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IMAGES OF EUROPE PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE

ISSEI 2014 – Conference Proceedings
Porto, Portugal

Edited by
Yolanda Espiña

PORTO

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ISSEI 2014 - Conference Proceedings Porto, Portugal
YOLANDA ESPIÑA [EDIÇÃO]

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Editorial Note

This publication presents the Proceedings of the XIV International Conference of the International Society for the Study of European Ideas (ISSEI), held from 4 to 8 August 2014 at the Catholic University of Portugal in Porto, under the theme "Images of Europe: Past, Present, Future".

At the dawn of the twenty-first century, Europe shows signs of approaching a transformation that requires to rethink the European tradition and the values that formed and constitute the way Europe sees itself and the rest of the world, and vice versa, and to incorporate a clear idea of itself beyond its geographical boundaries. To discuss the proposed theoretical and practical challenges, featuring their extent, effects and implications for Europe and beyond Europe was the mission of the nearly 300 participants in this conference, coming from different academic fields and more than 36 countries and 160 institutions from all over the world.

The conference was organized in thematic workshops, proposed to and accepted by the ISSEI Conference Committee. At a later stage, each paper had to be submitted to and accepted by the chairs of the respective workshops. This publication contains a very significant number of the papers presented in the conference. The edition of the published papers was supervised by the chairs, as well as the internal order in which the papers appear within the workshops. The editor has taken care of the final supervision and editing of the final order of the workshops, which are alphabetically organized by the chairs´ name within the different sections. We are very grateful to all the contributors, who have made possible this version of such an intense and highly motivating Conference.

The e-book was feasible only thanks to the precious work of the designer, the artist Diogo Tudela. We are also very grateful to the Universidade Católica Editora – Porto, for the backing to the online edition project.

And last, but not least, we would like to thank the High Patronage of the Presidency of the Portuguese Republic, and the support of the Institute of Douro and Port Wines and the Porto Commercial Association.

Porto, January 2016
Yolanda Espiña, Editor
Catholic University of Portugal in Porto

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Welcoming Address

Yolanda Espiña

Dear Delegates,

I would like to welcome you to this meeting, and to thank in the first place all those who have helped us, especially the president of the Catholic University of Portugal in Porto, Prof. Afonso Vaz, and former presidents, Prof. Carvalho Guerra and Prof. Joaquim Azevedo, as well as the organizations that have offered us their help, namely the Institute of Douro and Porto Wines, and the Porto Commercial Association. Most significant is the High Patronage of the Presidency of the Portuguese Republic, which kindly wanted to be associated with this internationally renowned event. I would also like to thank the valuable collaboration of Dr. Maria Lopes Cardoso and her highly professional team. And a special thanks to our assistants, wonderful students of this university.

Of course, nothing would have been possible without the drive, experience and permanent interaction and advice of the ISSEI central organizational committee, coordinated by Prof. Ezra Talmor, founder and president of ISSEI, and Dr. Edna Rosenthal with the most valued collaboration of Rachel Ben-David. I would also like to thank very especially Prof. David Lovell and Prof. Heinz-Uwe Haus for their availability and wisdom in tackling unavoidable or unforeseen incidents throughout this whole process. I also have to mention Prof Marianna Papastephanou, co-organizer of the previous ISSEI Conference in Cyprus, for her friendly advice, and Dr. Veronica Mehno, always helpful for translation issues.

At our University, the Catholic University of Portugal, in its regional center of Porto, we welcome the 14th (fourteenth) edition of the bi-annual conference of the International Society for the Study of European Ideas. As has already been sufficiently explained, and as we will experience in these next few days, the function of this Society is to think of Europe from its most varied perspectives, facing its diversity in a framework of reflection that is capable of understanding diversity and at the same time emphasize what unites us, starting from the common rationality that is explored in the various traditions and diversities that meet and are found here.

On this occasion, there is a theme which bonds us, that is, "Images of Europe: Past, Present, and Future". I want to be very brief, but in the few minutes which have kindly been granted to me, I would like to consider three aspects of our theme which are intimately linked.

In the first place, I will refer to the idea of image, a notion which serves as the framework for the reflection of this conference and which also invokes the question of what here will be called "referentiality".

I will also refer to the idea of rationality, which brings with it the understanding of what is common to us, a speculative notion which interacts with the real, but which in that interaction becomes immediately ethical.

And finally I will refer to the university, that is, to the university institution as such, and to the university as a place of welcoming and of acceptance.

1. Let us begin with the notion of image. Indeed, image implies simultaneity of presence, a unifying presence. It implies therefore a unity that immediately refers to an essential discontinuity with what the image is not. At the same time, the term itself, image, immediately suggests a reference. Image is always image of, but at the same time the image is something we can identify in itself. What we can call "referentiality" implies a universe of connections, or more clearly, of relations, because if we consider the image alone, isolated, we find ourselves questioning the very significance of denoting something without any other (apparent) reason than its very presence. But then, why should we call it image?

There is a well-known statement in Aristotle's *De Anima* (cf. 427b-434a). As he tries to show the importance of the individual, as a basis for the universal, and of the empirical, as a basis for the intelligible, he speaks about a common sense or (common) sensibility, which specializes in five senses but is one only. And this first unity is concrete and known. It is image! As Aristotle states, instead of sensations, the intellective soul uses images. We cannot forget in this respect another aspect of the Aristotelian theory: the identity between content and thing in the agent intellect. In fact, Aristotle states that the soul, in the act of knowing, turns itself (in a way) into what is known. That is why the soul in itself is empty: because if it had its own form, it would not be able to perceive things (an alterity, other than itself, other than the soul) as known. Therefore there is a continuity between matter and form, between senses and intellect, between substance and accidents.

But this continuity can be expressed only under the form of an intersection, and the important point here is that this moment of intersection is precisely the image. Image is the unity (discontinuity) which, in its very presence, summons the continuity that is capable of uniting knowledge and reality. Located here is what can be called

a multidimensional logos. The image convokes, therefore, the question of truth - a notion intimately related to the very notion of logos - since through image logos does not remain self-referential.

2. Let us now consider the second mentioned aspect, rationality, which is another way of speaking of logos. The need not to remain on a self-referential level qualifies rationality in yet another meaning, a rather surprising meaning: rationality is found in ethics. Let us recall the eternal question of Socrates which Plato offers us in his dialogue the *Gorgias* (474c)_: "which of the two seems to you, Polus, to be the worse—committing injustice or suffering injustice?"

Thousands of readings have been given to this sentence, from all possible perspectives. But we are not interested here in the answer, at least not in this brief reflection. What is of interest here is the fact that the question was formulated. We certainly know very well Socrates' response. The response is intended to be much more than rhetorical: everyone, and not only Socrates, can consider that it is better to suffer an injustice than to commit an injustice.

But we are interested here in the question itself, because it recalls in a foundational way the second dimension of our argument: because in this strange question of rationality, the latter finds itself, suddenly, as grounding itself in what much later would be called conscience. And what is surprising of this strange question of rationality is that it only appears when one's own rationality is projected outside of oneself. And in that projection, rationality examines itself before the need for action, which can only be action in the world.

Injustice is only committed or suffered from the standpoint of justice. To perceive an injustice implies perceiving an injustice as such, and therefore, to speculatively attend to the asymmetries of reality in a dynamic which summons the rationality of man who is capable of distinguishing an injustice from justice. Or what is the same, therefore capable of distinguishing evil from good.

Now, one suffers the injustice of another, or does an injustice to another. The rationality that is capable of abandoning its own self-referentiality arises as an exploration of the experience of the other and of the experience with the other. That experience is genuinely ethical, and in it rationality finds itself, since it attests to its universality. The Socratic question deals with that rationality that finds itself when it goes out from itself. But the answer is its vocation to the truth, an arduous task

through the paths of history, trying always to distinguish justice from injustice and thus to know what the better thing to do is.

3. We arrive then at the University. The University is an institution fully born in Europe, solid from the 13th (thirteenth) century. Its origin integrates diversity in a unity, but in the first place not so much uniting a diversity of knowledge, but rather uniting people, *universitas magistrorum et scholarium*. The further consolidation of the curricula was mediated by different developments, originated to some extent by the contact with Ancient sources through translations and also by the growths and need of consolidation of certain disciplines of theoretical nature, like philosophy or theology. Furthermore, the contact with older traditions and, in a way, forgotten questions, gave rise, in the Europe of that time, to a flourishing exchange, not exempt from arguments, which would prepare the Old World for its intellectual encounter with the challenges that the New World, at the end of the fifteenth century, would present.

As stated in the invitation of this edition of the ISSEI, we find ourselves in a situation of profound changes. What is certain is that we are also presented with characteristics which are in a certain way very similar to those of the very founding of university institutions, many of which have lasted to this day and of which we have today numerous representatives: The university as a place of meeting, as a place of rational discussion where argumentation is the fruit of study and of abundant and independent analysis; the university institution as the focal point of stable reflection, as opposed to the instability of the events of the life of the world; and also as a place which exists because it carries out its ethical vocation in the life of the world.

In this sense, the university institution is also a place of welcoming, of acceptance. This is what we would like the Catholic University of Portugal to be for all of you during these days.

Thank you very much for coming here!

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School of Arts.
Catholic University of Portugal in Porto, Portugal

Opening Speech
European Ideas & The World

David W. Lovell

On behalf of the International Society for the Study of European Ideas, welcome to this 14th ISSEI conference, and thanks in particular to the local organisers – Professor Yolanda Espiña and her team, and to the senior administration of the Porto campuses of the Catholic University of Portugal – for their work to make this event such a success. [1]

I would like also to thank the Organising Committee, and to take a moment to make a special vote of thanks to Rachel Ben-David. Rachel has worked for ISSEI and its journal, *The European Legacy*, for the past 17 years, holding together the organisational core of ISSEI. Now, life takes her in different directions and we wish her all the best for the next phase of her journey.

Of course, the keys to driving the content of this conference, as they have been from the beginning of ISSEI, belong to the workshop chairs: thank you for your work in bringing together participants around particular themes and issues. What is remarkable about this conference is the enormous breadth of topics discussed and approaches adopted. I wish you well for your discussions.

In this presentation, I propose to do two things. The first is to sketch the life and spirit of ISSEI over the past 30 years; the second is to acknowledge the centenary and outline the significance of the First World War, which began a hundred years ago this month, in August 1914. Though they are two rather different anniversaries, they can both be utilised to exemplify my theme of 'European ideas and the world', for they both have an international significance.

The International Society for the Study of European Ideas

ISSEI was founded out of discussions held in 1984 in Bellagio, Italy. Our conference represents its thirtieth year. Biennial conferences have been held in its name around Europe since the first in 1988; I have attended all but two of them, and made some important intellectual connections there, not to mention

friendships, across many years. And I have learned a lot from my workshop colleagues, and I continue to learn. For all its puzzles and frustrations and sometimes disappointments, what a privilege it is to be able to study the human experience in its diversity and unpredictability, and to offer our knowledge, however meagre, to others, especially to our students, so that they too can take up the challenge and strive to see further than we have.

ISSEI was always more an ideal than an organisation with newsletters, organising committees, and annual fees. It is an ideal of cooperative inquiry into the ideas of Europe, the idea of Europe itself, and – where I myself connect with the Society – the influences of Europe on the rest of the world. This is, as you can perhaps tell by my accent, partly an accident of biography: as an Australian, I am part of a European diaspora. It has been argued that the west coast of the remote continent on which I live was discovered by Portuguese explorers, though the competition with the Dutch, French and English was also intense and was ultimately won by the English. That is why I am speaking to you today in English, not Portuguese. This process of exploration and 'discovery', and the increasingly intense competition towards the end of the nineteenth century between the European powers for, as the German Foreign Minister, Bernhard von Bulow, put it in 1897, a 'place in the sun', drew the rest of the world into Europe's orbit and ultimately into Europe's tragic war in 1914.

The spirit behind ISSEI for the past 30 years has resided in the Talmors: originally Sascha and Ezra Talmor, but – since 2004 – Ezra alone. I pay a tribute to them both. Now 97 years old, Ezra still plays an important role in conceiving the broad themes for ISSEI conferences and editing the journal of the Society, *The European Legacy*, though nowadays he is assisted by Edna Rosenthal and me. Many of you will perhaps remember Sascha (since many of the people who attend this conference are, in my experience, regular contributors to it). Sascha brought to this gathering – which she genuinely loved – a feeling also of family sharing. She was an extraordinary individual, with a capable mind, who influenced my own appreciation of literature over the years. And she herself was an embodiment of a type of twentieth-century 'European' life which is not atypical, especially in being buffeted by the political machinations that led to the Second World War.

Sascha Talmor's life, as I have explained elsewhere,[2] was inextricably linked with literature. She studied literature and literary criticism, she made substantial contributions to both, and she helped others to appreciate their joys and disciplines. In literature she found a form of expression suited to her reflective temperament, as well as a way to understand and reach out to others. Literature drew her to the detail of human experiences, to the concrete and not the abstract.

But insofar as she was a complex and distinctive mix of characteristics with her own story of chances encountered and choices made, so was she also part of a shared story. Her life, like so many others', was bound up with tumultuous and deadly events. The shifting boundaries of Europe after the First World War inevitably brought her into contact with different cultural influences. Villages, towns and cities were layered with the evidence of occupations and reoccupations. Her birthplace in Bessarabia (then Rumanian, but formerly Russian, to mention only the most recent changes at the time; nowadays part of Moldova) and her childhood home in Bukovina (then Rumanian, recently Austrian; nowadays divided between Romania and Ukraine) were both invaded by Soviet troops in June 1940; Sascha had arrived in the relative safety of Bucharest only a few hours earlier. Like many Europeans, she could change citizenship many times without even leaving her town. But like other European Jews she was a pawn in a game of ideological madness in which millions would ultimately perish. Fortunately, she and her family were able to emigrate in 1940, but Sascha was delayed for three years in Bombay before she finally arrived in Palestine to begin her studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Sascha recognised that such times—*our* times—could abuse and degrade literature, but they could also bring forth a deeply-felt reaffirmation of human decency. The spirit of ISSEI emerges from this recognition, and it is the spirit embodied in this conference: the willingness to meet together from all the countries of Europe, and indeed of the world, in a spirit of friendship and inquiry; where ideas are respected, and scholarship is rigorous and honest.

I have found a home in this 'Republic of Letters' not just because of the mutual respect of its citizens, but because of their openness to multi- and cross-disciplinary ways of understanding the human condition. Even as a student, I found debates about the methodological purity of particular disci-

plines arid; I still do. I do not mean to challenge methodological clarity – I insist on it (fuzzy thinking never helped anybody); but I do want to encourage a sense of complementarity among the many different ways that human issues may be approached.

The Centenary of the First World War

Conflict has been a part of the human story since its beginning. While nowadays we tend to limit our focus to the potential of scarcity to give rise to conflict, ideological and sectarian conflicts can be just as volatile as those around scarce resources, and even more cruel and malevolent. How we manage conflict is a test of human wisdom and skills. In important respects the long-standing institutions of government, law, diplomacy and the market are creative ways of channelling and managing conflict to beneficial ends. Wars happen when those institutions fail, when conflicting demands cannot be conciliated, when the limits of exchange are reached, or when compromise is regarded as anathema. Alas, we then apply our ingenuity and unleash our passions in the task of gaining advantage by destroying one another.

Conflict is not a peculiarly 'European' phenomenon, but Europe has drawn the world into its own conflicts, especially over the past 600 years. In my country, but in many other places that Europeans 'discovered', claimed for themselves and settled, the land was not empty, even if it may have appeared so. There were thus, to begin with, ample opportunities for misunderstanding between European explorers and settlers on the one hand, and indigenous populations on the other.

This very city of Porto, in which we meet, offers us an opportunity to glimpse some of this story. It is said to be the birthplace of Ferdinand Magellan (1480-1521), a name prominent amongst the hundreds of intrepid Portuguese explorers, whose expedition was the first to circumnavigate the world. But Magellan himself did not make the complete journey: he was killed in the Philippines (just as Captain James Cook (1728-1779), who mapped the East Coast of Australia more than two centuries later and claimed it for the English crown, was killed in what he named the Sandwich Islands – later to be known as Hawaii).

But the Europeans were powerful. They were technically well-organised for warfare; they had the drive and motivation to explore and conquer, often

connected to the demands of trade and the market; they had powerful ideas, including spiritual ideas, with which to succour themselves and convert the populations they met; and – in the spirit of what might be called 'dumb luck' – they had developed resistance to the germs (including the common cold and smallpox) that laid waste to swathes of native populations.

There was, in this 'claiming of the world' by Europe, an extraordinary amount of hubris. But one has to admire the pluck and courage and persistence of men who set out in tiny boats across the oceans in the service of their God, or even of Mammon. The hubris consisted, in part, of the belief that the rest of the world somehow belonged to Europe – as if the universalising mission of the Christian Church had an analogue in Europe itself. This was exemplified in the famous, or perhaps infamous, Treaty of Tordesilhas of 1494, dividing the world outside Europe (and, in the immediate sense, the Americas) into Portuguese and Spanish zones, by the only authority on which they could both agree: the Catholic Pope.

At the risk of testing your patience, let me come at last to the war of 1914–1918, about which you will see commemorations aplenty during the next four years, and in which my own country achieved the first major sense of its own nationhood and identity, in a failed campaign in Gallipoli, Turkey.

That war was described at its start as the 'Great War for Civilisation'; US President Woodrow Wilson (when the Americans finally joined the war in 1917) described it as the war 'to make the world safe for democracy'; and the many memorials that sprang up around the world soon after it described – with awful hope – that it would be the 'war to end all wars'. In recent times, and especially in the context of the focus accorded by the centenary of its outbreak, it has also become known – not without reason – as the war that changed everything.[3]

This war was especially significant because, sparked by a relatively minor event (the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand by a Serbian nationalist in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914), it set the whole of Europe on a collision course, bringing in to play the European diaspora and the European colonial empires as canon-fodder.

In terms of ideas, it was significant for its normalisation of both nationalism and democracy, as old empires – the Russian; the Ottoman; and the Austro-

Hungarian – fell, and as the borders of European countries changed. It began a short century of communism, which spread from Russia across the world, and especially into the colonial world, where it combined with the anti-imperialist struggle for national self-determination.

It was the first globalised war, and it prefigured much that was to come for the remainder of the century. It led to an anti-war literature that is still being read, including Erich Maria Remarque's *All Quiet on the Western Front*, and the poetry of Siegfried Sassoon, Wilfrid Owen and Robert Graves; it challenged traditional ideas about gender as women were increasingly drawn into the war effort; it led to ideas about the bureaucratisation of the world, and the 'decline of the West'; it reinforced a sense of intolerance and hatred between ethnic groups lashed to the notion of self-determination; and to a soul-searching about warfare itself that ultimately led to the clarification of combatants' responsibilities to protect civilians in the Fourth Geneva Convention, adopted in 1949. It is estimated that over the four years of fighting 10 million military personnel were killed (and as many as seven million civilians). Soldiers were often 'canon fodder' in set-piece battles. A century – and millions more dead – later, war has in some respects a different character. The Second World War (with 20 million soldiers killed, and perhaps 50 million more civilians) saw major developments in both the technology of war and subsequently further codification of the rules of war. Sadly, the impacts of wars on civilians have only worsened in every single conflict since.

The Great War changed the boundaries of the world, especially those in Europe, and carved up the Middle East. This European meddling in the affairs of elsewhere has not had a happy ending. The peace of 1919 has been described by David Fromkin, especially as it created the modern Middle East, as 'a peace to end all peace'.[4] The increasing reliance of Western economies on oil and its by-products made the strategic significance of this region all the greater.

Philip Jenkins has recently underscored the contemporary relevance of the First World War by arguing that the Abrahamic faiths helped to drive and justify the conflict,[5] and that the end of the Ottoman Caliphate led to fissures in the Muslim umma and resentments against Europe that are still being played out in the Middle East. A religious construction of the War may also help to explain the development of novel attitudes towards commemoration (which other war of modern times has had such a 'centenary' commemoration?), though the scale of its horrors cannot be discounted as a factor.

The war was a harbinger of things to come. With the normalisation of nationalism in Europe, there came also the call from European countries to their empires for troops to fight in the mother country's war. Although we often see the primary thrust of anti-imperialism and the decolonisation movement following the Second World War, the First established in the minds of many of the colonised that they were good enough—whatever their colour or creed—to stand up and fight beside their colonial masters. The British Empire, for example, drew hundreds of thousands of soldiers from India, from the West Indies, and from Nigeria.[6] They faced racism from their own side: but they proved they could fight.

Ideas are enormously powerful. The idea of equality before the law, proclaimed by the French Revolution, made its way across the continent on Napoleon's bayonets and ultimately across the world, chiming in with notions of the equality of all human souls in the Christian religion. It was corrosive of privilege, and is nowadays a given. The central idea of nationalism – that the political and the national unit should be congruent – is likewise not containable to Europe itself.

Those states that have split away from Europe's colonial grasp have typically used the rhetoric of national self-determination against the hypocrisy of the metropolitan powers and have generally adopted the forms of constitutional government, even if they ultimately succumbed to dictatorship and disorder. François Tombalbaye, soon to become the first President of the Republic of Chad, declared in 1959 that the new states were supporting 'our profound belief in the principles of a democracy that France has taught us'. Tombalbaye's own commitment to democracy was, unfortunately, merely rhetorical.

The transition to modernity, in Europe and elsewhere, has brought with it many challenges. Modernity questions and often rejects tradition, including in the home and private spheres, as well as in the public spheres of work and politics. It has meant a changed approach to social relations, and corresponding feelings of both liberation and isolation. It provides opportunities as well as threats. The anonymity of modernity, particularly in large cities, allows one to be unconventional and experimental in social life, but it also increases the risks of loneliness and alienation. These are themes that major European thinkers have explored at length in philosophy, sociology and literature, particularly over the last century.

Europeans' ideas and their technologies have given us a great advantage over others, which we have often abused for our own gain. Our 'world wars' have

hastened the spread of these ideas and technologies, and brought into question the 'civilisation' we flattered ourselves that we stood for. The anniversary of the start of the First World War will be commemorated for many reasons. But it should give us pause to remember how quickly it shattered the material progress and comfort of millions of Europeans who took it as granted that they were at the pinnacle of civilisation, and that their gains were irreversible. We spent the next century risking all for ideological certainties that now seem empty.

Conclusion

The European legacy is not written on tablets of stone, fixed and final, and destined for triumph. Rather: it is a work in progress. It is the work that we are all engaged on. It is a work that requires critical thinking; a respect for – but a sceptical reappraisal of – received wisdom; an honesty (and even a courage) to differ from one's peers; and imagination.

But it is also a work that requires that we engage with other traditions. Ever since the conquests of Alexander the Great; since the advent of the Silk Road; since the voyages of the European explorers, conquerors and traders: we have been interacting with, helping to shape, and borrowing from, other traditions. This is not just a question of our cuisine, though it is hard to imagine European cooking without the potato, the tomato, vanilla, coffee or tea, among many other staples of our modern diet that originated elsewhere.

Our wars, as I have already hinted, have increasingly drawn in the remainder of the globe, and even shaped its national boundaries and many of its current tensions. Our advances in deadly technologies have provided others with new ways to kill each other, and are sometimes aimed at us.

We need to be conscious of this history, and that Europe's interactions with and understandings of 'the other' have not always won us friends; that – where we have championed 'universal' ideas such as rule of law, human rights, freedom, democracy and equality – we have not always been consistent in our application of such ideas, and that being partial in our own cause has eventually struck others, not surprisingly, as hypocrisy.

Europe has, in a manner unprecedented in human history, 'globalised' the world; but the respect that we demand from others has not always been given

so readily by us to others. Our responsibility is not just to live up to the high standards of the Enlightenment – the intellectual initiative and courage I mentioned a moment ago – but also to be open to the contributions that other traditions can make. They are not simply imitators.

Consequently, in a conference whose central theme concerns 'Images of Europe', we should not forget the view from elsewhere.

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Endnotes

1. An earlier version of this paper was delivered on 4 August 2014 as the Opening Address at the 14th Conference of the International Society for the Study of European Ideas at the Porto campus of the Catholic University of Portugal.
2. David W. Lovell, "Sascha Talmor as Literary Critic: An Introduction", in Sascha Talmor, *Living Novels: A Journey through Twentieth–Century Fiction* (Washington, DC: New Academia Publishing: 2006), xiii-xvii.
3. See, for example, Margaret MacMillan, "World War I: The War That Changed Everything", *The Wall Street Journal*, 20 June 2014 (http://www.wsj.com/articles/world-war-i-the-war-that-changed-everything-1403300393).
4. David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East* (New York, NY: Henry Holt and Co, 2009).
5. Philip Jenkins, *The Great and Holy War: How World War I Became a Religious Crusade* (New York, NY: HarperOne, 2014).
6. Ashley Jackson, *Distant Drums: The Role of Colonies in British Imperial Warfare* (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2010).

SECTION I

History, Geography, Science

Workshops

—

Information

Chair: Chris Bissell

—

Calvinism as a Global Influence

Chair: Wayne Cristaudo

—

What Identity? The Abolition of Borders
from the Traditional Village to the Postmodern One

Chair: Theodor Damian

—

Europe
A Perennial Cultural Crossroads

Chairs: Denise Egéa *&* Michèle Lemettais

—

Art & Science. New Houses from Recycled Elements

Chair: Silvia Nuere

—

Anthropological Foundations
for Old & New European Challenges

Chair: Idoya Zorroza

SECTION I
History, Geography, Science

INFORMATION

Chair
—
Chris Bissell

Participants
—
José María Pérez Fernández
Chris Bissell
Delphine Jenart
Patricia Simpson
David Chapman
Steve Walker
Graeme KirkPatrick

Presentation

Chris Bissell

This workshop brought together nine presenters in a full-day session to offer a broad historical view of the evolving nature and understanding of 'information'. Beginning with medieval manuscripts, the session moved on to early modern news dissemination, biological modelling, painting, the quantification of information, and ultimately to aspects of the current global significance of 'information' in the age of the Internet and the World Wide Web. Presenters included art and cultural historians, specialists in modern ICT, and systems thinkers. Seven of the nine papers are included in the proceedings.

José María Pérez Fernández looked at news dissemination in Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries. The printed media of the time, and the necessary translation of such documents, were vital elements in the transmission of information. Pamphlets, ballads and popular verses, together with networks of traders, merchants and diplomats characterized a complex and exciting milieu. Moving forward a couple of centuries, Chris Bissell considered some early German work in biology and sociology that used gradually emerging information ideas to analyze the behaviour of humans and societies. Particularly noteworthy was the nineteenth and early twentieth century understanding of feedback in such systems. Delphine Jenart, of the Belgian Mundaneum in Mons, then presented a fascinating early-twentieth century project that aimed to collect, and make available, all the world's information. Now seen as an intellectual forerunner of the World Wide Web, the Mundaneum has evolved into an important archive and museum of the information technologies.

The remaining four papers were devoted, in their very different ways, to current interdisciplinary aspects of 'information'. Pat Simpson addressed the intriguing question of how much information is contained in a painting. She chose to look in detail at an abstract painting by Kandinsky, usually referred to as Cossacks, and concludes that the notion of such paintings containing 'information' is highly problematic, requiring both socio-historical contextualization and ongoing critical monitoring. David Chapman considered the tricky question of measuring or quantifying information, calling into question some of

the more extreme claims of the explosion of information in the digital age, and analyzing how, exactly, we might decide how much information is 'out there'. Finally, two papers brought the session completely up to date. Steve Walker examined the role of information in social contention, with particular reference to a number of projects on European labour movements. Walker maintains that informational perspectives can make a useful contribution to the analysis of international trade unionism and social movements in general. To conclude the session, Graeme Kirkpatrick examined the 'radical' and the 'social' imaginary, looking at the decline in radical, visionary, sociology in recent decades, accompanied by an increasing 'informationalisation' of society.

In the 1933 edition of the Oxford English Dictionary the word "information" referred primarily to personal data, to a piece of news or intelligence, or to various specialised legal uses. But by the time the 1986 edition appeared, a remarkable transformation had taken place. In addition to traditional meanings, a plethora of new terms appears: information content, desk, explosion, flow, gap, office, service, storage, system, transfer, work, carrying, gathering, giving, seeking, bureau, officer, processing, retrieval, science, technology – and, of course, 'the information revolution'. This workshop, with its remarkable interdisciplinarity, offered an unparalleled opportunity to investigate aspects of information over a period of several centuries. The proceedings papers give a modest indication of the breadth of academic thinking presented, and the valuable and extensive discussions that took place.

The Age of Exchange

Translation, News and the European Public Sphere in the 16th and the 17th Centuries

José María Pérez Fernández

Abstract

The international turmoil created first by the wars of religion during the second half of the sixteenth century and then by the Thirty Years War in the early decades of the following century stirred what Geoffrey Parker has described as an 'obsession with rapid change', which in turn fuelled demand for news. In parallel with the exchange of goods and currency, the development of financial capitalism, and the growth of diplomatic networks, news acquired the status of an increasingly valuable, albeit intangible, commodity. The circulation of news and opinion through the channels provided by, among others, *corantos*, controversial pamphlets, broadside ballads, or public spaces like the commercial stage predates the Habermasian coffeehouses of the late seventeenth century. A more detailed study of these complex and heterogeneous exchange networks will provide a comprehensive view of the material conditions, the textual and discursive infrastructure that shaped and sustained the European public sphere during this period. A close analysis will prove that print and translation played a fundamental role that can be approached from a general theory of communication. This essay aims to sample some case studies to illustrate the emergence this modern public sphere facilitated by agents of exchange that included translators, publishers, and newsmongers.

Keywords

Information, News, Sixteenth Century, Seventeenth Century, Printing, Translation.

Around 1570 the English explorer Sir Humphrey Gilbert drafted a manuscript with a proposal for a new curriculum design in response to the educational needs that a man of action like him had identified among the English elites. This pragmatic and innovative curriculum was designed for an institution that he called *Queene Elizabethes Achademy*, and it included the systematic study of history, geography, cartography, law, modern languages and vernacular literatures.[1] He also advanced the idea of the copyright library, a programme of compulsory publications by the academics, and of translations to be carried out by the teachers of modern languages:

"*All the fforesaid publique Readers of arte and the common lawes shall once within every six years set forth some new books in printe, according to their severall professions.*

Also every one of those which shall publiquely teache any of the languages as aforesaid, shall once every 3 yeares publish in printe some Translation into the English tounge of some good worke, as neare as may be for the advawncing of those thinges which shalbe practised in the said Achademy.

All which bookes shall for every be entituled as set forth by the gentlemen of Queene Elizabethes Achademy, wherby all the nations of the worlde shall, once every 6 yeares at the furthest, receaue greate benefit, to your highness immortal fame" (p. 9)

He concludes

"*And wheareas in the vniuersities men study onely schole learninges, in this Achademy they shall study matters of accion meet for present practize, both of peace and warre. And yf they will not dispose themselves to letters, yet they may learne languages, or martiall activities for the service of their Cowntrey.*" (p. 10)

Gilbert's proposal was a most fitting prelude to developments that would unfold during the following decades, alongside the domestic and international commitments of the English monarchy and its subjects. It illustrates the pressing need for the acquisition of practical knowledge in what he calls 'matters of accion' in peace and war, such as sophisticated navigational and cartographic techniques, besides foreign language skills. Translation and print were of paramount importance within this overall scheme: they facilitated the exchange of information with other linguistic communities.

In parallel with the exchange of knowledge, goods and currency, with the development of financial capitalism, and with the growth of diplomatic networks, information also acquired the status of an increasingly valuable, albeit intangible, commodity. My paper aims to briefly sample a catalogue of some case studies to illustrate the emergence of an early modern European public sphere facilitated by agents of exchange that included translators, publishers, and newsmongers.

In 1576 David Rowland dedicated his English translation—the first into that language—of the anonymous Spanish picaresque novel *Lazarillo de*

Tormes to Sir Thomas Gresham.[2] Like Sir Humphrey Gilbert, Gresham was another prominent Elizabethan man of many parts—merchant, diplomat, spy, pioneering financier and founder of the Royal Exchange in 1565. Rowland, who took the text of *Lazarillo* more as an actual account of daily life in Spain than as a work of fiction, described the novel as "these *reports* of little Lazaro" (1586, Aii^{v}), whose veracity Gresham would be in a position to confirm thanks to his considerable knowledge of languages, his professional expertise in trade, finance, and travel.[3]

About a generation after Humphrey Gilbert's proposal, James Mabbe (*ca*. 1571/2 – 1642?) was among those who had heeded his call for the study of vernacular languages and the appropriation of their intellectual capital through translation. Between 1599 and 1640 Mabbe rendered *La Celestina, Guzmán de Alfarache* and some of Cervantes' *Novelas ejemplares* into English. He taught Spanish at the University of Oxford, visited Spain as a diplomat, and also appears to have engaged in the exchange of secret information.[4]

In 1603 Mabbe contributed, with two poems (one in Latin, and another in Italian), to a volume in honour of James I (*Academiae Oxoniensis Pietas*, 1603). Another of the contributors to this volume was Alberico Gentili. One among several prominent Protestant exiles who had settled in England around 1580, Gentili had become regius professor of civil law at Oxford University. Generally acknowledged as a forerunner of the great Dutch scholar Hugo Grotius in the field of international law, Gentili produced several works on the kind of norms and principles that should regulate interstate relations. An advisor for the Privy Council, the Spanish embassy in London, and the Dutch republic, Gentili's patrons in England included Robert Dudley, Francis Walshingham, and Sir Philip Sidney, to whom he dedicated a work on the legal aspects of embassies (*De legationibus libri tres*, 1585). Gentili was, in short, an active agent in the normalization of diplomatic exchange and international relations.

The situation in the Netherlands, the French Wars of Religion, and the Anglo-Spanish crisis of the late 1580s, which coincided with the period when Mabbe joined Oxford University as an undergraduate, had prompted a series of lectures on international law and war which Gentili first published in three parts between 1588 and 1589. Once expanded, these lectures became Gentili's *magnum opus*, the *De jure belli libri tres*, which he dedicated to Robert De-

vereux in 1598. According to Artemis Gause, in this work "Gentili grappled with issues of great currency, born of the increasing complexity of international commerce, as well as the conflicts of religious allegiance and civic loyalty, which were echoed in the raging debates between humanists and theologians".[5] It also produced doctrine on the concept of a just war which "rejected religious difference alone as a just cause of war, and (moved, perhaps, by his personal experience) objected strongly to the execution of heretics." Gentili also argued in favour of the absolute separation of the realms of theology and law. His *Commentatio ad legem III codicis de professoribus et medicis* described the moral and pedagogical functions of poetry, and he also produced a handbook on how to teach Virgil to young students (*Lectiones Virgilianae*, 1603).

Ten years after Gentili's *Lectiones Virgilianae*, Leonard Digges carried a copy of the 1613 edition of Lope de Vega's *Rimas* from Mabbe, at the time secretary to the English ambassador in Madrid, for one Will Baker in Oxford. Very little is known of this Will Baker, but we do have some information about his connections, and some of the individuals that link him with Mabbe, Digges and other contemporaries throw interesting light upon these circles. For one, it appears that this Will Baker might be the same "Gulielmus Baker" who penned some of the poems that preceded Thomas Coryate's *Crudities* (1611). If we contrast the dates of Coryate's period in Oxford (*ca*. 1596-1599) he must have coincided there with Mabbe too, who matriculated in 1588, and obtained his MA in 1598.[6] Sir John Strangways, Mabbe's friend and patron, was also one among the host of over sixty contributors (a veritable Who's Who of cultural and political agents in the period) to the dedicatory verses for the 1611 edition of *Coryats Crudities*, whose full title runs *Coryats crudities: hastily gobled vp in five moneths trauells in France, Sauoy, Italy, Rhetia co[m]monly called the Grisons country, Heluetia aliás Switzerland, some parts of high Germany, and the Netherlands; newly digested in the hungry aire of Odcombe in the county of Somerset, & now dispersed to the nourishment of the trauelling members of this kingdome*.[7] Coryate's extravagant personality and the half serious, half amused attention he attracted with his travels from a large section of the political and cultural elite are part of the landscape in this age of translation, travel and exchange of all sorts.

The development of increasingly sophisticated commercial and financial exchange, the intensification of international relations, and above all the impact of the frequent wars on all these activities, turned the exchange of news into a trade that promised great returns. A relevant parallelism can be drawn between

the growing networks of public news and the very intense exchange of underground, secret information on all sorts of relevant subjects—political, religious, military and commercial, which engaged agents as diverse as the translator James Mabbe, George Abbot (Archbishop of Canterbury between 1611-33), or the diplomats and politicians James Hay, William Trumbull, and George Calvert. And there are also overlapping connections between these networks and those which engaged in the trade of valuable manuscripts, books and art objects. The latter included diplomats like Trumbull, publishers like Blount, and artists like Peter Paul Rubens—the latter of whom established a significant network of artistic exchange as he also took advantage of his political and personal connections to work as a diplomat and secret informant.[8]

The international turmoil created first by the wars of religion in the second half of the sixteenth century, and then by the Thirty Years War, was such that it stirred what Geoffrey Parker has called an "obsession with rapid change" which in turn fuelled demand for news. According to the figures provided by Parker "eighteen hundred broadsheets and pamphlets appeared in Germany in 1618, the year of the comets and of the Defenestration of Prague—more than five a day. Twenty newspapers, over two hundred pamphlets and over forty illustrated broadsheets described the massacre at Magdeburg in 1631 by an Imperial army commanded by Count Tilly."[9]

This period witnessed the vigorous emergence of a veritable early modern European public sphere, a complex and widespread phenomenon that included the flourishing of the so-called *corantos*. A network of European correspondents—running parallel with thriving networks of secret informants—sent their reports to these early modern newsletters. The first weekly newspaper was published in Strasbourg in 1609, and it featured information from correspondents all over Europe. The information it provided did go beyond politics and military action: on 4 September 1609, for instance, it reported Galileo's construction of a new astronomical telescope.[10] References to the thriving news market also feature in a verse epistle that the poet Michael Drayton addressed around 1621 to another great English translator, traveller, and explorer, "Master George Sandys, Treasurer for the English Colony in Virginia". The poem gives a sense of the vertiginous pace of events, which ran much faster than the communications network of the day did—in particular if these news had to travel across the Atlantic. As Drayton elaborates on the speed of news back in old Europe,

he encourages Sandys to continue with his transplantation of Ovid across the ocean to Virginia:

And (worthy GEORGE) by industry and use,
Let's see what lines Virginia will produce;
Go on with OVID, as you have begun,
With the first five Books; let your numbers run
Glib as the former, so shall it live long,
And do much honour to the English tongue:
Entice the Muses thither to repair,
Entreat them gently, train them to that air.[11]

This is a most symptomatic and extraordinary case that illustrates how early modern globalisation and the trade of all sorts of goods coincide with translation and information mongering as part of a general mercantile ethos that went beyond material goods towards the weaving of a transnational system of multicultural polyglot networks.

A few years before this singular case of transatlantic transplantation, Edwin Sandys—George's brother—had produced after an extensive journey throughout Europe a report on the state of religion in the Continent—his *Relation of the State of Religion in the Western Partes of the World* (1605). And ten years later George would follow his brother's account with a new report on different cultures and religions, his *A Relation of a Journey Begun an. Dom. 1610* (1615). The Sandys brothers were fully immersed in this international world of diplomatic and intellectual exchange, and they flaunted a new ecumenical ethos whose tolerant attitude arose from the awareness that originated in their gathering of information on cultural and religious diversity in different parts of the globe. Both were, like Alberico Gentili, aware of the need to regulate international relations. One of the translations produced by George Sandys was an English rendering of Hugo Grotius's 1608 Latin verse drama *Christus patiens*, a text which shows that Sandys agreed with some of this contemporaries that "Grotius's eirenic, rational theology represented a moderate alternative to the increased polarization of the country between puritans and high Anglicans."[12]

These circles reflect the ethos of a growing group of international scholars who tried to promote religious toleration and invoked the concept of *adiaphora* in the fields of international diplomacy, law, and trade.[13] In a 1620 masque Ben Jonson described the newsmonger as someone who collects information from all sources, and has friends of all religions and political creeds:

A factor of newes for all the Shieres of England; I doe write my thousand Letters a weeke ordinary, sometim twelve hundred, and maintaine the businesse at some charge, both to hold up my reputation with mine own ministers in Towne, and my friends of correspondence in the Countrey; I have friends of all rancks and of all Religions, for which I keepe an answering Catalogue of dispatch; wherein I have my Puritan newes, my Protestant newes and my Pontificiall newes.[14]

Another significant agent within these networks was James Howell, who was with the English embassy in Madrid during the negotiations about the Spanish Match—James I's frustrated attempt to marry the Prince of Wales to the Spanish Infanta. A well-travelled linguist, and a member of the circles around Ben Jonson—the so-called *tribe of Ben*—who shared with him the kind of international neo-stoicism inspired by Justus Lipsius, Howell authored, *inter alia*, a volume titled *Instructions for Forreine Travel* (1642), with practical information for travellers on Spain, France and Italy. Its second 1650 edition also contained data about the Levant and Turkey. A moderate royalist who advocated religious tolerance, Howell defended the traditional role of Parliament and rejected the radicalism of the Puritans. Besides his own intellectual production, Howell also edited the works of John Selden and Sir Robert Cotton. He was also an interpreter, a translator, and also issued a dictionary. D.R. Woolf describes him as "a moderate, appealing to common sense, compromise, and charity rather than to rigid principles and partisanship".[15]

This network of news was of course multilingual. In Amsterdam, printers published newspapers in French and English, and in 1620 English printers also started to publish translations of foreign *corantos*. The letters of John Chamberlain document that in 1621 there were news pamphlets published almost weekly, with many of them coming from Amsterdam, which was strategically located to send news coming from the areas in conflict—i.e. German-speaking central Europe—across the Channel into London. Also in the 1620s, if not earlier, the fluctuations of the English political establishment had come to depend to a large extent on the circulation of news and on the sort of changes that this could operate on the state of public opinion.[16]

This fervid newsmongering was the subject of one of Ben Jonson's satires: *The Staple of News* was premiered in 1626, went through print in 1631, and was eventually banned from public staging in 1632 by Charles I after the Spanish ambassador's protests due to the play's triumphant reports of Habsburg defeats. Which proves that even a second-hand representation of news reports could have a significant political impact and was considered pernicious for the public image of a foreign monarch.[17] The fact that Jonson came to satirize on the stage such a recent development as newsmongering itself illustrates the swift pace of change that was starting to pervade the public sphere in this period. Both in Madrid and in London the public stage constituted an unprecedented platform for religious and political propaganda, a privileged space in which certain topics could reach large audiences that went beyond the elitist nature of the previously described groups.[18]

Another revealing first-hand testimony of one of the many public spaces for the exchange of news comes from the author Francis Osborne (1593-1659). In the following passage he reminisces on his youth and the function of St Paul's Walk as a bourse for the exchange of fresh news during the early years of the seventeenth century:

It was the fashion of those times… for the principal Gentry, Lords, Courtiers and men of all professions not meerly Mechanick, to meet in *Pauls Church* by eleven and walk in the middle Ile till twelve, and after dinner from three, to six, during which time some discoursed of Businesse, others of Newes. Now in regard of the universall commerce, there happened little that did not first or last arrive here … And these *Newesmongers*, as they called them, did not only take the boldnesse to weigh the publick but most intrinsick actions of the State, which some Courtier or other did betray to this Society.[19]

The distinction between public news, traded for economic and / or political profit, and private intelligence (aimed at political and military intelligence) was not clear-cut, and a close look at this area may yield interesting insights into this phenomenon. The networks and agents involved in exchange of all types intricately overlap with each other: see for instance the private news networks that constitute the background to George Abbot and William Trumbull's correspondence—and in particular the background to the latter's intelligence activities.[20] There seems to exist a certain uneven continuum between the new public networks of printed news, the networks of private correspondents that

circulated in manuscript, and then the underground, undercover networks of secret correspondents that informed agents like Trumbull. The distribution of a copy of a speech by Archbishop Abbot against the Spanish Match in 1621 illustrates this overlap between private and public circulation of information, and the uses to which it could be put—note that in this not only Abbot was involved, but also Secretary Calvert, the future Lord Baltimore.[21]

All these developments took place hand in hand with the expansion of trade. In 1615, Sir Dudley Digges, the enterprising brother of the translator and diplomat Leonard Digges, published his *Defence of Trade*, an apology for the monopoly of the East India Company. Dudley Digges was among those who contributed with a poem to the series of "panegyrick verses" within Coryate's volume. Like Gilbert, he was interested in the search for the North-West passage, was a shareholder in the recently established Virginia and East India companies, and travelled to Moscow in 1618 on an economic mission on behalf of one of these companies. A few years before *The Staple of News*, Ben Jonson had already produced another play, a masque this time, titled *The key keeper*, composed to commemorate the inauguration on 16 April 1609 of the New Exchange, also known as Britain's Burse. This was the luxury shopping centre built in the Strand, and promoted by Robert Cecil, earl of Salisbury.

Alongside printed news in the form of *corantos*, the circulation of pamphlets, and the shaping of public opinion through the stage, there existed the more traditional ballads and verses sung in alehouses and other public places. This phenomenon raised concerns about the circulation among general audiences of potentially dangerous information that could steer common opinion in the wrong direction. This anxiety is of a piece with the concerns displayed by European moralists about the evil effects of popular drama or mass-produced prose fiction, besides religious and political pamphlets. In 1580 Anthony Munday says in his *Second and Third Blast of Retrait from Plaies and Theaters* that

"The nature of their comedies are... like the tragical Comedie of Calistus; where the bawdresse Scelestina inflamed the maiden Melibeia with her sorceries.... The examples whereof stirre vp the ignorant multitude to seeke by such vnlawful meanes the loue, & goodwill of others."

These are just a few cases among the myriad of translational and transnational news agents and networks of merchants, translators and diplomats that

populated Europe in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. A more detailed study of these exchange networks will lead to a more sophisticated account of the mechanisms and structures that shaped and sustained religious, political, cultural, literary and artistic discourse in Europe during this period. A general theory of early modern communication that includes translation as one of its fundamental strategies should provide a methodological approach for these complex processes. These networks included Mabbe's activities as an agent of exchange: for he dabbled in intelligence gathering and exchange, as he also translated literary, political and religious texts. The vertigious pace of change that early modernity had set in motion feature prominently in the Spanish original of *La Celestina*. Mabbe's English rendering of the original conveys this feeling within its own discursive texture, and as a printed artefact, his translation also circulated as one among the many goods that were being traded in these complex networks of early modern exchange.[22]

Hand in hand with printed news in the form of *corantos*—i.e the kind of ephemeral and controversial *prickly* pamphlets mentioned by Mabbe in his introduction to *The Spanish Bawd*—and public opinion in the form of plays, there existed the more traditional ballads and verses sung in alehouses and other public places, in particular as part of the general controversy between the Protestant and the pro-Spanish (Catholic) factions—which, constitute an important background for Mabbe's activities as a translator and agent of exchange.[23] These growing audiences for plays, pamphlets, ballads and sung verses did raise concerns about the unwanted and uncontrollable consequences of the movements of the opinion of the vulgar multitude—as others had shown concern for the effect of immoral plays and characters, which were imported from abroad and then 'taught to speak English'.[24]

This anxiety at the potential of the new expanding audiences is of a piece with the concerns displayed by English (and Spanish) moralists at the unexpected evil effects that public entertainment in the form of popular drama—in the new commercial scenes in London and Madrid—and popular printed literature (in particular prose fiction), religious and political pamphlets all over Europe. A more detailed study of these exchange networks will certainly provide an overall view of the scaffolding that actively shaped and sustained general European trends in this period, in religion, politics, culture, literature and the arts in general—within this scheme, translation played a fundamental role that

can be approached from a general theory of communication as well. Mabbe's activities as an agent of exchange, in general, and in particular his production as a translator, are thus an essential part of this age of exchange. The vertigious pace of change that early modernity had set in motion was, as we have seen, an essential part of *La Celestina*. Mabbe's translation conveys this feeling within its own texture as it also appears a one of the many goods that were being traded in the complex networks of early modern trade.

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Endnotes

1. The manuscript was first printed in *Queene Elizabethes achademy / (by Sir Humphrey Gilbert). A booke of precedence. The ordering of a funerall, etc. Varying versions of the good wife. The wise man, etc.* edited by Frederick James Furnivall. With essays on early Italian and German books of courtesy / by W. M. Rossetti and E. Oswald. London: Early English Text Society (Series). Extra Series; 8, 1869. Gilbert's proposal was in sharp contrast with the more traditional contemporary curricula of Cambridge and Oxford, which in the late sixteenth century still retained many traditional, late medieval schemes originating in the classical divisions of the liberal arts (see J.M. Fletcher, 'The Faculty of Arts', in *The History of the University of Oxford* (gen. Ed. T.H. Aston), vol. III *The Collegiate University*, ed. J. McConica (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) pp. 157-198, pp. 173-4). The proposal for the study of languages appears in p. 7 of F.J. Furnivall's edition.
2. *The pleasaunt historie of Lazarillo de Tormes a Spaniarde: wherein is conteined his marueilous deedes and life. With the straunge aduentures happened to him in the seruice of sundrie masters. Drawen out of Spanish by Dauid Rouland of Anglesey*. (Imprinted at London : By Abell Ieffes, dwelling in the fore streete without Crepell gate nere Groube streete at the signe of the Bell, 1586).
3. On Gresham, see Ian Blanchard, 'Gresham, Sir Thomas (*c.* 1518-1579)", *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2008 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/11505, accessed 16 Nov 2014]; also Keith Whitlock, "Introduction" to David Rowland's *The Life of Lazarillo de Tormes* (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, Ltd. 2000, p. 30, n. 12). There are also interesting references to Gresham in B. Reker's monograph on *Benito Arias Montano* (London: Warburg, 1972, pp. 71, 72, 75 and 122).
4. José María Pérez Fernández, "Translation, Diplomacy and Espionage: New Insights into James Mabbe's Career". *Translation and Literature*, vol. 23, part 1, Feb/March, 2014, pp. 1-22.
5. Artemis Gause, 'Gentili, Alberico (1552-1608)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004, online edn. Jan. 2008 [[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/10522, accessed 16 Nov 2014]

6. Paul Morgan, "'Our Will Shakespeare' and Lope de Vega: An unrecorded contemporary document". *Shakespeare Survey* 16 (1963): 118-20, p. 119.
7. Thomas G. Olsen, ed. *The Commonplace Book of Sir John Strangways (1645-1666)*. Tempe, Arizona: Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies & Renaissance English Text Society, 2004, pp. 3-4.
8. Mark Lamster, *Master of Shadows. The Secret Diplomatic Career of the Painter Peter Paul Rubens*. New York: Anchor Books, 2009, pp. 110-113; pp.114-118; pp. 119-121; pp. 132-133; pp. 133-135.
9. Geoffrey Parker, *Europe in Crisis: 1598 - 1548*. [Fontana Press, 1979]. 2nd ed. London: Blackwell, 2001, p. 213.
10. For more details, see Parker, 2001, p. 214. Recent scholarship on the emergence of news includes Joad Raymond's *News Networks in Seventeenth-Century Britain and Europe* (as an editor, London: Routledge, 2007) and Andrew Pettegree's *The Invention of News* (New Haven & London: Yale U. P. 2014)
11. The whole poem deserves much more detailed analysis—and therefore more space than I can afford here—in its singular combination of news exchange with translation, poetic imitation, and the transportation of the muses from Europe to America.
12. James Ellison, 'Sandys, George (1578–1644)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2008 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/24651, accessed 16 Nov 2014]
13. G.R. Evans provides a brief outline of the history of the concept of *adiaphora*, which he defines as "matters of Christian belief and practice about which Christian opinion could legitimately vary and which were therefore 'indifferent'" (G.R. Evans, "*Sancta Indifferentia* and *Adiaphora*". *Common Knowledge* 15:1, pp. 23-38, p. 23). For a fruitful application of this term in fields beyond theology see Gary Taylor, "The cultural politics of Maybe", in R. Dutton, A.G. Findlay & R. Wilson, eds. *Lancastrian Shakespeare: Theatre and Religion*. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2003, pp. 242-258.
14. Ben Jonson, *Newes from the New World Discover'd in the Moone. A Masque as it was presented at court before King Iames. 1620*. In [*The Workes of Benjamin Jonson. The Second Volume*] [s.n.] [1641], p. 41. Also in Ben Jonson, *The Complete Masques*, ed. S. Orgel, New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1969, p. 293.
15. D. R. Woolf, 'Howell, James (1594?–1666)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2008 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/13974, accessed 16 Nov 2014].
16. Richard Cust. "News and politics in early 17th-century England", *Past and Present*, 112 (1986), 60-90, pp. 69, 72-73.
17. Parker, 2001, pp. 214-15. For further details on *The Staple of News*, see C.H. Herford and Percy Simpson. *Ben Jonson. The Man and his Work*. 2 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925, vol. II, p. 169-72.
18. See Taylor, 2003, pp. 250-53.
19. Francis Osborne, *Traditional Memoyres on the Raigne of King Iames*. London: Printed for Thomas Robinson, 1658, section 20, pp. 64-66.
20. Further interesting details on Abbott, Trumbull and their networks see Schreiber, Roy E Schreiber's *The First Carlisle. Sir James Hay, First Earl of Carlisle as Courtier, Diplomat and Entrepreneur, 1580-1636* (Philadelphia: *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*, vol. 74, part 7, 1984), p. 35, *et passim*.
21. Cust, 1986, p. 62.
22. See James Mabbe, *The Spanish Bawd* [1631], ed. José María Pérez Fernández (London: Modern Humanities Research Association, 2013), pp. 19-21.
23. The bawdy and controversial text of *La Celestina* that he has just rendered into English, says Mabbe in his introduction "is not as many of your pamphlets be, like a tree without sap; a bough without fruit; a nut without a kernel; flesh without bones; bones without marrow; prickles without a Rose; wax without honey; straw without wheat; sulfure without gold; or shells without pearl." (*ibid.* p. 70)
24. Edward Topsell, in his *Times Lamentation: or An exposition to the prophet Joel, in sundry Sermons or Meditations* complained that many "Italian follies, Spanish inuentions, or French-fayned-wanton-volumes" were "taught to speak English" by many "histrionicall plaiers, whereby many good soules are endangered."

(London: Edmund Bollifant, 1599, pp. 63-64). For further interesting details on these ballads and sung verses, as well as on their target audiences—illiterate, as would naturally be expected of this type of media, but also more sophisticated audiences, see Cust, 1986, pp. 66-69, who reports, *inter alia*, ballads that contributed to public controversies involving Mabbe's patron, Sir John Digby.

The Information Turn in Modelling People and Society
Early German Work

Chris Bissell

Abstract

This paper considers early attempts by German scholars at viewing individuals and societies from what, in retrospect, can be considered an information point of view. Major figures considered are Eduard Pflüger, Felix Lincke, Jakob Von Uexküll, and Richard Wagner. Specific areas examined by such scholars are the dilation of the pupil of the eye, a general 'proto-cybernetic' approach to the human body, and feedback in organisms and the state. Such early work was not widely known by later German cyberneticists of the 1940s onwards, but it gradually came to inform their ideas.

Keywords

Information, Biology, Feedback, Signal Flow Diagram, Unemployment, Biosemiotics.

Introduction

The notion that living organisms can be considered in some respects as machines has a long history, dating at least as far back as Descarte's *De Homine* of 1643. Nearly two centuries later Charles Bell drew analogies between the biology of bones and internal organs on the one hand, and engineered structures and systems such as buildings, pumps and pipes on the other. Herbert Spencer in the 1860s considered the way organisms maintain dynamic equilibrium, drawing direct comparison with the steam engine, and also extended such ideas to the equilibrium of non-living systems in the natural world. At this point, although not made explicit, notions about information emerged. In Germany, Eduard Pflüger (1877) addressed the importance of feedback, using the example of the control of the dilation of the pupil, in a publication whose very title, 'Teleological mechanics of living nature' anticipated the classic 'Behaviour, purpose and teleology' of the 1943 paper by Rosenblueth, Wiener and Bigelow.

In a lecture published in 1879 Felix Lincke analysed mechanical regulation in general terms, and then applied his ideas to the human body. Lincke distinguished between the *indicator* (specifying the value of the parameter to be controlled), the

modifier (valve, etc), the *transmission* system (between indicator and modifier), and the *motor* (to supply power for the actuation). In the human body these functions were carried out by the eye, muscles and nervous system, for example. Information flow was thus a key factor, as was feedback.

By the 1920s a number of German zoologists and physiologists had taken up the study of biological control processes. Jacob von Uexküll (1864-1944) and Richard Wagner (1893-1970) both considered the rôle of feedback. Uexküll used what we would now term signal flow diagrams to represent both internal feedback loops and the relationship of the organism with its environment, while Wagner explicitly discussed biological feedback. Both authors also applied biological ideas to society. Wagner was the anonymous author of a short 1932 publication entitled *Unemployment and deflation in the body economic from the point of view of biological laws*, in which he proposed solutions to the economic crisis based on biological metaphors including feedback.

This short paper looks in a little more detail at the contributions of early German thinkers in this area, contributions which mark the beginning of the application of information ideas to biological and social systems.



E. Pflüger: Die teleologische Mechanik der lebendigen Natur. 57

(Physiologisches Laboratorium in Bonn.)

Die teleologische Mechanik der lebendigen Natur.

Von

E. Pflüger.

§ 1. Einleitung.

Die oberflächlichste Betrachtung der Gesammtheit der Processe in einem lebendigen Wesen zeigt sofort, dass sie in strengem Sinne niemals ein dynamisches Gleichgewicht darstellen. So ändert ein reissender Bergstrom, der Felsblöcke fortrollt und sein Bett durchwühlt, in jedem Moment den Wellenschlag und den Verlauf. In dem

Figure 1. The opening of Pflüger's publication.

Eduard Pflüger (1877)

Pflüger considered the control of the dilation of the pupil in a publication entitled: 'Teleological mechanics of living nature'. With great foresight he noted: 'the need here is for the correct degree of excitation of the optic nerve, in the way most suitable for acute perception. Thus the *excitation* of the optic nerve itself must control the width of the pupil'[1]. This is particularly important as it was one of the earliest papers to identify *information* flow in an implicit biological feedback loop.

Felix Lincke (1879)

Lincke was Professor of Mechanical Engineering at the Polytechnikum Darmstadt. Otherwise, little is known of him. In 1879 he gave a lecture, subsequently published[2], in which he explicitly compared the workings of the human body to elements of the control systems that were becoming so important in the mass production of the industrialised countries. In terminology remarkably similar to that of modern control engineering, he distinguished between the "indicator", "modifier", "transmitter" and "motor" – very much as we would now talk about sensors, controllers and actuators. Figure 2 shows Lincke's identification of the heart, lung, stomach, brain, sensory organs, nerves and muscles in a stylised, almost 'proto-cybernetic' form.

He went further:

'The difference between our voluntary actions and the operation of a machine is only quantitative. The reliability and effect of [our biological] organs, or a combination thereof, simply contrasts with the absolute express and undisputed result of a machine.'

And:

'[…] we observe the movement we have induced. In other words, the stimuli to the sensitive nerve endings resulting from the changes in our relationship to the external environment are transmitted to the brain by the sensory nerves and brought to consciousness. As we see, hear, feel, etc the motion caused by our 'machine' and the accompanying phenomena, we are in a position to bring our actions into harmony with our overall intention, as well as to modify or halt them in response to changes. [...] the activity we use to direct our human 'ma-



Figure 2. Lincke's 'proto-cybernetic' view of the human body.

chine' towards its goal always derives from the difference between the will and the perceived or imagined reality – that is, the difference between the desired and actual result of the action.'

In particular, Lincke distinguished between the "nerves of will" (what we would now call motor nerves) and the "nerves of sensations" (sensory nerves), pointing out that "the brain is a communication bridge between the nerves of sensation and the nerves of will".

Jakob Von Uexküll (1920)

Von Uexküll was born in Estonia, of an aristocratic family. Although the family money was mostly lost in WW1, he retained a villa on Capri, visited by the likes of Walter Benjamin!

Von Uexküll was the first to use the German term *Umwelt* [environment] in its modern socio-biological meaning. He wrote the seminal book *Theoretical Biology* (1920)[3], founded the Hamburg Institute for Environmental Research, and established the discipline of biosemiotics. The 1920 book included many explicit in-text diagrams of an informational nature – what we would now term, 'signal flow diagrams' (Figure 3).


Viel häufiger findet die Kontrolle innerhalb des Körpers ſtatt. Hier ſind zwei Fälle zu unterſcheiden: entweder wird die Bewegung der Effektorenmuskeln durch beſondere ſenſible Nerven rezipiert, wie das beifolgende Schema zeigt. Oder es wird die den effektoriſchen Nerven übertragene Erregung durch beſondere zentrale Rezeptoren zum Teil aufgefangen und dem Merkorgan zugeführt. Dieſe Rezeptoren bilden das zentrale Sinnesorgan von Helmholtz, das anatomiſch noch völlig im Dunkeln liegt.

Figure 3. Some of Von Uexküll's text, showing his in-text 'system' or 'signal-flow'diagrams.

In the second edition (1928) we find some even more surprising representations, very close to modern neural net approaches (Figure 4).

Perhaps the most important of Uexküll's ideas is illustrated in Figure 5. Here he gives a signal flow diagram of an organisms and its relationship with the environment[4]. Feedback is clearly indicated. This is perhaps the clearest view of a pre-WW2 feedback system in a biological context.

In a final, little-known work *The Biology of the State* (1920; 2nd ed 1933) Uexküll likened the state to an organism, with analogies within the state to the 'nutrition', 'physiology', 'diseases', 'parasites', and so on of an organism[5]. Although not explicit, given Von Uexküll's use of signal flows in biology, many subsequent ideas about 'information' are implicit in this work.



Figure 4. One of Von Uexküll's figures, closely resembling a neural net.



 Figure 5. An organism and its relationship to the 'innerworld' and its environment.

Richard Wagner (1920s, 1930s)

Wagner explicitly discussed biological feedback systems (1925)**,** and later made some rather excessive priority claims for certain cybernetics ideas (becoming somewhat marginalised in the German cybernetics community as a result).

Most interestingly for the present paper, however, is the fact that he was the anonymous author of a short 1932 publication entitled *Unemployment and deflation in the body economic from the point of view of biological laws.* In this intriguing text, which has only recently been examined in detail, Wagner proposed solutions to the economic crisis based on biological metaphors including feedback. Beginning with an analysis of the late 1920s economic crisis, and with the aid of many biological metaphors and arguments based on the technical notions of feedback and control loops.

The publication had a very small distribution. In 1961 Wagner admitted authorship and claimed that the book was suppressed by the "new rulers" of Germany.

Conclusion

Significant early German work in biological areas was associated with information ideas. There is certainly a need to avoid post-hoc over-interpretation, and it must be noted that much of the work discussed here was unknown to later information and cybernetics pioneers, both in Germany and elsewhere.

From the early 1940s onwards there was a significant German 'proto-cybernetics' – the major figure being Hermann Schmidt. This, however, is not within the scope of this paper, and has been considered by the author elsewhere[6]. The subject matter has also been considered, albeit cursorily, in introductory sections in Aumann's book on the history of cybernetics in the Federal Republic of Germany, which naturally concentrates on later developments[7].

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The Mundaneum in Belgium

Where Information Technology meets its Archaeology

Delphine Jenart

Abstract

Today the Mundaneum in Belgium is an archives center and a museum. But the origins of the Mundaneum go back to the late nineteenth century. Created in 1895 in Brussels by two Belgian jurists, Paul Otlet (1868-1944), the father of documentation, and Henri La Fontaine (1854-1943), Nobel Peace Prize in 1913, the project aimed at gathering the entire world's knowledge to file it using the Universal Decimal Classification system that they had created. Today their work is interpreted as the first paper search engine in history, a proto-hypertext. The cultural project of the institution now located in Mons, European Capital of Culture in 2015, is both aimed at highlighting the heritage and questioning the future of access to knowledge.

Keywords

Information, Mundaneum, Paul Otelet, Henri La Fontaine, Universal Decimal Classification, World Wide Web.

Introduction

Brussels, 1934. "*Here, the work desk is no longer loaded with books. Instead, there is a screen, and within easy reach, a telephone. All the books and all the information are somewhere else, far away, in a huge building. From there, the page that needs to be read is made to appear on the screen to find the answer to the question asked on the telephone.*" Paul Otlet[1]

Without knowing that this was written in 1934 by a lawyer passionate about bibliography, these few sentences may seem somewhat insignificant. Today, however, they provide an insight into a work that was clearly ahead of its time.

New York, June 2014: 80 years later, Paul Otlet's achievement is globally recognized and comes to light internationally thanks to an American author whose *Cataloging the World: Paul Otlet and the Birth of the Information Age* was published by Oxford University Press.

As we celebrate the 25th anniversary of the World Wide Web (1989-2014) and the 40th anniversary of the Internet (1974-2014), the Mundaneum, created at the end of the 19th century by Paul Otlet (1868-1944) and Henri La Fontaine (1854-1943, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1913), invites us to discover a new perspective on the history of information and communication technologies.

Vinton Cerf, the co-inventor of the TCP-IP protocol admitted[2]: "The Mundaneum reminds us that there is nothing new - it is only rediscovered in new ways, with new technology and with new capability. The Mundaneum, Memex, and now the Internet World Wide Web are only the latest manifestation. I can hardly wait to see what comes next!"

Back to the Origins

The Mundaneum is the work of two Belgian Lawyers, Paul Otlet (1868-1944) and Henri La Fontaine (1854-1943, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1913). At the end of the 19th century, both men aspired to collect and index all knowledge in order to share it on a global scale and thereby promote the idea of peace between nations.



Figure 1. Paul Otlet, Brussels, 1934 (collections of the Federation Wallonia-Brussels, Mundaneum)

Figure 2. Henri La Fontaine, Nobel Prize for Peace in 1913 (collections of the Federation Wallonia-Brussels, Mundaneum)

It was in Brussels in 1895 that the men laid the foundations of the *Office International de Bibliographie* (OIB). Otlet and La Fontaine drew upon the knowledge and techniques of their time to design and build the very first paper search engine, the "Universal Bibliographic Repertory (UBR)", based on record cards indexed using the "Universal Decimal Classification" system (UDC), which they developed from American librarian Melvil Dewey's Decimal Classification. In 2013 the Universal Bibliographic Repertory of the Mundaneum was among the 54 new additions to UNESCO's Memory of the World Registry[3].

The UDC is still used in libraries today, but Paul Otlet and Henri La Fontaine's contribution to the science of modern information management is not limited to just this classification system.

Figure 3. The Universal Bibliographic Repertory, Brussels, 1910 (collections of the Federation Wallonia-Brussels, Mundaneum)

Paul Otlet, the father of documentation, conceptualised a classification tool which was one of the first attempts in history to virtualise access to information.

Universal Decimal Classification's most innovative and influential feature is its ability to express not just simple subjects but relations between subjects … In UDC, the universe of information (all recorded knowledge) is treated as a coherent system, built of related parts, in contrast to a specialized classification, in which related subjects are treated as subsidiary even though in their own right they may be of major importance, (UDC Consortium, The Hague[4])

Figure 4. The Universal Bibliographic Repertory, Mons, 2011, © Patrick Tombelle

Considering the notion of information as independent from its medium, but also the need to come up with powerful means of transmitting this information, Otlet created blueprints for many systems between 1900 and 1935, each more visionary than the next including the microfilm technique he applied to the books, with the support of the Belgian scientist Robert Goldschmidt. As a result, Paul Otlet left us with many drawings and descriptive notes of what technology would become a century later: the video conference, the conference call, the mobile phone, cloud computing – in other words, the global communication network!



Figure 5. Sketches by Paul Otlet, Brussels, between 1900 and 1934 (collections of the Federation Wallonia-Brussels, Mundaneum)

"The Semantic Web is rather Otlet-ish" according to Michael Buckland, Professor Emeritus at the School of Information at the University of California, Berkeley[5].

As a true data scientist, in 1934 Paul Otlet had already sized up the challenge of the years to come: "Mankind is at a turning point in its history. The mass of data acquired is astounding. We need new instruments to simplify it, to condense it, or intelligence will never be able to overcome the difficulties imposed upon it or achieve the progress that it foresees and to which it aspires."[6]

At the heart of their era, Paul Otlet and Henri La Fontaine embodied the network culture. As such, they set up a global intellectual cooperation rallying together multiple institutions such as universities, libraries and associations from around the world, to ensure their project's success. They formed an international network which included personalities such as the Belgian chemist and philanthropist Ernest Solvay, the French architect Le Corbusier, the Scottish sociologist Patrick Geddes, the Austrian philosopher and economist Otto Neurath and the American industrialist and pacifist Andrew Carnegie.

Figure 6. Andrew Carnegie's visit to the "Palais mondial - Mundaneum", Cinquantenaire, Brussels, 1913 (collections of the Federation Wallonia-Brussels, Mundaneum)

The Mundaneum, birthplace of international institutions dedicated to knowledge and brotherhood, became a universal documentation centre over the course of the 20th century. Its collections, comprising thousands of books, newspapers, small documents, posters, glass plates, postcards, and bibliographic records were gathered and stored in different locations around Brussels, including the "*Palais du Cinquantenaire*", built in 1880 to celebrate the 50th anniversary of Belgium's independence.

This gave rise to a much more grandiose project in the mind of Paul Otlet: the World City, for which numerous architects including the famous French architect Le Corbusier would create plans and models. The aim of the World City was promoting world peace by bringing together the major institutions of intellectual work such as libraries, museums and universities that would govern the production and dissemination of information on a global scale. Deeply rooted in utopian ideals, this project was in Otlet's mind the architectural translation of what would become the League of Nations. The World City would never actually come to fruition.

"To understand what the Mundaneum is, architectural history needs to enter into a dialogue with and open up to the history of information science, the history of internationalism, and especially the history of positivism in all its spirituality", Wouter Van Acker, Griffith University (Australia) [7]

The Mundaneum project was quickly confronted with the magnitude of the technical development of its era.

The Mundaneum Today: Preserving the Heritage, Debating the Internet Society

Now located in the southern Belgian city of Mons, just a few miles from Brussels, the Mundaneum has become an Archive Centre of the Wallonia-Brussels Federation (Belgian State) and a temporary exhibition space. Mons is preparing itself to turn into a European capital of Culture in 2015.

The documentary heritage that is currently archived there is made up of the personal archives of its founders, books, small documents, posters, post cards, glass plates, the Universal Bibliographic Repertory (UBR), the International Press Museum and archive collections relating to three main themes (pacifism, anarchism and feminism): 4 miles of documents.

Since the publication of the first biography of Paul Otlet in 1974, "*The Universe of Information: the Work of Paul Otlet for Documentation and international Organization*" by an Australian student named Boyd Rayward (University of Chicago, USA), a large international scientific community has developed around the legacy of the founders of the Mundaneum.

Today, thanks to an abundance of literature (Oxford University Press, MIT press, Harvard University, the University of Indiana, the University of Illinois, Ghent University, Cambridge, Paris Sorbonne, UCLA-Berkeley, the Universities of Hamburg, Bologna, Montreal, and so on) in a series of fields ranging from History to Information science, from Digital humanities to Digital archaeology, from Architecture to Bibliology, Paul Otlet's undeniable contribution to information science during the 20th century and to our understanding of information technologies is now recognised.

At the heart of our Information Society, the Mundaneum project keeps its purpose alive by constantly updating its message. Bringing the utopia, the ideas, archives and collections bequeathed by its founders face to face with current and future social issues: such is the ambition of the Mundaneum, which is currently looking toward "Mons, European Capital of Culture 2015", whose leitmotiv is none other than "*Where technology meets culture*"!

Making the Information Age Accessible to Everyone

It took the digital revolution for us to recognise Paul Otlet as the visionary that he was... but also to realise that the origins of information and communication technologies are much more deeply rooted in the history of mankind, and came long before the appearance of the first calculators. French philosopher Michel Serres describes the advent of information technologies as "a cultural and cognitive revolution". This relates to the very depths of our being: our language, our "existence in the world". The legitimacy of its history makes the Mundaneum a unique place which offers a critical reflection on the digital revolution, of which we are all witnesses and participants. Today, the Mundaneum takes on meaning in this new cultural landscape. This is why, more than ever, the Mundaneum is turning towards the younger generation who were born into the "digital age".

As a place where information technology meets its archaeology, the Mundaneum dares to be a space for the socio-cultural mediation of communication technologies. Spurred on by the revolution, the scope for action and reflection is immense: Identifying and promoting the understanding of the social impact of these technologies, bringing ICTs and people closer together and demystifying their use, helping people understand how they can be used as medium for building social ties, encouraging everyone to consider their own status as a digital citizen and not only as a consumer of technologies, making the public aware of the development of new knowledge as well as new identities in the web 2.0 era based on issues linked to data organisation and control, promoting the society of knowledge by highlighting strategies for sharing knowledge, discussing issues related to freedom of expression on the Internet but also respecting and protecting the privacy of others, highlighting the scientific developments that foretell of a near future where technology permeates all aspects of our everyday lives...

An Exhibition Space, a Forum for Discussions, a Mediation and Meeting Place for Groups, and a Virtual Platform for Celebrating a Unique Legacy

In light of this vision the Mundaneum started to offer a programme of events dedicated to these issues in 2011. Google found its roots in the Mundaneum history and decided to support its project: this was intended to give greater impetus to this initiative – the only one of its kind in Belgium! The Mundaneum runs exhibitions about the social impact of the digital revolution, lectures and debates addressing many topics from the freedom of expression on the Internet, digital studies, the Internet and multilingualism to scientific mediation in the Web 2.0 era, to name a few, but also a series of high level speakers conferences aiming to highlight the role of pioneers of computing in History (Louis Pouzin, the French inventor of the datagram, Robert Cailliau, the Belgian co-founder of the World Wide Web at CERN, Vinton Cerf, the American co-inventor of the TCP-IP protocol). Every exhibition becomes the subject of significant pedagogical mediation focused on digital literacy.



Figure 7. Picture of the Mundaneum museum located in the heart of the city of Mons, Belgium.

At last, the Mundaneum takes the chance of the Internet and its partnership with Google to highlight its archive on a global scale: the staff curates virtual galleries[8] in an aesthetically pleasing format on the Google Cultural Institute international platform (digital archives.mundaneum.org). In 2015 the Mundaneum will be 120 years old[9] and has never been more relevant. The heritage of the early 20th century Europe - both philosophical and material - we preciously conserve deeply echoes with hot topical issues and societal challenges: open data, networked knowledge, collaborative platforms, global and free access to knowledge for all.

Otlet's work matters today not just as a kind of historical curio, but because he envisioned a radically different kind of network: one driven not by corporate profit and personal vanity, but by a utopian vision of intellectual progress, social egalitarianism, and even spiritual liberation (Alex Wright, biographer of Paul Otlet[10])

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Painting as "Information"?
Globalisation and Abstract Art

Patricia Simpson

Abstract

A common belief regarding globalisation is that it is driven by 'information'. For Maurice Castells (1996) the primary vehicles of networked information were the internet and the media. This paper sets out to explore whether art works, particularly paintings can be regarded as containers of information which participate in the process of globalisation.

Today, identification of what counts as a painting is sometimes problematic, nevertheless a painting still has certain basic physical and visual characteristics. Do these characteristics constitute 'information'? I suggest that, to be able to read and understand what the characteristics might signify, we need to know about the artist and the historical context in which the work was produced. Thus, I argue that the characteristics of a painting might rather be regarded as raw 'data', hence the retrieval of 'information' depends on a process of interpretation of the data by the viewer, using verifiable data from other sources. The extent and veracity of the retrieval and interpretation of the data will depend on the cultural/socio-political baggage that the viewer brings to the encounter with the painting, in context.

Art, particularly painting, has been used in the process of globalising cultural colonisation since at least the 1400s, and this has never been disconnected from power politics. The conclusion highlights problems with treating any visual material as 'information', and also the deeper problem with the concept of 'information', and its ambiguous relationships with constructs of truth, reality, authenticity, and with the operations of power and money.

Keywords

Art, Painting, Information, Kandinsky, Castells, Abstraction.

Introduction

A common belief regarding globalisation, reinforced by Maurice Castells, is that it is driven by "information". The term, however, is problematic. Castells rejected the definition of "information" given by Fritz Machlup (1962) – as the "communication of knowledge" – because of its breadth - preferring the vague definition provided by Marc Porat in 1977: "information is data that have been organised and communicated."[1] Castells (161), identified the primary vehicles of globalising "information" as the networked resources of the internet,

and other publicly available communications media. Can paintings be seen as sources of "information", which participate in the process of globalisation? This paper explores the question, taking as its main focus a painting by Vasilii Kandinsky [2] a Russian artist who worked in Europe, but ultimately received particularly heroic status in the history of avant-garde western art in America 1937- the mid-1950s.

Since the early 20th century it has become more difficult to define what a painting is. Nevertheless, paintings still have certain basic, physical and visual characteristics including: their size; physical application of coloured paint of some sort on a surface - usually two dimensional; and some illusion of space, irrespective of whether single-point perspective is used, and of whether there are recognisable images. Paintings also may have titles indicative of content. Do these characteristics by themselves, constitute communicable "information"?

A painting may be said to be organised, in the sense that it represents choices made, consciously and unconsciously by the artist. Its appearance, evidence of making, materials used etc., can be seen as data. As a social historian of art, I suggest that to be able to understand what the characteristics might signify, we need to know about the artist and the historical context in which the work was produced. In this way, the data can be translated into "knowledge" as used by Castells: "a set of organised statements of facts or ideas, presenting a reasoned judgement or experimental result which is transmitted to others through some communication medium in some systematic form."[3]. I will argue that the characteristics of a painting might rather be regarded as raw data.

The extent and accuracy of the retrieval and interpretation of the data will depend firstly on the cultural/socio-political baggage that the viewer brings to the encounter with the painting. Secondly, it will depend on the historical and cultural context of the encounter. The final part of the paper exemplifies this by looking at the subtle shifts in the interpretation of the raw data of Kandinsky's paintings, during the globalisation of western avant-garde art between the early 1910s and the 1930s. The conclusion highlights the problems with treating painting, and indeed any other aspects of visual culture, as "information" in any conclusive or definitive sense.

Abstraction and "Information"

Painting's dubious potential to offer "information" directly is more obvious if we look at an abstract work rather than a highly illusionistic one, because we are not seduced by legible imagery into thinking that the depicted images simply constitute the "information". The choice of a painting by Vasilii Kandinsky, nicknamed by him variously as *Cossacks* and *Battle* (1910-11) and now owned by Tate Modern in London, is precisely because Kandinsky believed such paintings were a form of communication.[4]

Although the work nods to tradition by being made of oil paint on canvas, was painted with brushes, and has a title that suggests subject matter, there is no naturalistic depiction of recognisable imagery and no apparently legible narrative. The colours are bright all over and encourage the viewers to focus on the immediate surface of the work, rather than guiding them to recognise conventional representations of spatial illusion or perspective. There are also a lot of black lines, which suggest drawing or graphics, but it is difficult to make any sense of them as representations of things. The brushmarks are evident, varied and scrubby, as if the work had been dashed off in haste. We might initially believe this from the work's official title – *Study for Composition IV.* If we look at *Composition 4,* 1911 (Kunstsammlung Nordrhein-Westfalen, Düsseldorf),[5] however, we see something just as scrubbily painted and even less legible. How might we translate the visual and material data of *Cossacks* into "information"?

There is, in fact, some identifiable imagery. It is a battle scene in a landscape. At the top, are crude representations of birds flying above two embattled horsemen and a citadel. Below the horsemen is a rainbow and darkened sun between two hills. On the bottom right, against the blue hill, are three Cossacks with red hats and lances. The black lines on the hills represent the lances of the two sides of the battle.

The choice of Cossacks for the imagery of battle may relate to Kandinsky's Russianness, but the imagery is very unlikely to refer to any historical event. Kandinsky's writings indicate that his aesthetic and philosophical interests were directed towards a notion of painting that eschewed description of the tangible world, and sought to give intuitive insight into a different, non-material world of essences, sensations and emotions.

It is clear from Kandinsky's essay *Concerning the Spiritual in Art* (1911, published in 1912), that his goal was to eliminate imagery, and to communicate with the viewer purely through colour, line, and form, but he had not yet found a way to do this. Instead, Kandinsky concentrated on abstracting the images as far as he could, to simplified, coloured marks and shapes. His essay also suggested that the battle referred to in the painting may represent the defence of what he perceived as the "spiritual" element of humanity, faced with the contemporary forces of materialism embodied in the advances of industrial capitalism.[6] This interpretation can be tenuously supported by reference to Kandinsky's theorisations of the meanings of certain colours elsewhere in the essay – for example, blue as the colour of "spirituality", in relation to the citadel located on a blue hill, and green as the colour of "materialism" in relation to the green beard of the Cossack on the left and the green hatching on the left-hand hill (59).

Because of Kandinsky's passion for the operas of Richard Wagner, the art historian Peter Vergo has also suggested that some of the imagery, particularly the rainbow bridge, may have been prompted by the *Ring* cycle, in which a rainbow bridge provides the means for the Gods to enter Valhalla. But while there are, thus, a number of possibilities for what the painting might be about in a narrative sense, Kandinsky's own writing on *Composition 4*, published in *Der Sturm* magazine in 1913, however, only mentioned "battle" and "lances" in brackets, and focused on an abstract description of "movement", "tangled lines", and "bright, sweet colour", intimating that he wanted the work to be seen as being principally about its formal qualities.[7]

One potential reason was that Kandinsky was involved with a number of like-minded, cosmopolitan artists including Franz Marc, and the musicians Paul Klee and Arnold Schoenberg, within the German Expressionist *Der Blaue Reiter* group in Munich in 1911. All were affected by the influence of French avant-garde culture, in relation to the advance of modernity and modernisation. One of the greatest initial impacts on them was the international spread, from the 1880s, of the Parisian Symbolist movement. Symbolism had a neo-Platonic stress on the noumenal as the true reality, and an allied concern with rendering poetry and art to the condition of music. Music, viewed through the lens of the German Romantic philosopher, Arthur Schopenhauer's *The World as Will and Representation* (1818), was perceived by Symbolists as disconnected from

describing the physical world, and thus closest to an expression and experience of the noumenal. Such a way of thinking opened up the possibility for creating non-naturalistic, abstract art forms, aimed at expressing this "higher" reality.

In an article published in the Russian art journal *Apollon* in 1910, Kandinsky identified the pathway to such art as having been marked out by certain French artists: Paul Cezanne, Vincent Van Gogh, Henri Matisse and Pablo Picasso. Thanks to them, he asserted: "slowly…the spiritual is beginning to outweigh the purely material". In Kandinsky's view, these artists had opened the way for: "the composition of the future: a kind of composition that is pure, untrammelled, exclusively pictorial, based on evident laws of combination, of movement, of the consonance and dissonance of form, line and colour."[8]

References to aspects of these artists' work are embedded in *Cossacks*. On the left-hand hillside Kandinsky used the hatched brushstrokes that were typical of Cezanne's work.[9] The strong emphasis on line not only implied links to Cezanne but also to Gauguin. As in Gauguin's work *Vision After the Sermon* 1888,[10] *Cossacks* offers no likeness to the physical world, and uses non-naturalistic colours and distorted imagery to underline this.

Gauguin's style, and decision to depict Breton women in traditional costume, were connected to the strong current of so-called "primitivism" within the Symbolist movement. This trajectory of belief held that non-western art and tribal artefacts, and also western folk art and customs, untrammelled by academic conventions, evinced a closer relationship to the noumenal. Therefore, such artefacts could be used as resources to inform the development of more – allegedly spiritual – abstract art practices within the Symbolist intelligentsia. Moreover, Brittany was presented in contemporary French tourist guidebooks as wild and primitive, which may have impacted on Gauguin's choice of subject matter. Gauguin's style was also informed by the Japanese prints and other foreign artefacts – the products of French colonialism – to be found in Parisian flea-markets.

Kandinsky had a corresponding interest in "primitive" artefacts, including Russian folk woodcuts - *lubki* - Bavarian *hinterglas* paintings; the work of small children, and of people in mental institutions. The lack of illusionistic perspective, the bright colours, and simplified imagery in *Cossacks* drew on these sources, as well as on works by Gauguin.

For the rough imagery, and strong use of unnaturally vibrant complementary colours [blue/yellow], Kandinsky may have been partly indebted to the work of Van Gogh, with which he may have been acquainted in Paris, but also may have encountered in Dresden in 1905.[11] This work had already had a powerful impact on the first grouping of German Expressionists, *Die Brücke*, founded in Dresden in that year.

Matisse's paintings offered Kandinsky a reinforcement of his own inclination towards "primitivism", they were brightly coloured all over, had apparently "unskilled" rough brushwork, simplified images, and denied conventional perspective, through the equal intensity given to colours in areas staged as foreground and background.[12] The denial of conventional perspective in representing illusory space was also a strong feature of the contemporary Analytical Cubist work of Picasso.[13] It is probable that Kandinsky was particularly drawn to such works both for the illegibility of their subject matter, and the profound illegibility of the surroundings in which the fragmented images were located - as a promise of the "pure" art to which he aspired.

At this point, we may have some contextual means to interpret and understand the data offered by *Cossacks* in its own time. What we cannot do, however, is to construct a definitive hierarchy of the importance of the factors mentioned, and hence, a definitive account of what the painting is about. We can produce, however, both "information" and indeed "knowledge" in Bell's sense, with the proviso, that these interpretative statements are subject to change and reconfiguration by different authors in different circumstances.

This is exactly what happened with Kandinsky's work between 1937 and the 1960's in the process of being globalised from what became the new, post-WWII avant-garde centre - New York.

Globalisation and Interpretation

Kandinsky was an active participant in the early stages of the globalisation of avant-garde art from its pre-WWII centre - Paris. The city appears to have developed this status from the late C19th onwards due to a profound shift of emphasis in the Parisian art market, away from the state-sponsored Salon system, and towards the proliferation of small dealers focused on new artistic departures. These attracted speculative buyers, who would purchase cheaply the

sorts of work that establishment critics hated the most, and wait for its value to rise when the next, more controversial style emerged. The changing nature of the art market was supported by a publishing boom, particularly in illustrated magazines about art and culture, and pamphlets by would-be avant-garde artists, not just in Paris but all over Europe and in Russia, so that more people could find out about the latest trends. It was also supported by the railway networks in France and across Europe and Russia. These fostered the distribution of publications, and enabled artists, collectors, dealers and other interested people to travel to Paris to consume the works.

Networks were established between ambitious artists in different countries. Kandinsky and the *Blaue Reiter* group in Munich belonged to a network that included Matisse in Paris, Mikhail Larionov and Natalia Goncharova in Moscow, and lasted until 1932. It was partly supported by Herwath Walden, art dealer and founder of the *Der Sturm* magazine (1910) and Der Sturm Galerie (1912). Indeed, in 1911 the *Blaue Reiter Almanac* contained an idealistic joint statement by Kandinsky and Franz Marc, effectively celebrating this network: "The whole work, called art, knows no borders or nations, only humanity."[14]

Kandinsky was personally involved in the early globalising process, as a disciple of French avant-gardism. In his role as correspondent for the Russian art journal *Apollon*, however, he acted as an authoritative intermediary between Paris and Moscow. Simultaneously, however, he was establishing himself as an expert interpreter, potential innovator and future leader of avant-garde practice, both through his critical and theoretical publications, and through wide exhibition of his work in Europe and the UK. By 1929, Kandinsky's work was being bought by the American collector Solomon R. Guggenheim, and these works, which included some paintings from 1910-11, formed the core of Guggenheim's Museum of Non-Objective Art that was founded in 1937.

This is the point at which the operation of power politics within the globalisation of Kandinsky's work can be seen to cut in. By 1937, Kandinsky had moved to France to avoid the persecution of German avant-garde artists being meted out by the Nazis. Indeed, some of his works had been sequestered and displayed in the *Degenerate Art* [*Entartente Kunst*] exhibition, which circulated through major German cities between 1937 and 1938 to show the sorts of art practices unacceptable to the regime. In 1937 in the USA, however, the director and curator of Guggenheim's collection and minor German abstract artist,

Hilla Rebay wrote a catalogue essay entitled "The Beauty of Non-objectivity", for the collection's first public exhibition in Philadelphia. Her essay identified Kandinsky's work as works of "genius" offering "beauty" and "refreshment to the soul". Asserting that there was no intellectual content, Rebay declared that there was nothing to be understood about the works by the viewer, and that there was consequently no need to be aware of the technical "laws" which had guided their construction. [15]

Rebay's essay not only denied the relevance of any historically contextualising evidence to an interpretation of Kandinsky's paintings, but also, effectively, located the paintings as being beyond the materialistic concerns of social politics, and implicitly, therefore, an expression of human freedom. This approach was also implied in the exhibition, *20th Century German Art*, held at the Burlington Galleries in London in July 1938, which also contained works by Kandinsky. The show was initially planned by the organisers as a political *riposte* to the Nazi *Degenerate Art* exhibition. As such the proposed title was *Banned German Art*, thus making the political connections clear. However, with its changed title and lack of political content, the exhibition was ultimately an anodyne show vetted by the British Foreign Office to comply with the contemporary policy of appeasement. As a result, German Expressionists such as Kandinsky were positioned, not only as fundamentally apolitical, but also concerned only with art, and this was reinforced by American art criticism in the late 1930s-1950s. These were the circumstances and forms of contemporary explanation forming the context in which *Cossacks* passed into the Tate collection in 1938. Significantly, the work was bought and donated to the Tate by Solomon R. Guggenheim's niece, Mrs Hazel McKinley.

Conclusion

In conclusion, what I have argued is that much as Kandinsky would have liked it to be, *Cossacks* cannot be demonstrated to be a direct communication of '"information"' in the sense used by Bell and Castells. Instead it emerges as a collection of raw data in need of contextualising, in order that the data can be translated into 'knowledge' or '"information"'. The early globalising networking that Kandinsky participated in, within his own time and place, may have enabled other people, in Germany, Paris and elsewhere, such as art-

ists, gallerists, collectors and other cognoscenti, to interpret the data to some extent. But these interpretations would have been both partial and partisan, dependent upon the recipients' position and knowledge. Socio-historical contextualisation, exemplified by this paper, may help the contemporary viewer to understand the work. It is still, however, a partial and partisan interpretation. In the process of globalisation, as indicated by the subtly divergent forms of interpretation of Kandinsky's work offered in the late 1930s in the USA and UK, what constitutes "information" in paintings is contextually subject to variation and change that needs continual, critical monitoring.

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Endnotes

1. Maurice Castells, *The Network Society, The Information Age: Economy Society and Culture* (Blackwell, London, (1996) 2000, 1, 17).
2. Vasilii Kandinskii is the current correct transliteration of the artist's name, however, Kandinsky has become an accepted spelling of his surname, hence the rather hybrid transliteration in this essay. Older transliterations of his first name as Wassily are still used by the Tate Gallery and other sources, hence this spelling in the visual references and endnotes.
3. Ibid.
4. See http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/kandinsky-cossacks-n04948 .
5. See http://www.ibiblio.org/wm/paint/auth/kandinsky/.
6. Wassily Kandinsky,*Concerning the Spiritual in Art*, translated by Michael Sadleir, (New York: George Wittenborn Inc. (1947) 1970, 24-41).
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8. Wassily Kandinsky, "Letters from Munich, V, October-November 1910," in *Kandinsky: Complete Writings on Art*, 79.
9. See for example Paul Cezanne, *Bathers*, 1895-1905, (National Gallery, London) http://www.nationalgallery.org.uk/paintings/paul-cezanne-bathers-les-grandes-baigneuses .
10. See, https://www.nationalgalleries.org/collection/artists-a-z/g/artist/paul-gauguin/object/vision-of-the-sermon-jacob-wrestling-with-the-angel-ng-1643 .
11. See for example van Gogh's, *Wheatfield with Crows*, 1890 (van Gogh Museum, Amsterdam) http://www.vangoghmuseum.nl/en/collection/s0149V1962.

12. See for example Henri Matisse, *Open Windows Collioure*, 1905, (Collection of Mr and Mrs John Hay Whitney), http://www.nga.gov/content/ngaweb/Collection/highlights/highlight106384.html.
13. See for example Pablo Picasso, *Seated Nude*, 1909-1910 (Tate Modern, London) http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/picasso-seated-nude-n05904.
14. Wassily Kandinsky and Franz Marc, in *The Blaue Reiter Almanac* (1911), (New York: Viking Press, 1974, 251).
15. Hilla Rebay, "The Beauty of Non-objectivity", (1937), in *Modern Art and Modernism: A Critical Anthology*, eds, Francis Frascina and Charles Harrison, (London: Harper and Row, 1982, 145-149).

Measuring Information

David Chapman

Abstract

It is easy to look at developments arising from digital technology such as social media, smart phones and tablets, digital photography, and go along with the general perception that there is vastly more information around than ever before. Claiming that there is more information around, however, assumes that it is possible to quantify information, and that in turn seems to assume that we know what information is.

Engineering disciplines have measures for what they call information. Claude Shannon used one in his celebrated work on a mathematical theory of communication which led to the discipline of information theory, and a variation known as algorithmic information theory (AIT) was developed by Andrey Kolmogorov, Ray Solomonoff and Gregory Chaitin.

