventions and protocols, on conflict prevention, conflict management and conflict resolution: peacekeeping, combating of corruption, combating of small arms and light weapons; and prevention of drug abuse, illicit drug trafficking and organized crimes, most of which are also applicable to terrorism* (Akanji, 2019; 101).

In the area of combating terrorism, ECOWAS has collaborated with state and non-state actors regionally and internationally. Regionally, it has been a channel for collaborations for member states to build and implement counterterrorism measures. In 2006 for example, Heads of State and governments of the member states of ECOWAS deliberated on the rising cases of terrorism and money laundering in the region and directed all member states to enact laws to incorporate “the revised Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) standards and necessary international instruments on AML/CFT” (GIABA 2006. 22).

In the international scene, ECOWAS has a relationship on terrorism and related issues with development partners such as the UN, World Bank, EU, African Union (AU) and many countries within and outside of Africa. For instance, the body entered into a multi-year (2015-2019) security and development agreement with the US government in 2015. The agreement concentrated on strengthening democratic institutions, enhancing trade and investment in addition to peace and security, including Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership (ECOWAS, 2016). Likewise, ECOWAS is a regional partner of the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), a committee that was created by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005) to facilitate the ability of UN member states to prevent terrorist acts within and outside their borders and the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), established to execute CTC’s policy decisions and conduct expert assessments of UN member states on counterterrorism. In view of this partnership, ECOWAS has developed some measures, including the establishment of counterterrorism institutions and instruments (UN, 2015; Nnoli, 2006).

Among the prominent counterterrorism institutions established by ECOWAS is the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in West Africa (GIABA); established on 10 December 1999, as an institution to combat money laundering but with expanded mandate to incorporate combating terrorism financing in 2006 in view of the growing terrorism in the region and the role that illicit money (money laundered) plays in fostering it. GIABA thus, was tasked with the responsibility to ensure that “member states of ECOWAS recognize, adopt and implement international AML/CFT measures for the purpose of ensuring the security, integrity and stability of the region’s financial system” (GIABA 2015, 13). In addition, GIABA’s mandate involves provision of technical assistance to ECOWAS member states in the area of institutional and regulatory frameworks and good governance; organizing self-evaluation exercises for member states as well as peer assessments with a view to enhance the effectiveness and compliance of national regimes with international standard and coordinating and facilitating regional and international cooperation (Eme, 2014; Moulaye, 2006).

From its annual reports, there is sufficient evidence that GIABA has in many ways, helped ECOWAS member states to implement Financial Action Task Force (FATF) measures; provided technical assistance to them in key areas such as policy development, training, mentoring capacity building, study tours, equipment and advisory services; and undertaken country assessment to determine the level of each member state’s compliance with AML/CFT, especially the FATF standards (GIABA 2015; Eme, 2014). As of 2015, for instance, all member states of ECOWAS have been assessed by GIABA and put on follow-up process, which involved continual monitoring, collection of up-to-date information on compliance and exerting of pressures on countries that were unable to address the lapses in the AML/CFT measures. The result of these efforts by GIABA have been tremendous, including the ratification and domestication of UN treaties on terrorism by some ECOWAS member states, including Nigeria (Akanji, 2019).

Furthermore, GIABA’s efforts have led to the enactment of counterterrorism legislations and establishment of institutions on counterterrorism by all countries in the region. For instance, in Guinea, Law No. L/2014/010/AN on Countering the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) was promulgated in 2014; and Decree Nos.

D/049/PRG/SGG and D/050/PRG/SGG, that established the Inter-Ministerial Committee responsible for assessing the AML/CFT regime of the country and mapping out the mission, organization and functioning of the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), in line with Article 23 of the AML Law were promulgated in April 2015 (ECOWAS, 2016). Equally, Nigeria has criminalized money laundering and terrorism with the enactment of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act 2004 and Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act 2013 (OCHA, 2014; Hassan, 2014)

In addition to GIABA, which focuses on combating terrorism financing, ECOWAS has equally come up with some other counterterrorism mechanisms such as ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Coordination Bureau (ECOCTB), ECOWAS Arrest Warrant (ECOWARRANT), ECOWAS Black List of Terrorist and Criminal Networks (ECOLIST), ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Training Centre and Counter-Terrorism Technical Assistance Directory (ECOWAS, 2013). These mechanisms were created in February 2013 using the adoption of the ECOWAS Political Declaration and Common Position against Terrorism, that contained ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Implementation Plan. The ECOWAS Declaration was premised on giving effect to regional, continental, and international counterterrorism instruments and to lay a common operational framework for actions to prevent terrorism in West Africa, in addition to being predicated on the assumption that a terrorist threat to one is a threat to all in the region (Akanji, 2019).