It has long been debated whether these information theories have relevance to semantic information, with some authors dismissing them on the grounds that they are not about the content of information. However, using the example of the information contained in a school report, this paper shows how information theory can quantify semantic information. Based on the modelling developed by Shannon, it is shown that school reports generated with the assistance of dedicated report-writing computer programmes contain a lot less information than it might appear at first sight, and may contain a lot less information than a handwritten report from the days before digital technologies.

Keywords

Information Theory, Algorithmic Information Theory, Kolmogorov Complexity, School Reports.

Introduction

The idea that there is more information around than ever before is widely taken as a given fact of the age. Alongside the technological developments leading to a genuinely exponential increase in the size of computer memory, the rise of social media has recruited mass-participation to the task of filling-up all the ever-expanding storage capacity. With cameras on mobile phones and wireless broadband access, photographs and videos are taken and shared at will, while text, images and streamed or downloaded audio and video is available from multiple servers to inform or entertain 24/7.

From time to time attempts are made to quantify the amount of information being generated, and, for example, in *The Ethics of Information*, Luciano Floridi[1] talks about the 'zettabyte era', quoting a study which had shown that:

In 2011 the amount of information created and replicated will surpass 1.8 zettabytes (1.8 trillion gigabytes) – growing by a factor of 9 in just five years"

This figure was arrived at essentially by counting data bits. It is not quite as crude as directly counting every bit stored in every computer and phone memory, but it is nevertheless counting bits. However it is easy to identify situations in which there are bits that should not be identified as information, or at least need careful consideration before awarding them the status of information. The bits in the computer representing this sentence might reasonably be accounted as information. But what if it contains nonsense text at random? Do the bits that represent the following characters deserve the status of 'information'? sahduos8wbb. Furthermore there are multiple copies of this file on different computers, so the bits are duplicated in several different places. Do the duplicate copies constitute additional information? These are just two examples of the reasons why we should be wary of counting bits in order to measure information.

This paper therefore starts by addressing the question of what information is. It then looks at two engineering measures of information: that based on the work Claude Shannon ("Shannon Information") and that based on the work of Andrey Kolmogorov, Ray Solomonoff and Gregory Chaitin (algorithmic information). It illustrates how these measure might be exploited using the example of a school report and closes with some conclusions about information.

What is Information?

Descriptions that have been used for information include 'data with meaning' or 'data in context'[2] and Gregory Bateson's 'difference that makes a difference'[3], but at best these need some unpicking. A useful categorisation which is sometime ascribed to Norbert Wiener distinguishes between matter, energy and information (arguably this distinction is, somewhat self-referentially, a difference that makes a difference).

Consider, for example, a digital device such as a smart phone. Matter (the metal, plastic, glass, silicon used to build the phone) and energy (the charged bat-

tery) are uncontroversial, but what is important about the phone is the information: the multimedia (text, audio and video) that it is used for, but also the design of the phone. We know that the multimedia exits as binary data, patterns of 1s and 0s, but beyond that, what is it? This three way categorisation is not restricted to manufactured artefacts, since the categories of matter, energy and information are equally relevant to the understanding natural objects, including biological entities such as plants and animals.

Although matter and energy are uncontroversial, we still can not really say what they are. There are few people who have understood physics as well as Richard Feynman, yet he said of energy[4]:

"[I]n physics today, we have no knowledge of what energy is. […] However, there are formulas for calculating some numerical quantity, and when we add it all together we get "28" – always the same number."

Feynman is saying that while we can not say what energy is, we can measure it. It may be the same with information but that takes us back to where we started because the reason for wanting to know what information was in order to be able to measure it. We have come full circle, and perhaps understanding information is iterative.

A way in to the loop is through the existing measures of information from the field of computing and communications engineering.

Shannon Information

For many people the age of information began with the publication in 1948 paper of *A Mathematical Theory of Communication*, by Claude Shannon[5]. David Mackay said that this paper "both created the field of information theory and solved most of its fundamental problems"[6] and it has certainly been influential, having received more 10,000 citations as of December 2014 according to the Web of Science Database. Though it addressed the specific task of modelling electrical communication systems, the breadth of fields among those 10,000 citations – including such unexpected topics as Pediatrics, Fisheries, Public Administration, Women's Studies, Art and Religion – reveals that it has found application a long way beyond its origins.

Shannon was working on electrical communication systems and modelled that system with a diagram that itself has become an iconic on the world of information theory. This model is shown in Figure 1, but with a slightly changed layout to emphasize the communication of a message from the source to the destination.



Figure 1. Shannon's model of a communications channel.

Shannon supposes that a source has messages to send to the destination. The source sends a continuous stream of messages, one at a time, each selected from a finite set of possibilities. Each message is encoded by the transmitter and sent as a signal through the channel. The signal might be corrupted by noise in the channel, then is decoded by the receiver, ideally recovering the transmitted message which is delivered to the destination.

Shannon wanted to know the rate at which messages could be sent down the channel, and he derived his famous equation:

$$C = B\log_2(1+S/N)$$

B, *S* and *N* are physical, measurable features of the channel: the bandwidth, *B*; the power of the signal, *S*; and the power of the noise, *N*. *C* is called the channel capacity and is measured in bits per second, but it is what Shannon – following the work of others such as Hartley – called information.

One way of interpreting *C* is that it is the rate at which binary choices can be sent down the channel. This can be measured in information bits, where one bit represents the selection between two equally-probably alternatives. These information bits, as opposed to regular data bits, are sort of idealized bits that are doing the maximum work any bit can do. Every information bit supplies one binary decision about something which would otherwise be equally likely to be either of the two possibilities.

The world does not come made out of binary decisions ready to be conveyed by information bits, but Shannon's paper showed how to calculate the equivalent information content of real messages. Simplified, the calculation is based in the idea that if you are communicating a message and the probability of sending that message is p, then the information content of the message measured in bits is $-\log_2 p$(or, equivalently, $\log 2(1/p)$). Notice that this is consistent with the idea that a single decision about something with two equally-likely outcomes delivers one bit of information, because in that case the probability, p, would be 0.5 and $\log_2(1/0.5) = \log_2 2 = 1$.

The idea of Shannon information becomes more intuitive with more examples. Consider parents communicating information about their new baby. First, they send a message about the gender. Given that boys and girls are equally likely, this is one bit of information. Suppose it is a boy, and they then send a message with the name. One approach to understanding the information content of the name is to consider what names are possible. Suppose that the parents are English and we can assume they use an English name. A list of English boys names identifies 610 possibilities. If they are all equally likely, the probability of any of them is 1/610 and the information conveyed by one of them is $-\log_2(1/610) = \log_2 610 = 9.25$bits. Names are not all equally likely, however. Of the 358,438 boys born during 2013 in England and Wales, 6,949 of them were called 'Oliver'[7], so, with no further information, the probability that a boy was called Oliver in 2013 was 6,949/358,438 = 0.0194 and the information content of a message saying a boy is called Oliver that year was $-\log_2 0.0914 = 5.69$ bits. Six boys that year were called Theon[8], so the probability that a boy was called

Theon was 6/358,438 = 1.67 x 10^{-5} and the information content of a message announcing this name was $-\log_2(1.67\text{x}10^{-5})$=15.87 bits. In general being told something improbable provides more information than being told something you expected to be the case anyway (there is more information in being told you have won the lottery than in being told you have not won it).

Returning to the question of what information is, Shannon's work has come in for criticism on the grounds that it is not about semantics, so how can it be anything to do with information?

Shannon himself said it his 1948 paper:

"The fundamental problem of communication is that of reproducing at one point either exactly or approximately a message selected at another point. Frequently the messages have meaning; that is they refer to or are correlated according to some system with certain physical or conceptual entities. These semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem."

But to say this makes it irrelevant to information is to miss the point. As Donald Mackay pointed out[9]

"The trouble here appears to be largely due to a confusion of the concept of information with that of *information-content* – the confusion of the *thing* with the *measure* of the thing." (Emphasis in original)

As explained earlier, knowing how to measure something – be it energy of information – may not be the same as knowing what the thing is, but it is one aspect of understanding it.

Algorithmic Information Theory

Shannon information is one strand of information theory, and it is fair to say is the mainstream information theory, but another strand is Algorithmic Information Theory, AIT, which was devised independently by Andrey Kolmogorov and Ray Solomonoff, and has been further developed by Gregory Chaitin. It is also frequently referred to as Kolmogorov Complexity or Kolmogorov Information.

In a standard textbook on the theory[10], Ming Li and Paul Vitanyi have an introductory example along the lines of the following. Suppose you toss a coin

50 times and write down a 1 if you get a head and a 0 if you get a tail. You do it once and get the following result.

01001011101110100110101100001000100011111 0

You then do it again and get a tail every time, giving the next sequence.

00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

According to simple probability theory, these two are equally likely outcomes. Every possible sequence of 50 bits is equally likely, so the particular mix of heads and tails represented by the first sequence just as likely as getting 50 tails, as represented by the second sequence. (They are in fact both extremely unlikely, with a probability of $1/2^{50}$which is about one in 10^{15}, one in a thousand million-million.)

Intuitively there does appear to be a qualitative difference between these sequences, and in AIT there is a difference on the basis that it is possible to describe one of them much more concisely than the other. It is possible to describe the second sequence by saying "repeat 0 fifty times", whereas there is no such simple description of the first.

Sequences do not necessarily have to be obviously simple in order to have a short description. Consider the following 50 digits.

31415926535897932384626433832795028841971 6

This might just look random, or else you might spot that it is the first 50 digits of the number pi. It can be described concisely by saying "the first 50 digits of π", but that presupposes that the reader knows the digits of the number π. However, it is possible to write an algorithm (a computer programme) that generates the digits of pi. Such an algorithm is unlikely to be shorter than 50 digits, so it would not be a concise way of describing these digits, but the principle could be

used for communicating, for example, a sequence of 10,000 digits in which case the algorithm might well be much more concise than sending the 10,000 digits explicitly. In this way, AIT defines the 'Kolmogorov complexity' of a sequence x as K(x), where K(x) is the shortest algorithm that can generate the sequence x.

While AIT can be seen as 'merely' about data compression, it has also been interpreted as having more profound significance. It is claimed to be about finding the absolute minimum number of bits needed to describe a sequence, and therefore to be a measure of the absolute information content of the sequence.

Li and Vitanyi argued that AIT is superior to Shannon as a measure of information[11].

"Shannon ignores the object itself but considers only the characteristics of the random source of which the object is one of the possible outcomes, while Kolmogorov considers only the object itself to determine the number of bits in the ultimate compressed version irrespective of the manner in which the object arose."

The problem, however, is that according to AIT the sequence with the highest information content is one consisting of an entirely random sequence of digits. Arguably, meaning – semantics – is entirely absent from AIT, whereas a calculation of the amount of information based on Shannon's modelling, requires an exploration of the message content.

An example based on school reports is instructive.

The Information Content of a School Report

Forty years ago, in the days before personal computers and word-processing, a school report was typically a slim document with a few handwritten notes from the teachers. These days, school reports are much bigger. Often a report is a booklet with lots of detail about what the pupil has been doing and has achieved in each subject. The report appears to contain a lot of information, apparently a lot more than in the days of small hand-written (or typed) reports.

Today's reports, however, are generated with a lot of help from computer programmes. An example of report-writing software for use in schools following the National Curriculum for England and Wales worked along the following lines[12].

The teacher enters the name of the pupil and then chooses the grade of the pupil for each a subject, selecting from a pre-defined set such as: *h* for higher achiever, *m* for average to more able achiever, *l* for average to less able achiever and sen for students with special educational needs. The software then writes the whole report, drawing on the statements contained in the National Curriculum for England. A randomising element ensures that no two reports are identical, even if the grades are the same.

For example, in one version of this software, entering *m* for ICT for one pupil (John), generated the following

John has extended his knowledge of a variety of computer programs and he can log into the network without support. He has explored a variety of features included in software for composing music and is aware that questions can be turned into search criteria when using data handling programs. He has found information relating to his topic work from given websites on the worldwide web and explains patterns that govern a computer simulation

This is 442 characters. A text file containing this paragraph has 442 bytes, which is 3,536 bits, but the amount of information will be much less.

Algorithmic information theory would measure the information content by finding the smallest number of bits required to generate the 442 bytes of the file. There is not an simple answer to this, but a first approximation which would give an upper limit is to use a standard compression algorithm. Zip, for example, compresses the file to 388 bytes, but this will be a long way from the minimum.

AIT considers the file itself, but to use ideas from Shannon information theory we need to consider the message that the file is conveying. In this case, given that we are interested in the information about the pupil being conveyed from the teacher (the message source, in Figure 1) to the parents (the destination), all of that information is contained in the selection of *m* (the message) by the teacher. The teacher judged John to be *m*, rather than *h*, *l* or sen. If the four options are equally probable the information content is $\log_2(1/0.25) = 2$ bits. The amount of information conveyed about John from the teacher to the parents by the 3,536 bits of the file is 2 bits of information.

There are many reasons for the difference between the file size and the amount of information. The report contains information about the National

Curriculum, for example, so some of the bits carry information about that. However, the important insight from this analysis is that the amount of information conveyed from the teacher to the parents about the pupil is 2 bits.

A very simple comparison with an old-fashioned hand-written report is possible by considering the choice of words available to the teacher when writing the report. The amount of information in the computer-generated report was so low because the teacher was selecting one from only four possible options. When writing a report, the options available to the teacher are in principle vast. Even a short sentence would come from a very large number of different sentences that might be written. The calculation also takes account of the probability of the different sentences, but even so the teacher is likely to be routinely choosing from a lot more than four options, so the information content will be correspondingly higher.

Conclusion

Information is just as real as energy and matter, and can be measured. A convenient unit of information is the information bit. A data bit can carry one information bit, but very often does not. Analysing data using ideas drawn from the information theory of Claude Shannon can help to identify the amount of information that is being carried by the data, sometimes leading to surprising results.

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Endnotes

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Information and Social Contention
An Initial Outline

Steve Walker

Abstract

Social movements arise where there is some form of social contention, typically when a movement of people with values and aims different from a society's mainstream arises. Information is important in several ways to these social movements; the establishment of a shared movement identity, the co-ordination of activity, and as a terrain of conflict with a social adversary. While the role of information and communication technologies in recent social movements, such as the 'Arab spring' or 'Occupy' movements has been widely studied, the role of information itself has generally been seen as unproblematic. Recent work in the philosophy of information may provide a basis for thinking about the role of information, as distinct from the technologies used to store, organize and communicate it, may provide a basis for thinking about it. This paper sketches how this might work using examples from the European labour movement, where there has been considerable debate over the last decade or so as to whether or not there is an emerging social movement, or whether it remains a transnational bureaucracy disconnected from 'grassroots' trade unionists. It draws on the experiences of a series of transnational projects which aimed to develop cross-border collaboration through the use of e-learning and online networking approaches. The failures and relative successes of this approach may be explained at least partially as informational problems.

Keywords

Information, Social Contention, Trades Unions, Castells, Floridi, European Union

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Introduction

This paper is an initial attempt at sketching an informational perspective on social movements and social contention. It draws on the work of Floridi[1] and Mingers[2], linking this to the concept of framing of issues and information widely used in the study of social movements, using case material of European trade unions' distance learning and transnational networking projects.

Social Movements, Contention & Society

There is a close relationship between social movements and information: in his 'The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture' trilogy Manuel Castells devotes a volume[3] to the relationship between social movements, identity

and information and revisits the subject following the Arab Spring and Occupy movements[4]. Castells' volume is part of a substantial recent literature on the relationship between information and communication technologies (ICT) and social movements. In this literature, ICT generally refers to digital communications technologies and particularly the internet. It is important to note, though, that the relationship between social movements and technologies of information and communication predates this recent interest, as can be seen in the unstamped press, pamphlets and ballads in the emergence of an English working class movement in the early 19th century[5] or debates about the role of television in the presentation of socially contentious politics in the UK in the 1970s[6].

Irrespective of the particular technologies involved, information is central to the study of social movements and social contention in at least three ways. Firstly, information and the control of access to it can itself be the subject of social contention as in the disputed regulation of the early C19th English press[7] or more recently, Wikileaks[8]. Secondly, information is central to the co-ordination of social movement activities whether it be transmitted via railways[9], telegraph[10] or the internet[11]. The geographic reach and speed of information exchange enable or constrain the ways in which social movements can organise themselves. Thirdly, and most fundamentally, information is central to establishing the very purpose of social movements. At the heart of a social movement is the way they make sense of the world differently from the dominant views of the societies in which they exist and with which they have an adversarial relationship[12]. In the literature on the relationship between social movements and ICT as with many discussions of information systems, the relationship with information is largely seen as unproblematic[13].

Informational Perspective – Semantic Information

Social movements, then, are deeply informational: inter alia they are about the use of information to establish particular shared meanings within a social movement and propagate these meanings in opposition to the understandings of their adversaries. How, then, might we think about information?

The starting point for most contemporary considerations of information is Shannon and Weaver's theory of communication[14]. This views information in terms of measures (expressed as bits) and uncertainty reduction. While impor-

tant in communication engineering, it has nothing to say about the content of information. More useful here is Floridi's[15] characterisation of information as true semantic content (see Figure 1). Information, for Floridi, consists of one or more data; is well-formed according to the syntax of the particular system of representation; and, to be information, the well-formed data must be meaningful. The first distinction in Floridi's map is between environmental information inherent in the world around us, independently of our knowledge of it (for example, the number of rings in a tree indicates its age, independently of whether people recognise it as such).



Figure 1. Floridi's Model of Information

The term 'semantic information' here refers to information encoded in human communication systems. Floridi distinguishes between factual statements about a state of affairs in the world and instructional statements (such as 'please pass the salt', intended to bring about a state of affairs which does not yet exist) which cannot be judged as true or false. Factual content may either be true or false.

Following Floridi and Mingers, I will accept the argument that for semantic content to constitute information, it must be true (that is, a timetable with completely inaccurate descriptions of when a train will leave cannot be described as information). True information forms the basis of knowledge. How we might assess the truth of a particular piece of information is, of course, itself a major philosophical concern. Floridi's epistemological 'level of abstraction' (LoA) recognises that different agents will recognise the same information as having different meaning, dependent on prior knowledge and experience. Following Mingers, I will assume that information, like the data which carries it, is objective but that the meaning derived from information is subjective.

Information, Framing and Social Movements

Social movements, generally, are concerned with changing the world and their perspectives and understandings differ from those dominant in a particular society. Central to social movements is the struggle over information and its alternative meanings; the validity of pieces of information may be disputed but perhaps more typical is a disagreement about the meanings attached to it. The ways social movements establish meanings and the ways they frame issues and ideas is central to their study. Collective action frames are the outcomes of negotiating shared meanings to simplify and communicate aspects of the world and three types[16] of such frames are common across political or economic social movements; diagnostic, attributional and prognostic. Diagnostic frames concern the identification of an issue or problem and the development of interpretations that can be shared among movement adherents. Attributional frames concern the identification of responsibility for the existing, contentious, state of affairs. Prognostic frames propose courses of action, again typically a contentious process. Collective action frames, then, are contentious in that they challenge others' frames. This counterframing can then be played out as a battle inter alia of ideas involving disagreement about the meaning and relevance of information to a question, the distinction between information and misinformation, and intentional disinformation. Prognostic frames will also include elements of instructional information aimed at bringing a future state of affairs into being.

Case – European Labour

The ideas sketched above are explored in the context of a series of projects involving the European labour movement. Since the 1990s there has been discussion about the possibility of developing a European labour movement that can adequately represent workers in a European Union which has been becoming increasingly integrated politically and economically. Since 1973 the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) has been the formal representative body of trade unions in the European Union. The ETUC's primary role is to represent trade unions and workers in the policy-making processes of the European Union. There has been widespread debate in the labour movement and the academic about the role of the ETUC and related organisations in the creation and mobilisation of a European labour movement[17],[18].

The following section of this paper reviews the outcomes of two trade union education projects led by the ETUC's education department, (then called the European Trade Union College (ETUCO)) in informational terms. These projects aimed to exploit the development of the internet to develop the capacity of trade unionists to collaborate across national borders through a series of around 25 sub-projects. Each sub-project comprised cross-border collaboration either between unions in pairs of countries or wider transnational networks typically addressing issues in a particular industrial sector. While some progress was made in improving communications, the process was not straightforward: establishing reliable communications methods was often problematic, typically for linguistic and technological reasons. Where communications were established there were significant issues of developing shared understandings of issues, partly because the issues they were trying to address were themselves novel and rapidly changing, and partly because of the differing national and industrial contexts in which trade unionists in different European countries were operating. Project participants experimented with a number of communication tools and methods to try to develop shared understandings of issues as the basis for some form of action. In many instances during the projects, asymmetry in the access to and control of information between their members and their employers were at the heart of the issues that unions were attempting to address. The following discussion tentatively illustrates these issues through examples from the family of projects.

The most basic informational problem that project participants needed to overcome was to establish effective exchange of information. Without achieving this, the wider project objectives would be impossible. Two recurrent problems hindered some sub-projects: technology use and language[19], [20].

Technology problems, or more accurately, differing sociotechnical arrangements in different organisational settings significantly hindered information exchange. Some unions made extensive use of online conferencing systems, which had become a normal part of their work while others used email to accomplish similar tasks. Some online security settings made it difficult for project participants to access some services from their workplace.

Language was perhaps a more significant issue: while a sender may be able to transmit information in a language they know, a recipient may not be able decode it adequately, or at all, in order to extract meaning. A number of initiatives were undertaken to address this issue. In face to face events simultaneous translation was provided. One project included a review of (then available) machine translation services, concluding that these were not adequate. In practice the initiatives that did achieve effective communication tended either to use a common language which was widely enough used (typically English) or where pairs of languages are at least partially mutually intelligible (e.g. Nordic languages; Spanish/Portuguese).

Beyond these issues, though there proved to be a rather wider range of barriers to effective communication (that emerged where the exchange of semantic content was feasible In Europe national systems of industrial relations differ markedly: for example the levels of legal support for worker participation in company governance through works councils in Scandinavia and Germany are markedly different from the more exclusionary practices in the UK and southern European practices. Around the various transnational European union bodies there is a cadre of experienced union officers well versed in these issues, but for many workplace-level trade unionists there is a significant amount of mutual 'background' learning required before joint activity can take place. In this process a number of information-related dynamics were hinted at, including reluctance or refusal to share information with trade unions organising at a company's plant in another country (which may be amenable to analysis in game theoretic terms) information differentials within unions (as in Michel's 'iron law of bureaucracy); or in terms of information overload in which more information is available to

agents than they are able to interpret and act on in a timely way. More widely, understandings of emerging information networks and their role in co-ordination and union organisation are closely entwined with the political and organisational dynamics of unions.

Given this diversity, it is not straightforward for European trade unionists to construct of shared understandings of the issues confronting them and how to respond. Building collective action frames among potential social movement actors has thus been difficult in this context. There were, though, some examples of effective transnational action, though often restricted to relatively small numbers of trade unionists. The clearest example here concerns a campaign organised by the European section of the international federation of trade unions organising in the service sector, Union Network International Europa (UNI-Europa) in opposition to elements of European Commission's 2004 directive on services in the internal market (widely referred to as the Bolkestein directive, after the European Commission responsible) on the reduction of obstacles to cross-border trade in services in the European Union. UNI-Europa and its affiliates saw the directive as a challenge to the model of a social Europe, permitting 'social dumping', for example by allowing workers to be employed in another EU country under labour legislation in the company's country of origin and hence undercutting workers' conditions in better-protected countries. This raised issues both of co-ordination and internal framing similar to those outlined above, and articulating an effective counter-frame to the European Commission and its supporters' presentation of the underlying issues (who, for example, described regulations as 'bureaucratic red tape' and trade unions as 'xenophobic' and 'protectionist'). In semantic information terms, this involved identifying and using relevant information firstly to develop an internal understanding of the issues to be addressed and the responsibility for them (diagnostic and attributional frames) and secondly to generate credible alternative views of the future world and how that might be achieved (prognostic frames, expressed as instructional information). This involved a form of informational conflict with proponents of the Directive. UNI-Europa assembled a database of likely impacts of the directive in different EU countries. This was disseminated and elaborated through face to face meetings and digital networks and conferences.

This was feasible partly because of the heavy involvement of experienced union officers familiar with diverse national union contexts, and partly by most of the other participants being political officers of national trade unions who were more likely than most trade unionists to have a second language (typically English or French), reliable access to the internet and were all well-versed in techniques of wielding influence in their national political environments (though not, generally, in the processes of EU policy formation). While others adopted traditional tactics such as national demonstrations, UNI-Europa's central campaigning method involved lobbying members of the European Parliament, which had to pass the directive in order for it to come into effect. They contributed directly to shaping amendments to the directive which were successfully passed by the Parliament and which addressed many union concerns including, most significantly, overturning the country of origin proposal. For a wider discussion of social movement framing of contention around the Bolkestein direction, and the use of frames to allow wider alliances of protest to be built, see Crespy (2010).

Discussion and Conclusion

This paper is very much a starting point for an informational perspective on international trade unionism and social movements. The ETUC case highlights some areas in which an informational perspective may be useful in thinking about aspects of social movements and social contention. An informational perspectives draws out some of the difficulties that have arisen in trying to engage trade union officers and members more actively, and some of the attempts that were made to address the difficulties. This might be fruitfully extended in analysing international trade unionism, and perhaps social movements more widely, in informational terms as, for example, in game theory in analysing information (non-)sharing behaviours or 'model power' as a way of thinking about counter-framing issues and information. The link between an information theoretic view of social movement framing processes might usefully be elaborated further as a form of systems-oriented social epistemology concepts of 'unfair epistemic discrimination' and 'epistemic injustice' are also important here, both within social movements, but also highlighting issues in contemporary social movements

such as hacktivism and the open data moment in which access to and control over information are ostensibly core to a social movements existence and activities.

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The Social Imaginary in the Information Society

Graeme Kirkpatrick

Abstract

There has been a change of inflection in references to 'the social', associated with informationalisation. Theories that take account of the way that digital technology has been used to reconfigure social processes highlight a new intrusion of societal demands on private aspects of the self, which has affected our collective capacity to think the future. This is related to neo-liberalism and especially its homogenisation of the subject around a singular rationality, which to an extent has been technologically implemented. The result is a depletion of the 'radical imaginary', which explains the decline of radical, visionary sociology over the last 30–40 years.

Keywords

Information, Social Imaginary, Radical Imaginary, Neo-Liberalism, Information Society:

Introduction

This paper argues that over the past few decades there has been a change of inflection in references to 'the social' and that this is strongly associated with informationalisation, or the rise of a 'networked society'. It suggests that digital technologies have been used by neo-liberalism to impose a specific experience of the world and a particular way of being a self. This has corroded our capacity for imagining the social at the same time as it has negatively affected our ability to think the future[1].

Part of the motivation for this paper is my observation that contemporary sociology lacks radical visions. If we look back to the period just before the so-called computer revolution[2] we see something very different. In the 1960s and 70s authors like Ivan Illich[3] invited us to imagine a world without schools, Shulamith Firestone[4] proposed using technology to abolish traditional biological reproduction. Even Alec Nove's[5] sober calculations on the economics of feasible socialism evince a willingness to reflect on the potential for a different kind of society. Indeed, it seems that part of writing about society at that time was

this very process of asking how it might be made different. The way the 'social' appears in these works has largely disappeared from contemporary sociology.

I will begin by saying what is entailed in the idea of a 'social imaginary' and the 'radical imaginary', both ideas from Castoriadis[6]. This leads to reflection on the role of the body and language in the production of social representations, or symbolisations that are decisive for mediating imaginary and real in and through concrete social practices. The second section discusses recent theories of neo-liberalism and focuses on its employment of informational technology. On the basis of this short survey I suggest in conclusion that neo-liberalism, as implemented through digital technologies, has resulted in a depletion of our capacity to symbolise the social, to represent it to ourselves. As our map of the social becomes co-extensive with its (un-)reality, so it is increasingly difficult to conceive real change.

The Social and Radical Imaginaries

The idea of a social imaginary comes from the sociology of art[7]. It describes the human facility for representing some parts of experience sectors as constitutive of our collective being, the entity we form and share with others of our kind. In the classic expression of the idea, Castoriadis emphasizes that the representation a society contains of itself is always contingent on the ongoing work of the social imaginary:

"…there is no articulation of social life that is given once and for all, neither on the surface nor at greater depth, neither really nor abstractly. This articulation, whether with respect to the parts it posits or to the relations established between those parts and between the parts and the whole, is in every instance the creation of the society in question" (Castoriadis, 180)

The social imaginary is reflexively involved in the creation of its own object because the way we imagine our society includes some idea of our role in it and this conditions our behavior, which ultimately produces society.

Between the imaginary as a facility for producing a determinate social image and practice informed by ideas about what society is and what it can or should be in the future, there is necessarily a role for the symbolic. Symbolisations enable people to represent their society and to communicate about it. The

imaginary must be redeemed through the symbolic to take on meaning. For Castoriadis, this is the intersection of "the curvature specific to every social space…" with "real, rational and symbolic odds and ends that contribute to any society" (143)

An important part of the idea of the social imaginary concerns the principle of change. No society is fully self-identical and social reality is in constant flux. One effect of social representation is to stabilize this, especially by imposing a temporal order on events. The social imaginary creates 'imaginary time', which "as the time of social representation always tends to cover over, to conceal and to deny temporality as otherness alteration" (212). In contrast to the steady flow of events articulated through imaginary time, "…true time," is "the time of otherness-alteration, is a time of bursting, emerging, creating" (201). This time of flux is more true because ""the social *is* this very thing – self-alteration, and it is nothing if it is not this" (215). Objective time is only an effect of the social representation as it falls back over the real.

Real time is, therefore, imaginary. True time is the time of the body tracing out, through gesture and (initially not well understood) new actions, and social reality exists in the oscillation between this and the objective time of the symbolic, where society's image is congealed and which sets the real.

This is where the radical imaginary takes its place: "The creative role of the radical imagination of subjects… is their contribution to the positing of forms, types/*eides* other than those that already exist" (264). In literature, the arts and creative sociology, the radical imaginary is at play: in the interstices of the societal image, of its symbolic reality, there are spaces for interpretation, thought and play. The intersection of this play and the symbolic generates change in the social image.

The intersection of the imaginary and the symbolic is therefore central to this conception of the inherent reflexivity of the social image in relation to practice and, within this, the question of social temporality. The idea of the social imaginary identifies an important function of media in any social formation, since these will be present at this intersection. George Steiner has pointed out that something profound is happening at this level of the linguistic representation through which social reality is represented, born of the increased salience of informational technology and the related idea of code, network, etc.

Much recent theoretical work exploits the affinities between natural language and the idea of a code. Theories that identify binary operations at the heart of natural language have suggested these are deep. Post-humanists claim it is only prejudice that makes us think language as such is different from the codes we find elsewhere in nature or indeed in technology (which itself shades into nature once we stop privileging the human). However, Steiner lodges a reservation that I think echoes Maurice Merleau Ponty, for whom natural language and words differ from information and codes. Words do not only represent ideas I already have they, "…have the extraordinary power to draw me out of my thoughts; they cut out fissures in my private universe through which other thoughts irrupt"[8]

Linguistic meaning does not reduce to its logical or formal properties as these are grasped in the idea of a code but are rooted in the human body, where they resonate. Gesture, body and *socius* are, for Merleau-Ponty the humus of an "original semantic thickness" possessed by natural language[9]. Steiner emphasises that this dimension of the inner body, a dark space from which language emerges and launches its surprise attacks, is inherently withheld from society; it is private: "In each and every act of aesthetic reception there are elements both cultural-collective and private" (144). Without this, there could be no radical imaginary and no new symbolisations that subvert objective-imaginary time with the destabilizing force of the true.

In his own reading of the contemporary situation, Steiner is apocalyptic. He argues that, "…current changes in the experience of communication, of information, of knowledge, of the generation of meaning and of form are probably the most comprehensive and consequential since *homo sapiens* development of language itself" (217). These changes are associated with Steiner's main concern, which runs through his book, namely that we seem to be "losing the future tense".

Information, Transparency and Risk

To understand the forces behind this change and to get a perspective on the way that information technology alters the workings of the social and radical imaginaries, we can look at recent sociological studies of the information society.

Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello[10] point out that since the 1980s new management techniques have been effective in making work more attractive by presenting it less as a set of bureaucratic tasks to be carried out in conformity with the demands of an oppressive hierarchy and more as a series of dynamic challenges that involve the individual worker as a whole person working within horizontal competitive relations. New labour processes reach deeper into the inner lives of subjects while technologically enhanced surveillance functions mean that there is nowhere to hide: the worker's motivations must be those of the employing organization, even when contracts are short-term and employee loyalty is not reciprocated.

It is also widely observed that the body has taken on new functions in informational capitalism. Nigel Thrift[11] argues that the hand is acquiring new epistemic functions as increasingly we navigate tactile interfaces to manipulate data. Increasingly, work involves getting a feel for the game of data management in a process Thrift dubs 'qualculative'. The demands of bureaucratic rationality reach into areas of life they did not previously touch but the operative rationality has a softer edge.

This is related to a new harnessing of the aesthetic. Information machines have reconfigured the worlds of work and play, often effacing the boundary between them. Manuel Castells[12] talks about a global media that are knowingly aimed at stimulating the pleasure centres of the brain to get people to do things. This provides a chemical inducement, perhaps, at those very points where in the past workers might have felt coerced into instrumental performances. He writes that, "Our brain thinks in metaphors, which can be accessed by language but *are physical structures in the brain*" (142). Viewed in this way, "emotions are a channel to convey arguments" (152). Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval go so far as to describe this as "generalised doping… Various addictions and dependency on visual media keep us hooked into our prescribed role"[13].

Information technology saturates our experience and work structured by interaction with manipulative interfaces limits the range of our subjective responses. Writing from a post-humanist perspective, Maurizio Lazzarato argues that the inner self is now a redundant construct since "man, language and consciousness no longer have priority"[14]. Rather, humans are now dispersed into machines and subject to what he calls 'machinic enslavement': our 'self' is an effect of the virtual machine assemblage which unfolds us as part of its programming.

For Dardot and Laval, the effect of this new existence a homogenisation of the discourse in which we are able to make sense of our selves and our experiences and in light of which we plan what we should do: everyone must imagine themselves as an 'enterprise'. The semantic ground we tread is narrowed: we cannot initiate a conversation about how we'd like 'society to be' because the idea that there's any connection between what we'd like and 'society' has been ruled out of bounds. There has been a constriction of the radical imaginary.

The compulsion they refer to is derived from what Lazzarato refers to as our 'machinic enslavlement' but it is also underpinned by our exposure to risk in the new economy, to the permanent danger[15] of redundancy, marginality, poverty and death. Increasingly, the lack of employment security and social safety nets translates into "the imperative to take upon oneself the risks and costs for which neither business nor the state are willing to pay." (53). According to Dardot and Laval, "we are witnessing a radical individualisation that leads to all forms of social crisis being perceived as individual crises and all inequalities being made the responsibility of individuals…" (277).

Here too information networks are key to neo-liberalism's success. Making individuals responsible for everything that happens to them presupposes, "an 'information society' in which the role of public authorities and enterprises should consist in providing reliable information… this establishes a mechanism that identifies the *sharing* of risk and the *bearing* of risk. Once it is assumed that the individual is in a position to access the information required for his choice, we must assume that he becomes fully responsible for the risks run" (278).

What we see here is restricted access of the imaginary to the symbolic. Reading this in Lacanian terms, Dardot and Laval argue that the situation is one of 'mass psychosis'. Now, "the symbolic structure is subject to instrumentalisation by capitalist economic logic…capitalist discourse brings about mass psychosis by destroying symbolic forms" (293-4). Lazzaroto wants to intensify our 'escape' from the symbolic: "Deterritorialised desire… bears within it an 'economy of possibilities' and an 'autopoietic subjectivity'" (52). For him, informational capitalism proliferates subjectivities and cannot contain them in available symbolisations. But in truth, neo-liberalism has generated a sense that economic reality sets sharp limits on the social-possible, such that Luc Boltanski writes that the impotence of left critique is not a function of mass deception or media manipulation: "currently, it is the closure of reality on itself that discourages critique"[16].

We should not forget, though, that today's 'realistic' society is no less imaginary than any other. As Castoriadis pointed out, referring to a person as a "thing or mechanical system" is no more realistic than calling him an owl (157). Thinking of oneself as an enterprise is equally ridiculous. And yet, "the new figure of the subject effects an unprecedented unification of the plural forms of subjectivity that liberal democracy allowed to survive and which from time to time it knew how to exploit…"[17].

Rather than interpreting this as the destruction of the symbolic, I think these theories describe a society in which the dark spaces of the imaginary and the private are fused prematurely with a specific, ideological symbolization. This reflects the fact that the body and its energies are articulated to public structures (work, communication) in new ways, made possible by information machines.

Suspension in Virtual Time

The issue, then, is not so much the instrumentalisation of the symbolic as the level on which this instrumentalisation occurs (after all, capitalist instrumentalism has a long history of 'reaching through' apparently autonomous symbolically structured environments). We seem to be in a situation where the work of the radical imaginary merely subserves the congealed version of reality produced by established processes. This has implications for time: we are suspended between real (objective and imaginary) time and true time. This is the situation described by Castells:

"In the industrial society, which was organized around the idea of progress and the development of productive forces, *becoming* structured *being*; time conformed space. In the network society, the space of flows dissolves time by disordering the sequence of events and making them simultaneous in the communications networks, thus installing society in structural ephemerality: *being* cancels *becoming*." (35)

This has implications for politics. Suspended as we are in this viscous present, we cannot envisage a future that is radically different. The only change we can allow ourselves to want is the change that is necessitated.

Hence our political elites constantly describe themselves as 'modernizing reformers' and insist that their power rests on their capacity to take the hard decisions that have to be taken. He writes of an, "…assimiliation, strange when one thinks about it, between *volition* and *necessity*, which is often associated with totalitarian regimes invoking a determinist philosophy of history" (130). If modernizing decisions are necessary then obviously we do not need strong leaders to take them: we may as well elect pieces of fruit, or owls.

It is in this context that Steiner fears we are losing the future tense: "Future tenses are an idiom of the messianic. Take away energizing anticipation, the imperative of waiting and these tenses will be end-stopped… Grammars of nihilism flicker on the horizon."[18]

The reasons for this change are obviously complex but language, information and the relationship between them are deeply implicated. The interface of the imaginary and the symbolic has been displaced, moved deeper into the interior of the subject. We lose sight of the importance of this when we confuse language with a code. A code is defined by being translatable, without loss of content, into another code. But language is involved in a brush with the ineffable; it is mediated through the human, the imaginary and the private. It is able to be more precise than any informational system when it comes to specifying human truth because, like our ability to think the future, it is integral to the production of that truth.

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SECTION I
History, Geography, Science

CALVINISM AS A GLOBAL INFLUENCE

Chair
—
Wayne Cristaudo

Participants
—
Wayne Cristaudo
Gesine Palmer

Presentation

Wayne Cristaudo

Few figures have had a greater impact in the formation of modern social habits, values and institutions than John Calvin. The Calvinist ethic and aesthetic as well as the Calvinist approach to public office and the meaning of society and the state all moved in a very different direction to Catholic and even Lutheran based societies. Indeed, although a second generation reformer, the enormity of Calvin's influence upon social and political institutions was far greater than Luther's. While he was not responsible for the revival of republican politics, he and his followers provided a theological ethic in which individual initiative and industriousness and communal responsibility worked hand in hand with republican institutions. The power and appeal of Calvinism in the 16th and 17th centuries is thoroughly conspicuous in the political success it so swiftly achieved, just as it can be gauged by the spread of liberty and commercial growth that followed wherever a Calvinist ethos took hold of a state, as it did in Holland, Great Britain and what would become the United States of America. The influence of Calvin's ethics and politics was matched by his view of aesthetics in which the representation of the sacred gave way to the simple activities and vocations of everyday life. Calvin, in other words, radically transformed how people interacted with God, each other, and with the world, as well as how they looked at it.

Of course, no movement is ever pure, and the evolution of an organic set of ideas involves adaptation and modification and metamorphosis. In the United States that metamorphosis has now advanced so far as to drop the biblical grounding itself upon which Calvinist ethics, aesthetics, and politics evolved. What remains, though, is a cluster of Calvinist forms such as church state separation and legalistic moralism, public transparency, public demands of moral accountability and purity of principle in speech as well as deed, public shaming and apology, faith in manifest destiny, an aesthetic of the anti-ostentatious, and an ethics that balances following one's calling, putting wealth to use and being motivated by inner faith and purity of soul. One might add more generally that as one scratches the secular surface of the enlightenment one will find a hidden layer of Calvinist influence.

The interest then in the papers on this panel were not so much in Calvin's thought as a self-contained theological system, but as a cluster of elements and emphases that originated in a theological narrative, but which have now shed their more overt theological trappings whilst remaining active powers in the world.

The two papers included in this section emphasize somewhat different aspects of Calvin's influence. The paper by Wayne Cristaudo focusses more upon the United States as a Calvinist creation and as a global mouthpiece for its own Calvinist sub-conscious; the paper by Gesine Palmer explores the enduring relevance of its universalism whilst also drawing attention to some of the grosser and more narcissistic residues in its doctrine of election. Palmer's paper also make important comparisons between the theocratic components of Calvin's Geneva and what contemporary Islamists are undertaking in their contemporary 'reformation.'

This panel is a forum for those interested in theo-politics and Calvinism as a social and political phenomenon which evolves far beyond the immediate theological doctrines and disputes, which tend to preoccupy the more standard theological explorations of Calvinism.

The Calvinist Roots of Pluralism in the United States

Wayne Cristaudo

Abstract

The United States' view of itself in the world and the emphasis it places upon religious tolerance and social pluralism in the political process owes much to its Calvinist founders, and the Calvinist ethic and aesthetic. While Calvin himself provided a particular view of governance that made a fundamental distinction between Church and state, it was the particular features of what would become the United States of America combined with the experiences of persecution that the Calvinists brought with them that facilitated political pluralism in North America. The Calvinist solution to the potential conflict of demanding 'civility' between 'thick' communities has also contributed to a more modern kind of community – communities of identity. These are generally more in tune with the forces of modernisation than the traditional values and loyalties of older style 'thick' communities. Thus it is that, in the main, the legacy of Calvinism been very successful for controlling political conflict in the United States. There is, however, no reason why it will work with peoples whose history and circumstances has not led to shared political 'surfaces.'

Keywords

Calvinism, John Calvin, Pluralism, United States of America, Calvinist Ethic, Calvinist Aesthetic.

Since its founding what we now know as the United States of America has been conscious of God's favour in its victories.[1] It had been chosen to play a providential role in His plan so that, as John Winthrop put it, 'the eies of all people are uppon us' (sic).[2]It had, as John O'Sullivan would write more than two centuries later in the July–August 1845 issue of the *Democratic Review* 'a manifest destiny.' This faith in the United States' providential purpose has continued to exist even though its courts forbid prayer in public schools and its public culture is a secular one that demands tolerance of different faiths.

The persistence that the United States of America is 'special' is as evident in the more expansionist moments of US public policy, as under the Bush regime, as in the more isolationist moments as under Obama.[3] It is no less evident in the liberal academic conscience which is ashamed of the industrial-military complex, and which argues from a hegemonic platform of

global higher education for a world in which tolerance, respect and equality triumphs politically, as it is in the neoconservatives who thought it possible to transpose liberal democratic systems to the Middle East.

After the last World War hegemonic opportunities for the United States were as much cultural and ideational as commercial and military. Behind that hegemony was a mind-set that reflected the unique history of the United States' Calvinist founding and, the role that founding would have in its subsequent development. Perhaps the most important of its legacies was in its public tolerance towards other faiths. Thus it has managed to preserve a Christian 'popular culture' alongside an Enlightened public one (somewhat to the dismay of educated Europeans), which is visible in its popular music, movies, everyday speech, and its currency, with 'In God we trust' appearing of dollar bills. Thus, unlike in France and Europe where liberal and later socialist forces were resolutely anti-Christian, the mind set of North Americans remains a faith driven one. Again this is completely conspicuous in the self-belief and faith in redemption/ happy endings that is intrinsic to the North American mythology. That this would all develop alongside the slaughter of Indians and the institution of slavery is an irony that could be seen as the shadow side of the presumption in being God's elect.

The most famous case made for Calvin's historical influence upon modernity is still Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. While the thesis that capitalism is born out of Calvinism has been subject to numerous critiques, it is difficult to dispute that mass literacy and the importance ascribed to time measurement in Protestant areas confirm the link Weber makes between Protestantism and economic growth.[4] On the more general point of growth and economic growth David Landes has observed that:

> the records show that Protestant merchants and manufacturers played a leading role in trade, banking and industry. In manufacturing centres (*fabriques*) in France and western Germany, Protestants were typically the employers, Catholics the employed. In Switzerland, the Protestant cantons were the centre of export manufacturing industry (watches, machinery, textiles); the Catholic ones were primarily agricultural. In England, which by the end of the sixteenth century was overwhelmingly Protestant, the Dissenters (read Calvinists) were disproportionately active and influential in the factories and forges of the nascent Industrial revolution.[5]

It is not just commercial growth that followed in the wake of Calvinism, so did political freedom. In his *Lectures on Calvinism*, the great Dutch politician Abraham Kuyper would point out that,

> even after the lapse of three centuries, in all distinctively Roman Catholic countries, even in the South American Republics, the Roman Catholic church is and remains the State Church, precisely as does the Lutheran Church in Lutheran countries. And the free churches have exclusively flourished in those countries which were touched by the breath of Calvinism, *i.e.,* in Switzerland, the Netherlands, England, Scotland, and the United States of North America.[6]

Indeed, although the case has been famously made by J.G.A. Pocock for Machiavelli and the Italian city states in the role of modern republicanism,[7] the spirit of community that came with the depth and commitment to a common faith and the great importance of education within the faithful is the real dividing line between the tightly knit communitarian republicanism of the Calvinists and the more violent pre-modern Roman based republicanism advanced by Machiavelli. In this respect, one might say that Weber's thesis has to be tempered by acknowledging the solidarity of members of the spiritual community that is essential to Calvin and which is not, in Calvin, to be sacrificed solely for profit.[8]

The other aspect of the Calvinist impact upon the spread of political freedom that cannot be underestimated is the persecution that Calvinists suffered. For English Calvinists, Elizabeth's Act of Uniformity of 1558 was a brutal reminder of how out of favour they were for older monarchical systems of authority – and Calvin's writings indicate that monarchy was little more than tyranny. This was not to say that Calvinists were *ipso facto* tolerant – Calvin's role in the burning of Michael Servetus in Geneva for heresy alone suffices to refute that. But over time the Calvinist would play a decisive role in creating a more tolerant public sphere, most particularly in what would become the United States of America. The reasons for this were as much circumstantial, particularly sociological and geographical. For the pilgrims and their successors had no domineering alternative faiths with their accompanying social and political bulwarks to contend with. The new arrivals to the colonies could live among the like-minded. That is to say, North America was pluralist in deed, by default so to speak, in a manner that confirms Montesquieu's thesis about the role of geography in shaping a na-

tion. Thus too when religious division forced 'excommunication,' as in the case of Anne Hutchinson for her anti-nomianism, one could flee and find refuge elsewhere. The locus of faith had already been shifted by Luther, whom Calvin followed in this matter, to the conscience. But it was in North America, originally thanks to Roger Williams' 'royal charter' for the colony of Rhode Island, that freedom of conscience was extended so that it would mean genuine political tolerance extended to all.[9] In his Bloody Tenants of Persecution of 1644, Williams listed twelve central arguments. I will just mention numbers 1, 8 and 12, as they provide the essence of his rationale:

> That the blood of so many hundred thousand souls of protestants and papists, spilt in the wars of present and former ages, for their respective consciences, is not required nor accepted by Jesus Christ the Prince of Peace…God requireth not an uniformity of religion to be enacted and enforced in any civil state; which enforced uniformity, sooner or later, is the greatest occasion of civil war, ravishing of conscience, persecution of Christ Jesus in his servants, and of the hypocrisy and destruction of millions of souls….Lastly, true civility and Christianity may both flourish in a state or kingdom, notwithstanding the permission of divers and contrary consciences, either of Jew or Gentile[10]

That the North American settlers were willing to embrace this pluralistic culture was every-bit as important as Williams' 'charter' in the formation of a pluralist society. This pluralism was also nourished by Calvinism in two fundamental ways: ethically and aesthetically. And it would be this underlying ethic and aesthetic that would ultimately facilitate a Calvinism or Puritanism of *form* or *style*, as opposed to a Calvinism of *content*.

The Calvinist aesthetic can be summed up in one word: simplicity; the ethic in another: purity. Aesthetics and Ethics are, of course, branches of philosophy, which is to say they are 'Greek' ways of classifying experience. The Calvinist aesthetic and ethic, by contrast, exist in their relationship to religious faith, most specifically faith that God's commands tower over everything. Our place in the world is built around responding to what God wants from us. And what God wants is undistracted service. From the Calvinist point of view everything that gets in the way is of the devil. Distractions of eye and ear, false iconic depictions of God's majesty, for the Calvinist, may gratify the whore of Rome but not God, nor our immortal souls; Catholic art, for the Calvinist, typifies how

remote this faith is from God's will. The whitewashed unadorned wall, plain and simple clothing, the song that has no musical accompaniment are the real expressions of the Holy Spirit. The bible, with its stories of everyday life, with its simple message of humility and devotion, the plain style of its narrative, the Son of God who is, in so many ways, the antithesis of any classical hero, who dies the most degrading of death is the antithesis of the classical rendering of sublimity.[11] Unlike in Europe, where the Calvinist aesthetic was a reactive one, America did not offer a fully formed anti-Calvinist aesthetic against which it had to find a place. On the contrary simplicity and everyday life was its original (non-indigenous) aesthetic. It was an aesthetic that knew nothing of rank except, if we may use the term, spiritual rank - and spiritual rank (i.e. as one of the elect) was what all Calvinists prayed for.

Calvinist ethics and the Calvinist view of politics stand in the closest relationship to each other. Both ethics and politics remain merely pagan without salvation. The ethical dimension in Calvinism is necessarily one of individuation; the soul responding to the call from God to play its role in His divine plan. God knows exactly what He is doing – the elect are part of that plan.[12] For the Calvinist to be worthy of election means living completely by faith. This also involves us participating in associations which strengthen our faith: thus dedicating our lives to understanding and living by God's command. Yet we must also live among those who God knows are damned. And Calvin's politics is driven by that 'reality.' Calvin's Augustinianism is deep and perhaps most conspicuous in his view of politics as, at best being, illuminated by the community of the faithful, but having to deal with the more earthly entanglements of social and political life. The rigorous separation of Church and State is above all one of function. Without the 'ethos' or 'culture' of the right faith, human association would be just as it is and was for pagans. The state thus needs to protect the community of the faithful, while maintaining peace and order. Thus, for Calvin, civil government 'has as its appointed end, so long as we live among men, to cherish and protect the outward worship of God, sound doctrine of piety and the position of the church, to adjust our life to the society of men, to form our social behaviour to civil righteousness, to reconcile us with one another, and to promote general peace and tranquillity.'[13] It is thus not off the mark to say, as Harro Höpfl does, that for Calvin 'the Christian polity is an educational enterprise.'[14]

The Puritans and the new environment in which they operated were able to take this ethics and politics far further than any European. Having themselves been the victims of political persecution, and finding themselves in a new environment of North America where pluralism of faith was a possibility that simply was not genuinely feasible in the Old World, plagued, as it was, by bitter memories, and existential investments where the economic, the social, the political and religious lines of demarcation were bogged in history. In sum, in the New World the Puritans could afford to be tolerant of those for whom election had not been granted. Indeed, to simply embark once again in religious wars whilst also fighting off the 'Indian' made little sense in the New World.

In his brilliant book *No Offence* and building on the sociological insights of Weber, Parsons, Bellah and others, John Cuddihy crystalizes the process and unintended telos of Calvinism in the United States of America as being the transformation from what he calls 'a religion of civility' to a 'civil religion.' For Cuddihy, the religious tolerance that evolved in North America under the broad civic umbrella of Unitarianized Calvinism, led to the creation of a 'thin' civic community of the surface, in which difference between groups was politically protected. The thin civic community existed in parallel to the thicker 'warm, dense closeness of "real solidarity" of traditional communities. What evolved within 'Anglo-American culture', says Cuddihy, is 'a solidarity of the surface, and solidarity for the interim.'[15] These thin communities of the surface were 'held' together by manners, and, that most Calvinist of political words, 'civility'. What groups believed within their own community was their concern – what mattered was how they behaved on the outside, on the surface. Respect towards other communities was essential for holding the social fabric together, though respect did not mean real engagement and shared enthusiasms. Primarily, it meant not causing offence; each group maintained is its own absolutes – but only on the 'inside' or below the surface.

As the times have changed, so have the absolutes to be respected, and even what counts as a community. They include ones that Calvin himself found abominable – communities based on same sex relationships, for example. Moreover, the collision between the social modes favoured by modernization and traditional communities also enforce 'thinner' types of community, and appeals such as the 'rights' of particular/ thin more abstract communities – the gay community, the African American community, the indigenous commu-

nity, the queer community, women etc. In this respect, it is also true that the mores of civility are not intrinsic to bourgeois society, which also draws upon Unitarianized Calvinism. It is also fair to say that with the exception of the Civil War, where the absolutes could not be kept from the surface, the 'strategy' – or 'providential' socio-political solution – of political pluralism, of the sort identified here, has been extremely successful in the United States.

At the end of the Second World War, with Europe at its weakest, and Asia lacking in geo-political power, the United States found itself in a position where its destiny as a global leader was, to all intents and purposes, clearly manifest – the only other contender was atheistic and communist and showed every sign of belonging to the damned. Quite naturally, in its plans for rebuilding those parts of the world within its sphere of influence, the United States appealed to the values and institutions that that had helped its own transition to modernity. Moreover, its comparative success compared to everywhere else – so it seemed – was due not only to its economic drive but its spiritual core. In fact, it is not too far off the mark to say that the only spiritual core that the United States has, as a whole, is to be found in its public institutions and the narratives of legitimacy which sustain them. But those narratives bear little reality to the lives of so many Americans that it is not misleading to call that core mythic. In this respect, the public persona of America reflects a deep feature of Calvinism itself: Calvinism can only ever provide momentary occasions and locations of 'purity,' but it approaches the world in such a manner that the world itself cannot puncture this faith in its own rectitude. That is what being of the elect requires.

The United States stood before a world in ruins and held out a promise – as it still does – that it knows the way to salvation. What, however, it rarely considers is that other peoples and nations have had vastly different trajectories and do not share the same visions and appeals for making their worlds. And thus the appeal to such 'thin' solutions as rights and mutuality of respect often has little appeal.

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Endnotes

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7. J.G.A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton: Princeton University press, 1976).
8. To use anachronistic political terms – if Weber's thesis points to a right wing Calvinism, others such as Michael Walzer, Sheldon Wolin, and Roland Boer emphasize a Calvin of the 'left'. See Michael Walzer, *The Revolution of the Saints: A Study in the Origins of Radical Politics*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1982) and Sheldon Wolin, *Politics and Vision*, chapter 6, and Roland Boer, *Political Grace: The Revolutionary Theology of John Calvin*, (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster, John Knox, 2009). By way of reconciling these 'sides', John McNeill makes the following point: 'Certainly the bourgeois heresy of wealth as a mark of divine approval entered into later Calvinism, though always under the restraints of insistence upon charity and service. It may have broken in during the era of Puritan individualism, with the triumph of the independents and the growth of foreign trading interests.' John T. McNeill, *The History and Character of Calvinism*, (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 1954), p. 419.
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Calvin and the Pursuit of Universal Ethical Principles

Gesine Palmer

Abstract

In his well-known work on Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism, Max Weber described the building of an "iron cage" of discipline and internalized virtues. The essay compares Calvin's rule in Geneva to the rigid rule of Islamist organizations in Middle Eastern cities. There are some common features concerning the attractiveness of strict rule in times of crisis and upheaval – but in the end, the individualization and universalization of the idea of election create the substantial difference.

Keywords

Calvinism, John Calvin, Pluralism, United States of America, Calvinist Ethic, Calvinist Aesthetic.

A Choice Between Universalism and Particularism?

> The knowing man is blind in no man's cause, but best sighted in his own. He confines himself to the circle of his own affairs, and thrusts not his fingers in needless fires … He sees the falseness of the world and therefore learns to trust himself ever, others so far, as not to be damaged by their disappointment[1]

Individualism has become somewhat old fashioned lately. Global changes and permanent war have rendered the words *unifying* and *connecting* as well as *identifying* and *belonging* desirable. While classical modern theory had the individual and the universal as its primary relationship – postmodern theory laid more stress on the particular groups, historicized the universal, and exposed the autonomous individual as a sad scheme. In this context, Calvin represents an out-dated role model of white male Protestant leadership: the first of a series of miserable figures, who are emotionally poor like the Scrooge in Charles Dickens' Christmas Carol.

Beginning with Max Weber's well-known work *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Calvinism is generally identified as a specific ethos concerned with economic expansion and cool rationalism that conquered the world by industrious labour, constant asceticism and imperial aggression.

According to its own self-definition, however, the Protestant Calvinist spirit is rather concerned with universal ethical principles – the same principles in whose name this spirit is being criticised. When post-colonial theories doubted this focus and reduced even universalism itself to its supposedly particular Protestant roots and capitalist subtexts, *confessing* Calvinists didn't have to be bothered that much: they still could accept their ideas as *their* confession. It was their *particular* drive to mission rather than a universal truth. Had it ever been different? Their *secular* and educated heirs were much more afflicted by the philosophical loss of universal pretentions to truth. As defenders of universalist ethics, they found themselves in a state of permanent self criticism and self-defence. As far as cultural theory is concerned, the West is no longer the best, and an end of Western apologies is not in sight.

In spite of all cultural relativism and self-criticism, however, some specific Calvinist elements of cultural life-style, went global – they remained untouched by regional, political or religious differences. These elements concern Calvinist ideas of personal development. What Weber called "methodische Lebensführung" has been secularized, as has the notion of the "internalization of moral values", individual responsibility for success or failure, and a preoccupation with disciplining, designing, coaching, planning, and bringing every single aspect of one's life to perfection. While the very idea of human rights is drawn into doubt in the name of cultural relativism, a universal "tic of total training" has become ubiquitous. The sign "I am the sum total of my training" seems to be written on the foreheads of the successful individual. The striving for togetherness, one-ness, and we-ness is no exception. It has become an internalized individual virtue in the first place. If someone seems to have shortcomings in this realm, we need to redesign this "deficient" person – not her group.

There are strong arguments that there should be *more* universalism when it comes to human rights, and *less* universalism when it comes to individual perfection. But human rights and the search for perfection both demand a certain degree of individualization and universality. However, while an ethics of human rights evolves out of the consciousness that is formed by relationships with other people, individual perfection and absolute motivation reduce the individual by "shaping" it – and so increase its vulnerability for totalitarian ideologies. If perfect motivation is all – you can be perfect also as a useful instrument to any ideology soever. Which of these two directions the interpretation of Calvinist tradition takes depends a great deal on how one understands the problem of choice.

Childhood of the Chosen One

> Calvinism with its dark perspective on life had, however, no good effect, on the development of fine arts. The famous paintings of the Netherlands during the 17th century, reaching their peak in the work of Rembrandt (1607-1669), cannot be ascribed to Calvinism, although it is strangely Protestant in character.[2]

The Calvinist attitude towards the perfectable individual goes further. What has been described by Weber as the "iron cage" of virtues, rationalism and "inner-worldly" asceticism illustrates a stringent attitude towards human desires, happiness and beauty. At the same time marshals these qualities into productive economic powers. Still, the most liberal attitudes in favour of the human soul's unfolding as an individual *with* desires, *with* a certain fondness for the arts, and *with* the the capacity to pursue happiness, have developed exactly in those parts of the world, in which Calvinism has had a great social impact.

One of Paul Klee's darker paintings from 1930 bears the title "Childhood of the Chosen One". A child in a yellow shirt steps almost out of the picture, leaving behind a sky, which is dominated by a hexagram in blue, walking with reddish feet on an earth that is dominated by a moulded swastika inside a womblike structure in muddy red. To think of the blue figure as symbolizing (a fatherly) Judaism, the red figure as symbolizing (a motherly) Catholicism and the yellow figure the Protestant movement does not seem far-fetched.

That there is a chosen *one* can only support the allegory. From the Bible (which has the problem of fatherly choice beginning with the story of Cain and Abel) to the present age, the very idea of election has always been haunted by the thought of *another* who has *not* been chosen (if there was a *choice* at all). Judaism represses the problem by making election a given for this one people and projecting the fear of not being elected into the outer world. Catholic Christianity denies the very notion of election by claiming that virtually everybody is chosen through the divine sacrifice (whose protagonist had been chosen once and for all). Calvinism re-establishes the sublime feeling of being chosen in the individual – and as its flipside, the permanent fear that this might turn out to be an error. The tension between these two states of mind, the elevated feeling of being chosen, and the humiliating fear of being destined to hell and disbelief from the very beginning, presupposes a *hidden choice* on the part of the Al-

mighty – and is supposed to be the lasting effect of the Calvinist belief on the mind of the individual believer. Caught between two extreme poles, man can only find a way out into the realm of industrious labour, in order not to allow for the suspicion that he might be destined to be an *un*chosen one. The rivalry of religions has become a tension in the inner self of the believer. The bright yellow of the chosen one is always in danger of being but a matter of a shirt.

The Strange Attractiveness of Strictness

> To lead an awakened, conscious, bright life was, other than some popular ideas have it, the goal – the erasing of naturalness concerning carnal pleasures the most urgent task - , and to bring order into the life-style of those who were dedicated to it, the most important means of asceticism.[3]

The German church historian, Karl Heussi, wrote about the new style in Geneva (the cradle of Calvinism) under Calvin's rule:

> The elders supervised the discipline (Kirchenzucht) typical for Calvin's church, meaning, they took hold of the entire everyday life of the community (they had the right to enter every house without invitation or announcement) and tried to sanction every little speck of religious or moral misbehaviour as well as civilian trespassing by spiritual punishment (public blaming, penance, public repentance in front of the community, excommunication); if these sanctions didn't work, the elders (who were at the same time members of the civil government) could apply for worldly sanctions (burning for crimes against divine truth and high treason; execution for blasphemy, disrespect against the parents, adultery and fornication; absence from Sunday services, gambling, dancing, carnival, attending of bars were severely punished).[4]

These descriptions resemble strikingly the situation in any of those cities that have come under Islamist rule during the last decades. There seems to be only one small difference: In Calvin's city, it was not exclusively the female body which scandalized and thus needed to be covered, but rather all displays of carnal pleasure between men and women had to be concealed. Besides this first presupposition of universalism, the similarities are substantial: Not only did Calvin intro-

duce an iron rule of religious zeal and real asceticism, as do the Islamist leaders of our times, he also shared the strange dissatisfaction of present religious leaders with comparatively "developed" stages of civilization and diversification in their own cultures.

Like present "fundamentalist" elites who spew out their contempt for decadent Western behaviour, whose opportunities they nevertheless enjoyed in their education, John Calvin had himself received higher education in the then modern humanist style. He was successful at that and planned to go forward in an academic career. At a certain point of his life, however, he found fit to *break* with humanism and to establish a much more radical idea of God almighty – whose most important attribute is his supreme power. You believe it – or you don't. But if you believe it, the basic elements are clear: God is the creator – and man, his creature, is nothing. The world serves God in order to express his glory. And he who refuses to offer his life in service of this supreme God, is a sinner.

The scholar who does not believe in a sudden revelation that made people change their ways and try to put not only themselves but all others in the service of their respective God, remains unadvised. How can a person who declaredly breaks with humanism in order to put God at the center of his world view, be at the same time the founding father of a movement that prepared the grounds – in spite of all the despotic and theocratic rigidness in its beginning – for modern democracies?

The collapse of mediating structures and its consequences appears to be an important clue. The "civil" interpretation of a rigid command uses the latter as a stumbling block, stimulating more or less smart and beautiful ways of circumvention. Only if these become too complex for a driven mind *and* a larger social group, can the "fundamentalist" interpretation of the command gain broad support. The heads of the reformation movement took the commands seriously. And, like in present Islamist societies, it was the bourgeois class in Geneva that resisted. In their view, Calvin and the Reformation blurred the important distinctions between lay-people, priests and monks, demanding that each and every Christian had to be a monk[5]. Calvin won the fight and made Geneva the central post for the spread of Calvinist reformation all over Europe.

What does this teach us for the understanding of radical religious movements in our time? Are we to face similar phenomena, this time under Islamist rule? Islamism in the Middle East is perceived as a kind of reformation. What has been left behind

by colonialism, post-colonialism, or local elites corrupted by "Western life-style" and luxury is experienced as "chaos" and "sin". Religious zealots and rebels in Islamist states proceed in a manner that looks very similar to early Calvinist societies. They elevate the highest God – and order everything around his service. The first thing they do, wherever they get hold of a region, is to establish a severe control over the life-style of people. No more escapes, no more little "sins", let alone greater "sins". No so-called licentiousness in the streets, no mercy with apostates. In exchange for these restraints, they mobilize people to constantly exercise an ascetic control over outbreaks of spontaneous "affection". For the same reasons Pentecostal Protestants today outnumber Catholics in Latin America. Had Weber seen them or the Islamists, he probably wouldn't have believed his eyes. But obviously the promise of internalization works beyond the borders between different religious traditions. Especially when outward circumstances do not present much hope and the institutions of diverse and complex societies appear to be dysfunctional for a critical mass of individuals, recommendations like "if you cannot change the world, change your inner person" gain attention. Sounds familiar?

Indeed. The coach next door will tell you this without any need to invoke any religion. The Salafist preacher will tell you the same: just that with him, Allah is the one who demands control over your inner self. Are there other substantial differences?

Sacrificing, Individualization, and the Doctrine of Election

> The end of sacrifices turned out to only have been an internalization of sacrifice. In the tyrannical self-control of the cleansed consciousness the compulsive power of sacrificing ruled on, and all the more so as it was unconscious.[6]

As a matter of fact, there are common features in all more or less fun-damentalist religious movements. But there is a difference that finally brings us to the title of this paper. Were it not for the *universalistic* substance of its very notion of election, the Calvinist reformation might have taken a similar path as the current Islamist reform – which, at least in terms of *our* morals, looks like a failure .

Bloody conflicts do *not* make the difference. They occurred in any case and, with their traumatizing effects, they added to the peoples desire to take control of their inner selves and their immediate surroundings. Blood

sacrifices that had long since been replaced by more complex forms of social order return as the master remedy for the fright and terror suffered by insecurity and significant losses. Its logic being: "If already I seem to be destined to suffer the violent death of my loved ones or my own, I at least will be the one, who makes sense of it. I will *incite* death by myself, and for a *cause*."

We need to fight this. But we better understand it. Because, at the bottom of this logic, its principle is a desire and a failed attempt to create an *alternative* to (self-)sacrifice. Already the most primitive forms of sacrifice were intended to initiate cultural work that tried to *reduce* the violence and – hence – to take the grand object, the God, who supposedly *enjoys* sacrifices, a little less seriously, or to make him appear less severe. As the trauma recedes, social structures are relaxed. Catholicism with its circumstantial inventions of double grounds and double standards seems to have been one possible way for quite a large amount of people for quite a long time. It offers a developed civilization, able to nurture or absorb several conflicting structures in its great womb. Lutheran or Anglican Protestantisms left some of its ritual and mediating aspects intact, and Humanism certainly produced the keenest avant-garde inside and outside the several churches when it came to diminishing God's power and rendering him more gracious. Calvinism took another way, not only due to its founder, but also due to its subsequent development. Still, it became seminal for a culture of hitherto unknown individual freedom and perspective by *universalizing* and *individualizing* the very doctrine of *election*.

How was this possible? Calvin took *choice* seriously. God gives his command, which is to be strictly obeyed with inward conviction. Whether man *can* be obedient at all, however, is *out* of his hands. It is destined in advance by the almighty whose ways are unknown to humankind. Consequently, literally *nothing* can be done by anyone to please almighty God. All the rites and measures people invented all over the world in order to achieve forgiveness for their sins or earn themselves a place in heaven in the afterlife were devaluated as being mere superstition. Even funeral rites were suspected to be superstitious measures and idle actions – Calvin himself was buried without even a gravestone reminding others of his earthly presence. The state of the elect is to be strived for, but it is strictly forbidden to

enjoy it. Man has to "erase" all the "ego" in himself – and put everything into the service of God. Then, he *can* experience his own election as a kind of servant or instrument of special value to God and engage in helping others to become good soldiers in the army of the Lord. Belief acknowledges the nothingness of the individual in its entirety, even inasmuch as "group-interest" could be part of it. This last step gives real strength to the ideal believer, who now easily suffers everything and obeys God's commandment in bliss and catastrophe alike.

The enormous economic and strategic productivity, especially in the US, where Puritan immigrants built the most powerful communities, might be explained that way. It was founded almost solely on individual power and very small communities. Here we also have the context of the fight against slavery. Its pioneers suffered bravely for its elimination. As Ulrike Brunotte writes: "The hero of the expanding markets was the active and free individual that faced unlimited outward and inner choices." She wonders how political reforms could be initiated when there was no representative institution and no real powerful political body – and finds the answer in the "abstract moral rigor of the abolitionist movement. In the secularized, but deeply Puritan society whose self consciousness was built on the assumption of full-fledged autonomy of its individuals, the very existence of slavery hit every single individual as their personal guilt." [7]

We might query whether internalization and abstraction led to individual engagement for the op-pressed. Yet it happened in Calvinist Protestantism. A universalist understanding of election can, however, be translated into other religious and philosophical contexts.

The impulse to resist an unjust or even murderous action is the expression of the highest readiness to take respect towards the universality of humankind personally – and hence to make protection of *every* individual a matter of personal engagement. It can be understood as the deepest bond with humankind that an individual can possibly achieve. It can become an individual stigma or a matter of personal rancour wherever a larger group of humans is acting collectively against another group or *one* excluded member of the group. A single person resisting a group whose collective identity is founded on human sacrifice runs the risk of becoming the next victim. Still, this very person is – in a given context – the only one who is

prepared to take responsibility for freedom seriously and act, even in isolation, on behalf of the universality of the human being. Resistance of this type depends on the readiness of the single person in question to separate entirely from the peer group, if necessary, and to rely on nothing but her or his personal judgement and consciousness alone.

Throughout the history of mankind this experience is at the core of the enduring truth (wether secular or religious) of any ethical notion of election. Its focus, however, is no longer on sacrificing or erasing the inner desire for anything for its own sake or for a grand object named God – its focus is the foundational common ground of every human society deserving that name.

Calvinism helped to discover this meaning of election. Hence it has a share in the pursuit of universal ethical goals.

Compared to this achievement, the more vulgar aspects of internalization and development can be neglected as remnants of a multi-faced religious machine of "purification" running empty and deserving no more respect than other desires for a little order in everyday-life.

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Endnotes

1. *Works of the English Puritan Divines,* 10 Bde., London 1845-1847, L. Bayly, Praxis Pietatis, cf. Max Weber, *Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus,* Vol. 1, Gütersloh, ^{6}1981, 198f (note 26).
2. Karl Heussi, *Kompendium der Kirchengeschichte,* ^{11}Berlin 1958, 326 (Translation GP).
3. Max Weber, *Die protestantische Ethik,* 135f (Translation GP).
4. Karl Heussi, *Kirchengeschichte,* 325 (Translation GP).
5. Max Weber, *Die protestantische Ethik,* 137.
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SECTION I
History, Geography, Science

WHAT IDENTITY? THE ABOLITION OF BORDERS FROM THE TRADITIONAL VILLAGE TO THE POSTMODERN ONE

Chair

—

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Presentation

Theodor Damian

In this workshop we explored several fundamental aspects that distinguish our world today and the world of tomorrow from what it used to be in terms of values and identity, shift of paradigms, village community and cosmopolitan community (pre-modern - modern - postmodern approaches), to the creation and definition of a worldview, all these applied not only to strict geographic European contexts, but also to other areas influenced by and tributary to European philosophies and practices.

One major issue analyzed here is that of identity, personal and collective. Is identity static or dynamic or both? How do those two aspects interact? What is the meaning, the role of borders in this context?

The metaphysical dimension of personal identity is not disconnected from the collective identity of groups, in particular minorities who, as a result of migration, find themselves in cultures sometimes very different from theirs, as one finds in both real life and literature.

On the other hand the technological advances in our society and its rapid changes impact one's identity in terms of one's need to constantly adapt to these changes by learning new skills and values as necessary tools for survival.

Finally, the issue of identity and borders has major political implications, in particular in relations between countries where mixed populations live in the same territory, usually around borders.

The presentations are using interdisciplinary approaches and offer critical explorations of new case studies that indicate present and future trends in anything that is European or has to do with Europe.

Teaching Reloaded

How Can Meaning and Transcendence Help Us Reassess Who We Are?

Theodor Damian

Abstract

While teaching is about changing the self and the world, it is important to clarify why such change is necessary by explaining that one of the major purposes in life is to achieve harmony between self and the world. If I am part of a system I have to be in harmony with it. A disorder in this relationship brings about suffering, while happiness is the elimination of suffering. Harmony also gives me a sense of belonging and that I am in the right position *coram mundo*. Then, if both I and the world are in motion, in continuous development, there is constant need for me to understand myself, to know myself, as Socrates exhorted, and the world, in order to become an agent of change while always in harmony with what is to be changed. Thus, the multiple types of borders between me and myself, within myself, and between me and the others and the world will slowly be turned into bridges that facilitate harmony, integration, communication, communion, unity.

Keywords

Teaching, Identity, Meaning, Transcendence, Self-assessment, God, Man, *imago dei*, Contemplation.

Preliminaries

The first question in this equation with four key concepts, teaching, meaning, transcendence and self, is related to the self, more precisely, to the question *Who Are We? Who Am I?* Then come meaning and transcendence, or transcendence and meaning, and finally how you teach these two in order to make them not only relevant to being, in general, but to who I am, in particular, to help one integrate these existential conditions or dimensions in one's understanding of oneself. How you understand yourself is crucial to the quality of your being, not only or not so much in the static sense of the term, like something *is* vs something *is not,* as in the dynamic sense of the term, which is *becoming*.

If we speak of the quality of life or quality of being, which, while not disconnected, are two distinct issues, several questions arise: How do we

distinguish between levels of quality, the issue of levels being implied in the term *becoming?* Is becoming the same thing as progression or development?

Is progression a kind of illusion where one falls into the pit facing it, yet without seeing the bottom, which means he or she thinks he is going forward, but actually is falling into the pit, as Emil Cioran would suggest in his book *The Fall into Time?*

What is forward and what is upward? What is illusion and what is reality? Is reality that what we see and is subject to change as Heraclitus is said to have postulated, or is reality what we don't see, the essence of things, while what we see and changes is the illusion of reality, as Parmenides would hold? Are Plato's understanding of the divine world of ideas and the hinduistic concept of *maya,* according to which what we see is the illusion while the reality is transcendent, a solid or necessary foundation for one to build a philosophy or a theology that would lead to a better understanding of *Who is Man?*

If there is a transcendental dimension of our life, what is it? What is its meaning? Why is it there and what are we supposed to do about it? Is transcendence the actual meaning of life, or is meaning something else, yet which leads to the transcendent?

When we teach, formally and informally, how do we do it so that we conscientize people about meaning and transcendence?

In what follows I will offer a few reflections on each element of the equation included in the title of this essay.

Who Is Man?

This is the big question which implies two major, serious aspects that one needs to address. One is ontological, about being in general and being in a certain way, in particular, and about becoming. The other is epistemological, about why I need to know who I am, about how I can know myself as the old adage, know thyself, exhorts and about how I know that I know.

In his book *Who is Man,* published in the sixties, Abraham Heschel asks the following question: "Is it not conceivable that our entire civilization is built upon a misinterpretation of man?"[1]

About fifty years later, Matthew B. Crawford problematizes the issue in a similar way: "How can I be sure that my knowledge of reality is knowledge?" he asks. And again: "How do we know some evil genius hasn't deceived us?"[2]

If we are immersed in speed, towards our own perdition, instead of ecstasy,[3] if we are becoming busier with every day, doing more on the surface or expanding on the horizontal in the detriment of the vertical, we swim at the surface, that is we live superficially, instead of also diving into the depths. That implies that we forget to inquire about meaning, we don't know how to practice meditation and contemplation, we don't care about transcendence. Then, the issue of *Who am I* becomes unattractive, unimportant and irrelevant. We stay outside because what we see there makes us feel more comfortable than what we see if we look inside.

As Heschel wrote, "outwardly *Homo sapiens* may pretend to be satisfied and strong; inwardly, he is poor, needy, vulnerable, always on the verge of misery".[4] It is ironic because normally it is the treasure that is expected to be found inside and not these weaknesses. Or maybe just because we are ignoring the treasure and the ways to cultivate it, the inside is becoming sick, and we suffer without even noticing, like when one dies of a painless illness.

The problem of man, in particular in our time, is that he is lacking models. Real models are *rara avis.* So, we adopt what is at hand. As children, we take our parents as models. Later we take teachers, heroes from books and movies, street models. Heschel is right to postulate that "what determines one's being is the image one adopts" (8).

Christian religion teaches that man is created in the image of God. So man's model should be God in as much as God chose to reveal Himself to man. Yet, man does not recognize God in his being and life. Man's image should be a mirror in which he should see not his own face, but God, the Face. As Shakespeare put it in a sonnet, we are not just beautiful, we are *too beautiful.* That beauty should make us think. We are too wonderful, and "one of the most embarrassing things in our life is that we are the greatest miracle on earth and we do not understand it" (113).

In our digital existence, without noticing, we take the image of the gadgets we are using. They consume our time and image and give us the mask. As image of the machine man goes towards reification of his life and consciousness.[5]

The machine profanates the image of man and that affects not only man himself, but also his relationship with others and with the world. Cioran puts it this way: "Man, who becomes profane, agent of dissolution, is always external or marginal to things; if he manages to insinuate himself within them, it is in the fashion of the worm in the fruit."[6]

In other words, as the same philosopher observes, the way man treats creation is a "criminal misdemeanor." He stands before it "as a self-proclaimed destructor"(42).

In many respects man in our world is like the man who killed God in Nietzsche's vision; man usurped God, and once he got in God's place didn't know what to do. In that case suicide appeared to be the solution. In the case of man in the real world, one solution seems to be an exit from self-centeredness, the generous embrace of the others and of the created order, or as Matthew B. Crawford writes, we need to learn to pay attention to something *else,* outside ourselves; paying attention will help us connect to the world "in a mood of appreciative discernment."[7] This is important because, as Heschel observed, "mankind will not die for lack of information, but it may perish for lack of appreciation."[8]

In other words, practices such as paying attention, meditation, prayer, and contemplation could help us get out of the ghetto of the self - even though one will never want to get out of the prison where one feels comfortable - to get out from our own captivity and see that there is beauty beyond ourselves which we have to start to appreciate and value.

It is by connecting oneself to the world that one contemplates in order to understand it that man has a chance not only to find his right place *coram mundo,* and implicitly *coram Deo,* but also to define himself in an adequate way.

The question of *Who is Man? Who Am I?* is meant to raise awareness about who we think we are and who we are in reality, about the direction in which we go, about our destiny and destination, about meaning and values, in other words about a healthy theory about man, an adequate anthropology. Such a theory is important because if "a theory about stars will never become part of the being of stars," one about man, "enters his consciousness, determines his self-understanding and modifies his very existence. The image of man affects the nature of man." (7)

A correct self-understanding has to do with finding the ultimate meaning in life. This meaning in turn is not about the multitude of things that we do daily, at once, of the type "texting-while-viewing-while-talking-while-eating,"[9] and so

on; it is about beyondness, about transcendence and how we make it part of our life, just like when the part suddenly realizes it is part of a whole and without the whole it cannot be what it is, a part.

This connection to the whole, to what transcends us, is teachable as it is subject to methodic guidance, just as when parents guide their children to discover every day new values in life, and implicitly, it is vital and has the power to transform us and gives us power to transform the world.

Meaning

As implied in the previous reflections, meaning comes from being connected to God who is all in all, and this connection is the result of overcoming a certain type of inner border, of overcoming separation and repatriating into the whole. Whatever is greater than yourself is a source of meaning, but greater implies mystery, that is to say, meaning comes to you from beyond as you explore it. This exploration needs courage. You go beyond yourself in stages, just like when advancing on any road. First you explore the neighborhood that you know, then you go farther to places you know less, and ultimately you adventure in the unknown in this incessant quest for greater or higher meaning.

When you go out of yourself you pay attention, you observe, you listen, just as when you are on uncharted territory and you want both to protect yourself and to learn, but also to find what you are looking for.

Since ultimate meaning comes from God, in your pilgrimage to Him you will meet and hear the discourse of others and then the discourse of creation. Hearing those discourses will help you understand and consequently to position yourself adequately in the midst of other people and in God's creation before you will move on to hear God's discourse. This is how you find a sense of belonging and meaning. According to Heschel, "the cry for meaning is the cry for ultimate relationship, for ultimate belonging."[10]

Listening to these discourses gives you the chance to use discernment to distinguish between superficial and essential, between false and authentic, and to move towards the essential and the authentic.

This is like moving from the periphery to the center, which implies overcoming borders.

Man was not created in the image of God in order to inhabit the periphery. Man was meant for the center. That is where his *locus* is. He chose to marginalize himself like the prodigal son. Yet his real home is the center, and that is where the meaning is.

To move from the margins to the center is a pilgrimage. The difference between a regular trip and a pilgrimage is like the difference between ordinary and extraordinary. What characterizes the pilgrimage is the target, which is sacred. The center is sacred because the center is God, and God is the ultimate relationship, the ultimate communion. In order to be prepared for this type of relationship one has to learn to exit one's self-centeredness and adequately connect with other people in an appreciative way. The relation with others has also a sacred dimension. That is why Victor Frankl believes that it is through the event of encountering that meaning comes to one's life.[11]

When living in excessive self-centeredness (to put it pleonastically, for deliberate emphasis) man thinks he is sure of himself and doubts everything else. Doubt may be good for critical thinking, but it is detrimental when applied to relationships with others and with God. Doubt isolates one in oneself.

Noticing how our world is and evolves determined Emil Cioran to affirm that "a civilization begins in myth and ends in doubt."[12]

This is part of what A. Heschel calls "the terrifying seriousness of the human situation."[13]

Remaining closed, hidden in the captivity of his self-centeredness opens the perspective that man will die alone in a life he never understood as he never understood himself. Loneliness is already a major psychological and sociological crisis in our society. Venturing out is the necessary thing. Yet even getting out, which is starting your pilgrimage, and not just an ordinary trip, needs guide and guidance, and this is where teaching comes into play. The teacher is the one who will remind the message to the messenger who has forgotten it (119). Forgetting the message is like going for nothing, like having forgotten the destination and going around with no target and direction. In such a case man looks like "a somnambulist who sees himself walking, who contemplates his movements without discerning their direction or their cause."[14]

That is what happens when one is in the false and not in the authentic, when one is at the periphery believing that he is at the center. In such an existential

confusion, as Cioran writes, "man accumulates unreality and delates himself in the false, in an irrational tendency to gigantism. What fling him into action are his debility and his inadaptability" (44-45).

This is meaninglessness.

In order to avoid living in such confusion and existential vacuum man needs to learn to stop often and ask the question: What is the meaning of this? Why am I doing this? He needs to stop the never ending busy multitasked work and pay attention, pray, meditate, concentrate, allow the transcendent to come to him, to replenish his soul; he needs to look for a guide while trying to discern between a real prophet and a false, self-proclaimed prophet, and place himself in the shoes of the servant of Empress Candace of Ethiopia who was looking for a teacher. When the apostle Phillip asked him if he understood what he was reading from the Holy Scriptures, he retorted: "How can I understand if I don't have a guide?"[15]

Transcendence

One way to understand transcendence is as reconnecting to the Beginning, and at the beginning there was the Word and the Word was with God and the Word was God (John 1, 1); and God is a Word at the extremity of silence as Ignatius of Antioch and Meister Eckhart put it.[16] That is why, alluding to a statement by St. Augustine, Karl Rahner said that God is "closer to me than I am to myself."[17]

Transcendence, which goes beyond the limited self and is part of one's real identity and true nature, is the existential dimension that gives worth and dignity to man who is created in the image of God and with the possibility of achieving divine likeness.

According to Christian theology the *imago Dei* in man relates to the human reason, feeling and will, and the likeness of God implies holiness and immortality.

Reason, feeling and will are something man has, and while they have their own transcendent dimension, holiness and immortality are possibilities given to man at creation that transcend the current human condition. They imply longing and striving, in particular after one realizes what is worth striving for,

meaning God. Holiness is defined by the Church Fathers as longing for God, and immortality is a consequence of holiness that integrates one in God's communion, or, speaking in the language of the mystics, it helps one reach the union with God, also called *theosis.*

However, the efforts of one's self-transcending in God's direction is left altogether at man's latitude, as Pico della Mirandola beautifully put it:

> We have given you, oh Adam, no visage proper to yourself, nor any endowment properly your own, in order that whatever place, whatever form, whatever gifts you may, with premeditation, select, these same you may have and possess through your own judgment and decision. The nature of all creatures is defined and restricted within laws which We have laid down; you, by contrast, impeded by no such restrictions, may by your own free will, to whose custody We have assigned you, trace for yourself the lineaments of your own nature.
>
> I have placed you at the very center of the world, so that from that vantage point you may with greater ease glance around about you on all that the world contains, We have made you a creature neither of heaven nor of earth, neither mortal nor immortal, in order that you may, as the free and proud shaper of your own being, fashion yourself in the form you may prefer.
>
> It will be in your power to descend to the lower, brutish forms of life; you will be able, through your own decision, to rise gain to the superior orders whose life is divine.[18]

Transcendence, which is a dimension of being that distinguishes man from animal, is what gives meaning to life, and that is why Abraham Heschel postulated that existence without transcendence is a way of living where things become idols and idols become monsters. [19] Victor Frankl also believes that transcendence, of self, is a human dimension and a human ability that creates meaning,[20] as it "refers to the highest and most inclusive or holistic level of human consciousness.[21] As R. Kendal Soulen explains, "the human self is grounded in a transcendent reality because it revolves around something other and greater than itself."[22]

The theological understanding of transcendence has a significant impact on one's life, as man's position *coram Deo,* his or her vertical dimension of life, translates into his or her horizontal dimension of life or his position *coram mundo,* in front of the world.

In other words, just as I have to be careful about how I stand before God, so I have to be careful about how I stand before other people for it is my relation to others that consolidates my relation to God; my interaction with people, on the horizontal, represents the platform on which I build my relation to God, thus allowing me to grow vertically.

As Roger Garaudy put it, the other is my transcendence, so self-transcendence implies three directions of growth: an inner growth, one towards the other and the third one towards the Totally Other. The other, as my transcendence, is what calls me beyond my individual limits, that which makes me be a human person,[23] and it is the person that is capable of love and transcendence (48). In other words man is on the road between the individual and the person as he realizes that the individual can easily fall into individualism and that brings about separation and death (63).

If then the other is my transcendence and transcendence is a fundamental dimension of my being, I can justly say, paraphrasing Descartes, "you are therefore I am," and this type of existential indebtedness requires a relation of love. In other words, "you " ("You") are the cause of my being and my loving response makes me be who I am: *Amo ergo sum.*

This is what Johannes Gründel meant when he said that the human person is oriented towards the encounter[24] and when Jacques Lacan said that the human subject is constituted in the field of the other.[25]

One way in which we become aware of transcendence and make it bear fruit in our lives is contemplation. As a mystical practice, contemplation has to be rescued from oblivion, from the garbage can of history; it has to be resurrected from the dead and brought back to the center.

According to A. von Heuer, contemplation brings about light (through contemplation one becomes light)[26] and that helps one assimilate or assume one's past existence, but also the present one, beyond all sensible contradictions.[27] In such a context one reaches a new inner state that makes one ready for revelation, for discovery and self-discovery and that is where meaning comes from.

Contemplation is in many ways an exercise of attention. As Joseph E. David notices, in our world today our hearing, viewing, reading and other activities are disrupted by an invasion of all kinds of information that makes concentration difficult and superficial. In such a situation where we become increasingly

distracted, disorganized and overwhelmed, there is an imperative need to cultivate the skill of attention, to learn how to pay attention. Such practice will bring us to "the good beyond ourselves,"[28] which means the benefit of transcendence. There is a need to conscientize transcendence, to relate to it, to incorporate it into our lives.

The problem of attention is also analyzed by Matthew B. Crawford who observes how our lives today are becoming more and more fragmented (a phenomenon signaled by American sociologist Robert Bellah even before the invasion of digital social media) and how attention becomes a cultural crisis that leads to the difficulty of maintaining a coherent self.[29] This is alarming because an incoherent self indicates a type of schizophrenia, split personality, which was otherwise announced in the 1960s and 1970s by such philosophers as Abraham Heschel and Erich Fromm when they wrote about the neurotic society of their time.

In such a context it is encouraging to hear that contemporary philosophers of science seek "to restore transcendence to its proper ethical and philosophical–theological place."[30]

Teaching

Teaching is about the transmission of knowledge and at the same time about helping others to learn how to discover themselves, to discover and relate to others and to the Totally Other and to the world. Knowledge is necessary not only in order to learn to survive and achieve desires, but also in order to learn to harmonize oneself with one's environment at both levels, micro-cosmic and macro-cosmic.

In the professional sense, teaching is necessary in order to achieve systematic progress. Thus teaching implies the systematization of knowledge, its analysis and interpretation and then, transmission with a precise purpose in view.

Teaching and learning are a guided adventure that begins in the mind. Just because it has to do with mind and soul, with the unknown and with a universe that we only try to understand but cannot contain fully, teaching has to allow for transcendence.[31]

Teaching is a gift and a privilege. It forms, informs and transforms the learner in most of the cases in irreversible ways. In its creative and restorative dimen-

sions teaching is the antidote of epistemological despair. As it restores both the self and the world it requires passion, dedication, commitment, love and faith.

William Ayers and Patricia Ford put it this way: "The teacher's task is as unique and inventive as a friendship or falling in love. The teacher's work […] is about having one eye on the students" who are "tridimensional: complex, trembling and real, and one eye on the world we share," which is also tridimensional, "dynamic, complex and in need of repair. […] Teaching, like organizing is an act of faith." [32]

When it comes to the self the teacher places him or herself at the pulpit of the inner temple of the student, a sacred act that requires taking off the boots or even the sandals, and from there assesses the student's gifts and talents and guides him or her to self-assessment, to self-discovery, to self-examination, the only thing that makes one's life worthy, according to Socrates.

The teacher will then balance the pride and greatness of this self-discovery with a sense of humility that will help the student develop "an open sense of self that is both strong and flexible." [33] That, in turn, prepares the student to take a conscious control of his or her life, to develop a realistic vision of the future based on an adequate *Weltanschauung* and find meaning in who he or she is and what he or she does; this is the meaning that empowers and gives inner stability which makes one always ready to create and embrace one's destiny. This is where the prophetic function of teaching comes into play, and where, theologically speaking, the teacher becomes a co-worker with God in the process of man's restoration and of that of the world.

As self and meaning are so much interrelated where a certain understanding of self generates meaning, and meaning strengthens the self, good teaching has to do with an adequate definition of self, with an appropriate type of belief in oneself, all the more since one becomes what one believes.

Martin Haberman writes that good teaching is not about "stuffing in," it is about "drawing out."[34] In other words, good teaching is a liberating event that leads one out of the inner captivity, as Paulo Freire advocates when he criticizes in his entire work the banking style of education. As William Ayers also put it, "real learning requires assertion, not obedience; action, not passivity. It is an intimate act, an ambiguous and unpredictable act. It is deeply human."[35]

The liberating character of teaching and learning is very evident in an episode of Frederick Douglass's biography. He realizes that education is about overcoming the barriers of the mind, about getting out of captivity. This is exactly what his master in Philadelphia thought when he replied in indignation to his wife as he caught her teaching young Douglas: "A nigger should know nothing but to obey his master – to do as he is told to do. Learning will *spoil* the best nigger in the world. If you teach that nigger (speaking of myself) how to read there would be no keeping him. It would forever unfit him to be a slave."[36]

Liberation brings about meaning and the teacher's role is to help the student conscientize it and base on it the moral choices he or she makes in life.

The teaching of self-discovery and consequently of how to make sense of one's self, life and destiny is intrinsically linked to teaching transcendence in the sense that neither the self, nor the world can be fully contained, understood, explained. In self-examination one understands that there is more unknown than known when it comes to how much we know about ourselves and the same is valid of the world around us. Misunderstanding of the self implicitly leads to misunderstanding of the world and of how we relate to it.

The disorder of and in our world is in major part due to this misunderstanding. When we will restore and unify our internal world we will be able to improve the external one. As Todd O. Williams put it, "only when we repair our relationship to the external world will we then be prepared to take action to make things better,"[37]

Both self and the world have to be acknowledged and respected in what they have that transcends our knowledge. There is the visible and the invisible, the physical and the spiritual, the material and immaterial, the form and the essence. There is need for one to learn to connect to both realms, the immanent and the transcendent. One way in which we can learn to connect with the transcendent is contemplation. A. von Heuer writes that contemplation "repatriates the soul into being"[38] It is basically a non-verbal prayer, or reflection, or attempt to realize the divine presence in any given thing in the created order, including the self. It is an attempt to rid the mind of any thought whatsoever, to empty oneself of anything that occupies the inner space in order to bring in or discover there the divine presence.

As it brings about the inner peace, the peace of the mind, contemplation can be taught, in particular when it comes to the techniques that one can use to achieve it. One of these techniques is silence, the silence of the mind, s*ilentium mentis,* a type of inner re-programming that is an apophatic way to approach the divine and that leads to a new way to perceive things and consequently to find meaning in them and relate to them in a new way.

Many pedagogues and teachers in contemporary academia realize the benefits of contemplative practices in the classroom, their empowering effect on students and promote them actively.

For example when the teacher allows moments of silence in the classroom the teaching takes on highly significant new dimensions. It becomes like a liturgy, sacred public service, where the classroom is, in a way, a sacred place in which a mystical transformation occurs; the teacher is the minister and the students the faithful and above all, the "mathematician of all things," as Parmenides of Elea calls God.

Silence helps students internalize the rules of academic discipline, the discovery that comes through getting knowledge in the context of teaching, and the new aspects of the complex relationship between self and others and self and the world.

As teacher Patricia Ford puts it, "we must also learn to tolerate and survive long silences in the classroom, rather than giving in to them, because we feel uncomfortable. Silence that will lead to real engagement later is more valuable than filling silence with empty knowledge."[39] In fact, more than "tolerate and survive long silences" we need to learn to like and value moments of silence and use them as an empowering teaching technique.

At the Metropolitan College of New York, for example, among other colleges and universities, Dr. Clyde Griffin, a specialist in linguistics but who teaches inter- and trans-disciplinarily, introduced contemplation practices in his courses. As a result the students reported to relate better to who they are, to the teaching subjects, and to understand better their hierarchy of values.

Conclusion

One of the keys to successful teaching is for the teacher to allow the student to be who he or she is through a guided process of self-assessment, so that the student can be comfortable and express him or herself in the classroom. That gives a chance to the teacher to know the student, his or her background, experiences and skills, assess the level and create bridges between these and these and new knowledge. This teaching empowers students to change themselves and change the world as they discover themselves and the world anew with interest, curiosity and pleasure, a platform for a constant new flight towards new territories of understanding and towards new levels and ways of connecting themselves with surrounding reality. They will be permanently aware that there is more to be explored and it is worth to do so.

One example of such student centered approach to teaching in terms of self-discovery is provided by my classes with incoming students in the Purpose-centered system of education at the Metropolitan College of New York. The purpose is a general topic of each semester towards witch everything students learn in any class is geared. The first Purpose, meaning the general topic in the first semester, is called "Self-assessment and Preparation for Practice". Thus, everything students learn in every class has to be relevant to self-assessment. They have to write papers on that.

Following the advice of Meister Eckhart and Nietzsche I encourage students to have a "why" for everything, not to take things for granted, knowing that the "why" generates a "because" which introduces an explanation which in turn facilitates understanding and thus contributes to the inner growth.

While teaching is about changing the self and the world, it is important to clarify why such change is necessary by explaining that one of the major purposes in life is to achieve harmony between self and the world. If I am part of a system I have to be in harmony with it. A disorder in this relationship brings about suffering, while happiness is the elimination of suffering. Harmony also gives me a sense of belonging and that I am in the right position *coram mundo.* Then, if both I and the world are in motion, in continuous development, there is constant need for me to understand myself, to know myself, as Socrates exhorted, and the world, in order to become an agent of change while always in harmony with what is to be changed. Thus, the multiple types of borders

between me and myself, within myself, and between me and the others and the world will slowly be turned into bridges that facilitate harmony, integration, communication, communion, unity.

As William Ayers and Patricia Ford wrote, "the purpose of education in a democracy is to break down barriers, to overcome obstacles, to open doors and minds and possibilities. Education is empowering and enabling; it points to strength, to critical capacity, to thoughtfulness, and expanding capabilities."[40]

Teaching is fundamental to who we are because it has to do with the inner person and helps one to realize and grow into the sovereign freedom of the spirit. Teaching helps one find meaning in who one is and in one's connection with the others and the world and points to the metaphysical character of participation. Teaching makes one understand that the other is a mystery that requires awe and doxology as any transcendent reality, that man is creator of transfiguring beauty whose inner fire can turn matter into light and that he or she is called to transcend any formal and artificial separation through the irreducible power of his capacity for communion.

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Assessing Collective European Identity on the Regional Level

A Secondary Data Analysis of Eurobarometer 2004 – 2012

Waqas Ejaz

Abstract

The European Union has been very keen to develop a common sense of community and identity among Europeans. The EU as a major actor in developing a collective identity considers that through its strong cross continental governance structure it can stir the common sense of "we-ness" among Europeans. The EU as an institution requires people to identify with it in order to lend legitimacy to its structure and helps create a more integrated Europe. This secondary data analysis explores attitudinal trends among people across all 28 members from 2004-12. It evaluates their perception of the EU as a centrally situated organization stirring the sense of community among them.

Keywords

Collective Identity, European Identity, European Integration.

Introduction

With the motto "Unity in diversity" the European Union "(…) signifies how Europeans have come together in the form of the EU, to work for peace and prosperity (…)".[1] One continent, one currency unit, building a geographical community working together in a global world market, while at the same time being shaped and enriched by plenty of diverse cultures, traditions and languages. These political, social and economic developments highlight a strong transformation of a once war torn continent into a key global player. But despite abolishing territorial boundaries and bringing countries closer together, there are unseen psychological barriers (prejudice, discrimination, false opinion etc.)[2] as well as economic and political challenges that still exist. These challenges hamper the EU's effort to develop a sense of "Europeness" or a "collective European identity". There is a considerable amount of scholarship available that "commonly" implies that the concept of European identity is "a pre-requisite for a functioning democratic European polity,"[3] hence it offers the required legitimacy to the European Union. From an institutional point of view the

European Union in general and the European Commission in particular try to promote the construction of a European identity with ongoing research and consequential programs. The goal of every program is to decrease barriers among member states by increasing the contact among people.[4]

The current study acknowledges the significance and relevance of the collective European identity because a collective identity "ensures further European integration"[5] which seems to be the goal of the EU as reflected through its various policies and programs, notably CRIC, ELDIA, EuNaMus, EUROIDENTITIES, etc. [6] In the wake of such intensive policies and integration efforts of the EU it makes sense to access the trends in people's attitude towards a unified Europe and one common political entity, the EU, and this is what the current study intends to do. In order to investigate the trends in people's perception over a period of time, this study has used Eurobarometer surveys from 2004-12 to conduct a secondary data analysis.

Construction of a Collective European Identity

Issues related to "identity" have become a highly contested terrain in social sciences and the term itself seems somewhat overstressed.[7] To make this study more clear it is important to have a basic conceptualization of a collective European identity. Taking inspiration from scholarly work on the concept of nationalism, I discuss in this section the role of institutions in identity construction. Wiener writes that the European identity basically indicates the collective identity of people living in Europe and as such, on a theoretical level is not much different from a national identity.[8] Some scholars argue that it can be constructed with the help of social communication. [9] Moreover, administrative[10] or authoritative units also play a significant role in identity building.[11] In the current study I argue that the identity of people across Europe can be accessed through their perception of and attitude towards the EU, since it is the central authoritative unit and one of the actors responsible for constructing a collective European identity. Furthermore, I believe that these perceptions vary a great deal from region to region throughout the continent.

EU Institutions as Identity Builders

The EU's quest to go beyond its technocratic character and form a new European identity can be traced back to its first official formulation in 1973 in the "Declaration on European identity," developing into "one of the central issues facing the EU today."[12] Today the EU and its various institutions is the most important representative of European identity. There has been a number of different studies highlighting the relevance and relationship of European identity with the EU.[13] The "discursive institutionalism," an approach from political science, delivers useful insights concerning the role of institutions' public communication in identity construction. It provides the idea of "communicative discourse" as a tool to use for ideas in the mass process of public persuasion in the political sphere.[14] Discursive institutionalism further argues that in order to construct a European identity we don't only have to preach a sense of belonging to Europe (by being European) and active engagement (participating in European affairs) in "Europe, but also communicate what EU is and does" in order to build a collective European identity, and this is a job done by the EU and its various institutions on a mass level.

Research Design

My research is based on a secondary data analysis of Eurobarometer surveys between 2004-12. Eurobarometer is a survey to monitor the public opinion in the European Union conducted by internationally recognized survey research institutes on behalf of the European Commission and its responsible Directorate-General(s) and departments in the role of the principal investigator series.[15] A total of 52 Eurobarometer surveys from 2004-12 have been studied; however only 19 surveys were considered for data analysis, mainly due to the recurrence of relevant questions throughout 2004-12. Some questions that have been chosen for analysis were not asked in the last Eurobarometer survey (77.3) of 2012 that I considered for my dataset. So the timeframe for such questions would be from 2004-11. The reason behind choosing a certain timeline for data collection is that in 2004, the EU allowed the maximum number of countries (15) to become member states. It provides a sound argument to begin the data collection with a high number of member states present in each survey. Each questionnaire and dataset consists of more than one theme, so I have considered only those surveys as well as questions that are most relevant to the chosen theme.

I could have used the data to know the people's perception in each member state; however I chose not to work on the level of individual states, but rather group them according to their geographical locations. That will help me to understand the identity pattern on the regional level (meso). So, in order to investigate the collective European identity pattern on the meso level, I divided the continent into four cardinal directions (east, west, south and north) on the basis of the geographical categorization of countries provided by United Nations. According to the UN Statistics Department[16] all 28-member states are categorized as follows:

North	**South**	**East**	**West**
Denmark	Greece	Bulgaria	Austria
Estonia	Italy	Czech Republic	Belgium
Finland	Malta	Hungary	France
Ireland	Portugal	Poland	Germany
Latvia	Slovenia	Romania	Luxembourg
Lithuania	Spain	Slovakia	Netherlands
Sweden	Croatia		
UK	Cyprus		

Table 1. UN Statistics DEpartment (2013)

Though the above categorization is purely on the basis of geographical location, one can still point out further commonalities among members in the respective groups than just their location to prove the particular classification as logical. For example, Germany and France are rightly placed in the "West" column as both are being described as "twin engines" and proponents of European integration.[17] Moreover, other members in the column have somewhat alike tendencies. Similarly countries in the "East" column share the history with Soviet Union and can be termed as comparatively smaller economies than other EU member states. Considering the theoretical approach of banal Europeanism I argue that in these four regions the daily experience with the EU is different, and so it leads to different levels of identification.

Research Question

As is quite evident, the EU is a multi-level governance structure and people living in Europe have consistent interaction with it. So, using the structuralist approach, we can argue that people's European identity is derived from their perception and their relationship with the EU. Despite working with secondary data, I chose to devise research questions instead of hypotheses, mainly because of the exploratory nature of my interest in understanding people's perception towards a collective identity across Europe. Keeping this framework in mind, my main research question intends to explore various attitudinal trends of people towards the EU.

RQ: How do people across Europe attribute European collective identity?

In order to answer the question, I developed some further sub-research questions.

Sub-RQ1: How do people living in different regions of Europe tend to consider their country's membership in the EU?

Sub-RQ2: Do people across Europe believe their country has benefitted from its membership in the EU?

Sub-RQ3: What kind of image does the EU conjure in people across the continent?

Sub-RQ4: What does the EU mean to people in all member states?

Results

Sub-RQ1: How do people living in different regions of Europe tend to consider their country's membership in the EU?



Figure 1. Percentage of Europeans who feel good about the EU

As I already mentioned, the perception of a country's membership in the EU is vague, yet arguably an indicator of a collective European identity. The distribution in the above graph gives a complete picture of how people perceive their country's membership in the EU. The data indicate that almost all member states feel good about being a member of the EU. The graph also shows that throughout 2004-2012 more than 50% of the people in Western member states always considered their country's membership in the EU a good thing. This indicates that member states in the West can be termed as pro-Europeans. Another striking element in the figure is the sharp decline in good feelings about a country's membership in the EU in the southern part of Europe.

Sub-RQ2: Do people across Europe believe their country has benefitted from its membership in the EU?



Figure 2. Benefit of EU Membership

In order for Europeans to identify with the EU, it is naturally required for them to believe that their countries have received benefits by earning the membership in the EU. In this regard, analyzing this question helps me further in exploring another dimension of attitudinal trends among Europeans. The figure above reveals that a huge majority of more than 50% of Europeans, irrespective of their location, believe that their country has benefited by being a member of the EU. It confirms the astounding success of the EU in making people realize its ability to deliver across the continent.

Sub- RQ3: What kind of image does the EU conjure in people across the continent?



Figure 3. Image of the EU

In order to make my analysis more comprehensible I opted to find out the mean value of the variable. So, I recoded the variable ranges 1 to -1, where 1 means positive, 0 means neutral and -1 indicates negative. As Laura Cram[18] believes that the sub-conscious image of the EU among people can point us towards a tentative "Europeness," this graph helps us understand the trend over time. The figure above illustrates the consistent drop of a positive image of the EU across the continent. The most worthy reading comes from the Southern European member states. The Southern part of Europe at the beginning of our timeline has the highest positive values; however, by 2012 the numbers plummet to negative, the only part of Europe where the EU does not conjure a positive image in people.

Sub-RQ4: What does the EU mean to people in all member states?



Figure 4. Positive meaning of the EU

In order to answer this question, I grouped the values of this question into negative, positive and neutral. The following values were considered positive: peace, economic prosperity, democracy, social protection, freedom to travel, work and study, and cultural diversity. Values that associate negative meaning with the EU are unemployment, bureaucracy, waste of money, loss of cultural identity, and more crime. Some values (euro, stronger say in the world, not enough control on external borders) are ambivalent in their meaning, so they were not considered for the analysis. The cross tabulation of this newly created variable with the independent variable of regional classification offers strong differences in what the EU means to people across Europe.



Figure 5. Negative meaning of the EU in people's minds

The two presentations above indicate that in Eastern member states most people mean more positive than negative things when asked about the EU. On the other hand, Western Europeans, who were considered pro integration (see fig. 1 and 2), tend to attribute more negative things to the EU as compared to rest of the regions.

Limitations and Conclusion

The fluid nature of identity definitely makes it very difficult to measure,[19] and it is even tougher when one tries to encompass the concept of a European collective identity on a macro (regional) level. However, I argue that looking at identity from a broader, bigger picture may highlight its various characteristics in a way that has rarely been investigated and may further help to focus on special regions that might need more attention. In the quest to answer our main research question about people's attribution of collective identity, I have shown through the results listed above that there has been progress made throughout

Europe. The EU has proved to be an integral component of people living in Europe. On the basis of the above results we cannot point a finger to a certain European region that is more prone than others to develop the sense of collective European identity. However the results do reveal that most Europeans, irrespective of their region, consider the EU as beneficial, positive and a good thing for them. These banal indicators point out that the EU on the basis of its overwhelming support among Europeans should continue to evolve towards a more integrated continent, though work needs to be done in specific regions, especially in Southern Europe. As the results reveal, after the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 in general and the Euro crisis in particular, public opinion about the EU changed dramatically, especially in the Southern countries. It does not only highlight the discontent in Southern Europe but it also indicates the strong connection between the EU and the economics of the continent. This means that a crisis in general or a financial crisis in particular can severely affect the integration efforts of the EU.

Despite the relevance and significance of the current study, there are a number of things that hinder its efficacy. The most important limitation of the study is related to the availability of a consistent supply of identity related questions in Eurobarometer. Classification of the member states on the basis of their geographical situation is not quite representative. Comparing the regions in order to analyze European identity patterns is useful, but alternative aspects like focusing on GDP, population, area, membership status and other aspects would provide additional helpful information. However, although the study in hand has various limitations, it does provide a fresh look at the collective identity from a continental point of view.

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Towards a Dissolution and Reconstruction of East-West Paradigms in Malraux's *Les Conquérants*

Nina Tucci

Abstract

In *The Conquerors*, Malraux expands the East-West dialogue begun in *The Temptation* of the Occident and continued in *The Royal Way* by placing his heroes under the aegis of the Communist revolution in the East. The core of the task is two-fold: for the Oriental, revolutionary *action* (doing) will help to release him from the notion of man as a mere link in the chain of creation and inculcate in him the Western ideals of individuality, human dignity, liberty and action, the process manifesting according to individual temperament, for example, terrorism; for the Occidental, it will be to move from the state of egocentricity towards inclusion into the human community (being). To this end, Malraux investigates the Oriental notions of ancestor worship, Taoism and Confucianism. This experimental, Oriental-Occidental initiatory experience develops under the patronage of the master-disciple relationship, and will receive a fuller expression in Malraux's *Man's Fate.*

Keywords

East/West, Being/Doing, Terrorism, Revolution, Initiation, Ancestor worship, Taoism, Confucianism, Master/Disciple, Egocentricity/Collectivism.

Les Conquérants, published in 1928, is part of a trilogy, *The Royal Way* (1930) and *Man's Fate* (1946) in which Malraux explores cultural differences between East and West. The theme is the subject of a short epistolary text, *The Temptation of the Occident* (1926), in which A. D., the Occidental, and Ling, the Oriental, explore the differences between the two cultures. In short, the Occidental civilization is depicted as one in which man seeks to dominate nature through action, whereas Oriental civilization sees man as a mere link in the chain of creation. The ensuing novels address the mutual influence that one civilization has on the other, in other words, how the Occident can integrate the Oriental notion of "being" in the world, and how the Orient can adapt to the ways of the Western notion of "action" and individual significance in the world. The task is assigned to strong individuals usually in the form of a master-disciple relationship.

In *The Royal Way,* the master, Perken, and the initiate, Claude, test the possibility of giving an absolute value to the tenet of *action* in the Oriental jungle. In *Les Conquérants,* the theatre of action is a political one, the great strike of 1925 in Canton. The core of the struggle is two-fold: on the one hand, the destruction of the 2500-year old Chinese civilization with its notion of man as a mere link in the chain of creation; on the other hand, European colonialism and Western individualism. For example, the young terrorist, Hong, represents the first instance of nascent individualism. His mentor, the Italian, Rebecci, had inculcated in Hong the basic tenet of Occidental existence: "It was the uniqueness of his existence."[1] Hong belonged to that segment of society whose existence was not acknowledged, thus, the recourse to solitary acts of terrorism, for terrorism, says the Jngian Dr. Anthony Stevens in *The Roots of War & Terror* is the name we give to the form of basic war that people who are otherwise powerless wage against governments that have caused them some real or imagined grievance and that they cannot directly confront by conventional means." [2] Newly awakened to the ideals of human dignity, liberty and action, Hong violently punishes those who would deny him these inalienable rights: "… torture . . . is … a just means. Because the life of a man who lives in misery is tortuous. And those who teach them to support that should be punished, priests, Christians or others" *(The Conquerors,* 140). Already in the *Temptation of the Occident,* the perceptive Wang-Loh had foreseen that accepting Occidental values would serve to point out to the Oriental revolutionaries what had been denied them, and that the driving force that led them to destroy old forms was anchored in hatred because conversion to a new creed or to a new mode of thought can breed fanatic adherence. As his hatred develops into an all-consuming passion, Hong becomes increasingly impatient with the slow pace of party measures and takes matters into his own hands. He commences a series of slayings, and his victims on both sides will be those who, in his opinion, impede the machinery of the revolution which, in Hong's language, means thwarting his aspirations to achieve a modicum of human integrity. Most importantly, however, terrorist action puts Hong in touch with his own true basic nature. The master figure of the novel, Garine, observes that "Each murder [increased] the confidence that he (Hong) [had] in himself, and that he [was] slowly becoming conscious of who he [was] in the depths of his being: an anarchist" (146). It is the *act* of the crime itself that juts him out of temporality into timelessness where he can truly be *himself.* When his actions become a detriment to the party, Garine eliminates him from the scene.

If the youthful Oriental, Hong, becomes conscious that terrorist action is an expression of his *being*, it is because of the presence of the Westerner, Pierre Garine, "the archetypal Conqueror of Canton," as Herbert Lottman calls him in his forward to the novel, the new master in the guise of director of propaganda.[3] And the master came to the Orient with his own spiritual agenda. How can the Western tenet of "action" be transformed into a meditative state? How can "action" produce the same euphoric state that one experiences in meditation? Earlier we said that the heroes of *The Royal Way,* served as a profile for *The Conquerors.* Like Claude and Perken, Garine attempts to escape Western intellectualism. We are told that "he was indifferent to systems of thought" *(The Conquerors,* 57). Like them, he wanted to effect a synthesis of the opposing concepts of "being and doing" on the human scale of possibilities, to create a new mode of being through the intensity of action: "To align oneself to any great action and not let go of it, to become intoxicated with it . . ." (68). Like them, he assumes a non-individualistic attitude asserting that his life does not interest him, yet all the while clinging to the will to power: "There is nevertheless something that counts in life: not to be defeated (69, 197).

For Claude and Perken of the *The Royal Way,* leaving the linear time of the Occident and entering the Oriental jungle could be equated to entering a space of non-time. It was a withdrawal that could affect a spiritual death and rebirth, a regeneration of the individual. Revolution can also be viewed in this very same manner, for the archetypal value of revolution in the history of mankind has always been to destroy the old, existing forms in order to bring about a new order. Approaching revolution from an archetypal point of view raises it and the hero's involvement in it to a mythical status, and it is in this light that we could interpret political action in *The Conquerors.* Action not for a specific goal, but action that transcends the purposes and cross-purposes involved in the conflict. The revolution, for Garine represents a possibility for action, which is more important than the act itself, the amelioration of the Chinese masses, for example. Political action in the revolution becomes, then, an initiation ritual, similar to that of Claude and Perken's action in the jungle. Garine, within the fabric of the revolution, has, like Claude and Perken, entered a primordial time, a time of absolute freedom where he attempts to define his own essence. He is using the fluid situation of the Chinese Communist revolution as a myth-making experiment, and he subordinates the complexity of revolutionary action to the terms of his personal revolt by placing it under the aegis of the impact of Europe on China. Garine openly admits his distaste for his fellowman,

and if he preferred to help the poor, it is because they were the down-trodden of the world. He is nevertheless lucid as to the importance of his work among the Chinese masses. In instilling in them a sense of individual existence, Garine claims to give them hope: "In this very moment, how many men are dreaming of victories that two years ago they did not even suspect possible! I have created their hope" (158). As for himself, he knows that he cannot live in the society he is helping to create, and that the private motives underlying his action are anchored in the metaphysical need to liberate himself from the human condition. The narrator-disciple of the novel makes the comment that "from power, Garine sought neither money nor consideration, nor respect: nothing except the *essence* of power itself" (201).[4] Garine reinforces the accuracy of this observation and, at the same time, gives an example of his view of Oriental detachment fused with Occidental will to power: "My action renders me apathetic to all that is not attached to it, beginning with its results. If I linked myself so easily to the Revolution, it is because its results are removed in time and are always changing. At heart, I am a gambler. Like all gamblers, I think only about my game with obstinacy and force" *(The Conquerors,* 201).

Garine's experiment with pure action, however, brings him into conflict, not only with party members who were geared toward practical concrete results, but also with the Confucian-like sage, Tcheng-Dai, who seeks to undermine European colonialism "without violent measures, without combat" (110). Tcheng-Dai's death leaves the way open for revolutionary victory. Despite the victory, Garine experiences defeat, and it comes, ironically from the very victory that brings termination to a life-giving action. In order to establish *being* through *action,* one must identify with one's act, that is, the intensity of action must be maintained at a continuous uninterrupted flow in order to maintain the integrity of pure being. In the end, Garine himself seems to doubt the durability of this exteriorized absolute: "when my action pulls away from me, when I begin to separate myself from it, it is also its blood that drains away. . ." (200).

Garine's failure in the Orient also causes a rift in the master-disciple relationship. The narrator is left with the knowledge that the avenues that Garine had chosen to establish an identity were doomed to failure. As in *The Royal Way,* we are left with a dying master and disciple stripped down to their bare humanity, united in friendship: "We embraced each other. . . . I search in his eyes for the joy that I thought I saw: but there is no such thing, nothing but a harsh and yet fraternal sobriety" (228).

In retrospect, the hero, Garine, withdraws from a world of form and order to an alien civilization that imposes few restrictions, where he can play out his experiment to give Western man a soul. He seeks unity within the limits of the relative world. He experiments with the Oriental attitude of detachment from the fruits of action. Revolutionary action becomes an initiation rite that opens onto a kind of timelessness, where he can experiment freely and without constraint. At one point, he exclaims: "When I think that all my life, I have searched for liberty!... (194). He sought to transpose the power of the ecstatic experience supposedly achieved through meditation into Occidental intensity through action: "Power," he observes, "is obtained only through persevering energy, through an unrelenting will" (72-3).

The Oriental notion of the continuity of the human person through ancestor lineage becomes another vehicle of experimentation to leave behind proof of his existence. He wants to live through the men whose lives he helped to mold and change: "To survive! That's what it is all about" (215). What conclusions, then, can be drawn from Malraux's experiment in this early novel? What was learned from the mutual East-West crossing over of Garine and Hong? What did Garine learn from his encounter with Tcheng-Dai?

Garine and Hong are doomed because they cannot be a part of the society in which they live. Both men are in a philosophical impasse. Though Garine is a highly reflective and lucid individual, he fails to arrive at an absolute value because he is unable to assimilate the new ideas on an emotional level. Hong's dilemma is the opposite. He is, as one of the characters of the novel describes, "a kid" who has accepted the gift of individuality on a purely emotional level, without reflection. The conflict between Garine and Tcheng-Dai seems to further point to the arbitrary nature of both Eastern and Western thought, and this is crucial insofar as it relates to Garine's own personal struggle. It would seem that Garine wishes to bequeath to the Oriental the very individualism that he left behind. On the other hand, he senses that the professed disinterest of Tchen-Dai's Confucian persona of moral and ethical behavior masks the desire to endure: "The legacy of his glory [that] he will bequeath to China . . . (91). Speaking from a psychological point of view, there are important lacunas to be considered. How can the Chinese masses be expected to come to a sophisticated awareness of their personal dignity as men without having gone through the various steps that lead to ego development, which is so character-

istic of the West. Garine must, by force, become the nerve center that upholds them in the newly found ideals. And when he is gone? Garine was aware of the problem: "All these men that I guide, whose soul I have helped to create, . . . I don't know what they will do tomorrow . . ." (193). These ambiguities and contradictions in Garine become clearer when scrutinized from the Oriental-Occidental framework.

On the surface, it may seem that his effort to abolish the concept of collective life in Asia contradicts the fact that he himself seems to be moving toward collective values. It is a transposition of cultural values. He wants to destroy the notion of man as a fragment of the whole and to relegate him to the relative world where he can enjoy the dignity of his individuality and live with his fellowman on a fraternal basis. As we have seen, Garine's action is not based on a personal love for his fellowman, but he does connect with him on the level of the underlying continuum of the human struggle with destiny, which parallels the Oriental concept of the continuum as the Eternal Source: He notes: "We have our struggle in common" . . . (69). There is a movement from a state of egocentricity toward inclusion into the human community. The Jungian, Anthony Stevens, puts it thus: "It is not just the prospect of victory that attracts us but the activity itself and the possibilities it provides for *individuation*."[5]

In the end, however, the experiment ends in failure, as Garine is defeated both outwardly and inwardly. Revolutionary victory is coupled with illness. The narrator-disciple learns that achieving being through action on the relative level cannot be permanent as physical deterioration separates man from his acts and, instead of leading to unity dissociates man from the cosmos. In *The Conquerors,* the metamorphosis of the Occidental will to power remains unsolved. And, perhaps, it is because of this that dismemberment, such an integral part of initiation leads to physical death. Revolutionary action does not act as an agent of purification and does not liberate Garine from the human condition. Yet, Garine, unlike the hero, Perken, of *The Royal Way,* does break through the bondage of human alienation. In his own personal critique of the *The Conquerors,* Malraux says: "Are we going to continue to be a part of a fragmented humanity where each one continues to act in a particular domain, or rather are we going to accept the birth of a collective spirit that will sweep away all secondary problems and replace humanity in a domain of an entirely different set of challenges?" [6]

Though the symbols that express a culture are not transferable, Malraux felt that it was possible to grasp the human spirit in its universality. He makes this clear in his critique of Herman Keyserling's book *Journal of the Voyage of a Philosopher:* "It is less a matter of judging various cultures, than it is to understand the meaning of the rules of life that they propose, and, in the last analysis, of their concept of perfection. To profit from and to understand this acquired knowledge, we must allow them to enter into a general order of the mind." [7]

In retrospect, it would be useful to refer to Taoist and Confucian thought, much alluded to in *The Temptation of the Occident.* The goal of both Taoism and Confucianism, is the total transformation of the individual. Both are moral codes, both advocate ancestor worship, both make use of the master-disciple relationship, both are anti-individual in that they teach that man is but a fragment of the universe. The path, however, is different. Confucianism is a social metaphysic and Taoism is essentially a mystical metaphysic. R.S. Blakeney, in his translation of the *Tao Tê Ching says:* "The . . . moral proposal is most probable where individuals press together and life requires general agreement on its conduct. The mystic view becomes probable where individuals confront the universe alone."[8] Confucianism and Taoism both teach that the oneness of the all-embracing continuum that is common to all men inspires a mutual feeling of compassion between men. Garine's attempt to administer to the Chinese masses reflects Taoism in trying to create an anonymous oneness, but he also takes on the aspect of one of the Confucian "literati," for the Confucians teach that the educated elite should direct their energies to social service and action. Claude and Perken of *The Royal Way* experiment with the notion of achieving being through action in the isolation of the jungle; Garine experiments with being through action through participation in the communist revolution. A full awareness and definition of the different modes of being through action will receive their fullest expression in Malraux's *Man's Fate.*

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From the Cradle to the Grave?

European Policy on Life Long Learning, Reskilling and Employability within the EU2020

Nikos Papadakis & Maria Drakaki

Abstract

The paper deals with the new European Lifelong Learning policy and its relation to Reskilling and Employability within the new European strategy "Europe 2020". In particular, it analyses, briefly, the historical background of European education policy before and during the Lisbon Strategy, focusing on the key priorities of the "Education and Training 2010" work programme within the Lisbon Strategy and its final outcomes. Subsequently, it focuses on the new European Strategy on Education & Training in the context of the "Europe 2020", underlining the main modifications in education, training and LLL (indicators, benchmarks, etc), as well as the new policy tools developed and implemented (such as JAF).. It provides a brief depiction of the major priorities of the new E&T 2020 work programme highlighting the emphasis, as in the Lisbon strategy, on reskilling and VET as prime movers for increasing employability and promoting development. The paper ends in a critical review of the current LLL strategy and its broader role, given the side effects of the recession.

Keywords

European LLL Policy, Lisbon Strategy, "Europe 2020", Education & Training, Policy Rationality, Reskilling, Employability, Learning Paradigm, VET, EQF, JAF, OMC, Skills Mismatch.

Preliminary remarks on the EU2020

The EU2020 strategy was developed in order to contribute in an actual Recovery and Development Plan, including major developmental, economic and social issues (i.e. "new skills for new jobs").[2] It was developed as a response to the challenges, set by the crisis. Key terms in the strategy include: *smart, sustainable and inclusive growth*, high employment and social inclusion according to the Commission's Communication on EU2020. Education and Training are central in this strategy. Obviously Education Policy has a privileged role to play.[3]

More specifically, "the EU2020 strategy mentions seven European flagships including "youth on the move" and "new skills for new jobs", which are of particular relevance for education and training."[4]

1 Sketching the Historical Background: The Road to Lisbon and the Quest for a New Mission. LLL Rising

Since 1992, according to Murphy, "Member States gradually proceeded in ceding partial sovereignty over many areas of political decision making, including education, which were powerfully guarded as part of their legal dominion."[5] In fact, the gradual "loss of the international competitive advantage especially in the rapidly growing sectors"[6] constituted a reliable threat for the EU that had remarkable impact in the existing public policy complex and affected the development of the Lisbon Strategy. Life Long Learning (LLL) became a focal point of the whole EU developmental strategy for the previous decade, perceived as the institutional and operational umbrella for both Education and Training policy and practice, that could provide a new paradigm in HRD in order to increase competitiveness.[7]

The Lisbon Strategy (began in 2000) came to propose an overall strategic framework as a response to the demands of the EU Member States for a Knowledge Society, with main priorities being growth and jobs, lifelong learning as a leading feature and innovation as a vehicle for economic change, through the implementation of research initiatives.[8] The need towards Lifelong Learning was defined to a great extend by the concern on the effectiveness of the traditional education systems at a national and supranational level.[9]

The safeguard of the economic sustainability terms of the Union and the recovery of its competitive advantage in the global economy inevitably led the member states to the introduction of an actual supranationality as the only means to achieve those goals. Within the new framework for the development of policies in Education, Training and Lifelong Learning, namely, the Work Programme "Education & Training 2010" of the Lisbon Strategy[10], supranationality came to guide many educational reforms at the national level.[11]

Subsequently, the reform agenda promoted through the Lisbon Strategy for growth and jobs, has led to the gradual transformation of education policies into active employment policies[12] and to the overdetermination of education policy by the macro-economic agenda.[13]

Under this scope, national governments were invited to proceed in national reforms with the use of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) in policy planning and implementation.[14]

A typical example of the OMC lays on the development of the Education and Training 2010 work programme and more specifically in the use of "tools" such as, clusters, peer learning activities, networks, university-business partnerships, etc. Emphasis was laid on the development and reinforcement of skills through a continuous reskilling.[15]

Besides strengthening the competitiveness of the EU economy, what was desired was the creation of education and training systems, which would be able to contribute to employability in a decisive manner.

2 The Key Priorities of the Lisbon Strategy and its Final Outcomes

The main priority of the Lisbon Strategy in education and training fields was Lifelong Learning itself, with emphasis on the participation of the 12,5% of people aged 25-64 on Lifelong Learning programmes until 2010.[16]

There were other four benchmarks (see Table 1).[17] The other key priorities of the Lisbon Strategy included:

—The change of the "learning paradigm", throughout LLL, towards a competence-based learning with a simultaneous turn towards the learning outcomes (knowledge, competences, skills).[18]

— The actual development of the 8 key competences within the entire spectrum of Lifelong Learning.[19]

— Emphasis on benchmarking, with a gradual turn from strict quantitative benchmarks towards composite indicators.[20]

— The establishment of common "European Indicators and Benchmarks" where possible and the simultaneous formation of reference criteria for each member-state referring to metacognitive competences, active citizenship, participation in adult education etc.[21]

— The development of the European Qualifications Framework (EQF) and subsequently of the National Qualification Frameworks[22] and the prioritization of Vocational Education and Training.[23]

— The "structuring of quality assurance systems."[24]

This exploited technocracy contributed to the establishment of a new equilibrium among expertise, interest politics and political power aiming at a legitimate establishment of the effectiveness intended.[25]

All of the above depict the drift of education, training and Lifelong Learning policies from the individual goals (such as "mobility") to an overall approach through the exchange of best practices. Emphasis was now given on what is able to be measured. However, it is not uncommon that within this transformed framework there were cases where the "sovereignty of quantitative indicators… shrinked the political content of the comparison…and in fact "obliged" the Member States to move towards the accomplishment of specific values-goals."[26]

At the end of the day, the Lisbon Strategy did not fully fulfill its objectives in the fields of Lifelong Learning, Education and Training (as well as in several other fields) (see Diagram 1 and Table 1, showing the progress of Member-States with regard to the Lisbon objectives in the fields of education and training).



Diagram 1
Source: European Commission DG EAC as appears in European Commission, *Progress towards the Common European Objectives in Education and Training. Indicators and Benchmarks – 2010/2011* (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2011), 11.

Lisbon Objectives	EU Benchmarks for 2010	EU Average for 2010
Early Leavers from Education	Less than 10%	14.4%
Low Achievers in Reading Literacy	17% (decrease at least 20%)	20%
Completion of Upper Secondary Education	85% (at least)	78,6%
Adult Lifelong Learning Participation	12,5%	9,3%
MST Graduates	Increase by 15%	More than 37,6% increase

Table 1. Member-States Progress towards Meeting the Five Benchmarks for 2010 (2000-2010)

The combination of political maximalism and visionary superiority widened the institutional and regulatory asymmetries among the Member-States.[28] The sovereignty of specific economic values and consequently, the prevalence of economic rationality in the implementation of the strategy for Lifelong Learning in combination with the almost obsessive (in Krugman's terms) reference of all main policy imperatives to competitiveness created a quite monothematic agenda.

The abovementioned agenda overdetermined discursive practices and policy making. The constant appeal to reskilling (with the implicit adoption of a simplifying mismatch assumption) as a basic «tool» to cope with former and new unemployment, deterred a more holistic approach to the unemployment problem.

3 EU2020. Trends and Dimensions of the New Reform Agenda

The first phase for the design as well as the beginning of the implementation of the EU2020 in the fields of education and training, has, besides the major modifications, maintained the emphasis on reskilling and strained the necessity for greater flexibility.

The new framework has been defined by two important changes:

1. A new policy tool, the Joint Assessment Framework (JAF), is implemented to provide optimal coordination[29] while…

2. out of the 5 benchmarks of the European strategy designating the real policy priorities for the new decade have completely changed and the remaining three have been reformed either in content or in quantity.[30]

More specifically, the two new indicators concern:[31]

— Participation in Tertiary Education (replacing the equivalent indicator on Secondary Education) with a benchmark of 40% of the population aged 30-34 by 2020.

— Participation in pre-school education, which replaces the indicator concerning science and technology graduates, and sets the benchmark for 95% of children at the age of 4 by 2020.

Moreover:[32]

— The drop-out rate is now extended to training as well and sets the benchmark of falling to 10% in total in education and training.

— The indicator on low achievers is extended besides literacy to other "key competences", such as mathematical competency and sciences. The ultimate benchmark is for the "operationally illiterate" rate to fall below 15% of the population aged 15 (according to comparative data provided by PISA, OECD) by 2020.

— The benchmark for the participation of adults on Lifelong Learning is raised to 15%.

It is worth to mention that for the first time, two of the key indicators-priorities (early school leaving from education and training and tertiary education) are included in the main agenda of the EU2020 (headline targets)[33] (see Diagram 2).



Diagram 2. The 2020 Benchmarks for Education & Training
Source: European Commission – DG EAC as appears in European Commission, *Progress towards the Common European Objectives in Education and Training. Indicators and Benchmarks – 2010/2011* (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2011), 17.

Furthermore, in November 2011 and May 2012, two new benchmarks were adopted concerning employment rate of recent graduates (employability-benchmark up to 82%) and learning mobility while a language skills benchmark has been in progress.[34]

The following table (Table 2) shows in detail the performance of M-S in 2012 with respect to the 2020 benchmarks compared with the 2009 EU average.

			EU average		HIGHEST performer	LOWEST performer
			2009	2012	2012	2012
Europe 2020 headline targets						
Early leavers from education and training *Europe 2020 headline target: less than 10%*			14.2%	12.7%	4.2%	24.9%
Tertiary education attainment *Europe 2020 headline target: at least 40%*			32.1%	35.7%	51.1%	21.7%
ET 2020 benchmarks						
Early childhood education and care *ET 2020 target: 95%*			91.7%	93.2%[11]	100%[11]	70.6%[11]
Low achievers in basic skills *ET 2020 target: 15%*		Reading	19.6%	:	8.1%[09]	41.0%[09]
		Maths	22.2%	:	7.8%[09]	47.1%[09]
		Science	17.7%	:	6.0%[09]	41.4%[09]
Learning mobility	IVET	Leonardo da Vinci outbound	0.6%	0.7%[11]	7.1%[11]	0.1%[11]
	Higher education	Erasmus inbound	:	1.1%[11]	8.4%[11]	0.0%[11]
		Inbound degree mobile students	:	7.0%[11]	40.6%[11]	0.5%[11]
Employment rate of recent graduates *ET 2020 target: 82%*			78.3%	75.7%	91.9%	42.9%
Adult participation in lifelong learning *ET 2020 target: 15%*			9.2%	9.0%	31.6%	1.4%
Proposed ET 2020 benchmark[14]						
Foreign language skills		ISCED 2 students at proficiency level B1 or higher in first foreign language[1]	:	43.5%[11]	82.7%[11]	9.3%[11]
		ISCED 2 students learning a second foreign language	58.6%	60.8%[10]	100%[11]	0.0%[11]

Table 2. Education and Training Benchmarks (2009 & 2012)
Source: CEDEFOP, EAC, European Survey on Language Competences (ESLC), Eurostat (LFS-ISS-UOE), IEA TMSS, Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, OECD (PISA) as appears in European Commission, *Education and Training Monitor 2013* (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2013) 12.

As the above Table shows, in 2012, regarding early leavers from education and training the EU average stood at 12.7%. Compared with 2009 the rate decreased only by 1.5 percentage points[35].

Regarding the other key indicators:[36]

— The benchmark of tertiary education attainment (aged 30-34), reached to 35.7% (2009 EU average: 32.1%) (Diagram 3).



Diagram 3: Tertiary Education Attainment, aged 30-34 (%)
Source: Eurostat (Labour Force Survey) as appears in European Commission, *Education and Training Monitor 2013* (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2013), 39.

— The participation in early childhood education and care (ECEC), in 2011, stood at 93.2%.

— Furthermore, there are no statistics for 2012 concerning low achievers in Reading, Maths and Science. However, in 2009, the EU-28 average reached 19.6% in Reading Literacy, 22.2% in Maths and 17.7% in Science. Those three EU averages are far from the EU 2020 benchmark (15%), except for the EU average in science which is slightly above.

— The adult participation in Lifelong Learning decreased to 9%.

— The employment rate of recent graduates reached to 75.7%. However, it was decreased by 2.6 percentage points from the 2009 EU average.

For the successful implementation of the ET strategy and in order to fill in the implementation gap, efficient monitoring mechanisms are used (including reporting and assessment of the National Reform Programmes, coordination at the Eurozone level and quality assurance in the data policy).[37]

The fundamental tools for fine tuning in education and training include:

a) The ELLI index emphasising the socio-economic outcomes of LLL".[38]

b) The evidence-based policy making paradigm (Policy, Practice, R&D).[39]

c) The JAF, which is an analytical tool, developed initially for employment, including integrated guidelines, such as 8 and 9 concerning education and training. It uses Key overall indicators and Sub indicators.[40] It is based on "a qualitative and quantitative assessment methodology to identify key employment and social challenges. It employs a simple methodology-basically visual – to pinpoint potential problem areas".[41]

One of the most important modifications concerns the prioritization of the indicator of Employability (consisted by 6 sub-indicators) and its direct correlation to Education and Training.[42]

The ET 2020 strategy: a) promotes VET aiming at employability and social cohesion and b) calls for 'closer cooperation between general and vocational education sectors as a preventive approach to early leaving from E&T'.[43]

Within the overall strategy for the next 6 years, EU2020 prioritizes:

– the importance of flexible learning pathways and…

– the need to reinforce the attractiveness of VET among the key target groups.[44]

Increasing participation and improving quality and flexibility of VET are also key policy objectives.[45] Within this context, a key issue and a challenge for the member-states is the validation of non-formal and informal learning, within a 'mutual zone of understanding'.[46]

Even though supply and demand in skills, concerning high skilled population, seem, (see Table 3), to move towards the same direction, supply rises remarkably faster than demand. The crisis has affected the field and probably will increase further the existing skills miss-match in quantitative terms.[47]

Despite VET development and prioritization, training cannot operate individually to fulfill the broader expectation-mission (given by the Commission within EU2020) in competing/ facing unemployment and recession side effects. What we actually need is a major paradigm shift in the core of the existing public policy complex as such.

	Demand for skills						Supply of skills					
	High Change (%)		Medium Change (%)		Low Change (%)		High Change (%)		Medium Change (%)		Low Change (%)	
	2000 - 2010	2010 - 2020	2000 - 2010	2010 - 2020	2000 - 2010	2010 - 2020	2000 - 2010	2010 - 2020	2000 - 2010	2010 - 2020	2000 - 2010	2010 - 2020
EU27	**31.5**	**19.7**	**9.4**	**4.8**	**-21.0**	**-20.1**	**44.3**	**26.5**	**8.0**	**1.8**	**-17.3**	**-28.9**
Belgium	28.4	16.3	21.4	13.5	-28.3	-19.4	31.5	19.7	25.1	11.5	-25.2	-31.7
Bulgaria	20.8	10.0	25.3	3.1	-26.8	-24.0	19.2	8.2	3.7	-0.9	-31.5	-34.9
Czech Republic	38.6	30.3	2.3	-3.0	-34.9	-15.1	47.6	46.2	0.9	-6.3	-40.2	-47.5
Denmark	23.9	13.0	-22.5	-14.9	33.3	20.8	38.7	20.7	-18.6	-13.3	7.6	4.0
Germany	10.3	0.4	5.9	0.4	-14.6	-6.5	16.4	9.0	7.8	-2.5	-15.5	-18.1
Estonia	21.4	5.6	-11.1	6.1	-19.2	17.5	37.1	12.4	-0.9	-6.9	-31.2	-24.0
Ireland	67.7	16.8	5.9	13.2	-33.1	-30.2	86.2	13.8	20.3	5.2	-23.2	-33.8
Greece	47.1	22.0	15.2	15.9	-13.4	-24.4	51.1	24.6	12.7	11.3	-16.0	-26.7
Spain	50.0	26.2	51.5	32.2	-17.6	-32.2	66.9	23.1	69.4	30.1	-3.9	-39.3
France	31.1	32.3	3.9	2.2	-20.2	-16.9	45.7	29.3	10.4	3.5	-18.4	-20.4
Italy	44.0	21.6	22.8	13.1	-16.1	-18.2	56.5	34.5	19.5	13.2	-18.4	-25.5
Cyprus	63.3	33.3	28.0	13.9	-13.1	-18.3	75.3	30.8	38.7	17.5	-10.1	-26.5
Latvia	27.0	23.7	-9.1	-6.4	-12.6	36.0	46.9	29.0	0.0	-11.7	-30.6	-27.6
Lithuania	-10.7	-9.0	14.7	17.2	-47.2	4.9	5.0	3.0	12.0	-0.2	-61.0	-40.7
Luxembourg	88.7	29.9	36.9	16.4	0.0	-30.7	107.1	34.5	18.8	18.9	-22.2	-38.8
Hungary	37.2	25.9	-8.5	-2.2	-38.7	-13.2	50.2	38.6	0.1	-6.5	-30.9	-49.0
Malta	81.8	22.5	44.0	36.1	-11.0	-20.2	95.7	37.8	46.4	31.7	-13.0	-37.9
Netherlands	45.7	26.1	-2.2	-1.8	-13.3	-11.1	52.1	34.6	0.9	-0.1	-16.2	-30.1
Austria	43.7	31.1	4.5	-1.7	-5.7	-9.4	62.2	51.2	5.4	-6.9	-10.7	-22.9
Poland	54.8	26.7	9.5	-13.7	-12.5	-3.6	39.4	45.5	-5.9	-15.1	-19.2	-32.5
Portugal	63.1	18.2	38.8	40.3	-18.3	-14.9	71.7	24.0	49.8	26.4	-11.7	-15.6
Romania	13.8	27.1	-1.7	0.8	-46.5	-17.2	359.6	71.4	-26.6	-17.8	-0.3	-22.9
Slovakia	48.7	39.2	2.9	-1.5	-44.6	-14.8	66.3	28.5	3.4	-6.7	-23.4	-29.4
Slovenia	56.4	25.5	0.2	-5.7	-29.7	-15.6	66.6	40.5	0.4	-3.8	-36.7	-41.6
Finland	32.3	11.4	9.2	4.2	-32.4	-20.1	36.2	26.4	2.6	-9.9	-43.0	-45.5
Sweden	18.9	9.0	0.4	5.6	-5.0	4.0	39.3	28.8	7.3	-2.4	-6.7	-25.9
United Kingdom	30.6	19.4	16.6	15.7	-30.7	-44.4	40.2	20.4	19.7	13.0	-29.6	-43.6

Table 3: Demand and Supply for Skills by Qualification Levels
Source: CEDEFOP skills forecasts (2012) as appears in European Commission, Education and Training Monitor 2012 (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2012), 57.

4 Concluding Remarks

The EU2020 has introduced new benchmarks and headline targets in the fields of education, training and LLL. It has increased its social dimension comparing with the Lisbon Strategy and it clearly emphasizes employability. But it seems that the prevalence of the economic rationality still exists.

EU2020 follows the methodological legacy of the Lisbon Strategy in policy making, but on the other hand it introduces new more elaborated policy tools (such as JAF) in order to achieve fine tuning at both supranational and national level.

EU2020 seems less maximalistic than the Lisbon Strategy, even though some of the key objectives (such as the ones concerning low achievers in Read-

ing, Maths and Science, adult participation in Lifelong Learning and the employment rate of recent graduates) are not likely be achieved. Additionally there are still remarkable gaps concerning the Member-States "performance" in the abovementioned domains.

All the abovementioned raise the inevitable questions:

Is EU2020 a better strategy? Probably yes.

Is it a totally new one comparing with the Lisbon Strategy? Not, in fact.

Taking into account the methodological inheritance of the Lisbon Strategy, but also the inability to reach most of its benchmarks (at the EU level), the emerging question is whether another European policy on Lifelong Learning is now feasible, let alone in the middle of the crisis. It seems that it is, but is it the proper one?

The European Commission insists on the need for reforms, despite or even because of the effects of the crisis. Who could disagree? But, it seems to insist, simultaneously, on the prioritization of the macro-economic surveillance of the reforms, comparing to the Welfare priorities and needs. We have to reconsider it. In any case, the real and actual problems remain, even growing bigger. Within such a context, training cannot be perceived as a panacea for dealing with unemployment.

In fact, the problems inherited by the previous decade, notably, the gradual abandonment of regulation, the deficits and in some cases ambiguity in decision making and governance at the EU level, the inability to manage asymmetries and gaps between the M-S (deepening, due to the crisis) and a 'tradition' of procedural fetishism now seem to coexist with enlarged social insecurity, institutional delegitimation and political frustration. And this is a challenge that cannot be confronted by just a new Education, Training and LLL strategy (without underestimating its importance and necessity). It presupposes major transformations in the public policy complex and a new equilibrium between the macroeconomic agenda and the Welfare policies (in fond of the second).

The situation described above inevitably affected the lifelong learning strategy within the EU2020. A strategy which, however, has to remain visible and sustainable, since it is directly related to the sustainability of the

European Union. Even it is not enough to provide a holistic "remedy" for the above-mentioned problems (i.e. unemployment), LLL strategy is absolutely necessary as a substantial determinant of a more inclusive public policy complex.

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Why Does Europe Not Positively Inspire Russia to Find Its Identity?

Kamen Lozev

Abstract

The paper discusses the 'spiritual vacuum', or the identity crisis, in today's Russia exhibited by the lack of a well-stated and well-supported contemporary 'Russian Idea'. Brief historical survey shows that the image of 'Europe', or the 'West', had permanently been dividing Russia's intelligentsia into opposing camps: the pro-Europeans (*zapadniki*, westernizers) vs. the anti-Europeans (*Slavophiles*, anti-westerners). 'Europe' serves as some "reference point" to identify Russia's place, or Russia's mission (the *Russian Idea*), in the world. 'Europe' today is still splitting apart Russia with the Eurasian ideology being the radical anti-European pole . Key ideas of Alexander Dugin, the founder of neo-Eurasianism, are discussed to show how profoundly the European values and principles diverge from Dugin's ideology.

Keywords

Russia's Identity, Slavophiles, Westernizers, Neo-Eurasionism, Dugin.

The issue of Russia's identity is both interesting and difficult. Europe (The West) has always been involved in the debates about it and in view of this I will try to substantiate the conclusion that so far Europe has not succeeded in inspiring Russia to define itself as a European country. Today *Russkiy mir* (the Russian world) is by no means European, and those who associate themselves with the *Russkiy mir* do not consider themselves Europeans. However, in Russia today, as well as in the past, there is and has been a pro-European (Western) camp, insisting that Russia has been and always will be part of Europe and therefore a European country, and that the urgent priority of Russia now is to speed up the "europeanization processes". This tendency has always been defeated in favour of other tendencies insisting on the uniqueness and originality of the "Russian way" and pursuing the realization of the "Russian idea."

The heated debates over Russia's identity are not new or unusual. There is a saying that "for millennia Russia has been in search for Russia"[1]. These words

reflect the complexity of the question and bewilderment of Russians every time they ask themselves: *Who are we?*

Nikolay Berdyaev, the great religious thinker who constantly wrote about the *Russian way* and the *Russian idea* stated that "brokenness, interruptedness is characteristic for the Russian history... The development of Russia was catastrophical."[2]. Unlike the Slavophiles, Berdyaev does not find anything "organic" in Russia's development. On the contrary, potential for "catastophe" is, according to him, Russia's historical destiny.

The latest catastrophic point in Russia's history was around the year of 1991, when the Soviet Union was peacefully and painlessly dismantled. Putin often describes this as "the greatest geopolitical disaster of the Twentieth century"[3]. The interesting point here is that Putin's statement is totally within the tradition of the Russian religious philosophy of history.

The catastrophe had many faces, and among others it had a spiritual aspect. It led to an identity crisis. Russians felt humiliated in many ways; Yeltsin's "shock therapy" was de facto "economic genocide" (Al. Rutzkoy), and the situation in Russia became worse than during the Great Depression in the West decades ago. The "Russian idea" in its Soviet version had come to a deplorable end. Russians felt poor, lost and disillusioned. They also felt misunderstood and abandoned by the West; after all, the huge and powerful Soviet empire, as S. Karaganov and D. Trenin point out, was neither defeated or occupied, nor put under control by an outside power. All was done in the name of democracy, of Western values and of integrating Russia into the family of prosperous nations. But reality showed an ugly face, and the West did not care and did not help Russia. In my assessment, during the 1990s a great chance was missed – both by the West and Russia – that of turning Russia into a modernizing and europeanizing country, of building a common future with the West. This was not to be. In the second half of his presidency Yeltsin changed his language. As for his successor, Putin, we can hardly feel in his talk of "sovereign democracy" and "Russia as a specific civilization" the signs of following a European model.

The theoretical discussion about the identity of Russia was initiated in the first half of the nineteenth century when Chaadaev's *Philosophical Letter* quickly split the intelligentsia into two opposing camps: the *Westernizers* and the *Slavophiles*. Herzen compared the *Letter* to "a shot produced in the dark night;"

it was the first awakening of original historiosophic thought. The fundamental question was: Is Russia destined to repeat in its development the phases of the West or it is moving forward in its own singular way? Both camps loved Russia, but as Herzen put it, the Westernizers loved her as a child while the Slavophiles - as a mother[4]. The central dividing line between the camps was their assessment of Peter the Great and his reforms aiming at westernizing Russia. While the Westernizers saw Peter as a great reformer, the Slavophiles insisted on the specificity of the Russian culture, to which Eastern Orthodoxy had given birth, and saw Peter's reforms as betrayal of the authentic spirit of Russia.

Influenced by Schelling and the German romanticism, especially by the principles of *organicity* and *wholeness*, the Slavophiles repeatedly compared Russia and Europe, explaining some of the identity features of the Russian people and emphasizing the reasons why Russia cannot be a European country. They were religious thinkers, and for them Russian Orthodoxy was the strongest factor shaping the character of the Russian people. Wherever they turned, they found the formative function of religion. Alexey Khomyakov, one of the fathers of the Slavophile movement, believed that religious faith permeates philosophical thought and is also the basis of all civilizations and ways in history. This meant that Russia and Europe are doomed to be different since the archetypal basis of Russia is Orthodoxy while for Western Europe it is Catholicism.

The Slavophiles found three identifying "elements" of the West that they claimed to be alien to Russia. Ivan Kireyevski points them out: first, the Roman Church, second, the Roman education and erudition, and third, the Roman state, born out of the violence of the conquests (79).

The Roman Church was criticized for having allowed the spirit of Rationalism to penetrate into Catholic scholastic thought. For the Slavophiles Rationalism was like the Second Fall of Man, it was the source of all evils. In the West theology had assumed the character of abstract reasoning while in Eastern Orthodoxy it retained the inner wholeness of the spirit. Rationalism led the West to a specific kind of thinking – categorical, broken, fragmented, dismembered, divided, in contrast to the thinking in Russia which retains integrality, totality, wholeness. The loss of spiritual wholeness in the West led to fundamental changes in life: "In the West," Konstantin Aksakov wrote, "*souls are killed*, replacing them by improved state forms, police public utilities; consciousness is replaced by law, the inner motive –

by regulation, even charity is turned into a mechanistic activity; in the West all worries concern the state forms." (79)

The second element – Roman education and erudition – had led in the end to the reign of jurisdiction, formalism and aristocratism. The Slavophiles believed all these came from Rome. This meant that Western society had lost its organic character. If the society is of an organic nature, the Slavophiles maintained, it would never need formal-juridical regulation, human relations would not need contracts or any other guarantee.

The third element, the Roman state, the Slavophiles claimed, is absolutely alien to the Russian people. "The basis of the Russian society and state are good will, freedom and peace." (78) Berdyaev severely criticized this last statement of K. Aksakov as naïve, romantic and totally inadequate to explain the Russian history and the origin of the huge military empire and the hypertrophy of power in Russia. The Slavophiles, however, insisted that the Russian people is the most obedient, pious and peaceful of all peoples in the world. They offered an explanation of Russian "самодержавие" (autocracy, absolutism) totally based on Orthodoxy and the idea that power and politics are "зло и грязь" (evil and dirt); the Russian tsar *was elected* during the time of the Moscow kingdom and *assigned* power as a *burden*, not as a *right*. He was likened to the head of a family and was called "царь-батюшка" (tsar-father). The Russian people never wanted to deal with power, politics, glory and conquests; all they wanted was peace and spiritual freedom.

Alexey Khomyakov elaborated on another original Russian trait: *sobornost* (togetherness). According to him *sobornost* is so fundamental that without it the distinction between Russia and Europe cannot be understood. Russia is *soborna,* Europe is individualistic and collectivistic. Collectivism means outer and organized togetherness; *sobornost* is the opposite – it is an expression of liberty realized in togetherness, it is life according to the choir principle when the personality is not suppressed, but is simply deprived of its violence, egoism and exclusiveness. *Sobornost* results out of the full-blooded spiritual life of the Orthodox church.

It is difficult for a westerner to understand the spirit of *sobornost,* and, in general, the spirit of Russian-Eastern Orthodoxy. Why? The reason, according to the Slavophiles, is again the formal and rational thinking of the West. Both

Western churches – the Catholic and the Protestant – incarnate the spirit of authority. Khomyakov insists that Russian *sobornost,* based on love and freedom, is a denial of the spirit of authoritarianism: "We recognize no Head of the Church – neither secular, nor spiritual. Christ is the Head – and it recognizes no other." "The Church is no authority, just like God is no authority; Christ is no authority either. Because authority is something outward for us. Not the authority, but the truth and at the same time the life of the Christian is its internal life." "The Church knows brotherhood, not submission." [5]

The Slavophiles claimed that it is in Russian Orthodoxy where the spirit of brotherhood in the name of Christ lives. The fundamental belief is that Christianity was adopted in greater purity by the Russian people than by the West, because Christian truth fell on virgin soil there. Here lie the roots of a fundamental trait of Russians: their messianism. The Russian people is just as messianic as the Jewish people. The *Russian idea* can be understood only through understanding this specificity of the Russian people: they believe that they bear the supreme duty to spread true Christianity in the world. In his poetry Khomyakov conveys this very emotionally: "open to *them* the secret of freedom," "give *them* the gift of holy freedom" (82). Here "them" is Europe, the Europeans, who never understood the free spirit of true Christianity.

The discussions among the Slavophiles and the Westernizers focused the attention on the identity traits of the Russian people. Both camps discussed the differences between Russia and Europe and their philosophy of history left an indelible mark in the manner of thinking about Russia and the Russians. By the end of the nineteenth century this intellectual movement was overcome, but the questions it raised continued to be discussed by the intelligentsia. Prior to the Revolution of 1917 another intellectual movement came into being, now known as the "Old Eurasionism." It tried to make sense of Russia's place on two continents – not only geographically but also geopolitically and culturally.

Today one of the successors of this thinking is Alexander Dugin, founder of the neo-Eurasionist movement, which has been transformed into the political party "Eurasia" (2002). Dugin has written extensively on many varied topics but I shall deal only with three of his ideas which are of direct relevance to this presentation. He was recently dubbed as "Putin's Rasputin," as "the expansionist behind Putin." His doctrines are a strange, even exotic, mix of communism, Nazism, ecologism and Mother Russianism, but the Kremlin views them with

sympathy. Dugin can be understood only in the context of the breakdown of the USSR. He seeks to respond to the crisis of the 90s by imitating and radicalizing old ideas.

On the issue of Russia's identity Dugin proceeds from an *axiom* he deems to be central: „Russia is not a country, it is a civilization."[6] If we think of Russia as a normal, European country she will "automatically become a caricature of a country". Dugin explains why: the main political, economic and socio-cultural processes have followed a natural logic in Europe and in the West, while in Russia they have taken a different, original, unique course. This is a typical Slavophile position leading to the conclusion: Russia is commensurable only with Europe as a whole or with the Chinese civilization. The Russian identity is a *civilizational identity*. The man of the Russian world has to be conscious of this and have the self-confidence that he lives in a special civilization. Gigantic processes of political and economic integration are nowadays underway, so Russia bears the responsibility to re-unite the countries which have temporarily slipped from this civilization and construct the Eurasion Union.

This "axiom," however, has another merit: if Russia is viewed as an ordinary country all its uniqueness will disappear. Why? Because all its specific ethnic, confessional and cultural groups will then have grounds to claim independence, and Russia will be blamed as an oppressor trying to "russify" everything. According to Dugin, all this is changed if Russia is seen as the basis of the Eurasian civilization. It will then be attractive, because its aim will be to preserve and guarantee the uniqueness of all these groups and all other elements without forcing them to choose one model or another, stimulating their development. Dugin's concern and fear these days is the "project of creating a Rossiyskaya (not Russkaya, i.e. Russian) nation" which goes directly against his "axiom" and threatens to further break down the Russian Federation.

The second "identification" claim is this: as the basis of the Eurasian civilization Russia can exist only as an *empire*. Historically, Dugin emphasises, we have developed as an empire, a powerful and great empire. "If Russia is not great, it will not exist." "The identity of the Russian is imperial: ... the empire is part and parcel of our history, this is our identity, our destiny... We are imperial people. And we should not be embarrassed by this." [7]

The imperial nature of the Russian people leads Dugin to claim the existence of a specific "Eurasian super-ethnos". It will counter the other super-ethnos, the American one, and its forced globalization. The Russian ethnos is in the centre of the Eurasian super-ethnos.

But has not the Russian people historically been seen as the leading *Slavic* people? Dugin is reluctant on this: "The Russians are not Slavs, nor Turks, neither are they Aryans or Asians. They are a special community endowed with a great mission" (316). To be an empire is Russia's "state identity," its destiny. Russia is called upon to build the Eurasian empire which can be nothing less than global in scale: "It is the goal of full Eurasianism – Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok. Great Eurasian Continental Empire. And we will build it."[8] A Slavic empire, Dugin calculates, would only be regional and therefore inadequate for Russia's mission. The Russians are most fit to be in the centre of the empire because the Russian people is over-national, or super-national, and therefore able to accommodate within itself the various ethnic elements of the Eurasian empire. Dugin is obsessed with his broader view of the eternal war between the ocean and the land: Russia personifies the empire of the land while the US and Great Britain represent the empire of the sea. Interestingly enough, the "liberating mission" of Russia with respect to Europe is to free it from the Atlantic reign: in a TV interview Dugin sees as part of Russia's national idea the "conquering of Europe in the Russian way" and creating some kind of protectorate under the Russian tsar or president.

And there is a third, perhaps the most important, identification feature – Eastern Orthodoxy. Dugin is absolutely clear about its importance: "We are first Orthodox, then Russians and only after that – humans"[9] Like the Slavophiles, Dugin thinks Russia was 'most organic' during the Moscow Kingdom. Unlike them, however, he emphasizes the unity and fusion of the secular with the religious power, which he names "symphony of power"[10]. Russia then was "святая Русь" (Holy Rus), and this idea of the sacralization of power and of turning contemporary Russia into "святая Русь" is still living in Dugin.

There is hardly any need of showing that Dugin's doctrines are anti-Western and anti-European. The Slavophiles loved the West which for them was Europe. Dugin fears the West which for him is "the quintessence of

the West – the USA," and he dreams of "destroying the Atlantic empire" and reviving the glory of the lost Soviet empire. Dugin's ideas have great influence on high-level Russian statesmen, even on Putin himself. Though obviously radical, his doctrines are also well received by many ordinary Russians. The existence of Dugin and of thinkers like him in contemporary Russia perhaps shows best how Europe (the West) does not positively stimulate Russia to find its identity.

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SECTION I
History, Geography, Science

EUROPE
A Perennial Cultural Crossroads

Chairs

—

Denise Egéa & Michèle Lemettais

Participants

—

Petra Munro Hendry
Ivone Moreira
Marianna Papastephanou
Zdenko Kodelja
Denise Egéa
Michèle Lemettais

Presentation

Denise Egéa & Michèle Lemettais

Throughout its history, Europe has never ceased to oscillate between unity and division and, today, numerous viewpoints still compete as to what "The New Europe" is, can or should be. The idea of the unification of Europe has evolved throughout the centuries, and, if the foundations of the individual nations may be similar, the interests of their peoples are greatly divergent, and incredibly diverse populations, ethnicities, languages, and religions, sometimes within the same borders, have been weaving the fabric of Europe throughout time. Nowadays, most nations in Europe can be labeled "multicultural" since different ethnic and religious groups live together, sometimes in harmony, sharing a dominant culture, sometimes in more or less violent animosity and distrust of one another.

In 1949, when the Congress of the Hague expressed the wish to establish a European cultural community, the "Founding Fathers" of Europe gave priority to economics, and the idea of the "Great Market" prevailed, while failing to initiate a cultural policy. So while Europe was thought out in terms of economy, socio-geography, or history from the start, little thought was given to a cultural community. For two decades each individual nation managed its own cultural capital and policies. Only after 1970 did it become evident that the European community wanted a "soul", a "spirit", Jean Monnet declaring: "If I had to do it again, I would start with culture."

Bound into an either/or stance toward culture, debates about integration vs multiculturalism have been at the heart of the political and ideological struggles over the control of education as a key to preserving and transmitting a cultural legacy or as the agent of cultural change. The construction of a European "spirit" or identity faces the dilemma of preserving an "idea" of Europe while not closing itself upon its own perceived identity and the necessity of respecting, at the same time, in Derrida's words, "differences, idioms, minorities, singularities" and "the universality of formal law, the desire for translation, agreement and univocity, the law of the majority," while avoiding both "dispersion" and the danger of a centralizing hegemony.

The breath of the papers presented in this session reflects the diversity and the depth of the cultural streams crisscrossing Europe, their influences beyond borders and time, and how education, amongst other factors, can help articulate a response to the difficult process of creating a European "spirit", "soul", identity. The 19th century idea of the construction of a Europe based on a common identity whose foundations would be the Greco-Roman Antiquity, Christianity, the values of Humanism and of the Enlightenment have long been exploded as more and more borders are toppled, allowing for a meeting, if not a merging yet, of influences, ideas, languages, etc. For Petra Hendry, the creation of a Franco-Afro-Creole democratic ideology, encompassing a culture of equality, came directly from the global diaspora engendered by the European colonization, while Ivone Moreira, through her analysis of Edmund Burke's reflections on the 1789 Revolution in France, posits that the influence of the French Revolution may have led to the unbridled, individualistic and soulless capitalism of the 21st century. One of the many thorny obstacles to achieving a genuine European union reside in its multilingual character, and Zdenko Kodelja proposes that linguistic justice becomes reality by considering Van Parijs' argument for a true linguistic diversity in Europe while continuing to use English as a lingua franca. Tackling another very thorny issue, Denise Egéa reconsiders the role of education and of the school itself in the debate between multiculturalism and integration, noting with Derrida that assimilation cannot be the answer, but nor can dispersion. Through a criticism of Braidotti's nomadic Europeanness, Marianna Papastephanou offers that an effective rupture with colonial times is an answer to the dangers associated with the concept of "fortress Europe". Finally, Michèle Lemettais questions the legitimacy of a European identity by considering Salman Rushdie's forced abandonment of his.

A Transatlantic Pedagogy
Louisiana's Franco-Afro-Creole Revolutionary Educational Tradition

Petra Munro Henry

Abstract

This paper examines the construct of European identity, and of European culture, by maintaining that these issues are intimately linked to the global diaspora of European colonization. It takes as its starting point a transatlantic worldview in which the colonial and early antebellum "south," specifically Louisiana, is reconceived as an international crossroads of European, African, Caribbean, South and North American intellectual exchanges (Hall, 1992). This re-conceptualization not only challenges the dominant geographic constructs of "Europe," but disrupts dominant narratives of educational history rooted in a Western, European standpoint by maintaining, like Paul Gilroy (1988) that this vibrant, hybrid crossroads, which he terms the "Black Atlantic," was the locus for a creolized democratic, revolutionary culture of equality. Born of the spirit of Catholic universalism and the democratic ideals of the American, Haitian and French revolutions (Scott, 2005), this paper traces a distinct Franco-Afro-Creole democratic ideology that developed in, what I term, the "pedagogical circuit" that encompassed Europe, West Africa, the Caribbean and the Mississippi Valley. An explication of this Afro-Franco-Creole culture highlights an educational tradition that is the result of a hybrid, transnational, and creole process that positions contemporary European identity in a transatlantic crossroads.

Keywords

Educational History, Black Atlantic, Enlightenment, Afro-Creole Education.

> Universal history goes from East to West. Europe is absolutely the end of universal history.… Universal history is the discipline of the indomitable natural will directed toward universality and subjective liberty.
>
> Hegel, *Philosophy of Universal History*

> Men make their own history, and the black Jacobins of San Domingo were to make history which would alter the fate of millions of men and shift the economic currents of three continents.
>
> C.L.R. James, *The Black Jacobins*

> The definition of universal history that begins to emerge here is this: rather than giving multiple, distinct cultures equal due, whereby people are recognized as part of humanity indirectly through the mediation of collective cultural identities, human universality emerges in the historical event at the point of rupture. It is in the discontinuities of history that people whose culture has been strained to the breaking point give expression to a humanity that goes beyond cultural limits.
>
> Susan Buck-Morss, *Hegel, Haiti and Universal History*

It hardly goes without saying that history is contested terrain. From the post-colonial to post-structuralist, deconstructionist and linguistic turn, the very possibility of history has been called into question. Unlike Hegel who maintains the "West" is the "end of history," or C.L.R. James who suggests that the black revolutionaries of the colonial empires "make history," I, like Susan Buck-Morss, ironically appropriate the much critiqued concept of "universal history" as a means to articulate a "trans-Atlantic cosmopolitan creole" revolutionary educational tradition that emerged in Louisiana. This requires re-conceiving traditional histories that posit the French metropole as literate, urban, and enlightened, in contrast to the colonies as oral, primitive and superstitious, cultures of a Creole world that are coded as inferior to the "purer" traditions they combine and "mix up."[1] Instead, I embrace a trans-Atlantic Creole cosmopolitanism in which the modernist concepts of east/west, colony/colonizer, metropole/periphery are no longer understood as bounded analytical pathways that travel seamlessly through time.

Alternatively, this paper takes as its starting point a transatlantic worldview of history in which colonial New France and early antebellum "Louisiana" are reconceived as an international crossroads of African, Caribbean, European, South and North American intellectual exchanges. [2] This re-conceptualization not only challenges the dominant geographic constructs of the nation state, but disrupts the "Enlightenment" and it corollary ideas of freedom, democracy and revolution, by maintaining like Paul Gilroy that this vibrant, hybrid crossroads, which he terms the "Black Atlantic," was the locus for a creolized democratic, revolutionary culture of equality.[3] Born of the spirit of Catholic universalism and the democratic ideals of the American, Haitian and French revolutions, this paper traces a distinct Louisiana Franco-Afro-Creole democratic ideology that developed in, what I term, a "trans-Atlantic pedagogical circuit" that encompassed West Africa, the Caribbean, the Mississippi Valley and Western Europe.[4]

The Atlantic world of Louisiana was one of intense cultural exchange between multiple groups: Africans from Senegal and Gambia (some of whom were educated, Catholic and Muslim, speaking multiple languages including Arabic and French), North American tribes such as the Houma and Natchez (whose 2,000 year economic exchange system spanned from Canada to South America), as well as French colonizers, priests, nuns and peasants. This transatlantic circuit brought into circulation numerous languages (Wolof, Bambara, French, Spanish, German, Portuguese, Houma, Iroqouis, Chicksaw, etc.), oral and written literary traditions, food ways, religions (Islam, Judaism, Catholicism), myriad technologies and material cultures. The multiple intersections within this hybrid trans-Atlantic circuit resulted in a Franco-Afro-Creole culture that created it own understandings of what it meant to be an educated citizen.

Excavating this pedagogical circuit I draw on the concept of a "problem space" (not a history, but a temporality) in which readings of the past do not function as a reference for some supposed future.[5] Drawing on Michel De Certeau's notion of history as everyday practice, this Franco-Afro-Creole tradition suggests a time/space matrix that requires a porosity of history, dislodging historical events like the Enlightenment to create new problem-spaces for understanding what has made possible the categories of modernity, particularly notions of democracy and the "public." Given this porosity, counter-narratives to dominant Enlightenment discourses emerge from a Franco-Afro-Creole intellectual tradition in which the subject of the "educated citizen" emerges not from the nation-state, but from a cosmopolitan "Creole Atlantic" understanding that posits a transnational, global citizen of an international "brotherhood."

Points of Entry

Given that New Orleans is considered "America's first genuinely multicultural metropolis" our point of entry on the "trans-Atlantic" circuit will be in Southern Louisiana.[6] In 1519, the Spanish were the first to document the numerous Indian settlements and extensive towns along the Gulf Coast. By the early 17th century European competition for colonial lands and riches resulted in establishment of New France. French exploration of the Mississippi valley was initiated by Frances' Canadian settler La Salle who in 1682 sought to confirm the connection between the upper Mississippi and the Gulf of Mexico.

France already had a presence in the Caribbean, on western Hispaniola. Better known as Saint-Domingue or Haiti, this "pearl of the Caribbean" was to become one of the world's wealthiest colonies. This wealth was derived from the massive number of enslaved Africans (800,000) who were forcibly brought to the colony between 1680-1780 who worked on the sugar, coffee and indigo plantations. While Saint-Domingue developed an exploitative plantation economy, Iberville in 1718 founded New Orleans as a strategic site from which to protect New France from the Spanish and English. New Orleans would not exist without the native geographical informants on whom Iberville and his brother Bienville relied. The critical geographical knowledge of the native Bayagoulo, Houma and Tunica provided early French explorers with the knowledge of the swamps, marshes, rivers, bayous, ridge systems and bays. They revealed to the newcomers the portages, safe routes, resources and foods without which the French would not have survived, much less settled the land.

Within a year of the founding of New Orleans, the Company of the Indies, who had been given management of the colony by the French crown, had sent 2,462 indentured servants (engagés), 1,215 exiles (prisoners, beggars and vagabounds) along with soldiers and workers of the Company of the Indies to develop the colony. Most of these colonists were unsuited or unwilling to engage in agricultural work, many died and or fled to native villages. Ultimately, the company was forced to bring enslaved Africans. The first two ships arrived from Senegambia in 1719. These ships contained not only African slaves, but rice seed. African knowledge of rice production literally ensured the survival of the early colony given that this became the only reliable food crop (Louisiana gumbo and jambalaya all have roots in African food ways using rice). African knowledge of food ways, river boating, medicine/herbs, and metalworking was essential to the colony. African religious beliefs, oral traditions, music and kinship systems would also shape Louisiana's vernacular culture including storytelling, folktales, voodoo, jazz as well as concepts of democracy. Notions of freedom were continually forged by Africans through a variety of ways including large Maroon communities (run away slaves living in the bayous) as well as slave revolts, like the 1731 revolt in which eight Bambara slaves plotted a rebellion against the French with the goal of taking over the colony.[7]

At the heart of this trans-Atlantic approach is the vital claim that enslaved, indentured, and Native populations "whose labor built much of the Atlantic

world were also thinkers and political actors, and that at certain points they transformed and expanded the meaning of democracy."[8] From a trans-Atlantic perspective, meanings of democracy (and its corollary, the educated citizen) were not exclusive to European enlightenment thought. Alternatively, I suggest that Enlightenment ideologies were sites of complex and contradictory negotiations of subject identities. In Louisiana, "multiracial, multicultural and multinational contact zones" were sites in complicating meanings of political identity through building communities that sought to define, create, and re-imagine and re-define the democratic, public sphere.[9] According to Gwedelyn Hall, "A slave in Africa probably had more rights that a poor white in France, and certainly more rights than a poor white in French Louisiana."[10] Enslaved Africans in French Louisiana had a strong sense of justice and demanded their rights within the framework of slavery that was spelled out in the *Code Noir* that provided certain rights to enslaved peoples.

The agency of enslaved Africans can also be attributed to a Latin European "universalist" religious culture in which "all" persons were to be inducted into the Catholic church; meaning that slaves were to be baptized, confirmed, could marry, could sue their masters, could buy their freedom and could serve as godparents. This inclusion within the most "public" and dominant cultural institution of the colony as spiritual "equals" provided enslaved persons access to dominant cultural mechanisms through which they could re-establish African cultural beliefs and kinship networks, be active agents, and most importantly be introduced into the basic rudiments of literacy. The churches mission of indoctrinating all members of French colonial society into the Catholic Church was particularly evident among the Ursuline Sisters who had arrived in New Orleans in 1727 and founded the Ursuline convent school. By educating girls of all races, classes and ethnicities it was the first public school in the American colonies to provide free, universal education for all girls.

As Gwedolyn Hall has maintained, due to the missionary influence grounded in "spiritual universalism," and the *Code Noir*, there was an openness to peoples of other races and cultures.[11] While slavery, and its unjust practices were never challenged by the Church, the spaces created through universalist Catholic religious practices produced a rich site for the appropriation, adaptation, and contestation of meanings that resulted in a shared, although complex (there were runaways, maroon communities, and slave revolts) "public" culture.

This universalist ethic challenged emerging Enlightenment constructs of equality as embedded in "rights" discourse maintaining instead that shared "public" spaces were critical to reflecting the moral equality of all human beings.

Creole Revolutionary Traditions

The three ideological traditions that emerged in the trans-Atlantic sphere: a distinctive universalist ethic of Catholic education; a Franco-Afro-Creole intellectual tradition rooted in the radical political philosophy of the age of democratic revolution (American, French and Haitian); and a transatlantic, hybrid, creole understanding of identity and citizenship resulted in a Franco-Afro-Creole understanding of education as embedded in a radical political ideology of moral equality in which citizenship was reflected not merely in "rights" discourse, but was embodied in a communal human dignity signified by shared public spaces, most importantly schools.[12] This radical vision of an egalitarian society culminated in Louisiana's 1868 constitution that mandated free, public, and racially integrated education for all children. According to Carolyn Cosse Bell:

> Louisiana's constitutional convention of 1867 was arguably the Reconstruction South's "most radical blueprint for change. It went to unprecedented lengths to achieve complete equality for black Louisianans. It required legislators and other state officials to recognize by oath, the civil and political equality of all men. It alone among Reconstruction constitutions explicitly required equal treatment on public transportation and other places of public accommodation. And it forbade segregation in public school. The school integration accommodation provisions of the Louisiana constitution were a century ahead of their time.[13]

According to Rebecca Scott "the language of 'public rights' captures something that a majority of the members of the Louisiana convention knew from experience: that individual dignity was nourished by formal respect in public space and public culture."[14]

The concept of the "public," and specifically "public rights," in defining citizenship in relation to Atlantic and Caribbean revolutionary traditions has recently been illuminated by Rebecca Scott.[15] New Orleans was a crossroads in which democratic ideologies circulated. As early as the American Revolu-

tion, Free Men of Color from Louisiana had served in the colored militia with their Spanish colonial counterpoints in fighting against the British in support of American independence. Revolutionary ideologies of *fraternity, liberty and brotherhood* infiltrated New Orleans during the French Revolution not only through news from France, but through the large number of émigrés who fled France during the aftermath of the revolution. The French Revolution became Americanized in its most dramatic form in St. Domingue (Haiti), where free people of African descent rose up for equality, and in August 1791, the enslaved revolted en masse. Slavery was abolished and Haiti became the second independent nation in the Americas. White Jacobins in the Americas: merchant seaman, dock workers, voyageurs, indentured servants and soldiers were eager to ally themselves with slaves and free people of African descent, supporting the full equality for people of all races and the abolition of slavery by any means necessary.[16] The ideology of the rights of man reverberated throughout lower Louisiana (a Spanish colony in 1791). Slaves in Louisiana were well informed about the French Convention's abolition of slavery in all French colonies. In 1795 a conspiracy to revolt, organized by both whites and the enslaved, was discovered by the Spanish authorities in Point Coupee, just miles upriver from New Orleans. The origins of this discontent are traced to a Waloon (a French speaking Belgian) teacher and tailor, Jospeh Bouavel, who had read to the slaves from the *Declaration of the Rights of Man*. Although the revolt was not successful (nor was the 1811 slave revolt) it is clear that revolutionary ideas of equality and democracy were well known among enslaved Africans and Free People of Color. Free People of color did not simply seize the ideas of liberty, equality and fraternity rather, they were instrumental in defining what these terms meant for revolutionaries on both sides of the Atlantic.

The democratic vision of Franco-Afro-Creoles and enslaved Africans was severely thwarted with the Americanization of Louisiana in 1804**.** Rigid binary understandings of race as either black/white resulted in the institutionalization of racial exclusions, which included a denial of voting rights, a ban on interracial marriage in 1808, and segregation in theatres in 1816. However, the revolutionary ideologies of Franco-Afro–Creoles were boosted by the influx of Haitian émigrés in the early nineteenth century, that not only doubled the population of free people of color in the state but also reinvigorated the entrenched French, Catholic culture in spite of ongoing persistent attempts by the Americans to impose their language, political ideology, religion, and understandings of race as a binary construct. Hopeful that

Americanization (Louisiana became a state in 1812) would led to full citizenship given the American Revolutionary ideologies of equality, Franco-Afro-Creoles were instead treated as an "objects of scorn" after statehood. Compelled to seek avenues to articulate their political ideologies, Free People of Color began literary associations (Sociétế d'Economie, Société des Artisans), published poetry (*Les Cenelles*)**,** started schools (Couvent School, St Mary's of the Sisters of the Holy Family), founded new religious orders like the Sisters of the Holy Family, benevolent and fraternal organizations (Etoile Polaire and Perserverance Lodge were both interracial lodges guided by the concept of "universal brotherhood) and started newspapers (*La Tribune)* which was the first daily African American newspaper). At the heart of these social institutions was a radical belief in equality.

By 1810 free people of color made up almost 30% of the population of New Orleans, were well educated, traveled widely and highly articulate in the revolutionary and romantic ideals of France and Haiti. In the Age of Revolution, proponents of universalism spoke of one race, the human race, an idea articulated far more broadly than the later course of history would have it appear. Toussaint L'Ouverture, Thomas Paine, Victor Hugo, and Alexandre Dumas, as well as Louisiana Afro-Creole writers Victor Sejour, Armand Lanusse and Paul Trevigne were writers who considered themselves "citizens of the world."[17] Their radically cosmopolitan ideas and writings circulated throughout the globe as counter-narratives to the official version of history in which " universalist claims of revolution shrank to a narrow racialist nationalism."[18]

While always navigating between freedom and slavery, free people of color hoped that the Civil War would ignite a revolutionary zeal that would result in freedom for *all* people uniting them in a transatlantic citizenship that extended beyond national boundaries. On September 27, 1862, after Union troops seized New Orleans, the African American *Tribune* wasted no time in setting out the goals of radical Creoles. Afro-Creole Paul Trevigne wrote, "We inaugurate today a new era in the South. We proclaim the Declaration of Independence as the basis of our platform…You who desire true republicanism, democracy without shackles, gather round us."[19] For Afro-Creole activists, public education was a prerequisite to "democracy without shackles." The radical 1868 Constitution, specifically required equal treatment in public places and it forbade segregation in public schools. New Orleans schools underwent a racial desegregation in the 1870's. Though a brief interlude (radical reconstruction ended in 1878), this vision of "public" rights as

central to signifying human equality, emerged in a trans-Atlantic creole cosmopolitan pedagogical circuit whose salience is no less significant today.

Conclusion

While lodged predominately in the activism of Franco-Afro-Creoles this trans-Atlantic revolutionary spirit was an interracial, international movement that included French, German and Belgian émigrés, Catholic clergy, as well as black Protestants. As Paul Gilroy has maintained the complex intermixture of African and European philosophical and cultural systems was not an appropriation or extension of Enlightenment thought, but in fact contributed to a "counterculture of modernity" whose locus of authority was *not* in the nation state.[20] The Afro-Franco-Creole protest tradition envisioned an Atlantic community that transcended the boundaries of individual nations and ultimately transcended racial oppression as well. This transgression of the dominant discourses of "citizenship" through a transatlantic, universal understanding of citizenship in which human equality was signified by "public rights" (not exclusively civil or political) was a radical geopolitical reframing of the ontological and epistemological assumptions about the nature of rights, freedom, equality, reality, time, space, the human, learning and education.

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Endnotes

1. For fuller discussion of these categories see Françoise Lionnet, (2011). Cosmopolitan or Creole Lives? Globalized Oceans and Insular Identities. *The Modern Language Association of America*.
2. Gwedolyn Hall (1992). *Africans in Colonial Louisiana*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
3. Paul Gilory (1988). *The Black Atlantic*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
4. Rebecca Scott (2005). *Degrees of Freedom*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

5. See Petra Munro Hendry and Ann G. Winnfield (2013). Bringing out the dead: Curriculum History as Memory. *Journal of Curriculum Theorizing, 29* (1), 1-35.
6. Richard Campanella (2008). *Bienville's Dilema*. Lafayette: University of Louisiana Press, 167.
7. Shannon Dawdy (2008). *Building the Devil's Empire: French Colonial New Orleans*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
8. Laurent Dubois & J. S. Scott (2010). *Origins of the Black Atlantic*. New York: Routledge, 1.
9. See Stephan Knadler (2008). *Remapping Citizenship and the Nation in African –American Literature*. New York: Routledge, 2.
10. Hall, (1992), 128.
11. Hall (1992).
12. See the following for a further discussion of these three traditions; Caryn Cosse Bell (1997). *Revolution, Romanticism, and the Afro-Creole Protest Tradition in Louisiana, 1718-1868*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University. Emily Clark, (2007). *Masterless Mistresses: The New Orleans Ursulines and the Development of a New World Society 1727-1834*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.; Mary Mitchell, (2008). *Raising Freedom's Child*. New York: New York University Press.
13. Hall, (1992), 1.
14. Rebecca J. Scott, (2007). Public rights and private commerce: A Nineteenth-Century Atlantic Creole itinerary. *Current Anthropology, 48* (2), 246.
15. Rebecca J. Scott (2007). The Atlantic World and the Road to Plessy v. Ferguson. *The Journal of American History*. 726-733.
16. Hall, (1992).
17. Susan Buck-Morss (2009). *Hegel, Haiti and Universal History.* Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
18. Ibid, 109.
19. *L'Union*, September 27, 1862, translated in James McPherson, *The Negro's Civil War: How American Blacks Felt and Acted During the for the Union* (New York: Vintage, 1965), 276.
20. Gilroy, (1988).

The French Revolution as a Cultural Revolution

Ivone Moreira

Abstract

Edmund Burke, a supporter of the American struggle for liberty, was a precocious and ferocious critic of the French Revolution. This behavior was criticized by his friends and his contemporaries and viewed as an inexplicable thing. However, if one peruses carefully the Reflections on the Revolution in France, and the hundreds of pages he wrote after criticizing the French Revolution, from the Thoughts on French Affairs to The Letters on a Regicide Peace, one cannot fail to admire his clairvoyant, almost prophetic vision, about the events of the Revolution. In fact, Burke applied to the analysis of this historical phenomenon - which he reputed the most extraordinary of his time and the most curious to speculate upon – an acute vision on human nature, showing an extraordinary ability to read those events, their motivations and their principles, and to deduce from all that the adequate consequences to society and to civilization.

Burke saw in the French Revolution much more than a closed event: for him this revolution was distinct from all the others known until then, and a forerunner of a profound cultural change in Europe and perhaps in the whole world.

The aim of this article is to present the main aspects Burke identified as the signs of a cultural revolution started by the French Revolution, and their contrast with the vision Burke had of society and tradition.

Keywords

French Revolution, Burke, Tocqueville, Culture, Democracy, Freedom, Soul.

Burke is sometimes identified with the Romantic Movement, giving much more importance to mores, to tradition, to aesthetic features, and to historicism, as foundations of society than to reason and, in this respect, he is seen as a man who anticipates the nineteenth century. In part, this is true.

But Burke was also truly a man of reason, even a man of the enlightenment. Gertrude Himmelfarb in *The Roads to Modernity*[1] asserts that we can find two different kinds of Enlightenment and that we should include Burke in that known as the Scottish Enlightenment, as a disciple of Adam Smith. The relationship between the two thinkers is perhaps confined to shared opinions on economic matters, however, I don't think we need to consider a division in the Enlightenment, a Continental Enlightenment and a non-Continental one, to find Burke as an Enlightenment thinker: he was a correspondent of Joseph

Priestley, a scientist and a renown figure of the English Enlightenment, and also an admirer of other cultures, showing a tolerance towards Indian culture and Indian society, that was truly interesting and quite innovative for eighteenth century Great Britain. He asserts that politics is a rational matter; he pronounces himself against the divine right of kings, declaring that no one could defend such a thing in that enlightened age, in which he included himself[2].

His mentality was certainly influenced by the enlightenment doctrines, but in him we just cannot find a uniformity that would allow us to classify his positions within a defined category. Mainly because he values tradition as a pillar of society, his political views are linked to history and mores and in conflict with the revolutionary mentality, and he raised his voice to criticize the French Revolution when everybody was applauding it.

The French Revolution had a sort of blindness to history lessons, a sort of arrogance and intolerance, a sort of irrational hatred towards all that was established, and a furious desire to start afresh and proceed along the path that French philosophers had chosen, that Burke just couldn't cope with. If Burke thinks it is necessary to put an end to the French Revolution, it is because the mentality which supports it rejects all foundations of society, both natural and historical, in favour of a rationalist presumption that human reason is, by itself, capable of constructing human institutions according to its own design. The French Revolution departs from the regular course of the historical process and in so doing, is committed to the overthrow of the old society that Burke cherished.

Burke recognised in the French Revolution, better than any other of its critics, and even better than most of its admirers, the novelty of a rational plan for society. The model of a cultural Revolution that was taking place in the world of science and literature was also invading the political world. One of the reasons why Burke always called the French Revolution *Revolution in France*, was because in it he saw not a movement that came from the people, but an intellectual movement originating in literary clubs aiming to overthrow social order and bring about the downfall of religion:

> I hear on all hands, that a cabal, calling itself philosophic, receives the glory of many of the late proceedings, and that their opinions and systems are the true actuating spirit of the whole of them.(…) It is not with you

> composed of those men, is it? whom the vulgar, in their blunt, homely style, commonly call Atheists and Infidels? If it be, I admit that we, too, have had writers of that description, who made some noise in their day. (…)But whatever they were, or are, with us they were and are wholly unconnected individuals. With us they kept the common nature of their kind, and were not gregarious.[3]

Reading this quote one might feel inclined to qualify Burke as a reactionary, without taking into account that he is the same man who supported the American colonists, who was against slavery, and who defended the Indians' right to have their culture respected. Perhaps his opinion deserves our full attention.

When the French Revolution occurred, it certainly produced a sudden and abrupt change in French society, but it is still controversial whether these changes were not prepared long before by the same society and it's ideals, and whether these changes would not have occurred even without the turmoil brought about by the revolution. Simon Chama in *Citizens* thinks the changes produced by the Revolution were superficial and more apparent than real, at least in the fundamental aspect of social transformation:

> What has the Revolution accomplished to balance these penalties? Its two great social alterations – the end of seigneurial regime and the abolition of the guilds –both promised more than they delivered. Though many artisans were undoubtedly happy to be free of the hierarchy of the corporations that constrained their labour and reward, they were, if anything, even more nakedly exposed to the economic inequities that persisted between masters and journeymen. Likewise the abolition of feudalism was more in a way of a legal than a social change and merely completed the evolution from lords to landlords that had been well under way in the old regime[4]

Certainly, many reforms in Western society today that we ascribe to the French Revolution, such as social mobility, freedom, or the rule of law expressed in a more egalitarian society, which allows for the punishment of the most powerful - in theory at least - are not completely the work of the French Revolution.