The reason for counterterrorism mechanisms of the ECOWAS Political Declaration and Common Position against Terrorism was to fight terrorism using a three-pronged approach; that is, to Prevent, Pursue and Reconstruct. Under the first approach, member states of ECOWAS are expected to prevent terrorism by, and in consideration of other things, eliminating the socio-economic and political conditions, such as poverty, unemployment and inequalities, which facilitate the rise of terrorists. Likewise, to achieve the second pillar of the approach, ECOWARRANT, ECOCTB and ECOLIST were approved for establishment so as to enable member states of ECOWAS to cooperate in giving and obtaining evidence on terrorists in other member states, design a databank of terrorist activities, trends and developments, draw up names of individual terrorists and terrorists networks and

exchange information and intelligence on terrorist activities among others (ECOWAS, 2013).

The mechanisms are nevertheless, expected to function with and be assisted by other institutions in the region including GIABA, on combating terrorist financing – ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN) and West Africa Police Chiefs Committee (WAPCCO) for information gathering to predict and detect terrorist activities and the ECOWAS Court of Justice for the enforcement of the rights of the victims of terrorism (Moulaye, 2006). As part of the third aspect of the approach, the ECOWAS Declaration expects member states to heal the wounds of terrorism by offering psychosocial and medical support to victims of terrorism and to build people’s trust and confidence in the government.

Again, ECOWAS has been in the forefront of attracting global attention to terrorism in the sub-region and in seeking international actions against it. This has been in a number of ways, including by regular open condemnations, through press releases of terrorist activities whenever they occur in the region, such as in the case of the abduction of 276 Chibok secondary School girls in April 14, 2014 in Borno State Nigeria (Idris, 2014); ECOWAS also condemned attacks in June 2015 by Boko Haram on targets in N’djamena, Republic of Chad, where 20 people died and several others were wounded (ECOWAS Info, 2015) and the attacks of 17 June, 2015 by the same group on the Gueskerou area of Diffa Province of Niger Republic, in which not less than 38 persons died, mostly women and children with several others wounded and more than a hundred homes set ablaze (ECOWAS, 2015).

Another way is by emphasizing the inclusion of terrorism in the sub-region on the agenda of major global and regional multilateral actors. For instance, on 12 January, 2015, ECOWAS requested the AU Peace and Security Council to include an item on terrorism by Boko Haram in Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin region on the agenda of the AU summit slated for the year (AU, 2015). Consequently, terrorism by Boko haram was included on the agenda of the 25th AU Summit, which was held in Johannesburg in June 2015, with the result that the summit, among other things, endorsed efforts by member countries of the LCBC and Benin Republic to

operationalize the MNJTF that was established to combat Boko Haram in the region (ECOWAS, 2015; Bossuyt, 2016).

A major constrain however to ECOWAS's counterterrorism efforts in West Africa has been the lack of willingness and lustre approach of the organization and its member states to implement counterterrorism decisions and legally binding instruments (Akanji, 2019). This is evidenced in the sense that though ECOWAS as an institution is a platform for states in the region to discuss, articulate and develop ways of combating regional challenges, many member states of ECOWAS such as Nigeria, Cape Verde, Guinea and Sierra Leone defaulted in the submission of their 2015 annual country reports to GIABA (GIABA, 2015), thus hindering the evaluation of the state of terrorism financing and money laundering in them and as the possible areas of technical assistance they could have received from GIABA.

Likewise, financial constraints, emanating from the failure of member states to honour their financial commitments to ECOWAS, have limited the capacity of its institutions, including those on counterterrorism, to operate optimally. The implementation of some of the activities of GIABA between 2011 and 2016 for instance, fell below the optimal (66.36%) level, due to shortage of funds that all ECOWAS institutions experienced at the time (Inks, 2017). The level of achievement that GIABA garnered at the time, though below the optimal level, was essentially due to financial assistance it received from development partners, especially the African Development Bank. Also, not every ECOWAS member country has ratified, signed or acceded to essential binding international legal instruments on counterterrorism. For instance, though a majority (13 out of 15) of the member states have ratified the 1999 OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of terrorism as of 2017 (AU, 2017), only 7 of the 18 UN and universal instruments on counterterrorism have been ratified by all the states in the region (ECOWAS, 2016).