It is known that Louis XVI began the reforms to reward merit, rather than social position, some time before the Revolution. It is also known that, across the channel, freedoms had been protected and enshrined since the Magna Charta, five and a half centuries before 1789, and that was exactly Burke's argument: the people in England had protected freedom as the right of the English people, in a concrete and specific way, taking into account the circumstances and taking into account history, and that was a much more effective way to do so.

Burke describes the Jacobins as atheists and not gregarious. Both classifications are related. With remarkable foresight he saw that the first enemy of Jacobin philosophy, and of the culture that would emerge from it, was religion and that Jacobins didn't care for religion because they also didn't care for society. In Burke's opinion, after the death of religion, society would be poorer, because atheism would destroy the true and most strong source of all gentle feelings in man's heart. The future would be a time that would proclaim equality and freedom as a programme for all men, with the ferocity and the coldness of a technical programme and, as he himself put it: "the age of chivalry [had] gone. That of sophisters, economists, and calculators [had] succeeded; and the glory of Europe was extinguished forever"[5].

His pessimistic view of the results of the Revolution was evident in many ways and regarded in a variety of aspects: like his sceptical view of the benefits that the most humble people of France could expect from the overturning of French society; like the suspicion he had about the plundering of Church property, and how he was sure that the lands of the Church would change tenants, but this would not benefit the people; like the economic situation in France too, and the disastrous future of this unfortunate country, until it would be able to rediscover the flourishing situation it had before the Revolution. All these fears were proven and justified.

As for the moral consequences of the path started by the French Revolution, we can see the flourishing of positivism in the works of August Comte, during the nineteenth century, with the confidence that education and science would be the way to extinguish all social problems, and would replace morals. This enlightened and naïve hope also had its dark side, in the first half of the twentieth century with the terror of China's cultural revolution.

Again in the nineteenth century, a few decades after the publication of *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, Tocqueville, a French thinker, was to revisit Burke's ideas on the French Revolution to derive from them all the consequences that were included in his assumptions. It is true that Tocqueville was talking about America and the American democratic society. But, in a way, it is the practice and corollary of the philosophical principles, which were the cradle of the French Revolution, that are being analysed in their consequences.

In fact, in the brilliant description that Tocqueville gives of a certain kind of democracy you can find an analysis of the consequences of the power that egalitarian systems exercise over individuals:

> "The moral dominion of the majority is based in part on the idea that there is more enlightenment and wisdom in many men combined than in one man alone, more in the number than in the choice of legislators. It is the theory of equality applied to minds. (…) and once majority has formed on a question, there is, (…) no obstacle that can, I will not say stop, but even slow its course and leave time for the majority to hear the cries of those whom it crushes as it goes. (…) when a man or a party suffers from an injustice (…) to whom do you want them to appeal? To public opinion? That is what forms the majority. To the legislative body? It represents the majority and blindly obeys it. To the executive power? It is named by the majority and serves it as a passive instrument.(…)"[6]

In these new schemes, where a man is just a number, freedom is threatened, but not necessarily by the kind of danger that one can suffer under the absolute rule of one man: under the rule of a tyrant your body is in danger, but, even if repressed, a man can be free in his soul; under *soft tyranny,* as Tocqueville calls it, your soul is in danger and slowly gets impoverished. The tyranny of egalitarian regimes leaves the body alone and attacks the soul:

> The master no longer say: you will think like me or die; he says: You are free not to think as I do; your life, your goods, everything remains with you; but from this day on you are a stranger among us. (…) you will

> remain among men, but you will loose your rights to humanity. When you approach your fellows, they will flee from you like an impure being. And those who believe in your innocence, even they will abandon you, for people would flee from them in turn. Go in peace; I spare your life, but I leave you a life worse than death.[7]

In fact, contemporary democratic regimes are thought to represent a promising heritage of the French Revolution, and if indeed we can say so, they are a great heritage. But the fact is that they might also be totalitarian, and are often, in the Burkean and Tocquevillean sense. Tocqueville pointed out that the good use of this irresistible power was only accidental, and the danger was that it could become monstrous without anyone being strong enough to stop it, and, we could add, without anyone being aware of it.

The twentieth century proved that he was right to some extent: through its control of public opinion, a totalitarian regime got ratified and started a war with the applause of its people. The twenty-first century is proving him right in another way: with all the clichés cherished by public opinion often replacing morality, or intending to be a new morality – very often miserably devoid of true reflection – a horde gets the approval of merciless laws. We might say that as citizens, successors of those in the French Revolution, and free from old prejudices – such as the great prejudice of Religion – we are autonomous beings, but we are also very selfish ones.

Another consequence that Tocqueville pointed out as affecting egalitarian societies is that a struggle for comfort and material goods prevails, and men are primarily concerned with themselves, and their concern includes no attention towards their souls, as they are unaware that they have a soul. The tragedy Tocqueville anticipated – that men would be animals moved only by greed and fighting only for their material comfort – threatens us today more than ever and could endanger even more true democracy.

For Tocqueville, what was the way out of this situation? The constant surveillance of our own instincts, fighting egocentrism; fighting the inclination to be mainly concerned with our small world; getting out of ourselves, associating with others in order to achieve communitarian goals; contradicting our tendency to be selfish and helping others; and being able, through association, to be independent of the dictatorship of the majority.

But achieving these goals without true humility is impossible – and our path drives us away from humility: we are always craving for power in one way or another. To fight this inclination, Burke and Tocqueville both thought religion was fundamental.

Returning to Burke, and to his vision of the changes the French Revolution was bringing, at the end of his life, in one of his last texts, *Thoughts in French Affairs*, he admitted the necessity of revolutions and even asserted that revolutions were perhaps as much necessary in the moral world as they were in the physical one. He also admitted that when social mentality is prepared for new values, to struggle to prevent the triumph of those values would be vain[8]. Thus, at the end of the eighteenth century, European civilization chose the path of laicism and, with it, also a materialistic view of man and society. It chose that the majority was to prevail and dictate the rules, sometimes without other criteria but the number of votes, and that truth should be a matter of consensus. The French Revolution was one of the manifestations of this choice and, at the same time, a consequence of it.

But, as Heraclitus believed: "travelling on every path, you will not find the boundaries of soul by going – so deep is its measure"[9], and so we hope that we are now on the dreary desert fringes of our soul, and that we will regain green pastures in time.

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Endnotes

1. Gertrude Himmelfarb, *The Roads to Modernity*, (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004), 87.
2. "The king was only a trustee for the public. Property and subjects existed before kings were elected, and endowed with a portion of the former for the protection of the later. (...) Jacobitism elevates kings into the rank of gods, and contends that the people were made for them, not they for the people. (...) But in the present times, in this enlightened age, in this country and on this occasion to avow such theories of despotism is

something worse than jacobitism. It is jacobitism sublimated and refined into a detested system of the most humiliating slavery". Edmund Burke, "Mr Burke's Establishment Bill", in *The Speeches of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke in the House of Commons and Westminster Hall*, Vol. II, (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, 1816), 121.

3. Edmund Burke, "Reflections on the Revolution in France", in *The Works of the Right Honorable Edmund Burke*, Vol. III, Revised Edition, (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1865), 349.

4. Simon Chama, *Citizens, A Chronicle of the French Revolution,* (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 719-720.

5. "But the age of chivalry is gone. That of sophisters, economists, and calculators has succeeded; and the glory of Europe is extinguished forever". Burke, "Reflections", 331.

6. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, Vol. I, ed. Eduardo Nolla, (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2012), 404, 407, 414.

7. Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 418-19.

8. "If a great change is to be made in human affairs, the minds of man will be fitted to it, the general opinions and feelings will draw that way. Every fear, every hope, will forward it; and then they who persist in opposing this mighty current in human affairs will appear rather to resist the decrees of Providence itself than the mere designs of men. They will not be resolute and firm, but perverse and obstinate". Edmund Burke, "Thoughts on French Affairs", in *The Works of the Right Honorable Edmund Burke*, Vol. IV, Revised Edition, (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1866), 377.

9. Diels/Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*.(Griechisch/Deutsch) Berlín, 1951–52. (DK B45).

Europe's Spatial Metaphors and (Un)Timely Interruptions

Marianna Papastephanou

Abstract

Time and again, Europeanness, Europe as an actuality of common ground and Europe as a prospect are illustrated through spatial metaphoricity. From Jacques Derrida's play with the cap, the cape and the peninsula in The Other Heading (1992) to current political philosophical discussions of North and South divisions, of the crossroad and border-crossing and of the *topos* of commonalities or the *chora* of the cities of refuge, the figurative force of spatiality has been drawn into the European imaginary with unprecedented force. Despite its lasting significance, this reliance on the spatial figurative sometimes often emerges at the expense of considerations of temporality. Starting from critical approaches to Europe such as those by Rosi Braidotti nomadic Europeanness, this essay will examine the neglect of temporality and in particular of asynchronous time. It will then develop arguments in favor of retrieving the diachronic or historical axis for framing challenges and stakes such as historical ethical debts and unsolved political problems of global justice that Europeanness confronts today. Finally, it will be suggested that an ethic of European time also invites considerations of the untimely, of the break and rupture that is required if the continent's liminality, its oscillation between its own particularism and its universalist aspirations, is to overcome dangers associated with 'fortress Europe".

Keywords

Space, Time, European Identity, Borders, Nomadic Subjectivity, Deconstruction.

Introduction

Time and again, Europeanness, Europe as an actuality of common ground and Europe as a prospect, are illustrated through spatial metaphoricity. From Jacques Derrida's[1] play with the *cap*, the cape and the peninsula to current political philosophical discussions of North and South divisions, of the crossroad and border-crossing and of the *topos* of commonalities or the *chora* of the cities of refuge, the figurative force of spatiality has been drawn into the European imaginary with unprecedented force.

Despite its lasting significance, this reliance on the spatial figurative sometimes becomes hegemonic at the expense of considerations of temporality. When this happens, emphasis is mainly or even exclusively given either to border crossing, to a borderless world, or to various locations/localisms. Then, a place, for instance, Europe, is exaggerated to a Promised Land. Conversely, the

significance of history, of the diachronic entanglement of people, and the challenges all this presents for the "here and now" become overlooked.

Rosi Braidotti explores the European potential through various and rich spatial metaphors. Yet, unlike other thinkers, she claims that such explorations should not bypass temporal considerations. She writes: "thinking may not be topologically bound, especially in the age of the global economy and telematic networks, but it certainly is not outside the temporal span of history".[2] Reflecting on her own development of the theory of nomadic subjectivity, Braidotti explains that, quite against neglects of temporality, in her work, she goes "to some lengths to connect the nomadic subject position to the issue of locations as spatiotemporal conditions". And she argues that, "as a specific moment of our historicity", postmodernity "is a major location that needs to be accounted for".[3] The spatial metaphor of the map is again operative, since "'locations' are not cognitive entities, but politically informed cartographies that aim at making visible and consequently undoing power relations not only between men and women but also among women". Thus, politics of location entails a specific politics that attempts to make sense "of diversity within the category of 'difference' understood as the binary opposite of the phallogocentric subject".[4]

Starting from critical approaches to Europe such as Rosi Braidotti's,[5] this paper briefly indicates that, despite the accommodation of historical concerns and temporal aspects within Braidotti's framework, her nomadism is at times ambivalent in its handling of temporality. It often fails to account for European asynchronous temporality in ways that undo the projection of the northwestern-European past onto the rest of Europe. Braidotti's framework also falls prey to northwestern ideals (some of which are developmentalist) of synchronized time and a synchronization with the spirit of the times. In the end, such lapses may lead to EUtopianizing this constructed Europeanness. A further move (critical of such handlings of time yet beyond the confines of this paper) that is only indicated here develops arguments for retrieving the diachronic axis of challenges and stakes such as historical ethical debts and unsolved political problems of global justice that Europeanness confronts today. Those point to a different ideality, one that relies on another sense of asynchronous time that operates as the un-timely, as inviting Europe to consider the possibility of its own, radical redirection.

Temporality and Responsibility

The bearing of the proposed approach can be unpacked as follows: in our workshop's call for papers it is said that: "Derrida's words on European identity are helpful to articulate these two dilemmas facing education in Europe: (1) How can education be the keeper of a certain idea of Europe, its memory, and, at the same time, build the promise of a Europe which will not close itself upon its own identity?; (2) How can education respond to the necessity of respecting, at the same time, the uniqueness of 'differences, idioms, minorities, singularities,' and 'the universality of formal law, the desire for translation, agreement and univocity, the law of the majority,' while avoiding both 'dispersion,' and the danger of a centralizing hegemony?"[6]

This paper qualifies the above as follows: first, keeping the memory of the idea of Europe in acceptable terms requires more than the spatial metaphor of being open, of being a *chora*. It also requires viewing time beyond the chronological measurable sense and obtaining awareness of how European *chorochronos* (spatiotemporality) has created responsibilities that have not yet been met, not even at the level of mere acknowledgement of the ethico-political debts that such responsibilities entail. Second, merely respecting differences (though a major task and as yet frighteningly unattained) is too limited an expectation from European education. Respecting difference has a clearly topological character of being nice to the other you encounter literally or metaphorically. But it does not say much about the more active and demanding ethico-political debts that Europeans may have toward others who had made Europe (or some Europeans) wealthy, who are still burdened by the intractable problems that European expansion bequeathed to them and whose current realities may challenge us to think differently about our own conceptualizations and to take some critical distance from our familiar ways of interpreting the world. Some of this will be developed in the paper, but most of it will be aside for reasons of time. Overall, the paper suggests that an ethic of European time also invites considerations of the untimely, of the break and rupture that is required if the continent's liminality (its oscillation between its own particularism and its universalist aspirations) is to overcome dangers associated with "fortress Europe".

For Braidotti, thinking is a nomadic activity; that is, thinking is tightly connected with the spatial metaphor of movement and passage. For thinking takes place in the spaces in between, in the transitions. Yet, Braidotti makes imme-

diately clear that this does not make thinking a "view from nowhere". To be nomadic or in transition does not place the thinking subject outside history or time. When applied to European nomadism, this idea is rendered as follows: "Being a nomadic European subject means to be critical of unitary, hegemonic and imperial notions of Euro-centrism. It situates the subject in transit within different identity-formations, but sufficiently anchored to a historical position to accept responsibility for it".[7] What is the responsibility that Europe (and each of its countries) has accepted? And can it truly accept the relevant responsibility when European thought clings so uncritically on its own celebration of the person in transit, when it fails to understand that, literal or metaphorical, transit cannot be utopianized without the risk of the very homogenization and conceptual uniformity that European thought seems otherwise to loath?

To accept responsibility goes hand in hand with a practice of accountability for one's embodied and embedded locations. This practice, "as a relational, collective activity of undoing power differentials" is linked, for Braidotti, "to two crucial notions: memory and narratives. They activate the process of putting into words, that is to say bringing into symbolic representation, that which by definition escapes consciousness, insofar as it is relational and invested by a yearning or desire for change".[8]

The questions Braidotti asks to increase awareness of accountability are revealing of both the attention paid to time but also the limitation of considerations of time to synchrony. For instance, an issue is: "How to resist the injustice, violence and vulgarity of the times, while being worthy of our times, so as to engage with the present in a productively oppositional and affirmative manner?"[9] We may problematize this by further asking: are injustice, violence and vulgarity only of our times? Are they not part of a genealogy whose continuity will be missed if we keep viewing such pathologies in a non-genealogical way? If it is true that "*Amor fati* is not fatalism, but the awareness of a bond of profound intimacy between ourselves and the world, the space-time we are living in",[10] should we not enlarge our scope of accountability by changing the tense of the "space-time we are living in" to that of the "space-time we have been living"? If yes, then, the "acknowledgment that 'we' are in *this* together"[11] should become an acknowledgement that we have been in this together. We should then explore the demands this acknowledgement makes on the citizen who, despite various denunciations of the state-centric tradition, still profits from citizenship in advanced states and from Europeanness.

Hence, if "a cartography is a theoretically-based and politically-informed reading of the present"[12] the next question might be: what about the past? Is the past just absorbed and contained in the present? It is accommodated in Braidotti's thought, when she adds: As such cartography "responds to my two main requirements: namely, to account for one's locations in terms both of space (geo-political or ecological dimension) and time (historical and genealogical dimension); and to provide alternative figurations or schemes of representation for these locations, in terms of power as restrictive (potestas) but also empowering or affirmative (potentia)".[13] But this accommodation of time is not as active and demanding as those considerations of time that transcend encyclopedic interest and are utilizable for truly determining responsibility. Map, cartography, horizon, the cartographic mode, all assume a temporality and acknowledge it but only to empty it ultimately into the flux of today: in Braidotti's words, "I see my work as outward-bound, affirmative and looking at the concrete historical realities of today – the actual here and now. Hence the emphasis I place on cartographic accuracy and situated, embodied, and embedded perspectives".[14] One wonders whether this emphasis on the "here and now" and on spatiality accommodates the past and the power the past exerts on the temporalities of Europe's other within and out.

Most telling of her assumption of different temporalities is a point on the archaic that, if thought through, eutopianizes the EU present. First, Braidotti identifies the present through the following generalities: "we already live in permanent states of transition, hybridisation and nomadic mobility, in emancipated (postfeminist), multiethnic societies with high degrees of technological mediation. These are neither simple, nor linear events, but rather multilayered and internally contradictory phenomena." [15] Now, this is how such phenomena relate to multiple temporalities: "they combine elements of ultra-modernity with splinters of neo-archaism: high tech advances and neo-primitivism, which defy the logic of excluded middle."[16]

As I see them, these splinters are, in fact, very revealing spatial metaphors, as they are surfaces, thin, sharp pieces of something (such as wood, glass, etc.) that have broken off a larger piece.[17] As a body or a surface, Europe is not only a land with its jetties and caps but also with its splinters, breaking off from the main body, from the whole. A splinter of archaism, then, evokes that the broken European surface also contains pieces of past or that Europe is in a

way attached to a renegade piece (was it part of Europe before it broke away?) of asynchronous time. As it happens when considering multiple temporalities associated with different spatialities, the issue of developmentalism regarding those who have to catch up with the rest of Europe to reach its post-nationalist, or supposedly multi-ethnic state cannot be sidestepped. In my view, it has to be discussed head-on.

Dystopianizations and Utopianizations

Thus, when Braidotti writes that "splinters of archaism are mixed up with the most advanced social, urban, technological and cultural developments, to produce the paradox of simultaneously opposite social effects,"[18] we may explore this position by asking: which contrasted temporalities are here correspondingly dystopianized and utopianized? Who inhabits such asynchronous spatialities? The answer we may draw from various texts of Braidotti is that a major splinter of archaism is Eastern-European spatiality. When Northwestern Europe seems to have reached to a large degree a postnational level of experience, archaic splinters are still trapped in nationalist sentiment. Eastern Europeans crop up in Braidotti's textuality only to illustrate the space of crisis created by those lagging behind. I do not dispute that a specific nationalism (encountered in East and West, North and South) is a major challenge and it should be downright condemned. However, we should not downplay the fact that attention to it sometimes blocks our awareness of other, more subtle yet no less pernicious pathologies that may burden Europe. Also, singling out nationalism as a major problem and associating it mainly with a specific European spatiality/splinter leads to too general or uniform and, in fact, ahistorical accounts of European time.

I think Denise Roman points to something similar when she puts it as follows. "Ultimately, it is history that may represent the crux of the problem. As it stands now, transnational feminism appears as a dehistoricized and geographically amorphous theoretical framework. It seems to have in mind a romanticized, generic notion of Europe, as if taken from some prudish nineteenth-century British novel."[19] Against such uniform narratives, Roman explains that "for historical and geographical reasons, East-

Central and Southeastern European states never participated in the history of worldwide colonialism, slavery, and imperialism, as Western European states did". This does not imply a supposed "innocence" or exculpation. For "it is true that they practiced ethnic discrimination and a serf-based class system throughout their history, as well as the racial politics of WWII and the Holocaust—inside their borders (as a matter of policies, legislation, or old customs)." To Roman, "the only sound international politics these states practiced during most of their history up to modern times was defending, more or less successfully, their frontiers against great historical powers—the Czarist Empire (later the Soviet Union) and the Ottoman Empire". Hence, the Eurocentrism that is locatable in Eastern Europe is found in "the inner fascisms and racisms, not in colonialism, which is a mark of Western European history."[20]

Therefore, Roman makes a point that serves as an example for us now to illustrate the weakness we have detected in Braidotti's effort to couple space and time considerations. In Roman's words, "for transnational feminism to enter into a dialogue with Eastern European women and a democratic notion of the European Union, first it must be ready to open a discussion and make these distinctions, and not simply spread an indiscriminate and collective politics of 'European guilt' from West to East."[21]

I believe that such lack of adequate distinction and historical nuance explains ambivalences or slippages in Braidotti's work as the following: on the one hand at the quite general and declarative level, Braidotti urges contemporary European subjects of knowledge to "meet the ethical obligation to be accountable for their past history and the long shadow it casts on their present-day politics." This points to something more related to concrete ethico-political debt emanating from the past, but it is then diluted by a recourse to commonplace truths that detect as pathologies only the usual and well-rehearsed: xenophobia, lack of respect, etc. When the above generality invites concrete examples, Braidotti writes: "the new mission that Europe has to embrace entails the criticism of narrow-minded self-interests, intolerance, and xenophobic rejection of otherness. Symbolic of the closure of the European mind is the fate of migrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers, which bear the brunt of racism in contemporary Europe."[22] Why do her exemplarities concern only movement, and specifically, the kind of

movement that brings the other into European spatiality? So, is all that Europe owes to otherness just a better treatment of the people ashore? And what about other states of exception within Europe? What about those who may not come to Europe at all, but whose claims are legal-political without involving a visit to European space?

Conclusion

Braidotti argues that "to be worthy of our times, we need to be pragmatic: we need schemes of thought and figurations that enable us to account in empowering terms for the changes and transformations currently on the way."[23] To be worthy of our times: what about the un-timely or the "out of time"? Beyond metaphysics, the "out of this world"[24] evokes a critical interplay of immanence and transcendence, a topical response to timely crises and an overcoming of fashionable and unimaginative solutions that are trapped in the hegemonic wisdom of the "here and now". By contrast, Braidotti's "affirmative deconstruction" is affirmative in another sense too, in one that EUtopianizes the existent: "We already live in permanent states of transition, hybridisation and nomadic mobility, in emancipated (postfeminist), multiethnic societies with high degrees of technological intervention". But this utopianized reality is set at risk by the negation that borders with it: "these are neither simple, nor linear events, but rather multilayered and internally contradictory phenomena. They combine elements of ultra-modernity with splinters of neo-archaism."[25]

Braidotti's ambivalence regarding the untimely becomes evident when she indicates it without naming it: "the political activist has to think 'in spite of the times' and hence 'out of my time', thus creating the analytics – the conditions of possibility – of the future."[26] Then, elsewhere, she affirms the present too much. For, the untimely is more demanding than it appears at a declarative level. This becomes more evident if we contrast the untimely to Braidotti's plea for synchronization: "Contemporary feminism works towards a more affirmative approach and helps subjects synchronise themselves with the changing world in which they try to make a positive difference. Co-synchronisations constitute communities across generations. Fitting-in-with-the-world in order to help it along the horizon of hope and sustainability expresses an evolutionary talent. It is about the ability to adapt and develop suitable navigational tools within the fast-

moving techno-, ethno- and gender-scapes of a globally mediated world."[27] I have argued in this paper that such syn*chron*ization overlooks the rupture with the (neo-)colonial times that is yet to come and surely overdue.

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Endnotes

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The Problem of Linguistic Justice in the European Union

Zdenko Kodelja

Abstract

There are two main aims of the European Union's language policy: the protection of linguistic diversity and the promotion of multilingualism. But despite this, the growing dominance of English is undeniable. In fact, English is becoming something like a common lingua franca. This situation in which one language has a privileged status is often seen as obviously unjust. According to Van Parijs, who conceives linguistic justice as fair cooperation, equal opportunity, and parity of esteem, it is unjust because of different reasons. In this paper I am going to discuss predominantly two different but at the same time interrelated things: firstly, his arguments for and against the use of English as a common lingua franca in the European Union, and secondly, some of his ideas of how it might be possible to achieve greater linguistic justice while abandoning neither the use of English as a lingua franca nor the linguistic diversity in Europe.

Keywords

Linguistic Justice, Language Policy, Multilingualism, Lingua Franca, Linguistic Diversity .

The European Union is – as its motto, "United in diversity", explicitly shows – a transnational and plurilingual entity.[1] However, its linguistic diversity is not only an empirical fact,[2] but also something that is officially recognized as a very important value of the Union. With this act of recognition, the EU has taken a stand on the issue of linguistic diversity, which is contrary to the thesis – defended by some philosophers, linguists and politicians – that "linguistic diversity, by itself, cannot plausibly be regarded as good".[3] There are different reasons why they think so. For some of them, linguistic diversity is an obstacle for achieving either a genuine union within the European Union or a Europe-wide democracy because these aims are, in their opinion, achievable only if the European Union adopts a common language.[4] A resolute and persuasive defender of the thesis that linguistic diversity in the European Union cannot reasonably be seen as something good – for the reason that it is an obstacle – is, among others, a distinguished Belgian philosopher, Philippe Van Parijs, who claims that linguistic diversity is "an obstacle to the achievement of distributive justice".[5] In spite of this, he admits that there is a good reason for maintaining linguistic diversity within the European Unity as well. Nevertheless, at the

same time he emphasizes that "the reason why linguistic diversity must and will be preserved is not that it is intrinsically valuable, nor that it can be expected, all things considered, to have beneficial consequences. It is simply that it constitutes, for the foreseeable future, a by-product of the pursuit of linguistic justice as equal dignity".[6]

On the other hand, supporters of the opposite thesis, namely, that linguistic diversity within the European Union is an essential value which requires institutional protection, do not exclude the possibility that linguistic diversity is also intrinsically valuable.[7] However, it is still an open question whether it has value in and of itself, or primarily because of its instrumental value. Why? Because this thesis already presupposes that linguistic diversity can have intrinsic value. This presupposition is wrong in two cases: firstly, if there is not at all such a thing that has intrinsic value, and secondly, if only one thing – which is not linguistic diversity – can have such value.

Philosophers who have serious doubts about the idea of intrinsic value, or even reject it, belong to different philosophical traditions and use different arguments in order to justify their doubts and objections to the widely accepted theory that the intrinsic goodness of something is a genuine property of that thing. "Especially well known for their dissent are Thomas Hobbes", "who believed the goodness or badness of something to be constituted by the desire or aversion that one may have regarding it, and David Hume," who similarly took all ascriptions of value to involve projections of one's own sentiments onto whatever is said to have value".[8] Later on, similar arguments were used by the so-called "non-cognitivists". Among them we can find both emotivists and prescriptivists, who argue that there are no moral properties or moral facts and, therefore, that judgments about goodness and badness are not descriptive statements about the moral properties of a certain thing but rather either expressions or evocations of feeling and attitude, or something that constitutes a kind of command as to how we are to act. This means that the claim that something is good is not a statement about it, which can be true or false, but an ascription of value to it, which can be neither true nor false, since it is an expression of feelings, attitudes, evaluations, recommendations or prescriptions.[9] However, there are also other kinds of arguments which have been used for defending the idea that nothing has intrinsic value.[10]

If we accept them, then it is obvious that the previously asked question – whether linguistic diversity has intrinsic or extrinsic value – is illogical and nonsensical. The same could be said if the claim that only one thing can have intrinsic value were true, under the condition of course, that for those who defend this claim, linguistic diversity is not such a thing.

According to Kant, for instance, the only thing which is intrinsically good or, in other words, good in itself, that is, good independently of its relation to other things, is a good will. Kant argues namely that the only thing "which can be regarded as good without qualification", that is, as unconditionally good, is "a good will". A good will is, therefore, good not because of its consequences but "in itself".[11] This does not mean that other things cannot be good, but that they are not good in all circumstances, and "can also be extremely bad and hurtful when the will is not good".[12]

Another theory, according to which only one thing is intrinsically good, is hedonism. Hedonism is usually interpreted as the ethical theory which defends the idea that "there is one thing, and one thing only, that is intrinsically good, namely pleasure".[13] However, George E. Moore totally disagrees with such an interpretation. In his opinion, hedonistic utilitarianism "does *not* assert that pleasure is the only thing *intrinsically* good… On the contrary, it asserts that any whole which *contains* an excess of pleasure over pain is intrinsically good".[14]

In addition to this interpretation of hedonism, there is a variety of other philosophical theories which reject the idea that one, and only one, thing can be intrinsically good. In fact, they are widely accepted. As a result, there are different lists of things which are – or are supposed to be – intrinsically good.[15] Even if this is not a proof of their existence, it is at least proof that several philosophers argue that things which are intrinsically good, including linguistic diversity, exist.

Therefore, if we take into consideration all these arguments for and against their existence, it seems reasonable to conclude that the question of whether linguistic diversity in itself can have intrinsic value or not is still opened. However, for the purpose of this paper this question is less important than the question as to whether linguistic diversity is valuable (either intrinsically or extrinsically) at all. The answer given in the official European Union documents is unambiguously affirmative. Linguistic diversity has a status of im-

portant value. As such, it is declared as one of the fundamental principles of the European Union and acknowledged as a right of its citizens.[16] The notion of linguistic diversity embraces all languages within the Member States and not only the official ones.[17] All these languages are – regardless of the differences among them – proclaimed as "equal in value and worthiness",[18] or, a little more restrictively, as "equal in value and dignity from the cultural point of view".[19] This means that on the declarative level all these languages are seen as equal with regard to their cultural value and dignity. In spite of this, in reality, the European Union guaranties equal treatment only to those languages which are official languages in the Member States. Since official languages are treated equally in a legal sense, it seems obvious that they are treated justly as well. For, such treatment is in accordance with one of the fundamental principles of justice, which requires equal treatment for equals.[20] However, in this case the European Union treats its official languages justly only in a formal sense, that is to say, in observing a rule that lays down the obligation to treat in the same way all "beings of one and the same essential category".[21] But this definition, emphasizes Chaïm Perelman, "tells us neither when two beings are part of an essential category nor how they ought to be treated".[22] It tells us only two things: firstly, "that beings must be treated not in such or such a manner, but equally, so that it is impossible to say that one has been placed at a disadvantage by reference to another", and secondly, "that equal treatment must be provided only for beings forming part of the same essential category".[23] In our case, therefore, equal treatment of all official languages in the European Union can be justifiably understood as just because of its conformity with the previously mentioned principle of formal justice.

But, are official languages really treated justly? The question arises because, in reality, they are not treated equally when they are used as working languages. Although all official languages are also working languages of the European Union,[24] this de jure equality among them is not respected de facto: English, French and, to a lesser extent, German, are namely the predominant working languages.[25] The result of this European Commission policy seems to be good and bad at the same time. It is good because of reducing communication and translation costs, and bad because of at least two reasons: firstly, it diminish the value of exactly those things (linguistic diversity and language equality) which the European Union proclaims as essential values; and secondly, it is obviously unjust since it violates the principle of formal justice which requires equal treat-

ment of all official languages. Since such unjust differentiation among official languages can be identified with discrimination,[26] and discrimination based upon language is legally prohibited,[27] it seems that this quite arbitrary linguistic policy is not only unjust but also illegal. In any case, even if it might be interpreted as legal, it will remain unjust. Furthermore, the use of only three working languages is in itself sufficient proof that equality of official languages in the European Union is more a myth than reality.

Suppose now that using all official languages as working languages already is – or that it will be in the expected, more extended European Union – a practice that, because of its administrative inefficiency and economic unsustainability, seriously endangers the normal functioning of the European Union. Would, in such a case, the previously discussed unjust language policy be justified? The answer can be either yes or no. From the utilitarian or consequentialist point of view, such a policy is morally right if "it can be reasonably expected to produce the greatest balance of good or the least balance of harm."[28] On the other hand, such a policy is absolutely wrong and unacceptable from the view of Kant, who thinks that justice is so important that "if justice perishes, there is no further point in men living on earth".[29] The same we can say for John Rawls, who holds that "justice is the first virtue of social institutions" and that "laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust".[30] Therefore, looking from this point of view, the discussed language policy cannot be morally justified and, consequently, it should be abolished or reformed; and the opposite, it is morally justified on the consequentialist basis if the consequences of this policy are significantly better (or less bad) than they would be if the policy were different. However, this does not mean that the current language policy in the European Union is necessarily the best possible one. Some think that it would be better if the number of working languages were higher, while others think just the opposite, that there should be only one working language.

Since the growing dominance of English at the global level is undeniable, it seems very likely that it will become a common lingua franca also in the European Union. In fact, many Europeans already use it as a common lingua franca. The problem is that such a situation – in which one language has a privileged status – is obviously unjust. According to Van Parijs, who conceives linguistic justice as fair cooperation, equal opportunity, and parity of esteem or equal respect to various languages, such a situation is unjust because of three reasons:

Firstly, it is unjust that non-native speakers of the lingua franca "should shoulder the whole burden of learning the lingua franca",[31] while its native speakers get it for free.

Secondly, it is unjust that native speakers of the lingua franca gain greater opportunities because of competence in their native language, "in particular as regards competition for jobs in an increasingly trans-national market".[32]

Thirdly, it is unjust that the privilege given to one language ("the native language of a subset of the European population") fails to show equal respect for "all other languages, many of them closely associated with the collective identities of other subsets of that same population".[33]

Van Parijs, who in spite of this defends the use of English as a common lingua franca in the European Union, argues that the extent of all three sorts of linguistic injustice caused by the spreading of a lingua franca can be diminished. The first kind of injustice, that is, injustice as unfair cooperation, will be reduced, he claims, "as a consequence of the very spreading of the lingua franca, and free riding" of non-Anglophones "on Anglophone intellectual production should provide at least rough justice".[34] Inequality of opportunities – as a second sort of linguistic injustice – can be, as he says, diminished "by democratizing proficiency in the lingua franca" in the European Union.[35] And what is his answer to the question of how to reduce the third kind of linguistic injustice, which is the consequence of giving unequal respect to various languages? In his opinion, the best way for achieving this aim "consists in granting each linguistic community the right to impose its language as the medium of instruction and public communication" on its territory.[36]

Although these ideas of how it might be possible to achieve greater linguistic justice in the European Union without abandoning either the use of English as a lingua franca or the linguistic diversity in Europe are quite convincing, they are not unproblematic. In any case, they are challenging and worthy of paying them much more attention than it was possible to do in this paper.

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Endnotes

1. The term "plurilingual" has, in this context, the same meaning as the term "multilingual". It refers to the presence and use of the variety of languages in the European Union and it does not imply that all its citizens are competent in more than one language.
2. Linguistic diversity is usually understood in two ways: as a number of languages and as a percentage of the population using any single language. At the moment, the European Union has 24 official languages and a lot of regional, minority and immigrant languages.
3. Philippe Van Parijs, Linguistic diversity as curse and as by-product, in *Respecting Linguistic Diversity in the European Union*, ed. Xabier Arzoz (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2008), 17.
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8. Michael J. Zimmerman, "Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value", in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2010 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, URL http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/value-intrinsic-extrinsic/.
9. Referential authors are, for example, Charles L. Stevenson, among emotivists, and Richard M. Hare, among prescriptivists.
10. Monroe Beardsley, for instance, claims that all value is extrinsic and that nothing has intrinsic value. (Monroe C. Beardsley, "Intrinsic Value", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 26 (1965), 1-17).
11. Immanuel Kant, *The Moral Law: Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (London: Routledge, 2005), 63-64. Since only rational beings can have a good will, and good will is the only unconditional good, they have unconditional or, in other words, absolute value. As such, rational beings are an end in themselves and "not merely a means for arbitrary use by this or that will" (ibid., 105-107). For this reason, they must treat one another as ends in themselves. In other words, just because they are ends in themselves, they "serve the will as a subjective ground of its self-determination" (ibid., 104-105). Since "the will is conceived as a power of determining oneself to action in accordance with the idea of certain laws", it follows that the law, which determines the will, is the categorical imperative formulated as: "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end" (ibid., 106-17).*
12. Ibid., 63.
13. William David Ross, *The Right and the Good* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 9; G. E. Moore, *Ethics* (London: Williams and Norgate, 1912), 73.
14. Moore, *Ethics,* 1912, 73.
15. The most known is the following classical list of intrinsic goods: truth, goodness, and beauty; while one of the longest lists of them is that given by William Frankena. It includes: life, consciousness, and activity; health and strength; pleasures and satisfactions of all or certain kinds; happiness, beatitude, contentment, etc.; truth; knowledge and true opinions of various kinds, understanding, wisdom; beauty, harmony, proportion in objects contemplated; aesthetic experience; morally good dispositions or virtues; mutual affection, love, friendship, cooperation; just distribution of goods and evils; harmony and proportion in one's own life; power and experiences of achievement; self-expression; freedom; peace, security; adventure and novelty; and good reputation, honour, esteem, etc. (William Klaas Frankena, *Ethics*, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1973), 87-88).
16. In Article 22 of the *Charter of Fundamental Rights*, it is stated: "The Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity"; *Report on endangered European languages and linguistic diversity in the European Union* (2013/2007), 4.
17. In addition to official languages, it includes "also co-official languages, regional languages, and languages that are not officially recognised within the Member States" (*Report <Titre>on endangered European languages and linguistic diversity in the European Union* (2013/2007), 4.)

18. Ibid.
19. Council Resolution of 14 February 2002 on the promotion of linguistic diversity and language learning in the framework of the implementation of the objectives of the European Year of Languages 2001 (OJ C 50, 23. 2. 2002).
20. Aristotle has formulated this principle with the following words: "treat like cases as like" (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, V.3. 1131a10-b15; *Politics*, III.9.1280 a8-15, III. 12. 1282b18-23).
21. Chaïm Perelman, *Ethique et droit* (Bruxelles: Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 1990), 30, 60. According to Perelman, formal justice is necessary linked with logic since "the application of the rule must be correct and logically impeccable: the just act must be in conformity with the conclusion of a specific syllogism", which he calls "the deontic syllogism because its major premise and its conclusion are norms of conduct" (*ibid*., 59). In our case, this syllogism can be formulated as: 1. All Europe's languages ought to be treated equally. 2. Slovene, French, Italian German, Croatian, English, (and so on) are Europe's languages. 3. Therefore, Slovene, French, Italian, German, Croatian, English, (and so on) ought to be treated equally.
22. Ibid., 31.
23. Ibid.
24. Article 1 of Council Regulation No. 1.
25. In spite of this, "all EU languages are to be treated on an equal basis with respect to publication of official EU documents" and citizens have the right to "communicate with institutions in an EU language of their choice" (Shannon Hall, *Protection and Promotion of Multilingualism in the EU*, 2013, URL http://www.e-ir.info/2013/05/15/protection-and-promotion-of-multilingualism-in-the-eu/).
26. Italian philosopher Norberto Bobbio argues that discrimination can be understood as unjust differentiation precisely "because it violates the fundamental principle of justice … according to which those who are equal must be treated equally" (Norberto Bobbio, *Elogio della mitezza e altri scriti morali* (Milano: Linea d'ombra, 1994), 127).
27. Article 290 of the *Treaty of Maastricht* on European Union.
28. Tom L. Beauchamp, *Philosophical Ethics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991), 129.
29. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, in *Kant's Political Writings*, ed. Hans Siegbert Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970) p. 159.
30. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, MASS.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 3.
31. Van Parijs, *Linguistic Justice*, 208, 50-86.
32. Ibid., 208, 87-116.
33. Ibid., 208, 117-132.
34. Ibid., 208.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.

Cultural Crossroads and the Challenge of Education in Europe

Paths to Integration or Multiculturalism

Denise Egéa

Abstract

Bound into an either/or stance toward culture, debates about integration vs multiculturalism are at the heart of political and ideological struggles over the control of education. As either choice presents the danger of limiting access to education, Derrida's words can be paralleled to articulate these two dilemmas facing education in Europe: (1) How can education be the keeper of the memory of Europe, and, at the same time, build the promise of a Europe which will not close itself upon its own identity?; (2) How can education respond to the necessity of respecting, at the same time, the particularities of differences and idioms, and the law of the majority? (Derrida, 1992, p. 78) This project proposes to address the debate about the persistent sterile dichotomy of integration vs multiculturalism. Using Derrida's analysis of aporias and antinomies, it will discuss the aporetic nature of culture in which the other and the different are inherent. It will also consider how education is faced with the responsibility to respond to the challenge of this "double and contradictory injunction."

Keywords

Integration, Multiculturalism, Access to Education, European Culture.

A combination of the rise of national sentiment and the discrediting notion of "bilingual deficit" – knowing Gaelic, Breton, or Basque, would leave less room for English, French, or Spanish – has led to changes in curricular and cultural priorities. However, it is extremely rare, even for the most enthusiastic activists, not to want the majority language to be learned, and the majority culture to be acquired as well.

Educational Response to Cultural Diversity

Two main responses to cultural diversity have traditionally been advocated in education: core curriculum education (re-introduced in American education for example, and source of great controversy), and multicultural education. Respectively, they correspond to the fundamentalist and the constructivist models in official discourses.

Core curriculum education advocates assimilation and integration. In the US, it comes largely from the humanities (Bennett's "cultural literacy"; Bloom; Hirsch). Their critics call them "assimilationists." They are more concerned about US economy and technology status in international competition than about assimilating culturally diverse groups into the mainstream culture. They call for "neutrality in education" and "teacher proof curricula."[1]

In Europe, before its collapse, the communist/socialist education system presented the example of an attempt at assimilation. The fundamental feature of the Soviet school system was its uniformity on several levels: (1) the curriculum: everything was equally mandatory for all students, the same textbooks were used, and teacher training was the same everywhere; (2) the philosophy: in the various types of schools, all students were to master the same areas of knowledge, based on principles of equivalence and egalitarianism in education; (3) the foundation: theoretically at least, it was equally uniform in its Marxist-Leninist framework; and (4) the goals: they were to create a "good," socially minded citizen for a socialist society who would also realize in his (masculine gender intended) private life the values of a classless, egalitarian, and collective society.

In practice, this agenda proved to be based on the impossible assumption that the academic performance of both minorities and majorities depends on what goes on inside the schools, and all we need to do is "fix the schools." The main drawback was that it did not address the nature of minorities' cultural diversity. Besides, children bring to school their communities' cultural schemata of understanding "social realities," as well as the educational strategies which they, their families, and their communities traditionally use.

The multicultural education approach corresponds to the constructivist official discourse, with an emphasis on diversity and differences. The current movement is mostly led by minorities. For example, in the US, it emerged primarily in the 1960s, as a response to the "cultural deprivation" theory ("differential and inferior curriculum") and Blacks wanting "the same curriculum that was available to Whites."[2] Now, it is linked to cultural diversity, and is equally concerned with minorities doing well and those doing poorly. Although, according to Gorski "multicultural education is still a relatively new concept, that will continue to change to meet the needs of a constantly changing society," "today, literally dozens of models and frameworks for multicultural education exist."[3]

While James Bank[4] has been a leader in this field, other authors have expressed a variety of positions: Giroux, Kincheloe and Steinberg, Labaree, Levinson, McLaren,[5] to name a few.

In Europe, the post-Soviet Central and Eastern nations have been in a continuous process of change, leading to the current crises in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. One of the most important factors in the passage from monistic to pluralistic education is the abolition of the state's monopoly on education. However, it occurred in different ways in different countries with always one major problem: financing education. Some radical changes did take place, essentially ideological as is the case in Poland. The strongest initiative is seen in Kazakhstan, where besides the two dominant groups (Kazakh and Russian), over 130 other ethnic groups are represented. Since 2011, a trilingual policy is being implemented, while the goal is also to support all minority languages and cultures.[6] Ambitious objectives which are not without some serious challenges.

Looking at multicultural education literature, one can identify a number of goals. They include fostering pride in minority cultures, helping minority students develop new insights into their own culture, reduce prejudice and stereotyping, and promoting intercultural understanding.[7] The question remains: To what extent is it successful in improving the academic performance of minorities? Its limitation have a number of sources: (1) it ignores minority students' own responsibility for their academic performances; (2) its theories and programs are rarely based on actual studies of minorities' cultures and languages; and (3) it fails to distinguish minority groups who are able to cross culture and language boundaries from those who are not.[8]

Neither the core curriculum, nor the multicultural education responses to cultural diversity are satisfactory. They fail to recognize that minority children are influenced by the relationship between minorities and main stream cultures, and by complex social, economic, historical and cultural factors. Moreover, they overlook the fact that there are different types of minority groups and minority status involved.

Cultural Differences, Identity, and School Learning

The relationship between minorities and the mainstream cultures generally affects minority schooling. However, different minorities are affected differently. In particular, involuntary minorities show the most frequent and greatest amount of difficulties.

Voluntary minorities (especially children of first generation immigrants) come to school with a history of their own and, therefore, established cultural schemata about the world and human relations. Also, they may not speak or understand the language of instruction of their host country, and their cognitive framework may differ. However, their problems do not develop in opposition to the main culture or to protect their identity, sense of security, and self-worth. Consequently, they do not perceive learning the new language and culture as threatening to their own culture, language and/or identity, and most often, they will overcome any initial problems. Notwithstanding, they might require teaching approaches different from those used with the mainstream students, at least early on in their education in the host country. Experience has shown that they can benefit from so-called "additive learning," reaching a level of accommodation without assimilation. They are able to cross cultural and language boundaries without "losing themselves," these differences being nothing more than barriers to be overcome. Their chief reference remains their cultural group of origin and home country. Should any problems develop, they are generally specific enough to be identified and attended to.

Problems with involuntary minorities (resulting from colonization, slavery, or border shifting for example) differ from those encountered by voluntary minorities. This is particularly true in relation to communication, cognitive, interactional, and learning styles. They are unable to cross cultural and language boundaries since differences are generally maintained by those they perceive as the "enemy" or the "oppressor." As a consequence, these minorities may feel threatened in their identity, their sense of security and self-worth. In addition, they often face persistent and contradictory pressures from, on the one hand, the dominant group demanding that they conform and assimilate and, on the other hand, their peers who require loyalty toward their group of origin and who discourage success in school (deemed an indication of "buying into the oppressor's ways"). These factors combine to render their problems extensive and difficult to detect and identify. Therefore, it is much more difficult to help students of involuntary minorities whose reference remains the dominant group.

It is of paramount importance for educators to recognize that: (1) there are different types of minorities even within so-called ethnic groups, each with a different set of problems; (2) there are different kinds of cultures which carry language and value differences; and (3) all minority children face problems of

social adjustment and academic performance in school because of their cultural and language differences, and their relations to the mainstream culture. No doubt, teaching these students presents major difficulties, which are often ignored, overlooked, or miss-diagnosed. However, can they ever be labelled "language deficient," "learning disabled," or worse? Can teaching them be the impossible task it is sometimes purported to be?

Education as Possibility

A very first step is to understand the nature of multicultural co-existence in order to minimize ignorance of the cultural other. Part of this understanding implies knowledge of the history behind those cultural differences, and a conscious effort not to lump the many factors which cut across cultural differences into one monolithic entity. It is impossible to understand these differences without an analysis of ideologies and their relations with the balance of powers across time and space.

It is impossible to hope overcoming oppression, discrimination, passivity, or rebellion without first acquiring a critical comprehension of the history within which these intercultural relations take place. They are indeed part of a historical process since, as human beings, our actions construct history even as they are historically conditioned. In a perspective where men and women are capable of assuming themselves as both objects and subjects of history, capable of reinventing an ethical and aesthetic world beyond the already existing cultural patterns, Freire sees history as a time of possibility. According to him, "to think of history as possibility is to recognize education as possibility."

Jacques Derrida discussed this condition of possibility in conjunction with the play of antinomies and aporia inherent in his notion of capital as memory (no repetitive memory, yet no absolutely new) and as hegemony (no assimilation, yet no dispersion). These double injunctions, contradictions, aporias, are for Derrida the very essence of possibility and responsibility. Derrida has described and discussed extensively in several of his texts how these dilemmas are inherent in his concept of responsibility, and are, in fact, the *very condition* of its possibility.[9] For "at a certain point, the promise and the decision, that is to say the responsibility, owe their possibility to the test of undecidability which will always remain their condition."[10] He stresses repeatedly that, if there is an

easy decision to make, there is in fact no decision to be made, no possibility of decision, therefore no responsibility to be taken, only a set of rules to follow, a program to implement.

Derrida links this concept – this condition of responsibility as being dependent on the simultaneous necessity of a condition of impossibility – to a notion of "messianism," to the experience of the promise. It is by opening a space for the affirmation of this promise of the "messianic and emancipatory promise," of the impossible event as a promise, that it will preserve its capital of possibilities, of dynamic ideal in-the-making, "to-come." No doubt, there is danger in settling for an easy consensus, for facile "transparency," since, while "claiming to speak in the name of intelligibility, good sense common sense, or [supposedly] the democratic ethic, this discourse tends, by means of these very things, and as if naturally, to discredit anything which complicates this model."[11] As soon as we settle for a common space, we turn all possibilities into a program, or into an "ontotheological or teleo-eschatological scheme."[12] Derrida defines responsibility as "a certain *experience and experiment of the possibility of the impossible: the testing of the aporia* from which one may invent the only *possible invention, the 'impossible invention'*" (Derrida's emphasis).[13]

Derrida has questioned again and again institutional education powers, and thoroughly discussed our responsibilities as educators.[14] Yet, he encourages us to be cautious and vigilant, and not reject everything. As educators, it may be easy to be attracted by the lure of making everything equal (as if we ever could) and equally accessible to all, *apparently* removing all sources of possible contention and conflict. However, under the pretense of "the univocity of democracy," a model which "coincides with certain institutional powers"[15] may in fact be imposed, as seen in the example of the Soviet failed attempt at uniformizing education.

Conclusion

Pressures on minorities to assimilate have been strong, and have been reflected in the powerful influences exerted on curricula, education, and educators. However, a Eurocentric curriculum would not meet the needs of future generations any more than an Anglocentric or Francocentric one did in the past. Understanding both our own culture and that of others is essential if we are to

live in an inevitably multicultural world. This paper addressed the continuing debate on integration vs. multiculturalism. Considering the aporetic nature of culture, overlooked in all models of education and curriculum, the necessary step is to recognize with Derrida the double imperative of neither monopoly nor dispersion neither repetitive memory nor the absolutely new. The true dilemma is not a choice, but how to assume the dual responsibility to, both and at the same time, integration *and* multiculturalism; for not only must "foreigners" be welcomed, but one must also "recognize and accept [and respect and learn from] their alterity," recognize the enrichment they bring to the community, and not merely "integrate" or assimilate them. It is not easy, but it is vital.

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Endnotes

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14. See also Denise Egéa-Kuehne, "Deconstruction Revisited and Derrida's Call for Academic Responsibility," *Educational Theory 45*(3) (1995): 293-309; and Denise Egéa-Kuehne, "Neutrality in Education and Derrida's Call for 'Double Duty'," in Frank Margonis (ed.) *Philosophy of Education 1996* (Urbana, IL: Philosophy of Education Society, 1997), 154-163.
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Joseph Anton
Code Name or Reductive (European) Identity?

Michèle Lemettais

Abstract

Throughout his memoir, Joseph Anton, Salman Rushdie bemoans the fact that, in order to survive the fatwa proclaimed by the Ayatollah Khomeini for "blasphemy" in his novel The Satanic Verses, he had to abandon his identity and assume a new name. For the man who writes "In the pages of a novel it was clear that the human self was heterogeneous, not homogeneous, not one thing, but many, multiple, fractured and contradictory (627)", it was a profoundly painful act to "translate" his Indian self into a new identity based solely upon the education he had received in England.

When Derrida poses that the imposition of not only a new language on the immigrant, the refugee, the other, but the translation in his own language is the first violence against the one who is asking for asylum for whatever reason (De l'hospitalité, 21), the philosopher gives us a tool to understand the burden Rushdie had to assume during his years in his double exile. England has long prided itself on the fact that it is a nation of welcome and acceptance of the Other as such and a nation of multiculturalism in its postcolonial new world reality. But, in times of crisis and for all of its citizens, is it undeniably so? That is the question that Rushdie keeps coming back to throughout his retelling of the ordeal he endured for 10 years, hiding under a name reminiscent of the long cultural past of Europe but erasing his Indian identity.

Keywords

Identity, European Identity, Cultural Heritage, Language.

Derrida's ideal of a European identity, firmly and stably cognizant of its own foundation, yet freely open to the Other, posits a rational equilibrium between memory and history in the making, singularity and universality, idioms and translations. For Salman Rushdie, a British educated man and a deeply Indian cultured man, this Derridian concept of a European identity can and should also be applied to the writer who depicts the "human self […as] heterogeneous, not homogeneous, not one thing, but many, multiple, fractured and contradictory (627). Thus, in the very first sentence of *Joseph Anton*, his protagonist, himself, appears fully multiple and contradictory:

> Afterwards, when the world was exploding around him and the lethal blackbirds were massing on the climbing frame in the school playground, he felt annoyed with himself for forgetting the name of the BBC reporter, a woman, who had told him that his old life was over and a new, darker existence was about to begin.(3)

The words "blackbirds" and "school" are particularly striking as they hint at the two cultures he inhabits fully and which enable him to be a remarkable and diverse writer. The blackbirds are prominently featured in one of his novels, *Fury*, where they represent the three Furies, the female chthonic deities of vengeance or the infernal goddesses of the Greek mythology. In *Joseph Anton*, the blackbirds of bad omen can be interpreted as being a representation of the three goddesses Al-Lat, Al-Manat and Al-Uzza of the Arabic mythology, "the winged goddesses, like exalted birds" (41), who are the subject of the verses of the Koran recited by Muhammad, "Have you heard of Al-Lat and Al-Uzza, and Al-Manat, the third, the other one? They are the exalted birds and their intercession is greatly to be desired" (43) and which he recanted later on. The initial verses, which instructed the faithful to treat the three goddesses as daughters of God or angels, were said to have been dictated by Satan and thus became known as the Satanic verses, inspiring the title of Rushdie's novel *The Satanic Verses*, for which he was sentenced to death by the Ayatollah Komeini on February 14th, 1989. As for the word "school", it represents not only his own education in England, thus encompassing the forging of his new life, creating his British identity and citizenship, but it also represents part of his heritage, as his father had been educated in England and it was in his footsteps that his son followed all the way to the University of Cambridge. Thus, the *fatwa* sentencing him to death would not only be a challenge to his life and to his identity as a writer, but, in the response it precipitated from the West and particularly from Britain, it would bring into question his identity as a British citizen.

When Rushdie contemplates his life and his education from boarding school to university in England, it is not to write a tale of woe and longing, but rather a mixed tale of some wretchedness and a great deal of hope. For, even though it purports to be an open multicultural society which welcomes immigrants, especially as it compares itself to its neighbours on the European continent, Britain was a tough place for a 13 year old Indian boy who learned very quickly

and personally about alienation, "the sin of *foreignness*" and the feeling of being someone's Other, which was a new and strange feeling for an adolescent who had never considered himself the Other of someone else. He noted forthwith that you could make three serious mistakes as a foreign student in England: "In an English boarding school in the 1960s, […] there were three bad mistakes you could make, but if you made only two of the three you could be forgiven. The mistakes were: to be foreign; to be clever; and to be bad at games… He made all three mistakes. He was foreign, clever, non-*sportif.* And as a result his years were, for the most part, unhappy" (27), adding that "racism was something he quickly understood" (29). The school, which left him with the knowledge that he had been "wonderfully well taught" (27), also taught him about his own multifaceted identity, which would be occasionally challenged. Finding his research papers torn in his room or the words "WOGS GO HOME on his wall" (29) made him realize early on that he was different, no matter how well he adapted to his environment. The experience repeated itself, though to a lesser degree, as he went on to university, at King's College in Cambridge, having realized by then that "he was also a product, at least in part, of the deep-rooted Muslim culture of South Asia, the inheritor of the artistic, literary and architectural riches of the Mughals and their predecessors" (39). At Cambridge, though, he discovered great teachers and created close friendships with others who did not abide by the racist dictates of some public school students, and he was pleasantly surprised that there were "other, more attractive Englands to inhabit, in which he could easily feel at home" (36).

But the pronouncement of the *fatwa* on February 14, 1989 would arouse anew his feelings of alienation, and his anger and resentment would be first concentrated on the people he felt were not behaving in a logical and moral fashion. He was shocked, for example, to discover quite a number of Labour parliamentarians and parliamentarians "with significant numbers of Muslim constituents … and a strong history of defending freedom of speech place themselves meekly on the Muslim side of the fence" (130). He firmly believed that the reason he lost the Whitbread Book of the Year award, where his novel was the winner of the Best novel category, was the result of political shenanigans — two of the judges being conservative Tories — and not lack of literary merit. But, more profoundly and fundamentally disturbing was the necessity of living in hiding and changing his name, once the British government offered to protect him and did so for almost 13 years. For the author who had

embraced British life and who would be later knighted by the English monarch, it was reminiscent of those years in boarding school where, as a young boy, he felt marginalized and sometimes ostracized, having his identity questioned and being made to suffer because of it. For the British government, he had to be protected, but the protection was offered by the higher-ups in a grudging manner, be it from the foreign secretary or even Margaret Thatcher who, "on television, [was] understanding the insult to Islam and sympathizing with the insulted" (153). For the British Special Branch of the Metropolitan Police, the task of hiding him was a matter of simply getting him, in heavily armoured cars, to wherever he had found a place to stay, the suitability of which having had to be first approved by them. The act of hiding was a matter-of-fact necessity for the protection team but it was not so for Rushdie, who felt engulfed in shame and humiliated:

> he had to duck down behind a kitchen counter. As he crouched there … he felt a sense of deep shame. To hide in this way was to be stripped of all self-respect. To be told to hide was a humiliation. Maybe, he thought, to live like this would be worse than death. In his novel *Shame* he had written about the workings of Muslim "honor culture," at the poles of whose moral axis were honor and shame, very different from the Christian narrative of guilt and redemption. He came from that culture even though he was not religious, and had been raised to care deeply about questions of pride. To skulk and hide was to lead a dishonourable life. He felt, very often in those years, profoundly ashamed. Both shamed and ashamed. (147).

A couple of pages further, talking about the publishing houses who were hesitant to publish the novel or firmly on his side and publishing the book even after the *fatwa*, he adds: "While all this and much more was happening, the author of *The Satanic Verses* was crouching in shame behind a kitchen counter to avoid being seen by a sheep farmer. (151)

The hiding brought shame but the name changing brought back the familiar feeling of alienation as he himself questioned to what extent he still had a place in a democratic society. He was asked to "rename himself" as Salman Rushdie,

the author of *The Satanic Verses,* needed to become invisible, unidentifiable, unable to write checks, to rent a house or even to register to vote. In order to be able to vote, the citizen has to provide a home address which of course he did not have, as he was forced to move from place to place every few weeks, thus "to protect his democratic right of free expression he had to surrender his democratic right to choose his government" (163). When the police asked him to choose a new name for himself, he was told "probably better not to make it an Asian name" (163) — in other words, better to forgo his Indian identity all together. For the man who had written *Midnight's Children,* his love letter to India, and who had felt "dreadful, disconnected, spurned" (516) when India refused to allow the BBC to film the movie on its soil, it was a harsh demand, even more so as he was made to choose a name in a language that not only did not acknowledge his Indian self but carried within it a past heavy with racism and colonialism, prompting him to remark: "to be asked to give up your name was not a small thing…[and] he was to give up his race as well. He would be an invisible man in a whiteface mask" (163), referring, no doubt, to Ralph Ellison's social commentary and anti-racism novel *Invisible Man*.

Derrida, in his seminaries on hospitality, underlines the problems created by language and especially the translation through which the "foreigner" needs to pass in order to ask for hospitality in the language of the Other, stating "the nation, the State, … imposes the translation in its own language upon him and that is the first violence" (39), the foreigner being unable to keep his language, therefore his culture, his identity, in the eye of the host. Even though Rushdie is a British citizen with English as one of his mother tongues, he undergoes the same experience when he is asked to choose a new name which is not Asian, though he circumscribes rather neatly the imposition made on him by choosing Joseph Anton, the first names of two of the writers he loves and whose literary creations are not so dissimilar to his own:

> Conrad, the translingual creator of wanderers, lost and not lost, of voyagers into the heart of darkness, of secret agents in a world of killers and bombs, and of at least one immortal coward hiding from his shame; and Chekhov, whose *Three Sisters* believed that real life was elsewhere and yearned eternally for a Moscow to which they could not return: These were his godfathers now. (165)

The experience of having to create a fictional name for himself was another questioning of his identity, as he was, in a sense, turning himself into a fictional character, similar to the characters in his novels for whom he had invented fictional names. But it is also reminiscent of the name change his father decided for himself, probably to escape the authority of his own powerful father and the weight of his name: Khwaja Muhammad Din Khaliqi Dehlavi. So, with great care and thought — just as his son would do years later when choosing Joseph Anton — he "renamed himself 'Rushdie' because of his admiration for Ibn Rushd, 'Averroës' to the West, the twelfth-century Spanish-Arab philosopher of Córdoba who rose to become the *qadi* or judge of Seville, the translator of and acclaimed commentator upon the works of Aristotle. … A true scholar of Islam who was also entirely lacking in religious belief, [he] had chosen it because he respected Ibn Rushd for being at the forefront of the rationalist argument against Islamic literalism in his time" (23).

When Anis changed his name, he had remained in the mother tongue and in the mother culture. When his son was forced to rename himself, his first choice Ajeeb Mamouli (a fictional character for a possible story) was rejected as sounding "far too 'Asian' " (164). So, he had to remain in only one of his mother tongues (English) and in one of his cultures (Western), at the expense of the other tongue (Urdu) and culture (South Asian), performing as it were an act of ablation of his self. That violent act of de-possession of the self, inflicted through the language remaining and allowed to him (allowed is a term that he will have to deal with on numerous occasions when he is in the protection of the Special Branch), has been analysed by Derrida in many texts.

Ginette Michaud, in an essay analysing the Derridian hospitality[1], reminds us that, for Derrida, the language is the site of the original violence in that all language is essentially that which splits and divides itself, engendering division and partition, which implies violence, and one could even pursue the thought to the idea of the mother tongue, which gives birth (and death) in an act which is also violent. If, according to Derrida, we do not live inside our language, we do not have a language which is ours and where we feel at home, it is because language is made up of de-localisation, separation, and distance. "[L]anguage is what never ceases to separate from me (se départir de moi)… It is also from where I take off, what I protect myself from, and what I separate from. What separates itself from me while leaving from me" (44). Every writer has experi-

enced this phenomenon of a text taking off on its own, at it were, in spite of its author. Language inhabits the text after it has left its author and carries with it threats of alienation, to the reader and especially to its author. In Rushdie's case, the violence does not reside in the translation, but in the language itself as he writes that "he, too, was being forbidden to use his language. His language was improper, even criminal. He should be tried in court, hounded out of society, even killed. This was legitimate because of his language. It was the language of literature that was the crime." (122) It is interesting to note the shift from "his" language to "the language of literature." The language of *The Satanic Verses* does not belong to him any longer — did it ever? — and the separation from its author is also creating a rift in the identity of the writer, especially as he has to write his own distance to and from himself by creating, again under duress, a new name to identify himself.

Michaud notes that the evolution of Derrida's thought on language is evident in the text *The Eyes of Language*: *The Abyss and the Volcano*, in which he analyses an unpublished letter written by the German-born Israeli philosopher and historian Gershom Sholem to the German theologian and philosopher Franz Rosenzweig. In the letter, Sholem declares that Hebrew has a sickness in itself, which emanates from its secularization, it being a sacred language, and adds: "Hebrew is pregnant with catastrophes" (47), which brings Derrida to remark: "Before the vengeance of language, one could say, there is a language of vengeance that traverses generations and speaks beyond them. In the present case, this apocalyptic confession describes a language of vengeance that avenges an evil done to language. There is always a language of vengeance; vengeance always implicates language. Yet in this case the offense, the dispute, the crime concerns language itself" (note 43, p. 47). As Rushdie rightly saw, it was the language of literature, the language of storytelling and tales, which became the crime in his case. The attacks on the novel stemmed from not only a misreading of the text, from a blurring of the line between what Derrida calls the two sites of language, sacred and profane, religious and secular, but also from a misrepresentation of the writer's identity.

And what is that identity? Again, Rushdie defines himself as a writer : "This in the end was who he was, a teller of tales, a creator of shapes, a maker of things that were not" (629). As for literature, after 13 years spent hiding from the fanatics who had chosen to confuse a tale with reality and condemned him to

death, he more than ever believes that its place in the human saga is primordial, for: "In the pages of a novel…[r]eaders and writers could take that knowledge of broad-based identity out in to the world beyond the pages of books, and use the knowledge to find common ground with their fellow human beings… This was what literature knew, had always known. Literature tried to *open the universe*, to increase, even if only slightly, the sum total of what it was possible for human beings to perceive, understand, and so, finally, to be" (628). Joseph Anton came to be because Salman Rushdie was denied his freedom of expression, his right to write a story, his place as a citizen in a democratic nation. As an identity, a European identity, "Joseph Anton" can only be reductive, intimating not only a dis-location of the self, but more profoundly a dis-possession of the self and thus, remains simply a painful code-name and the title of a long memoir.

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Endnotes

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SECTION I
History, Geography, Science

ART & SCIENCE NEW HOUSES FROM RECYCLED ELEMENTS

Chair
—
Silvia Nuere

Participants
—
Inês Moreira
Pablo Bris, Silvia Nuere, Félix Bendito & Muriel Saint-Supéry
Bárbara Rangel

Presentation

Silvia Nuere

Looking forward to find a solution to the global housing problem in Europe, we proposed a collaborative work through the construction of houses built from recycled elements, throughout many disciplines such as architecture, sustainability, art, industrial design, sociology, anthropology or orders related to the human conditioning.

As housing is a basic necessity for human being we should deal with all these involved aspects, working in a combined operation. We also need to transmit to the future professionals that any solution may come from a global proposal and not as an addition of small parts that don't show the real problem.

From different points of view we have shown the possibility of working together to look for a solution to the problem of the way the houses are built. There are so many difficulties nowadays for so many people. For example, as Barbara Rangel tells us, finding a house for a young couple is now a difficult task and public investors no longer have the capacity to build ready to live houses with average areas to meet the needs along a family life. It has to be a space easily adaptable to the family demands, increasing and decreasing in size over time, the natural story of a home over the family history: the incremental house. If the project takes this natural necessity as a design task it's possible to reallocate the housing budget.

But also we have to think about disability and how we have to take care about some design solutions to make more affordable the inhabited space as Lígia Lopes told us. The aim is that designers and professionals from other fields could work together into the concept of Inclusive Design with participative methodologies to mitigate social exclusion. Nobody can be excluded and has to be actively involved in the design process.

From another point of view, analysing the work of Inês Moreira, we can also consider the house building trough the way of exhibitions, from architecture to spatial installations. We can experiment different collaborations between architecture, contemporary art and the humanities, producing oblique research into

contemporary cultures. The interest is to approach the matter of construction through little architectural spaces, and explore them as experimental structures and to bring face to face the pleasure of creation and life.

There are so many setbacks when we get a house and we think that it's better to afford the problem through the interaction of all the disciplines we have mentioned, so we will find an easy and affordable solution from a global vision with a working group.

Curating Small Architectural Structures
"Insatiable Builders" Exhibition

Inês Moreira

Abstract

This paper approaches a specific *case study*, the Insatiable Builders exhibition curated in France in 2014, at Lons-le-Saunier, where a group of commissioned new architecture structures was exhibited inside and outside the exhibition spaces of a museum. The title, *Insatiable Builders*, is an expression that leads to the vast territory of construction work and invites to look at the reasons that turn construction to resemble a compulsion. If large real estate investments and market oriented developments can portray the insatiability to build, and in some way portray the greed of savage construction, the proposal of the curatorial project, is to look in a different direction. The curatorial proposal is to address the question of construction processes through small architectural spaces, exploring it as experimental spatial structures, and tackling the pleasures of creating and inhabiting it.

Departing from the archetypical ideas of building small structures, the project alters the notion of individual isolation so to propose a notion of collectivity in new architectural production. The project is interested on a shared compulsion to build: why and how are people motivated to creating small structures? Grasping the compulsion to build with bare hands, the paper addresses some processes of design and assembly of small architectures: whether seasonal, ephemeral or nomadic vernacular dwellings, whether spatial prototypes or real scale 1:1 architectural models, it presents how people, and architects, are share the desires to create a small place of their own.

Keywords

Young European Architects, New Constructive Techniques, Small Scale Architecture, Do-It-Yourself, Curatorial Project.

Introduction

Insatiable Builders is the title of an architectural and pedagogical exhibition which has happen at a company Museum in Lons-le-Saunier, France, from February to September 2014, at the Maison de La Vache Qui Rit[1]. The exhibition has the architectural contents curated by Inês Moreira (architect) and the pedagogical plans and contents co-curated by Morgane Blant-Boniou (museum mediator). If research exhibitions are opportunities to explore new disciplinary and/or conceptual approaches to both exhibition and curated objects, and me-

diation programs aim to communicate to wide audiences, the specific *case study* was set as a hybrid project, between research and pedagogy. Testing a concept - that encompasses a position facing new architectural compositions, its related community based practices with new materials and construction techniques –, the project was from the beginning conceived with an embedded strategy of mediation to the wide audience of a generalist private company museum (Group Bel), therefore diverting from other more "disciplinary" projects. This paper faces the crossbreed project to focus on the architects´ and designers´ new spatial works, deferring the depiction of the mediation strategy for a future moment.

The Project

The project departs from the formulation of an expressive articulation: *Insatiable Builders*. The eloquent expression, more than a concept, immediately leads us to the vast territory of construction work and invites us to look at the reasons that turn construction to resemble a compulsion. If large real estate investments and market oriented developments can portray the insatiability to build, and in some way portray the greed of savage construction. In Insatiable Builders project, the curatorial strategy looks in a different direction: the proposal is to address the question of construction processes through small architectural spaces, exploring it as experimental spatial structures, and tackling the pleasures of creating and inhabiting it.

An escapist tone underlays the desire for small architectures, and in many coffee table books, websites, and printed posters seldom depict bucolic images of huts, sheds, or cabins in paradisiac landscapes. They appear as hermitic spaces that sidestep the demands of everyday urban routines and, therefore, take us into the exceptional realm of imagination. Huts epitomize some of the most secluded refuges were people, artists and thinkers went to create their space of exception. These remote places constitute the most iconic images of "the primitive hut", offering many qualities, as the relation with the environment and ecology, or the performative practice of building a personal space, and lacking contemporary ideas of functionality or efficacy. Children are as well expert practitioners, building imaginary huts, creating autonomous spaces away from the purposes and limits of the world of adults.

Insatiable Builders exhibition departs from these archetypical ideas, though, the proposal is to alter the notion of individual isolation so to offer a notion of collectivity in new architectural production. Today many young architects, and designers, are collectively producing their own projects, some experimenting new constructive solutions in small scale constructions, other exploring new materials or reuse old and vernacular techniques, or collaborating with communities and exploring very simple constructive systems with *do-it-yourself* approaches.

We are interested on a shared compulsion to build: why and how are people motivated to creating these buildings? To grasp the compulsion to build with bare hands, the exhibition brings forth some processes of design and assembly of small architectures: whether seasonal, ephemeral or nomadic vernacular dwellings, whether spatial prototypes or real scale 1:1 architectural models, people, and architects, are fascinated for these small structures and many share the desires to create a place of their own.

The exhibition at Maison de la Vache qui Rit presents a group of spatial installations conceived by architects and designers from different countries in Europe (France, Portugal, and Netherlands) who are diversely exploring the design departures and the construction processes of their projects, staging the diversity of statements, politics and compulsions to build. The several built/presented structures embody diverse reasons for their conception: departing from the scarcity and material restrictions, from vernacular iconic shapes and materials, from the tailoring of new do-it-yourself solutions, from the need to prototype with new materials and techniques, the guest authors are exploring and building playful small architectures.

The guests offer a broad perspective of contemporary architectural approach to small structures, some designing and building alone, some building and designing in collaboration: Catarina Pinto and Terrapalha, a Portuguese architect´s collective, have been exploring natural autochthonous material resources and local knowledges to collectively build new structures with "archaic" forms and geometries, while André Castro Vasconcelos, and architect, flies to different places carrying his complex tool kit to "assemble" new suspended structures. Both The Cloud Collective, a group of Dutch architects, and Verónique & Françoise Maire, French twins designer and architect, offer spatial projects to be reproduced: the first through on-line interaction and autonomous

digital fabrication, the second by making available the plans for a simple do-it-yourself replication. Petit Cabanon, scenographers at MVQR, have reused the cardboard bricks from previous exhibitions to create a collaborative self-built pedagogical space with the team of the museum, and in a more politically implicated mode, EXYZT have collaborated with the community of Cova do Vapor, near Lisbon, to create a communal kitchen and a cultural center that was used along the summer 2013. These *Insatiable Builders* embody a desire for horizontal and collective practices, sharing the labor with the constructors, our building themselves.

The Constructions

The exhibition unfolds as a route through the several installations in the outside garden and in the temporary exhibition rooms of the lower floor and the upper floor of the museum.

Figure 1. "The Womb Shelter" by Terrapalha/Catarina Pinto (PT).

 Figure 2. “The Sheperd Shelter“ by Terrapalha/Catarina Pinto (PT).

Catarina Pinto´s architectural projects are developed as collectively built construction processes taking advantage of local skills, knowledges and materials. With the newly created site-specific projects, *The Shepherd Shelter* and *The Womb Shelter* presented at the gardens of MVQR, Catarina Pinto follows simple hand-driven construction techniques and explores natural materials found locally and existing abundantly in winter 2013 harvest in the region of Jura. The two new structures presented at *Insatiable Builders* relate constructively and functionally to the seasons along the duration of the exhibition: the first shelter articulates a winter protection and considers the eventual snow layers to fall in winter´s coldest days as a variable of its design; the second, *The Womb Shelter*, is a tribute to Nature´s seasons and cycles and it is thought to transform throughout time – it is designed to be transformed, collectively, in spring 2014 in a workshop to silt it with a clay covering. *The Shepherd* and *The Womb* shelters connect to nature, symbolically evoking the masculine and the feminine elements and responding functionally to natural maltreatments elements, as human shelters. During the design process, Catarina has visited a shepherd man and learnt about the construction methods and choice of materials, finding a living testimony of these archaic constructions, in the remote mountains in Portugal. Catarina´s huts interpret and explore the forms, the textures, and the colours of autochthonous materials and use/invent new and old craft techniques to build with it.

Figure 3 & 4. "Vêtements de Rechange" by André Castro Vasconcelos (PT).

Following a slow, meticulous and systematic process – I dare calling it almost obsessive – André Castro Vasconcelos has defined a unique building method which is itself a spatial project. André´s spatial work interplays with architecture and art generating ephemeral, transient and performative structures built of second-hand garments which are then suspended in public spaces to create functional shadow protections. His spaces are practical deconstructions of architectural language: the constructive system, the composition, the final object are deconstructed in this inventive construction system. The several structures produced are handmade structures exploring the joys of creativity, of recycling and of pure resourcefulness: assemblages of colorful men/women shirts and plastic bottles, metal can´s caps, wires and other everyday elements recovered from the urban space, a new constructive system exploring the different materials, shapes and sizes of a few objects. At the entrance of MVQR, a suspended sculptural piece – *Vêtements de rechange* - hangs from the glass ceiling, along the

luxurious vertical garden and welcomes the visitors. Surprising, and strangely familiar, it stimulates the imagination provoking different reactions: is it an experimental dome, a textile sculpture, a suspended hut, or maybe a children's game? In a creative and compulsive desire, the author leads us to his new and surprising construction: chosen pattern-by-pattern, colour-by-colour, connected button-by-button and then carefully hanged row-by-row, with the tensioned strings that hang the 84 shirts in an intriguing new shelter.



Figure 5. "The Hermit House" by The Cloud Collective.

The *Hermit House project* is a software platform developed and made available by The Cloud Collective, a Dutch architectural group, stands in the intersection of do-it-yourself construction (and a bit of custom design) and can be promptly produced by digital modeling/fabrication in different locations, separating the architect from the final builder. Consisting of an open-source design tool to generate customizable small structures (available on-line www.

hermithouses.nl), the website reads: "*There is a unique building method and software package that allows us to design small houses in numerous varieties and quickly make them into reality. With this 'mass-customization' way of producing we can suit local constraints and serve the specific needs of clients without a lot of extra costs*". The platform can be manipulated on-line by any user who wishes to freely customize a hut, adapting an authored design to individual needs (within pre-determined available options) and delivers it by email in a document containing all the technical details and dimensions, tools and pieces needed.

Figure 6. "The Hermit House" by The Cloud Collective.

The *Réserve*, by Véronique & Françoise Maire – French designer and architect -, is a simple shed intended as a garden storage of raw material (wood and bottles) and created to protect gardening tools, among other possible purposes. The construction technique explored in *La Réserve* is in debt to two ancestral storing techniques: stacking, or pilling up, sawed timber while it dries, and

frameworking the laying bottles. As the authors explain: "*This principle of construction, sharing an implementation of technical and visual simplicity, also offers the advantage of being easily fit to auto-construction*." La *Réserve* produces a functional space that can be adapted to urban use, fixing a utopian archetype but bringing it to a banal everyday use.

Figure 7 & 8. "La Réserve" by Veronique & Françoise Maire.

Figure 9. "La Cabaniére" by Inês Moreira (Petit CABANON).

Cabaniére is the French term to designate the widespread process of construction that (illegally) advances in the terrain, enlarging a smaller pre-existing structure. It was popular after the Second World War along the French coast when people got to build their summer retreats by the sea, but it is as well used in most impoverished locations, as in the 60´s *bidon-villes*, to build and expand basic dwellings. Do-it-yourself construction processes tend to explore simple low-cost solutions and simple and fast construction techniques and, in contemporary European society, reusing materials is thought to be a potent "green" possibility for building, partly dictating the "design" results. To enunciate do-it-yourself construction, the *cabaniére* processes, and the reuse of materials, the *Insatiable Builders* exhibition includes an actual installation. Reusing the material remains from the recent past of MVQR, namely the cardboard bricks from the scenography of *Rewind* exhibition (2010), Petit Cabanon, the scenographers of several projects at the Museum, have proposed a structure so to create a small hut for pedagogical activities – named *Cabaniére* - following the same playful

process of continuous construction using the spare cardboard bricks (30x30x-120cms). Instead of trashing or recycling the material of the cardboard bricks, they were kept for 3 years waiting so to be reused, creating a different space. The space was built exploring the material, the process of assemblage and the hand-work of the production tea, not involving experts.

Figure 10. "La Cabaniére" by Inês Moreira (Petit CABANON).

Insatiable Builders are moved by various drives to which social and political determination are relevant, from housing unconventional life styles, to finding alternative ecological solutions, to suppress poverty and scarcity, many triggers start construction. Making evidence of such political implication, *House of Vapour and Kitchen of Vapour*, two small and ephemeral spaces built side by side, with recycled pine wood, on an empty plot in front of the beach of Cova do Vapor (Lisbon), bring not exactly a hut but a community based and collaborative project. Started and developed by French collective EXYZT with two local associations of dwellers - Associação de Moradores da Cova do Vapor and Associação Ensaios e Diálogos - the Kitchen and the House were created as a self-organized place to stimulate the sharing, the learning and the artistic

creation, in the poor and isolated community of Cova. Its purpose was to increase the active participation of children and people from the village in cultural activities developed during the summer 2013. The construction of the House of Vapour follows the planes of the architectural collective EXYZT, who built it with their bare-hands along the inhabitants of Cova do Vapor and many other volunteers, bringing a cultural project to life, during and after its construction process, with a group of people that grew every day.

Figure 11. "Casa e Cozinha do Vapor" by Exyzt & Associação Ensaios e Diálogos.

Some Reflexions

Exhibiting architectural constructions inside a museum differs from building it in open air, in a specific social, geographical and spatial context; this difference is commonly approach as a matter of representation of the architectural object in an exhibitionary context. Exhibitions tend to rely on drawings, plans, models, photographs and other visual representations to document and transmit the architectural object. The exhibition *Insatiable Builders* grasps the processes of building, which implies to address a temporal dimension that cannot be represented in traditional representations, and, above all, the exhibition aims to address what we perceive as a "collective compulsion" to build that can be found on young architects and designers, a drive that pushes to collective endeavours, mutual involve-

ments and in many cases to a community of people involved in self-organization: these architects love to build with their bare hands. Assuming a clear pedagogical choice to present along the architectural objects - the small structures itself -, several samples of the materials used for construction – shirts, bottles, wood, and other -, as well the architectural plans and models used to envisage the projected spaces, some short documentary films on different topics – recycling, ecology – were exhibited to bring non-strictly-architectural topics and voices inside the exhibition space, an attempt to amplify the debate around the question of building.

From a more technical perspective, exhibition making, the question of representation of a "community" of builders became a delicate topic and, even though parallel to architectural design, it hits the centre of the problem of the concept of the *Insatiable Builders*. Even though accepting the curatorial project and the selected projects to be built, the museum could not accept the presence of half a dozen teams of builders inside the exhibition spaces building their own structures as it was perceived as posing health and security problems to the institution and its visitors. Other logistic problem as long accommodation of international authors was mentioned as an obstacle to the collective exercise of building. Therefore, it was decided, in a top-down imposition, to commission the construction of the diverse structures to a local construction company specialized in theatre scenography, which carefully built and followed the plans of the authors. If there is a different reasoning in commissioned artworks – most commonly produced by the artist and his/her team - and the commission of a conventional building – delivered by contractors -, for the production of the insatiable builders exhibition, the museum understood the small structures as more "regular" buildings. Although the rigorous plans of the authors were executed, the performativity of the collective process of building was dislocated to other hands and tools, as the technical decision of contracting sidestepped the authors manual capabilities, disturbing the expected notion of a "builders community". The compulsion to bring the projects to live was shared with other´ constructors' hands, leaving a certain feeling of insatiability. Hopefully, it will boost the desires to build and trigger new constructions, elsewhere.

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Endnotes

1. The original title in French language is *Les Constructeurs Insatiables*.

Accommodating Cabins as a New Way of Building Houses

Pablo Bris, Silvia Nuere, Félix Bendito & Muriel Saint-Supéry

Abstract

The current economic crisis has meant, particularly in Spain, the almost cessation of new buildings construction. This deep crisis will mean in future an irreversible change in the Spanish construction model, based to date almost exclusively on the brick.

The project "Accommodating cabins as a new way of building houses" is part of a larger research within the line "Modular Architecture" developed by the Research Group "Design and Industrial Production", belonging to the Technical University of Madrid, which aims to respond to the need for decent housing at an affordable price, by offering through Internet the plans, resources and other technical details required to build a house oneself.

The proposed houses are built from the combination of industrially made modules (accommodation cabins, which are prefabricated modules usually used as provisional constructions in conventional building works), prefabricated subsystems and other catalogue components available on the market, all they set together by dry joints.

Keywords

Recycling, Affordable Housing Prefabricated, Self-Construction, Crisis.

Introduction

The current economic crisis in Europe has implied, in the specific case of Spain, the almost complete cessation of new buildings construction.

In a few years the house has moved forward from being contemplated exclusively as a primary good to be also considered a capital asset. We analyse the influence that this transformation has had on architecture (housing typology, building methods, the architectural profession and the architect training) and offers architectural alternatives –trough the university– to the present crisis.

Housing: From Primary Good to Capital Asset

While in the middle of the 20th century the percentage of home ownership in Madrid and Barcelona was of 6 and 5% respectively[1], nowadays it amounts to 83.2%, what makes Spain be one of the European Community countries with the highest percentage of home ownership[2].

From the beginning of the first housing bubble (1986-1992) -of a speculative rather than constructive nature[3]-, housing prices, which had been growing at rates comparable to consumer prices until then, began to grow in parallel with stock prices and property starts being seen from two perspectives: Firstly, as a necessary good, recognized as a legal right by Article 47 of the Spanish Constitution. Secondly, as a capital asset in its different aspects what caused an increase in housing demand:

1) a generator of wealth thanks to an ever-increasing real estate capital gains, until 2007;

2) a store of value in the medium and long term; or

3) a short-term speculative product (purchase and sale on periods shorter than two years[4]).

During the second housing bubble from 1997 to 2007, of a constructive nature this time[5], the concept of home as an investment was maintained and reinforced. The fact that housing has become an alternative of investment for many Spaniards has resulted in implications not only on his price (and its outsized rise and revaluation[6]), but also, in regards to the new housing building, on its typology, on its building technologies and on the architects and their professional formation.

a) Impacts on housing typology.

Typologically speaking, there is only one type of housing (hall, living room and kitchen, hallway that leads to 1, 2 or 3 bedrooms and 1 or 2 bathrooms) and the only variations are therefore quantitative, both in number of bathrooms and bedrooms and in square meters.

It seems unreasonable to ignore the evolution experienced by the family in recent years (one-parent and blended families, single people, etc.) or the population aging.

From our point of view, the fact that the housing supply in Spain remains monolithic is directly related to the widespread consideration of housing as a capital rather than a primary good: the more homogeneous the homes, the greater the probability of being exchanged in the market.

b) Impacts on building methods.

In Spain the same building model from the 60s remains. The construction is on site and follows always the same sequence of procedures: first, foundation and linear structure (beams and columns, usually made of concrete); then, roofing, building enclosure, interior walls and service systems. It is a construction model that uses brick, concrete, cement and plaster as main materials, and requires long work deadlines. It is based on the successive entrance of various trades on site what implies that its success depend on the ability and training of the various professionals.

c) Impacts on the architectural profession.

Most of the modern architecture historiography[7] has presented a heroic image of the architect: an independent professional with clear social conscience, who serves their fellow citizens and is able to transform the society in which he lives.

In Spain, the architects have been unable to counter the voracity of the building developers, to promote new typologies of housing or even to suggest alternative methods to the traditional craft-based construction.

d) Impacts on architect training.

The training of architects in Spain has not substantially changed in the last 100 years. Unlike what happens in other European countries, the Spanish architectural education has an integral character including both aesthetic and technical training (structures and service systems calculating). However, in the present construction model the aesthetics aspect is a priority since the building is designed almost exclusively from the formal viewpoint and technical and structural problems are solved afterward.

Industrial architecture and prefabrication has been absolutely neglected in the Spanish universities. It has been transferred by the architects to the civil engineers on a voluntary basis, what partly explains the lack of development and research on alternative constructive methods on architecture.

The crisis: time to change our real estate model.

The Spanish real state crisis affects principally those whom bought their homes as a personal good, without speculative intentions (motivated, in many cases, by the high prices of rent, which are equal or even bigger than the monthly mortgage fees), but paid a price inflated by the speculative bubble. Together with this fact, the dramatic rise of unemployment is causing that a growing number of Spaniards are being evicted[8] and, therefore, put at risk of social exclusion.

Therefore, it is time for Universities to offer solutions for the current housing problem, to the extent of our possibilities.

Proposed solutions: ends and means.

The "Modular architecture" Research Line's general aim is to propose industrialized or highly prefabricated housing alternatives, which will simplify the citizens' access to adequate housing, from architectural and also constructive standpoints – considering space, typology, aesthetic, among other criteria, but also constructive quality, energetic efficiency, durability, etc.

Prefabrication seems to be an alternative[9] that, from a logical point of view, should have been developed in house building, as in other countries[10] (Davies, 2005; Kieran & Timberlake, 2004; Ryan, 2010). The alternatives or solutions proposed from our research group share the following points:

a) The development of research on architectural typologies;

b) The abandonment of conventional craft-based building system and the gradually replacement by industrialized construction methods and/or highly prefabricated systems and subsystems assemblies, together with the enhancement of the reuse of existing buildings.

c) The rethinking of the way projects are conceived and the replacing of the

hierarchical and pyramidal system –in which architects occupy a top position and aims the formalism– by a matrix arrangement, in which they are part of a team of technicians and engineers.

d) The provision of solutions from a social viewpoint.

e) The incorporation of research to professional practice. With the traditional construction system, every project starts from zero. Industrialized architecture allows to research with each project and to improve the prefabrication systems, as well as sharing and spreading knowledge.

f) The rethinking of the way of future architects training.

Project Description

The "Accommodating cabins as a new way of building houses" is a temporary and somehow emergency project[11]. It does not intend to be a general solution to the housing problems of our country, but aims to be part of a series of alternatives to respond to the presented problems, by the means described in the previous section.

The project's goal is to make available to anyone –and free of charge– the plans, resources and information required for building their own family housing.

The proposed houses are based on the reuse of accommodation cabins (factory-made modules usually used as temporary buildings, offices and restrooms, on the conventional building sites).

The residences must be inexpensive, flexible from the typological point of view (customizable according to the future user's needs), built from the combination of industrially made modules (accommodation cabins), prefabricated subsystems and other catalogue components available on the market, all they set together by dry joints.

What is an accommodation cabin?

Accommodation cabins are light prefabricated structures –manipulated by truck crane–, with small dimensions (length: 3, 4, 6, 8m, width: 2.44m, height: 2.59m), which can be transported by truck without special movement permits.

They consist of a solid frame-typed metal structure. The joints between the columns and the beams are rigid.

a) Advantages of using accommodation cabins as construction basis:

— Ease of obtaining different layouts and typologies from modular elements (see figure 1). The houses are gotten from a variable amount of cabins, depending on the size of the project. It is strongly recommended to use the same type of container in each project. The way the cabins are set together may vary on the ground plane, but not on height (they are attached by bolted joints at the level of the horizontal beams, at the top and the bottom of the structure).

– Construction quality. The houses are industrially built, with a high level of finishes quality. As mentioned, the structure is frame-typed, which means it is structurally resistant to any alteration made on its façades, as, for example, opening holes on them (see figure 2.1).

Furthermore, unlike what happens with shipping containers, the accommodation cabins are usually insulated (walls, floor and roof). Although insufficient, the prior isolation is a good base for further improvement (see figure 2.5).

– Economy. The stagnation of the building sector has strongly dropped the accommodation cabins prices: for example, a 6 meter container costs between 300 and 800 Euros, depending on possible offers and on its state of conservation. The price of shipping containers remains stable on due the residual value of the steel.

b) Inconveniences of using an accommodation cabin as construction base:

– Aesthetic. The containers' aspect is inevitably associated with its temporary purpose.

– Space. The interior space of each module is small, always limited by the width (2.35m on the interior side).

– Thermal and condensation problems. Despite insulated, the frame is a continuous thermal bridge.

Subsystems incorporated to the accommodation cabin.

To avoid the described problems several construction subsystems are incorporated in the house. The essential ones, both from constructive and aesthetic

(external appearance modification) perspectives are two: the addition of a new facade and a new roofing.

The new enclosure – both facades and roof – has to meet several conditions: it has be as cheap as possible, light (so it can be easily assembled by two people) and ventilated (to prevent condensation). It also has to be attached to the frame by removable joints (bolted) and must eliminate thermal bridges –and for this we must ensure that the thermal insulation covers the entire frame, with a minimum thickness of 3 cm.

a) New outer horizontal enclosure: incorporating a ventilated facade.

The new facade is made using cement wood boards bolted on an auxiliary support structure made of treated pine wood battens. The battens enable the separation to provide space for a ventilated chamber and the reinforcing insulation.

b) New "vertical" enclosure: addition of a new roof.

The roof, which goes from a flat to a pitched roof, has dual mission. First, it changes the way the roof works: from a hot, no ventilated cover to a cool and ventilated one. Secondly, it modifies the parallelepiped geometry of the houses.

Although most of the applied subsystems affect the enclosure, the entire interior of the home, from interior partitions to the service systems, is composed of catalogue components or prefabricated building systems and subsystems available on the market.

Building with accommodation cabins: an open project.

As already mentioned, a website that will provide to anyone[12] the required documentation for building their own family housing is under construction.

The website intends to spread information about:

– Different typologies and models of houses.

– The required documentation for the understanding and execution of the building system.

– Different manners of building houses, among which are:

a) The self-building method: possibility to build/assemble the house by only two people (usually on site).

b) Pseudo-industrialized construction: possibility of off-site manufacturing, making each module almost prepared to be assembled on site.

– The calculations of insulation, service systems, etc.

– Recommended subsystems and components, indicating where to purchase them (usually on line) and their costs.

The project, although initially restricted, aims to be open and fed back through the experiences of those who take part in it – the ones who build using the documentation spread through the web.

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Figures



Figure 1. Different accomodation cabin typologies



 Figure 2. Assembly of two-module housing

The Incremental House as a Challenge for the After Crisis Housing

Bárbara Rangel

Abstract

Finding a house for a young couple is now a difficult task. The financial crisis made the purchase of a house an impossible mission and renting a mirage. Although circumstances are urgent, social housing policies to help young couples to start their family life are no longer a priority. Public investors no longer have the capacity to build ready to live houses with adequate areas to meet the needs of a family life. Construction is increasingly expensive and the urban plot more valuable. A house has to be a home again that grows along with the family, a space easily adaptable to the family demands, increasing and decreasing in size over time adapted to the natural story of a home over the family history. For an architect, designing an unfinished house could be an outlandish but stimulating challenge. The project defines the housing core, the project defines the developing rules predicts the future needs. The developer builds the housing core dimensioned for a couple, and as the family grows the house is adjusted with their needs. This participative project methodology brings a solution for the housing investment reallocating the housing budget. Through the analyses of selected examples of incremental housing in modern architecture, this article seeks to organize the conceptual ideas involved in EVOLUTIONARY HOUSING TYPOLOGY to support the decision in contemporary design. Organizing the design concepts and project principals of this typology can help design teams to explore it as innovative solution for today's political and urban dwelling crisis.

Keywords

Incremental House, Design Strategy.

"Tan solo cuando los individuales pueden tomar decisiones sobre la planta y equipamiento de su vivienda, verdaderamente será posible decir que dicha vivienda expresa sus aspiraciones personales."

Habraken 1979

"Versatile is the house: just like men, flexible yet solid."

Bruno Taut 1930 (Bruno Taut 1930 citado em Whyte 2010)

The Incremental Housing Concept

In the beginning a family is composed of two elements, a house with 35m2 is sufficient. When the children arrive the area increases to 55m2. In the third

stage of a family life the children can continue their life in the same house, so more space is required, or they start their own have, so the old couple just needs the 35m2 again. When the house grows with the family it became a HOME. The HOME is the intimate space of each family, the identification of its individuality. To claim its singularity a family needs to improve their home, getting more space or improving the construction technologies: for economic reasons and functional motifs, accommodating an extra child or installing a small commerce; or cultural or emotional ones, just to show the financial improvement of the family, a natural process in every culture (illus.1).



Illustration 1. Evolutionary house concept.

An incremental house has the capacity to be changed over time following the rules defined by the project, without compromising the urban set. This is probably the oldest housing concept. In a vernacular house is possible to identify the initial core and the methodologies adopted to make its evolution in construction, architecture and urban scale. The urban design is composed according to a molecular structure allowing the growth within each family property. The houses are composed in a modular geometry adapted to the site's shape and the available materials. Different building technologies with different raw materials define the rules for the formal and programmatic evolution of the EVOLUTIONARY HOUSE, in their association, the NEIGHBOURHOOD UNIT and how these clusters are integrated in the landscape, the URBAN CORE. Although, this singularity cannot be arbitrary, each house is part of a common body, the city, made of rules that define where one's liberty starts and finishes. The evolution must be ruled.

Using the biological definition of "evolution" as a sequence of events representing the development of a species or of a group of related organisms, it is possible to find a definition for the EVOLUTIONARY HOUSE. The incremental housing design is based in a molecular concept where the EVOLUTIONARY HOUSE is the basic cell. The URBAN CORE, a molecule composed by NEIGHBORHOOD UNITS, a set of 10 to 15 EVOLUTIONARY HOUSES, a house defined by the initial nucleus with the capacity to grow. Today, in a current house these updates are illegally made by adding more space or dividing the existing one. Instead of prohibiting these extensions; if the project predicts and controls these changes, it's possible to regulate the evolution of each house and therefore the evolution of the city (illus.2).



Illustration 2. Progressive housing project concept

The evolution process must be systemized during the design process, defining a hierarchy of transformations in sequential stages according to the defined priorities in the housing program, according to the balance

of the formula in the different stages: INVESTMENT + EXECUTION CAPABILITY

In the beginning a couple just needs a one bedroom house, only when the family grows or a small workroom is needed, more space or a technological improvement is necessary. This first construction stage corresponds to the heavy construction, structure and the network infrastructure, systems involving specialized hand labor and a higher investment. For the following stages, construction of elements that require less technical ability should be left, if possible prefabricated, as partition walls, finishes, installation of specific equipment, etc (illus.3).



	Infrastructures Main Structure Exterior Envelope Bathroom Kitchen	Developer Invest
Phase 1	50% of the Total Area	70% of the Total Investment
	Bedrooms Finishing's Upgrades	Family Investment
Phase 2	25% of the Total Area	15% of the Total Investment
	Polyvalent Spaces Technological Improvements	Family Investment
Phase 3	25% of the Total Area	15% of the Total Investment

Illustration 3. Progressive housing formula.

Thereby progressive housing seems to solve the social housing formula without reducing the areas. Public investment in housing is reduced. The investment is divided and the construction staged, the structure and heavy infra-structures are supported by the developer approximately 70% of the total investment of a current social house. The finishing and technologies updates shall be the responsibility of the families. With the same global investment it would be possible to accommodate more young families building more "half houses", small houses with capacity to grow (illus.4).

Illustration 3. Progressive housing investment.

The main challenge for an affordable housing project is to ensure good conditions of habitability with the smallest investment. In the design, the first assumption must be finding a solution to optimize the construction process according to the real needs of the family over time. Taking advantage of the natural need of the family to improve their home it's possible to control the evolution if the design provides the conditions to make a sustainable progress.

Progressive Housing in the Beginings of Modern Architecture

"I do not want to lose sight of the central idea of using the machine and all modern industrialism to produce beauty.(…) Simply selling houses at less cost means nothing at all to me. To sell beautiful houses at less cost means everything.(…)"

(Robert 2009)

Despite the simplicity of this housing concept, this typology has not been an option in most of the social housing projects, probably for political reasons. But, for an architect, designing a house without an expected completion could be outlandish but a stimulating challenge.

Since the design of the 'American System-Built Houses' (Sdoutz) FRANK LLOYD WRIGHT studied low cost evolutionary housing, as a solution to minimize the construction costs through the constructive process phasing. He was seeking for a formula to design the city from the house, like an organism is made from a cell. In USONIAN HOUSES PROJECT (1947), the module starts in a concrete block. Inside a circular plot of 72m in diameter, each family built a house according to a defined matrix. These bricks allowed various types of assembly like a Lego system, they made structure and partition therefore the evolution of the house was possible in numerous ways (Reisley 2001)(fig. 1, fig. 2, fig. 3).



Figure 1. Patent of blocks for a double wall light (Frampton 1999), Figure 2. Usonian Houses, Jacob Home, 1936 (Wright 1936), Figure 3. Sol Friedman House, Toy Hill General Plan (Wright 1948)

WALTER GROPIUS, at the beginning in Bauhaus and later in the US explored this typology. To respond the USA Red Cross orders of pre-fabricated houses between 1942 and 1952, Gropius developed, for the Factory Christoph and Unmack the PACKAGED HOUSE, a constructive system fully prefabricated (Christensen 2008). The basic module was a panel of 40 X 120 inches (approx. 1.0m x 3.0m) that grew in an orthogonal metric of 40 inches (approximately 1.0m). The panels were assembled vertically and horizontally in a 45º system with a Y shape, allowing numerous possibilities for the house evolution (fig. 4, fig. 5).

Figure 4. Packaged House, 1942 – 1952 Axonometric (Nerdinger 1988), Figure 5. Packaged House Prototype, Assembly Diagram (Christensen 2008).

As a response to the National Housing Program launched in the 40s by the US National Housing Agency, MARCEL BREUER (also teacher at Bauhaus and emigrant in the USA) proposed a pre-fabricated evolutionary house for mass production, the YANKEE PORTABLES, a wood structure house based on aircraft wings design supported in cantilever by a single concrete foundation alignment (fig. 18, fig. 19, fig. 20, illus. 11). In 1948, Breuer developed for an exhibition on modern housing in MoMa, the BI-NUCLEAR HOUSE, a solution that made a formal separation of social and private areas. Although this house had been designed for families with low income, this house became a "fashion" typology that would be replicated infinitely within the 50's American elites (Hyman 2001) (fig. 6, fig. 7, fig. 8, fig. 9).



Figure 6. Tankee Portables, Construction Scheme, Marcel Breuer, 1942 (Hyman 2001), Figure 7. Yankee Portables, Prototype Marcel Breuer, 1942 (Hyman 2001), Figure 8. The Modern Home Exhibition at MoMA, Marcel Breuer, 1948 (breuer 1948), Figure 9. The Modern Home Exhibition at MoMA, Marcel Breuer, 1948, Plan (Breuer 1948).

When Le Corbusier found that the structure could be separated from the façade, a formula to the incremental house design came up. The MAISON DOMINO, a universal structure for a house to respond to the reconstruction of France and Belgium, after the 1st World War shown in Pavilion de *l'Esprit Nouveau* for the 1926 *Exposition Internationale des Arts Décoratifs et Industriels Modernes*, Paris. (Le Corbusier). With this abstract structure it was possible to find different combinations for the URBAN CORE and NEIGHBOURHOOD UNIT (fig. 10, fig. 11).





Figure 10. Dominó House Le Corbusier, 1914 (Corbusier), Figure 11. Freehold Masionettes, 1914 (Corbusier 2006)

As opposed to this MAISON DOMINO globalization, also in CIAM the TEAM X explored the evolutionary housing concept given by the vernacular architecture. For ALISON AND PETER SMITHSON, a house was not a perfect machine, but rather a unique territory, a HOME (Heuvel et al. 2004). In their research, the IDEOGRAMS, the houses bound together in an almost biological association transforming cells in a molecule (Smithson and Smithson 2001)(fig. 12).

> "A structure should welcome its appropriation by inhabitants, their patterns of use, their art of inhabitation."
>
> (Smithson and Smithson 1994)

This ideogram became a real project in the STRIP HOUSES, an URBAN CORE based on the English suburbs housing, with 12 to 14 houses NEIGHBORHOOD UNITS limited in rectangular lots. In each house only the slabs were fixed, bathroom, kitchen and the two dressing spaces were static spaces, around which the compartments were defined (fig. 13). For the consolidated city they developed the FOLD HOUSES a concept that fits in existing urban fabrics. The NEIGHBORHOOD UNIT was developed from a two floors height wall, along which came each house (fig. 14, fig. 15).



Figure. 12 Snowball House, Alison and Peter smithson 1975 Neighbourhood Unit (Heuvel et al. 2004), Figure. 13 Strip Houses, Alison and Peter smithson, Neighborhood Unit 1958, Axonometric (Heuvel et al. 2004), Figure. 14 Fold Houses Neighborhood Unit–Concept (Heuvel et al. 2004), Figure. 15 Fold Houses – Evolutionary House (Heuvel et al. 2004)

After the 1970 earthquake in Peru was promoted an international completion for incremental housing for the displaced population in Lima, the *Concurso Internacional Proyecto Experimental de Vivienda* PREVI. This was the opportunity for the CIAM architects put in practice the housing theories of the Colage City, (García-Huidobro, Torres Torriti, and Tugas 2008). The URBAN NUCLEUS was a set of services at different scales. In the NEIGHBORHOOD UNITS, urban spaces are understood as a common property, cared for and built by the community. The EVOLUTIVE HOUSE should accommodate 4 to 6 people until 8 to 10. JAMES STIRLING presented a house hierarchically developed around the patios in two levels (fig. 16).

Figure. 16 Pátio House, Previlima, James Stirling, 1978 (Fernando García-Huidobro 2009)

The repetition as a rule in architectural composition is taken to the extreme in HABITAT 67 by Moshe Safdie in the competition launched by EXPO67 in Montreal. For the NEIGHBORHOOD UNIT proposed a three-dimensional layout by the module overlapping. In Montreal the URBAN CORE was composed of 148 dwellings (Schneider and Till 2007)(fig. 17, fig. 18).



Figure. 17 Habitat 67, Moshe Safdie, 1967 (Safdie 1967), Figure. 18 Habitat 67, Moshe Safdie, 1967, Work Photos (Safdie 1967)

Since his first project the ROGER'S HOUSE, RICHARD ROGERS chased the evolutionary housing by the systematization of constructive industrial processes (Rogers and Gumuchdjian 2000). From this project was born a prototype evolutionary house, the ZIP HOUSE, designed in partnership with Team 4. The free-standing mobile panels endowed with wheels and a locking inflatable system, allowed a completely open 9m width, where the internal partitions could be randomly distributed. For the opaque walls were used free-standing panels used in refrigerated trucks (Rogers 2010). (FIG. 20). Today, for a URBAN NUCLEUS of 145 urban houses, MILTON KEYNES HOUSING, Rogers presents following the English garden city logic, creating collectives and private green spaces. The NEIGHBORHOOD UNITS are organized organically in a band the houses associate modules that provide typologies from 2 to 5 bedrooms (fig. 22, fig. 23).



Figure. 20 Zip House, Richard Rogers, 1968 Axonometric (Burdett 1996), Figure. 21 Milton Keynes Housing, Richard Rogers, 2005, Neighborhood Unit (Homes And Communities Agency 2008), Figure. 22 Milton Keynes Housing, Richard Rogers, 2005, Evolutionary Housing (Homes And Communities Agency 2008)

Today, is in Latin America that more progressive housing projects are developed and implemented. ELEMENTAL, a Chilean multidisciplinary team led by Alejandro Aravena promotes integrated housing projects to solve the urgent housing problems demanded by the state programs "A Roof for Chile". The families assume responsibility for housing development and maintenance, the state subsidizes the plot and the base housing (Knuckey). Taking advantage of the strong Chilean tradition of self-construction, ELEMENTAL developed a model type that could form different types of housing in different contexts.

Setting the value of each HOUSE and the area of its base, it is possible to calculate for a specific budget how many families can be accommodated**.** To build each house 300 UF (Chilean concept for housing finance) are required, for 100 houses 30.000UF. With this same amount, 30,000 UF ELEMENTAL propose a building for 100 families, the PARALLEL BUILDING(illus. 6).



1 HOUSE = 300 UF
100 HOUSES = 30.000 UF

1/2 HOUSE = 70%x300 UF
30.000 UF = 142 HOUSES

PARELLEL BUILDING
n HOUSES x 72m2 of floor area = 30m2Xn + 42m2xn

$$\text{Nº OF FAMILIES} = \frac{\text{TOTAL RESOURCES}}{\text{COST OF A REASONABLE HOUSE}}$$

Illustration. 6 Elemental Design Concept

Starting from an EVOLUTIONARY HOUSE developed in three 4,5m x 6,5m modules, it is possible to define a URBAN CORE adapted to different contexts and medium sized NEIGHBORHOOD UNITS. For a current situation and plot, is used the EXPANDABLE HOUSE, a house built in two stages. For a small plot the PARALLEL BUILDING, on three floors two houses are articulated, on the ground floor one that grows horizontally, in the first floor grows in two levels. For a wide urban plot, the FELXIBLE HOUSE typology, in the internal space is possible to build one more level (fig. 23).

Figure. 23 Elemental Expandable House, Parallel Building, Felxible House (Andres Iacobelli 2007)

Conclusion

"Something that can be changed is forever new."

(Schneider and Till 2007)

The main challenge for an economic housing project is to find a solution that responds with dignity to the living conditions of a normal family with the lowest possible investment. Most often, this equation is solved by minimizing the portion of habitability conditions, reducing areas, opting for low-quality building materials and in areas outside of urban centres (Alves 2003). On the other side the portion relating to conditions of habitability is calculated only for the number of people in the household at the time of construction of the dwelling. However, if still in project, is chosen a type of housing that can grow according to the size of the family and of their economic conditions, it can not only reduce the initial investment of investors as allows each family to adapting the house family needs as they change.

In some countries, as a consequence of the bankruptcy of the real estate market, the housing concept is changing. Instead of changing homes, the state developers are providing progressive houses. For instance, the adaptability is already a requisite in the United Kingdom for the social housing projects, thinking not just of the disabled but in the aging process of the families (Foundation).

Today's precariousness and continuing necessity of housing are forwarding a profound reflection on the fundamental concepts of housing, particularly its

life cycle and investment responsibility. A house has to be again a place where the family grows, along with its identity and necessity. The state can no longer provide "pret-a-porter" housing. The investment must be re relocated, with the same amount used before it has to attend the accommodation of more families. The cost of a house must be divided, the skeleton and the vital infrastructures supported by the promoter, the functional and technological improvements by the family, the EVOLUTIONARY HOUSE.

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SECTION I
History, Geography, Science

ANTHROPOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR OLD & NEW EUROPEAN CHALLENGES

Chair
—
Idoya Zorroza

Participants
—
Augusto Sarmiento
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Presentation

Idoya Zorroza

In the XVth century, the discovery of the Americas meant not only the incorporation of new possibilities for the old Europe (commerce and navigational routes, geographical discoveries, new botanical and faunal findings, etc.) but, additionally, intellectual challenges in many different orders. Firstly, in juridical terms; the known world with its "ius gentilium" in force had to be extended to new peoples, for which foreknown categories did not apply, demanding a revision of its philosophical and juridical basis. At a philosophical level, the discovery of cultures so different from Europe, without sharing even minimal linguistic, historical or cultural roots, demanded from Old World intellectuals to define what it meant to be a human being, the notion of human dignity, which eventually paved the way to inviolable, universal rights, and an understanding of moral behavior that transcends nations and times, for it affects that which is constitutive and personal.

Recent decades have seen a new international line of research aimed at XVI and XVII century Hispanic thought (including, most notably, the authors associated with the School of Salamanca and their impact). The disciplines currently developing this line are mainly associated with the history and philosophy of law and economics. The former discipline deals with the formation of modern law and with the particular influence of ancient and medieval thought (especially in the concept of individual rights or human rights). The latter discipline is concerned with understanding the qualitative theory of money and new economic dynamics (new trade, exchange, and even financial tools). These studies converge in the development of several central notions, as dominion, natural law, human rights, property, freedom, human dignity…

While these notions can be defined in very similar terms within modern thought, XVI and XVII century authors have their own philosophical background, reaching diverse implications and conclusions.

Taking advantage of earlier anthropological richness, as developed by premodern authors, including sixteenth century Hispanic thinkers, it is worth linking some theses whose central ideas open up a conversation on and revi-

sion of some contemporary interconnected points. This is the aim of the works included in this section: the recovering Spanish sixteenth and seventeenth century thought, in order to understand its role in shaping European thought and the history of ideas, and identify opportunities for developing ideas with which to meet the challenges of contemporary thought.

1. In "Francisco de Vitoria's Formulation of Personhood as the Basis of Personal Freedom and Equal Rights among Men and Peoples", Augusto Sarmiento underline that sixteenth-century Spanish theology can generally be said to actively delve into and develop the rights of human beings, as individuals and as a members of society, representing a common constant in the comments and theological works of the time. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that this inquietude and defense of man has some theological roots: the dignity of the human person and the radical equality of men, which implies and always starts from the idea that human beings— whatever their color and culture— are created "in the image and likeness of God." In his work, Prof. Sarmiento the analyses the theological background that, as earlier emphasized, has contributed so significantly to the declaration of natural law as a system of rights of man and of society.

2. In "What is the Law? Tradition and Modernity in Alfonso de Castro (16th century)", Manuel Lázaro Pulido shows how Alfonso de Castro (Franciscan theologian, student of Francisco de Vitoria in Salamanca) wants to solve the problem about the way in which divine law could be translated to the natural law of the concrete reality. In *De potestate legis poenalis* (1550), Castro essays a new definition of human law as the "right will of him who directs a people in its name, promulgated by word or writing, with the intention of obligation subjects to obey". There is not direct reference to the determinations of divine, natural, and divine-positive law. For Castro human laws are hierarchically subordinated to natural law, but there is not deduction from them. If the will is the essential point, the different cultural manifestations (i.e. American and European forms) show in a best way the anthropological universality. Alfonso de Castro thus provides an answer to the nature of the law that runs away from ontological personalism and common-good essentialism, by presupposing the common good of the manifest human nature. In this way, Alfonso de Castro brings an answer to a problem aroused in the 16th century that still feeds the present and future through a reading of tradition.

3. In "Francisco de Vitoria and the Problems of Dominion and Justice", Mª Idoya Zorroza shows the link between human dominion over that which is real within a framework of justice and, moreover, in a wide and more comprehensive anthropology. There is a natural connexion between dominion, use, (free) will, ontological dignity of human being. Human being has dominion over that which is real by an ontological distinction and relationship with reality. Then, *dominion* expresses a peculiar relationship of man's superiority in relation to objects. At the level of fundamental or metaphysical anthropology, this dominion is a logical consequence of man's dignity as a rational and free person, and of the fact that, with his intelligence and will, man is able to arrange means to ends, which has, as a condition of possibility, the dominion that man exercises over his actions. Certainly, man possesses dominion because man is master of his actions; human being is *causa sui*: because man is cause of his actions: he acts "propter finem." To consider on an anthropological level the internal linking of human dignity, personal, rational and free reality, with *dominion* and with *use* has different connotations from those (specially in modern philosophy) that come from the internal linking between liberty and property.

4. In "Homo Plenus; Paradigm of Anthropological Sustainability", Rafael Alé-Ruiz deals with the cornerstone concept of economic science and science of Business Management: the *Homo Economicus* (*homo faber et economicus*). It must be critically analysed the rationality and the limits of the *Homo Economicus*, basis of the actual Business Management Science, because of the need of overcome the actual economic and entrepreneur thought. Economical sustainability requires ensuring the integral development of the person through the actions of the companies. This act must be guided in a different paradigm: *Homo Plenus*, whose foundations background can be identified at the ethics and morale of economic fact described by the Spanish authors of "Escuela de Salamanca".

Francisco de Vitoria's Formulation of Personhood as the Basis of Personal Freedom and Equal Rights among Men and Peoples

Augusto Sarmiento

Abstract

The historical and biographical cinemaSixteenth-century Spanish theology can generally[1] be said to actively delve into and develop the rights of human beings, as individuals and as a members of society,[2] representing a common constant in the comments and theological works of the time. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that this inquietude and defense of man belongs, in first place, to the School of Salamanca, represented firstly by Francisco de Vitoria, who both founded the School of Salamanca and international law.[3] Secondly, Vitoria's disciples and followers, including most notably Domingo de Soto, held the noble task of "clarifying the natural law as a system of fundamental rights pertaining to man and society."[4] The Salamanca theologians' writings and treatises on man and his rights is correctly rooted in the starting point from which they built this theology of man and natural law— namely, from the revelation that God made man from man himself, as referenced in Genesis, especially in chapters 1 (26 to 30), 9 (1.3.7) and 12 (8-9). Along with many other more or less circumstantial factors, among which the discovery of America is often cited, we cannot forget that one of the School of Salamanca's main theological features is precisely that of being lively, dynamic, and always attentive to issues at hand.[5] Furthermore, the School of Salamanca maintains a deep conviction, confirmed by faith, concerning the dignity of the human person and the radical equality of men, which implies and always starts from the idea that human beings— whatever their color and culture— are created "in the image and likeness of God."[6] This doctrine is certainly present in all of the Salamancan scholars' texts dealing with man or any issue thereto related. This is especially true of the specific writings on the subject, particularly de Vitoria's *Relecciones De Indis*,[7] Domingo de Soto's treatise *De iure et iustitia,*[8] Las Casas' *De regia potestate*,[9] and in the comments to the treatises *De legibus* and *De iustitia et iure*.[10] It is therefore necessary to consult these comments if one intends to access the sources of Salamancan ethics and theology of man; there we find that the law and natural law, the dignity of the human person and the fundamental equality of peoples are directly considered or, at least, serve as a basis for the content. The present work will focus on the analysis of the theological background that, as earlier emphasized, has contributed so significantly to the declaration of natural law as a system of rights of man and of society. Focusing specifically on the first relection *De Indis,* the present article thus aims to highlight Vitoria's principal contributions on freedom and the radical equality of peoples.

Keywords

Human Rights, Personhood, Natural Law, Scholasticism, Human Dignity, Freedom, Discovery of America

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Freedom and Humane Treatment of "Indians" (Native Peoples)

Vitoria was concerned with the freedom and humane treatment of the native peoples. Apart from the writings that directly addresses issues related to newly discovered lands— e.g., *De temperantia*[11] and the second *De Indis*— Vitoria

discusses this subject elsewhere. Thus, in his class lectures on the subject of infidelity, Vitoria expressly states that infidels or *insulani* should never be compelled by force to embrace the Christian faith.[12] The Salamancan teacher takes the same view concerning questions of domain.[13]

Nonetheless, the issue at hand is directly addressed in the first relection *De Indis*. Vitoria took advantage of the practical problem concerning the legitimate conquest of American lands and used it as a framework for theological reflection on the equality and freedom of all men. Ultimately, Vitoria's attempt aims to establish native peoples' equality and legal capacity based on their rational condition. In order to substantiate rights and domain, only the rational dimension of man, and no other substitute, would serve.

In his writings, Vitoria uses very simple methodology; first, he pauses to consider the illegitimate titles underwriting the occupation of newly-discovered lands, which he then follows up by considering legitimate titles. Without meticulously detailing the development of this doctrine, which goes beyond the interest at hand, it is worth noting that Vitoria's reflection goes beyond this concrete case and develops a theoretical dimension of universal reach.

The thesis that Vitoria seeks to respond to comes down to two elements, including one of an anthropological nature and the other of a theological nature. The former, as Vitoria recognizes in the relection, is just an updating of the Aristotelian theory concerning the condition of slavery proper to some human beings based on the demands of nature, which pertains to the mentally retarded or those born in this condition, etc. According to this theory, the inhabitants of the newfound lands would be included in this category, as some thought, because "they are little different from irrational animals, since they do not have sufficient use of reason and are incapable of governing themselves"[14] and therefore "are servants by nature [...], such that they can be ruled as servants."[15] This reasoning corresponds to Ginés de Sepúlveda's thesis, among others, in support of conquest and colonization.

This theory, which is theological in nature, consists in the idea that both the faithful and pagans have lost private and public domain, the former due to mortal sin[16] and the latter due to infidelity.[17] Although Vitoria directly refers to and refutes the version offered by the Waldensians, such as John Wycliffe[18] and Richard Fitzralph,[19] the theory is generally founded on false Augustine su-

pernaturalism, according to which Christ has entrusted to his Church (and the Pope) all spiritual and temporal powers; consequently, neither the faithful nor infidels have any power or domain since the former have committed mortal sin and the latter do not recognize the Pope.

Made in the Image and likeness of God as the Basis of Domain

Once he presents these objections, Vitoria strives to show their weakness and, in this context, he offers his theory on the freedom and equality of all men. The argument is transparent: "domain is based in the image of God; but man, by nature, is made in the image of God, that is, based on rational powers; then..."[20]

The ultimate reason, therefore, for human dignity consists in man's condition as divine image. Hence, being a human being as such— being made in the image of God belongs to human beings as such— is sufficient motive for claiming that man is a subject with rights and with capacity for domain. Since rationality permits man to share in that image, it must be concluded that: a) all men, in as far as they are rational, are equally worthy and are subjects of rights, etc., b) sin, given that it does not destroy the image included in creation, does not somehow erase human dignity nor does it take away the capacity for domain proper to human beings. Vitoria simply applies a well-known theological axiom: "grace does not destroy, but rather perfects nature."

For this same reason, infidelity is a worthless designation against legitimate authority and dominion, which is not based on faith and grace, but rather on the natural order and, it is important to highlight, one should sufficiently distinguish between the natural and supernatural orders as the basis of rights. Vitoria's method consists in warning against false supernaturalism and they underlying confusion between the natural and supernatural order in the so-called Augustinian theory on supernaturalism.

Given his possession of rationality, man possesses personhood and, as such, is a subject with dignity and personal rights. On this level, all men and all peoples are absolutely and fundamentally equal; they enjoy the same freedom and capacity for domain. This is precisely the reason why irrational human beings cannot be subjects of rights and, when they are attributed to them, it is only in an improper and metaphorical sense.[21]

On the other hand— Vitoria continues— legal capacity, dignity, the condition of personhood, and being a subject of rights is one thing, but it is quite another to use and administer the goods over which one has domain. However, the fact that such use is somehow prevented and must be exercised by others, as is the case with those who lack full use of reason, such as children[22] or the demented,[23] is no argument for natural slavery or against absolute dignity and equality among men.

In any case, Vitoria flatly argues that native peoples cannot be deprived of control over their assets based on their alleged inability to reason.[24] The fact that native peoples possess lower rational development can be found in the education, or lack thereof, that they have received[25] and not in the fact that their natural condition is inferior. As rational beings, all men are equal.

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Endnotes

1. For example, Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, with his work *Democrates alter, sive Dialogus de iustis belli causis adversus Indos* (edited by A. Losada, Madrid: CSIC, 1951), and Juan López de Palacios Rubios with *De las islas del Mar Océano = Libellus de insulis oceanis* (Paulino Castañeda Delgado / José Carlos Martín de la Hoz and Eduardo Fernández (eds.), Pamplona: Eunsa, 2013) represents some of the defenders of the legality of conquering Indian lands because, among other reasons, they, as Aristotle says, by nature and condition, were born not to be free, but rather to be ruled by others.
2. See Melquíades Andrés, *La teología española en el siglo XVI*, II (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1977), 279. See additionally among the long list of bibliography: Vicente Beltrán de Heredia, "El maestro Domingo de Soto en la controversia de Las Casas con Sepúlveda," *Ciencia Tomista* 47 (1932): 35-39; Venancio Diego Carro, *Domingo de Soto y su doctrina jurídica* (Madrid: Hijos de E. Minuesa, 1943); *La teología y los teólogos españoles ante la conquista de América*, vols. 1-2 (Madrid: Talleres Gráficos Marsiega, 1944); *El maestro Fr. Pedro de Soto, O.P. y las controversias político-teológicas en el siglo XVI*, vols. 1-2 (Salamanca: Convento de San Esteban, 1950); Lewis Hanke, *Bartolomé de las Casas, pensador, político, historiador, antropólogo* (La Habana: Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País, 1949); Joseph Hoeffner, *La ética colonial española del siglo de Oro. Cristianismo y dignidad humana* (Madrid: Cultura Hispánica, 1957); etc.
3. There is abundant bibliography on F. de Vitoria. See: "Lecturas inéditas de F. de Vitoria: bases para la

edición crítica," *Scripta Theologica* 12 (1980): 575-592 and specially: Jean Paul Coujou and Mª Idoya Zorroza, *Bibliografía vitoriana* (Pamplona: Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 2014). Vitoria is seen as the founder of international law in several studies as: Camilo Barcia Trelles, *Francisco de Vitoria, fundador del Derecho internacional moderno* (Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 1928), VV.AA., *Francisco de Vitoria, fundador del Derecho internacional moderno* (Madrid: CSIC, 1946); Camilo Barcia Trelles, "Fr. de Vitoria et l'école moderne de droit international," *Anuario de la Asociación Francisco de Vitoria* 1 (1929): 187-229; J. Barthélemy, "F. de Vitoria," in A. Pillet, *Les fondateurs du Droit international* (Paris: Giard, 1904); J. Baumel, *Le Droit International Public, la découverte de l'Amerique et les theories de F. de Vitoria* (Montpellier: Graille & Castelnao, 1931); James Brown Scott, *The Spanish Origin of International Law* (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1928; Union, N.J.: Lawbook Exchange, 2000), *Fr. de Vitoria and his Law of Nations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934); *The Catholic Conception of International Law* (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1934); M. Lasallamas, "Conceptos y principios fundamentales del Derecho de gentes, según la doctrina del P. Vitoria," *Anuario de la Asociación Francisco de Vitoria* 1 (1928): 269-305; Atilio Dell'Oro Maini, *La conquista de América y el descubrimiento del moderno derecho internacional* (Buenos Aires: Guillermo Kraft, 1946); Luciano Pereña, *La Universidad de Salamanca, forja de pensamiento político español en el siglo XVI* (Salamanca: Universidad de Salamanca, 1954); Antonio Truyol Serra, "Los principios del derecho público del orden internacional," *La Ciencia Tomista* 72 (1947): 123-138; Teófilo Urdánoz, *Estudios ético-jurídicos en torno a Vitoria* (Salamanca: Universidad de Salamanca, 1947); Ramón Hernández, *Francisco de Vitoria: vida y pensamiento internacionalista* (Madrid: BAC, 1995); José Barrientos García, *Repertorio de moral económica (1526-1670): la Escuela de Salamanca y su proyección* (Pamplona: Eunsa, 2011).

4. Avelino Folgado, "Los tratados *De iustitia et iure* en los autores españoles de los siglos XVI y XVII," *La Ciudad de Dios* 172 (1959): 275-302.

5. See: A. Huerga, "Escolástica," in Q. Aldea / T. Marín / J. Vives (eds.), *Diccionario de Historia Eclesiástica en España*, II (Madrid: Instituto Enrique Flórez, 1972), 825-829.

6. *Genesis*, 1, 26. Cfr. Edward Sarmiento, "Human Dignity in the Thought of Vitoria as seen principally in the Relectio de indis," online: 27 july 2007, DOI: 10.1111/j.17412005.1946.tb06592; Mª Idoya Zorroza, "Francisco de Vitoria and the Dignity of Man: Scholastic Anthropology and Humanism," in *New Perspectives on Francisco de Vitoria*. *Does International Law lie at the heart of the origin of the modern world?* (Madrid: Fundación CEU San Pablo, e-book, 2014).

7. F. de Vitoria dedicated two relections on native peoples, both of which pertain to the academic year 1538-39, titled: *De indis recenter inventis relectio prior* (the first) y *De indis, sive de iure belli hispanorum in barbaros, relectio posterior* (the second). These texts have been edited on numerous occassions (See: A. Sarmiento, "Lecturas inéditas de F. de Vitoria," 576-577, n. 3). The best edited edition was completed by T. Urdánoz in *Obras de Francisco de Vitoria* (Madrid: BAC, 1960), 641-726 and 819-858. This is a bilingual edition —Latin and Spanish— with richly documented introductions.

8. Domingo de Soto, as stated in the prologue, is aware that he is undertaking a new task. Soto published the first edition his treatise *De iustitia et iure* in 1553. The second corrected and expanded edition was published in 1556-57. The last edition, which is bilingual, is the following: *Domingo de Soto, De la justicia y el Derecho* (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1967 ss.).

9. Bartolomé de Las Casas' text, *De regia potestate*, which is about self-determination in law, is probably the most noteworthy among the writings of Spanish theologians. The critical edition was published by L. Pereña in 1969 in the collection "Corpus Hispanorum de Pace."

10. As is well-known, the treatise *De legibus* contains questions 90 to 108 from sections I-II of Saint Thomas's *Summa Theologiae* and *De iustitia et iure* contains questions 57 to 122 from sections II-II of the same text.

11. This relection was given during the academic year 1537-38. See: T. Urdánoz, *Obras de Francisco de Vitoria*, 995-1069.

12. See: F. de Vitoria, *Comentarios a la II-II*, q. 10, a. 8 and a. 12.

13. See: F. de Vitoria, *Comentarios a la II-II*, q. 57, a. 3; q. 62, a. 1; q. 66, a. 8.
14. F. de Vitoria, *De indis*, II, n. 18, in T. Urdánoz, *Obras de Francisco de Vitoria*, 723.
15. F. de Vitoria, *De indis*, II, n. 18, in T. Urdánoz, *Obras de Francisco de Vitoria*, 725.
16. See: F. de Vitoria, *De indis*, II, n. 5, in T. Urdánoz, *Obras de Francisco de Vitoria*, 651-652.
17. See: F. de Vitoria, *De indis*, II, n. 7, in T. Urdánoz, *Obras de Francisco de Vitoria*, 655.
18. See: F. de Vitoria, *De indis*, II, n. 5, in T. Urdánoz, *Obras de Francisco de Vitoria*, 651-652.
19. See: F. de Vitoria, *De indis*, II, n. 5, in T. Urdánoz, *Obras de Francisco de Vitoria*, 651-652.
20. F. de Vitoria, *De indis*, II, n. 6, in T. Urdánoz, *Obras de Francisco de Vitoria*, 654.
21. See: F. de Vitoria, *De indis*, II, n. 20, in T. Urdánoz, *Obras de Francisco de Vitoria*, 653.
22. See: F. de Vitoria, *De indis*, II, n. 21, in T. Urdánoz, *Obras de Francisco de Vitoria*, 653.
23. See: F. de Vitoria, *De indis*, II, nn. 22-23, in T. Urdánoz, *Obras de Francisco de Vitoria*, 664.
24. See: F. de Vitoria, *De indis*, II, n. 23, in T. Urdánoz, *Obras de Francisco de Vitoria*, 664-666.
25. See: F. de Vitoria, *De indis*, II, n. 23, in T. Urdánoz, *Obras de Francisco de Vitoria*, 664-666.

What is the Law?
Tradition and Modernity in Alfonso de Castro (s. XVI)

Manuel Lázaro Pulido

Abstract

The XVIth century signals the spatial and temporal rupturing of the West, expressed ad extra in the suggestive discovery of the New World and, ad intra, in the breaking of former confidence signaled by the Reform. The XVIth century would culminate in breaking the uniformity of Catholicism, the birth of national projects, and the universality of experience of a Humanism that nourished the possibility of Christendom before other religions (Judaism, Islam). But while this experience of unification of identity was confirmed in the Spanish monarchy, the rest of Europe was opening itself to the New World. The discovery brought concrete existential experiences that were very different, and inaugurated a new age in which experience of national identity was now realized individually, without the possibility of a unification of the diverse. Individual interest will little by little impose upon the common good, for the general community, while existent, could not be the ultimate grounding of concrete measures: there is no measurable unity, and if there is no quantifiable criterion, there cannot be a decisive criterion, a science, a law that unifies processes, at least the political ones.

Alfonso de Castro answers to a nature of the law that runs away from ontological personalism and common-good essentialism, by presupposing the common good of the manifest human nature. Freed from the naturalism of Aristotelian hermeneutics and grounded on the expression of the human will, true and authentic receptacle of human freedom, he supports a criterion of humanity and citizenship that does not fall into a solipsism of the will that has proven so ill. Some of his thesis anticipated democracy and secured the universality of the Catholic-Christian message in the diversity of founding wills of the socio-political community was not followed by jurist theologians.

Keywords

Human law, Aristotelism, Thomism, Natural law, Personhood, Common-God, Freedom, Human Will, Humanity

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The XVIth century signals the spatial and temporal rupturing of the West, expressed *ad extra* in the suggestive discovery of the New World and, *ad intra*, in the breaking of former confidence signaled by the Reform. The XVIth century would culminate in breaking the uniformity of Catholicism, the birth of national projects, and the universality of experience of a Humanism that nourished the possibility of Christendom before other religions (Judaism, Islam).

But while this experience of unification of identity was confirmed in the Spanish monarchy, the rest of Europe was opening itself to the New World. The discovery brought concrete existential experiences that were very different, and inaugurated a new age in which experience of national identity was now realized individually, without the possibility of a unification of the diverse. Individual interest will little by little impose upon the common good, for the general community, while existent, could not be the ultimate grounding of concrete measures: there is no measurable unity, and if there is no quantifiable criterion, there cannot be a decisive criterion, a science, a law that unifies processes, at least the political ones.

The measuring character of the law was pointed out by Thomas Aquinas: "The law is a rule and measure of our acts according to which everyone is induced to operate or stop operating; *law* comes from *linking*, for it obliges in order to action" (Th. Aq. S. Th. I-II, q. 90, resp.). The XVIth century is born with a desire for unity, but develops in the factual reality of a plurality of existences and orders in the world. The intellectuals of the time faced the challenge of re-ordering this world. Some will try with the regenerating wish of a *new land* where, from fraternal freedom, a new prophetic Christian project may be affronted. Others, without forgetting that Utopianism, will try to set the intellectual bases capable of setting a Catholic Orb that can attain that harmony which, in a way, was pretended even from the XVth century's Council of Basel.

The Second Scholastic, glimpsed in the XVth century and developed in the next one, is a "Second" one, not a mere transposition of Medieval Scholastic. The rupture that could be seen at the beginning of the XVIth century needed solid supports (tradition), but new wisdom, new order, a new unifying intent and the harmony of faith before diversity could be built by imitating medieval schema that were overflown.

This perspective explains the employment of the *Summa Theologica* as a reference book subject to commentary in the University of Salamanca by Francisco de Vitoria in the 1539-1540 course. The employment of the Summa supposed a wager to present a fundament of the essentiality (and universality) of Christendom incarnated in an essentiality (and universality) of the emergent project of the Hispanic monarchy, that when initiating its run along the American discoveries had it its womb a diversity whose accidental character prevented from seeing the community of such a project.

The situation is magisterially explained by Luis Fuertes:

> "Facing such a variety of men, of reasons, with national and even religious sensibilities aroused, what made us human beings beyond accidental considerations? What was the common human element? What should we commit to? From where should the transit to transcendence be made possible? How could we vertebrate the cohesion and the doctrine of the Church in a more firm and secure way for the new times? And last of all, How to keep the unity and harmony of the Empire?"[1]

The security before accidental diversity needed a doctrine that could be commented with the logical schema in a way that made way for the grounding of being by rationality. Vitoria's theology is built from a common supporting principle before the human plurality of the Creating God: existence. Francisco de Vitoria brings forth a metaphysical solution that spills out optimism: the persuasion that the project of a common Catholic Orb can be attained. Catholicity is discussed, but the Council of Trent established order: there is still hope. The problem arises when the first part of the formula is questioned from 1552 with the revolution of the federated protestant princes in France, announcing the definitive break-up of the Diet of Augsburg of 1555. With imperial unity broken, and the empire's possibility itself put into doubt, frustrated the project of a nation born to unify, the second part of the formula also breaks: the idea of a Catholicity, and a unified political-religious universality is no longer possible. Such is the context of the words of Melquiades Andrés, while commenting the consequences of the Reform:

> "Both confessions, catholic and protestant, are recognized. The *ius reformandi* belongs to the authority of the empire, not to its subjects. The religious is subordinated to the political, the theologians are supplanted by the jurists. Protestantism is now on par with Catholicism. Protestant cult is starting to organize in a stable way".[2]

How should we handle this situation? What law should we apply? How can accidental events relate to the law of harmony? Theological jurists know the deficiencies of juridical theory; indeed, a topic is only insistently analyzed when it demands clarifications. Francisco de Vitoria knew this from the beginning. Not only should the Catholic orb found itself in a Catholicism that understood common good as grounded on divine law, but even the Hispanic monarchy

should do just that. This is why the theologians of the School of Salamanca poured out their reserves from the beginning to the repression in the New World, especially as expressed by the "Requerimiento". Vitoria denounced the abandonment of the Christian principles of human dignity, even so far as to go to the Real Consejo de Indias and to the Council of Trent.

The new world of the New World could not be built in the incoherence of a social and political freedom unaffiliated to faith and, therefore, to humanism. The theologians of Salamanca –Vitoria and his disciples– knew this. The problem was the way in which divine law could be translated to the natural law of the concrete reality. Here is where different aspects appear. The problem is accentuated in the situation of Europe.What rule should man give himself to determine his plural accidental determinations? That is to say, what is human law? How should it be built?

The Human Law according Alfonso de Castro

One of the most interesting theories of human law was the one by the Zamoran Alfonso de Castro (1495-1558). This Franciscan theologian, student of Francisco de Vitoria in Salamanca and a great humanist, with a scholarship in the new University of Alcalá, did not write a *strictu sensu* commentary to *De legibus*, but kept this reflections in mind throughout all his works, for he deals with themes referring to the treatment that should be dispensed to the different elements of the state, especially heretics. This leads him to reflect about the obligatory nature of the law and its consequences in what we now call criminal law. To distinguish punishment from law he must first define what is human law. He carries this out in the first two chapter of his *De potestate legis poenalis* (1550).

Alfonso de Castro defines human law as the "right will of him who directs a people in its name, promulgated by word or writing, with the intention of obligation subjects to obey".[3] Marcelino Rodríguez Moreno claims this definition of human law does not refer to "the general concept of law previous to the determinations of divine, natural, and divine-positive law".[4] Indeed, Castro focuses his attention on human law as the starting point for his general reflections about law. The Franciscan does not question the conceptual fundament above law referred to divine, natural, and divine-positive law. He begins from

the conviction that law regulates human actions inasmuch as they are social, which is why it requires a criterion of justice, essential attribute to the existence of law according to Castro.

The necessity of starting from human law is not original to Castro but it is essential to him. The Franciscan master is not denying that human laws are hierarchically subordinated to natural law, but rather that they can be conclusively derived from it as its natural consequences. The fundamental point resides in the nature of the principle that regulates human law: the will. This is the essential point of differentiation regarding the Thomist tradition of law. It is an election born of the Franciscan school and it makes this author, we believe, an author that better responds to the anthropological universality of the XVIth century project that manifests in accidentality: in the diverse ways of manifesting humanity and its accidental cultural (America), socio-political and religious forms (Europe).

Indeed, Thomas Aquinas defined law as "a prescription of reason, ordered to the common social good, proclamated by him who has to care for the community". Law, as we have said, is a demarcation criterion, a measure, that belongs to reason. Human reason discovers particular dispositions of natural law as deductions are obtained in science by the speculative reason. Commenting question 90 of the *De legibus*, about the essence of law (If the law is something proper of reason o resides in the intellect or the will) of the Angelic doctor, Francisco de Vitoria declares:

"I answer that law is something that belongs to the intellect, for ordering belongs to the intellect, and law is the rule and measure of acts, called 'law' because it comes from 'linking', because it obliges. It is evident, then, that law is founded on the rational nature".[5]

For the Zamoran professor, law is not defined by logic consequentiality but by the direction of the action, which is a *sine qua non* element of law. Law must "direct" towards action. And for this the intellect is not sufficient, with the reason that observes the fundament of human law (natural law), for it must have a directional element. Alfonso de Castro explicitly defends the will from the classic Roman law that numbers four qualities of law, all of them proper acts of the will (*imperare, vetare, permittere* and *punier*) and from the Ciceorian etimology of law from *election*, that belongs to the will.

In the end, there is a school dispute here: the Franciscan doctrine of Scotus (and here with roots also in Bonaventure), in which the volitive element grounds in the end the law inasmuch as this is directive (it prescribes and prohibits). We should remember that for Scotus reason does not direct (*imperat*), it rather judges and proposes what should be done; it is the divine will the one that gives obligatory character to the law and the moral precepts. Duns Scotus thus affirms in his consequences that "*imperium est actus voluntatis*" and if, for law to be such, it has to direct and "*imperat*", logically it cannot be based on reason but on the will.[6]

The intellect is not negated, but rather that the ultimate disposition is a consequence born of reason. Ultimately, the radical freedom of the subject (of man), made in image and likeness of God omnipotent, is the one that grounds this doctrine. Law is law inasmuch as the divine legistlator exerts its will of formally constituting it as law, not as illumination of a common nature, for it is in itself still a mere proposal. Divine free omnipotence, in its own nature complete and perfect, illuminates a contingent nature, making natural law a presentation supported on the legislator, and not in this contingent nature. This secures human freedom, making the defect of contingency (where evil appears) an occasion of freedom for men. And it projects on the human community the real possibility of legislation as direction of action. Here Alfonso decidedly separates himself from a classical view of the law, as Scotus did in his time, showing the modernism of his proposal, in the sense that law proposes action born of a historical and temporal conscience, and even if law has strong classical echoes, yet as a pre-politic and configuring statute does not appear as configuring society. Society is not built as a reflection of human rationality grounded on divine law, but rather it is configured around positive law born out of the will of the legislator, which falls on the members of society itself, thus giving the law a 'pedagogic' function.

Alfonso de Castro brings an answer to a problem aroused in the XVIth century that still feeds the present and future through a reading of tradition. As written by Simona Alngella in the introduction to *De legibus*, Vitoria "underlines, opposing the common view of 'modern' philosophers, that law is a mandate that belongs *immediate ad rationem*. Indeed, law is determined by reason and not by the will, for it is ordered towards an end; but ordering is proper and exclusive of rational beings, and is therefore an act of the intellect".

Alfonso de Castro, nevertheless, points towards elements that affect the metaphysical visión of nature of the Thomist and Scotist school. He appears as a thinker that reaches out for an equilibrium between the nominalist position with the classical one, beginning with the deliberation proper of Duns Scotus's genius, oriented in his juricial expression towards a more impartial road in a time of sociopolitical and religious changes as important as the ones being lived in his epoch. He also shows, over a rich intellectual sieve, the high school of practical politics with which he was linked due to his closeness to the court of the Austrias.[7] The grounding of human law in the radical election of the free will of men and in the communion of their interests answers in a much better way to the equilibrium between the universality of a projected Catholic universe born out of grace and the search for the necessity of an order and the essential in the uniformity of differences. To this is added the rightness of the will that constitutes human law, built on the customs (the tradition of moral use) and in criteria of utility and necessity.

Alfonso de Castro formulates a doctrine that contributes in a decisive way to build the foundations of what will be called "rule of law", like a state that is due to the authority of law, which is said as such when it compels, not by executive force but according to the legitimacy of the law (which requires seeing where this legitimacy resides). Here we understand that executive force must be underlined not only by voluntarism (a theoretical justification), but also by the own force of the law. Indeed, if the law did not direct and compel, all force would fall in the executive power, as he himself declares at the beginning of his book on penal law, when he declares that if we think that law does not criminally oblige, then law would not have the same force as a judge, to whom is conferred all the executive power subtracted to the law.[8] A state of law demands a facultative subject that "directs a people in its name", that is to say, a legislator that represents the people:[9]

"Laws that are proclamated by princes or magistrates in a Republic, inasmuch as they are conceived as expression of the people's will, are worthy".[10]

The will of the people is the expression of common good. Alfonso the Castro therefore realizes an interpretation of the Aristotelian common good from the presupposition of a Franciscan civil organization, in which man's intrinsic freedom, the one that makes decisions from a volitional faculty through having rational option presented (a pedagogic-orientating principle of natural law) constitutes its essential anthropologic fundament.

We can thus save the excesses of individualism from the part of the active principle –the prince or legislator– and the passive principle –the people– and, therefore, escape from Atomistic positions that eventually derive into a Contractualism or a Utilitarianism with a capacity to dynamite the justice of the law and, so the very concept of law.

Alfonso de Castro thus answers to a nature of the law that runs away from ontological personalism and common-good essentialism, by presupposing the common good of the manifest human nature. Freed from the naturalism of Aristotelian hermeneutics and grounded on the expression of the human will, true and authentic receptacle of human freedom, he supports a criterion of humanity and citizenship that does not fall into a solipsism of the will that has proven so ill. The option for the will answers in a better way to existential and human realities being lived in his time, thus grounding Catholicity as an expression of the freedom of man to embrace the divine message and explain a reaction (punishment) based on the contextual criteria of civil coexistence, in which a human law from a society that in imperial times wishes to express itself as a universal project now knows that it can only be an expression of the will. In this way, even if the political project fails, it does not entail the failure of the religious project, for the human law is not joined in consequential necessity to the natural (and divine) law, in which it is founded.

Sadly, this fundament that anticipated democracy and secured the universality of the Catholic-Christian message in the diversity of founding wills of the socio-political community was not followed by jurist theologians.

The other option ended up compromising –in the failure of its consequences (the forms of societies and particular human laws)– the very essence of its own final fundament, becoming a mere Naturalism at first and, later on, pure Positivism, while splitting off the will of its fundament, leaving the subject as an atomic, solipsist, individual. Tearing up Tradition and Modernity.

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Endnotes

1. José Luis Fuertes, *El discurso de los saberes en la Europa del Renacimiento y del Barroco* (Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 2012), 100.
2. Melquiades Andrés, *La teología española en el siglo XVI* (Madrid: BAC, 1976), vol. I, 315.
3. Alfonso de Castro, *De potestate legis poenalis,* I, c. 1 (ed. Laureano Sánchez Gallego, *La fuerza de la ley penal,* Murcia: Sucesores de Nogués, 1933), 12. "Recta voluntas eius, qui vicem populi gerit, voce aut scripto promulgata, cum intentione obligandi subditos ad parendum illi".
4. Marcelino Rodríguez Molinero, *Alfonso de Castro y su doctrina penal. El origen de la ciencia del derecho penal* (Pamplona: Eunsa, 2013), 47.
5. Francisco de Vitoria, *De legibus*, q. 90, a. 1 (eds.: Simona Langella, José Barrientos, Pablo García, Salamanca: Universidad de Salamanca, 2010), 88: "Utrum lex sit aliquid rationis vel in ratione an in voluntate. Respondet quod lex est aliquid pertinens ad rationem pertinet imperare; et lex est regula et mensura actuum, et dicitur a ligando quia obligat. Lex clarum est quod est in natura rationali".
6. Iohannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, d. 44, n. 1, in *Opera omnia* (studio et cura Commissionis Scotisticae, Civitas Vaticana: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1963), vol. VI, 363-365.
7. Cfr. M. Castro, "Alfonso de Castro, OFM [obs] (1495-1558), consejero de Carlos V y Felipe II", in *Salmanticensis* 5 (1958): 281-322; A. González, "Vida y bibliografía de Fray Alfonso de Castro", in *Liceo Franciscano* 12 (1958): 9-106 (biography in: 9-36).
8. Alfonso de Castro, *De potestate legis poenalis,* I, c. 1 (ed. L. Sánchez Gallego), 13. "Qui ita sentiunt, hac sola ratione ostendunt, se minorem facere Legis potestatem, quam Judicis, cum saepe Judex, illis etiam fatentibus, sine ullo legis subsidio, sed solo suo mandato, subditos suos possit obligatos ad poenam reddere".
9. Marcelino Rodríguez, *Alfonso de Castro y su doctrina penal*, 64.
10. Marcelino Rodríguez, *Alfonso de Castro y su doctrina penal*, 35.

Francisco de Vitoria and the Problems of Dominion and Justice

Idoya Zorroza

Abstract

Recent decades have seen a new international line of research aimed at XVI and XVII century Hispanic thought (including, most notably, the authors associated with the School of Salamanca and their impact). The disciplines currently developing this line are mainly associated with the history and philosophy of law and economics. The former discipline deals with the formation of modern law and with the particular influence of ancient and medieval thought (especially in the concept of individual rights or human rights). The latter discipline is concerned with understanding the qualitative theory of money and new economic dynamics (new trade, exchange, and even financial tools). These studies converge in the development of several central notions in the field of a theory of justice: dominion, use and property. While these notions can be defined in very similar terms within modern thought, XVI and XVII century authors have their own philosophical background, reaching diverse implications and conclusions.

Taking advantage of earlier anthropological richness, as developed by pre-modern authors, including sixteenth century Hispanic thinkers, it is worth looking into the link between human dominion over that which is real within a framework of justice as one of the ideas that could be used to meet particular post-modern challenges in which many have detected limitations and the need to overcome some of the concepts crys-tallized from modernity. Or that is my view, at least, such that failing to recognize a rich version of the dominion concept trips us up in ways that impede the adequate evaluation and understanding of these topics.

Keywords

Dominion, Freedom, Property, Thomism, School of Salamanca, Human Nature, Excellence, Reality.

Introduction

The present text is situated within an ongoing research project entitled *The anthropological foundations of 'dominion,' 'use' and 'property:' The School of Salamanca's impact in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.*[1] The project aims, first, at recovering sixteenth and seventeenth century thought, including textual Hispanic thought, in order to understand its role in shaping European thought and the history of ideas. It further aims at identifying opportunities for developing ideas with which to meet the challenges of contemporary thought.

The word *dominion* comes with an associated ambiguity that must be resolved. Indeed, according to the *Oxford English Dictionary* dominion is "sovereignty" and "control"[2] over persons and things. It is consistent with the Latin etymology, where "domus" represents the origin of "dominus" or lord and "dominium", property and dominion.[3]

This apparent ambiguity is explained by the historical origin of the term: *dominio* comes from *dominus,* which in Roman legal and social structures assumed a financial liability as both head or representative figure of the family unit, as jurisdictional authority on three main levels: over his partner (wife), over his children and over his slaves. *Dominus* links a sense of ownership of objects and power over people, justifying the structure of ancient Roman families and their head. The lord (which in the social structure appeared as *paterfamilias*) could hold four powers according to Roman law: the *patria potestas* over children; *dominica potestas* over slaves; *maritalis manus* over his wife; *mancipium* over other free men subject to him.[4] In short, wealth and dominion went together in the same figure, dominical and patrimonial power, power over people (at different levels) and power over objects.[5]

The union of these two forms of dominion in one person has opened up a slippery understanding of the anthropological characteristics of dominion over objects with dominion among human beings. This conceptual slip is important to highlight because understanding the difference was needed to resolve a specific "historical, practical question," namely the debate over the legitimacy of Spanish dominion in the West Indies over its inhabitants and territories. Although we will not go into that matter here, it serves to anticipate the fact that the distinction of dominions requires addressing three factors:

a) The ontological richness of he who holds dominion (thus distinguished, according to medieval thought, dominion that God and the angelic dominions are capable of, and the dominion pertinent to human beings. This excludes non-rational realities.[6] He then gives the following *definition of dominion:* "dominion is the power to use an object according to one's own judgment."[7] Thus, only human beings, as a rational and spiritual reality, are capable of exercising dominion since, following Aquinas, only the rational creature has mastery over his acts.[8]

b) The constitutive difference of that which is dominated, that which falls under dominion.

c) The relationship established between that which is possessed and who exercises dominion, a particular relationship according to the two previously mentioned elements, the relationship that might be established on a reality that lacks a proper end, others that are orderable regarding overlapping purposes (respecting and taking into account their own constitution, which is out of reach "because man did not create it" ... these relationships with respect to realities that, following the Kantian expression, are "ends in themselves" and that seek their own end for themselves.

However, I am going to focus on the issue of dominion as it refers to goods or material objects.

Human Dominion over Reality implies the Idea of Excellence and Superiority

According to Francisco de Vitoria, in his *Commentary on the Secunda Secundae* (q. 62, a. 1), dominion is defined by three characteristics, ordered from strict and proper to more general.

"I affirm that 'dominion' is understood in three ways. First, a strict and peculiar way, such that it points to some eminence and superiority; the way in which princes are called lords [domini][9]".

A second way of understanding dominion is making it equal to "property, i.e., as distinguished from use, usufruct and possession."[10] Dominion here refers to a certain *faculty* of use or the ability to count on the availability of an object without limitations that impose, in this case, use or usufruct. But dominion cannot rest on the ability to make such use or usufruct of that which is real, or in mere possession, because somehow "having" does not mean being the "owner."

This brings us to the third meaning of dominion: "Dominion is taken in a third way, more widely, as if assigning to it some faculty to use an object *according to law* [...], or according to laws established by way of reason."[11] Concerning the relationship between dominion and an object what matters is not the object itself, but rather the subject's *relationship* with the object that implies a *faculty* to use or have it for oneself.[12]

In this text, we see how the strict definition of dominion is associated with the idea of superiority and, as we have shown elsewhere,[13] dominion over that which is real is justified by the ontological dignity of man, who is free and rational. He was thus was given dominion over that which is real (given and derived, but true and real), which implies man's clear ontological distinction, resulting in a being that is capable of this dominion relative to other non-rational realities. Then the essential and defining element of dominion is "excellence" and "superiority". This definition had already been highlighted in medieval commentaries, beginning with Dionisio's texts (given that dominion is there highlighted as preeminence –*superpositio,* superimposed or overlaid– against its justification as a power or faculty).[14]

The Root of Dominion over reality according to Vitoria

In brief, Vitoria says that human dominion *over reality* implies the idea of *excellence* and *superiority* over it. Indeed, *dominion* expresses a peculiar relationship of man's superiority in relation to objects. This relationship is 'peculiar' because it only corresponds to human beings; it was presented in a primarily theological argument made by the scholastic authors as something granted or imparted by God's superior or full dominion [*altum*] over the world. Full dominion, in this hierarchical consideration, is associated with the *creative* power over things, capable of reaching its essential and existential internal constitution. Dominion proper to human beings in relation to that which is real is derived and does not reach this constitutive level, but it is creative in rearranging reality and in giving it a specifically human, new purpose. At the level of fundamental or metaphysical anthropology, this dominion is a logical consequence of man's dignity as a rational and free person, and of the fact that, with his intelligence and will, man is able to arrange means to ends (in fact, in order to achieve his own vital and existential wellbeing he must do so), which has, as a condition of possibility, the dominion that man exercises over his actions: "only he who owns his actions can have, strictly speaking, dominion over objects."[15] Or, as Soto claimed, "nature itself does not constitute an owner of things for anyone who is not owner of his actions, nor of objects."[16]

Also, as Vitoria says, "natural law permits man to be preserved in being. But this cannot be so without other creatures, since all other creatures exist for the conservation of man [...], because all created things that have been established

in the nature of things are necessary for the conservation of men [...]. Thus *man has the right to use all things*."[17] Here we put aside, at this level, the psychological foundation, a deepening in the notion of *use* of the will. Still, we will insist on the purpose of use: the realization of a fully human life, not just subsistence or achieving a comfortable life, but the achievement of the end proper to human beings.[18]

He further argues (following the classic Aristotelian thesis) that man is the *apex* of worldly reality: within creation, man is the most excellent reality. Furthermore, within this world, he has a particular function: he subdues reality to the extent that he re-directs new purposes that nature cannot give itself, just as he orders his action by making nature a means regarding the ends that he himself proposes.

It is possible because "man has an advantage over the other animals because of reason, wisdom and speech;"[19] and specially because of freedom. Vitoria describes freedom, looking at operation (and with it, at the opening and necessary determination that humans must meet), defining the term from the expression "being *causa sui*"[20] with which Aristotle defined a freeman in contrast to a servant. This *operation*[21] relates to the *end* that is accomplished with an action; to be *causa sui* as a cause in itself (since the purposes of any action is given more by its end than by its origin). Certainly –as it is said before–, man possesses dominion because man is master of his actions.[22] This idea of *causa sui* is behind the definition of dominion over things: because man is cause and master of his actions –*causa sui*– not by efficiency or formality, but rather by specificative teleological determination: to act "propter finem."[23]

This final consideration is linked to the notion of person as *causa sui*, that particular relationship that a person has with reality, which makes that which is real a means in order to obtain an end: *dominion*, in the form of *use*, is linked not only to a notion of freedom as freewill, but also especially to the definition of person as *causa sui*, in the particular configuration of a reality *in fieri* that is made with *that which is real*.

To consider on an anthropological level the internal linking of human dignity, personal, rational and free reality, with *dominion* and with *use* has different connotations from those that come from the internal linking between liberty and property.

A Preliminary Conclusion
The Difference to the Naturalness of "Property" in Modern Thought

The internal linking of the "free citizen" and "owner" in the socio-political realm can be traced to the medieval and ancient periods. However, as noted, the notion of *dominus* had a broader meaning beyond just wealth that also included jurisdictional aspects and acquired an analogic semantic plurality, including the coexistence, for example, of various forms of domain (use, enjoyment, mere property, eminent domain, direct domain, beneficial ownership, full ownership, forums, juro, emphyteusis...). The modern notion of property and its internal correlation with individual liberty was well expressed by the English philosopher John Locke (1632-1704), the father of and inspiration for modern individualism and liberalism. For Locke, property is an attribute of human liberty, property is essential to the human being, and is understood in absolute terms: as an attribution and, in terms of disposition, without limits on possession. Property and liberty are individual attributes; life in society is conceived negatively (limitation in favor of a peaceful life free of conflict) or agreements (contracts) in favor of self-interest. Thus, for Locke, the only inalienable right is the right of property, a right that is achieved by appropriation.[24] The first *property* a man has is his own life and liberty.

In this context, the forms of dominion as *mere use* can only spell a weak sense of property. Something is *proper* when it is individualized with respect to the property of others. Violating private property is likened to violating the internal dignity of human beings. However, considering the scholastic notion of dominion that we have seen, *use* does not arise as the weakest form of dominion, but rather as its fundamental position: the use of that which is real for the achievement of an end. In man's relationship to reality, the important thing is *to use it*, i.e., to refer it to its own vital dynamism and make it develop new possibilities. Property is one (or more) way to stabilize use that is referred and subordinated to the common good.

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Endnotes

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2. Furthermore, see the *Oxford Dictionary* that includes this definition of *dominion*: "dominion: 1 [mass noun] Sovereignty or control: man's attempt to establish dominion over nature".
3. A. Ernout / A. Meillet, *Dictionnaire Étymologique de la Langue Latine* (Paris: Librairie C. Klincksiek, 1959), 182-183.
4. Margarita Fuenteseca Degenefee, *La formación romana del concepto de propiedad (dominium, proprietas y causa possessionis)* (Madrid: Dykinson, 2004), 11 and 32.
5. M. Fuenteseca Degenefee, *La formación romana del concepto de propiedad*, 81; 86; on page 110, the author highlights that *domus* as a sphere of *dominius* ended up structuring dominion as property at the end of the republic; this represented both real and personal elements (119). The development of commerce strengthened *possessio* as new access to property. See also: E. Cordero Quinzacara / E. Aldunate Lizana, "Evolución histórica del concepto de propiedad", *Revista de estudios histórico-jurídicos* 30 (2008): 345-385.
6. Francisco de Vitoria, *Comentarios a la Secunda Secundae de Santo Tomás,* latin edition by Vicente Beltrán de Heredia (Salamanca: BTE, 1954), q. 62, a. 1, n. 11: "this dominion [...] was not passed on to any non-rational creature."
7. Francisco de Vitoria, *Comentarios a la Secunda Secundae,* q. 62, a. 1, n. 29; "Then one can, within the natural law, transfer one's things to another person as long as one is not impeded by the law."
8. See the references to the *Summa Theologiae,* I, q. 83, a. 1; I-II, q. 1, a. 1, ad2; q. 6, a. 2, ad2; q. 17, a. 6.
9. Francisco de Vitoria, *Comentarios a la Secunda Secundae,* q. 62, a. 1, n. 6.
10. Francisco de Vitoria, *Comentarios a la Secunda Secundae,* q. 62, a. 1, n. 7.
11. Francisco de Vitoria, *Comentarios a la Secunda Secundae,* q. 62, a. 1, n. 8.
12. For Vitoria the ultimate foundation of the kind of dominium that man can exercise rests on two premises: first, God the Creator made man in His image and likeness and, as a rational reality, man is, in virtue of his rationality, the best image God created. Furthermore, God the Creator is the true owner of that which is real; man is owner in this sense in as far as God has shared His universal dominion with man, in as far as he has received from God the possibility of owning. Vitoria analyses this in his text, although that analysis is a matter for another time.
13. Mª Idoya Zorroza, "La definición del dominio según Alberto Magno", *Cauriensia* 8 (2013): 411-432.
14. Cfr. Albertus Magnus, *Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus,* c. 12, in *Opera omnia* (Monasterii Westfalorum: In aedibus Aschendorff, 1972), vol. XXXVII/2, 429-430.
15. Teodoro López, "Propiedad y dominio en Francisco de Vitoria", in Juan Cruz Cruz (ed.), *Ley y dominio en Francisco de Vitoria* (Pamplona: Eunsa, 2008), 71-92.
16. Domingo de Soto, *De iustitia et iure libri decem* (Salamanca: 1556; Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1967), IV, q. 1, a. 1, 284.
17. Francisco de Vitoria, *Comentarios a la Secunda Secundae,* q. 62, a. 1, n. 13. Vitoria continues to analyze the concept of *natural law* and linking it to common or particular property, in the state of nature that is integral or fallen. The following observation is interesting, "such that man did not own all things for all uses, since having real dominion it is not advisable to use of it according to all uses." Francisco de Vitoria, *Relectio De indis*, n. 5, n. 6, in *Obras de Francisco de Vitoria, Relecciones teológicas,* ed. by Teófilo Urdánoz (Madrid: BAC, 1960), 652, 654 and 662. Vitoria founded dominion in man's participation, as image of God, from which God is Creator and Lord of all things: "Dominion over one's own action and over the very members."

18. In *Relectio De potestate civili*, n. 3, Vitoria considers the principal character of an end: the need for something is found in its *end*, and "what Aristotle says, that not only in natural things, but even more so in all things human, necessity should be considered according to the end, as the first and paramount cause." Within this *order of ends*, Vitoria, following Thomas Aquinas, defends the idea of a natural order in the world in which human reason participates (through knowledge).
19. Francisco de Vitoria, *Relectio De potestate civili,* n. 3.
20. The notion of *causa sui* in Aristotle, which Thomas Aquinas used, is more *self-determination* than the notion of causality as it is employed in modern thought: A. L. González, *El absoluto como 'causa sui' en Spinoza* (Pamplona: Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, ^{3}2000), 10. J. A. Spiering affirms this in a similar way saying, "*Liber est causa sui*: Thomas Aquinas and the maxim 'the free is the cause of itself'", *The Review of Metaphysics* (2011).
21. Thomas Aquinas, *In libros Sententiarum,* II, d. 25, q. 1, a. 2, ad4; d. 30, q. 1, a. 3, ob1; J. A. Spiering, "*Liber est causa sui*: Thomas Aquinas": "the free is not the cause of itself in being, but the cause of itself in acting". This transcendental dominion is nothing but the idea of *freedom*: Pablo René Etchebehere, "Uso de razón y libre albedrío", in *Ley y dominio en Francisco de Vitoria*, 197-202.
22. Francisco de Vitoria, *Comentarios a la Secunda Secundae,* q. 62, a. 1, n. 6, p. 65. This freedom is beyond reason considered as intellect and will –freewill at the operational or faculty level–: Francisco de Vitoria, *Relectio De eo ad quod*, 1315, 1318-1320.
23. Francisco de Vitoria, *De beatitudine, In Primam Secundae Summae Theologiae, de Tomás de Aquino, qq. 1-5*, ed. by Augusto Sarmiento (Pamplona: Eunsa, 2012), q. 1, a. 2, n. 4. A practical consequence: Vitoria asks if children can be real owners, civil and naturally, and concludes that civilly they are, as well as *naturally* (an argument from authority of theological character) because "the foundation of dominion is in being made in the image of God, to be a true owner is constituted by not being for the benefit of another, as animals are, but rather by being a *propter se* being with a proper and inalienable personality"; *Relectio De indis, I,* n. 21, 664-665: "non est propter alium sed propter se".
24. J. Locke, *Second Treatise of Civil Government,* chapter 5.

Homo Plenus

Paradigm of Anthropological Sustainability[1]

Rafael Alé-Ruiz

Abstract

The cornerstone concept of economic science and science of Business Management is the Homo Economicus, homo faber et economicus. That real person who makes decisions, which we suppose, are rational but who has also driven us to a global crisis scenario. Hereinafter, it will be critically analysed the rationality and the limits of the Homo Economicus, basis of the actual Business Management Science. The need of overcome the actual economic and entrepreneur thought will be dealt so as to guarantee that the future decisions in these areas enable the sustainability which today's business economic rationality has not shown any consideration. This makes the company be to the service of men and not vice versa. Sustainability requires ensuring the integral development of the person through the actions of the companies. This act must be guided from the paradigm of Homo Plenus, whose foundations background, can be identified at the ethics and morale of economic fact described by the Spanish authors of "Escuela de Salamanca (School of Salamanca)", so that companies maximizes wealth´s generation. This task must necessarily be illuminated not only by ethics but by the guiding binomial (ethics + prudence).

Keywords

Homo Economicus, Homo Faber, Personhood, Rationality, Prudence, Ethics, Management.

As the proverb states, money cannot buy happiness, an aspect addressed by John McDermott in an article in the Financial Times[2] in which he reflects on the work of Richard A. Easterlin[3] on the subject of the relationship between income and happiness, known as the *Easterlin paradox:* once the bare necessities are covered, earning more money does not make people happier.

Moreover, the current crisis has exposed a real need to critically analyze the paradigm underlying business actions and ultimately the behavior of the individual who models and shapes them in order to be able to create conditions for permanent sustainability.

Business Management

Today's society is a complex reality; however, to say that modern-day society is characterized by individualistic materialism seems, not so much reductionist idea, yet at best a summary of a large number of verifiable facts. Modern man seeks to have and not to be, which is another condensed description of the individual member of that society. Economic-business nihilism is another feature of present day society, which is but a mere final translation of the concept of nothingness to an economic-business category, and which can be defined in a nutshell as that there is no business or economic truth, since there are as many truths as there are individuals.[4]

The concept was first introduced by Adam Smith in 1776, and more precisely defined by Mill in 1874 with the use of the tem utilitarianism. But it was not until the beginning of the 20th Century that Wilfred Pareto coined the term *Homo Economicus*,[5] *a* word meant to express the behavior of the individual who makes rational decisions in response to certain economic stimuli. Modeling any reality entails *narrowing* the possible decisions to a set of options. Modeling the reality of the individual implies *reducing* free actions –which are personal choices made as economic and business individuals– to a limited set of options, and this is inconsistent with the emergence of reality and the fact that reality is constantly under construction, and that during that process the different parties have an impact on, and are dynamically and unpredictably impacted by that reality.

Similarly, in the early twentieth century, *Business Management* science emerged based on that same *Homo Economicus*, an individual understood to be rational just because it maximizes his own benefit. This anthropological conception is basically the one used nowadays both in economics[6] and *Business Management*[7] *science*.

However, man is a far richer reality.[8] The human person is a being who has dignity and freedom, who is, in fact, a physical, social and spiritual reality. The person tends by his nature towards fulfillment in his personal development and is thus the subject of greatness. The person's actions are moral acts insofar as it concerns his perfection and his development, and his decisions are free; ethics guides them to proper end.

Certainly, economics and business acts are proper of the human person, but they are not the only specific acts inherent in man. Reducing the reality of *man* to only his economic or business acts is *anthropological reductionism*. Regarding only the tangible, that which is represented by money, as convenient and subject to man's decision is fallacious, as it involves the dissection of man himself, the breakdown of his unitary character, and the assumption of the part for the whole.[9] In this sense, authors of the Spanish Golden Age, the School of Salamanca, were able to see the problem and analyze it. Their findings show the need for economic and business morals, and anticipated the very science of business and economics. "We are witnessing a revival of interest in the contributions and innovations offered by the so-called School of Salamanca. In the field of economic ethics, the works of […] have identified the essential contribution of Golden Age thinkers, since–based on a vast knowledge of the commercial and financial activities of the time–they were able to cast a critical eye over the activities developing from modern standards".[10]

I propose the use of the term *wealth* rather than profit/utility. Wealth has a tangible part, measurable in monetary units, and an intangible part evident in the multiple ways in which social development is supported, especially in the helping of those in need, or in the work environments that are created where human dignity and its development are respected. Both types of wealth have value, and we should not forget Antonio Machado when he spoke about confusing price with value.[11]

The results of business/economic activity will vary depending on the anthropology adopted, and morals and ethics will need to act on different issues. It is therefore necessary to define business as a result of the actions of the person. But before attempting to give a definition of the business organization, we need to specify the tools to be used to do this.

A process is the set of a series of interrelated actions pursuing an aim. Processes are essentially dynamic. A system is a set of elements interrelated in a particular way, with a certain structure, based on a particular aspect of reality, and with a specific aim and purpose.[12] Systems are said to be open if they relate to other systems. A system is known as a multi-contingent one, if within it an element interacts with others and those others interact with this element in multiple ways. Additionally, if all those contingencies take place at the same time, the system is regarded as a holistic one.[13] Moving forward, we can com-

pare the socio-economic political and business reality as a set of open systems that interact with each other in space-time.

Based on the above, a company may be defined as a social and technical organization based on knowledge. It is an *organization* because it is composed of distinct parts, but aligned with a particular structure and relationships sustaining its multi-contingent, holistic nature. Additionally, this structure has a purpose.[14] *It is social* because it is comprised of people and interacts with people; that is, it interacts with those who are generically known as stakeholders, and with society in general. *It is technical* because each company has a particular technical function; that is, one or more transformative processes which determine what product or service will be produced and in what way. Finally, it is *open* because the company is related to the rest of the socio-economic, political, and business system of which it is a part.[15]

Businesses are *convenient to the person*, they are positive for fulfilling his end[16] by providing products and services to make easier the attainment of such purpose.

Business Management "science"?
Is there a Specific Science for Businesses?

Between 1776 and 1874, a Newtonian and rationalistic vision was applied to the company as a subject of scientific study following the unstoppable trend of those times. Is there a science related to the company as an entity? Would it be possible to define such science? What role does the person play?

Every science is defined by its material object and formal object:[17] what science studies and the point of view from which it is studied. The sciences can also be speculative or practical, according to whether they are concerned with what can be speculated or what can be operable. All that is operable is singular and concrete.[18]

It has become evident that companies must be of assistance to the human person, to his nature. This can be expressed by saying that they must manufacture products or offer services that help the person to develop to the fullest, and that these products cannot only be manufactured, but they are also good, *operable* and *viable*. We have literally defined Prudence, so that prudence and not just ethics lie *within the very essence of the company*: ethics-prudence, together.

This is a foreshadowed in the School of Salamanca. Francisco de Vitoria states: "Similarly, when there are many sellers and only one or a few buyers, the price of an item shall not be determined by the common estimation of men, but by the reasonable causes for which the price of the item is obtained […] the price must be set according to the discretion of an honest man".[19] It is well to remember that in this school the words prudence, honesty, good, and virtuous are used interchangeably to describe the same thing. It is the pair ethics-prudence, and not just ethics, which becomes crucial in business organizations. Considering this *"guiding pair*" makes it possible to understand–from the integral anthropological point of view–what companies must do and what they should not do, as well as the most helpful way of doing it.

Ethics alone can be speculative and abstract if they are not action-oriented. In the company we are seeking, ethics must be *"grounded"*, enlightened by prudence, by the here and now, by the particular situation with its specific circumstances. That is the way in which a business organization must continually adapt to its socio-economic-political environment to fulfill its purpose; it is a *prerequisite for the sustainability* of the company. For the School of Salamanca, prudence is not a guideline, it is mandatory, as Vitoria states in his treatise on this virtue,[20] which in turn is based on the Thomistic consideration of prudence as an "operational habit of practical reason immediately ordered to regulate and lead all human actions to their true end, and not in a somewhat vague and indeterminate manner, but in a totally individual, concrete and contextualized way".[21]

Combining the aspects above, Business Management science offers a sustainable way of solving personal and societal needs of man through the ethical and prudent generation of wealth as its *material object*, something that is similarly shared by other sciences. The *formal object*[22] of Business Management science is to maximize the sustainable creation of wealth.[23] Therefore, the science that studies the company is *Business Management* science.

Thus considered, a company is very different from what neoclassicism states. This school of thought considers the person as a reduced reality expressing its anthropology in the paradigm of the *Homo Economicus*. As for the business organization, it is considered as a reality with the sole intention of generating financial profit.

On the other hand, when considering wealth, a company is helpful to the person in a deep sense, in an *ontological* sense; it assists him on his path to perfection; it helps him to achieve his maximum potential. A company is subject to morality because its actions are also ordered towards the perfection of the person. Therefore, business actions should also be "grounded" by the particular here and now, as befits the specific space-time in which the company conducts its business, something that is achieved by means of prudence.

Operationally, a company conducts its business, manufactures its products or generates it services using certain processes acting on information, production or negotiation. However, since it is grounded on an integral anthropology, the operations of a company go beyond the strictly technical to link directly with the person given his teleological condition, since these operations dictate to business people, be they owners or directors, what to do in view of the supreme principle of morality, and how to do it in the specific circumstances of each case.[24]

Moreover, a company is also an element of the socio-political-economic-business system made up of all companies: financial entities, insurance companies, regulatory entities and society in general.[25] A company is an essential element of this system, not merely an accidental component, since it creates sustainable wealth for all, directly or indirectly. The person as an individual who has any type of relationship with the company–as a worker, stockholder, supplier or client, just to name a few–as well as society understood as an expression of the social nature of the person, profit from the creation of wealth. From this perspective of maximizing wealth, a company solves the dilemma between personal good and common good thanks to its dynamic nature: people seek their own good, which they can maximize in an open socio-technical organization. Again, this idea is already present as a standard thesis of the School of Salamanca, where the law is, on the one hand, a practical proposition, a rule or rational measure of actions,[26] which should be aimed at the common good and enacted "by those in charge of caring for the community, since they take care of the common good for which the law is established."[27]

A company is a *holistic* reality, all parts must work in an interconnected and simultaneous manner. It is *multi-contingent*, that is, each part affects and is affected by all others within the socio-economical political and business system. And it is *dynamic*, a company must continuously adapt to its environment to generate maximum wealth.

Companies relate to each other, to other companies, and to the other elements of the socio-political economic and business system within an area of relationship called market. The market, as such, is nothing but a tool. In order for a company to achieve its objectives, the market should work under the principle of efficiency–it must use as few resources as possible to achieve the goal–not under the principle of effectiveness, which would be to achieve the intended goals and nothing more. One might be efficient without being effective and vice versa, although the ideal is to be both effective and efficient.

Homo Plenus, Paradigm of Anthropological Sustainability

Basing Economic and Business Management sciences on the *Homo Economicus* paradigm, that is, on a limited anthropology, has demonstrated not only its inability in regards to sustainability, but also its failure to adjust to the subject of the economic act and the business act, the person.

A tangible profit has been maximized at the expense of the person, with the result of minimizing to the point in many cases of eliminating the second component of the guiding word pair of the actions of a company–prudence–noting that ethics had already been relegated to the realm of speculation.

Business Management illuminated by the *Homo Economicus* paradigm became a purely practical and concrete science devoid of any pretense of helping in the development of the person, the actual economic subject. A decrease in prudent acting within business has resulted in overlooking risks–or in practical terms, taking higher risks–either because other companies have done it, or because the one who comes in last is a fool. At any rate, this has led a great deal of companies to situations of excessive leverage, which greatly complicates or even compromises their future.[28] Using terminology specific for the economic and business world, the separation between real economy and financial economy could only be achieved minimizing or setting aside prudence in the actions of the business organization, allowing short-term myopia to define reality, perverting common sense and one of the first propositions of logic which states, *"Nemo dat quod non habet,"* one cannot spend what one does not have.

At a certain point in time, *Business Management*, in a sense, ceased to be a practical, operable, viable science and became an art, a a purely practical science. *Business Management* focused on the knowledge of the operable in so far

as feasible, regardless of its morality, which had in turn become something essentially speculative. This is what happens when prudence is no longer used in business. Ethics by itself becomes abstract, which is necessary to a point, but not all that is needed.

Since experience has shown the inability of a company to achieve sustainability based on a reductionist anthropological conception, a critical assessment of the associated paradigm, the *Homo Economicus*, is imperative. From a non-reductionist anthropological conception–integral anthropology–the economic and business actions of the person lie in the *Homo Plenus*, which defines the economic and business subject as the one who decides among several possible alternatives while maximizing wealth generation.

Conclusions

Two problems of great impact on the business organization were identified: unsustainability and being an end in itself.

The paradigm of *Homo Economicus*, which has enabled the current and impressive development of the enterprise within a framework of the economic neoclassical tradition, must be overcome. The anthropology underlying this paradigm has proved to lack the seed of sustainability when the business actions reach a global level. Neither people individually nor society at large, understood as vital reality of the person, has developed to the fullest with this paradigm, which can be designated as incomplete.

Sustainability, at least in regards to this reality arising from the action of man, the business organization, requires *ensuring the integral development* of individuals[29] and thus of society through the decisions driving their actions. A paradigm based on an integral anthropology that considers the person in all his dimensions enables a company to be *ontologically coherent with the truth* and not just socially coherent. This new paradigm is what enables the company in a way that is universal and necessary to be at the service of the person, and not the other way around. *Homo Plenus* is the anthropological paradigm consistent with the emerging reality of the person, thus appropriate for his development, particularly in regards to the business organization as a means for such development. Therefore, *Homo Plenus* is the paradigm that defines the economic and business subject as one who decides between several alternatives, maximizing

his wealth, where *his* refers not only to the individual per se, but to a member of a society, inherently consistent with his nature. Individual wealth cannot be maximized without the cooperation of others.

Essentially, any economic or business action is nothing less than the interaction of people in a particular area and with a specific intention. As long as individuals are considered for *who they are and not by what they have*–persons, not mere economic agents–the system will work better, giving more room for creativity as an expression of wealth creation for all the people involved.

Integral anthropology focused on the *Homo Plenus* paradigm allows for the overcoming of a reductionist paradigm that, through the business organization, has generated marginal results for the person through the maximization of purely tangible benefits. The neoclassical school of thought, whose influence has expanded to the present, had its paradigm, *Homo Economicus.* A critical response requires an integral anthropology. The paradigm of *Business Management* science must also be different: *Homo Plenus*.

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Endnotes

1. The author is grateful to Camartis Institute for its assistance in the production of this work.
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16. Atilio Borón, "¿Una teoría social para el siglo XXI?", *Estudios Sociológicos* (2000), 459-478.
17. Antonio Millán-Puelles, *Fundamentos de Filosofía* (Madrid: Rialp, 2001) 177.
18. Speculative sciences are concerned with the speculative reality through reflection, while practical sciences are concerned with the operable, that which is technically feasible. Here we find a very enlightening taxonomy. The operable may in turn be feasible in practice insofar as it is technically qualifying or viable (it can be done in practice) insofar as it is morally qualifying. Art is the operable + feasible, and Prudence is the operable + viable.
19. Mª Idoya Zorroza, *Francisco de Vitoria, Contratos y usura (Comentario a Summa Theologiae, II-II, q77-q78)* (Pamplona: Eunsa, 2006) 89.
20. Vicente Beltrán de Heredia, *Comentarios a la Secunda Secundae de Santo Tomás,* 6 vols. (Salamanca: BTE, 1934).
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27. Cfr. Vicente Beltrán de Heredia, *Francisco de Vitoria, Comentario al tratado de la ley,* 13-14.
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SECTION II

Economics, Politics, Law

Workshops

—

Globalization: The "New" Religion Theory & Implementation

Chair: Joseph Aieta

—

Direct Democracy in Europe

Past, Present, Future

Chair: Maria Marczewska-Rytko

—

The Rediscovery of Europe

Chair: Dietmar Meyer

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Eurocentrism, Post-Colonialism, Cosmopolitanism & Other –Isms

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Globalization In And Of Europe Local Perspectives

Chairs: Bo Petersson & Maja Povrzanović Frykman

SECTION II

Economics, Politics, Law

GLOBALIZATION: THE "NEW" RELIGION
Theory & Implementation

Chair

—

Joseph Aieta

Participants

—

Joe Downing

Presentation

Joseph Aieta

In "Global English and the Global Self," through emphasis on EIL as a way to enforce Western, particularly American and European beliefs on others, Joe Downing raises interesting questions about a new imperialism. Is it possible to learn English without also adopting American and British-cultural values? Does the image of the self have anything to do with acquiring a second language? What role might gender play in language learning? And ultimately, is English a linguistic tool for creating globalization based on Euro-American mono-culture and free-market capitalism?

Global English and the Global Self

Joe Downing

Abstract

In "Global English and the Global Self," through emphasis on EIL as a way to enforce Western, particularly American and European beliefs on others, Joe Downing raises interesting questions about a new imperialism. Is it possible to learn English without also adopting American and British-cultural values? Does the image of the self have anything to do with acquiring a second language? What role might gender play in language learning? And ultimately, is English a linguistic tool for creating globalization based on Euro-American mono-culture and free-market capitalism?

Keywords

Direct Democracy, Citizenship, Polis, Pericles, The Areopag, The Popular Assembly.

The narrative surrounding the phenomenon of Global English has, since the middle of the 20th century been that the use of English worldwide is the result its natural evolution into a world 'lingua franca'. English seems to give access to world markets, knowledge and fashionable culture and its place in the world appears serendipitous. There are, however, a great many criticisms of this point of view which challenge the neutrality of global English. Most foreground inequalities where English is favoured over other languages and they show particular concern for its place at the heart of political and economic systems that seems to reproduce injustice. This essay will address the analyses and recommendations of two writers for whom these characteristics represent real dangers in need of solutions, namely Robert Phillipson and Alistair Pennycook.

While Phillipson's work is structuralist in its approach, linking the English language to its place in wider forces of imperialism, Pennycook's approach represents a post-structuralist understanding of power and re-

sistance. For Pennycook, despite being linked to domination and exploitation in the past, the use of English globally does not necessitate that it will continue to be used for exploitative purposes by the powerful. Pennycook thus believes that the characteristic of English language to exploit can be eradicated without removing the language.

This essay asks whether Pennycook's way of resisting the inequality in global English is possible, and does so by invoking other work from slightly outside the study of English as a global language which looks at what motivates people to learn a second language. In particular we will look at the 'L2 Motivational Self System of Zoltan Dornyei, which says that success in a second language hinges on the learner having a clear, ideal or fantasy-based vision of themselves as a speaker of the target language. This work will ultimately explain how, in light of Dornyei's theory, the actual possibility of English users resisting the established values associated with the English language is not likely, and thus Pennycook's ideas are challenged.

Phillipson's invention of linguistic imperialism was one of the first attempts to look behind the neutrality and universality implied by notions of English as a lingua franca or EIL. As Pennycook explains, Phillipson's work makes it clear "that it has been deliberate government policy in English-speaking countries to promote the worldwide use of English for economic and political purposes". [1]

A working definition of English linguistic imperialism is that the dominance of English is asserted and maintained by the establishment and continuous reconstitution of structured and cultural inequalities between English and other languages.[2]

Linguistic imperialism is born out of an analysis which can be called structuralist. It is thus based on the assumption that structures underlie how things play out in society. There is the idea in Phillipson's work that certain things are and were always inevitable about English language spread and the values it entails by dint of its role in wider structures; before, it was the language spoken by a former colonial power, and today, it is at the centre of a world defined by the globalisation of capital and Euro-Americanising culture.

The book *Linguistic Imperialism* ends, not with a solution but with a question: "Can ELT contribute constructively to greater linguistic and social equality, and if so, how can ELT be committed, theoretically and practically to combatting linguicism?" (319) Linguicism is a term Phillipson uses like other 'isms', to describe where there is "unequal division of power and resources … on the basis of language"(22). Despite his open-endedness, Phillipson's response to the problem of globalising English is relatively clear. As Pennycook says, Phillipson's "key concept is encapsulated by the phrase 'anti-linguicist strategies'… This highlights first language maintenance while seeking a greatly diminished role for English" (308). The answer for Phillipson then, lies in legal sanctions against English spread, the promotion of translation and the protection of language rights.

More recently, Phillipson's analysis of the causes and corollaries of global English have been challenged by newer ideas which build on its foundations but which argue that there is some inadequacy in the analysis. The work of Alastair Pennycook who is at the centre of this shift, is characterised principally by a theoretical move away from structuralism towards post-structuralism. This view claims that understanding the world only in terms of structures and oppositions like centre and periphery, powerful and powerless, is false.

Whereas Pennycook is clearly aware of the past and present position of English as the language of the slave master, the capitalist and the neo-colonialist, his point is that it is not the property of any dominating power, but of all. This is why, for Pennycook, Global English is not a problem that needs eradication. Where global English might be exploitative as a result of its values, it is because there is a deficit of English-language use which can change values that come with it.

Pennycook's attitude to the how global English should be understood can be drawn together under his concept of 'the Worldliness of English', a term "intended to deal with the specificity of English and its diverse contexts. Worldliness on the one hand points to the global spread of English, and on the other hand is concerned with English as it is caught up in everyday use in its own contexts". [3]

Pennycook turns to pedagogy to bring about the possibility of emancipatory and democratic identities using English language. His body of work is thus

concerned with mooting what he calls a 'critical pedagogy' attuned specifically for EFL teaching. The practice of critical pedagogy is essentially an intellectual and discursive enterprise whose ultimate goal is the making available of English language as a discursive tool with which to narrate identities which are free from prejudice. It would be free from the history of the English language and free from values which exploit people.

More recently, Pennycook has invoked another concept to develop his analysis of global English which offers readers of his work a more nuanced and complete understanding of it and of his critical pedagogy. This concept is performativity. Performativity is a term borrowed from critical theorist Judith Butler, whose work centres on the politics of gender. Butler's work asserts that the naturalness of gender is the effect and not the cause of anatomical differences between male and female. Butler describes gender, not as something pre-determined by anatomy, but something sustained by nothing more than performance; and hence performativity. She writes that "if gender attributes... are not expressive but performative, then these attributes effectively constitute the identity they are said to express or reveal", [4] they are not the result of something prior. Pennycook draws out the appropriateness of performativity to his work on language like this:

> What role English plays in particular contexts needs to be understood in terms of specific sociologies of those contexts. If we start to pursue such questions in terms of local contexts of language, it becomes possible to consider using English not so much in terms of some inevitable, essential commonality, but rather — as with Judith Butler's (1990) understanding of gender as something performed rather than pre-given— as another form of 'performativity'. (Ibid.).

For Pennycook, performativity is a way of representing the radical contingency of what global English can mean. As a radical writer, the study of much of Butler's work concentrates on victims of exploitation, engaging in a debate about what would represent an emancipatory politics for them. The invocation of her ideas by Pennycook, gives a clearer idea of what his radical pedagogy might amount to.

In Butler's view, emancipation from asymmetrical power relationships like that between men and women, are held in place by public discourses which

regulate our thinking by various claims to knowledge. Resistance to this authority, requires making a claim to new knowledge. For Butler, a great deal of potential power lies in being able to appropriate "the very terms by which one has been abused in order to deplete the term of its degradation or to derive an affirmation from the degradation[. R]allying under the sign of 'queer' or revaluing affirmatively the category of 'black' or of 'women'" (158).

According to Pennycook the same potential resistance is available to users of English in the global context. Thus in his view "the 'Africanization of the English language' is not merely a question of identifying a local variant of English, but rather must definitely include the deracialization of English" (118). Whereas the categorising terms of colonial and neo-colonial rule construct the 'Africanisation of English' as a mutation of a norm, Pennycook argues for its revaluation as a deracialised mother tongue.

In terms of breaking the link between what English means and the language, it would seem to require two things with regard to a speaker of English for whom it is not their mother tongue: First, that despite their learning of English, the learner/speaker do not use English as a language for social prestige or for economic purposes. Or secondly, that despite their learning of English they don't endorse Euro-American culture and values.