Again, ECOWAS member states have often provided irregular reports to the CTC and even fewer reports per UNSC Resolution 1624, a resolution designed to accelerate border security and encourage member countries to submit updates to the CTC' (Warren 2012). The implications of this are two; the first being that the defaulting slates have failed to develop national mechanisms to enforce the

instruments and the second is that the situation has undermined ECOWAS's efforts to develop region-wide mechanisms to enforce the instruments. In addition, ECOWAS itself has been lethargic in implementing its own counter-terrorism decisions. This shows in the fact that the mechanisms (and the entire strategy) approved for creation and implementation by the Political Declaration and Common Position against Terrorism of 2013 have not been fully functional, contrary to the declaration that they should be operational within 6 months from the date, 28 February 2013 of the adoption of the document. This, it is argued, is due to limited dedicated resources for its implementation (UN, 2016).

Also, ECOWAS's effort in combating terrorism in the sub-region has been undermined by the character of the international political environment; especially as it relates to the high-stake politics and struggles involving the AU and UN, contributing to the negligence/decline in interest of its initiatives. The general character of the international system, as defined by the UN Charter, is that regional and sub-regional organizations must acquire the approval of the UNSC before undertaking the use of force. This is why chapter VIII, Article 53 of the Charter stipulates that '...no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council ...' (UNSC 2015). This is further reinforced by Article 54 of the same Chapter VIII of the Charter, which states that 'the Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the preservice of international peace and security. These provisions have severely created legitimacy problems for enforcement actions unilaterally or collectively undertaken by regional and sub-regional organization, most of whom only secured the approval of the UN retroactively (Warren, 2012).

Finally, a communiqué that was adopted by the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) at its 1010th meeting held on 19 July 2021 on the implementation of the Regional Strategy for the Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience (RSS) of the Boko Haram affected areas of Chad Basin can be seen to show further efforts of the AU in combating Boko Haram threat in Nigeria and West Africa as a whole. The summary can be seen in [Appendix A](#).

Conclusion

The main objective of this thesis was to analyze the emerging threats to Nigeria's national security with Boko Haram as a case study which can be linked to the already existing security challenges it faces. These security threats have been growing with a fierce momentum and have been challenging the very foundation of the nation. The key significance of this work which was to evaluate the effects of Boko Haram in Nigeria and the emerging threats that have developed as a result of the presence of this group in the ongoing war of over a decade. As terrorist groups gain grounds not just in Nigeria but all over the world, it is crucial that state and non-state actors tackle this global phenomenon. Anticipating that with the information provided in this research paper, the world can be better informed on the imperative dangers of terrorism, it is consequential to understand its expansion and threats across borders as can be seen in the six chapters of this thesis.

Specially, in our world today where threat to security has been on the rise, it was necessary to extensively explore the concepts of security and threats. Threats, which are without boundaries enlarge the risk of other threats and this factor can be likened to the Nigerian case. The threat posed by Boko Haram has expounded to other threats which have emerged in Nigeria namely, food crisis, poverty, lack of education, insecurity, banditry and kidnapping, corruption, religious intolerance etc. These concepts which were explored in the first chapter of this work, clearly deduce the fact that security incorporates all measures to safeguard citizens and the nation state against any violent occurrence. As no one person is immune to threats, the essentiality of the need of a constant all-encompassing security should be a necessary action to salvage the socio-economic challenges faced in Nigeria. The vulnerabilities seen in Nigeria stem from socio economic threats, terrorism, transnational organized crimes, and internal conflict. With the presence of these social threats by Buzan identified in the country, it is not too far from becoming a failed state.