To answer the specific question of whether the values associated with English can be divorced from the language and so whether these situations are possible, this work will turn to another field whose focus is on precisely why people learn language; namely second language or L2 motivation theory and Zoltan Dornyei. Dörnyei's well supported theory is that there is a link between success as a second language learner and having a clear ideal image of oneself as a speaker of that language. To understand Dornyei's work it is necessary to return to the central component of it; that of 'possible selves'.

Dornyei argues that motivation and success vary according to what one feels is attainable, desirable and crucially what is 'ideal'. He explains that "if the person we would like to become speaks an L2, the Ideal L2 self is a powerful motivator to learn the L2 because of the desire to reduce the discrepancy between our actual and ideal selves". [5]

Crucially in her work, Judith Butler also uses the concept of an 'ideal' in terms of a conception that motivates action. Talking about what happens in drag, But-

ler says, the "regulatory ideal is [ ] exposed as a norm and a fiction that disguises itself as a developmental law regulating the sexual field that it purports to describe". [6] Just as for Dornyei an ideal image we have of ourselves drives us to learn language, for Butler it polices the boundaries of the gender we perform. The way we are motivated to become speakers of English and the way we are motivated to perform gender, or any other meaningful social act is the result of conceptions we have of things we either want to become or to avoid becoming.

As Butler writes, "[t]he very injunction to be a given gender takes place through discursive routes: to be a good mother, to be a heterosexually desirable object, to be a fit worker, in sum, to signify a multiplicity of guarantees in response to a variety of different demands all at once" (198). If one considers then, what injunctions are at work regarding the learning of English there are many, all tied up to the familiar values of seeking social and economic prestige and responding to injunctions to enjoy or respect the authority of the cultural products the English language has to offer.

Crucially, Butler is insistent that there is no agency on the part of the individual self on whom these discourses are working. That is, we do not choose to assume gender roles, or to 'like' English; if we do, we *already* do. There is no choice before we assume our choices, no choice to assume or not to assume our ideal. What produces the desire to learn English, is *already* this 'multiplicity of demands' which *are already constituting* the individual and she is already responding to and deriving identity fulfilment from these values.

The implication of the insight from the work of Pennycook, is that, whereas there is no essential limit on the fluidity of language and least of all on what a language represents, if people do learn English, they are likely, already to be responding positively to the values carried by that language:

> A key tenet in the self-based conception of L2 motivation is that the fully-fledged Ideal L2 self is a vivid and real image: one can see, hear and feel one's ideal self…the more positive our disposition towards these L2 speakers, the more attractive our idealised L2 self… Thus, it is difficult to envisage that one could possibly develop a potent ideal L2-speaking self while at the same time despising the people who speak the L2 in question. [7]

Pennycook's critical pedagogy thus meets with some difficulty in light of Dornyei's work and the values entailed by global English seem quite intractable from the language of English. That is, the English language that a successful

EFL or L2 learner produces and thus perpetuates in order to be the ideal English speaking individual she imagines herself to be, looks to be inherently conservative, as in order to have sufficient motivation to learn English, there must be some appeal to the learner of the values she perceives are associated with English. It follows, then, that the learner, in using the language, will conserve these prestigious values of the language in order to partake of or be associated with them herself.

As we look at some of these values, we might try to map each of them onto the motivation of an aspiring L2 English speaker. Consider how English seems to carry the values of economic and social success. Indeed, where this is the perception by a non L1 English-speaker, whether they are unemployed or skilled in a specialist field, a king or a peasant, it is likely that they will find themselves wanting to access to the prestigious values that come with English. If so, it follows that they would want to learn English; they would idealise themselves as speakers of English and would thus reproduce the basic reality that English is the language of economic success. By the intervention of this learner of English that is, English would continue to 'stand for' social success, intellectual status and progress.

Where we are concerned with how Euro-American cultural values are disseminated in English. Here, where an individual encounters these cultural products; Western pop culture, Hollywood, pop music, but also presentations of Western values, they either respond positively to these products or they do not. If people respond favourably to them, it follows that they simultaneously want to learn or improve their English language. They too, idealise themselves as speakers of English, not to mention as one of an international community of adherents worldwide and they thus reproduce the link between western values and a global English, thus settling the place of Euro-American cultural values in their culture. By the intervention of this learner of English, the English language continues to 'stand for' the values portrayed in the material.

As I offer some outcomes from this work I think it might be useful to do so in stages with a varying degree of extremity. First, it should be made clear, that on account of Dornyei's analysis and the work of the L2 motivational self system, Pennycook's aim of achieving a critical pedagogy has to be missing a structural 'backbone'. This is made clear by Dornyei's disciple Ryan, who says "some of the most important applications suggested by [Dornyei's] research are

at a macro-planning level". [8] He refers precisely here, to a particular program in Japan called JET, (which follows a very common model) whereby native English speakers are brought in to Japanese schools to be authorities on English. Ryan's conclusion, in the wake of extensive research corroborating the L2 self theory, is that these imported teaching assistants undermine or confuse the authority of the Japanese teacher. The teaching Ryan has in mind is close to Pennycook's worldliness of English, but he is emphatic that such developments towards a democratic English won't be made until the notion of the native expert is eradicated from schools.

In truth, however, if English in its amorphous guise as a global language is used to reproduce inequality on the basis of language and if it forces the participation a globalisation based on an Euro-American mono-culture and free-market capitalism, then its spread should be curtailed in a very decisive way. Especially, that is, given that any learner of English likely to experience any success will necessarily reproduce of these values. Structural constraints on the reach of global English in terms of how and how much it is taught will impose new conditions of possibility on non English-speaking people and call for a manoeuvring of globalisation towards benefitting the many rather than the few. it would signal a move towards self-determination and away from what Ngugi Wa Thiong'o calls "that Euro-American-based stranglehold". [9] Thiong'o resists the temptation to think that there is only the prosperity of what he calls Euro-American globalised capitalism.

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Endnotes

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SECTION II
Economics, Politics, Law

NEW COSMOPOLITAN HORIZONS AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY PROBLEMS IN THE GLOBAL AGE
Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives

Chair

—

Boris Gubman

Participants

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Presentation

Boris Gubman

The question regarding an European cultural identity should be understood nowadays in the perspective of radical changes on the communicative platform of postmetaphysical thinking (J. Habermas). Despite the existing differences between radical postmodernism supporters (J.-F. Lyotard, J. Derrida, G. Vattimo, etc.) and their opponents (J. Habermas, K.-O. Apel etc.) declaring their allegiance to the Enlightenment heritage, they share the global world vision and are opposed to any kind of conservative isolationist and traditionalist approach to cultural identity problem from A. Gehlen to A. de Benoist or A. Dougin. The postmetaphysical stance of philosophizing becomes prevalent in their analysis of cultural problems and creates a certain common ground for their vision of European cultural identity in the mosaic horizon of global world. Irrespective of the disagreements, both trends come to the conclusion that globalization makes particularly important the civilization non-similarities, puts a specific emphasis on common roots of European identity. Sharing the Kantian cosmopolitan perspective of universal history understanding, both Habermas and Derrida believe it necessary, for example, to find particular foundations of European culture that should lead to the formation of its contemporary unity in contrast to the United States. Putting a demarcation line between cosmopolitan, Western, and European cultural identities, they reveal the political significance of this problem. J. Derrida, G. Vattimo, U. Eco, J. Habermas, and other theorists give a profound description of the religious and secular roots unifying Europe and producing basis for the emergence of its new cultural and political identity.

New Cosmopolitan Horizons and European Identity Problem in the Global Age

Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives

Boris Gubman & Karina Anufrieva

Abstract

The rapidly globalizing world presents new challenges for the philosophical interpretation of cultural identity acquiring simultaneously a new cosmopolitan dimension and mosaic diversity. Surpassing all national boundaries, information networks contribute to the formation of global economic, social, political, and cultural space. Global community creation is accompanied by the growing awareness of the dependence of human life on the previously non-existent factors and risks that are surpassing local and national boundaries.

A contemporary cosmopolitan vision ought to be colored by an understanding of the universal as conceivable in a historically conditioned approach. This new cosmopolitan vision of the world reality should imply a fresh look at European cultural identity problem, considering the radical changes within the global community under the perspective of post metaphysical thinking. The mosaic panorama of the contemporary culture generates a deep feeling of specific European identity.

Keywords

New Cosmopolitism, European Identity, Postmetaphysical Thinking, Globalization.

Introduction

Like never before, a human person feels her involvement in the cosmopolitan world order context. It has a considerable impact on the contemporary philosophical understanding of cultural identity demanding specific approaches to the human existence perspectives in the local, transnational, and cosmopolitan dimensions. The Modernity cosmopolitan worldview emerged on the basis of the classical metaphysics conceptual strategy. With the decline of classical metaphysics, new approaches to the cosmopolitan worldview were created on the basis of the communicative platform. Even the interpretations of the classical pattern of cosmopolitan identity are no longer possible without the appeal to postmetaphysical stance of philosophizing giving a chance to look at it as historically and communicatively conditioned[1]. The new cosmopolitan vision produced today should necessarily be colored by this kind of understanding that

the universal is imaginable in a historically conditioned and limited way. This new cosmopolitan approach to the contemporary world reality does not abolish the necessity to cast a fresh glance at the European cultural identity problem. It should be reconsidered today in the perspective of the radical changes within the global community on the platform of postmetaphysical thinking. The mosaic panorama of the contemporary culture generates a deep feeling of specific European identity. This issue also becomes an area of prolific debate contributing to the formation of practical strategies needed for the coexistence of cosmopolitan order, transnational and particular cultural units in the dialogical space of contemporary world community.

The Cosmopolitan Cultural Perspective: Old and New Dimensions

The cosmopolitan perspective of understanding history is deeply rooted in the Judaeo-Christian tradition. Universalism of the Christian interpretation of mankind in its relation to God appeared long before the creation of philosophy of culture dating back to Modernity period when the opposition of nature and culture became the subject of theoretical discussions. Growing unity of mankind and radical divorce with the traditional society practices and cultural pattern in the West stimulated the new round of debate regarding the necessity of a cosmopolitan world outlook in the age of the Enlightenment. Aimed at the uncovering the universally valid ideal framework of the linear social progress leading to a constant perfection of human rational achievements and freedom all over the globe, the Enlightenment project was cosmopolitan in its inner spirit. Despite the often pronounced confrontation of the Enlightenment with the traditional Judaeo-Christian vision of history, it is inconceivable without this background whose secularized version it represented in the inner teleologically structured vision of mankind's development. Simultaneously, within this thought framework, history was approached in a Eurocentrist perspective paying little interest to a variety of social and cultural patterns of evolution existing in different parts of the world. Thus, the Enlightenment project cosmopolitanism was reduced definitely to a Eurocentrist vision of mankind's development.

The contradictory nature of the Enlightenment project cosmopolitanism is most visibly revealed in I Kant's legacy that was highly praised by G.W.F. Hegel. Kant spoke of the Enlightenment as the nucleus of the age of human "maturity" when the public use of reason prevails over the tradition. The Enlightenment, he believed, should create a previously non-existing perspective for the freedom of thought providing the liberation of a human being from any kind of guardianship in the field of reflexive understanding of the world[2]. Kant highly praises a personal maturity that means for him an ability to use reason without any limits imposed from the outside by any kind of established tradition or authority. Assuming full responsibility of his thinking activity and actions, a mature subject reflexively takes individually and socially significant decisions. Kant understood Enlightenment as a balanced and steady transition to the state of a free rationality triumph different from any kind of violent revolutionary change. Giving a chance for abolishing personal despotic rule and oppression on the part of profit-seekers and power-hungry men, a revolution is unable, he believed, to reform a style of thought due to a very simple fact that the newly born superstitions will be ruling the soulless mob instead of the previously existing ones.

Kant's analysis of the rationalist basis of the Enlightenment project is unimaginable without his belief in the universal value of humanism and cosmopolitan vision of history. He believed that the existence of the inner teleology ordering the course of human history should guarantee the gradual rational and moral perfection of mankind on its move to the final victory of the civil society order all over the globe[3]. In this perspective, the European history inevitably becomes the center and the ideal pattern of the steady progressive transition of mankind to the teleologically predestined end.

When approached from this standpoint, the cosmopolitan dimension of the Enlightenment project looks quite contradictory. Reason, in Kant's interpretation, is endowed with universal theoretical and moral foundations that should be gradually revealed in the course of history through the human reflexive efforts guaranteeing in the final instance the creation of a global civil society order where the individual freedom should prevail. The opportunity of coexistence of different rational strategies of interpretation of the same area of thought and practice is beyond the mainstream of Kant's philosophy and classical metaphysics of consciousness as a whole. Thus, the possible way of cohesion between

the universalist-cosmopolitan aspirations of the Enlightenment project and its historical time and space limits is the problem arising within Kant's analysis of the self-justifying activity of reason. It remains unsolved within the Hegelian approach to the cosmopolitan dimension of the Enlightenment project.

Hegel's understanding of the cosmopolitan dimension of history indisputably owes much to the Kantian perspective of its interpretation, but looks as an organic part of his more detailed and sophisticated interpretation of the universal history course. Offering his own presumably non-biased philosophical reading of the universal history, Hegel never fulfilled his promise and portrayed the main stages of mankind's evolution in the key of substantialist thought pattern as a reflexive progression of the world Spirit. His thought is aimed at uncovering the objective inner logical structure of history that is gradually revealed in the unending reflexive self-deployment of the spiritual subject-object substance[4]. Hegel believes that the universal logical necessity is manifested in time and space within the particular segment of history. It is present in the subjectivity of the reflexive self-justifying development of the world Spirit. Through the growth of subjectivity the universal history achieves the fulfillment of its logical necessity. The Hegelian analysis of the universal history is based ultimately on the teleological and Eurocentrist approach defining each general stage of mankind's development as a step forward towards the enrichment of freedom and subjectivity.

European history is regarded by Hegel as a paradigm of cosmopolitan world order spreading its influence upon the entire world. Understanding subjectivity principle as the cornerstone of Modernity, he interpreted the Enlightenment as an essential stage in its formation related to the uprising against the tradition power in search of the rational basis of nature and human society. He approached the Enlightenment and the French Revolution as the crucial points of Modernity nourishing the consciousness of the self-justifying power of reason situated in the present and able to work out universal vision of the world and project it into the future[5]. This self-justifying movement of reason determines the value of the permanent renewal and cosmopolitan dimension of progress specific for Modernity. Emphasizing on the universal significance of subjectivity principle based on the reflexive pattern of reason's self-justification, Hegel evidently paves the way for the vision of the Enlightenment as a never-ending process. At the same time, this kind of interpretation is possible only within the

framework of mono-logical thought which is alien to the pluralistic and multicultural experience supported by major currents of contemporary philosophy.

The cosmopolitan view obtains another important dimension in the Romanticism philosophy where the substantialist and Eurocentrist approach to history is complemented with the interest to particular cultures. Universal is counterbalanced by the particular whose value is established through the romantic ironic kind of philosophical reflexion. Tradition was rehabilitated and reason acquires its historical dimension in the works of the Romanticism representatives that considerably influenced different versions of life philosophy and hermeneutics. Subjecting to rational criticism the persuasion of the existence of the universal logical foundations of knowledge gradually uncovered in the understanding of reality, the hermeneutical reason questions the validity of the Enlightenment project foundations for the contemporary global and multi-cultural world. Although the Enlightenment critical rational pattern is still alive in contemporary philosophy of culture, it is noticeably transformed and coexists with the ironic reflexivity deeply rooted in the Romantic heritage. The hermeneutical reason strategy that prevails in the contemporary philosophical approach to cosmopolitan order and cultural diversity problem should be understood as combining both reflexive patterns in a synthetic unity[6].

Despite the exiting differences between radical postmodernism supporters (J.-F. Lyotard, J. Derrida, G. Vattimo, etc.) and their opponents (J. Habermas, K.-O. Apel etc.) declaring their allegiance to the Enlightenment heritage, they share the global world vision and are opposed to any kind of conservative isolationist and traditionalist approach to cultural identity problem from A. Gehlen to A. de Benoist or A. Dougin. The postmetaphysical stance of philosophizing becomes prevalent in their analysis of cultural problems[7]. Interpreted in a non-similar fashion, the communicative platform serves for establishing new possible analytical strategies of cosmopolitan culture horizons adequate for the mosaic panorama of the world community. Within this specific social and cultural situation, classical philosophical heritage, and Kant's ideas, in particular, becomes the source of inspiration for the contemporary understanding of cosmopolitan perspective.

The cosmopolitan identity, which is presumably given today in the process of its formation, should be described on the basis of acquisition of the parameters that become widespread all over the globe. Certain qualities and value

characteristics surpassing the frontiers of national cultures should be considered as possessing a cosmopolitan universality. They should be taken as having a unifying force for building some kind of global identity. Finding a basis of cosmopolitan identity is not an easy task due to the existing cultural diversity demanding a consensus strategy for obtaining certain unity. The platform of reconciliation should not abolish cultural diversity and suppress it by some kind of power alien to the mosaic panorama of the world community. If so, cosmopolitan identity should be gradually constructed in reflexive dialogical efforts of the hermeneutical reason. It may emerge as a commonly accepted image describing transnational communities or even a world-wide unity of mankind irrespective of the existing disparity and conflicts among the nations. Cosmopolitan dimension of the world is gradually constituted through the transnational identities. This process is approached differently by Habermas and Derrida who established, despite the divergences of view, a common ground of cosmopolitan dimension understanding[8]. Regardless of their non-identity, they join their efforts confronting any kind of cultural conservative philosophy from A. Gehlen to A. de Benoist who reject the importance of cosmopolitan dimension of culture and its Enlightenment roots.

Taking into account the existence of a definite cultural background for the formation of transnational identity, Habermas believes that it is inconceivable without a concrete political strategy. Transnational identity construction is for him a necessary constitutive part of the cosmopolitan world order. In contrast to Kant, who spoke of the cosmopolitan dimension of history in a purely philosophical perspective paying very small attention to the reality of its concrete events, Habermas always refers to the dynamics of the significant trends of social and cultural development. He rejects any kind of teleology and Eurocentrism, but his approach to the problem is evidently based on the idea that has a European origin. Following Kant, he believes in the power of moral foundations and law that should inspire the transition to the transnational identity surpassing political boundaries and cultural diversity. Criticizing C. Schmitt's theory, Habermas claims that international politics should be based on the strategy of finding an ideal communication situation able to provide the conditions for the rapprochement between nations on the platform of categorical imperative ethics and law system that rests on its foundation. Deontological strategy of transnational identity construction is complemented by the idea that general law platform should be accepted within the mosaic of cultures and

find support in the milieu of their life-worlds. The way it should be done, however, remains open for further discussion and quite unpredictable. Different scenarios of cosmopolitan identity creation existing even within the 'divided West' should certify, Habermas believes, in favor of the openness of the future transition in this direction. Common European identity formation on the basis of the constitutional process makes, in his opinion, a preferable and necessary stage of the transition to the new cosmopolitan consciousness. It should be accompanied by the renewal of the political status of the United Nations as a nucleus of the stable world order based on justice.

In contrast to Habermas, Derrida proposes the intercultural negotiations strategy as a platform for cosmopolitan identity formation. The expected outcome of this kind of dialogue that is underway within the global information space should be the creation of the cosmopolitan world outlook bridging the gap between the non-similar cultures[9]. Like Habermas, Derrida follows the Kantian cosmopolitan perspective, although purely legalist path towards its realization does not satisfy him. Derrida is far from denying the importance of the legal and political dimensions of the cosmopolitan identity formation problem, but he is also persuaded that world view divergences constitute the deepest level of contradictions between different cultural communities. He puts an emphasis on the role philosophy should play in building the cosmopolitan identity[10]. As a free self-justifying activity of human reason, philosophy has the ability to hear voices of different cultures and create a synthetic meaningful portrayal of the world. Thus, it is cosmopolitan in its nature and mission creating a ground for law and political unification of the world regardless of the contradictions existing between its units.

European Identity in the Global Community

The growing awareness of the existence of transnational ties leading to the cosmopolitan identity formation is combined today with the feeling of coexistence of different cultural units constituting the mosaic universe of the world community life. Among the polyphony of voices of various cultures, the European one is easily recognizable as possessing specific influence and force. Irrespective of their theoretical disagreements, representatives of different versions of contemporary philosophy of culture come to the conclusion that globalization makes particu-

larly important the understanding of common roots of European identity. Even if this identity is conceived as constructively built through the legal and political consensus, that does not exclude a certain cultural basis unifying all nations belonging to European tradition. At the same time, the transnational European identity does not abolish cultural and political diversity among the Europeans themselves. Another important issue is the relations between the North American and European attitude to the common cultural roots, non-coincident scenarios of the European heritage reading that may lead to a certain polarity of views on the contemporary world panorama. All these problems arise within the context of contemporary polemical debate concerning the currently existing cultural and social state, prospects of its evolution in the future.

In the debate concerning European identity problem, both radical postmodernist authors and their opponents claming their allegiance to Enlightenment heritage stand in opposition to conservatism. A. de Benoist and other representatives of the European "new right" philosophy, for instance, look at the European identity problem from the isolationist standpoint criticizing the Modernity and Enlightenment project legacy on the pagan value platform. This kind of approach looks totally unacceptable for authors accepting dialogue as a way of cultural self-identity formation.

Sharing the Kantian cosmopolitan perspective of universal history understanding, both Habermas and Derrida believe it necessary, for example, to find particular foundations of European culture that should lead to the formation of its contemporary unity in contrast to the United States. Despite their theoretical differences, both thinkers came to this conclusion under the pressure of the political events of the Iraq war that had revealed the conflict between the United States and Western European countries. The 'division of the West' became the reality demanding explanation not only in terms of the concrete political causes of the split within the allies in their attitude to the Iraq war, but also in the perspective of the cultural tradition duality that made this kind of disagreement possible. Putting a demarcation line between cosmopolitan, Western, and European cultural identities, Habermas and Derrida reveal the political, as well as the cultural significance of this problem.

The famous text on the European identity, written by Habermas and signed also by Derrida, appeared in 2003 and raised questions on the possibility of its definition and diversity of national cultures that exists within

the continent's unity. European culture produced Christianity and capitalism, natural science and technology, Roman law and Napoleon's code. It gave birth to civil and city forms of life, as well as to democracy, human rights and secularized state and society that spread over from Europe to other continents. Produced in Europe, these fruits of continent's culture are commonly shared in the West. Both Habermas and Derrida believe that the Western style of thinking deeply rooted in the Judaeo-Christian tradition and marked by individualism, rationalism, and activism is commonly shared by Europe and the United States. Specific values first produced in Europe became accepted as identity platform of the West. If so, the core of the European identity becomes rather vague and problematic. However, Habermas and Derrida insist on the possibility to find it in the set of typically European values that differ from commonly shared in the West[11].

Europe consists from the non-similar nations possessing specific cultural heritage. First and foremost, throughout its controversial history Europe, Habermas and Derrida argue, learnt a lesson of the coexistence of different nations whose interests were standing in the direct opposition to each other. Thus, the detrimental effect of the nationalist contradictions was somehow reduced and softened by the practices of the tolerant attitude towards the other. Culture that for many centuries was harassed by the oppositions between the city and village life styles, the religious and secular power, knowledge and belief, state authority and class struggle acquired the capacity to unify the diversity, to institutionalize contradictions and stabilize existing tension within the society. Habermas and Derrida agree that the ability to accept the other may be understood as the cornerstone of the European identity.

Both thinkers agree that the European identity profile is constituted through the constructive effort in the public sphere. They claim that in the third quarter of the 20-th century Europe looks possessing the following features of common mentality: secularisation became prevalent, citizens are opposed to any attempt to cross the border between religion and politics; inhabitants of the continent trust the managing power of the state and evaluate with suspicion the market prospects; the clear understanding of the 'enlightenment dialectic' becomes widespread and the optimistic illusions of the technological progress gradually disappear; the guarantees of

the prosperity given by the welfare state and the opportunities to cooperatively solve arising social problems are accepted in their majority; the tolerance threshold of the violence against personality is low; world peace order is understood as established on the law basis, and the UN is approached as the institution obliged to provide it[12]. All these specific features constitute, Habermas and Derrida believe, the basis of European identity profile today within the unity of the West. It should be gradually formed by the joint efforts of all the members of the European Union possessing common historical experience and facing contradictions existing within the Western alliance. Both theorist emphasize their allegiance to non-Eurocentrist perspective, but sharing Kantian strategy, they look at the European scenario of gradual cosmopolitan world order construction as the universal strategy aimed at overcoming multiple threats to stability and peace produced outside of the West by its militant opponents. This kind of awareness of the mission of Europe permitted them to find a reconciliation point regarding the necessity to understand its identity formation as a task essential for establishing universal cosmopolitan order all over the globe. In this commonly accepted perspective, politics should be understood as providing the necessary framework for the cultural and social identity of Europe. Overcoming Kantian teleology of history, Habermas and Derrida are not able to leave completely Eurocentrist approach to the cosmopolitan order creation ideal.

To be within the Kantian paradigm of thought means to reproduce the vision of history which is inconceivable without taking European Modernity pattern of social and cultural development for a basis of understanding of the sequence of events that happened after its emergence in the panorama of mankind's life. Habermas is following this line of argument appealing to his own platform of thought that rests on the Enlightenment rooted belief in the power of learning that paves the way for the gradual change in human history. Thus, rejecting Kantian teleology of history and any kind of substantialist thought, he uses the resources of hermeneutical reason for political construction of the new European identity image projected on the global community level as a transnational unifying force. Modified Enlightenment reflexive pattern serves as a basis for political strategy that should level differences between the 'old' and the 'new' Europe, abolish the confrontation with the rapidly emerging multiplicity of non-European

in their origin sub-cultures with the tools of the 'mild' multi-culturalism, and, finally, lead to the renewal of the value foundations and normative roots of the world community life. European culture sources are taken for a starting point of the universally valid politics and law strategy that, in its turn, gives unity to a variety of cultures without ruining their autonomy and authenticity. However, given the rejection of any kind of determinism and substantialism, this pluralist interpretation of history has European cultural values of Enlightenment as a focal point defining the 'highway' of global community development.

Joining Habermas in the European identity manifesto, Derrida reveals his solidarity with this kind of view which looks quite opposed to the commonly accepted understanding of the postmodernist uprising against the linear and centrist interpretation of the irreducible cultural plurality existing in the human world. This means that the Enlightenment heritage also works in his approach to the problem of the European identity problem. At the same time, admitting the importance of this perspective, he is trying to combine it with the kind of reflexivity rooted in Romanticism with its imaginative ironic play with the mosaic of different culture. The purely legalist and political way to European identity looks quite incomplete in this perspective, and Derrida believes that the permanent negotiations with other cultures, as well as with different layers of its own tradition could also contribute to the permanently changing image of the European identity. In this respect, he never left the ground of Levinas philosophy paying tribute to the otherness as the necessary reference point in the identity constitution process. He always continued to repeat that he felt in himself the unbreakable unity of Jewish, French and European identities complementing each other[13]. Thus, the permanent negotiative construction of the European identity should be considered as a parallel move to its gradual political creation that is accentuated as primarily important within the format of Habermas thought on the subject.

In their understanding of the European identity formation, J.-F. Lyotard, G. Vattimo, and U. Eco are also, and sometimes more radically, expressing the postmodernist anti-centrist and dialogical approach. The information society culture stemming from the Modernity period rationalism and Enlightenment heritage is interpreted as a focal point in contemporary revolt

against any kind of meta-narration and centrist approach to history[14]. The adventures of hermeneutical reason led to the refutation of any kind of linear and centrist understanding of history most clearly expressed in Vattimo's heritage, but they are deeply imbedded in the Enlightenment project belief in the unlimited foundational power of human rational ability. The Enlightenment project still remains a reference point even in the radical postmodernist dialogical interpretations of the European identity. Its future is portrayed as activated by the whole set of the world inter-cultural relations making vital European tradition values. Eco spoke in this context of the changing situation of Europe within the West, as well as its relations Asian cultures[15]. Vattimo reveals the formative force of the Judaeo-Christian heritage and emphasizes its role for the future of the European identity preservation[16]. Despite the appeal to traditional European culture values, postmodernist theorist considerably differ from the conservative thought by their dialogical openness and non-hostility to other cultures.

The cosmopolitan horizon becomes a starting point of any reflexive effort to obtain a cultural identity in the contemporary world. It is persistently present even in the conservative philosophy of culture trying to escape from this situation appealing to monadological view that denies universality in the name of isolationist uniqueness. Anything culturally unique demands today a certain comparison with the universal cosmopolitan perspective. Not only national, but also transnational identity is obtainable within the format of this approach. At the same time, the cosmopolitan dimension itself should be understood as the outcome of the constantly renewed effort of the hermeneutical reason constructing the image of the mosaic unity of the cultural world. Rejecting Eurocentrist and teleological approaches, it still contains in itself the impulse of the Enlightenment project inconceivable without the search for rational foundation of human activity. In this sense, cosmopolitan identity as a point of reference of any other identity construction will never loose its ties with the European culture heritage. Remodelled on the hermeneutical basis, it gives, in its turn, a new twist to the understanding of the transnational identity formation. Thus, it appears that the European identity problem is approached today within the cosmopolitan horizon simultaneously by post-modernist authors and their opponents looking at today's world as a climax Enlightenment project. The

reference to the Enlightenment and its pattern of cosmopolitan world view is deeply imbedded even in the radical postmodernist theories denying any kind of universal order in the mosaic of cultural reality. Plurality of cultural identities and their equality may be postulated only on the premise of reference to the universality of rational attempts to portray the world. The Contemporary vision of European identity opposed to conservative monadological views is conceivable only in this perspective.

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SECTION II
Economics, Politics, Law

EUROPE SEEN FROM THE OUTSIDE

Chair
—
Stefan Höjelid

Participant
—
Michael Longo

Presentation

Stefan Höjelid

What's wrong with the European Union?

When José Manuel Barroso as outgoing president of the European Commission in October 2014 gave his final speech to the European Parliament he devoted most time of the speech to all crisis during his ten years in office: "I think you can agree with me that these have been exceptional and challenging times. Ten years of crisis, and response of the European Union to this crisis. Not only the financial and sovereignty debt crisis – let's not forget at the beginning of my first mandate we had a constitutional crisis, when two founding members of the European Union rejected, in referenda, the Constitutional Treaty. So we had a constitutional crisis, we had a sovereign debt and financial crisis, and in the most acute terms we now have a geopolitical crisis, as a result of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine." Barroso though did not miss the opportunity to point out that he still mastered all Union crises during his term 2004–2014 and he underlined that the EU had worked with the right conscience, putting the global interest of the European Union above specific interests.

It did not however prevent Jean-Claude Juncker in his speech to the European Parliament as incoming president of the European Commission to establish that the crisis is far from over and that the crisis has taken its toll: "More than six million people lost their job during the crisis. Youth unemployment has reached record highs. Several of our Member States are still far away from sustainable growth and adequate levels of investment. In many countries, trust in the European project is at a historic low."

In other words, history often repeats itself. Since the start of the European cooperation in the fifties the European Community as well as the European Union has had its fair share of crises. As a letter in the mail box crises have a tendency to trigger debate on the ultimate goal and the purpose of the European co-operation. What is the fundamental idea with European integration? Is it a genuine and true European solidarity with the Union's lofty goals and principles, or is it perhaps just about the Member States' own interests?

Referring to Joseph Weiler's thoughts in one of his many publications on the constitutional development over the years, one wonders if the new clothes really have an emperor.

Some scholars like Jürgen Habermas, the German philosopher, argue that earlier generations' most powerful driving force, which was in force also in the former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl's generation – to put an end to Europe's bloody history, integrating the unreliable Germany into a peaceful Europe and to unite Europe economically – has lost much of its original relevance. This also applies to earlier generations' so called Carolingian basis – the invocation of the Christian West. It takes obviously more to get political support of the people. Legitimacy of the European project is not just about talking on behalf of different interests in legal, bureaucratic and economic terms, but also about talking to peoples' feelings: in other words a common value orientation.

Michael Longo focuses in his article on what he calls "the twin crisis", that is the eurozone crisis as well as the immigration and the asylum crisis. These two policy areas have according to Longo detracted from the EU's allure in recent years. He argues that the European Union's capacity to influence the direction of international governance in diverse fields is challenged by the union's many internal shortcomings, exposed both by the Eurozone crisis and the immigration and asylum crisis. The EU, according to Longo, has to regain its lost mojo and its aspirations by refocusing on its soft power credentials like pluralism, solidarity, equality, non-discrimination and respect for human rights.

Regaining the European Union's Lost Mojo
A View From the Outside

Michael Longo

Abstract

It is often claimed that the European Union has the capacity to positively influence the direction of international governance in diverse fields from climate change to human rights. As seen from the outside the EU's soft power resources and underpinning values exert a strong, magnetic attraction. The EU's foundational principles and innovative institutional characteristics may be seen to offer distinct opportunities for regional and international development. However, this assessment is inevitably challenged by a switch to the EU's many internal shortcomings, revealed both by the Eurozone crisis and the immigration and asylum crisis. In effect these crises are creating widening deficits of solidarity, social justice and legitimacy, which detrimentally impact growth, stability and self-perceptions.

The EU seems to have lost its way and its spark. It is reasonable to surmise that the EU will not succeed in restoring its soft power credentials unless it closes the gap between what it currently is and what it promises to become. To this end, reminding the EU of its credentials may assist Europe's self-perception in concrete ways. Thus, the EU may need to refocus on its emblematic image as a creative, transnational, soft power founded on principles of pluralism, solidarity, equality, non-discrimination and respect for human rights to regain its lost mojo, its aspirations and its potential to positively influence global institutional development through innovative ideas as much as good practice and example.

Keywords

European Union, Soft Power, Eurozone Crisis, Asylum Crisis, Solidarity.

Introduction

The European Union (EU) has had a profound effect on Australia for various reasons, most notably for its agricultural policies which have traditionally been viewed in Australia as detrimental to Australia's interests. Scholars in Australia have written about the "combative attitude" that "has long informed Australian approaches to the EU".[1] Experts have called on Australia to enhance its relationship with the EU, the first step in this direction being a more nuanced and reflective understanding of what the EU is and what it represents for Australia. To this end Murray observes that "[t]he EU affects Australia both directly – through

trade, investment and political summitry – and indirectly – through EU governance norms ..."[2] Implicit in this statement is the awareness that the EU has the capacity to inform policy in other jurisdictions including Australia. However, care is warranted as I do not wish to be understood to be arguing that the EU is a model for other jurisdictions. Nonetheless I am contending that the EU can maintain and enhance its capacity on the international stage only if it fulfils its promise as a distinctive, new kind of polity whose solutions to complex problems offer something different from the norm. It is the EU's soft power resources that give the EU much of its global cache and it is the outsider's unchecked view of the EU which can inform the EU of what it can be to the rest of the world. Through a process of recounting, the outsider can give back not what the EU is, but what it might be – an improvement on the original.

In keeping with the conference theme on the power of images and ideas from within and without, the focus of this paper is on the ideational rather than the material. It focuses on the power of ideas in constituting a polity itself – the ways in which perceptions of self and the perceptions of others can be constructive. By nature a socialising force, the EU invites discussion of what it might represent in terms of promise if not current approach.

So how is the EU perceived? There are indeed multiple images. There is the Europe of a single market of 500 million consumers united in their desire to trade and to carve out a better economic future based on ever closer union. There is the Europe of political institutions which represent 28 independent states, who by pooling their sovereignty, have constituted a unique political entity – an emerging federation of a new kind – which at times seems to be inching towards political union. There is the EU of a *sui generis* legal order which binds the member states and monitors compliance with EU law. And then there is the EU as soft power, exporter of democracy and good governance norms, protector of human rights, major contributor of development aid around the world. The EU appears on the international stage as a new kind of polity, with supranational supervision of many facets of legal, economic and social life. It promotes itself as a citizens' Europe, a region which privileges diversity and stands up for human rights. Thus, the EU's emblematic image is of a creative, transnational, soft power founded on principles of pluralism, solidarity, equality, non-discrimination and respect for human rights. If this image flounders, it is argued that the EU will cease to be – for itself and for the rest of the world – what it promises to be.

This paper argues that the EU must reconnect with the emblematic image of itself if it is to regain its lost mojo, its aspirations and its potential to positively influence global institutional developments through innovative ideas as much as good practice and example. What would be the point of the EU if it entrenches division, inequality and discrimination, contrary to its foundational values as a post-national organisation? If it develops into 'Fortress Europe', bent on exclusion and balancing the books alone, it will lose its gloss at home and abroad, with an inevitable loss of global influence.

The EU as Soft Power

The story of EU enlargement is testament to the EU's pulling power as 28 states progressively positioned themselves in the EU's orbit. Nye states that soft power resources are the assets that produce attraction which can lead to acquiescence.[3] He asserts that "[s]eduction is always more effective than coercion, and many values like democracy, human rights, and individual opportunities are deeply seductive."[4] So too, of course, is economic prosperity. This seductive power is not confined to states. A regional body such as the EU can, and does, have it. Indeed it is customary to speak of the EU's soft power resources in terms of its influence vis-à-vis third states; its ability to attract through its cultural diplomacy and similar resources; ultimately, the influence it has within the world. In recognition of its soft power credentials, the Nobel Committee in 2012 awarded the peace prize to the EU for its contribution to "the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe" for more than six decades.[5]

Notwithstanding the accolades, conflicting images of the EU prevail. There is Europe of mounting debt, recession, austerity, unemployment, inequality, social unrest, rising populism, extremism and intolerance towards immigrants. Within this negative energy hovers the spectre of EU defection, with the UK first in line. Putting the UK – a serial EU critic – aside the EU's political credentials are also being put to the test in other member states.[6] France is entering new unchartered territory of Euroscepticism following the emergence of the anti-EU *Front National* as its largest political party after the 2014 European Parliamentary election. With her uncompromising stance towards monetary union and her nationalistic declaration that "France is not a country that can

accept tutelage from Brussels"[7], the *Front National's* Marine Le Pen has galvanised anti-EU sentiment in France and drawn similarly minded political parties in other member states to seek alliance with her. Indeed, it is no longer possible to speak of the UK as a curious anomaly in the EU.

So what is the cause of this growing discontent both in the EU heartland and on the periphery?

Twin Crises

Two policy areas have seriously detracted from the EU's lustre in recent years: the Eurozone crisis and immigration. At the core of the debates surrounding these issues is the loss of national sovereignty and the incapacity of the EU to find solutions to complex dilemmas of governance, which some would say are partly of the EU's making. As long as these policy failures persist, any idea of EU soft power leadership appears fanciful.

— *Eurozone Crisis*

The Eurozone crisis has revealed significant cracks in the European edifice. The program of austerity implemented in Southern Europe at all costs including at the expense of work, social cohesion, equality and democracy has raised questions about the EU's commitment to European solidarity and of the ability of its citizens to influence EU governance. The current policies of the EU are objectionable to a large number of citizens across countries and across political ideologies. While opinion on the euro in the euro zone is divided marginally in its favour[8], this perception is reversed in the new members of the EU who have not yet adopted the euro.[9] Regardless, there is a growing belief – whether within or without the euro zone – that the cause of the social, political and economic disaster impacting the euro zone, is monetary union. As Paul Krugman observes: "[d]epression-level slumps didn't happen in Europe before the coming of the euro."[10]

Economists Michel Aglietta and Thomas Brand argue that the euro is essentially a foreign currency for the members of the Eurozone, binding them to rigidly fixed exchange rates regardless of their underlying economic realities and stripping them of monetary autonomy.[11] Rather than helping the member states to converge, the euro has exacerbated the underlying differences between them.

Across all indicators of economic performance there are widening gaps between North and South. Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy have experienced capital flight, falling investment and GDP, spikes in unemployment (especially youth unemployment) and banking turmoil. Germany, on the other hand, is on a different planet. Strongly competitive, it is buoyed by a euro whose settings arguably align favourably with German conditions and a high-end export driven economy.

Despite structural and economic differences, including differences in competitiveness across the EU, monetary policy operates on the assumption that one size fits all. Fiscal tightening and economic reform are presented as the main answers to a problem that patently requires innovative *supranational* solutions as much as national discipline. There may be a need to implement the Growth and Jobs Compact[12], to develop a suite of supporting policies and to loosen the grip of austerity in the short term if recovery is to gain pace, but this may not suffice. Structural reforms will be required to ensure long term survival for all of its members. However, there appears to be little appetite for the kind of reform that will centralise further power in Brussels. Treaty fatigue is evident and the EU has never been so divided.

Debt mutualisation and fiscal union are advocated by some members; others seem to prefer political union along the lines of a United States of Europe; others still will not accept either. Moreover, citizens may not accept any of these options.[13] To many, the EU appears significantly more overbearing and ideologically driven than ever before. There is a perception that the EU is German-dominated and excessively autocratic. Thus, despite some recent success in shoring up the euro currency, largely the result of the ECB's demonstrations of commitment and strength, the ultimate demise of the euro still appears possible in the absence of significant reforms.

If the single currency architecture is indeed defective, as widely thought, then the EU's insistence on fiscal tightening in the South is a misdiagnosis of the problem which is seriously jeopardising the economic wellbeing of millions of people. Furthermore, it is reigniting old national prejudices among states and introducing a system of winners and losers within the EU along North-South lines. More and more citizens in many member states are losing faith in the EU as an institution, most now thinking that European integration has weakened their country.[14]

On the governance front, many member states of the EU rate extremely poorly. Within the Eurozone itself are states at virtually opposite ends of the spectrum of global rankings for corruption.[15] There is evidence that corruption, inequality and poor governance detrimentally affect economic performance. In particular, corruption can exacerbate income inequalities[16] and contribute to unsustainable deficits, market distortions and extractive institutions.[17] The failure of the EU to reverse bad governance practices in some of its own member states or to influence, through its good governance norms (see the Commission's White Paper on Governance[18]), the adoption of reforms that point in the direction of good governance must raise questions of just how the EU will positively influence the rest of the world.

— *Immigration/Asylum Crisis*[19]

The failure of the EU's asylum policy has been a mainstay of prime time news reports around the world as boatloads of asylum seekers arrive and are stuck in Italy and other frontier states. Unveiled in 1999 in the *Amsterdam Treaty*, the EU's common asylum and refugee policy pledged that the EU would become an 'area of freedom, security and justice'. In a regulatory framework featuring expanding EU competence and increased cooperation between member states, it was envisaged that every refugee would be entitled to the same fair asylum procedure regardless of where in the EU the applicant sought asylum. However the policies have been roundly criticised for their excessive focus on keeping poverty-stricken refugees out and for promoting unequal burdens among member states. Some states, chiefly Italy, have argued that there is little coordination from the EU resulting in an excessive burden on frontier states to cope with growing numbers of asylum seekers and other migrants. Since 1999 hundreds of thousands of people have landed on the Italian Island of Lampedusa fleeing war and misery in Africa and Asia. In May 2014 the Italian interior ministry confirmed that 36,000 people had landed in Italy from the beginning of 2014 (and rising exponentially) compared to 42,925 people for the whole of 2013, 13,267 in 2012 and 63,000 in 2011 at the height of the Arab Spring revolutions.[20] Furthermore, it has been estimated that 10,000 to 20,000 people have perished in the Mediterranean on a voyage to Lampedusa.[21] According to the United Nations Refugee Agency, more than 2,000 people have lost their lives in the Mediterranean since the beginning of 2011.[22] This figure is continuously

rising with every new tragedy at sea. The Island has arguably become a symbol of the failure of the EU's asylum and refugee policies.[23]

Although the refugee crisis is formally characterised as a problem for all EU member states, states such as Italy, Greece and Spain are virtually alone in dealing with arrivals from Africa and Asia. The EU's Dublin Regulation[24] – requiring an asylum seeker to apply for asylum in the first state that he or she has entered – has meant that countries surrounded, or almost completely surrounded, by other EU countries are mostly beyond the reach of refugees and asylum seekers as such states have the right under the Regulation to send asylum seekers back to the state of entry unless they are likely to experience serious abuse of rights in those jurisdictions. This state of affairs has generated disagreement between member states.[25] Economic conditions in Southern Europe are so challenging at present that many question the ongoing viability of struggling economies in Italy, Greece and Spain, yet these countries are left to bear a disproportionate burden in the crisis.

In the face of this human tragedy the EU is open to criticism for its investment of hundreds of millions of euros on measures to prevent unwanted immigration: measures such as the deployment of police units to external borders; the building of fences and the use of radar and satellite technology to monitor refugee routes in the Mediterranean Sea. Indeed, "[e]ven in one of the most developed rights regimes of our world [Europe], refugees and asylum seekers still find themselves in quasi-criminal status."[26] To be sure the EU experience is not singular. For decades western states have been pursuing ever more restrictive policies aimed at preventing entry. So while the problem is pervasive, and change in the international legal regime for the protection of refugees and asylum seekers long overdue, we seem to expect a better answer from the EU. We generally expect more from the EU than other jurisdictions. And despite current practices, it is still likely that the impetus for change will come from the EU where human rights protections are seemingly matched by strong rhetoric. Yet, the current disjuncture between practice and rhetoric is particularly apparent because the restrictive policies appear to contradict most vividly the way in which the EU polity defines itself and projects itself to the rest of the world. This image has the necessity built in it for change and innovation to meet the aspirations that characterises it. If the EU is to not appear hollow, if it is to endure as a soft power, it must continue to find innovative solutions to the prob-

lems of co-existence. There are internal cleavages – the rise of populism and xenophobic politics – which further complicate matters. Thus, Europe today finds itself in an uneasy place between hope and illusion.

Conclusion

The EU currently represents a great deal both in terms of its influence in global trade and for what it represents on the international stage through its unique institutional structures and governance norms. This is not to say that the EU is a model. Indeed, it is contended that in order for the EU to be what it promises to be, it must live up to its own rhetoric.

From the economic perspective the EU continues to inform the world trade agenda as a pioneering regional economic organisation.[27] In the areas of human rights protection, climate change abatement, international development and cultural diplomacy the EU is potentially second to none. Furthermore, the EU possesses enormous soft power resources which can positively influence other jurisdictions in the pursuit of public goods such as good governance and democracy.

However, a reality check reveals that the EU has significant shortcomings which detract from internal growth and stability as well as its global appeal. These shortcomings include not only growth and job deficits but also widening deficits of solidarity and social justice. There is no more effective way for the EU to nullify the positive potential of the "European perspective" than by not living up to the values it espouses and the standards it sets for itself in terms of good governance, human rights protection and democratic participation. Therefore, the EU needs to make good on its democratic governance promise for the sake of its own citizens before it can hope to influence other countries' citizens in these directions. Similarly, it needs to embed an equitable asylum system that protects the fundamental rights of all persons before it can claim moral leadership in the area of human rights protection. It currently falls short on both counts.

The EU does appear to be losing its way and its spark. It seems reasonable to surmise that the EU will not represent a positive influence, let alone a model, unless it restores the vision of what it promises to become. Sometimes a picture gains clarity from a distance. To this end, the definition of the EU from an

outsider's perspective as a harbinger of new modalities and ways of thinking may assist Europe's self-perception in concrete ways. It may in fact assist in the reconfiguration and rearticulation of what the EU seeks to be. Drawing on Jacques Derrida's construction of the process of *iteration*, through which each repetition of a concept is a form of variation that transforms meaning, adding to it and enriching it in subtle ways rather than simply reproducing the original usage[28], Europeans *and others* can contribute to the rearticulation of the EU's goals by the process of iteration. Therefore, a focus on the EU's emblematic image as a creative, transnational, soft power founded on principles of pluralism, solidarity, equality, non-discrimination and respect for human rights may assist the EU to regain its lost mojo, to reappraise its aspirations and its potential to positively influence global institutional developments through innovative ideas as much as good practice and example.

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3. Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Public Affairs, 2004).
4. Ibid, x.
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SECTION II
Economics, Politics, Law

DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE
Past, Present, Future

Chair
—
Maria Marczewska-Rytko

Participants
—
Victor Castellani
Maria Marczewska-Rytko

Presentation

Maria Marczewska-Rytko

The scientific aim of the workshop is to identify and analyse, as thoroughly and multidimensionally as possible, the dynamic image of direct democracy in Europe (idea and institutions of direct democracy). Between 750 and 500 BC a government system of the city-state (polis) developed, in which citizens were a community constituting the state organism. State decrees were issued by resolution of the Council and the people. The idea of direct democracy appeared inter alia in the visions of Jean Jacques Rousseau, and during the French Revolution. However, its proponents were unable to realize the postulated ideal in the form it obtained in the ancient era. In the next centuries, criticism leveled at democracy followed two directions. First, it was believed that the people were not able to be motivated by the common interest. Second, it was claimed that the implementation of the idea was only possible in communities with a small population. Advanced techniques and tools of social communication provoked deepened consideration in the sphere of theory or visions and attempts to effect definite solutions aimed at the introduction of the idea of direct democracy into the practice of the functioning of contemporary societies on a far wider scale than currently applied.

Direct Democracy in Classical Athens
Case Studies from the 5th Century

Victor Castellani

Abstract

Three case studies of major decisions and sometimes quick reversals of decisions by the sovereign Assembly of 5th century Athens, as reported in Thucydides' History, demonstrate how the citizen body could be swayed and counter-swayed by skilled and influential speakers. These include statesmen like Pericles and Nicias, whom the historian admired, demagogues like Cleon, whom he detested, and opportunists like Alcibiades, about whom Thucydides, like his Athenian compatriots, had mixed feelings. The actions concerned the continuation of Pericles in power and questions about how to treat surrendered Mytilenian rebels who had attempted to withdraw from the Athenian empire and whether to launch a huge armada to add Greek Sicily to the empire. Although a fourth case, regarding the aftermath of a costly navel victory, is only outlined, its lesson about the volatility of opinion and decision is similar.

Keywords

Alcibiades, Athenian Democracy, Cleon, Demagogues, Direct Democracy, Pericles, Mytilenian Debate, Sicilian Expedition, Thucydides.

"I expected this outbreak of anger against me," reportedly said an elected Athenian general during the third year of open warfare against Athens' mainland enemies, "since I understand the reasons for it, and I have called an assembly with this object in view, to remind you of your previous resolutions and to put forward my own case against you… you are attacking me for having spoken in favor of war and yourselves for having voted for it" (158-159; II.60.1 and 4).[1] At the brink of that war, he had persuaded the sovereign citizen Assembly (*Ekklēsia*) to declare that the 30 Years Peace of 446 BCE was broken. Urging the war-resolution he said:

> "Athenians, my views are the same as ever: I am against making any concessions to the Peloponnesians, even though I am aware that the enthusiastic state of mind in which people are persuaded to enter upon a war

> is not retained when it comes to action, and that people's minds are altered by the course of events…. I call upon all of you who are persuaded by my words to give your full support to these resolutions which we are making all together, and to abide by them even if in some respect or other we find ourselves in difficulty…"
>
> (118-119; I.40.1)

Later in that war another elected general—one of ten, but similarly then most influential—gave another speech that Thucydides reconstructs, during what he believed was unwisely re-opened debate about how to punish rebellious Mytilene. Dominant on the large and rich island Lesbos, Mytilene was an allied-city-state that had kept its own navy and enjoyed other privileges within imperial Athens' Delian League. The Mytilenians rebelled against Athenian hegemony, tried to leave the no longer voluntary "league," and even to ally with Sparta.

His tirade began so:

> "Personally I have had occasion often enough already to observe that a democracy is incapable of governing others. You fail to see that when you allow rebels to persuade you to make a mistaken decision and when you give way to your own feelings of compassion, you are being guilty of a kind of weakness which is dangerous to you and which will not make them love you any more."
>
> (213; III.37.1)

Both imperialist leaders quoted above declared that "Your empire is now like a tyranny: it may have been wrong to take it; it is certainly dangerous to let it go" (as the first said, II.63.2 on p. 161) and "What you do not realize is that your empire is a tyranny exercised over subjects who do not like it and who are always plotting against you" (the second, III.37.2 on p. 213).

The first was Pericles, whom Thucydides idolized; the second, Cleon, whom the historian detested, pronouncing him "remarkable among the Athenians for the violence of his character" (212; III.36.6). Thucydides praises Pericles for ex-

emplary statesmanship that was really benevolent monarchy, thanks to his extraordinary power to sway the *Ekklēsia*, which enacted laws and decided policy conforming to his supremely wise judgment. He could rouse and encourage the citizens when they were dispirited, could temper their energy when it might lead them off the prudent course he had plotted for "the *dēmos* [= nation, people] of the Athenians" (as his city-state named itself).

In the third year of warfare Pericles needed to boost his fellow citizens' morale when not only had many farms been ravaged by enemies who enjoyed land supremacy, but a terrible plague had decimated citizens crowded together behind the Long Walls of Athens. Pericles needed to check the suffering people's afterthoughts—despite satisfactory progress of the war from his 'Big Picture' perspective. In the last of three speeches that Thucydides puts into his mouth, Pericles sufficiently reassured them of his wisdom and incorruptibility, so that they stayed the course, sent no peace mission. Soon after they re-elected him to generalship and, the historian says, "put all their affairs into his hands" (163; II.65.4). Irrationally, however, venting their distress they also imposed a hefty fine on him.

This first case demonstrates how volatile was the temper of that *Ekklēsia* who made laws and unmade them, reversed policy in successive decades, within a year or two, even on consecutive days. The several thousands of citizens in that Assembly hardly regarded themselves as bound by previous decisions, predecessors' *or their own*, on the grounds that *those* decisions, by the *dēmos'* sovereign will, had instituted something new or changed something old. Their will *remained* sovereign, at every periodic Assembly meeting or any specially added one.

Now we turn to Cleon.[2] The day before, at his motion a virtual 'death sentence' was voted upon the surrendered rebel state. All Mytilenian men were to be executed, women and children sold into slavery, walls of their city torn down, their ships added to Athens' navy, and their land allocated to poor Athenians. However, an added Assembly day was called to reconsider this drastic verdict, at which Cleon offered this assessment of legislative policy: "We should realize that a city is better off with bad laws, so long as they remain fixed, than with good laws that are constantly being altered, that lack of learning combined with good common sense is more helpful than the kind of cleverness that gets out of hand, and that as a general rule states are better governed by the man in the street than by intellectuals" (213; III.37.3). He accused those who urged

the *dēmos* to mitigate their harshness of yesterday as being either (a) sophisticated but unprincipled entertainers, deft at playing upon emotions like pity, or (b) bribed hirelings of wealthy Mytilenians—or *both*. "You," Cleon told the Assembly, "are simply victims of your own pleasure in listening, and are more like an audience sitting at the feet of a professional lecturer than a parliament discussing matters of state" (214; III.38.7).

This second case involved not just anonymous opponents but a spokesman whom Thucydides names: Diodotus, a person otherwise unknown. Others whom Thucydides' account omits evidently spoke both for and against moderation. To Diodotus, however, the historian ascribes a remarkable, profoundly amoral speech (217-222; III.42-48). Diodotus followed Cleon, whose harangue (213-217; III.37-40) had attempted to refute his anticipated plea for leniency. Now *he* countered Cleon ingeniously. He conceded that anger over Mytilenians' treachery and "injustice" motivated the preceding decision. Compassion should no more move them now than it did the day before, nor, however, should indignation, *if harshness was not advantgeous*. He argued that it would be more useful to Athens if *most* Mytilenians were allowed to live and work and engage in trade, earning and paying hefty cash 'tribute' to Athens. Farmers should be made to pay rent for land whose ownership would pass to needy Athenians. Only the guilty upper class should be executed, the masses forgiven—if, in fact, they were really culpable at all, since, Diodotus argued, the many had been bullied by the well-armed few (and their mercenaries) into joining in the rebellion. Some of the *dēmos* had in fact opened city gates to attacking Athenians, ending the siege of the place. Were they to be punished for that favor? Perhaps Diodotus' most powerful argument, sad to say, was that if Athns did exterminate the entire population of Mytilene, high and low in social and economic class, she would make imperialism harder for herself. When other allied/subject cities rebelled in the future, *as they inevitably would do* whenever they entertained high hopes of success like the Mytilenian rebels just now, the fate of Mytilene would prevent them from ever surrendering. Athens would be hard pressed to keep a siege going till the last rebel was slain, and then would take over an empty land that could contribute no men, no ships, *no silver* to her war effort. Moreover, democratic Athens' natural friends in allied city-states, the *dēmos*, might turn against slaughterers of their class-mates and defect to the anti-Athenian bloc that Sparta led.

In fact, after Diodotus made this unedifying appeal an ugly compromise was reached. He and those who agreed with him could not save all of the rebels, nor preserve Mytilene's economic autonomy. The Athenians' wrath was appeased by the slaughter of "only" *over a thousand* of the Mytilenian Few. Many thousand others were spared, but reduced to share-croppers or cash-paying tenants on properties that now would belong to absentee Athenians.

The third case again examines competing efforts to un-persuade and re-persuade the sovereign Assembly about a "decided" matter. Speakers revisited the Athenians' resolution to circumvent the 50 Year Peace of Nicias (421 BCE) in its sixth year. By launching an armada to interfere in *Sicilian* interstate conflicts, one prominent man protested, they would invite their balky allies in the Aegean region to revolt and their sullen mainland enemies to restart the Peloponnesian War. Athens would run exactly that kind of risk against which, according to Thucydides, Pericles had long before expressly warned his compatriots. "You should feel confident in ultimate victory," he had advised them, "if only you will make up your minds not to add to the empire while the war is in progress, and not to go out of you way to involve yourselves in new perils" (122; I.144.1).

Thucydides unusually gives Nicias, who had negotiated the peace treaty, *two* speeches in a debate over whether to rescind the preceding day's motion to sail west so as to assist beckoning non-Hellenic Egestaeans in their war with Greek Selinus at the west end of Sicily and to aid exiles from Leontini against Syracuse at its southeast. Neither group was *per se* a worthwhile ally to acquire; their real value was to give Athens pretext for intervention in Sicilian affairs.

Nicias' first speech Thucydides quotes tries, Pericles-like, to restrain the excessive imperial ambition of the Athenians (414-418; VI.9-14). He argues that, although technically Athens remained at peace, she had dangerous enemies close to home who had already been provoked by Athenian diplomatic maneuvers in recent years and were eager to resume fighting. Some subject allies were already in revolt, and with certain unfriendly states Athens was only in precarious short-term armistice. These problems should be resolved before Athens undertook new hostilities to the west across the Ionian Sea against populous city states that would be hard to conquer and even harder to control, so far from Attica. Nicias further warned about personal over-reaching of his younger colleague Alcibiades—glamorous, brilliant, bold, controversial—who with him

was named one of three generals who would lead the proposed *but not yet defined and funded* Sicilian Expedition. In this speech Nicias used unabashed *ad hominem* attack, though be did not deign to name its target.

> "It is with real alarm that I see this young man's party sitting at his side in this assembly all called in to support him, and I, on my side, call for the support of the older men among you. If any one of you is sitting next to one of his supporters, do not allow yourself to be brow-beaten or be frightened of being called a coward if you do not vote for war. Do not, like them, indulge in hopeless passions for what is not there… Our country is now on the verge of the greatest danger she has ever faced."

He thus tried to split old from young voters, thinking that those closer in age to himself would still be war-weary and must distrust wanton, scandalous Alcibiades. However, as Thucydides explains, many older citizens believed that General Nicias' legendary good fortune and his characteristic caution would at least prevent disaster. However, *success* was what they *expected.* Conquest of Syracuse and her Sicilian and (Greek) Italiote neighbors, tacit goal of the audacious enterprise, would permit *their* generation, like that of Pericles, to add to the wealth and power of the state, not just timidly maintain it, and guarantee their diverse cash subsidies from increased imperial revenues. Younger men, who would actually do the sailing and rowing, the fighting on land and on sea, and, as they too expected, the *conquering*, were eager for adventure.

In his second speech (423-425; VI.20-23) Nicias declared that, if despite his grave reservations the expedition *did* proceed, it must be huge and costly. Spelling out its needs he hoped that the *dēmos* would be put off by the price. On the contrary, they voted everything he asked for, offering to authorize even more if the commanding generals sought it.

Between Nicias' two speeches comes one of Thucydides' most extraordinary compositions. Alcibiades' measured, even respectful reply to Nicias, is as brilliant as the speaker, familiar to many readers from Plato's *Symposium*. Like Pericles, Alcibiades was not shy about claiming to be exceptional; but only in his early 30s, he was brasher by far.

> "It is quite natural for my fellow citizens to envy me for the magnificence with which I have done things in Athens. Such as providing choruses and so on, yet to the outside world this also is evidence of our

strength… Indeed, this is a very useful kind of folly, when a man spends his own money not only to benefit himself but his city as well… people like this—all, in fact, whose brilliance in any direction has made them prominent—are unpopular in their lifetimes, especially with their equals and with others with whom they come in contact; but with posterity you will find people claiming relationship with them, even when none exists. And you will find their countries boasting of them not as though they were strangers or disreputable, but as fellow countrymen and doers of great deeds. This is what I aim at myself, and because of this my private life comes in for criticism; but the point is whether you have anyone who deals with public affairs better than I do."

(419-20; VI.3-4 and 6)

His peroration ends so:

"Do not be put off by Nicias's arguments for non-intervention and his distinctions between the young and old… make it your endeavor to raise this city to even greater heights, realizing that neither youth nor age can do anything without the other, but that the greatest strength is developed when one has a combination where all sorts are represented—the inferior types, the ordinary types, and the profoundly calculating types, all together… my view is that a city which is active by nature will soon ruin itself if it changes its nature and becomes idle, and that the way that men find their greatest security is in accepting the character and the institutions which they actually have, even if they are not perfect, and in living as nearly as possible in accordance with them."

(422; VI.18.6-7)

He won his points. Nicias could only enlarge, not prevent the hubristic expedition. The cynicism of Alcibiades' flattering exhortations became striking afterward. Under threat of capital prosecution by personal and political enemies, Alcibiades defected to Sparta and disclosed his contempt for Athenian democracy (467; VI.89.5-6). Yet at home he had been a popular personality, irresistible in a smart rhetoric that was graced by stunning physical handsome-

ness and a charming speech defect that comic actors loved to mimic: that kind of naughty celebrity who enrages many but delights many *more*. He led Athens cheerfully, hopefully, to catastrophe.

Appendix

A complex political-legal crisis presents a fourth and final case that we know from Thucydides' continuator, Plato's contemporary Xenophon. In the aftermath of a major naval victory at Arginusae off the coast of Lesbos in 406 BCE the *Ekklēsia* with its agenda-setting *Boulē* (Council) voted to suspend the city-state's laws and constitutional principles of judicial procedure at the instance of demagogues who were pursuing their own agenda—which, in the case of two ship captains, was to divert blame for their own failure to save Athenian sailors from stormy seas or at least to return their bodies for funeral rites. Space permits only this outline, derived from Xenophon's *Hellanica* I.6, that lists votes of the volatile sovereign Assembly:

1 To bypass the constituted courts and try, illegally *en bloc* before the *Ekklēsia*, eight generals (two *in absentia*, six under arrest in Athens) for failing to save the drowning and to recover bodies of the drowned

2 To conduct an illegal/unconstitutional collective trial in a single day, when the accused were not permitted the customary lengthy defense speeches—adjourning, however, without a verdict when night fell

3 After a holiday break (and much sensational agitation) to entertain new motions on resumption of the trial

4 To resume the collective trial in the *Ekklēsia* toward a collective verdict

5 To accept an amendment that added two defendants (whom Xenophon regarded as alone truly guilty) and called for the legally prescribed individual trials of all ten

6 To reject *that* amendment, however—as unconstitutional!

7 To render a verdict of guilty, with capital penalty: hemlock for the six and confiscation of the property of all eight

8 But not long after: To invite prosecution of the demagogues "who deceived the people" into all of those now duly regretted illegalities

9 To arrest and imprison five alleged culprits who, however, escaped and fled during a brief spell of open uncivil violence (*stasis*) fomented by their adherents, now only a faction of the citizen body

Conclusion

Direct rule by all classes of citizens in Assembly repeatedly showed how any statesman less majestic (and other) than a Pericles could not control them; and even he on occasion could not do so completely. Their inconsistency in policy-setting was notorious, as was their at best sporadic adherence to unwritten yet well-established customs and principles (*nomoi*, collectively "the law") and to written legislation (*psēphismata*, "statutes"), not to mention abstract *dike*, "justice." Politicians, called *rhētores* ("orators"), sometimes appealed to emotions, other times to 'rational choice' by all or to special interest of a segment of the nation, even, ostentatiously, to legality and justice. They strove to be guides—or "drivers"—of the *dēmos, 'dēmagōgoi'* indeed. Sometimes one suspects that Cleon had it right when he said that practiced speakers—though not himself!—used showy devices that would win points from an audience who seemed to enjoy forensics as just another kind of contest, like dramatic and athletic competitions that entertained them on days when the courts and the *Ekklēsia* did not sit. Today's political campaigning, at least in the US, seems to be an ignoble descendant of this embarrassing syndrome.

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Endnotes

1. All quotations as translated by Rex Warner, Thucydides: History of the Peloponnesian War (London et alibi: Penguin Books, 1972). Bibliography on Thucydides himself, on the war, on the city-state Athens and her democracy, on Pericles and other Athenian politicians named in this essay is vast—and polyglot. Edith Foster, *Thucydides, Pericles, and Periclean Imperialism* and Martha C. Taylor, *Thucydides, Pericles, and the Idea of Athens in the Peloponnesian War* (both: Cambridge University Press 2010) are recommended recent compendia, with bibliography. See now also Antonis Tsamakis and Melina Tamiolaki, eds., *Thucydides Between History and Literature* (Berlin 2013).
2. See Antonis Tsamakis and Yannis Kostopoulos, "Cleon's Imposition on His Audience," in *Thucydides—A Violent Teacher?* (Göttingen 2011), 172-183.

The Ancient Idea of Direct Democracy

Maria Marczewska-Rytko

Abstract

The main goal of the paper is to verify the thesis: the ancient idea of democracy and attempts to realize it were defined first of all by dynamic changes in the institution of citizenship and mutual relationships between the Popular Assembly and the Areopag, as a result of which the Areopag lost its prerogatives for the Assembly. The dynamics of changes was the outcome of an increase in or loss of importance of various interest groups in the Athenian polis. Between 750 and 500 BC such a government system of the city-state (polis) developed, in which citizens were a community constituting the state organism.

Keywords

Direct Democracy, Citizenship, Polis, Pericles, The Areopag, The Popular Assembly.

In Thucydides' work Pericles characterizes the democratic system of the Athenian *polis* in the following words: **"**Our administration favors the many instead of the few: this is why it is called a democracy. The laws afford equal justice to all alike in their private disputes, but we do not ignore the claims of excellence. When a citizen distinguishes himself, then he will be called to serve the state, in preference to others, not as a matter of privilege, but as a reward of merit; and poverty is no bar […]".[1]

The abovementioned characterization shows democracy as a political system of opportunities open to each citizen. The formula of the city-state (*polis*) is a natural field of citizens' activities because political life is treated as a realization of one's personality. The system of values combines such qualities as virtue, justice and happiness.[2] Pericles names three principles constituting the special model of democracy in the Athenian *polis*: freedom, equality, and the majority rule.

The main goal of the paper is to verify the thesis: the ancient idea of democracy and attempts to realize it were defined first of all by dynamic changes in the institution of citizenship and mutual relationships between the Popular

Assembly and the Areopag, as a result of which the Areopag lost its prerogatives for the Assembly. The dynamics of changes was the outcome of an increase in or loss of importance of various interest groups in the Athenian *polis*. Between 750 and 500 BC such a government system of the city-state (*polis*) developed, in which citizens were a community constituting the state organism.

Citizenship

Initially, citizenship was acquired by a person born from an Athenian citizen, after coming-of-age.[3] A child at the age of three was registered in special records, so-called *phratry*, and when he turned eighteen, in the family records after verification whether he was of Athenian descent. The admission ceremony was a religious event. Citizenship passed from father to son. Before Pericles' reform, i.e. before 451 BC, citizenship was granted to the child born from an Athenian father and a foreign mother, whereas in the opposite case the child was treated as a foreigner. After 451 BC Athenian citizenship was conferred only on persons whose both parents were Athenians. Citizens were only men whose fathers had Athenian citizenship and mothers were daughters of citizens.[4] Citizenship was determined by the right descent and entry in the records. Aristotle writes that political rights are vested in those whose both parents are citizens, they are entered on the list of members of a *deme* (as *demoi*), when they turn eighteen.[5] When they report to be registered, the sworn *deme* members decide by vote whether candidates are of the age required by law; if they are not, they are reassigned to the ranks of minors; then the *deme* members verify whether the candidate is free and of lawful descent; if they decide that he is not free he can appeal to the court, and the *deme* members choose five prosecutors from among them.[6] If it turns out that the candidate unlawfully requests registration (on the citizens' list), the state sells him into bondage; if he wins his case, the *deme* representatives have to enter him on the list.[7] Then those registered are examined by the council and, should someone turn out to be under eighteen, they fine the *deme* members who registered him.[8] It should be also borne in mind that women did not participate in political life.

It should also be emphasized that in 457/456 BC *zeugitae* (representatives of the third kind of property class according to Solon's census division) were granted the right to hold the archonship. In this way the majority of Athenian

citizens obtained the right to be elected. They could thus be elected to hold most offices without meeting preliminary conditions. The property criteria were maintained only for the highest offices (particularly those that required financial liability, property being a security against misappropriation of funds).

What is also significant is that special salaries were introduced to pay for participation in the management of the affairs of state (*misthophoria*). These comprised stipends for judges and the pay for sailors, cavalrymen and hoplites in active service. Initially, participation in the Popular Assembly, which was the citizen's duty and took little time, was not paid for. With time, however, the right to remuneration was extended to apply to members of the Council of Five Hundred, officials, and citizens participating in the Popular Assembly. The most honorable functions in the military were not remunerated. Therefore they were held by the higher strata of the society. From 454 to 440 BC the number of those obtaining some kind of state remuneration was approximately twenty thousand.[9] In this way the exercise of state functions became a profession.

Pericles understood that citizens had to be interested in maintaining the democratic system and in participating in it. He emphasized in his speech that "To admit one's poverty is no disgrace with us; but we consider it disgraceful not to make an effort to avoid it. An Athenian citizen does not neglect public affairs when attending to his private business. [and those who are concerned only with their trade also know politics] We consider a man who takes no interest in the state not as harmless, but as useless".[10] In its assumptions ancient democracy was a system of all citizens participating in the affairs of state. All indifference in this area was viewed with a highly critical attitude. The political participation of Athenian citizens manifested itself not only in their presence in the Popular Assembly sessions. There were also assemblies at the level of phratries, phyles, and demes. In practice, each citizen was involved in the activities of the polis.

Institutions

The highest body of authority in the Athenian *polis* was the Popular Assembly (*ekklesia*), which held real power.[11] It was the only source of the legislative, executive and judiciary branches of it. It was a sovereign body in deciding all maters prepared by the Council of Five Hundred. The Council was subordi-

nated to the Assembly. Officials were elected and supervised by the Assembly composed of all *polis* citizens. We should however remember about the changes introduced by Pericles in this respect. Sessions could start with six thousand citizens present and they were probably summoned forty times a year. Current affairs were first of all decided: election and supervision of officials, financial matters, problems of supplying food to the city, organization of religious holidays, questions concerning private persons, and ostracism cases.

The underlying principles of the Assembly's functioning were freedom (*eleutheria*), equality before the law (*isonomia*), and the right to speak (*isegoria*).[12] Freedom meant the possibility of living and acting according to one's liking and free choices within the law. It was the opposite of slavery and autocracy. All citizens were equal before the law, equal in respect of making and implementing it. In practice, the principle of citizens' full participation in the exercise of power was the striven-for ideal. At least in theory, citizens could hope to hold various offices in the *polis* and to be subordinated to the laws they themselves made and could amend.

In practice it was not easy to advance one's arguments and convince six thousand people to accept them. Only very few were able to convince most of the Assembly members into supporting them. Consequently, the importance of knowing the rules of rhetoric and eristic increased. That is why techniques of effectively convincing others were commonly invested in. John Kenyon Davies observes that the results of this effort can be seen in speeches.[13] They all show how the power of the spoken word was used, thereby telling us much more, and more explicitly about the Athenian society than the works of historians or inscriptions could, because in order to be convincing, speakers had to appeal to the attitudes, values and prejudices of the audience.[14]

The Council of Five Hundred organized and supervised the life of the Athenian *polis*. It prepared the agenda of the Assembly's sessions. Aristotle describes what the order of the day looked like: "at the first (main) assembly (during each prytaneia) voting had to be held on the work of the officials, whether they exercised their functions well in the opinion of the people; then the issue of grain supplies had to be discussed; if someone also wanted to lodge a complaint of high treason, they had to do it on that day. On the same day the lists of confiscated property had to be read out as well as claims for inheritance had to be announced […]. During the sixth prytaneia, voting by raised hand was

ordered on ostracism, whether the procedure should be performed or not, and on taking legal action against informers (then called sycophants (MM-R's note) both by the Athenians and by the Metoikoi […]. Finally, voting was ordered on failures to keep the promise given to the people. The second assembly dealt with petitions. Each citizen had the right to put an olive branch as a symbol of petition on the altar, to present his case to the assembly, whether private or concerning public matters. The remaining two assembles were devoted to other matters: the law required that the assemblies deal with three religious matters, three reserved for heralds and deputies, and three lay ones.[15] Members of the Council of Five Hundred were chosen by a draw. There were ten commissions which exercised their functions for a definite part of the year. As Stanisław Filipowicz emphasizes, drawing was regarded as the fundamental rule of democracy because everyone was equal owing to the use of this method of choice.[16] In contrast, elections were regarded as an aristocratic principle because it required comparison of individual candidates.

Pericles' Role

The government system of the Athenian *polis* allowed statesmen to consolidate their advantage and gain power over the people. The way of electing to the key office of strategos changed in Pericles' time. Each of the ten strategoi had previously been elected by individual phyles, which acted jointly. In recognition of Pericles' merits the people waived this principle and one strategos was elected by all the citizens. Consequently, for fifteen years Pericles was in practice the first citizen.

Thucydides assesses Pericles's role in the following words: "For as long as he was in authority in the city in time of peace, he governed the same with moderation and was a faithful watchman of it; and in his time it was at the greatest. And after the war was on foot, it is manifest that he therein also foresaw what it could do. He lived after the war began two years and six months. And his foresight in the war was best known after his death. […] The reason whereof was this: that being a man of great power both for his dignity and wisdom, and for bribes manifestly the most incorrupt, he freely controlled the multitude and was not so much led by them as he led them. Because, having gotten his power by no evil arts, he would not humor them in his speeches but out of his authority durst anger them with contradiction. Therefore, whensoever he saw them out of season insolently

bold, he would with his orations put them into a fear; and again, when they were afraid without reason, he would likewise erect their spirits and embolden them".[17]

Pericles' position in the system of ancient democracy was also pointed out by Plutarch: "Now there had been from the beginning [among the Athenian people, MM-R's note] a sort of seam hidden beneath the surface of affairs, as in a piece of iron, which faintly indicated a divergence between the popular and the aristocratic programme; but the emulous ambition of these two men [Thucydides and Pericles, MM-R's note] cut a deep gash in the state, and caused one section of it to be called the "Demos," or the *People*, and the other the "Oligoi," or the *Few*. At this time, therefore, particularly, Pericles gave the reins to the people, and made his policy one of pleasing them, ever devising some sort of a pageant in the town for the masses, or a feast, or a procession, 'amusing them like children with not uncouth delights,' and sending out sixty triremes annually, on which large numbers of the citizens sailed about for eight months under pay, practicing at the same time and acquiring the art of seamanship".[18] This problem is perceived in a different way by Josiah Ober, who emphasizes in the introductory chapter that despite domination by individuals in certain periods, power in the Athenian *polis* essentially lay in the hands of demos.[19]

Pericles had an unquestionably great authority, thus making the citizens of the Athenian *polis* obey him even in matters that were not very popular. His successors did not have such authority and in order to maintain their position they resorted to all means to win favor with the people. Furthermore, the Peloponnesian War changed all domains of life (431-404 BC). The Athenian *polis* of Pericles' time could no longer function unchanged because it was based on the absolute subordination of its citizens' interest to the interest of the state. As Pierre Lévêque observes, the causes of the fall of the Athenian *polis* in 404 BC should be sought in the Athenians' inability to choose the middle course between striving for power, which required the people's dedication to the common cause, and development ambitions of individual citizens.[20] Aristotle's opinion seems to be pertinent in this context: "So long, however, as Pericles was leader of the people, things went tolerably well with the state; but when he was dead there was a great change for the worse.[...] After the death of Pericles [...] Cleon son of Cleaenetus [appeared as the leader, MM-R] of the people. The latter [Cleon] seems, more than any one else, to have been the cause of the corruption of the democracy by his wild undertakings; and he was the first to use unseemly shouting and coarse

abuse on the Bema, and to harangue the people with his cloak girt up short about him, whereas all his predecessors had spoken decently and in order. [...] It was Cleophon who first granted the two obol donation for the people [...] but then Callicrates of Paeania ousted him by promising to add a third obol to the sum. Both of these persons were subsequently condemned to death; for the people, even if they are deceived for a time, in the end generally come to detest those who have beguiled them into any unworthy action. After Cleophon the popular leadership was occupied successively by the men who chose to talk the biggest and pander the most to the tastes of the majority, with their eyes fixed only on the interests of the moment".[21]

Concluding Remarks

When discussing Thucydides' attitude towards the idea of direct democracy, it should be emphasized that scholars differ on this question. Some of them, adopting his life as the starting point, regard him as the opponent of the model of ancient democracy. Others believe, on the basis of his works, that he supported the idea of democracy at the time of Pericles' rule. We may also guess that he espoused the system in which an individual of high authority was at the head of society, as was the case with Pericles.[22] In general, Greek philosophers and historians had a rather negative view of ancient democracy. Isocrates recommended a return to Solomon's solutions and supported monarchy as a form of government.[23] Xenophon sought his ideal in the former aristocratic *Lycurgan* constitution of Sparta.[24]

Plato's criticism of democracy was leveled at what this great philosopher regarded as the decline of Athens, the defeat in the war with Sparta, and the collapse of morals and leadership.[25] Similar criticism of democracy can be found in Aristotle's writings. In his arguments democracy is a form of government concerned only with the interest of the poor.[26] Generally, Aristotle supported the influence of society on the exercise of government, including the process of law-making.

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SECTION II
Economics, Politics, Law

THE REDISCOVERY OF EUROPE

Chair
—
Dietmar Meyer

Participants
—
Balázs Hámori & Katalin Szabó
Ágnes Haragh
Zoltán Banhidi
Boglárka Hevér
Dietmar Meyer

Presentation

Dietman Meyer

No doubt, over centuries Europe was the center of the World! Over a long period of time European universities have attracted students from almost every country, European institutions were leading in several fields of research, the wealth accumulated by European empires has exceeded those of the most other countries, political and economic culture spread from Europe to other continents, and last but not least. But, however, one of the lessons the Old Continent had to learn in the 20th century is that numerous centers moved away. With the introduction of the so-called Bologna-system most of the European universities and colleges have adopted the Anglo-Saxon educational system, an increasing number of European academics continue their education in the USA – both signs, that the European educational system has lost its leading role. Research centers are located more and more in Northern America or Asia, and as a consequence, these regions are the most innovatives. Considering either the GDP data, or the wealth produced in different parts of the world, it will become immediately clear that Europe is not in the leading position.

To understand the role Europe plays today in the World, requires to understand the spatial element and the institutional condition for economic activities within Europe as well as all over the world. This spatial approach has characterized the presentations in the Session "The Rediscovery of Europe".

In the first presentation Katalin Szabó és Balázs Hámori have analyzed the innovation processes in Europe and compared them with similar activities on other continents. As a result they emphasizes the important role of cooperation, cooperation between institutions of higher education and firms, between firm, etc. This is a possibility to accelerate the "innovation by innovation" process which became more and more characteristic for successfully developing regions.

Ágnes Haragh presented a paper about the price dispersions. It well-known that prices of the same commodities differ, i. e., one has to pay

different prices at different places. If there are separated countries, the exchange rate is a elements in pricing causing price disparities. But what about the European integration where the traditional political and economic borders have been removed? How can regionally different prices be interpreted?

Zoltán Bánhidi has started his presentation with the Lisboa Strategy where information and communication technologies have been considered as important means for an increasing competitiveness of Europe, and therefore for economic and social development on the 'Old Continent'. His analysis has focused mainly to the necessary institutional condition for broad-band networks, especially institutions to be established by the governments.

Boglárka Hevér started with a traditional microeconomic model describing the competition for production factors usually applied under the conditions of free competition. Because of the latter market structure there is equilibrium on all factor markets. But, Boglárka Hevér argued, what will happen if observable conditions of the labor market or a demand-driven production will be taken into account. She could show that extending the traditional microeconomic model with the mentioned conditions, the evolution of unemployment or of free capacities of capital is a much more complex feature, i. e., the international flow of labor will not change necessarily the amount of unemployment, may be only the structure of unemployment will be another one.

Dietmar Meyer has analyzed the often discussed question whether the joint European currency, the Euro, will unify or divide Europe. The problem itself is very complex. From some points of view the introduction of the Euro seems to have accelerated splitting processes in Europe. But, however, the joint currency does only more express the differences between the economic performances of different countries. Consequently, not the Euro is the reason for a dividing Europe; the Euro itself may be a mean to support the integration processes; the main reason is the level of development of the real sectors of the different economies.

It should be remarked that all presentations have been followed by intensive discussions, the contributions were useful for the authors to finalize their papers.

New Trends in Innovation
Lessons for Europe

Balázs Hámori & Katalin Szabó

Abstract

While EU countries have an outstanding role in creating scientific output, they are unable to convert their scientific capacities into wealth-generating innovations. The Lisbon Strategy aimed at eliminating this obstacle, was not really successful. Even the EU-authorities consider the first decade of the 21th century to be a "lost decade" for innovation. It is especially aggravating in an era, when innovation has become the only crucial factor of long-term competitiveness for companies and countries too. The innovation process itself has also gone through dramatic changes. The authors attempt to analyse "innovation of innovation", in other words the radical renewal of the phenomenon. The paper focuses on two new innovation forms: crowdsourcing and reverse innovation. Besides describing these phenomena, the authors analyse: Whether crowdsourcing and reverse innovation poped up by chance at about the same time, or they are strongly interconnected and having common roots. Their hypothesis is: the ongoing "Great Transformation" of the economic system – from industrial capitalism to information economy – stands behind both. Both crowdsourcing and reverse innovations are special kind of „democratizing the innovation process". The big advantage of them is the channelling of ideas from remote areas, combining achievements from different fields. The European countries and the EU, if they want to catch up with the frontline players of innovation, should take seriously the above new types of innovation and to exploit the opportunity offered by this twin trend of innovation.

Keywords

Information Economy, Networking, Reverse Innovation, Crowdsourcing, Lisbon Strategy.

Introduction

At the dawn of the 21st century we are experiencing dramatic changes in the innovation process. The frequency of innovations, the appearance of new innovation patterns, the appreciation of the importance of innovation – in other words "the innovation of innovation" – have been analyzed by many from many aspects in the international literature. There is also an extensive literature on why the EU and within it the most developed countries lag in the global innovation competition, and why did the continent got stuck in the so called European paradox. The essence of the later one – as it is well-known – is „.that EU countries play a leading global role in terms of top-level scientific output,

but lag behind in the ability of converting this strength into wealth-generating innovations"[1]. However, it is much rarer to see papers that are not only analyzing the reasons behind the European innovation crisis in general, but also in the light of the new innovation forms and trends. Also, rare to see studies that does not simply analyze some aspects of the later ones – namely the "innovation of innovation" – by themselves, but also examine them in their interrelatedness. In our study we will analyze these two problems, namely: the interrelatedness of new innovation trends and their common roots in the context of the European paradox.

The European Paradox

The Lisbon Strategy (2000) aimed to make the EU "the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world."[2] This effort was not really successful. The European innovation gap has been attributed to countless factors in the literature.[3] The world of universities and the academia is closed; the university systems in most European countries prevent professionals coming from the industrial or business spheres to take hold of teaching positions in universities or research positions in academic research institutes. On the other hand, also from the business side the willingness to cooperate with the academic world is weak and the interest towards academic developments is strongly limited as well. While 50-60 years ago there was frontier research carried out in the laboratories of the European corporations as well, today we can hardly find even an example for that. There exists a two-sided information asymmetry: hence the European firms mostly do not even have insight about the research offering long-run innovation opportunities. But neither the inhabitants of the ivory towers, the university professors perceive properly the needs of the industry. But even if they would perceive it, they would not have the competency to market and profit from their scientific results. In the European training of scientists such preparation is weak or completely absent.

But not only the main actors of the innovation process are separated from each other by walls, but there are artificial barriers raised in financing as well within the innovation system. Separate funds are used for basic research under which commercial exploitation is prohibited, claiming that this should be financed by the business sector. Firms, however, only finance "ready to cook"

results, because in the short run this is their interest. They do not finance basic research even when later they could extract significant profit from them. The scientific market is a particular case of the lemon market, as it is difficult judge the value of a used car, it is also difficult to value new scientific outputs. Thus, because firms as a result of their motivations do not recognize, or do not fund properly profit enticing scientific research, those are forced out of the market or they do not even enter the market. The difficulties are enhanced by the fragmentation of European scientific research, the weak cooperation between the research institutes of the various countries as well as between the institutes within the countries, the roots of which can be at least partially traced back to the differences in their institutional backgrounds and academic traditions. Also, patent law is a problem, or more precisely the diversity of patent law related institutions within the EU. All of these factors jointly lead to that the European paradox does not appear to be easing – despite the numerous EU programs and efforts aimed at dissolving it. What's more, there appears a not at all desirable version of the dissolution of the paradox: instead of business application catching up to the level of scientific efficiency, exactly the opposite is happening, when the level of scientific efficiency is decreasing, as it is pointed out by article of Herrenz and Castillo.[4]

If we are searching for the common roots of the aforementioned reasons behind the European paradox, and we wish to narrow it down to one single expression, then we could point to the lack of openness. Researchers are similarly not open or not open enough towards the business world just as the business world is not open towards the academia. The state institutions are not open and flexible enough either, whether we are talking about patent regulations or funding of university research. But the member states are not open enough towards the EU either, as they only reluctantly carry out the tasks arising from European initiatives, even though openness and the willingness to cooperate should receive the utmost importance in light of the newest global innovation trends and forms, out of which we only discuss two here: crowdsourcing and reverse innovation.

Crowdsourcing

Networks, especially those version that form on the Internet, are the most striking features of innovation processes in the last decades. Knowledge is a network phenomenon, thus it is hardly a surprise that the *bulk of innovations are born in networks*, or at least networks play a significant role in their births. One of the most exciting new types of network innovations is the so called: *crowdsourcing.* This new term was introduced by *Jeff Howe* in an article published in Wired magazine in 2006. "*Simply defined, crowdsourcing represents the act of a company or institution taking a function once performed by employees and outsourcing it to an undefined (and generally large) network of people in the form of an open call.*"[5]

This type of innovation is used for solving a variety of problems: not only in the case of innovations, but often also in the case of ordinary tasks. Since in all cases there is a problem to be solved, this also presupposes a certain degree of creativity on the side of the problem solvers. Firms or organizations often select the right answers by a formal contest among the problem-solvers, but it is not rare that the focal actors combine the different solutions, offered by the best problem solvers, and the insiders work further on the final solutions. It turns out that the organization chooses among the problem solving variations by the votes of the potential users. That is a "double crowdsourcing", because the firms outsource the problem itself to the crowd and at the same time, they outsource the selection among the solutions too. It is especially frequent in the case of design variations, where the opinions of potential buyers, "the voices of the crowd" are very important for the firms.

The opening up of the innovation process, the involvement of external actors has steadily grown into crowdsourcing. Initially, the innovation implementing organization could at best only build on the intellectual capacity of its closest partners, in other words it was comparable to costal fishing. On the contrary, crowdsourcing is a more advanced form of open innovation, "sailing to open waters" with all of its advantages and risks. We could define the crowdsourcing itself as an impressive organizational innovation. Of course, by the term crowd we do not mean everyday people of the street, but the professionals and the practitioners, even though at times there are tasks advertised for the general public as well

Crowdsourcing has two basic forms:

— The task allocating organization itself, the so called focal agent, creates a platform, where it publishes the task for the potential problem solvers.

— In the case of the other form, brokers bring together the partners under several topics in a specially created platform, i.e. in an open innovation marketplace

An often cited case of the first version, is the case of Threadless, a T-shirt company based on an online community of designers.

The concept of Threadless is simple. Anyone can submit a design idea that gets ranked by members of the crowd. If the design gets enough votes, it makes it into the store and the designer gets a big payout – $2000 in fact. In addition to the cash, the winning designer gets a $500 gift certificate or Threadless merchandise. For each subsequent printing, rewards the designer with another $500 in cash.[6] Threadless.com has a community of 700,000 (!) users, who contribute to t-shirt designs.

We illustrate the second types of crowdsourcing based on the independent intermediary platforms with the example of NineSigma, one of the numerous similar institutions:

Current standard of care for the repair of fractured or reconstructed bones utilizes plates or screws for internal fixation, methods that are difficult and time consuming. A Global Medical Device Company was searching for novel technologies that would provide rigid internal fixation without the need for screws. The Company had approached medical industry and surgical organizations, but had not looked outside of the industry to find solutions. It turned to the intermediary platform, NineSigma and collaborated with it to define criteria for the desired technology. NineSigma reached out across its network for potential solution providers. Solution proposals were received from all over the world and included diverse approaches based on polymer physics, nanotechnology, bone cements and fillers, natural adhesives, biomaterials, semiconductors and more. NineSigma expanded the Client's access to global innovators, *beyond the medical industry*, by reaching broadly into the NineSigma network of solution providers. The Client identified a number of approaches, including novel solutions from gecko and marine adhesive pioneers, for follow-up testing. (*NineSigma*, 2012)[7]

Crowdsourcing by no means is a panacea, which could solve for all innovational dilemmas. In order to have a problem solved by external experts, the task must be well-defined. Difficulties can arise due to the complexity of the task, and it is possible that a complex task cannot be clearly divided into sub-tasks. If one part of the solution of this problem can affect other parts of the solution, or if the problem itself is systemic, then crowdsourcing is obviously not an option. The knowledge of the solution providers can also raise barriers to the application of crowdsourcing. Misunderstandings can happen, if the knowledge of the focal agent (who articulates the problem) and the solution provider is too far removed from each other.

ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
Large number of inventor gives a greater chance of eliminating errors.	Actually there is no crowd in crowdsourcing. It needs virtuosos, usually uniquely talented, highly trained people.
Spatially and professionally distant experiences can help to achieve a really good innovation result.	It is criticized that this method kills individual creativity, and degrades the work of the creators.
Combining the different solutions it leads to a greater efficiency of innovation process	Numerous problems arise the aggregation of various solutions and opinions.
Lower cost due the free or cheap contribution of problem solver	It is hard to exclude or punish malicious users and contributors
Crowdsourcing gives the possibility for externalizing the risk of the very risky R&D processes.	Crowdsourcing systems often use the help of machines to assist crowdsourcing. It causes numerous technical problems related to this.
It speeds up the innovation process.	The jointly produced solutions in effect develop "without legal rights" or in the "shadows of legality".

Table 1. Advantages and disadvantages in crowdsourcing.

Even though this process is not smooth, and it also raises numerous concerns, still almost all analysts agree that the future of innovation is in the networking solutions.

Reverse Innovation

The decentralized development and the emergence of new actors have brought to life a new type of innovation, the so called reverse innovation. The term itself was introduced by *Vyjain Govidarajan* in 2008. According to the definition: "A reverse innovation is any innovation that is adopted first in the developing world. Surprisingly often, these innovations defy gravity and flow uphill to the rich world."[8] In 2010 The Economist dedicated a special issue to innovation in emerging markets. The descriptive subtitle was 'The world turned upside down', indicating that the *poor countries are becoming more and more rivals to the rich countries in terms of innovation* (*The Economist*, 2010. – Italics by us: B. H. – K. Sz.)[9] Nothing shows better the recognition of the innovative capacities than the dynamic growth of the joint innovations with the most advanced group of countries. The role of innovation is also changing in the global economy: besides satisfying the demands of the high income strata of the developed countries, which was *almost the sole goal of innovation* before, *solving the serious social problems* of underdeveloped world becomes also important. As a result of this, the *low-cost, easy to use types of simple solutions* come to the fore. Let us see some typical cases of this.

Since the 1980s, GE had been trying to sell its expensive ultrasound scanners, with little success. The scanners were competitive just at the very top of the market in China, but 90 percent of hospitals couldn't afford them. In response, the company decided to create an independent team in China to develop a scanner just for the domestic market. The team came up with a $15,000 *handheld scanner* – just 15 percent of the cost of the company's previous low-end ultrasound. Performance was not as good, but that was outweighed by the portability, ease of use, and low price in a market of low-tech, low-budget rural hospitals. Today GE sells the portable scanners in the U.S. and other developed countries for use in ambulances and operating rooms – where a market never previously existed because traditional scanners were too big.[10]

But innovations from developing countries do not only surface increasingly in the world of products, but also in the world of services, so in the case of perhaps the most sophisticated service of all, in the case of financial services as well. We have all heard about *Muhhamed Yunus* and about the *Grameen Bank* the "bank for the poor", for which the founder received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006.

Throughout the world there are already 40 banks following the microfinancing Grameen model, from Bolivia (Banco Solidario in Bolivia) through Nigeria to the Philippines. But what is really interesting from our perspective is that based on the Grameen model there have been many similar institutions organized *in the most developed countries*. They have realized Yunus' idea in Chicago as well[11], and on May 17th, 2010 they held the opening ceremony of Grameen America's Manhattan in the heart of New York. „The poverty level in the US continues to climb, and Europe suffers from an ongoing recession. As we search for avenues out of the economic crisis, the innovations of social enterprises like Samasource[12], Kiva[13] and *Grameen* and their experiences of developing world poverty could help us fix what's broken in our own backyard." [14] These few examples above show that reverse innovation gains ground on the Globe. In some cases, American or Western European-based transnational companies establish local research centers in developing countries,[15] in order to rely on the local intellectual resources, on embeddednes and on local knowledge in the innovation process.

The Common Features of the New Type of Innovations

We can also see from the above cases that reverse innovation has numerous common features with crowdsourcing. This may indicate that a new paradigm of innovation unfolds before our eyes, and these types of innovations are only partial manifestations of it. The next table shows these in comparison to the traditional innovation mode.

The Characteristics of Innovation	Traditional Model	Crowdsourcing / Reverse Innovation
The Main Agents	Vertically Integrated Corporations	Innovation Networks: Increasing Importance of Marginal Agents
The Typical Place of Birth of Inventions	"Closed" Research Labs	Internet (Open Innovation) Importance of Marginal Agents
The Geographic Structure of Inventions	Highly concentrated in the world's economic centers	Decentralized, spreads to the less developed countriesimportance of marginal agents.
The Main Driving Forces of Innovation of Inventions	Profit	Social goals and human motivations of innovators also gain larger weight (glory, self-realization, etc.)

Table 2. The new type of innovations comparing to the traditional innovation model of industrial capitalism

Conclusions

Whatever element of the new innovation pattern we highlight, we sense radical changes, which reflect the radical changes in the economic system.

One of the fundamental features of the recent Great Transformation of the market economy is the dematerialization/virtualization of goods. Not surprisingly, nowadays innovation is primarily aimed at services and so called Experience goods, and less at the creation of new material products and production technologies.

As a consequence of ICT revolution closed, vertically integrated corporations open up, and *transform into global networks*. The decentralization of companies is logically followed by the *decentralization of innovations*. Crowdsourcing and reverse innovation are only specific forms of this "democratization" besides other forms.

We also can sense fundamental changes in the relationship between the main market actors: the buyers and the sellers. Costumers within days can form large groups of millions at very low costs; their *overall* vulnerability is already a thing of the past The consumer friendliness of innovations, the shifting of the goals of innovation to taking into account in a much stronger manner the perspectives of the users, which is characteristic of both crowdsourcing and reverse innovation, suggests that today the market game has to be played by different rules.

The European countries could shave off a lot from its lag in innovation, if the economic actors: the companies and the economic governance would pay attention to the latest developments of innovation. In its innovation policy the EU should make greater stress on that innovation types, which are in line with the ICT revolution and the most dynamic element of innovation system: the crowdsourcing and reverse innovation.

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Distance-dependent Price Dispersion

Ágnes Haragh

Abstract

The phenomenon of price dispersion appears in every part of the economic world such that the relevance of examine it could be instructive. Vanishing the borders between regions, countries and continents the importance of the distance increases. There are lots of theories exists about the price dispersion but there is a lack of theorems about the connection between location and price dispersion. I deal with this part of economy in my paper and try to show the significance of the increasing distance in the world.

Keywords

Price Dispersion, Distance, Transportation Costs, Geographical Distance.

Introduction

The phenomenon of price dispersion appears in every part of the economic world such that the relevance of examine it could be instructive. Vanishing the borders between regions, countries and continents the importance of the distance increases because of trading is getting easier and easier. Now I would like to connect the theorem of price dispersion and the existence of distance together. Firstly I write briefly about the phenomenon of price dispersion and present some of the results of empirical analysis regarding the distance. Afterward I would explain some theories how to put together price dispersion and spatiality.

The Theorem of Price Dispersion

The law of one price which is sourced from Jevons[1] does not valid in real life. By looking around in a real market we can notice that the same products are sold at several prices at different places even if it is a homogeneous good with numerous sellers. So "the law of one price is not a law at all", as Varian (1980)[2] wrote. Price dispersion is an explanation of what we experience on markets: the same products are sold at several prices. There are lots of empirical analysis exists about

it but not as much theoretical explanatory. From the theoretical part we could distinguish between authors who explain price dispersion with the specialty of monopolistic competition and who explain with search costs and asymmetric information. In the first group for example Hotelling (1929)[3] and Salop (1979)[4] describes a spatial monopolistic competition while prices could differ in only specific cases when the costs of producers differ as well. Contrarily in case of the existence of asymmetric information or search costs price dispersion could exists with the same production costs.

The basic models which describe price dispersion comes from Salop and Stiglitz (1977)[5], Varian (1980) and Burdett and Judd (1983)[6].

The model of Salop and Stiglitz (1977) explains the price dispersion with heterogeneous searching costs. They assume that two kinds of consumer exist on a market and they differ in their capabilities so in their search costs. The first type with low search cost could become an informed consumer with recognize all prices in the market such that he can purchase at the lowest available price. The other type of consumer with higher search costs called as an uninformed consumer. For him the expected benefits of search are less then the marginal cost of it, so the uninformed consumers purchase randomly. Next to their assumptions a two-price equilibrium could exists with a high monopoly price and with a low competitive price. In this case spatiality is included in the model but not consciously because the authors deal with zero transportation cost but from my viewpoint distance comes from the different locations of the sellers and due to that searching costs appear.

Varian (1980) develops Salop and Stiglitz's model (1977) with taking into account the "temporal" price dispersion. He distinguishes as well informed and uninformed consumers but besides the spatial dispersion which come from the different location and resulted search costs, consider the temporal price dispersion regarding to the stores pricing strategies. The advantage of the model is to deal with the experiences and the learning process. If consumers purchase more then once, the uninformed ones get experience with randomly buy at different places and could choose the lowest price from them next time which breaks the two price equilibrium and search costs are disappeared. To remain it, uncertainty has to exist in the market. If stores use periodic sales, the price of the seller change over time and consumers could not get experiences from prices. With periodic sales uncertainty remains hence the search costs could not disappear.

Burdett and Judd (1983) differentiate ex ante and ex post heterogeneity. Ex ante heterogeneity determined in assumption for example different costs of production or at Salop-Stiglitz (1977) or Varian (1980) consumers have different search costs. The authors examine rational expectation equilibrium which allows using ex post heterogeneity but ex ante homogeneity in consumer information. Ex ante heterogeneity could lead to ex post. For example in the Salop-Stiglitz model (1977) the different search costs mean ex ante heterogeneity but when consumers purchase different amount of information it becomes ex post heterogeneous as well. They found dispersed prices in both case of noisy sequential and non-sequential search.

In these three basic model distance and spatiality has a very important role. The stores are not located at the same place this is why searching costs appears in these models and because of these costs price dispersion could appears. But this distance between shops and consumers is only relatively exists because costs of information is not equal with transportation costs in these models where authors deal with zero transportation costs.

Add Distance to the Analysis

To define distance is difficult at all. What is distance? It could mean a lot. I would examine distances under three different aspects in the followings. Distance could exist between the place of production and the place of sale. Then the models modified by the transportation costs. The second is when we deal with geographical distance between cities, towns which could modify a whole model. Another aspect of distance is between markets. A market could be a country, a county, a region etc.

Firstly I would talk about the transportation costs. In these cases we could go back to Hotelling's (1929) linear city model and Salop's (1979) circle model as well. In these models costumers have transportation costs and only when sellers face different costs they sell their products at different prices. But this is no longer price dispersion because of the cost-heterogeneity.

Kano, Kano and Takechi (2010)[7] use wholesale and retail prices of Japanese agricultural products to examine the relationship between distance and transportation costs. They analyze the connection between prices and costs and the scale of price dispersion with elasticity (for example elasticity of price

differential with respect to distance). The analysis is based on the difference in prices between the region of the place of production and the region of consumptions. They study price dispersion from the seller and cost side instead of the consumer side. Such that the reason of price dispersion is not the searching costs but the transportation costs which appears because they should provide to pass products to the retail units. They discovered a positive correlation between the distance and the prices due to the fact that with the increasing distance the transportation costs increase as well which results price differentiation.

So in the case of the study of Kano, Kano and Takechi (2010), we can explain the difference in prices with monopolistic competition. Also Anderson et al. (2010)[8] examine distance related trade-costs. They use economic geography and location-pair-specific price dispersion measures and found that if they take into account spatially of prices the elasticity of price dispersion with respect to distance grows form 0,03 to 0,23. This means that spatially of prices which they explain with price "mountains and valleys" with which distance should be weighted is significant for gets a significantly high result.

Secondly I would like to explain some empirical results about how distance between cities and suburbs affects price dispersion. Anania and Nisticó (2011)[9] examine price dispersion in 437 North Italian retail units in case of 14 homogeneous products. They analyze the price dispersion between retail shops and the relevance of promotional discount. Among others they examined the price dispersion between major cities and towns and it proved to be relevant regarding to the distance. The search is based on that theory that in major cities the retail shops located densely so consumers faced with lower search costs. And because of this the authors expect lower prices and lower degree of price dispersion in these places. They results are the followings:

— Only considering average prices, cities showed higher values than countryside in case of 11 products from the whole 14.

— If the products are considered together, the result of the OLS estimation showed that the average prices are expectedly and on average 1,2% higher in cities than in towns and rural areas.

— Taking into account the differences in between stores (eg. small shop or supermarket) the difference between average prices is wider: in central cities average prices are expectedly and on average 1,3% higher.

— The products testing one by one they observed higher prices in big cities in case of 11 products.

— They found that the price dispersion is lower in cities in case of 9 products from the 14.

Their result differs from their theory. Their explanation of this phenomenon is that with higher density of stores results lower search costs but in cities this not necessarily associated with lower prices through tougher competition.

From my point of view by modifying the model of Salop and Stiglitz (1977) with geographical distance we could find a special case when prices are higher in centers and big cities then in the suburban.

Stewart and Davis (2005)[10] get the same results. They examine 250 fast-food restaurants' dispersed prices in Washington D.C. They found that prices are higher in the city than in suburban and rural areas. In the econometric analysis they separate the city center, suburbs and rural area with using Dummy variables. The study is primarily deal with socio-demographic purposes but the results of the econometric model relevant for the viewpoint of price dispersion. They expect that the poorer population who lives in the city center has to pay higher prices compared with the higher-income population who lives in the suburb part of Washington D.C. With the increasing income and housing prices the number of fast-food restaurants increase as well. Such that the competition is getting tougher and the market power of one firm decreases which leads to lower prices. They describe the role of the distance with the different factors of demand in the different areas from the citycenter.

Avgousti (2011)[11] examine the distance between gas stations at interstate highways in the U.S.A. He uses the model of Salop and Stiglitz. Avgousti (2011) assume that the commuters are the informed consumers while the long-distance travelers are the uninformed ones. In his study he investigate the stations location-decision next to their pricing strategy. A new gas station location depends on the distance between the fixed exits and they move into the farthest place in space to get market power. The average prices and the price dispersion is higher in that highway session where the density of gas stations are less. The result of Avgousti's (2011) econometric model is that the price dispersion depends on the degree of competition and the product differentiation but the characteristics of the demand do not significantly affect it.

In the same way as Avgousti (2011) uses the distance Pennerstorfer et al. (2014)[12] approximate the informed consumers with the commuters in examining the Austrian gasoline market. Informed consumers are composed by three kinds of consumers: who commuting out of the municipality where the station is located, who commuting into the municipality where the station is located and the consumers who passing by a station directly, despite neither working, nor living in the municipality where it is located. The authors do not analyze the relationship between distance and price dispersion because they assume that the evidence of price dispersion is informational asymmetry which comes from the existence of distance between consumers and the location of stores. In their econometric model they found a significant connection between the ratio of informed consumers and the amount of prices with negative correlation.

I have mentioned the transportation costs and after the distance between cities and towns. For last but not least we arrived to the distance between regions and countries which is really relevant from the viewpoint of Europe.

In Hungary Békési et al. (2011)[13] and Farkas et al. (2009)[14] examine gasoline price dispersion and the difference between prices between Hungarian regions because of they assume that stations compete with each others in these regional units called "kistérség".

But from the viewpoint of the growing Europe the international price dispersion is much more important.

Goldberg and Verboven (2004)[15] examine car industry for 1993 to 2003 in the 15 European Union member countries. They analyze how to price dispersion changes because of being a part of European Monetary Union and after the Euro zone. They found that EMU's impacts on their members a significant amount of declaim in price dispersion while within non-EMU members price dispersion firstly widened but after 2001 it gets back again to the starting amount. They found an exception from non-EMU members which is Denmark. They found that because of Denmark manages its exchange rate to euro the price dispersion acts as the same as in the EMU members. The authors examine how more the introduction of euro in 2002 affects price dispersion and they found that its disappearance is continued. They experienced the same process in non-EMU members as well but in the case of Sweden and the U.K. it could be only a fluctuation in price dispersion because of the short term of the analysis.

Such that with eliminating the trading borders and the borders between regions with different currencies price dispersion could be decrease.

Crucini et al. (2003)[16] examine approximately 220 individual good and services across 122 cities located in 79 countries in between 1990 and 2000. They distinguish between non-traded goods for example a haircut and between traded goods as desk-top PC to measure price dispersion between countries. They examine logarithm of price differences between two locations weighted with the nominal exchange rate. They found that the price differences mostly affected by the income and productivity differences between the observed pairs of locations. And another interesting result is that distance affects cross-sectional dispersion but if there is an international border exists between the two locations it does not matter. But when they examine international time-series dispersion the variance they observed only depends on distance if a border separates locations.

These analyses show us the importance of borders. Price dispersion appears between countries and for future examination it has to be taken into account.

Conclusion

The relevance of distance-relates examinations getting important as we can see from this short summary of empirical analysis which contain price dispersion and distance as well. I would like to expand the model of Salop and Stiglitz (1977) with distance to get a basic model which could explain its role. With extension of Europe or the globalized world, distance-related models may become serious part of the economy and econometric analysis as well.

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The Prospects of a Dynamic Knowledge-based Economy in the European Union

Zoltán Bánhidi

Abstract

In the Lisbon Strategy and its successor (Europe 2020), European leaders have identified the information and communications technology sector as the cornerstone, and set ambitious goals in their Digital Agenda for several key indicators: the quality of the communications infrastructure (e.g. broadband penetration), digital literacy (i.e. the ability and willingness to use these services) and the reduction of prices (eliminating roaming tariffs). This study investigates the results and broader effects of this strategy, focussing primarily on the targets relating to broadband networks, the extent to which these objectives were achieved or can be achieved, and whether achieving them could really have the potential to turn the tide and kick-start the economy. The main conclusion to be drawn from this study is that although governments have several options (direct and indirect instruments) to help the EU meet its headline targets, the current stringent access regulation in Europe might act as a disincentive to investments in network infrastructure for incumbents and alternative telcos alike.

Keywords

Infrastructure, Regulation, Economic Growth, Government Policy.

Introduction

Marred by the global financial crisis and struggling with severe institutional problems, the European Union (*EU*) is desperately trying to reinvent itself and kick-start its lagging economy. In pursuit of the "Lisbon dream" of becoming "the most competitive economy" in the world, EU leaders have identified the information and communications technology (hereinafter referred to as "*ICT*") sector as the key to Europe's success, and set ambitious goals in their "Digital Agenda" for several key indicators, including the quality of the communications infrastructure (e.g. broadband penetration), digital literacy (the ability and willingness of citizens to use these services) and the reduction of prices (eliminating roaming tariffs).

Amongst these, the targets relating to the quality of infrastructure seem be the most problematic, since on the one hand they failed to make any considerable progress in this area in the past four years (since the inception of the strategy), but on

the other, achieving them might be a necessary precondition for improvements in other indicators (e.g. those concerning digital literacy). Thus, the rest of this study is focussed mainly on this issue, attempting to assess the likelihood of meeting these objectives, review the broader economic implications of this strategy and evaluate the impact of ex-ante regulation and different policy instruments on the diffusion of broadband networks.

The Lisbon Dream and "Europe 2020"

In 2000, the leaders of the European Union set out to become "the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion" in just ten years. Despite the apparent failure of this so-called Lisbon Strategy (named after a European Council meeting in the Portuguese capital), which the leaders of the EU attributed to shortcomings of the implementation, its main goals and ambitious "vision" were largely retained in its successor, entitled "Europe 2020." To measure their success (the competitiveness, "sustainability" and "inclusiveness" of the EU), the European Commission has devised a set of "headline targets" for the EU-27, which were broken down into national targets.

Image 1. Selected Indicators of Europe 2020. Data source: Eurostat[2]

Indicator (Unit)	EU-27 Values in 2013	Target Values (Deadline)
NGA broadband coverage/availability (bandwidths exceeding 30 Mbps) (in % of households)	62	100 (2020)
Households with an ultra-fast broadband connection (bandwidths exceeding 100 Mbps)(%)	3	50 (2020)
Small and medium-sized enterprises selling online enterprises (%)	14	33 (2020)
Share of population buying online cross-border (%)	12	20 (2020)
Share of population buying online (%)	47	50 (2015)
Share of disadvantaged people using the Internet regularly (%)	57	60 (2015)
Share of population using the Internet regularly (%)	72	75 (2015)
Share of population having never used the Internet (%)	20	15 (2015)
Share of population using e-government services (%)	41.5	50 (2015)
Share of population using e-government services and returning forms online (%)	20.7	25 (2015)
Standard fixed broadband coverage/availability (in % of households)	97	100 (2013)

 Table 1. Digital Agenda Scoreboard. Based on Data Provided By The European Union's Thematic Website.

Both of these main strategies were quite complex and encompassed several action plans or "flagship initiatives," but amongst these, the i2010, eEurope and the "Digital Agenda for Europe" (hereafter referred to as "*DAE*") initiatives are of particular interest. Even before the Lisbon meeting, the ICT sector has been heralded as the cornerstone of any sensible growth strategy by the European Commission (*EC*), and the perceived "technological gap" between the EU and the US was often seen as primarily responsible for the "eurosclerosis," slower economic growth and low employment rates in Europe. Both the EC and the OECD viewed the role of ICT as a "general purpose technology," and opined that the competitiveness of the whole economy might hinge on the services provided by the ICT sector.[2]

A list of DAE indicators is provided in the following table (note the huge difference between the current and target ultra-fast broadband penetration rates):

The EC places special emphasis on the quality of ICT infrastructure, the most important components of which are arguably the quality and availability of high-speed (Next Generation Access, hereinafter referred to as "*NGA*") and "ultra-fast" broadband networks (based on optical fibre technology) that could enable the use of highly sophisticated online services. In its policy paper on the DAE, the EC cited some estimates (based on past empirical studies) to illustrate their significance: "ICT investment has so far had the highest correlation with growth: 10 percent more households connected to high-speed broadband can generate up to 1.5% higher GDP and 20 million jobs by 2020." Indeed, a host of empirical studies have found close links between broadband penetration and economic growth or the presence of knowledge-intensive firms, although one of the most prominent of these were later shown to suffer from severe methodological defects.

Evaluating the Effects of Broadband Networks

While it is usually accepted (by the majority of researchers and experts) that higher broadband penetration can be linked to increased productivity and economic growth, quantifying its impact might be complicated. The relationship between penetration and growth could be bidirectional (reverse causality must be taken into account), non-linear (there might be a "critical level" above which the effects are amplified) and the transmission channels are hard to identify (and quantify).

Moreover, the full realization of the benefits of broadband or other ICT investments might take as long as 5 to 7 years.

Although several studies attempt to link the use of broadband to firm presence, firm productivity and innovation; these are often based on anecdotal evidence and sometimes they cannot be verified by simple econometric models. Differences in productivity might be explained by the interaction of several external factors, e.g. restrictive labour and product market regulation might hinder the adoption of ICTs and substantially offset their potential effects. Unfortunately, the methodological problems associated with estimating the impact of broadband networks cannot be discussed here in full detail, but there seems to be broad support in favour of the existence of growth externalities amongst the researchers, but no consensus on the magnitude of these effects. For an in-depth discussion of these issues, the interested reader is kindly referred to the author's earlier paper submitted to the previous ISSEI conference in 2012.

Broadband Diffusion in Europe

One way to tackle the reverse causality problem is to estimate the diffusion of broadband and its economic impact together. The diffusion processes of ICTs, including traditional and ultra-fast broadband networks may be described by an S-shaped (sigmoid) curve and are usually modelled by a logistic curve. For instance, one might use the following equation:

$$Pen_t = \frac{\gamma}{1 + \exp\left(-\eta\left(t - \lambda\right)\right)}$$

Where t denotes the time period, t is the share of adopters at saturation level; λ represents the time (or number of periods) by which half of the saturation level is reached; and η denotes the 'speed of diffusion', growth relative to its distance to the saturation level. According to a recent econometric study, for NGA broadband networks, the saturation level might be approximately equal to the goal set by the DAE (50% of households subscribing to broadband networks exceeding bandwidths of 30 Mbps by 2020), and in the light of the current penetration rates and diffusion speeds (η) in EU countries, the DAE targets seem to be overly optimistic.



Image 2. The Diffusion of Nga-S (Country Positions Are Approximate). Based on Empirical Estimates by W. Briglauer and K. Gugler[13].

The European Commission and the telecommunications companies all agree that the rollout of these fast broadband networks in the EU is slower than it should be, but there is a difference of opinion as to the merits of the EU's current regulatory framework and the proposed remedy to this problem. The European Commission and some smaller (alternative) telecommunications operators argue that by and large, the ex-ante regulation currently in place is necessary and only needs to be tweaked to be more conducive to investments; according to the larger (incumbent) operators, however, it is largely responsible for the lack of investments in infrastructure, and needs to be phased out as soon as possible.[4]

Regardless of this debate, the most important factors of penetration growth might be identified with the help of econometric models and may be categorized as supply-side and demand-side determinants, based on whether they influence broadband availability (network roll-out) or the willingness of consumers to subscribe to these services (broadband take-up and use). Of course, the usual logic of the "short side rule" in economics also applies to these markets, as

either the lack of network infrastructure (low coverage) or the consumers' lack of interest would result in low penetration rates.

SUPPLY-SIDE DETERMINANTS	DEMAND-SIDE DETERMINANTS
Level of Competition (across Firms and Technologies)	The Level of Gross Domestic Product per capita
Population Density/Urbanization	Tertiary Educational Attainment etc.
Supply-side Policies:	Demand-side Policies:
— Access Regulation (cost-based access, regulatory holidays or de-regulation)	— Public demand of services (e-government, e-health etc.)
— State Aid Programmes (fiscal incentives, long-term loans, national financing programmes, PPPs, coordination, territorial mapping programmes etc.)	— Subsidies for consumers
	— Incentives to business demand (incl. support/information)

Table 2. Important Determinants of Broadband Penetration and Diffusion. Based on Empirical Estimates by F. Belloc, A. Nicita And M. A. Rossi.[15]

Furthermore, it may be useful to distinguish between the factors that can and those that cannot be influenced by industry-specific policies, as we would like to determine the extent to which governments can increase the growth rates.

These determinants can also be related to the sigmoid curve, since the relative importance of the factors depend on a country's current penetration levels relative to the inflection point and the saturation level. Recent empirical estimates show that the effectiveness of demand-side policies should increase as the penetration increases, but the efficacy of supply-side policies might be most profound in the initial phase.[6]

Obstacles to Quicker NGA Diffusion in Europe

According to the incumbent firms, the willingness of European telcos to undertake costly investments in infrastructure is diminished due to stringent access regulation in the EU. [7] They argue that while the current regulatory framework may be favourable for the consumers in the short run (at least from a static point of view), it reduces dynamic efficiency and deprive them of considerable benefits in the long run.

From a societal point of view, early deployment would be beneficial, but the largest telecommunications operators (incumbents) that are subject to access regulation and usually own traditional (legacy) networks make their investment decisions according to the net present value they expect from the project:

$$NPV_i = \sum_{t=0}^{n} \frac{CF_{it}}{(1+r_i)^t}$$

Where r_i is the cost of capital associated with project i, and CF_{it} are the expected "net cash flows" in different time periods (as earlier, these are denoted by t), adjusted for any opportunity costs. According to the basic principles of corporate finance, a firm should not undertake a project unless the NPV associated with it is positive.

The cost of capital might be calculated as follows:

$$r_i = r_f + \beta_i \cdot \left(r_m - r_f\right)$$

Where r_f refers to the risk-free rate of interest (usually approximated by the rate of return of bonds issued by a reliable government), r_m is the expected market rate of return and β_i is a measure of the systematic risk associated with the project.

In summary, the most important project-specific determinants of NPV are the cash flows and the systematic risk. Government policies might influence both of these, since part of the systematic risk might arise because of "regulatory uncertainty," as the regulator might be tempted to change the regulated access

conditions to the detriment of the incumbent once the network is operational (in order to decrease the market prices). To resolve this issue, the regulators should be prepared to make a credible commitment to only revise the remedies imposed on the incumbent firms after a reasonably long period, allowing the operators to plan their costs and revenue streams with more certainty.

On the other hand, governments can also decrease the cost of capital by providing long-term loans at low interest rates. As an alternative, the initial investment costs (CF_{i0}) might also be reduced by public co-financing, territorial mapping programmes etc.

The expected profits in subsequent years depend on the revenue streams of this project, the costs of operating and the extent to which this project negatively affects the revenues on traditional broadband access (cannibalizes existing products). The expected revenues might be decreased if the incumbent is subjected to access regulation or increased through subsidies and public demand for its services.

Additionally, incumbents might be tempted to delay investments to mitigate profit loss due to cannibalization (losing part of their revenue on traditional, copper-based broadband networks). This might explain the surprisingly good position of Eastern European countries in NGA-penetration rankings (relative to their richer Western neighbours) where the absence of legacy networks reduced the threat of cannibalization and contributed to faster roll-out.

The same line of thought can be applied to the investment decision of the alternative operators – favourable access conditions mandated by the regulators might act as a disincentive to investing in their own networks.

So far the EC has been reluctant to roll back the ex ante access regulation, but it has recently tried to accelerate broadband roll-out and take-up by committing 1.14 billion euro to 'broadband activities' and 'Digital Service Infrastructures' (Connecting Europe Facility). The effects of these programmes are yet to be seen.

Conclusion

As only four years have passed since the Europe 2020 strategy was launched, it would be unwise to jump to the conclusion that it would be just as ineffective

as its predecessor, but until now, significant progress could not be registered in the areas of competitiveness, employment or economic growth.

As for the ICT sector, it seems quite likely that most of the DAE targets will be met, or at worst, barely missed. On the other hand, the NGA and "ultra-fast" broadband targets seem to be too ambitious, and the necessary preconditions for improvement in these areas seem to be missing. In particular, the European Commission appears to be unwilling to significantly reform or abolish the current ex ante regulation, in spite of the fact that it is often cited as a major obstacle to investments in fibre optic network infrastructure. Instead, it seems to believe in a more interventionist approach, hoping that the combination of local and national state aid programmes, approved and partly funded by the EU, could make up for the lack of private investments.

An interesting – though rather extreme – example of this approach was provided by the Hungarian government, which proposed a new "internet tax" on internet service providers (*ISP*s) based on data traffic, only to shelve the idea a few days later due to massive protests by the citizens. The government had argued that this tax could not have hindered the consumers from using these networks since the bulk of the tax burden would have been borne by the ISPs, as the intense competition in the industry would have precluded them from raising prices. On the other hand, they would have pledged most of the revenues collected from this tax on a state aid programme aimed at establishing new broadband network infrastructure. Nevertheless, not even the European Commission was convinced by these arguments, and they urged the government to abandon the idea.

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The Borders of the European Union
From Micro and Macro Point of View

Boglárka Hevér

Abstract

It is well known that one of the most important elements of the EU is the free factor flow. Firms as well as individuals use these possibilities and continue their activities abroad. To take only a simple, but very actual example: a lot of Hungarian physicians have moved to Norway, thus the „market" for Hungarian physicians is not bounded by Hungary's borders. Having this in mind, how should the territory of a region be determined if it is acceptad that markets play an immens role is this field. Is it right to say that the European Union as centrally established structure is avoiding the aggregation of it's microunits, countries, regions, etc.? How should be interpreted from this point of view aggregate demand and supply, general equilibrium in Europe, or totally all over the world? Is this traditional and mainstream approach of economics true for continents or other „big" areas, and observable disequilibrium situations refer problems int he spatial structure of demand and supply?

Keywords

Edgeworth-box, Migration, EU, Unemployment, Economy Policy, Free Factor Flow, Capital–Labour Combination, Krugman-Model.

Introduction

It is well known that one of the most important elements of the EU is the free factor flow. This means that the traditional political and economic borders – within the EU – disappear. In the last period, especially after WWII, an intensive flow of capital and labour forces could be observed between different European countries, but there was also a migration from countries outside of the European Union to some of its member states. The decisions to leave the home country and to move to another country are made on the individual level. Reasons for migration are better chances to find a job in the destination country, or higher wages and salaries paid there, but also the better social conditions – education, health system, pension system, etc. – can be found in the background of these changes.

Of course, these individual decisions will affect the macro levels in both countries, that of the home country as well as that of the destination country, implying that former equilibrium situations could disappear, or former disequilibrium would become more and more an equilibrium. To take the example of labour forces' flow: unemployment in the home country will decrease, but the danger of higher unemployment in the destination country will arise.

The question is whether and how do the individual decisions and the changes on the micro level imply the equilibrium in macro level. Otherwise, and a little bit more concrete: will the free factor flow lead to full employment and general equilibrium, or not? The aim of the present paper is to give a possible answer to this question using fundamental microeconomics.

The Optimal Decision — From Micro and Macro Point of View

If the optimal decision of a company concerning its capital-labour combination will be analysed, usually isoquant curves and isocost lines are applied . The isoquant curve is the set of all capital-labour combination, which provides the same level of production. Along the isocost line the size of total costs does not change. Finally, where the isocost line touches the isoquant curve, there is an optimal capital-labour combination. Thus, in this situation one can produce the maximal level of output under given cost; or given quantity of goods can be produced with the lowest cost. This micro method will be adapted later to macro approach.

Using the macro approach, it is not the output considered, but the income flows. Therefore from the macro point of view an isoquant curve contains points, where the income is constant, but the amount of capital and the number of labourer is changing. But, however, applying these analytical techniques, we can determine the optimum size of labour and capital for the whole national economy – as can be seen in the Figure.



Figure 1. The isoquant curve and the isocost line from the macro point of view.

As it has been mentioned earlier, the optimum can be considered in two different ways, i. e. one can find the optimal combination of capital and labour to have the highest level of production assuming a certain cost level, or that optimal factor combination will be found with which a certain quantity of goods should be produces at lowest costs. Here, the second approach will be applied, i. e., it is assumed that a certain amount of production – in macro: of income – is given. There are two reasons for this. First of all, the intrinsic logic of the Krugman-model: Krugman supposes two regions with different population, and hereby with different demand for commodities. The higher demand leads to higher prices and to higher wages, stimulating the labour forces in the less populated region to migrate, so the demand, the economic and also the social differences between regions will increase. The second reason for the fixed income is that the following analysis will be done in the frame of the Keynesian approach. In Keynes' model a certain level of demand is assumed, and the supply (the production of companies) adjusts to this, therefore the optimal factor combination has to be derived under the assumption of given income representing exactly the amount of demand for goods and services. According to Krugman the idea will be extended to two regions.

The Optimal Decision of Region

Two regions are presumed: A and B. The isoquant curves of the two areas can be drawn in an Edgeworth-box. The size of box is determined by the available number of labours and by the amount of capital goods. The aim of companies is – in both cases – that a given amount of output (income) should be produced at minimal costs. With this in mind for a given initial allocation of labour and capital between the two regions, an isoquant curve can be selected for each area. If the two curves just touch each other, then there is – in the language of microeconomics – a Pareto-efficient point. But assuming that in both regions the factors of production are used optimally, the analysis requires also that the isocost lines must touch the selected isoquant curves. These depends on the costs of the factors, implying the slope of



It can be seen, that in the region A quantity Y_A is produced, because – by assumption – this is the demand in this area. To do this, N_A*number of workers and K_A*units of capital are necessary, because the isocost line touches the isoquant curve exactly in the point determined by these quantities. In the graphic

an initial endowment is also marked. According to this, N_0 is the labour supply in region A, and as a consequence, the amount of unemployment is obviously $N_{0A} - N_A^*$. The same is true for other region: Here the amount of excess supply on the labour market is $N_{0B} - N_B^*$. The difference between the two regions is represented by the different slopes of their isocost lines. The isocost line of region A is steeper than that of the isocost line in region B. This means that ratio of factor prices (i.e. the rate of the wage and the interest rate) is larger in region A than in region B, so either in region A labour is more expensive or capital is cheaper; of course, it is also possible, that both relations are valid, in region A wages are higher and interest rates are lower, than in region B.

Suppose that the prices of capital, i. e., the interest rates are the same in the two regions, therefore the situation described in the previous paragraph is valid if the wage is higher in A than in B. It can be seen that there are excess labour capacities in both countries, so unemployment is in region A as well as in region B. What will happen if there would be free factor flow?

Migration to the Region with Higher Wages

The consumers want to maximize the utility level; this is possible by consuming more products. To do this, they need income. The source of their income is the wage (apart from the other factor income). So a rational worker tries to find a job where wages are higher, i.e. now in the region A, and some workers migrate from region B to region A. This will increase demand of commodities in region A, i. e., it will be higher than earlier, and in the other region the converse, i. e. decreasing demand can be observed. To satisfy this higher demand by higher production the labour demand will increase in region A and in line with the described processes there is a falling labour demand in region B. The higher labour demand leads to higher wages in region A, and would imply lower wages in region B. But – as mentioned above, according to the observable facts and in the sense of Keynes' approach – downwards sticky wages have to be assumed. This means that the decline in wages in region B is impossible.

Summarizing the situation: in region A the good's demand and therefore the income are increasing, higher income implies higher labour demand leading to higher wages; in region B there is lower demand for goods and

services, lower income and thus lower demand for labour, but as a consequence of downwards sticky wages, the decreasing labour demand in region B will not cause lower wages.

But, however, from the increasing labour demand in region A does not necessarily follow that there the unemployment declines, very often only the structure of unemployment is changing. For example: it is totally imaginable that the original amount of unemployment in region A does not change, because the increased labour demand caused by the migrants is satisfied by themselves, or with other words: it is even the new spatial distribution of labour forces what satisfies the – spatially changed – demand for labour in region A. Therefore the number of people looking for a job in region A may be the same as before, it is only the structure of this group having been changed: earlier it had been consisted of labour forces only from A, now it may be mixed, people being unemployed may come from A as well as from B. This situation can be observed when the two populations, domestic population of region A and the migrating population coming from region B have different cultural backgrounds, traditions, etc.[2] In this case a part of the economy in region A focuses on the needs of the migrants, implying finally economic enclaves where migrants are working for migrants, migrants create demand for goods and services produced by migrants. It is well-known that in almost every metropolis there are districts where the population is characterized by a high ratio of migrants.

Of course, in some cases the increased demand for goods and services caused by migrations will be satisfied by the domestic labour force, i. e., migrants will increase demand, but only some of them will take part in the production (mostly by accepting a "dirty" or bad-paid job rejected by the domestic labour force), most of the grown demand will be satisfied by labour force from the higher developed region. Also in this case one could have the same level of unemployment, but the structure is again another one. For example: The Turkish guest workers could be useful for the German economy, because they create additional demand and the take jobs not accepted by Germans. But if the excess demand is mainly satisfied by goods and services produced by Germans the level of unemployment does not change, just the guest labours cannot find work, i. e. the structure of unemployment has changed.

In the other region the situation is the following: the wages will not change, but the demand for products – and thereby the income – declined. This lower demand requires lower number of workers; i. e. the unemployment is increasing.

It can be seen that the free labour flow could be advantageous, if the wages would elastically change according to the disequilibrium on the labour market.. But in case of downwards sticky wage in region B the unemployment – under these initial conditions – is determined by factors coming from the outside from the labour market in region B.

Finally, migration does not cause necessarily higher unemployment in the destination region, but the negative effect on the labour market of the less developed region seems to be sure.

Implications: Economy Policy

Both regions are looking for a solution to this problem. It is known, that the goal of a good economic policy is to increase the demand, causing higher income and therefore higher welfare too. Based on the well-known relationship we know that the creation of income can be described by the expression $Y = C + I + G + (EX\text{-}IM)$. Increasing demand is accessible by trade or government expenditures. Therefore, if the region B could export to the other region (the companies can produce suitable products) or the government could immediately increase the demand (ignoring the budget deficit), the unemployment in region B could be reduced. But there is a limit. Full employment would exist, if the new endowment is an optimal labour-capital combination. In this case that isoquant curve should be achieved, on which this point is.

If the new endowment is not an optimal factor combination, the following cases are possible:

In the point of new endowment is characterized by a higher amount of labour and less capital goods than in the optimal point; in such situation the capital is the bottleneck, so the full employment – under above conditions – is impossible. In this case the solution is to change the slope of isocost line, namely to change the rate of factor prices. Because the wage is given, the cost of capital should be increased for instance by higher taxes introduced by the government. The conclusion is that in an undeveloped area it is the worst idea to raise the minimum wage; instead of this rather tax should be levied on the capital goods.

In the other case, the optimal point is on the right hand side of the optimal endowment, i. e. the labour is determining the situation. Therefore there is excess demand on the labour market, namely there is full employment and even more labour is needed, but will be costly. The best situation would, if the source of excess labour demand is the export. Then the less developed region requires a larger active population or tax should be levied on the labour. Unfortunately, this situation is not really relevant.

In both cases, i. e., when there is a shortage of capital, or a shortage of labour, the solution could be to change the slope of isoquant curve. In the case of capital shortage it would be advantageous, if the corresponding isoquant curve would become steeper than earlier. This means that one unit of labour will be more effective, more productive. This could be achieved with human capital.

The free factor flow is not a solution to the problem of unemployment in the less developed region if wages are downwards sticky, this will only increase the developmental differences – from this point of view Krugman's theory is confirmed: the catch up is possible, but not easy. It is difficult to find an adequate economy policy. It many cases, it is worth to pursue a mixed economy policy, not just a demand-driven one.

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Does the Euro Unify or Divide Europe?

Dietmar Meyer

Abstract

The integration process within the European Union was going along with the cooperation in the monetary sector. One of the most important results in this field was the introduction of the joint currency in 2002. Especially after the financial crisis (2008-) it was an often and controversially discussed question whether the joint currency will unify of divide the European Union.

The author's presentation will touch three points: First of all the introduction of joint currencies will be considered from theoretical point of view, reflecting the Mundell's well-known theory of optimal currency areas. In the second part the experiences of the last decade – the decade of the joint currency – will be discussed. An very important point id the close relation between the introduction of the joint currency and the sovereign debt crisis in Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, etc. In the third part the author summarizes the results and draw conclusions for an interpretation and for a possible answer to the question Does the „Euro unify or divide the European Union?".

Keywords

Euro, Optimal Currency Area, Inflation, Debt.

Introduction

The joint European currency was always a problem often, intensively and controversially discussed. The aspects the discussants having in their minds are quite different. First of all, there is the economic approach. Using a joint currency will obviously reduce transaction costs, but on the other side it is well known that the success of such a currency depends on the economic performance of the member states taking part in this monetary integration; the advantages from and the contributions to the joint currency are not equally distributed among the member states. Then there is a political point. Having a joint currency demonstrates the strong cooperation between the member states of the currency area, but there are differences between the reputation of the participating countries depending on the distance between the new joint currency and the old national currencies. Having mentioned the national currencies one has to take into account cultural or traditional elements too: national coins and

banknotes have represented not only money values, but also the country, the national economy itself, they are "an expression of national sovereignity[1], thus the substitution of national currencies with joint money means also a loss of national identity.

Let's leave it at these examples! In any case mentioned above there are pros and cons due to the introduction of joint currencies in general, and of course all these points, all these arguments could be observed before 2002, when the Euro became the official currency of 12 member states of the European Union. What is the real situation after more than one decade? Did the Euro fulfill the expectations of politicians and economic experts? Does the joint currency support the European integration or is it rather a catalyst which brings the economic and social problems in the European Union to light?

The Euro from Theoretical Point of View

In his famous paper published in 1961[2] Robert Mundell argued that the introduction of a joint currency requires high factor mobility between the participating economies, sectors and profession, etc., because missing the flexible exchange rates asymmetric shocks cannot be absorbed by the monetary sector, it would be the intra- and international flow of capital and labor which distributes goods and services efficiently. As a consequence, in a longer run the economic performances of the participating countries will converge to more or less the same level. In his research Mundell has focused to Canada and to the United States where the necessary factor mobility was traditionally given. The Dollar's role as joint currency in the United States is therefore result of a quite natural process, a process having developed over almost 200 years.

Applying Mundell's ideas to the European Union, one will find two different situations. On one side, the free factor flow between the member states is a declaration at least from that point of time when the Treaties of Rome had been signed in 1957. But, however, in reality the European factor markets are rather inflexible, a phenomenon sometimes called Eurosclerosis[3]. Considering the economic performances of the EU member states, their expected equalization can hardly be observed; the so-called Two-speed Europe (an expression used by the former president of the EU Commission, Romano Prodi) reflects disparities in income, in economic performances, dynamics of economic and social development, etc.

The background of all these phenomena is the history of the Old Continent, characterized by national states with their own national economic policy. Over centuries the economic and political relations between European countries had more a competitive than a cooperative character. Only in the last 60 years it has been attempted to stimulate the cooperation, but – having in mind the existence of the different political blocks over 40 years – not including the total continent.

From this point of view it is quite obvious that the European Union does not fulfill Mundell's conditions for introducing a joint currency. According to the Theory of Optimal Currency Areas the member states have to harmonize their real processes last, but not least by the liberalization of the international flow of goods, services and factors. Having done this the EU will be robust enough to absorb successfully exogenous shocks, and only then the right time is given to introduce the joint currency. Thus, from economic aspects the decision to introduce the Euro in 1992 and its introduction in 2002 did not correspond to the economic conditions, it was a nice dream of some politicians, or with other words: the introduction of the joint currency was rather politically motivated than economic requirement. The former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl has expressed this with clear words in an interview: "If a Chancellor is trying to push something through, he must be a man of power. And if he's smart, he knows when the time is ripe. In one case – the euro – I was like a dictator ... The euro is a synonym for Europe. Europe, for the first time, has no more war."[4] Eurosceptic arguments are mostly developed along this line of thought.

Of course, there are other – more optimistic – views about the introduction of the Euro, although Mundell's conditions are missed. A joint currency implies the abolition of exchange rates and therefore decreasing transaction costs. Measuring prices, wages, production, etc. in the same currency means the direct comparison of the economic performances, making clear which economy or economies are at given time the winners or the loser. This kind of feedback will create more competition and therefore higher welfare. In this approach the joint currency is considered as the engine of economic a social development.

But, however, one should not forget, that money itself does not produce anything, money is a mean expressing the economic performances of different – competing or cooperating – economic actors. The great advantage of using the same currency within an economy or in different economies is to have the

same measure for all activities. But it is the latter which serves as basis for higher income, lower unemployment, etc. i. e., for higher welfare.

This approach is in some sense similar to what is well-known from the Olympic Games: Measuring the performances of all athletes – let's say in the sprint race – with the same electronic time clock give the possibility to declare the exact differences between the competing athletes, but for taking part on the Games the athletes have to fulfill some conditions – the so-called Olympic quotes – due to their performances; these condition are fixed by national or international organizations.

In the European Union, or more exactly: in the Eurozone, the "Olympic quotes" can be identified with the euro convergence criteria formulated in the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. If candidate countries applying for the membership on the Eurozone do not satisfy the convergence criteria, the situation is quite clear: these countries will not become participants of the monetary integration, they have to stay outside of the Eurozone until the conditions are fulfilled. Of course, if these countries once have satisfied the conditions for membership, they are allowed to introduce the joint currency. But what will happen if one or some of these economies have later – as members of the Eurozone – problems to fulfill the criteria for inflation, interest rate, budget deficit or debt? The Maastricht Treaty does not contain any scenario for this problem, thus if a country is once member of the Eurozone it remains member forever.[5]

This is an essential difference due to the Olympic Games: Athletes apply all for years for one competition, for the Eurozone membership the countries apply once for the forever-membership!

Experiences of the First Decade and of the Financial Crisis

First of all, let's have a look at some economic data!

A strong currency means a low inflation rate. Before the introduction of the Euro price stability was observable in Germany, Austria, France and Benelux. It is quite rational that other countries having applied for membership in the Eurozone would benefit for monetary system from the stability of these national currencies. So, let us see first the evolution of inflation rates.

Year	DE	IT	GR	FR	AT	ES	PT	EU
1999	1,32	2,10	2,32	1,37	1,66	2,77	1,71	1,74
2000	2,18	2,75	3,66	1,74	1,83	4,00	3,81	2,57
2001	1,39	2,23	3,53	1,43	1,80	2,51	3,95	2,14
2002	1,16	2,94	3,49	2,16	1,67	4,03	3,96	2,77
2003	1,04	2,54	3,14	2,38	1,28	2,68	2,32	2,04
2004	2,26	2,38	3,12	2,32	2,52	3,28	2,59	2,35
2005	2,11	2,11	3,46	1,76	1,58	3,72	2,53	2,29
2006	1,38	2,07	3,19	1,69	1,59	2,72	2,49	1,91
2007	3,11	2,81	3,86	2,80	3,48	4,29	2,73	3,07
2008	1,13	2,35	2,19	1,19	1,46	1,45	0,84	1,60
2009	0,84	1,10	2,55	1,02	1,05	0,89	– 0,14	0,93
2010	1,85	2,09	5,15	1,99	2,17	2,86	2,45	2,21
2011	2,27	3,65	2,17	2,68	3,39	2,36	3,49	2,75
2012	2,04	2,58	0,325	1,52	2,92	2,99	2,08	2,22
2013	1,22	0,67	– 1,02	0,83	1,98	0,31	0,17	0,85

Rates of inflation of some EU member states in % of the last year.[6]

Form the table it becomes quite clear, that in the years before the Euro had been introduced, Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal had an inflation rate higher than the average of the European Union – in the case of Portugal the year 1999 is an exception. In the 11 years the Euro has been used as joint currency the national inflation rates do not exceed the EU-average in Italy in 2010 and in 2013, in Greece between 2011 and 2013, in Spain in 2008, 2009, 2011 and 2013, in Portugal in 2007 – 2009 and in 2012 and in 2013. Considering the number of years when the national inflation rates were not higher than the average of the EU-member states, it is obvious that in most of the years Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal have proved to be unable to reduce their inflation rates to the level of the EU-average. The inflation rates in these economies were in average 1,2 %-point higher, than in the higher developed economies, thus the introduction of the euro has provided them with more stable and cheaper money. As important consequence: These four member states of the Eurozone could easily benefit from the advantages of the joint currency – when the economic situation in their countries was stable.

Rank	…	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
1	GR	101,2	107,5	107,3	112,5	129,3	147,9	170,6
2	IT	105,7	106,3	103,3	106,1	116,4	119,3	120,8
3	PT	62,5	63,7	68,3	71,6	83,0	93,2	108,0
4	IE	27,3	25,6	25,0	44,5	64,9	92,2	106,4
…	…	…	…	…	…	…	…	…
6	BE	92,0	88,0	84,0	89,2	95,7	95,5	97,8
7	FR	66,7	64,1	64,2	68,2	79,2	82,3	86,0
…	…	…	…	…	…	…	…	…
…	…	…	…	…	…	…	…	…
10	DE	68,5	67,9	65,4	66,8	74,5	82,5	80,5
…	…	…	…	…	…	…	…	…
14	ES	43,2	39,7	36,3	40,2	54,0	61,3	69,1

National Debt Ratios in the Eurozone.[7]

From the table it can be seen that the countries with the highest debt ratios were Italy and Greece. If one would consider the dynamic of the debt rate's development, the ranking would be: Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Spain. The gov-

ernments of these economies were totally rational when they used this stable and cheaper money for debt-financing and – directly or indirectly – to finance consumption, transfer payments, etc.

But exactly this is the problem of Germany, France, Austria, i. e., the problem of those economies which are net lender, because finally these countries will finance – directly or indirectly, through the transmission mechanisms of the European Central Bank – the debt of the net borrowers.

Back to the Initial Question
Does the Euro unify or divide Europe?

It was especially the financial crisis which generated again the problem whether the Euro is a boon or bane for the member states of the Eurozone. From the analysis done in the present paper it could be seen that the split in Europe between higher developed countries and less developed countries, between debt-ridden economies and those will less debt, between high-inflation regions and low-inflation regions had already existed before the Euro had been introduced. Therefore not the Euro is the reason for the splitting Europe, the reason are the differences in economic performance of the member states of the Eurozone based on conditions, knowledge, traditions, considerations, etc. To assert the opposite, namely that it is definitely the Euro causing the increasing discrepancies between European countries, would be a statement, like: the introduction of the Lira in Italy has the country economically divided into North- and South-Italy, or the introduction of the joint currency in Germany in the 19th century has caused the income disparities between the Western and the Eastern part of the country.

On the other hand, of course, the joint currency is a qualitatively different measure for economic activities and performances. Individual or even collective evaluations of countries or regions based on data collection, discussions with experts, etc. contain a lot of subjective parts, including the final formulation of the statements. In contrast to this money is an extremely relentless measure. While non-monetary evaluations will determine an interval, money reflects the situation with a single number. From this point of view it is quite clear that the introduction of the Euro will present a precise and insensitive ranking of the different economies of the Eurozone. But the reason that some countries have a

positive, others a more negative evaluation, is not the Euro, the joint currency provide a much more sharper picture about the present situation.

Summarizing the arguments: The Euro may be a mean to unify the European Union, and this currency will do it the more successfully the more similar is the performance of the participating economies. If the countries of the EU will more diverge, then the reason for this is even there different economic and social situation.

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Endnotes

1. Robert A. Mundell, "A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas", *American Economic Review*, 51, (November 1961), p. 661.
2. Ibid., pp. 657-665.
3. Paul Krugman, "Eurosclerosis, Then and Now." *The New York Times*, (January 22, 2011)
4. Jeevan Vasagar, „Helmut Kohl: I acted like a dictator to bring in the euro.", *The Telegraph*, (April 9, 2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/9981932/Helmut-Kohl-I-acted-like-a-dictator-to-bring-in-the-euro.html
5. Up to now there is only one possibility to stay outside the eurozone: if the country leaves the European Union. In the more than 60 years of European cooperation this happened only once: in 1985 Greenland left the European Economic Community, the precursor of the European Union, after a referendum.
6. Source: World Economic Outlook Database 2013.
7. Source: World Economic Outlook Database 2013.

SECTION II
Economics, Politics, Law

EUROCENTRISM, POST-COLONIALISM, COSMOPOLITANISM & OTHER –ISMS

Chair
—
Marianna Papastephanou

Participants
—
Tommaso Visone
Claudia Schumann
Pradeep A. Dhillon
Zdenko Kodelja
Niclas Rönnström
Eli Vinokur
Denise Egéa
Sevket Benhur Oral
Nick Peim

Presentation

Marianna Papastephanou

This workshop has focused on cosmopolitanism and other –isms of political philosophy and education and explored them from various perspectives. Despite being only a part of the workshop, the papers included here are indicative of the direction that the workshop and the discussion took at the recent ISSEI conference.

As a background framework, the relevant call for papers had encouraged the participants to consider the fact that various theories have, in the course of European thought, ended up in closed systems or '–isms'. Scholars were thus invited to investigate why such theories typically receive disparaging treatments and dismissive comments. But they were also urged to consider a recent tendency in political philosophical and cultural-critical debates that opens a possibility of more nuanced approaches to those '-isms'. Such approaches detect in several '-isms' ambiguities, ambivalences and hidden complexities. In this way, idea(l)s such as cosmopolitanism or discourses such as the post-colonial or politicized spatialities such as the European attract fresh theoretical negotiations and framings. Within the latter, dichotomous thinking is challenged and sweeping positions, be they glorifications or incriminations, are 'queered'.

Amongst other things, the workshop aspired to engage in this new dialogue from a variety of perspectives and also to advance it and, at the same time, to problematize it through as yet unexplored paths. The participants who responded to the invitation to join us were also encouraged to feel free to enlarge the scope of the workshop and to examine, if they so wished, more concretely (in descending order of relevance to the workshop) cosmopolitanism, Eurocentrism, post-colonialism, universalism, utopianism and other '-isms'. Though positions such as Martha Nussbaum's, Anthony Appiah's, Paul Gilroy's or Homi Bhabha's may come to mind as mostly relevant, the workshop was in no way limited to such standpoints. All theoretical frameworks of cosmopolitanism and related ideas were welcome, and material associated with all temporalities (historical, futurist) was no less pertinent than the one associated with 'current' discourses.

The papers hosted here exemplify the work that has been carried out from many perspectives. Problematizing unifying historical narratives regarding our topic, Tommaso Visone's paper revisits ideological wars of the early 20th century with an eye to their 'universalism versus particularism' dilemmas. Claudia Schumann's paper complicates prioritizations of cosmopolitanism over patriotism and vice versa through a fresh and critical reading of Martha Nussbaum's recent ideas and Alice Crary's views on moral judgment. Pradeep Dhillon's engagement with Immanuel Kant and Walt Whitman illustrates the importance of fully retrieving now neglected aspects of a philosopher's political ideals and of a poet's epic for re-working the relation between cosmopolitanism and patriotism. Zdenko Kodelja's critical reading of current political-philosophical debates concerning moral obligation and international right shows us why cosmopolitanism should not be thought independently of global principles of justice. Indeed, as Niclas Rönnström shows, there is a tendency to neglect higher political cosmopolitan demands, especially when theorists and educators rely on a narrow globalist view that departs from reductionist economic imaginaries of global interconnectedness. His notion of educational cosmopolitanism accommodates normative concerns that challenge rather than celebrate the globalized world. Eli Vinokur concretizes a similar challenge by critiquing many educational discourses on European citizenship today that ignore some deeper pedagogical-philosophical stakes of cosmopolitanism. Denise Egéa explores cosmopolitanism from a Derridean perspective that connects the right to philosophy with the teaching of philosophy and the educational responsibility that this connection entails. Benhur Oral undertakes another important venture, namely, to explore a new ontological horizon as an appropriate framework for cosmopolitan debates beyond the confines of exclusive responsibility to foreign humans. Finally, drawing critically on Giorgio Agamben, Jacques Derrida and Catherine Malabou's conceptual devices, Nick Peim sets out to explore biopower and to test the limits of cosmopolitanism in connection to encampment and the figure of the refugee.

From antiquity down to 17th century feminism, to Rousseau and Kant, from modernity to postmodernity, and so on, there have been important dimensions of politicizing sites of human entanglement that deserve attention. The participants in this workshop have pertinently taken up the task of such an attention in diverse and fruitful ways. They have thus made the workshop a most constructive and memorable experience for all of us and offered new insights and critical viewpoints that advance research in our field.

The Idea of Europe in the Age of Ideologies (1929–1939)
The Importance of a Forgotten Issue

Tommaso Visone

Abstract

The Thirties are often considered by scholars an age of nationalisms, not very interesting to analyze under the point of view of whom is willing to understand better the history of such a complex issue that is denoted as "Idea of Europe". This intervention aims to critically discuss the above mentioned point showing the richness and the peculiar reasons of the ideological and political debate related to Europe in the Thirties. After a methodological introduction, the contribution illustrates how, among 1929-1939, the economical, social and "civilization" crisis pushed the political reflection about Europe towards a polemical, plural and innovative meta-political dimension that opens to us some fundamental questions about the future of the current Europe.

Keywords

Idea of Europe, Ideologies, Thirties, Palingenesis, Metapolitics, Ortega *y* Gasset, Drieu La Rochelle, Anna Siemsen.

Scholars have often acted as if, after the Briand proposal of 1929, it were not possible to speak about an "Idea of Europe" almost until the 40s[1]. Thus, the 30s are commonly considered an age of nationalisms, not very interesting to analyze by whom is willing to understand more the history of such a complex issue that is called "Idea of Europe". That choice is commonly due to several reasons: who is studying the subject, trying to rebuild the roots of current European Integration, is so tempted to find a river that from Briand goes to Schumann through a karstistic way, avoiding the apparent road to nowhere of the ideological debate of the decay 1929-1939[2]; Differently, who is analyzing the European conscience focusing on the Thirties cannot found a defined and cohesive whole of characteristics that differenced Europeans from the rest of mankind - as in the XIX century and still in the 20s – but, according to coeval belief, a conflicting and heterogeneous challenge about the European identity[3]. Also who is interested in the History of the idea of United Europe, usually federalists or pan European scholars, are interested to highlight the importance of the link between Briand and Coudenhove Kalergi as the most important attempt to unify Europe or to exalt ideas emerged from federalist movements during the

40s reinterpreting all past history as a sort of preparation for true federalism in which the origin of all serious theorization is conceivable only by starting from the intellectual climate generated by the second world war[4].

In spite of those arguments and traditional approaches, it is possible to stress how the decay that goes from 1929 to 1939 has a fundamental role to address the political and intellectual meaning of European Integration in the XX century and to understand the period between the two world wars. In order to demonstrate that, it is firstly important to define what we mean by the expression "Idea of Europe". In the academic world there are mainly two meanings linked to it: the former defines a consciousness, a "being" (also an existing tendency), a differentiation between what Europe is and what it is not, a perception to be something of peculiar called Europe, whereas the latter indicates a project, a vision, a "should be", something to realize or to desire that is not yet present that will be common to all Europe. Of course, in historical praxis there are a lot of connections between these two ways to think about Europe, but we can say that, even though they are not separated, they can be conceptualized as distinct (so it is possible to distinguish them but they cannot be disconnected either)[5]. After having settled that, we can now point out how our focus, in discussing the 30s debate, will concentrate mainly around "projects" and so it will gravitate around the political idea of Europe and what revolves around it.

It's also important to clarify the meaning "ideology" or better "ideologies" have in my discourse. Using the coeval theories by Gramsci and Mannheim, ideology stands for a concept of the world, or an image of reality (what Heidegger calls *Weltbild*) with its movement, the possibilities related to it and an evaluative criterion embedded in it. An Ideology stems directly from the conceptual web that in every society is spun by philosophy, language, religion, art, common sense, etc. and, for that reason, it can be more or less coherent or systematized. According to this view, ideology is not simply a "negative" concept - ideology as false consciousness or distorted view of the world – but also a "positive" one, a "vision of life" and a fundamental tool to promote and evaluate action[6]. Now it's important to point out that in my exposition, I'll talk about plurality of ideologies. In fact, as many coeval observers and historian noticed, the Thirties were characterized by an authentic "clash of ideologies", by a radical conflict on the different collective directions to follow. The ideological battle was fought – as Enzo Traverso notes[7] – by intellectuals who were completely

engaged in it. In such a context, the study of European "projects" and "visions" elaborated by intellectuals takes on particular interest not only to grasp the Idea of Europe but also to better understand the1929-1939 decay.

Just to give a concrete view of the debate, I wish to briefly consider three of them. Let's start with José Ortega y Gasset who best represents the ordeal that liberals went through in thinking about Europe during the Thirties. At the end of his famous work, in the chapter "Who's run the world" Ortega focused on the fact that Europe ended with its "mando" of the world. According to Ortega, "mandar" – to rule – is exercising hegemony, or better to have "spiritual power" that doesn't correspond to coercive power. From this standpoint, "mandar" is promoting and affirming a "program of life", a path that practically creates order by sharing a goal among the ones involved. In the very moment Europe ended its "mando" over the World, still according to Ortega, nobody managed to substitute it with success. Such lack of *mando, as* Ortega highlighted, triggered the condition that would prompt the collapse not only of the world order of the XIX century, but also of the European society itself. Fascism, Communism, the rebellion of the average man, the strong growth of localism were all consequences of the collapse of the economic and social order due to the crumbling of the "idea" that underpinned it, that is the idea of a Nation-State. It gave Europe the chance to end its Middle Age, by further developing its social structures and by creating for the first time in history a united world under its "mando". However, this idea didn't work anymore in the new context of the Thirties. It was unable to cope with the challenge of an epoch in which "*todo ha crescido*". Therefore, he proposed to follow another idea that would be "*a la altura de los tempos*" : unifying Europe in a big Nation-State organized in a federation, "*los Estados Unidos de Europa*". This project would allow Europeans to nurse their shared illness with a common cure by creating the possibility to regenerate Europe and through this process, its "mando" as well. Obviously, being him a liberal, the Spanish philosopher believed that this project was the only one that could simultaneously regenerate liberalism in a "new liberalism" founded on pluralism and liberal-democracy and capable of going beyond the prior liberalism of XIX century[8]. Thus, with United States of Europe if the core of liberalism – individual freedoms, etc. – could survive in a new form, XIX century liberalism would be left in the past to follow a new idea that allowed to realize liberalism beyond liberalism. The same challenge was also shared by other mainstream liberals of that period - Croce, Nitti, Halevy, Robbins, Eu-

cken just to name a few- all intellectuals who were also aware that if liberalism had failed in giving an efficacious answer, the whole European continent would be thoroughly vanquished by new ideologies such as Communism and Fascism.

If we look to the socialist galaxy, the issue is quite different and complementary to the liberal one. They consider XIX century civilization dead just like the liberals did, even though they see, by various standpoints, such death not only as a danger – for the threat of fascism – but also an opportunity to create a new socialist society in Europe and in the world. Just to consider an interesting case, among all I wish to say something about the thought of Anna Siemsen.

Her pondering is well condensed in her work "*Dictaturen – Oder Europäische Demokratie?*" (1937) where she highlights the coincidence between social democracy and political democracy as aims of the socialist movements. But, according to her view, it wasn't possible to effectively defend and pursue these goals with the coeval division of Europe among sovereign national states. In fact, that partition was the cause of the success of dictatorships and of the incumbent war among Europeans, well represented by the Spanish Civil War. At the same time that "sovereign disorder" prevented Europeans to create a new world order based on peace and equality instead of the concrete possibilities of a war among the European states and the colonies that started to claim their independence. Against that threat – Anna Siemsen was sure about the fact that another world conflict would destroy Europe more than other parts of the World – she calls for a European democratic federation founded by the European continental and democratic states that would defeat fascist dictatorships to create the basis for a larger Union. This "Europa-Union" would create a new kind of socialist and pacifist society, founded on "internal colonization" or on the redistribution of richness and work in the poorest areas of Europe. Of course these wouldn't be an aristocratic/meritocratic society – as hoped by Ortega y Gasset – but an egalitarian one in social and political terms. Furthermore, that kind of Federation of equals could be the pillar of a new multilateral world order, founded on cooperation and equality among the different parts of the globe[9]. The Siemsen's idea is to promote a new kind of *Cosmopolitanism* in which the New Europe would be not, as in Ortega's thought, the "ruler" but the crossroad of cultural and economical exchange based on the equality of its participants.

This Idea of a Socialist Europe was harshly contrasted by fascist intellectuals who, being scared by the fascination of communist and socialist ideas among Europeans of the Thirties, inclined for another kind of solution.

Among such fascist intellectuals, Pierre Drieu la Rochelle's elaboration is interesting for his radical affirmation of the necessity of a new European order re-visited in a fascist way. Convinced of the ineluctable decadence of bourgeoisie in Europe he, after the 1934, converted himself to fascism and exalted the idea of a new civilization founded on strength, bloody brotherhood, hierarchy and northern-white supremacy[10]. During the Thirties his aversion to liberalism and bourgeoisie was so strong that, for a period, he also considered the opportunity to adhere to Stalinism, but his hate for abstract egualitarism and his aversion for cosmopolitanism brought him to consider fascism the only possible "ecumenical" solution to regenerate the decadent civilization of the old continent. Fascinated by Nazi-Germany and worried about the rise of new extra-European world powers (Japan, Usa, Ussr, etc.) he claimed for a new European Empire, dominated by fascist ideology and capable to defeat simultaneously liberalism, communism and the European tendency to mix races and to encourage materialism. In fact, according to Drieu, Fascism meant the return to the spiritual supremacy that Europe had been missing since Christian Middle Age and an explicit refusal of rationalist, intellectualist and materialist modernity with its typical supporters: the bourgeoisie and the Jews. The main enemy for him was the homologation of the world promoted by the latter, a "plague" that a new distinction founded on heroism, honor, religion, communitarism and strength would destroy all Europe creating the imperial basis also for a new world power capable to reverse the trend of decadence that invested Europe since the end of XIX century. For that reason he was a strong critic of nationalism, considered as one of the causes of the decline and as a typical product of bourgeois thought. Thus a new Holy Fascist Empire was also an instrument to transform again the world in a Eurocentric reality and to end with the XIX century civilization that was founded on national sovereignty[11].

In this sample of coeval theorizations every project was strongly connected with its ideology of reference in the double task to fight other ideologies and to regenerate European civilization. In the 30s it was clear that reordered Europe wasn't just choosing, politically, what the best institutional organization for Europe was but it was about choosing, meta-politically, a model of civilization. There was the evidence of the necessity to rethink completely the subject Europe due to the fact that the experiment of coexistence of XIX century had failed (and the last, decisive, blow was the crisis of capitalism as it was thought and practiced since XIX century)[12]. If Europe means something and does something as a subject in the world,

it would need a complete revolution and reorganization lead by new perspectives, new ideas. If in the 20s it was possible to think to an unitarian organization of Europe that followed the idea to save whatever possible to the XIX century civilization – and so the issue is only political and the debate is which kind of organization will be the best to save that set of common values – in the 30s the problem was different, it appears no longer possible to save something common because the collapse of economy, the disaggregation of society, the growth of fascism, the emergency of new planetarian powers and the birth of strong independentist movements in colonies signaled that the old project - that defining what Europe was in setting a common whole of values, ideas of history, and position in the world and was able until the first world war to keep Europe united - was once and for all dead. Thus "Palingenesis" became the core issue for Europeans and different projects of European order, molded with ideological addresses, tried to win, one against the other, the theoretical battle to create a new civilization and to defeat barbarism that was identified with concurrent visions. In that fight the prize was the European identity that was only re-generable by a project that, touching the whole continent, would set its new "unity"[13].

The decay between 1929-1939 is, thus, fundamental to signal a new problem: the definitive end of Europe as it was in the XIX century and the need to redefine and reorganize Europe in the new relationship with a world that can no longer dominate and easily address. This problem stimulated and nourished an ideological conflict that played on this central and still alive issue: what kind of civilization – or pattern of coexistence - should we have in Europe? What "should" Europe "be" (and thus, for the recursive effect, "is")? The second world war and the cold war didn't answer that question that was only frozen to the extent that it was no longer possible for Europe to relate directly as a potential subject (and no more, like in XIX, as the subject) to the World. It still remains valid.

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Endnotes

1. E.g. Heikki Mikkeli, *Europa. Storia di un'idea e di un'identità* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2002); Heinz Duchhardt, ed., *Europäer des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Mainz: Von Zabern, 2002); Mario Telò, *Dallo Stato all'Europa. Idee politiche e istituzioni* (Roma: Carocci, 2004); Derek Heater, *Europäische Einheit –Biographie einer Idee* (Bochum: Winkler, 2005); Elisabeth Du Reau, *L'idée d'Europe au XXe siècle. Des mithes aux realités* (Bruxelles: Complexes, 2008).
2. Eg. Giuseppe Mammarella e Paolo Cacace, *Storia e politica dell'Unione Europea (1926- 2005)* (Roma: Laterza, 2008) 7-11. For Mark Gilbert this river is just a British river see Mark Gilbert, *European Integration. A concise history* (Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 16-17.
3. This point is highlighted in Carlo Curcio *Europa : Storia di un'idea* (Firenze:Vallecchi, 1958). See also the substancial absence of thirties in Mikkeli, *Europa*.; in Paloma Garcia Picazo, *La idea de Europa: Historia, Cultura, Politica* (Tecnos: Madrid, 2008) etc.
4. Eg. Sergio Pistone, ed., *L'idea dell'unificazione europea dalla prima alla seconda guerra mondiale* (Torino: Einaudi, 1975); Verena Schöberl, *Es gibt eine großes und herriliches land, das sich selbst nicht kennt…es heißt Europa, Die Diskussion um die Paneuropaidee in Deutschland, Frankreich und Großbritannien 1922-1933* (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2003); Anne-Marie Saint-Gilles, *La Paneurope. Un débat d'idées dans l'entre deux guerres* (Paris :Presses de l'Université de Paris- Sorbonne, 2003) and Jean-Michel Guieu, "L'Europe des militants françaises pour la Société des Nations», in «Quelle(s) Europe(s) ? Nouvelles approches en histoire de l'intégration européenne au XX siècle» accessed February 15/2012 www.jmguieu.free.fr. Partially different is Jean Luc Chabot, *Aux origines intellectuelles de l'Union européenne. L'idée d'Europe unie de 1919 à 1939* (Grenoble: PUG, 2005).
5. About this relationship in the Thirties see Tommaso Visone, "Unità e molteplicità di un'idea metapolitica: l' 'Europa' negli anni Trenta", in *L'Europa una e multanime: un problema ancora aperto*, ed. Bruna Consarelli (Padova: Cedam, 2012), 137-151.
6. Also in Marx the concept is not univocal. See Christian Godin, *La Totalité; Volume 2. Le pensées totalisantes* (Seyssel: Champ Vallon, 1998), 441-448.
7. See Enzo Traverso, *A ferro e fuoco. La guerra civile europea 1914-1945* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2007), 205.
8. See José Ortega y Gasset, *La Rebelión de las Masas*, (1930) (Madrid: Austral, 2007), 187-248 and Id, *En cuanto al pacifismo*, (1937) in Id, *La Rebelión de las Masas*, 259-293.
9. See Anna Siemsen, *Diktaturen – Oder Europäische Demokratie?*(St.Gallen: Verlag Buchdruckerei Volksstimme, 1937).
10. See Pierre Drieu la Rochelle, *Socialisme fasciste* (Paris : Gallimarde, 1934) ; Id, *Confession*, (1939) (Paris : L'Herme, 2007).
11. See Pierre Drieu la Rochelle, *Gilles* (Paris : Gallimard, 1939) et Id, *Textes Politiques 1919-1945* (Paris : Krisis, 2009). See also Tommaso Visone, *La réaction au cosmopolitisme dans les années trente .L'idée d'Europe chez Asvero Gravelli, Carl Schmitt et Drieu la Rochelle* in *Cosmopolitisme et réaction: le triangle Allemagne-France-Italie dans l'entre-deux-guerres*, ed. Ute Lemke, Massimo Lucarelli, Emmanuel Mattiato (Chambéry : Éditions de l'Université de Savoie, 2014), 134-141.
12. In 1935 Helbert Fischer spoke about the end of liberal experiment. Id A History of Europe The Liberal experiment (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1935). See also the classic thesis of Karl Polanyi about the end of XIX century civilization in Id, *The great transformation. The political and economic origins of our time* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957).
13. See Tommaso Visone, *L'idea d'Europa nell'età delle ideologie (1929-1939). Il dibattito francese e italiano* (Paris: Chemins de Tr@verse, 2012), 252-263.

The Love of Country in Education
Questioning the Meaning of a Patriotic Education

Claudia Schumann

Abstract

Trying to understand Martha Nussbaum's shift from her prominent discussion of cosmopolitanism to her more recent proposal of a focus on teaching patriotism, much less acknowledged in the academic literature, the article explores the particular conception of love of country underpinning Nussbaum's turn to patriotism in education. Following Alice Crary's analyses of moral judgment, I will argue that good moral judgment requires the education of (practical) sensitivities just as much with regard to one's country as it does for the cosmopolitan. In line with the work of Marianna Papastephanou it will further be shown that a critically understood cosmopolitanism is indeed compatible with a critically understood patriotism, so that the patriotic and the cosmopolitan stance can be revealed as not being mutually exclusive as construed by Nussbaum. Looking at Honneth's notion of solidarity and Ricoeur's dialectic understanding of the relation between the logic of love and the logic of justice, I will conclude that it is just as undesirable to teach patriotism as it is undesirable to teach cosmopolitanism purely driven by the logic of equivalence, and that we should aim at fostering solidarity just as much in a local as in a global context.

Keywords

Cosmopolitanism, Patriotism, Education, Honneth, Crary, Nussbaum.

As I am thinking and writing about the possible meanings of patriotism in education, German newspapers comment euphorically on the victory of the German football team against Argentina.[1] This new-found national pride is further supported by outside perspectives on the success, as foreign newspaper titles read: "World Cup victory confirms Germany supremacy on almost every measure."[2]At the same time, the media report on commemoration services with politicians warning of the fanaticism and extensive nationalism in Europe leading to the beginning of World War I; other reports follow on the crisis in the Ukraine, its struggle for national integrity and independence from Russia, on the war between Israel and the Hamas in Gaza counting more than 1000 civilian deaths to date, and on the hoisting of the black flags of the ISIS, signposts of thousands of brutally violent killings in the name of the erection of an Islamic state in Iraq and Syria.

In light of these headlines, one might rightfully wonder whether Nussbaum's 1996 claim in the widely discussed *For Love of Country?* was correct, when she argued that "the worthy goals of patriotism" would indeed be better served by "the very old ideal of the cosmopolitan, the person whose allegiance is to the worldwide community of human beings".[3] Furthermore, it puts into question why in later years, and much less recognized in the academic discussion in education as well as in political theory, Nussbaum went on to change her mind and discards cosmopolitanism in order to now argue for "teaching patriotism".[4] In a closer analysis of her arguments, we will find that Nussbaum's "notion of a globally sensitive patriotism is not the easy target that many critics of patriotic attachment and concomitant education set for themselves".[5] However, we will also find that the underlying conception of patriotism and the hopes connected to it are constructed in a way that not only create an artificial tension and ultimate incompatibility with cosmopolitan aspirations, but that ultimately do not seem to serve well what Nussbaum considers the "worthy goals of patriotism" to begin with.

So which reasons does Nussbaum give for her shift to patriotism in education? First of all, she stresses the "importance of particularistic forms of love and attachment" as providing "the foundation of political principles".[6] Secondly, she says that cosmopolitanism implies "the denial of particular attachments [which] leaves life empty of meaning for most of us" and that "the solution to problems of particular attachments ought not to be this total uprooting, so destructive of the human personality" (Ibid.). This brings to mind an argument which Alasdair MacIntyre developed already in 1984 that "the moral standpoint and the patriotic standpoint are systematically incompatible"[7] since the partiality of the patriot stands in blatant contradiction with the widespread understanding of liberal morality holding that moral judgment and action require us "to judge as any rational person would judge, independently of his or her interests, affections and social position" (Ibid.).

It is quite apparent that Nussbaum in her later writings seems to align the stance of the cosmopolitan with this understanding of morality and that she seems to agree with MacIntyre that the strongest argument for patriotism lies in the following rationale:

If […] it is the case that I am characteristically brought into being and maintained as a moral agent only through the particular kinds of moral sustenance afforded by my community, then it is clear that deprived of this community, I am unlikely to flourish as a moral agent. […] Detached from

my community, I will be apt to lose my hold upon all genuine standards of judgment. (10f.)

In her arguments for patriotism, Nussbaum appears convinced that cosmopolitanism in a similar sense that MacIntyre puts forth for liberal morality would require us to be an "impartial actor, and one who in his impartiality is doomed to rootlessness, to be a citizen of nowhere" (12). Also in philosophy of education it has been argued that "national sentiment can provide this bonding"[8] which is needed to transcend immediate self-interest and that the love of country is an important means to underpin the civic friendship which is required to animate citizens for projects such as the fair redistribution of goods.[9]

In my prior work on cosmopolitanism[10] I have already contested the conceptualization of cosmopolitanism as a form of identity which stands in opposition to local and particular forms of being bound. In line with other proponents of rooted cosmopolitanism, I have stressed the importance of the critical dimension of Diogenes' claim to being a citizen of the world, arguing that the real conflict line does not lie between a stylized universalism and particularism, but that the "distinction which should matter is that between a badly understood cosmopolitanism which means nothing but the economically inspired extension of reification on a global scale, and between a critical cosmopolitanism which provides an analytical-descriptive as well as a normative resource for theorizing the withstanding, untangling and going beyond such reifications on a global scale"[11]. As Marianna Papastephanou carefully works out in her article on Nussbaum's turn to patriotism, it is precisely the narrow fixation on the late Stoic conception of cosmopolitanism which "traps her political thought in either/ors" and the "oppositional connection of cosmopolitanism and patriotism as attachments that operate at cross-purposes [which] effaces the possibility of conceptualizing them as a set and a subset whose synergy has mutually corrective and directive effects".[12] However, before looking more closely into the ways in which I think it can and should be argued that a critical cosmopolitanism is actually compatible with a critically understood patriotism, I think it is worthwhile to look at the way in which the understanding of moral judgment as abstraction from all particular attachment and sentiment is inherently mistaken which puts into question the main argument given for their conception of patriotism by both MacIntyre and Nussbaum.

Following the later works of Wittgenstein, Alice Crary in *Beyond Moral Judgment* has developed a thorough-going criticism of what she names the "abstrac-

tion requirement" which is widely spread in many varieties of contemporary moral theory and which she argues is "internally confused".[13] Crary draws an "image of a natural language as a non-neutral, intrinsically moral acquisition" (41) and argues that "learning to speak is inseparable from the adoption of a practical orientation toward the world – specifically, one that bears the imprint of the speaker's individuality" (43). Learning a language, for Crary, implies acquiring different intra- and interpersonal practical orientations which "encode a view of what matters most in life or how best to live" (43), so that "learning to speak is inseparable from the development of an – individual – moral outlook" (Ibid.). Hence, she demonstrates that if it is not "possible to get our minds around how things are independently of the possession of any sensitivities, we […] make room for an alternative conception on which the exercise of rationality necessarily presupposes the possession of certain sensitivities" (118f.). Crary recognizes that a certain form of impartiality might be required for moral judgment, but she also emphasizes that in ordinary situations what we mean by impartiality is merely "an abstraction from those routes of feeling that threaten to distort moral judgment" (203) and that this should not be confused with the philosophical question "whether every affective propensity we have as such represents a potential threat to such judgment" (204). In her account of moral judgment, there is room for cases in which an ascription of subjective properties "figures in the best, objectively most accurate account of how things are and, further, that the person who lacks the subjective endowments that would allow her to recognize them is simply missing something" (28). If Crary's analyses are correct, then moral judgment with regard to our *patria* just as much as in a cosmopolitan stance with regard to global issues is deeply tied to our sensitivities, and requires abstraction from some of these sensitivities only insofar as these might preclude sound judgment. More importantly, it requires a thorough-going education of these sensitivities in order to be able to arrive at an objective and rational assessment of how things actually stand and what course of action is the right one to take.

The idea that a genuine affective dimension plays an important role also for cosmopolitanism and that cosmopolitanism should not be reduced to merely legalistic, negative duty, "based on some relationship of reciprocity of benefits,"[14] was recognized by Nussbaum in her reply to the critics of her early prominent writings on cosmopolitanism. She then defended that children, "long before they encounter patriotism", "know hunger and loneliness, they have probably encountered death […], they know something of humanity."[15] While the patriotic stance here became strongly equated with ideological nationalism, the cosmopolitan stance was clearly

identified with more than a narrowly rationalistic, principled dutifulness. What seems to have changed her opinion in the following years is the idea that educating national sentiment, since directed at a "circle" that is closer to the self than the whole world or humanity as such is able to engender stronger "sentiments of love and support"[16] than educating for cosmopolitanism ever could.

Papastephanou has developed a convincing critique of Nussbaum's model of concentric circles and has suggested an eccentric model of cosmopolitanism instead.[17] Indeed, in her discussion of Aristotle's argument against Plato, Nussbaum betrays most overtly her model of love as one that is thoroughly emotivist and possessive. In apparent agreement with her reconstructed Aristotle she summarizes his insights claiming that "to make someone love something requires making them to see it as 'their own,' and, preferably also, as 'the only one they have.'"[18] Thinking about even closer circles than the nation, we could wonder if we would consider it a genuine form of love if our partner, parent or child would really primarily love us because they consider us their own or the only one they have, and it seems doubtful that a love so conceived could actually do the kind of work that Nussbaum wants for the worthy goals of patriotism, namely the de-centering of the self. Would such a possessive emotion not really just lead to an extended self-centeredness, an extended sense of self-importance and egotism?

I would like to suggest that if we are looking for a form of love or emotional-affective attachment to others which can play "the role of the 'cement' of society"[19], we might be better off looking in a place such as Axel Honneth has demarcated in in his *Struggle for Recognition* in terms of social esteem or solidarity.[20] He argues that in order for a society to not succumb to a merely legalistic structure based on negative freedom and constraints, we require a third form of recognition beyond personal love and moral respect, namely a form of social esteem or solidarity, which is accorded to each individual of a society qua individual and which implies an appreciation of the specific values and contributions a concrete person brings to the community, and therefore our active and positive interest in the projects that another person pursues. Its demands go not as far as the demands and commitments of personal love, but solidarity is affective sentiment inflected by the logic of justice – in a similar vein as Ricoeur argues that while the logic of love, the logic of superabundance, is distinct from the logic of justice, the logic of equivalence, both forms need to be dialectically related to each other.[21]

But where do these reflections on love and solidarity leave us with regard to the question of the meaning of patriotism for education and its relation to a cosmopolitan education? As we have learned from Crary, good moral judgment requires the education of (practical) sensitivities just as much for the patriot as it does for the cosmopolitan. As we can learn from Honneth and Ricoeur, it is just as undesirable to teach patriotism as it is undesirable to teach cosmopolitanism purely driven by the logic of equivalence. Therefore, we should aim to foster solidarity in a local just as much as in a global context. But what is the place then for patriotism in education? Much of what I have said so far could be read as suggesting a form of civic or even constitutional patriotism as suggest most prominently by Habermas, and it could be argued to be served well by underpinning it with national sentiment within appropriate constraints as suggested by John White (see above). However, if we follow the argument that the main critical impetus of a cosmopolitan stance is to commit ourselves to "non-reifying forms of boundedness"[22] and to "taking responsibility for making the situational and historical contexts of our own claims and demands visible" (Ibid.), this context-sensitivity leads to an understanding of patriotism which I would like to spell out in terms of two main aspects which Papastephanou has importantly drawn attention to.

Papastephanou points out that much of the recent literature on patriotism has focused on what she terms an "internal patriotism"[23] which requires patriotic affect and sentiment. In contrast, she argues for an outward critical patriotism which "raises legitimate demands and protects the rights of a particular people without nationalist claims to superiority and expects its people to be fair to others" (191). The external perspective on patriotism has the advantage of first of all demanding attention to the fact that our picture of our own *patria* also has to take into critical account outsiders' points of view on it, and secondly of allowing to make sense of the way in which patriotism can become politically activated, as in the wave of decolonization which started in the second part of the last century. Civic and constitutional patriotisms run the danger of underestimating "that national distinctiveness has had a specifically empowering role in people's resisting domination" (195), and they do this through a de-politicized understanding of culture. Therefore, in addition to stressing and demonstrating the legitimacy of this outward dimension of patriotism, Papastephanou furthermore proposes to shift the focus of patriotism from the nation back to the *ethnos* (193ff.). "Nation" is not only easily conflated with the nation-state and carries negative associations to the historically predominant exclusivist and arrogant stance of nationalisms, but it also relates back etymologi-

cally to the Roman goddess of birth and origin. (cf. 196) "Ethnos" in contrast can be shown to carry connotations which "bring together the stability of the common abode (home) with the mobility of flow and of a common navigation, the collective passage (homelessness) through a half-remembered, half-forgotten past and an unknown and uncertain future," (197) while notions of birth and hereditary lineage remain secondary. Papastephanou remains wary of the pitfalls of *ethnos*, but argues that patriotism could "better be theorized by the term 'ethnic' rather than 'national' because the word *ethnos* comprises as yet unexplored counterfactual possibilities" (198).

As I am writing this paper, I am myself in the process of relocating from Germany to Sweden for the next years to come. What might distinguish the love that I might find or grow towards my new country of residence, possibly becoming another *patria* for me, from the love that countless other Germans not living there nevertheless feel deeply towards Sweden? This German romance with Sweden is a love based on projective images fostered through highly popular TV crime shows and romantic family dramas set in Sweden and produced for the sentimental desires of the German audience. The most blatant difference, as I see it, will not lie primarily in the inward, emotivist dimension of patriotism, but in what Papastephanou characterizes as the outward dimension. Insofar as I am enjoying immediate benefits and profits from being a Swedish resident, I might have to consider other obligations to and claims by those countries with which Sweden has been historically entangled. And insofar as I come to enjoy and maybe love aspects of the specific way of living in this country, my transformed cultural identity might become politically activated in ways that the German TV audience might not.

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Endnotes

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17. Cf. Marianna Papastephanou, *Thinking Differently about Cosmopolitanism. Theory, Eccentricity, and the Globalized World* (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2012); especially Chapter 2.
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19. Papastephanou, *Thinking Differently*, 188.
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Cosmopolitan Patriotism
Moral Education through Kant and Walt Whitman

Pradeep A. Dhillon

Abstract

Moral thinking and the expansion of our moral imagination for Cora Diamond can certainly proceed from sound argumentation, but it develops just as well, if not better, when it is called to engage with the world through the arts. In other words, the arts are able to expand the moral imagination of those who would not likely to be moved argument alone. In this essay, I demonstrate the value of Diamond's thinking by elaborating on the topic of cosmopolitan patriotism found in philosophy and poetry. First, I draw on recent Kantian research to show that contrary to much of the discourse on cosmopolitanism, Kant's suggestion that we bear duties towards distant strangers does not arise from an indifference to the care, concern, and responsibilities towards those with whom we share more immediate bonds. That is, patriotism does not present a challenge to Kantian cosmopolitanism but is entirely compatible with it. Turning, to Walt Whitman's "Passage to India," I will argue that such thinking is not at all out of the realm of a poetically expressed cosmopolitan-patriotic vision. That is, I will point to the "serious thought"-an attribute typically used to make a distinction between philosophy and literature-that lies within Whitman's poem even as I show that philosophical arguments for moral education often proceed through a reliance on imagination. This exercising and expansion of the moral imagination is much needed as we struggle to settle into a global, democratic, 21st century.

Keywords

Cosmopolitanism, Patriotism, Kant's Political Philosophy, Aesthetics and Philosophical Argumentation, Moral Education.

In her essay "Anything, but Argument?" Cora Diamond seeks to establish the impoverishment of our moral capacities when we, as philosophers, insist on the sole legitimacy afforded by argumentation in moral thinking.[1] Regardless of how well such arguments are constructed, she tells us, they convince only those who are already inclined to think thus or are trained to evaluate such writing. Moral thinking and the expansion of our moral imagination, for her, can certainly proceed from sound argumentation, but it develops just as well, if not better, when it is called to engage with the world through the literary and, I might add, the arts in general.[2] In other words, the arts are able to expand the moral imagination of those who would not likely to be moved argument alone. The presupposition on which her argument rests is that those who are

not already inclined in a certain moral direction are too often limited by access to educational opportunities that would enable an extend and exercise moral imagination. Furthermore, if we place argumentation as the sole tool that can provide us with epistemic access to moral thinking we run the risk of claiming that only philosophers-trained in evaluating such arguments- can be moral! Clearly this is not an outcome that moral philosophers and educators would support. In making such an epistemic claim based on a sharp distinction between philosophy and the arts we also run the risk of suggesting that philosophy itself is incapable of expanding and exercising our moral imagination. This claim too would sit uncomfortably with most philosophers.

In this essay, I demonstrate the value of Diamond's thinking by elaborating on the topic of cosmopolitan patriotism found in philosophy and poetry. First, I draw on recent Kantian research to show that contrary to much of the discourse on cosmopolitanism, Kant's suggestion that we bear duties towards distant strangers does not arise from an indifference to the care, concern, and responsibilities towards those with whom we share more immediate bonds. That is, patriotism does not present a challenge to Kantian cosmopolitanism but is entirely compatible with it. Turning, to Walt Whitman's "Passage to India," I will argue that such thinking is not at all out of the realm of a poetically expressed cosmopolitan-patriotic vision. That is, I will point to the "serious thought"-an attribute typically used to make a distinction between philosophy and literature-that lies within Whitman's poem even as I show that philosophical arguments for moral education often proceed through a reliance on imagination. This exercising and expansion of the moral imagination is much needed as we struggle to settle into a global, democratic, 21st century.

In her recent exploration of Kant's cosmopolitan patriotism, Pauline Kleingeld clears some of the misunderstandings of Kant that stand in the way of demonstrating his relevance for this democratic global moment in human history.[3] Within a wider discussion of global justice, it is worth noting that by the 1790s Kant had completely stepped away from his earlier hierarchical views on race and had come to be deeply critical of slavery and colonialism. With regards migration, he changed his earlier view that different races were physiologically best suited for specific environments, and came to hold that all environments were suitable for human adaptation.

Having established Kant's cosmopolitan credentials around specific issues like slavery, colonialism, and migration, Kleingeld turns to his reconciliation of the duties we bear to distant strangers with those we bear to our fellow citizens. That is, he squares cosmopolitanism with patriotism. While the literature is replete with discussions of Kant's cosmopolitanism, there is very little that has been written on Kant's ideas of patriotism. We owe Pauline Kleingeld a great debt for bringing the relation between these two ideas in Kant's thought to the fore. Furthermore, Kleingeld's study on the topic of cosmopolitan patriotism is rooted in historical specificity. She not only carefully traces changes in Kant's thought, but also points out that patriotism, as understood during the nationalist period of the 19th Century, was quite different from the idea of patriotism as understood in the 18th Century. It is this turn to reading Kant in light of the democratizing18th century, I suggest, that points to the great relevance of his thought in the global 21st century.

It is commonplace, among philosophers in general and philosophers of education in particular, to argue that Kant's moral cosmopolitanism leaves no theoretical room for duties to one's State. This is the case despite Kant's many comments on the importance of cosmopolitans acting patriotically. Critical of notions of national exceptionalism-the idea that one's nation is superior to all others-Kant "claims that such a view should be "eradicated" and replaced by "patriotism and cosmopolitanism."[4] Patriotism for Kant represents a republic-what we would today call a representative democracy—which follows the rule of law that flows from the general will. Citizens are not only receivers of benefits from the State, but bear a duty to engage with it for it to continue functioning as a political community of free and equal members. This sets up a two -way normative relationship between the State and its citizens. The State bears a responsibility to treat all its citizens equally and fairly, for it has to create the conditions where citizens can exercise their democratic duties and express their general will. Kant's 1784 essay " An Answer to the Question: 'What is Englightenment?'" provides a detailed account of this relationship particularly through the institutions of scholarship and the press.[5] That is, citizens cannot withdraw from the business of the State to pursue their own private concerns. His injunction to "argue as much as we like, but obey," is not only a mandate for rule of law but also for literacy. Furthermore, when citizens and the State accept the mandate for free and equal participation, they make a contract with each other and the State to promote justice and thus create a just State. Such

enlightened citizens would, on Kant's view, go so far as to refuse to promote a just State by if it meant that they do so by all and any means. In others words, against the charge that Kant overlooks the special obligations we bear towards to the State of which we are citizens, we find that he endorses, repeatedly, these obligations which flow from his theory of political self-legislation that is in accordance with his principles of morality and right. This, Kant acknowledges, does follow some calculation-as is often supposed—but requires also the balancing of diverse moral demands, which is something that we have to gain experience in through education. In other words, in order to fully exercise our freedom, and hence claim our own humanity, we need to acknowledge and create the conditions-nationally and globally-for others to do the same.

This way of thinking bears two important entailments for moral education. First, we are called on to educate for the awareness that we bear responsibility towards our State and fellow-citizens not simply because they are "ours." But, rather, because they are free and equal legislators within the community of which we are a part. Second, since local loyalties develop early on in children, we need to slowly expand those feelings and understandings to go beyond the family, and our face to face interactions, even the imagined communities we share through print and other media, to include the community of all human beings. In sum, "Kant regards the promotion of the well-being of others as a duty. But instead of doing so in accordance with one's own view of the good, one should respect others as moral agents in their own right. This entails that one let oneself be guided by *their* ends, provided these ends are morally defensible, and one should take care that one not help others in a way that is humiliating or paternalistic."[6]

Let us return to Cora Diamond's thought that literature and the arts can serve to broaden our moral landscape through a turn to imagination. The cosmopolitan patriotic demand, as articulated by Kant, can be found in many places in Whitman's poetry, but I want to draw it out specifically through his verses in the "Passage to India," written on the occasion of the opening of the Suez Canal thus considerably shortening the distance between the United States, Europe, and the East, particularly India.[7] In addition, I want to point to the role that Kant's theory of the imagination could be said to play out in Whitman's poetic realization of cosmopolitan patriotism. For Kant, imagination, in keeping with Western classical thinking on the topic, plays an intermediate role between sensibility and

understanding. This is view that is first articulated in the *Critique of Pure Reason,* but underlies the subsequent *Critique of Practical Reason,* and the *Critique of Judgment.* Having established that sensibility and understanding stand in a mutual relationship, Kant divides sensibility between sense and imagination. The former "comprising the 'faculty of intuition in the presence of an object' and the latter 'intuition without the presence of an object' (A%15)."[8] Furthermore, imagination itself is further divided between memory, the recollection of objects that are experienced, and productive or poetic imagination. What is important for our discussion of Whitman here is that Kant takes productive imagination to create the conditions of experience that are neither willful nor accidental (which would be 'fantasy'). Thus when Whitman writes…

> O you fables, spurning the known, eluding the hold of the known, mounting to heaven!
> You lofty and dazzling towers, pinnacled, red as roses, burnish'd with gold!