In the second chapter, Nigeria which is also known as the "*giant of Africa*" is explored in its entirety. The complexity of the Nigerian state was dissected by underscoring the ethnolinguistic and religious differences present as a result of the amalgamation

of the Northern and Southern protectorates of the 1914. Presentation was made on the understanding of the state as well as its culture, religion, etc and the enormous diversities in Nigeria was tabled to better comprehend the conflicts it faced in history and still does. The fear of domination of one region over the other was analysed with respect to the amalgamation of the northern and southern protectorates by the British colonial rule, in which peoples of different values and religions were bound together to form a unified colonial state. This fusion, despite the nation gaining its independence in 1960, has led to the country experiencing alternating military and democratic rule. Nigeria has been wrought with constant challenges ranging from coups to countercoups which all have been due to corruption to insecurity. The uncertainty in Nigeria and the loss of lives of its populace as a result of the heightening level of insecurity is a heavy contributor to its religiosity as the citizens see the government fail them daily. This faith-based sentiment is a feeling of lost hope and many have turned to religious institutions. Conflicts of religion and ethnicity have been companions throughout Nigerian history and can be traced back to the cause of the country's first civil war that claimed the lives of millions. In the case of Nigeria, religious intolerance abounds thereby causing religious conflicts at any slightest provocation.

To combat these conflicts, chapter three examines the institutional design of the country and the steps implemented by the government to curb these conflicts to prevent future recurrences. Having addressed this, Nigeria was examined under its Federal System of Government and efforts were made to understand the Federal Character Principle employed by the government to better unify the country. The implementation of the FCP was investigated as the mode of this unification by the creation of the six geopolitical zones. Despite these measures by the government, one can question the role of the creation of more states and geopolitical zones in the progress and unity of the country. The state of the nation can further be attributed to the application of the federal character principle as roles are given to citizens not based on merit but mere inclusion. This FCP ought to be reviewed to avoid mediocrity in the development of the nation.

The strength of states was analysed in chapter four to broaden the concept of failed states or fragility of states in the viewpoint of the Nigerian state. This fragility

identifies the bridge that led to the emerging threats faced in Nigeria. The concept of a failed state and indicators of a failed state was deeply scrutinised in the case of the Nigeria and the role the elites play in the country. Also, with a guide to positive state functions, mentioned by Robert Rotberg, these indicators were a yardstick to further determine if Nigeria is a failing or failed state. Even in the abundance of natural resources, the country is still struggling with a high level of poverty as the resources only recycle in the hands of a few while the rest of the populace live in abject impoverishment. Furthermore, these existing threats as seen in Nigeria which are as a result of the fragility of the state have birthed other emerging threats which are instances of rise in insecurity, poverty, rise in the cases of kidnap and self-kidnap, agitation for secessionism, ritual killings, ethno-religious conflicts, religious intolerance, poorer qualitative education, food crisis and starvation, amongst others.

The root causes of insecurity in Nigeria are too numerous to mention but was summarized in a nutshell. Considering the emergence of Boko Haram which was as a result of corruption and imminent poverty in the north-east region of Nigeria, it was a 'jolly ride' for Boko Haram to spread and gain grounds. The alarming level of poverty in Nigeria is a breeding ground for people especially the Nigerian youths to be brainwashed by Boko Haram members in joining them. Bad governance at all levels has increased the antecedence of violent attacks and insecurity. This salient point has hindered the creation of jobs for many youths and this in turn has led to incessant killings in all forms, human trafficking, kidnaps, armed robberies, local terrorism etc. The high level of corruption has also adversely weakened the judicial system. Elites who have been arrested for public misappropriation of funds are often times released without completing their full jail term. This is also the case of some Nigerian youths being arrested and imprisoned without fair trials.

Chapter five presents the case study of this research paper which is Boko Haram, how it all began, what led to its emergence as well as chronicles of Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria. The term terrorism was also explored to better classify the group, the different factions of split and their modus operandi to distinguish each. The role of ideologies was a key factor in this chapter as it painted a clearer picture for the reason of the success of Boko Haram and its rising momentum. Also, analysis was

made to identify the biting consequences Nigeria faces due to these heinous acts purported by Boko Haram.

Finally, the last chapter focuses on analysing the roles played by international organisations in the combat against Boko Haram but with peculiarity on the African Union and ECOWAS. The different counter-terrorism measures applied by each and their successes or limitations in the same quest were evaluated in this final section. With these options explored especially on the roles played by the African Union and ECOWAS it was enlightening to be informed of the counter-terrorist measures developed and applied by these organisations.

Rounding up, this work has broadened the understanding that as complex as security is, it should be considered a system and for security to thrive in any given state first depends principally on how well information is shared and collaborated between its institutional bodies for the benefit of its citizens, the state, and their government.

The recommendations below are made in line with my observations as proffered solutions to the combat of the existing security challenges in Nigeria:

[Recommendations in Combatting the Security Challenges in Nigeria](#)

Tightening of Security across Borders: The porosity of borders is a factual cause that leads to the spread of these terror groups and the nation's borders must be tightened to be under strict control by agencies concerned. This also includes the interstate boundaries so as to tackle the movement of terror groups between states. If this is achieved, the government will be on an advantage in detecting the areas of concentration of these terror groups and eradicating them with adequate planned actions will be more feasible.

Provision of State-of-the-Art Equipment: The prevention, investigation and detection of insecurity can be tackled using the best techniques to stay ahead of the perpetrators. Government has to ensure the provision of armoury, latest technologies like body cameras, vehicle scanners, and security facilities for its military personnel and institutional bodies. The Nigerian government should also work more closely with the US government to increase intelligence collection. This cooperation will aid to stymie the evolution of this terrorist sect.

Transparency: All efforts should also be channeled in arresting everyone involved with Boko Haram and prosecuted. Likewise, the sponsors of the insurgent group should be arrested and tried for their crimes no matter who they are. No one linked to the group should be protected because of their societal status.

Incentivization of Education/ Job Creation: Without a doubt, one of the reasons for the impoverishment of the north is traceable to the long history of conservatism in the region. The Northern elites and the Government should be able to broker peace in the region and encourage education to create opportunities in order to avoid the youths feeling marginalized. The values of education should be taught in our schools so that the Nigerian youths will learn proper values and understand that western education isn't one's enemy. The Nigerian Government also ought to prioritize the creation of employment for its citizens. Many youths join Boko Haram out of hunger and frustration as the Boko Haram ideology appeals to the poor masses.

Training of Security Personnel: The Nigerian Government should acquire adequate approaches in the counter-terrorist measures especially learning from countries that have been successful in the combat against terrorism. Trainings should be applied in dealing with these security threats by intelligence sharing and logistics. The Government should devise military approaches that correspond to the unique paths and activities each factional group has pursued as well as invest in its law enforcement agencies in order to be proactive.

Employment of adequate security professionals: Considering the alarming rate of terrorism, companies and establishments in Nigeria should employ adequate security professionals who are well trained, and capable to increase intelligence gathering. There should be more synergy between the government's security agents and private security sectors in fighting Boko Haram. This stretches to include adequate security parameters in all our institutions. School administrators, leaders of different organizations such as churches and mosques should be security conscious and ensure that security measures are constantly updated.

Reconstruction: Priority should be given by the Government to the humanitarian response along with reconstruction efforts both for the victims and structures which

were destroyed by BH. Victims of BH should also be given mental health and psychosocial support. Adequate security must be ensured henceforth to guarantee continued unmet frustrations vis-a vis the civilian population and governance structures.

Infrastructural Development: Many roads in Nigeria are in a deplorable state. This has been one of the tactics used by these terror groups to waylay citizens as they use roads which are in bad shapes to kidnap victims. The Government should improve the road safety to ensure less attacks on commuters and prioritize security of transport routes.

Good Governance: Finally, good governance is the panacea to Nigeria's growing security challenges. This point which all encompasses the above will ensure that the government is accountable to its people. With good governance, leaders who hold public offices will ensure job creations, transparency, credibility as opposed to misappropriation of funds. This in turn will guarantee the socio-economic development and national growth thereby stemming poverty which leads to insecurity. Electing vision bearers into office is a remedy to good governance instead of recycling old leaders who do not have fresh ideas in running such a populous nation. This move if implemented in the forthcoming 2023 general elections, will be a huge step in the retracting the country's socioeconomic woes.

Summarizing the main points discussed throughout this research paper, we can conclude by pinning that the security challenges faced in Nigeria are opening doors to even more intensive security threats. These emerging threats are attacking the citizens, institutions, and the very existence of Nigeria. The government ought to intensify human and infrastructural development especially for the youths who are mostly vulnerable and victims of societal woes and unemployment. In view of a war that has been ongoing for over a decade and the split of Boko Haram into various factions, violent extremism remains a major threat to Nigeria. Even as it is observed how Boko Haram largely delegitimized itself, the underlying factors that supported its rise remain very much in play. Government's response has varied between military and non-military aspects but combined with the devastating humanitarian crisis and the destruction that has been wrought, the situation remains dire,

particularly as the insurgency continues to rage in parts of the country. Coordination and long-term solutions are needed for Nigeria to degrade the insurgents and address the root causes of violent extremism to avoid further militancy. Capping up, the government should apply sustainable security strategy, tackle corruption and mismanagement in the state while showing transparency in the combat against terrorism. This includes an imperative to implement policies that sufficiently balance security considerations with local needs, and that avoid prioritizing short-term but to implement sustainable goals in advance to nip future impending extremist cycles.

Abbreviations and Glossary

- AML/CFT – *Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of the Financing of Terrorism*
- ATS – *Anti-Terrorist Squad*
- AU – *African Union*
- CDC – *Constitution Drafting Committee*
- CTC – *Counter-Terrorism Committee*
- ECOCTB – *ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Coordination Bureau*
- ECOLIST – *ECOWAS Black List of Terrorist and Criminal Networks*
- ECOWARANT – *ECOWAS Arrest Warrant*
- ECOWARN – *ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network*
- ECOWAS – *Economic Community of West African States*
- EFCC – *Economic and Financial Crimes Commission*
- EU – *European Union*
- FATF – *Financial Aid Task Force*
- FCP – *Federal Character Principle*
- FIU – *Financial Intelligence Unit*
- GIABA – *Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in West Africa*
- JMTF – *Joint Military Task Force*
- JTF – *Joint Task Force*
- JAS - *Jamatu Ahli Al- Sunna lil Da'wa Wal Jihad*
- NNPC – *Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation*
- Oga – *A word for boss or rich man in Nigeria*
- PMF – *Police Mobile Force*
- PSC – *Peace and Security Council*
- RSS – *Regional Strategy for the Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience*
- UN – *United Nations*
- UNCTED – *United Nation Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate*
- UNSC – *United Nations Security Council*
- WAEC – *West Africa Education Council*
- WAPCO – *West Africa Police Chiefs Committee*
- Yahoo-Yahoo – *A form of online fraud or cybercrime*

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Appendix

Annex A - PSC/PR/COMM.1010 (2021)

COMMUNIQUÉ

The Peace & Security Council of the African Union welcomed the progress made on the implementation of the Regional Strategy for the Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience despite continued attacks by the Boko Haram and ISWAP terrorist groups. It also noted the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in the region as well as the security and political challenges present in the Republic of Chad. Commending the political cooperation and mutual trust between the affected countries of the region, the council applauded the governors of the worst-affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin for their efforts in the development of the Territorial Actions Plans (TAPs).

On the subject of protracted insecurity in the region, the council expressed great concern, dotting on the announcement of the death of the leader of Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau which they believe will further consolidate the group's activities. Expressing appreciation to the bilateral and multilateral partners for their continued support to the LCB region countries and the International Community through the International Support Group (ISG), it stressed on the importance to support development and peacebuilding efforts in the region. The Peace and Security Council further underscored the importance of establishing a multiparty trust fund aimed at promoting better accounting method and coordination of all resources while encouraging the AU Commission in collaboration with LCBC to undertake an institutional capacity needs assessment. While highlighting the imperative of concerted efforts, it further urged the AU Commission through its Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) to work in close cooperation with the LCBC and affected countries. In addition to the above point, it beamed on the value of strengthening institutional collaboration between the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Considering the rising level of deteriorating human conditions in the affected regions which has been accentuated by the impact of climatic change, insecurity and the COVID-19 pandemic, the PSC expressed concern and encouraged the AU Commission to deepen its engagement with the Lake Chad

Basin Regional Civil Society Platform including women and youth toward enhancing their contributions to stabilization, peace building and humanitarian assistance in the region. In summary, the council commended the AU Commission once again for its political leadership and support for LCBC while urging them to undertake effective interventions in the counter-terrorism measures against Boko Haram. Having requested the AU Commission to accelerate the development of standard operating procedure as an effective tool for stabilization operations on the continent, it concluded by deciding to remain actively seized on the matter. (AU, 2021)

ⁱ BH will be used in this work to denote the term Boko Haram