He speaks not of fantastical structures, but uses poetic imagination to extend the imagination of his American countrymen, to imagine real structures, the Golden Temple of Amritsar, and the Madurai temple with its ascending sculptural depiction of the religious myths of India that Whitman had not experienced but would no doubt have read about. It is important to note, however for Whitman these structures are the product of human imagination-or, in his words 'mortal dreams.' Thus, Whitman brings the accomplishments of distant others into focus for his countrymen through the use of a distinct aspect of the faculty of imagination that he calls 'imagination plastica.' This is the ability to present a pictorial representation in space. In addition, by emphasizing the mortality of the builders of these structures he transforms them from distant others to members of a shared global community. In Kantian terms, as a poet he uses the occasion of the opening of the Suez Canal to give expression to the responsibility he bears to his fellow Americans- a patriotic duty- to bring to their awareness the cosmopolitanism that must be part of their understanding of themselves as citizens of the thought that is America.

In line with Kant's thinking, Whitman's poem denounces the kind of patriotism that would hold and its own accomplishments superior to those of other nations. Thus…

Not you alone, proud truths of the world!
Nor you alone, ye facts of modern science!
But myths and fables of eld—Asia's, Africa's fables!

Whitman remains proud of the accomplishments of his country, the recently completed transcontinental railroad, and the laying of telegraph wires under the ocean, "The New by its mighty railroad spann'd, The Seas inlaid with eloquent gentle wires." But in this glow of rightful pride in American accomplishments, he warns against forgetting the past out of which this new was forged. In his words…

The Past! the dark, unfathom'd retrospect!
The teeming gulf! the sleepers and the shadows!
The past! the infinite greatness of the past!
For what is the present, after all, but a growth out of the past?

This, past, for him, includes the scholarship, 'the bibles and legends' of Asia and Africa. That is, cosmopolitanism, for him, is built into patriotism. Even as he sings his own country, speaking of the learning and wisdom of Asia and Africa he says, "You too I welcome, and fully, the same as the rest; You too with joy I sing." Thus equality in appreciating and lauding human accomplishment is a crucial part of his cosmopolitanism in this poem that he writes for the America that he imagines. The poem serves as the pedagogical purpose of promoting cosmopolitan patriotism.

The premise that grounds Kant's notion of cosmopolitan right is the idea that before any particular acquisition of property the earth is in common possession. Kant does not mean that the land is jointly owned but rather that it constitutes the material possibility of the interaction between peoples as also that of migration. Its very shape, its roundness, creates the condition of such an original community.

Even though various parts of the earth might be owned by different peoples, they continue to be thought of as part of the whole, which for Kant constitutes the "original community." Since they are 'locked in' they stand in a community of possible physical interaction that must be regulated in accordance with principles of cosmopolitan right. Whitman articulates this very idea when he urges his fellow citizens to recognize these possibilities when he says…

"Passage to India!
Lo, soul! Seest thou not God's purpose from the first?
The earth to be spann'd, connected by net-work"

He is urging Americans to see that they are part of this wider community. Furthermore, the community he envisions is not a complicated relationship between American selves and distant others, but rather as a community of close, even familial, relationships. Thus…

The people to become brothers and sisters,
The races, neighbors, to marry and be given in marriage,
The oceans to be cross'd, the distant brought near,
The lands to be welded together.

He seeks to encourage his countrymen to imagine a peaceful world where the Other, can be considered as another. An echo of this thinking can be found in Kant's reflection on migration and the diversity of races. Since humans can adapt to living in any environment-which, as I have already mentioned, is a reversal of his earlier thinking on this topic- and since they belong to the 'original community of the land' they have the cosmopolitan right to migration when their own habitats cannot provide the conditions necessary for their well-being. These migrations, with the possibilities of multiplying diversity are to be valued. In his words, such migrations should foster diversity instead uniformity, since nature itself favors "multiplying endlessly the bodily and mental characteristics in the same tribe and even family."[9]

Through this discussion of Whitman and cosmopolitan patriotism, I have sought to demonstrate Diamond's claim that literature and the arts can be bearers of serious thought and serve an important function in expanding the moral imagination of those who are not in a position to evaluate and judge philosophical arguments. Thus, Diamond seeks to rescue philosophers from making the indefensible claim that only philosophers, trained in evaluating moral arguments, can be effective moral agents. Conversely, she also seeks to redress the possibility that philosophy cannot expand and exercise moral imagination. In the final section of this essay, I turn now to examine the ways in which Kant's discussion of cosmopolitan patriotism does just that.

In his essay 'Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,' Kant conceives of the ways in which history must progress so that we can complete the development of reason that requires moral development, in order to achieve the transformation of the global society into a '*moral* whole.' This cosmopolitan ideal for historical progress is tied to our particular attachments and responsibilities. Speaking of the burden of history that we bear towards our descendants he says,

> "how our remote descendants will manage to cope with the burden of history which we shall bequeath to them a few centuries from now. No doubt they will value the history of the oldest times, of which the original documents would long have vanished, only from the point of view of what interests them, i.e. the positive and negative achievements of nations and governments in relation to the cosmopolitan goal…and this may provide us with another small motive for attempting a philosophical history of this kind."[10]

In other words, in theorizing the ideal, Kant uses productive imagination- the tool of poetic expression- to render for us a world that we should strive to achieve. He does this not by providing us with a romantic fantasy, but rather by taking us as we are, selfish beings, with narrow attachments- 'the crooked timber of humanity'- and carefully laying out what we can provided we can first imagine such a possibility. Furthermore, the use of productive imagination in building philosophical theories that can provide us with moral guidance as we develop as individuals, States, and species, not in one fell swoop, but slowly

through a moral education that links where we are to the ideal State we wish to reach. Finally, Kant relies on the imagination-the ability to render what is not present in his theory of cosmopolitan patriotism. Drawing on productive imagination he teaches us that that just because we have not accomplished such a State of cosmopolitan right in the past does not mean that given the freedom granted us by our very humanity, we cannot imagine such a possibility and strive towards it. In other words, Kant shows us, and shows us with imaginative force, the moral perfections we are capable of realizing just as Whitman teaches us ways in which American patriotism and cosmopolitan commitments are intimately linked.

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Endnotes

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The Cosmopolitan Idea of Global Distributive Justice

Zdenko Kodelja

Abstract

The problem of how justice is to be considered at the global level has provoked one of the most controversial discussions in contemporary political and moral philosophy. The main aim of these polemics has been, as Van Parijs stresses, to find an adequate answer to the question of whether global distributive justice should be understood as social justice in the sense that the principles of justice, accepted at the national level, should be extended to all mankind, or, just the opposite, if global justice should be understood as an inter-national justice, which requires the development of the principles that would enable fair interactions between nations or countries, which should be quite different from those principles that allow inter-individual equity within nations or nation states. The main purpose of this paper is to briefly discuss the reasons why some philosophers, like Beitz and Pogge, are convinced that the principles of justice, accepted at the national level, should also be applied to the world as a whole, and on the other hand, why Rawls, Nagel and some others think just the opposite. In addition, it will be argued that looking from the cosmopolitan point of view, principles of global distributive justice should apply equally and impartially to all human beings (Kok-Chor Tan) as citizens of the world, and that commitment to cosmopolitan principles of distributive justice does not entail commitment to a world state (O'Neill).

Keywords

Cosmopolitanism, Distributive Justice, Global Justice, Moral Obligations.

Although there are different interpretations of cosmopolitanism and different conceptions of cosmopolitan justice,[1] it seems justifiable to assume that the idea of cosmopolitan distributive justice – which some philosophers identify with economic justice – is based on some common characteristics of cosmopolitanism. According to Sebastiano Maffettone, there are mainly three such characteristics: individualism, universalism, and egalitarianism. Cosmopolitanism in its pure form is, firstly, "typically individualist, because it sees the relations between persons on the planet as the very starting point of every inquiry and practice", and for this reason "all the relevant relations are so inter-individual ones".[2] Secondly, it "is also universalist in the Kantian meaning of the term", since "its ethical and political norms are valid for all persons … in the same way".[3] And thirdly, cosmopolitanism is "egalitarian, even if often in a sophisticated way".[4] Maffettone stresses that it is

egalitarian because "it maintains that all people must be treated equally, like universalism itself requires. It does not maintain however that all people have a right to the same amount of resources. Some inequalities, for example, can be justified within pure cosmopolitanism in the light of a plausible incentive system. To keep the egalitarian assumption, it is here sufficient that these inequalities have effects that can be considered beneficial for everybody".[5]

These characteristics of cosmopolitanism and particularly its impartial egalitarianism are essential to the great majority of conceptions of cosmopolitan distributive justice as well. On the other hand, precisely these characteristics are the main reason that the cosmopolitan idea of distributive justice is constantly accused of neglecting "the special ties and commitments that … are associated with nationalism and patriotism".[6] Another reason why this idea is a target of severe criticism is the fact that at least some cosmopolitan conceptions of global justice are based on the assumption that some principles of distributive justice "apply between individuals *across* societies and not just within a single society".[7]

However, the problem of how justice is to be considered at the global level has provoked one of the most controversial discussions in contemporary political and moral philosophy. The main aim of these polemics has been, as Philippe Van Parijs stresses, to find an adequate answer to the question of whether global distributive justice should be understood as social justice in the sense that the principles of justice, accepted at the national level, should be extended to all mankind, or, just the opposite, if global justice should be understood as an inter-national justice, which requires the development of the principles that would enable fair interactions between nations or countries, which should be quite different from those principles that allow inter-individual equity within nations or nation states.[8]

Looking from the cosmopolitan point of view, principles of global distributive justice should apply equally and impartially to all human beings regardless of their nationality and citizenship.[9] Among the philosophers who are convinced that the principles of justice accepted at the national level should also be applied to the world as a whole are Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge. They both argue that such a principle is also the famous John Rawls's difference principle of justice, which requires social institutions to be arranged in such a way that social and economic inequalities "are to be to the

greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society".[10] However, some other political philosophers, for instance Nagel and, what is indicative, Rawls himself, unequivocally reject such interpretations. Moreover, they claim that global distributive justice is – in the world as it is now – impossible. In their opinion, it is impossible because there is no global justice without either a global people, or global democracy, or a global state, or a global basic structure.[11]

If they are right and, therefore, there cannot be global justice, then the question arises as to whether there are any moral or legal obligations of justice to diminish or, if possible, to abolish injustice at the global level. The answer is affirmative. There are both legal and moral obligations. Legal obligations are obligations of the nation states, while moral obligations are duties of individuals. In the case of inequality and poverty in the world – which are two distinctive sorts of such injustice – the moral obligations towards the poor of the globe, as Maffettone emphasizes, do not "depend directly on the existence of a controversial global basic structure",[12] or, we can add, on a global people, global democracy, or a global state. He argues that there is universal duty of justice, according to which "we have a duty to protect human dignity in all its forms, regardless of the presence of a real global basic structure".[13] This duty requires of us to "help whoever is in extreme difficulty" and especially to "save someone who is dying of hunger" regardless of whether or not "we are personally or collectively responsible for his or her hopeless situation".[14]

Peter Singer in his famous article "Famine, Affluence and Morality" – which can be seen as a paradigmatic example of the utilitarian cosmopolitan approach to global justice and inequality – also argues that the well-off people in rich countries have a moral duty to help poor people in poor countries. He interprets this duty as a logical conclusion that follows from the following two premises:

1. "Suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad".[15]

2. "If it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it".[16]

The conclusion which follows – if we accept both premises and assume that people in rich countries can prevent the "suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care" in poor countries – therefore, is: people in rich countries have a moral obligation to help those in poor countries.

What is important to stress here is that, according to Singer, the application of the second premise does not imply that the moral obligation of rich people depends either on the physical proximity or distance between rich and poor, or on the fact that there are many rich people who can help.[17]

On the one hand, he argues that mere distance in space is in itself irrelevant to the determination of what one ought to do. "If we accept any principle of impartiality, universalizability, equality, or whatever", says Singer, "we cannot discriminate against someone merely because he is far away from us".[18] This is, in fact, his answer to the following frequently used objection to help poor countries: "suffering outside one's country just is not something one has a duty to help alleviate, because those suffering belong to a different society, and hence a different moral community. Duties arise between members of single communities, bound by ties of mutual co-operation and reciprocity".[19]

On the other hand, he refuses the view that numbers diminish moral obligation. In his opinion, "it does not matter morally to the question, what you ought to do, how many people could help the situation".[20] In addition, it seems that he also thinks "that the causes of poverty are irrelevant to our moral obligations to the world's poor".[21]

This obligation to help those in poor countries is understood as a strict moral duty. This means that such help should not be considered as an act of charity or what "philosophers and theologians have called 'supererogatory' – an act that it would be good to do, but not wrong not to do".[22] Charity is not an obligation. It is "something that we are free to do or to omit".[23] The claim that we have a duty to help others is therefore much more demanding than our moral obligations are usually understood. The usual interpretation of one's strict duty is: not to harm others. But helping others is morally optional.[24]

In addition to this moral duty of individuals, there is, as we have already mentioned, the legal obligation of nation states as well. This obligation corresponds to the right to an adequate standard of living, which is recognized as a human right in the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* and in the *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*,[25] and also as "a fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger".[26] However, the problem is that human rights, as Habermas emphasizes, have at the same time moral content and "the form of legal rights. Like moral norms, they refer to every"

human being, "but as legal norms they protect individual persons only insofar as the latter belong to a particular legal community – normally the citizens of a nation state. Thus, a peculiar tension arises between the universal meaning of human rights and the local conditions of their realizations: they should have unlimited validity for all persons",[27] but until now, this ideal has not yet been achieved. At the moment it is still so that nobody can attain the "effective enjoyment of human rights immediately, as a world citizen", because an "actually institutionalized cosmopolitan legal order" has not yet been established, although "Article 28 of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights refers to a global order 'in which the rights and freedoms set in this Declaration can be fully realized'".[28]

Therefore, at the international or global level, there are no appropriate mechanisms in place to enable effective action in cases where countries do not fulfil their duties and thus violate this important human right. In such cases, according to Onora O'Neill, the role of the state should be assumed or at least supplemented by international institutions, transnational corporations and non-governmental organizations.[29]

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Endnotes

1. These differences can be seen, for instance, if we take into consideration three different "cosmopolitan approaches to the problem of global poverty": utilitarian (Singer), rights-based (Shue), and a duty-based (O'Neill) approach (Kok-Chor Tan, *Justice Without Borders: Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism and Patriotism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 40-53).
2. Sebastiano Maffettone, *Global Justice and Its Limits: Second Critical Studies Conference Calcutta, 20-22 September 2007*, 2007, URL www.mcrg.ac.in/Spheres/Sebastiano.doc, 5.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Tan, *Justice without Borders*, IX.
7. Ibid., 56.

8. Toon Vandevelde, Philippe Van Parijs, *Global Justice: Graduate Seminar in Ethics and Public Policy 2005-2006* (Louvain: Université catholique de Louvain, 2005-2006).
9. Tan, *Justice without Borders*, 4.
10. John Rawls, Erin Kelly, *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement* (Cambridge, MASS: Harvard University Press, 2001), 42-43.
11. Philippe Van Parijs, International Distributive Justice, in *A Companion to Political Philosophy*, ed. Robert E. Goodin, Philip Pettit, Thomas W. Pogge (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 642-649.
12. Sebastiano Maffettone, *Un mondo migliore: Giustizia globale tra Leviatano e Cosmopoli* (Roma: Luiss University Press, 2013), 116.
13. Ibid. This universal duty – and the correspondent basic socio-economic right to subsistence – "rest on the characteristic of human vulnerability. They are imposed by the fact that our weakness as human beings requires a necessary support that cannot be deferred" (*ibid.*, 119).
14. Ibid., 116.
15. Peter Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality", in Thomas Pogge, Keith Horton, *Global Ethics* (St. Paul: Paragon House, 2008), 3. However, his argument is also "deliberately vague, since he wants his conclusions to follow logically from a variety of ethical positions—from his own consequentialism, on which we would have a duty to transfer our own resources to the point where marginal utility could not be increased, to a comparatively weaker position which would only entail that we give up wealth until something "of moral importance" needs be sacrificed" (Michael Blake, "International Distributive Justice", *The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, 2013, URL http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/international-justice/).
16. Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality", 3. By saying that "without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance" Singer means "without causing anything else comparably bad to happen, or doing something that is wrong in itself, or failing to promote some moral good, comparable in significance to the bad thing that we can prevent" (*ibid.*, 3). Singer gives an explanation on how to understand the second premise in the following way: "If I am walking past a shallow pond and see a child drowning in it, I ought to wade in and pull the child out. This will mean getting my clothes muddy, but this is insignificant, while the death of the child would presumably be a very bad thing" (Ibid., 3).
17. Ibid., 4-5.
18. Ibid., 4.
19. This objection is presented and critically discussed in: Nigel Dower, "World poverty", in *A Companion to Ethics*, ed. Peter Singer (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 279.
20. Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality", 5.
21. David Miller, *National responsibility and global justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 237, n. 8. David Miller argues that Singer's drowning child example is "a very bad analogy for thinking about responsibility for global poverty" since he "asks no questions about outcome responsibility for global poverty: he does not ask why so many are poor, whether responsibility lies with rich nations, with the governments of poor nations, etc. – he treats poverty as if it were a natural phenomenon like earthquake" (*ibid.*, 234-237).
22. Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality", 7. "Supererogation" is a term which means "paying out more than is due (*super-erogare*)", and it is used as a name "of actions that go beyond the call of duty".
23. Onora O'Neill, "Rights, Obligations and World Hunger", in Pogge, Horton, *Global Ethics*, 148. Charity lies beyond one's duty. It is not required by justice: giving what is owed to one as his right. For this reason, it is not the fulfilment of a duty for others' rights.
24. Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality", 6-9.
25. Article 25 of the UNDHR states: "Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services …". In Article 11.1 of the ICESCR, it is stated: "The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international co-operation based on free consent".
26. ICESCR, Article 11.2.

27. Jürgen Habermas, *The Postnational Constellation* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), 118.
28. Ibid., 118-119.
29. Onora O'Neill, "Agents of Justice", *Metaphilosophy*, 1-2 (2001), 180-195.

Global Citizenship Education
For the Nation, the Market and the World

Niclas Rönnström

Abstract

In this paper I discuss two varieties of global citizenship and citizenship education against the background of modern social imaginaries. A social imaginary, according to Charles Taylor, is the way ordinary people imagine their social reality. He claims that there are three social imaginaries essential to modern society. One is based on individual agency, the economy, and two other imaginaries are based on collective forms of agencies, that is, the public sphere and the democratic self-rule of a sovereign people. Today, global interconnectivity is increasing in its scope, intensity, speed and impact, and it is rapidly becoming a pervasive feature of our condition humana. However, it is important to acknowledge not only an increasing worldwide interconnectedness but also the qualitatively different ways in which we imagine ourselves, or have imagined ourselves to be interconnected in modern society. In the paper, I discuss two varieties of global citizenship and global citizenship education: a narrow globalist view that departs from reductionist economic imaginaries of global interconnectedness, and a broad cosmopolitan view that takes seriously the different ways in which we imagine ourselves to be linked together in society. We have reasons to cosmopolitize citizenship and citizenship education, or so I will argue.

Keywords

Education, Citizenship, Citizenship Education, Globalization, Globalism, Cosmopolitanism.

A social imaginary, according to Charles Taylor[1], is the way ordinary people imagine their social reality and its relationships, order and identities. It can make possible and legitimize social practices, and it can start out as a theory and later transform into a social imaginary more or less lived among members of society. Taylor claims that there are three social imaginaries essential to modern society and its forms of interconnectedness, and I believe that they are also important for recent developments in citizenship education.[2] They are all developments of an original imaginary of the modern moral order in which the members of society are viewed as free and equal rational beings meant to collaborate in peace for their mutual benefit. The new modern moral order later transformed into an imaginary based on individual agency, *the economy*, and two other imaginaries based on more collective forms of agencies traditionally tied to a nation state, that is, the *public sphere* and the *democratic self-rule of a sovereign people.*

Today, global interconnectivity is increasing in its scope, intensity, speed and impact, becoming such a pervasive feature of our *condition humana*, that our understanding of society and education can no longer depart from the nation as the center of economic, cultural, social, political and moral gravity, or so it is argued.[3] In this globalization debate among scholars, policy makers and educators, it is important to remember not only an increasing worldwide interconnectedness but also the ways in which we imagine ourselves, or have imagined ourselves to be interconnected in modern society. In this paper I will discuss two varieties of global citizenship and citizenship education against the background of modern social imaginaries capturing forms of human interconnectivity in modern and late modern society.

Modern Imaginaries of Human Interconnectedness

The economic imaginary contains a view of human interconnectedness designed to produce mutual benefit among members of society under the beneficial influence of an invisible hand.[4]Members of society, it is assumed, can co-exist peacefully because they are involved in an ongoing exchange of advantages in which their different goals mesh, no matter how much they diverge. This is one reason why the economic imaginary involves an affirmation of ordinary life. It is supposed to enable members of society to serve their common good at the same time as they serve their own individual good by just leading their everyday, productive lives. The view of agency that is implied in the economic imaginary does not differ substantially from the view that was developed by Thomas Hobbes in the 17th century. It builds on an instrumental theory of practical rationality that involves taking a goal (desire) for an outcome and then using one's beliefs to determine which actions will be effective in bringing about the outcome.[5] This theory is derived from non-social contexts that do not essentially depend on norms, meaning and linguistic communication. The view of social order is derived from the idea of a self-regulating market and is nothing other than a consequence of individuals acting in "a system of incentives that seamlessly integrates the interests of instrumentally rational individuals in such a way as to produce mutually beneficial outcomes".[6] The economic imaginary made room for an objectifying account of society, that is, as a nexus of norm-independent processes making social events look like any other event in nature. [7]

In the global era, the economy has evolved into a highly influential globalist imaginary.[8] Members of society are imagined to be linked together in a global economy designed to produce mutual benefit on a global scale under the influence of an invisible hand. Globalization is mainly conceived as the liberation and integration of markets imagined to promote rationality, efficiency, social cohesion and prosperity, but it is also assumed that this can only be achieved by cultivating consumerist identities among the members of society.[9] Globalization is thought of as a natural phenomenon that we cannot really interfere with, but it is also imagined to be necessary, good and beneficent for all.[10] The nation state is conceived as a competition state because the global integration of markets puts nations and national economies at risk. The transformation of nation states into competition states is expressed in attempts to discipline the state and its citizens in line with the demands of a global economy.[11] The globalist imaginary is powerful, and, perhaps, so powerful that other ways in which we imagine ourselves as interlinked in society might be neglected.

According to Taylor, two modern social imaginaries involve an understanding of members of society being linked together in more horizontal modes of communicative, norm-regulated but also collective actions, that is, *the public sphere* and the *democratic rule of a sovereign people.* In agreement with Habermas's work,[12] Taylor thinks of the public sphere as a common space in which members of society can meet each other through different media in order to discuss matters of common concern.[13] These communicative encounters are assumed to shape the attitudes of the participants and enable the formation of wills and sometimes a common mindset, or mindsets. The public sphere is imagined to be open for all and quite independent of political power, at the same time as it serves as a benchmark for political legitimacy and governance.[14] The public sphere is held to be enlightened, and the government should therefore take it seriously. Moreover, since the members (or at least the citizens) of society are thought of as sovereign, governments are also morally obliged to take them seriously. The public sphere is therefore not only imagined to be an aggregate of voices, it is also conceived to be a collective agent, or a creator of collective agencies. The people are imagined to form a specific collective agency: the democratic self-rule of a sovereign people building their own nation as a norm-dependent society conceived as their common concern.[15]

It is easy to perceive the nation state as natural kind for self-identification, societal demarcation and moral obligation. However, James Tully reminds us how nation states came to be in terms of two kinds of struggle for recognition: "the equality of independent, self-governing nation states and the equality of individual citizens."[16] Nation states in Europe developed in opposition to the outside force of imperia and the feudal society within the evolving nations, but they also developed through a kind of domestic imperialism towards groups poorly attuned to the political majority culture. Will Kymlicka exemplifies this domestic imperialism that ignores, excludes or silences all who did not match the characteristics of the normal citizen, typically based on the attributes of the able-bodied, heterosexual, white male.[17] However, soon the national tuning process met with resistance from within. Groups within different nation states reacted against domestic imperialism, claiming their right to cultural recognition and the right to a life of their own choice and tradition not necessarily attuned to the majority culture.[18] This development and the two kinds of struggle for recognition characterizing modern nation states are important to remember in view of nationalist movements in Europe trying to re-claim ethnic nationalism in diversified nations.

Globalization has meant an increased diversification within many nation states and changed conditions for identity formation due to the de-territorialization of culture and meaning.[19] Ingrid Volker claims that research on the public sphere still assumes strong territorial ties to nation states.[20] Public communication should, however, no longer be conceived as local, national or global; rather, participation in the public sphere has become a communicative practice that negotiates civic identity between a global civic society and traditional national loyalties. Volkmer claims that the public sphere is globalized and a new intensive calibration of 'polis' and 'demos' is going on.[21] Political theorist David Held argues that processes of globalization lead to the political paradox of our times, that is, that the collective issues we must grapple with are increasingly global while the means for addressing them are national and local.[22] Globalization has meant that the idea of a self-determining collective, as well as the locus of political power, can no longer be exclusively identified with a nation state. Held argues for a political cosmopolitanism which in turn implies a re-contextualization of democracy, citizenship and citizenship education. In the next section, I discuss two varieties of global citizenship education in the light of modern social imaginaries, reminding us of important forms of interconnectedness in the global or world society essential to our understanding of citizenship in the global era.

Two Varieties of Global Citizenship Education: Globalist or Cosmopolitan?

Citizenship and citizenship education are hard to define because they depend on two components subject to a number of interpretations. Citizenship can be defined in relation to the rule of law, specifying what it means to be a bearer of rights and duties, but also in relation to a view of democracy explicating the character of democratic participation. If citizens are merely decision takers subject to rules and governance imposed on them, they can be seen as bearers of rights and duties, but they cannot be seen as active democratic participants or decision makers. Citizens, in a narrow view, are mainly imagined as decision takers with given rights and duties, but hardly as democratic participants; in a broader view, however, they are seen as decision takers as well as decision makers, and democratic participation is seen as crucial to citizenship. This categorization includes and resonates well with Keith Faulks's ideal types of citizenship in which thin views involve rights, passive democratic participation, a negative view of political involvement, clear separation between public and private matters, the value of independence, negative freedom and legal dimensions of citizenship.[23] Thick views involve reciprocal rights and duties, active democratic participation, a positive view of political involvement and no clear separation between public and private, the value and fact of interdependence, positive freedom and both moral and legal dimensions of citizenship.[24] In what follows, I will discuss briefly two varieties of global citizenship and global citizenship education against the background of the modern social imaginaries discussed above. One, the narrow globalist view that departs from dominant economic imaginaries of global interconnectedness, and the other, the broad cosmopolitan view, a de-parochializing contender taking seriously the different ways in which we imagine ourselves to be linked together in the world society.

A globalist view of citizenship and citizenship education reduces or translates collective agencies into economic worldviews, market transactions and consumer behaviour. This is reflected in the GSAE thesis developed in the field of comparative education.[25] A *globally structured agenda of education* seems to be promoted by transnational actors such as the OECD, the World Bank, the IMF and neoliberal regimes. The GSAE thesis reflects a strong relationship between imaginaries of globalization, needs for economic growth and the necessity of educational change for economic aims and the competitive edge of nations. The citizenship dimension is remarkable narrow because of the pri-

macy of economic concerns with regard to the aims of, the norms governing and the quality standards measuring success in education, as I have argued elsewhere.[26] Responding to globalization is not about transforming a national outlook into a cosmopolitan outlook in education because most or all aspects of education are linked to the strengthening of a nation's ability to stand up to global competition.[27]

In this widespread imaginary, school and society are essentially imagined as markets in which we are all interlinked in productive, economic exchange. Teaching and learning are simply seen as acts of market integration translated into the classroom level, where all kinds of diversity can be managed (not recognized) as long as the participants primarily play their roles as economic agents. However, since the consumer and the citizen belong to different social imaginaries, entailing different views of agencies and attitudes, the globalist view of citizenship education seems to be wrong-headed. The globalist can play his invisible hand card, claiming that all that is important for citizenship can be translated into economic worldviews, and that market transactions can do the job that communicative engagement can do in the public sphere, as Michael Wohlgemuth argues.[28] Communicative transactions in the public sphere are often claimed to be argumentative, inclusive, public, free of coercion, rationally motivated and of equal interest for all. In the market, however, this argumentative character might be translated into the equal opportunity to advertise and into buyers preferring new products; the inclusion of all buyers actually rules in markets; buying, selling and competing are definitely non-coercive; rationality is reflected in well-informed trial-and-error processes; and, finally, neither markets nor public spheres can guarantee that decisions are made in the interest of everyone. Wohlgemuth shows that economic transactions in markets display qualities functionally analogous to good public communication, and that we should not underestimate the functions that market mechanisms can have in society.[29] However, the discussion of modern social imaginaries above can throw light on the less attractive side of the globalist view.

The globalist reductionism or translation act is problematic because essential aspects of the ways in which we imagine ourselves to be interconnected in modern society seem to be lost in translation. *First,* individual agency cannot replace the collective agencies that are essential to the public sphere and democratic governance. The logic of communication in the public sphere is

qualitatively different from the aggregative logic of economic individualism, and the instrumental view of action and practical reason excludes dimensions that are crucial to the communicative view of action and reason essential to meaningful exchange, cooperative engagement and will formation in the public sphere. *Second,* the view of society as a nexus of norm-independent processes entails a view that escapes the influence of democratic citizens. It is obvious that this objectivistic take on social and political life hides normative grounds and moral imperatives that have come into existence because of us. The social imaginaries of a public sphere and democratic self-rule highlight the norm-dependent character of society, citizenship and citizenship education. *Third*, the invisible hand that is supposed to provide general welfare, even if this goal is not affirmed in the attitudes of actors, seems to belong to the rich and not to the poor in an increasingly unequal, interconnected world society.[30] Global justice and moral obligation essential to broad descriptions of citizenship and citizenship education cannot, or so it seems, be handed over to invisible hand factors; therefore, consumer behaviour cannot be equated with citizenship action as long as questions of morality and justice count as important for citizenship. Typically, Jon Elster argues, consumers choose between actions that differ only in the way they affect them, but the active citizen is often asked to choose between states that also differ in the way they affect other people.[31] Finally, *fourth*, the globalization of the public sphere and the eroding of the imaginary of democratic governance in terms of a sovereign people within a nation in the light of risks, challenges and common concerns that show no respect for national borders calls for a broad view of citizenship education, taking seriously worldwide interdependence, active democratic participation, moral and not merely legal aspects of citizenship and the need for a re-contextualization of citizenship for a globalized world society. This view of citizenship is not only geared to the competitive edge of competition states backed up with reductionist views of social interconnectedness. It is a view that is in agreement with the imaginaries essential to modern society, balancing moral attitudes, cooperation and communication with competition and instrumental reason.

Our global interconnectedness introduces the idea that not only social and moral responsibility but also citizenship education should be understood, at least partly, in cosmopolitan terms. However, to make a claim for cosmopolitan citizenship and education is to break with the citizenship tradition whereby one has obligations to fellow citizens within a nation. National citizenship is connected

to concrete rights and duties to a sovereign state rather than to abstract moral obligations to and worldwide connectivity with the rest of the members of the world society. However, the concept of 'cosmopolitan citizenship' can challenge the unfinished moral business of the nation state and the new-born ethnic nationalism sweeping over Europe. It makes us aware that the interests of one's fellow citizens or ethnic group cannot automatically take priority over our duties to others.[32] Moreover, since citizenship includes both legal and democratic aspects, it is not enough to object to cosmopolitan citizenship on legal grounds alone. The broad concept of cosmopolitan citizenship education involves educating citizens: (a) whose moral responsibilities and obligations transcend their national contexts and ethnic groups to include all individual and groups of human beings in the world society; (b) who can communicate with and learn from others, near or far, and recognize others as the same in some aspects, different in many aspects but equal in moral aspects; (c) who can understand themselves and others as citizens both of nations and of the world society, and, (d) who acknowledge the plural source of their own heritage and culture, increasing and crucial interdependence in the world society and making themselves aware of problematic aspects of nation-centred and nation-biased social concepts, habits and institutions.

Cosmopolitan education should not be understood as a tourist approach to the global other or simply an act of intercultural communication or multicultural encounter; rather, it is based on understanding people and persons living near and far away but it also involves the historicity, relationality and the action coordination crucial for our living together in a world society.[33] In cosmopolitan citizenship education, the nation cannot be the only centre of economic, cultural, social and moral gravity, and the market cannot be the only game in town. We have good reason to explore further other responses to global challenges than that of the globalist imaginary in education and elsewhere. The price we will pay for ignoring this route in education and elsewhere, seem to be an erosion of the democratic imaginary and the collective agencies we have imagined to be essential for modern human interconnectivity.

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Endnotes

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Reimagining European Citizenship
Europe's Future Viewed From a Cosmopolitan Prism

Eli Vinokur

Abstract

A critical reflection on the European Union project from a cosmopolitan prism shows that although the idea of a European Union is cosmopolitan in nature, its current condition is only instrumentally cosmopolitan.

This article suggests that the reason for this unpromising reality can be traced back to the first phases of the EU's establishment, namely the purpose of the "union" and the process of its creation. The author claims that the lack of an in depth educational process throughout the creation of the EU brought about a fragmented entity, which is united monetarily, but the citizens of which feel very little commitment toward their fellow neighbors. Thus today Europe needs a paradigm shift in education, not only in finance and politics. There is a need to foster a deliberative process that could unite European citizens into an open, reflective and diverse cosmopolitan community which is capable of transcending narrow interests

Keywords

The European Union, The Eurozone crisis, Cosmopolitanism, Education, European Identity.

Introduction

Often, policy makers overlook the potential that education offers as a basis for social, political or financial change. In this paper I will demonstrate that the absence of a cosmopolitan educational process throughout the creation of the EU created a fragmented entity that is united monetarily, but whose citizens feel very little commitment toward their fellow Europeans, let alone across European borders. I will claim that although the idea of a European Union is cosmopolitan in nature, its current condition, especially as manifested in the Eurozone crisis, is only instrumentally cosmopolitan. In fact, the EU is moving away from cosmopolitan theory and practice.

But not everything is lost. The contradiction between the social fragmentation and the interdependence within the EU leaves it with two choices: collapse as a union and face social and economic threats, or seek survival together. I maintain that this political and financial reality enables a renewed attempt

at the EU project, this time by fostering an educational deliberative process that could unite European citizens into an open, culturally sensitive, reflective, critical and diverse cosmopolitan community which is capable of transcending egotistical interests.

The article is divided into four parts. First, I reflect on the motives behind the inception of the EU. This leads to a critical account of the EU's contemporary situation. After highlighting the drawbacks of the EU's integration strategy, I advocate "integrated cosmopolitanism" as a pathway to inner border crossing, thus allowing for an alternative vision for the EU in the form of a diverse, reflective and open cosmopolitan oriented community. Finally, I briefly discuss the educational process that could foster a European Union more worthy of its name.

Kantian Peace via Economic Integration

The EU was a project of Kantian peace – an attempt at adhesion of European states that shared a common desire to say "no more" to their violent, barbaric history and create a "federation of Europe." [1] This political aim was to be actualized by the economic integration of European productive capacities.[2] The declaration of the first European entity – the European Coal and Steel Community – states that unity on the basis of common financial interests is the "first step in the federation of Europe."[3] Thus the foundation of European Unity was built predominantly on financial bricks.

The dream of the founding fathers of the European project for a shared sense of belonging among citizens of a growing European Empire was cultivated by the establishment of the European Economic Community or the Common Market in 1957, the European Community and finally the European Union.

The extension of the EU has brought about the most robust form of the European vision – "an integrated Europe with a single market subject to common rules and a shared framework of human rights and justice."[4]

Alas, behind the inspiringly articulated speeches and policy papers about a European vision, the primary motivation for a country to join the EU was narrow-ended. To convince citizens to join the union, politicians usually made the case for the comfortable life, mainly financially. Thus the aspiration towards an ethico-political cosmopolitan ideal of shared civic commitment and respon-

sibility across national borders was swapped for a seductive promise of potential personal profit. And indeed for a decade and a half it seemed that the architects of the European Union largely kept their promise.

Free trade and the removal of non-tariff barriers lowered prices for consumers. Increased trade to the EU created jobs and higher incomes, and trade within the EU rose by 30%. Between 1993-2003, the single market boosted the EU's GDP by 877 billion Euros (£3,819 per household). Investment from outside the EU grew from 23 billion Euros in 1992 to 159 billion Euros in 2005. Research conducted by Campos et al. found that membership in the EU had a positive effect on average incomes in all but one of its member countries.[5]

When Financial Interdependence Encounters Social Fragmentation

Sophie Duchesne claims that "European integration was expected to form citizens who identify themselves as European; these citizens were expected to share resources and subsidize poorer citizens. These self-identified Europeans would also support European institutions and policies;"[6] yet Eurobarometer surveys over the past 20 years show that despite the financial success of the European project, only about 10-12.7 percent of the citizens in Europe think of themselves as Europeans.[7] Moreover, when pragmatically tested during the Eurozone crisis, European citizens were reluctant to help remote strangers. A poll conducted by the German Emnid Institute in 2012 found that 62 percent of Germans opposed a proposed 130 billion Euro rescue package to help Greece's ailing economy.[8] On the institutional level, the way the EU institution treated the crisis sharpened the democratic and equality crisis, as they subordinated the will of the people to financial interests.[9] Germany even threatened to expel Greece from the EU if it conducted a referendum on the single currency.[10]

The contradiction between financial integration and social alienation erupted, not only in the form of a Eurozone crisis and growing inequality, but also in the shattering of the European solidarity dream. Once Europe became "too interconnected financially to fail," the egotistical glue that banded Europeans together became a two-edged sword.

The Eurozone crisis was followed by a steep recession in most EU member states.[11] The austerity measures implemented in response to the financial crisis

are considered to be one of the main reasons that unemployment in the EU 28 stands at 25.699 million, with 26.7% unemployment in Greece (49.80% among youth) and 25.3% unemployment in Spain (57.7% among youth).[12]

Austerity is detrimental to social equality. An Oxfam study concluded that 10% of the EU's population controls 24% of the EU's wealth.[13] At the same time, 24.5% of the EU population (122.6 million people) is living at risk of poverty or social exclusion.[14] According to the International Labor Organization (ILO), social inequality primarily accounts for social unrest within the EU, which is now the highest in the world. The ILO predicts social inequality will widen.[15]

The Eurozone crisis has also caused a spike in xenophobia. A poll conducted by Pew research found that 86% of Greeks, 80% of Italians, 57% of the French, and 55% of Britain's wanted less immigration.[16] Additionally, according to the European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey, "every fourth person from a minority group said that they had been a victim of crime at least once in the 12 months preceding the survey. More 'visible' minority groups –those who's appearance is different to the majority population – report, on average, higher levels of victimization."[17]

Finally, a survey conducted by Pew Research found that the favorability of the EU in the eyes of its inhabitants had fallen from a median of 60% in 2012 to 45% in 2013.[18]

The unpopularity of the EU became apparent when Marine Le Pen's National Front party recorded 26% of the vote in the last French election, The UK Independence Party recorded 27.49% of the vote in the European elections and Jobbik attained approximately 20% of the National vote in Hungary.[19]

Surprising as it may sound, I assert that the EU's current condition calls for another attempt at the European project, only this time via a cosmopolitan approach.

Integral Cosmopolitanism as a Pathway to Integration

During the last couple of decades, cosmopolitanism has become a matter of great academic interest. Extensive literature on cosmopolitanism has imbued the concept with new meanings, but simultaneously created a discourse that is divided internally into dozens of competing and sometimes fuzzy discourses.[20]

Many of cosmopolitanism's advocates tend to reduce it to only one prism, be it political, cultural, financial, ethical, sociological or anthropological, etc. I maintain that the connections between the challenges Europe faces today obligate us to formulate a cosmopolitan orientation that creates a combination of prisms without nullifying any of them, forming a kaleidoscope of varying perspectives. In previous work, I referred to this as an integrated conception of cosmopolitanism.[21]

I propose one central feature of a still to be aspired toward integrated cosmopolitan orientation, which may allow for further deliberation among scholars. An analysis of existing literature allowed me to identify the essential thread running through the cosmopolitan discourse as an orientation, an attitude to the other. This disposition toward the other can range from mere openness to the encounter to inner readiness to change as a result of it. I defined it in broad strokes as "being concerned for the other as I am concerned for myself."[22] In other words, to openly encounter the other, to include the other and care for their interests, one has to be able to free some space within oneself from oneself.

In a nutshell, "integral cosmopolitanism" suggests the main challenge of contemporary reality is overcoming the alienation that often stems from one to the other, be it a distant or a close other (since "otherness" can also manifest in the family and the close community, as well as toward any other dweller in the cosmos – the inanimate, vegetative or animate). After all, the financial crisis did not occur because economists were not open enough to certain cultures. The "other" for those economists was people outside their narrow range of interest.

Relying on this account of cosmopolitanism and otherness, I affirm that European integration demands primarily, to use a notion developed by Papastephanou, the crossing of "internal borders."[23] Such a move cannot happen on paper or on some high institutional or governmental level. It should grow from bottom up via education. Because, as noted by Alexander, human actions and attitudes stem from their "vision of the good," – the lofty goals towards which they strive – and education has a key role in its formation.[24] Thus far, European officials have been promoting a profit oriented educational agenda. An overview of the Bologna Declaration of the joint European Ministers of Education, as well as the preceding declarations of Lisbon and of

Paris implies an attempt to replicate the European political integration project in the realm of higher education, placing future financial success at the core of the integration of European academic institutions.[25] Before it is too late, European officials have to learn their lesson.

Education, the way I understand it, is much more than schooling or academization. It is even more than theoretical learning about the need to accept the other. Education is the result of the influence of an amalgam of forces that form and reform our perceptions regarding the meaning of life, right and wrong, just and unjust, morality and amorality, etc. Education is the story about life we tell ourselves and are being told by various agents in our society – from media to schools to grandma's lullabies. And today, there is an acute need for a new story, a cosmopolitan story.

A new cosmopolitan story can be generated only from the people who comprise society. Thus the European project has to be revived by an educational endeavor which will provide conditions under which people can mold a cosmopolitan-ethical prism – via a process of deliberation – through which they will encounter their society, reflect on it and act to change it for the better. Once people develop a cosmopolitan disposition, they will naturally form better and more humane enterprises, corporations, international institutions, NGO's, policies, financial systems and their likes.

Conclusion
Toward a Cosmopolitan Vision of Europe

A cosmopolitan turn in Europe calls for an in-depth educational process, not just an artificial attempt.

On the political level, in addition to constitutional and architectural reforms, there is a need to articulate a public sphere, where all parts of society will be represented and the most pressing issues will be discussed openly, but also respectfully, out of a sincere desire to form a truly sustainable society.[26]

The success of far right parties in recent elections was partly attributed to their leaders taking pressing issues and addressing them in a populist manner, whereas more moderate representatives in the EU largely ignored public concerns and used slogans like: "we need to celebrate diversity". Populists filled the

vacuum created by the ignorance, alienation and remoteness of the current representative democracy in the EU, and advocated a much easier to grasp vision of limited immigration and national protectionism. A vivid public sphere could counteract the populist rhetoric by filling the democratic void.

On the cultural level, although the European commission has invested more than 45 million Euros in research on European identity since 2005,[27] there is a need to recognize that the EU is very diverse – for now, there is no such thing as a European identity; rather, there are different identities intermingling in the European sphere, being constantly shaped and reshaped, some in a more open manner and some in a much more closed and extreme self-centered manner. In such a reality, it is not always possible to reach a consensus on a shared identity. In some cases, grounds for a mutually respectful discussion which ends in a modus vivendi is the best we can hope for. There is also a need to understand that some cosmopolitan orientations already exist and thus they are worthy of being recognized, even if they are not European.

Finally, there is a need to reform the financial system not only at the institutional regulative level but also at the core human level. It is imperative to articulate an educational move that will create another and much more efficient regulatory mechanism - an inner moral mechanism within a person, allowing him to self-regulate.

Ironically, from the most egoistic perspective, contemporary reality calls for the application of a cosmopolitan vision. European society is facing the crossroads of the double meaning with which Kant began his "perpetual peace" – the graveyard *vis*-à-*vis* the peaceful society. Acknowledging the tragic, some would say even prophetic note of this paper, I still cannot betray my deep gut feeling that history will judge us – parents, politicians, policy makers, scientists, media producers and finally educators – according to the path we will choose.

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Cosmopolitanism and Education
Of Philosophy and the Teaching of Philosophy

Denise Egéa

Abstract

In the current context of globalization, cosmopolitanism, socio-political conflicts and war, rights to philosophy and to the teaching of philosophy take a new dimension and urgency and present new challenges. Declaring philosophy to be cosmopolitan is not sufficient to make it universal. One must recognize the role played by appropriation and transformation of the philosophical and of the institutional and pedagogical models in non-European languages and cultures. In addition, today, access and rights to philosophy and the teaching of philosophy are ever more necessary, for they are indispensable to understand our renewed responsibilities in a broader world, and to make responsible decisions from a cosmopolitan point of view.

Keywords

Universality, Responsibility, Teaching, Diogenes, Derrida.

With the development of global processes, especially global communications and social media, the notion of cosmopolitanism has become more widespread. However, cosmopolitanism is not new. It has been traced back to Diogenes of Sinope (c. 412 B.C.), founding father of the Cynic movement in Ancient Greece. It is said that "Asked where he came from, he answered: 'I am a citizen of the world (*kosmopolitês*)'."[1] In an interview with Bennington, in 1997, Jacques Derrida explained:

> There is a tradition of cosmopolitanism … which comes to us from, on the one hand, Greek thought with the Stoics, who have a concept of the "citizen of the world." You also have St. Paul in the Christian tradition, also a certain call for a citizen of the world as, precisely, a brother. St. Paul says that we are all brothers, that is sons of God, so we are not foreigners, we belong to the world as citizens of the world; and this is this tradition that we could follow up until Kant for instance, in whose concept of cosmopolitanism we find the conditions of hospitality.[2]

In her book *Cultivating Humanity*,[3] Nussbaum gave a synopsis of the history of cosmopolitanism, which did not meet with complete approval. For example, Burbules provided an insightful review of Nussbaum's book, and an enlightening discussion of the shortcomings of her analysis, especially concerning education.[4] He writes that while she "would like to see education adopt this cosmopolitan Stoic stance," focusing "cosmopolitan education" on philosophy and ethical reasoning, knowledge, and imagination, she sidesteps the difficult challenges her position must confront.[5] He points out that, although she advocates the importance of the philosophical argument, she offers little debate, little examination of attendant tensions and contradictions. In "Resisting the Pedagogical Domestication of Cosmopolitanism," Gregoriou underscores these difficulties and sums up her discussion of Nussbaum's pedagogical approach in those terms: "In an effort to vernacularize Socratic pedagogy, Nussbaum's cosmopolitan proposal often collapses the problem of cultural translation to knowing 'some rudiments about others'," excluding culture which "remains [but] an external tool to cosmopolitanism."[6]

Gregoriou then turns to Derrida – whom Nussbaum dismissed as "simply not worth studying" – and his deconstruction of hospitality in search of "an alternative way to approximate a translation model of cosmopolitanism."[7] In this paper, I follow up on Derrida to reach a better understanding of cosmopolitanism in terms of the responsibilities it entails for the philosopher, as discussed by Derrida himself. In the aftermath of the most recent events and escalation in terrorist attacks in several countries on several continents in a matter of days, Derrida's words have a renewed impact.

In 1999, Derrida was invited to speak at a UNESCO[8] conference on the general theme of "The New World Contract" drawn up by Federico Mayor, then Director General of the Institution. In his address, Derrida discussed "the task of the philosopher here, such as [he saw] it assigned and implied by the new 'world contract'."[9] Derrida understood this task as also being "that of whoever tends to assume political and legal responsibilities in this matter."[10] He gave as examples four of the tightly linked themes around which have revolved his lectures, seminars, conferences, publications and interviews (including several interventions before UNESCO): work, forgiveness, hospitality, peace, and the death penalty.[11]

Later on, in an interview with France 3 in May 2002,[12] Derrida insisted – and it is nowadays most relevant – that philosophy is more necessary than ever to respond

to the most urgent questions raised by today's socio-political context, questions of politics, ethics and especially rights and law.[13] These issues concern international institutions, including "the UN, the Security Council, the role of certain sovereign states in their relation of respect or non-respect toward these international institutions" all having to do with international law.[14] Derrida stressed that, if international law is to be modified, "it can be done only on the grounds of a philosophical reflection."[15]

Another point Derrida makes, referring to Kant's 1784 text *Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht*,[16] is that these institutions as well as international law, most of which appeared after the Second World War,

> are already *philosophemes*. They are philosophical acts and archives, philosophical productions and products not only because the concepts that legitimate them have an ascribable *philosophical history* and thus a philosophical history that finds itself inscribed in the charter of UNESCO; rather because, at the same time, and for this reason, such institutions imply the sharing of a culture and a philosophical language, committing themselves consequently to making possible, and first through education [*et d'abord par l'*éducation], the access to this language and to this culture. [Derrida›s emphasis][17]

When signing the charter of such an institution, a state and its people make a commitment to uphold the culture, the philosophical heritage thus inscribed in its charter.[18] Derrida pointed out that some may see in it an "infinite opening," while others might object that "it is limiting to an apparently essentially European heritage."[19] And then some may lose sight of this implicit commitment altogether. Which stresses all the more that this commitment entails an education to culture and to philosophy which is of paramount importance for an understanding of what is at stake, and which is "indispensable to the understanding and the implementation of these commitments to these international institutions, which are … philosophical in essence."[20]

In light of the recent events, the rise in violence and terrorist activities in too many countries too often, Derrida's questions (although asked nearly 25 years ago) sound most urgent:

> What are the concrete stakes of this situation today? Why must the important questions concerning philosophical teaching and research, why must the imperative of the right to philosophy be deployed in their international dimension today more than ever? Why are the responsibilities which need to be taken no longer, and even less today in the twenty-first century, simply national? What

> do "national," "cosmopolitan," "universal" mean here for, and with regard to, philosophy, philosophical research, philosophical education or training, or even for a philosophical question or practice that would not be essentially linked to research or education?[21]

In this context – Derrida had already pointed out – the right to philosophy and to the teaching of philosophy, as well as the responsibilities at stake must be considered beyond national borders, on a cosmopolitan and universal level. This position raises new questions, already discussed by Kant who stated that "a philosophical approach to universal history … is inseparable from a kind of plan of nature that aims for a total, perfect political unification of the human species."[22] Since then, such institutions as UNESCO, the UN, and the Security Council have moved the creation of "institutions ruled by international – and thus philosophical – law" out of the realm of "fiction" into that of actual facts.[23] Whether they – that is their members who signed the charters – uphold the commitment thus made is precisely what is at issue.[24]

Is not one of the responsibilities of today's philosopher, in the context of globalization and cosmopolitanism, the necessity to move beyond the opposition Eurocentrism vs. anti-Eurocentrism? While upholding the memory of a philosophical heritage essentially Euro-Christian, it is necessary to both recognize its origins, and go beyond its limits. It is also essential to be aware that the philosophical has been and is being transformed and appropriated by non-European languages and cultures. According to Derrida, this is what a close, "long and slow" study of the historical roots and development of philosophy, one which he never had a chance to complete, should reveal. He believed that

> [w]hat is happening today, and has been for some time … philosophical formations that will not let themselves be contained in this dialectic, which is basically cultural, colonial and neo-colonial, of appropriation and alienation. There are other ways (*voies*) of philosophy …. [Moreover, n]ot only are there other ways of philosophy, but philosophy, if there is such a thing, is the other way (*l'autre voie*).[25]

Derrida also believed that letting philosophy, even under the label of cosmopolitanism, be determined by the opposition Eurocentrism vs non-Eurocentrism would be limiting the right to philosophy and to the teaching of philosophy. In order to follow up and understand "what is happening and can still happen under the name of philosophy," Derrida suggested three fields of reflection, under three "titles." According to him, they "could be the concrete conditions for respect and the extension of the right to philosophy."[26]

1. *First title*. Whoever thinks that the right to philosophy from a cosmopolitan point of view must be respected, granted, extended will have to take into account the competition that exists and has always existed between several models, styles, philosophical traditions.

2. *Second title*. The respect and extension of the right to philosophy to all people also presupposes … the appropriation but also the overflowing of what are said to be … the founding or originary languages of philosophy – the Greek, Latin, Germanic or Arabic languages.

3. *Third title*. Although philosophy does not simply amount to its institutional or pedagogical moments, nonetheless the many differences of tradition, style, language, and philosophical nationality are translated or embodied in the institutional or pedagogical models, at times even produced by those structures.[27]

Conclusion

After the shock of the latest wave of terrorist attacks, several governments agreed that education is the key, and started planning new reforms. It is a sound step, but going one step further, in the current context of globalization, cosmopolitanism, socio-political conflicts, terrorist threats and war, with Derrida, I would stress that, especially within higher education, the rights to philosophy and the teaching of philosophy take a new dimension and urgency and present new challenges. Declaring philosophy to be cosmopolitan is not sufficient to make it universal. One must recognize the role played by appropriation and transformation of the philosophical and of the institutional and pedagogical models in non-European languages and cultures. In addition, today, while threatened by budget cuts leading to closing programs, access and rights to philosophy and the teaching of philosophy are ever more necessary, for they are indispensable to understand our renewed responsibilities in a broader world, and to make responsible decisions from a cosmopolitan point of view.

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Endnotes

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7. Gregoriou, "Resisting the Pedagogical Domestication of Cosmopolitanism," p. 257.
8. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.
9. Jacques Derrida (1999) "La mondialisation et la paix cosmopolitique," first delivered at UNESCO's headquarters in Paris on November 6, as part of the "Discussions of the Twenty-first Century." Transcribed and published in *Regards* 54 (February 2000, 16-19). Translated by Elizabeth Rottenberg as "Globalization, Peace and Cosmopolitanism," in *Negotiations: Interventions and Interviews, 1971-2001* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2002, 371-86), 376.
10. Derrida (1999) "La mondialisation et la paix cosmopolitique." 376.
11. UNESCO has deemed it necessary to establish for itself a department of philosophy, which is why, in a previous address before UNESCO in 1991, Derrida declared that "UNESCO may in fact be this privileged place . . . perhaps the only possible place in which to truly deploy the question" of the right to philosophy. He continued: "As if, in a word, UNESCO and, within UNESCO in a way that was privileged, its department of philosophy, were, if I can say this, the singular *emanation* of something like *philosophy* as 'a right to philosophy from a cosmopolitan point of view'." (Derrida's emphasis, *Negotiations*, 330)
12. Jacques Derrida (2002) Culture et dépendances - Spécial Jacques Derrida. Presented by Franz-Olivier Giesbert. France 3 Television. (May). Transcribed and translated by Denise Egéa. No page number.
13. Derrida, "Culture et dépendances." npn
14. See also Jacques Derrida (2001) *On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness*, London and New York: Routledge.
15. Derrida, "Culture et dépendances." npn
16. *Idea* [in view of] *of a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose*.
17. Derrida, *Negotiations*, 331. Translation modified: in the French text, "first of all" relates to "education" (thus emphasizing the importance of education) and not to "access" to language and culture, as translated in the English text..
18. Following an eighteen years' absence from UNESCO, on September 12, 2002, speaking before the UN General Assembly in an effort to gain support to go to war against Iraq, President Bush announced the return of the United States of America to UNESCO (188 Member States; as a founding member, the United States helped shape the 1945 Constitution). UNESCO Press Release # 2002-64, Paris, September 12, 2002. Last accessed January 22, 2015. http://www.unesco.org

19. Derrida, *Negotiations*, 331 (also 371-86). They may overlook the fact that this is no simple heritage, and "combines and accumulates powerful traditions within it" (*On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness*, 31). See also, for example, Jacques Derrida and Elisabeth Roudinesco (2001) *De quoi demain... Dialogue*, Paris : Fayard Galilée; and Jacques Derrida (2001) *Foi et Savoir suivi de Le Siècle et le Pardon*, Paris : Éditions du Seuil.
20. Derrida, *Negotiations*, 331.
21. Derrida, *Negociations*, 332.
22. Derrida, *Negociations*, 333.
23. Derrida, *Negociations*, 333.
24. In fact, after much preparation, President Bush opted to go to war against Iraq regardless of the UN and other Member Sates' respective positions, not to mention the United States Congress's own opposition.
25. Derrida, *Negotiations*, 337.
26. Derrida, *Negociations*, 337-40.
27. Derrida, *Negociations*, 340.

A Speculative Vital Materialist Approach to Cosmopolitanism

Sevket Benhur Oral

Abstract

Taking Jane Bennett's vital materialism seriously, this article suggests that neither human individual nor any unit of human collective should be the starting point for a discussion on cosmopolitanism. Instead, I contend that a vital materialist approach that takes nonhuman actants/existents as seriously as the humans offers a more appropriate ontological horizon for a discussion of cosmopolitanism and its concomitant pedagogical forms. If we can conceptualize transnational publics which are constituted as much by nonhumans as by humans, cosmopolitanism then cannot merely be conceived as an orientation of openness to foreign humans, but it is also an openness to foreign nonhumans. A philosophical grounding of cosmopolitanism within a neo-materialist horizon is necessary to encourage a renewed engagement with the political and pedagogical projects of cosmopolitanism. The question is: how would the analyses of cosmopolitanism change if we were to take the force of nonhumans, what Bennett calls the thing-power materialism, seriously? Within an ecology of human and nonhuman material bodies, or actants, as potential members of constantly mutating transnational publics, a vital materialist cosmopolitanism seeks to enhance awareness of our entanglements with the world understood as a local, open and contingent achievement of human and nonhuman configurations and reconfigurations.

Keywords

Vital Materialism, Jane Bennett, Bruno Latour, Actant, Cosmopolitanism, Neomaterialism.

Introduction

CERN (European Organization for Nuclear Research) in Geneva, Switzerland—the underground mecca of high energy physics, where beams of protons are smashed together at close to the speed of light in the epic Large Hadron Collider (LHC) with its four massive particle detectors, ATLAS, CMS, ALICE, and LHCb—is a quintessential cosmopolitan community not only because it sits on the Franco-Swiss border and hosts scientists from over 113 countries but because it is constituted first and foremost by a vital materialist network of human and nonhuman[1] *actants* that forms "a public as a set of bodies affected by a common problem generated by a pulsing swarm of activities."[2] In other words, CERN is "a unified politico-scientific system"[3]: a *cosmopolitics* of actants.

In this paper, I will argue, based on Jane Bennett's conceptualization of vital materialism and drawing upon Bruno Latour's construct of action (or agency),

for a trans-panhuman (or posthuman) articulation of cosmopolitanism that takes into account the interinvolvements between human and nonhuman materialities that constitute a network that binds us together, the human and nonhuman things alike, without these two groups being relegated into two separate and irreconcilable domains, 'society' (or 'mind,' 'language,' 'culture') on the one hand, and 'nature,' on the other. In other words, the cosmos of cosmopolitanism is populated *once again* with both human and nonhuman things: a true *cosmos* of things.

In Graham Harman's interpretation, Bruno Latour, in his very intriguing and witty book, *We Have Never Been Modern*, claims that

> …modernity tries to *purify* the world by dissecting it into two utterly opposed realms. On one side we have the human sphere, composed of transparent freedom and ruled by arbitrary and incommensurable perspectives. On the other side we have nature or the external world, made up of hard matters of fact and acting with objective, mechanical precision. … We are told that nature is one, but that humans have numerous diverse perspectives on it. Not surprisingly, Latour rejects this modernist notion.[4]

Latour disputes this "modernist settlement"[5] as he terms it, whereby a huge and unnecessary gap between words and world is introduced and the solitary scientist is tasked with the discovery of the world as it is, purified of any contamination by language, politics, values, and passions. Instead, Latour laboriously describes the formation of scientific networks and how human and nonhuman actants in them work together through a chain of traceable mediations in the fabrication of facts.

> In the sciences, the degree of objectivity and certainty is directly proportional to the extent of artificiality, layering, heterogeneity, multiplicity, and complexity of mediations. The assertion sounds radical but is merely obvious: in a laboratory, no naked access to truth is thinkable. Is a microbe visible without the mediation of a microscope? Are microscopes found in nature or are they human fabrications? When one scientist questions another, it is not to ask whether new data (new facts) have been fabricated or not. The question is, "How have you proven that *x* is so?"—and the emphasis is on *how,* by what *means* or mediation.[6]

Latour 's project is not so much a new attempt at reconciliation between nature and society as a complete and radical denial of their separation in the first place. The hard scientific fact and the world of human power games have never been split into two.[7] The mobilization of myriad number of actants in trials of strength with each other and the mediations that obtain among them in variously shifting networks make sure of that. In short, there is no "radical schism between humans and things."[8] They both are equally historical entities.

In this sense, cosmopolitanism is not primarily conceived as a social, economic, political, or moral phenomenon (in its Euro-universalistic or post-human varieties). More importantly, it is principally a material phenomenon. The account of cosmopolitanism I will espouse here takes vital material singularities and their interlinkages as its main referents.

The ATLAS detector at the Large Hadron Collider, for instance, is a vital material singularity—an actant—the CERN cosmopolitan community shapes itself around. The pan-human interconnection[9] at CERN is engendered by the existence of this giant collider and its colossal and weird-looking detectors. It is inconceivable to imagine CERN without the latter. I am not merely referring to the concrete material infrastructure that makes it possible to carry out the physics experiments that aim to delve into the deep mysterious levels of the universe. More significantly, vital material singularities have their own generative power and autonomy that cannot be reduced to their prerequisite functional place in the interrelated system of scientific apparatuses that silently and obediently execute the tasks they were designed to do for the ultimate aim of unveiling the secrets of nature. Instead, a new complex existent comes into being that has the ability to surprise.

The Atlas detector is an affective body, an agentic assemblage that affects and is affected by other similar assemblages in the collective life of CERN. It is a *thing*, and not an object, that is, a vivid entity "not entirely reducible to the contexts in which (human) subjects set them, never entirely exhausted by their semiotics."[10]

As an existent that commands attention in its own right, the Atlas detector is "in excess of [its] association with human meanings, habits, or projects"[11] for it is endowed with what Bennett[12] calls the *thing-power*: "the curious ability of inanimate things to animate, to act, to produce effects dramatic and subtle."[13]

A vital materialist approach to cosmopolitanism takes thing-power seriously for life always exceeds our knowledge and control.[14] This is not something to be lamented. Not being able to know reality once and for all does not preclude speculation regarding its nature. On the contrary, it leaves it wide open to dispute its character, which is not meant to be pinned down once and for all since, as Meillassoux puts it, there is a difference between the eternity of the laws of becoming and the eternity of the becoming of laws.[15] Bennett's vital materialism is nothing but a bold attempt to speculate—with the help of Latour, Spinoza, Deleuze, and others—on the nature of reality.

The rest of the paper is divided into two parts. Part I goes into the basic tenets of vital materialism in more detail with particular focus on Latour's methodological concept of action (or agency).[16] Part II discusses the pedagogical implications of the cosmopolitics of vital materialism.

Part I
Vital Materialism

For Jane Bennett,[17] matter is not passive inert stuff lying over there waiting to be put to use in some useful project for humanity. Instead, she defines *vital materiality* as "the capacity of things—edibles, commodities, storms, metals—not only to impede or block the will and designs of humans but also to act as quasi agents or forces with trajectories, propensities, or tendencies of their own."[18] Matter, when not reduced to "a resource, commodity, or instrumentality,"[19] can be understood in the way Bruno Latour uses the term *actant* to refer to both human and nonhuman things, by which he means any object that "stands by itself as a force to reckon with."[20]

> The world is a series of negotiations between a motley armada of forces, *humans among them*, and such a world cannot be divided cleanly between two pre-existent poles called 'nature' and 'society.' As Latour puts it: 'we do not know what forces there are, nor their balance. We do not want to reduce anything to anything else … What happens when nothing is reduced to anything else?'[21]

Well, put simply, an *irreductionist* ontology happens, whereby the idea "that some beings are intrinsically more real or consequential than others"[22] is jettisoned. For Latour—heavily involved in combat against the Cartesian bodiless observer (the mind/brain-in-a-vat), empiricists' *tabula rasa* "bombarded by a world reduced to meaningless stimuli,"[23] Kant's universal *a priori* categories, Derrida's deconstruction, incommen-

surable cultural categories or language games, phenomenology's world-for-a-human-consciousness as well as scientific naturalism/reductionism in all its forms—what happens is that what he calls the modernist settlement—"the notion of a world 'out there' to which a mind-in-a-vat tries to get access by establishing some safe correspondence between words and states of affairs"[24]—is dismantled. Instead, we become connected to a vibrant reality that has never been lost or kept outside. In other words, for Latour,[25] we have never been modern. That is, the world has never been outside and we were never gazing at it from the inside. The modern settlement—or, "the modern Constitution," as he sometimes refers to it, has never taken place.

> There are not two mutually isolated zones called 'world' and 'human' that need to be bridged by some sort of magical leap. Instead, there are only actants, and in most cases it is impossible to identify the precise sphere ('nature, or culture?') to which any given actant belongs. The division of the world into two zones is a pointless fiction, since we have never managed to purify the world. We have never been modern.[26]

The ATLAS detector at the LHC is an actant caught up in a cosmopolitics of associations of human and nonhuman things. It cannot be reduced to a mere technical/material object devoid of any of the entanglements of a human world of politics. It is not something we are completely in command of and have the ability to absolutely control. In other words, it is not inert. It has the ability to surprise. It is an agent with powers that form alliances with other bodies we are not completely in charge of. It has a life of its own not in isolation but in conjunction with the turbulent political life of human projects and aspirations as well as the universe of nonhuman actors such as black holes, neutrinos, quarks, the Higgs boson, dark matter, gravitational waves, strings, m-theory and others.

For vital materialists, it is futile to relegate some aspects of the Atlas detector into purely scientific or technical realm and others into purely political or economic realm. Instead, the detector is constituted by the mobilization of a whole spectrum of articulated linkages created by specific traceable laboratory practices and techniques that bring things together in ways that reveal corresponding forces and energies.[27]

In the collective of humans and nonhumans, there is no unmediated action. The detector is not a neutral conduit for human will and ingenuity used to access a pristine objective reality out there waiting for us to discover it, neither is it a mysterious object that no human can master. In other words, it does not have

an essence. Rather, it has existence and existence is action.[28] The detector and the human enter into a relationship and unleash their forces in such a way that the link/association between the two modifies/transforms both. The detection of the Higgs boson is not the result of the human actor perfecting the neutrality of the detector and purifying its contaminating influence. The result is achieved by the mobilization of the shared mediated action. Neither the detector nor the human on their own achieves the result. It is a common achievement; they do it together each being transformed in the process. As Latour puts it, "action is a property of associated entities."[29]

> It is by mistake, or unfairness, that our headlines read "Man flies," "Woman goes into space." Flying is a property of the whole association of entities that includes airports and planes, launch pads and ticket counters. B-52s do not fly, the U.S. Air Force flies. Action is simply not a property of humans *but of an association of actants*.[30]

Another association of actants, this time between a human and a microorganism is detailed in *Pandora's Hope*, where Latour walks us through his account of how Pasteur and his microorganisms *happened* to each other in the former's laboratory in Lille, France in the middle of the nineteenth century. The human character, Pasteur himself, and the nonhuman character, yeast (or more fully, lactic acid fermentation yeast as opposed to brewer's yeast) are the main actors in this narrative. Interestingly, in the beginning of the story, the existence of the yeast is not even acknowledged. It emerges as a new entity as a result of an extraordinary series of transformations in Pasteur's laboratory.[31] These transformations take place through "a sturdy and thick layering of *transverse* paths"[32] whereby a vibrant *collective* constituted by the myriad associations of humans and nonhumans is formed. In this collective both human and nonhuman actors initiate action. Action is not solely within the domain of human subjectivity. Rather, agency is *distributed* across a network of transverse paths crossed by vibrant actants testing each other in trials of strength.[33]

> … Pasteur designs trials for the actor to show its mettle. Why is an actor defined through trials? Because there is no other way to define an actor but through its action, and there is no other way to define an action but by asking what other actors are modified, transformed, perturbed, or created by the character that is the focus of attention.[34]

Action, according to vital materialism, is not the privileged domain of human intentionality only. It is not limited to humans. Actants constitute a collective, "which refers to an ecology of human and nonhuman elements."[35] In such an ecology, action is distributed and nonhuman elements take as much initiative as the human actors. Latour revels in making statements like "laboratory scientists make autonomous facts"[36] to demonstrate the distributed nature of mutual action.

> The scientist makes the fact, but whenever we make something *we* are not in command, we are slightly *overtaken* by the action. … That which slightly overtakes us is *also*, because of our agency, because of the *clinamen* of our action, slightly overtaken, modified. Am I simply restating the dialectic? No, there is no object, no subject, no contradiction, no *Aufhebung*, no mastery, no recapitulation, no spirit, no alienation. But there are *events.*[37]

In replacing the word 'society' with "the notion of collective—defined as an exchange of human and nonhuman properties inside a corporate body,"[38] Latour points to the exploration of the historicity of not only humans but also nonhumans in the way they fold and unfold into/out of each other. For him, the mobilization of human and nonhuman actants in the collective can best be described as an event that leads to interesting things happening. Unlike the notion of causality put forward in the modernist settlement whereby "history has no other meaning than to activate a potentiality—that is, to turn into an effect what was already there, in the cause,"[39] events are marked by actants associating with each other through mediations as a result of which they are "modified, transformed, and perturbed."

Part II
Educational Implications

Having established the failure of the modernist attempts to purify scientific practices—the attempts to conceive "nature as a supposedly transcendent, nonhuman, ontologically separate domain in the world"[40]—and the success of things that act in assemblages of the human and nonhuman, it becomes clear that

> …meaning is not separate from matter. Indeed an assumption is that rather than separation as foundational to enacting a purified human condition, entanglement is materially and practically fundamental to a hybridised post-

> human condition. Objects are not entirely separate entities, but are mixings, gatherings, things, what Latour refers to as 'quasi-objects' in his argument that we have never been modern i.e. purified.[41]

The educational implications of a vital materialist conception of cosmopolitanism, therefore, point to conceiving education as engagement with a plurality of local cosmopolitics: negotiating plural vital materialist networks of human and nonhuman actants that form into unified democratically legitimate assembly of politico-scientific collectives affected by common problems. Cosmopolitics crystallizes around "matters of concern," which are housed in "a parliament of things," which is Latour's term for an arrangement wherein "nature-society hybrids [genetically modified foods, for instance] can be treated as one and the same collective, experimental and democratic process."[42] In the "parliament of things,"

> [t]hings are presented as "matters of concern." Matters of concern possess all of the qualities that "naturally given" facts *do not*. They are rich, complex, uncertain, surprising and artificially constructed. At the same time, this artificial fabrication serves only to make them more real—and, in this sense, more objective. Fundamentally, matters of concern, or hybrid quasi-objects, possess an open and uncertain character that makes them *inherently* political: As opposed to "naturally given" facts, their place in the future collective world is never completely settled. On the contrary, different points of view, different life-forms and different political practices will gather around the things in ever-changing ways, thus creating a string of occasional public forums where their future will be negotiated and influenced. [43]

Such negotiation within cosmopolitics requires the skills of articulation: the ability to recognize and craft increasingly subtle connections among the relevant actants in a particular parliament of things. To the extent that education is understood to be the practice of honing the skills to exist in a series of parliaments of things cosmopolitanism is possible.

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Endnotes

1.Nonhumans can refer to many different things: animals such as scallops, natural phenomena such as reefs, tools and technical artifacts such as mass spectrometers, material structures such as sewerage networks, transportation devices such as planes, texts such as scientific accounts, economic goods such as commodities, and so on (Sayes, 2014, p. 136).
2. Jane Bennett, *Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 101.
3. Matthew C. Watson, "Derrida, Stengers, Latour, and Subalternist Cosmopolitics," *Theory, Culture & Society*, 31 (2014): 75-98.
4. Graham Harman, *Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics* (Melbourne: re.press, 2009), 57.
5. Bruno Latour, *Pandora's Hope* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999).
6. Bruno Latour, "Whose Cosmos, Which Cosmopolitics? Comments on the Peace Terms of Ulrich Beck," *Common Knowledge,* 10 (2004): 450-462.
7. Harman, *Prince of Networks*, 59.
8. Harman, *Prince of Networks*, 61.
9. Rosi Braidotti, "Becoming-World," in "*After Cosmopolitanism,*" ed. Rosi Braidotti, Patrick, and Bolette B. Blaagaard (New York: Routledge, 2012).
10. Bennett, *Vibrant Matter*, 5.
11. Ibid., 4.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., 6.
14. Ibid., 14.
15. Christopher Watkin, *Difficult Atheism: Post-Theological Thinking in Alain Badiou, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Quentin Meillassoux* (Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 143.
16. Edwin M. Sayes, "Actor-Network Theory and Methodology: Just What Does It Mean to Say That Nonhumans Have Agency?," *Social Studies of Science*, 44 (2014): 134-149.
17. Bennett, *Vibrant Matter*.
18. Ibid., viii.
19. Ibid.
20. Harman, *Prince of Networks*, 13.
21. Ibid., 14.
22. Watson, "Derrida, Stengers, Latour, and Subalternist Cosmopolitics," 84.
23. Latour, *Pandora's Hope*, 5.
24. *Ibid.*, 113.
25. Bruno Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).
26. Harman, *Prince of Networks*, 57.
27. Jay Foster, "Ontologies without Metaphysics: Latour, Harman, and the Philosophy of Things," *Analecta Hermeneutica*, 3 (2011).
28. Latour, *Pandora's Hope*, 179.
29. Ibid., 182.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid., 118.
32. Ibid.,113.
33. Bennett, *Vibrant Matter*.
34. Latour, *Pandora's Hope*, 122.
35. Bennett, *Vibrant Matter*, 103.
36. Latour, *Pandora's Hope*, 281.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., 193.

39. Ibid.,152.
40. Anders Blok and Torben E. Jensen, *Bruno Latour: Hybrid Thoughts in a Hybrid World.* (London: Routledge, 2011), 75.
41. Richard Edwards, "The End of Lifelong Learning: A Post-Human Condition?," *Studies in the Education of Adults,* 42 (2010): 5-17.
42. Blok and Jensen, *Bruno Latour*, 78.
43. Ibid., 86.

"We Refugees": Biopower, Cosmopolitanism and Hospitality
Between the Camp and Encampments

Nick Peim

Abstract

Catherine Malabou's 'ontology of the accident' offers another angle on accounts of identity. To be radically transformed without anticipation, to be dispossessed, to have to reinvent oneself, to be without access to or even simply without a 'mother tongue' – and to have forge new ways of 'mitsein': this is the parallel condition of the refugee. For Agamben, following Arendt, this is the political emblem of our time. The refugee signals the structurally provisional condition of the citizen. This spectral refugee explodes the mythic integrity of territory, people, language and the questionable accoutrements of national identity. This refugee belongs within Agamben's understanding of 'the camp' as 'the secret matrix and nomos of our time.'

The TV program Deadwood provides a metaphor for contemporary political realities in relation to the general condition of the refugee. Deadwood is a frontier town, frequently referred to as 'the camp', fraught with the depredations of modernity and with the spiritual, psychological uncertainties of post-modernity. Deadwood operates as a metaphor for contemporary political realities.

In Cosmopolitanism, Derrida considers, alternatively, the possibility of a new cosmopolitan city as a response to paranoid auto-immunity fearful of the foreign other in the form of the refugee. The aporetic condition of hospitality seems to offer only a hope against hope in the face of what turns out to be, in Monolingualism of the Other, the impossibility of being at home in language. Derrida also speculates on the 'paradoxical opportunity' (of the refugee) implying a freedom from belonging. Such broad rethinkings of political ontology express a possible critique of education as the most extensive and ever-growing expression of biopower.

Keywords

Ontology, Refugee, Camp, The School, Hospitality, Cosmopolitanism.

"We Refugees…"

Malabou's account of the ontology of the accident and its implications has resonances for a 'fundamental ontology' of the contemporary, including the refugee as paradigm for existential conditions in modernity and beyond.[1] In this 'figuration', the refugee has a double semiotic function: it acts symbolically to express some essential features of being while it also corresponds more directly to extensive actual lived experiences. Perhaps also a more generalized condition of exile as figured in the idea of banishment from the ideal or dislocation from

a primordial condition of oneness, as Jung might have it. It is also metonymic in that for significant numbers of people the condition of the refugee is *their* condition. Refugee-dom corresponds to an actual lived experience: displaced, of uncertain abode, mobile, malleable, essentially homeless: but also forging, inventive and creative, the refugee-bricoleur remakes herself in liquid modernity.

This refugee condition is articulated in the work of Arendt and Agamben as a lived experience that symbolically problematizes integrity and coherence of identity. This model may have implications for understanding contemporary conditions in general: it constitutes an ontology of identity that holds in tension the relations between the global, the national and the local. An ontology of the refugee as paradigm figure will here be proposed within a wider system that addresses the governmental apparatuses of education.

The Camp as 'Matrix And Nomos' of Our Time

Agamben's scandalous proposal that the 'camp' is in fact 'the hidden matrix and nomos' of our time. presents a disturbance to comfortable accounts of the contemporary order of things.[2] Agamben declares that the regime of governance we live within is essentially figured in the form and function of the camp. This is an analogical relation: Agamben is at pains to point out that his use of the figure of the camp, while crucial, does not relate to the actual experience of the camp. Agamben uses the camp to illustrate something essential about the political character of our times under biopower. Here I want to explore this peculiar – but persuasive – ontological figure in relation to a relatively recent tv series, *Deadwood*, that won significant critical acclaim for its portrayal of a frontier world designed as typical of late nineteenth century USA. This symbolically liminal site expresses a condition of being between the state of civilization, the state of an assumed 'nature' and the acquisitive lawlessness associated with an aspect of American capitalism in its social and ecological dimensions.

The idea of both camp - drawn from Agamben – and encampment, drawn from TV programme, *Deadwood* – here provides a composite metaphor with powerful ontological resonances for our time, the time of 'we contempoararies'. Camp has many implications, some of them very dark, and the analogy needs very careful handling. For Agamben, the camp is essentially a space of *exception* where sovereign power can exert itself more or less without restraint within a

'state of emergency'. Encampment signifies more generally the temporary and uncertain in our apparently settled way of life. This condition has demographic, economic, technological and many other dimensions.

The two terms – camp and encampment – here are used to return to some themes regarding the onto-theological role of education and its place as an essential apparatus of contemporary bio-politics. From this perspective, the faith of everyday metaphysics and of dominant philosophy tht education is quintessentially a liberatory or salvationary mission is misplaced. Claims that education might hold the key to healing the wounds of modernity's legacies of difference and violence are misguided. Rather, we need to understand differently what education is today and how education has become a kind of a dominant mytheme. The powerful, messianic promise of education belies its central role in 'the great transformation' that has imposed a specific, if mobile, ordering onto the social order that is gaining in reach and power. The regime of *bio*-power that remains powerfully entrenched operates in parallel with the precarity that is a powerful dimension of ontology in modernity and beyond. Bio-power in fact represents itself as the necessary antidote to the uncertainties of 'liquid modernity'.[3]

The figure of the refugee – as paradigm figure for our times – provides a focus for some rethinking of the relations between bio-power and the governmental functioning of education in our time.

Arendt's Refugee

Arendt implies the refugee (as she was herself) as the paradigm figure of identity in our time. In her account, the refugee is condemned to begin again, to remake herself in strange or at least different circumstances, prefiguring Malabou's recent assertion of the ontology of the accident. Arendt's account highlights the fundamental 'thrownness' of human existence in Heidegger's key term in its specifically modern form.[4] In modernity, Arendt claims, the accidental, uncertain and precarious quality of existence is exacerbated by instabilities in mobile global political conditions. 'Liquid modernity' accentuates the experience of refugee status, provoking the question: In what can we put our trust? For Arendt the refugee experiences a loss of faith in collective experiences and forms of identity. For those who suffer such unhomely exile, trust can only

be granted to what we have made ourselves. If so, we suffer existential loneliness, displaced and removed from the securities of localness, the refugee suffers existential crisis. For Arendt, the figure of the refugee prompts the realization that the key political project is to understand how meaningful, dignified existence is possible under the particular conditions of the modern world.[5]

An interesting element in Arendt's account is the reference to Chaplin's 'tramp' as a prototypical refugee. This quintessentially urban figure exemplifies contingent existence: dispossessed, marginal, not belonging, Chaplin's tramp relies on resourcefulness and creative bricolage – moving among the debris and discarded places – always a spectator to someone else's 'good life'. Chaplin's 'tramp' develops a practice of survival, depending on chance mutuality. At the same time, the tramp enjoys a kind of freedom, is always detached from, irreverent to and distrustful of the state order and the law. Chaplin's tramp frequently clashes with the law signifying the 'dangerous incompatibility of general laws with [his] individual misdeeds'. Chaplin's 'tramp/refugee' is now 100 years old. Could he still exist?

Agamben's Expansion

A powerful development of Arendt's sketch of the refugee as a paradigm figure is offered in Giorgio Agamben's ontological claim that the refugee can be seen as the ultimate 'biopolitical' subject: the subject *par excellence* who can be regulated and governed – at the level of population management – in a permanent 'state of exception'. Agamben presents the 'figure of the refugee' as exemplary, as *the* symbolic representation of social and political reality in relation to Foucault's account of the emergence and rise of biopower and 'the great transformation'.[6]

The refugee problematizes strongly embedded categories of contemporary politics. Firstly, the refugee exposes the 'fiction' of national sovereignty, national identity and all associated legal and political categories such as 'the people' and 'the citizen' and their attendant safegurards. Refugees within the polity are in some senses always already reduced to 'bare life': humans without (or with a suspended) political identity or status. Secondly, 'the refugee' can be represented as the paradigmatic site of modern techniques of what Michel Foucault called 'governmentality': the organized practices and techniques used to produce, care for and/or dominate individual subjects within normative regimes

of disciplinary care.[7] Thirdly, Agamben argues that refugees can be seen as the ultimate 'biopolitical' subjects: those who can be regulated and governed at the level of population in a permanent 'state of exception' outside the normal legal framework – the camp. In detention camps, refugees are effectively reduced to 'bare life' whose status and identity is suspended under the law. Finally, Agamben suggests that by fully comprehending the significance of refugees in the present political order we may countenance new ways of political belonging and the limits and possibilities of political 'community' in the future. After the nation-state and its associated legal and political categories have been assigned to history, the refugee will remain as 'perhaps the only thinkable figure'.

In the first three of these ways, the refugee is also strongly related to the 'child' of education, the schoolchild. The child is often both legally and practically represented as a form of 'bare-life' a way of being that precedes entry into culture and identity 'proper'. The child is its subjection to disciplinary care, particularly through the apparatuses of schooling, intensively governedin relation to modes of conduct and habits of thinking. The child exists in a state of exception, being a 'special' subject subjected to special provisions under the law. The child is a key example of the state of exception that is indicative of the dispersed form of sovereign power that characterizes modernity and beyond. As if to offer a disturbing specular case of the child under the law in the state of exception, the child as refugee has a real face: in the UK where unaccompanied asylum seeking children are held in 'camps' ('detention centres') in a 'state of exception'.

According to Agamben's perspective, significantly developed from Foucault, the apparently rational (say, Kantian) instruments of the state are the very institutions that may facilitate an infinite expansion of disciplinary coercion and 'bio-political'control. According to this perspective, merely updating and expanding the classical discourse and reach of rights fails to grasp how power actually works with regimes of biopower. As history amply demonstrates, the reform of existing institutions – rather than develop freedoms and expanding the range of capacities – serves to entrench the worst aspects of sovereign power and the system of nation-states that produces refugees. According to Agamben, liberal and conventional realist theory do not provide sufficient analytical and normative understanding of the real and symbolic violence administered to refugees, including by liberal democracies. Rather, the figure of the refugee symbolizes the nature of the political regimes we live within. The treatment

of asylum seeking children in the UK for example – and other kinds of exceptional detainees – indicates the totalitarian potential of apparently liberal political order. Hence, Agamben's affirmation of the paradigm of the camp in modernity as essential to political-historical ontology. Agamben claims that 'the concentrationary universe' – in terms of experience a perhaps unparalleled extreme – signifies something essential about the juridical structure within which we live.

The camp constitutes an exceptional space that stands outside of or beyond the law: while at the same time, it is instituted by a constitutional action involving the legally sanctioned suspension of law. The camp constitutes a paradigm case: the camp (and camp in this sense may refers to a variety of exceptional, but legally sanctioned places, spaces such as Guantanamo bay, detention centres for asylum seekers and other social spaces) by virtue of its very existence problematizes the status of the citizen within even the most liberal political order.

Education/Schooling

Key aspects of schooling can be understood in analogy with Agamben's metonymic interest in the camp, such as: legal compunction and immunity from aspects of general law; the government of subjectivity; confinement in terms of time, space and association; 'dislocating localization'; the promotion of national cohesion; the strict separation of spheres of existence, particularly child and society. The school as we know it, like the camp, is a specifically European invention. The school is now globalized continuing to enact a rapidly accelerating process that we don't yet understand. Presitigious, traditional fee-paying English schools, for example, now replicate themselves in China with the connivance of the Chinese government as nation-states throughout the world seek to emulate – from a subordinate position, of ocurse – the form and function of western education systems, even down to the minutiae of curriculum specifications. The proliferating school as we know it is, in fact – and has to be – anti-democratic, in spite of protestations of reformers and redeemers (including 'critical' educationists). With its rabidly hierarchical distribution of differentiated statuses contemporary education looks like a new global feudalism.

The dark logic of Agamben's state of exception challenges liberal faith in reform. Within biopower, 'bios' – belonging to the culture, the 'national' group

– is granted but can be withdrawn. The state of exception institutes totalitarian powers under the law, some frighteningly extensive. For Agamben, the liberal state is as good as totalitarian insofar as the power to become a totalitarian state makes the state totalitarian. This state of affairs echoes with Benjamin's assertion of the conintuing state of crisis and with the more recent Nancy articulation of the provenance of 'mitsein' by Nancy.[8]

Derrida, Cosmopolitanism and Monolingualism of the Other

Derrida's work includes several excursions into the terrain of 'mitsein', including an explicit address to cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism in Derrida, although represented as a positive condition, when thought alongside hospitality, is also represented essentially as a challenge: an impossible if indispensable idea. In *Cosmopolitanism*, Derrida considers the possibility of a 'new cosmopolitan city' as a response to an excessive, paranoid policing of borders against the threat of the foreign other in the form of the refugee who appears in this guise, interestingly, as a figure of fear. Hospitality, though, turns out not to be a clearly embraceable opposite of auto-immune paranoia but an aporetic condition that makes infinite demand on the host while being constrained by pragmatic limits in order to make itself even possible. Hospitality appears then as an instance of the now familiar 'possible/impossible', almost as a hope against hope. And while Derrida proposes support for the ideal of the new cosmopolitan city the real point, perhaps, is that within the juridical structure described by Agamben's awkward reminder of the provenance of the camp – a version of bio-power – hospitality is both strictly delimited and unpredictable.[9]

Hospitality belongs with the discourse of the refugee and the possibility of being 'at home' elsewhere. In a further twist, though, Derrida's work, rather like Lacan's in this respect, problematizes the very idea of being-at-home in language. Published at more or less the same time as *Cosmopolitanism*, *Monolingualism of the Other* Derrida addresses linguistic identity in a partly autobiographical account. Derrida claims to have only ever had one language but that language, at the same time, was never 'his'. In language, there is essentially no home, no mother tongue. One is always subject to the other that is language and to its sovereign occupation of the self. Language is not homely. Identity in this sense can never be the expression of some proper unity with an interior

being of the self nor with a unified way of life, a mode of being proper to a determinate group held together by common language that expresses unity.[10]

As Nancy suggests, 'mitsein' is always paradoxically both fundamental and accidental, the grounds for identity *and* expressive of 'thrown-ness'. The accroutrements of belonging, of identity are inessential, borrowed. While we may embrace them as fundamental expressions of what we are, in fact, we acquire them retrospectively once that decision of belonging has been made on our behalf. Inessentiality then is primary and fundamental. Its shadow remains as a possibility as exenmplified in the potential condition of being refugee.

Paradoxical Opportunity

Derrida's rumination on language and identity speculates on the 'paradoxical opportunity' represented by certain North African Jews who have no direct or intimate relation to North African, French or Jewish culture. Such a 'figuration' suggests Arendt's refugee as positive bricoleur of identity. What is the nature of this 'paradoxical opportunity' (of the refugee) and to what extent does it signify a possibility for the general condition of 'we refugees' (the condition of subjectivity itself) in modernity? A big question attends the condition of cosmopolitanism. Could it simply be another empty liberal mantra ('democracy', 'freedom') that refuses to recognise its own underlying conditions under the ubiquitous regime of biopower? Could its emergence out of various catastrophes of modernity paradoxically signify and force recognition of another way of being together as Agamben ('inessential community') and Nancy ('inoperative community') have begun to suggest?

The TV program *Deadwood* provides a useful possible metaphor for contemporary political realities in relation to the general condition of the refugee. Deadwood is a real place in South Dakota but was, in the late nineteenth century, a frontier town. In the tv version it is this proto-civic space that is represented as being fraught with the depredations of modernity and with the spiritual, psychological uncertainties of post-modernity. In the tv programme, Deadwood refers to itself as a 'camp' signifying a pre-polis condition of temporary settlement. It is semi-lawless, dominated by the powerful, the scene of a scramble for wealth, tolerant of the abuse of women and of the subjugation of racial minorities. Law emerges, to protect incipient citizens, but also to act

in frequent states of emergency to impose a more or less arbitrarily conducted authority and order. Its manoeuvres are more or less arbitrary. In Deadwood inequalities abound with no dependable social welfare support for the vulnerable. One group, the Chinese, enjoy the status of permanent outsiders, outside of even the uncertain, capricious protections of the law. Their presence signifies a social space of exception where the unconscionable can happen. In general, Deadwood signifies a temporary encampment at times aspiring to civic status, but frequently dominated by other imperatives and struggles. It is both an account of emergence of modernity but also at the same time a radically critical depiction of contemporaneity. As the 'civilizing' forces in Deadwood emerge, the school occupies a central ideological and instrumental function in the transformation of the frontier environment. As the civilizing process (in the Elias sense) gains momentum, the 'other' lawless manifestations of sovereign power do not disappear but become less visible.[11]

Finally

Education today operates as the essential instrument of bio-power as briefly indicated above. What we might call the aporetic thinking of cosmopolitanism, configured around the ontology of the accident and centred on the paradigm figure of the refugee problematizes the rationally programmed 'futur' of education, as opposed to a more open 'avenir' that may only be anticipated without schedule, but also disturbs the claim of education to be on the side of either liberation or critique.

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SECTION II
Economics, Politics, Law

GLOBALIZATION IN AND OF EUROPE
Local Perspectives

Chairs

—

Bo Petersson & Maja Povrzanović Frykman

Participants

—

Bo Petersson & Tünde Puskás
Maja Povrzanović Frykman

Presentation

Bo Petersson & Maja Povrzanović Frykman

The societal processes subsumed under the shorthand rubric of "globalization" are customarily assumed to have a strong influence on all levels of contemporary society, and are seen as leading to increased interconnectedness, socio-cultural heterogeneity and the erosion of national boundaries, but also to heightened friction and conflict within and between groups. However, few existing studies explore what impact concrete manifestations of globalization have on developments on the ground in a sustained comparative manner, and with the focus on Europe. This workshop therefore invited contributions that relate to the dynamics of change in particular local contexts as key to the understanding of the impact of global processes. The geographical focus was on Europe, or on Europe in comparison with other parts of the world.

The workshop conveners particularly invited papers on the socio-cultural and economic effects and experiences of abrupt changes in local settings, widely attributed to processes of globalization. This could for example apply to effects of concentrated labour migration into neighbourhoods that have previously been relatively homogeneous in ethnic, racial and religious terms; shifting patterns of economic domination where capital is e.g. infused into Western Europe from Russia or Asia; or effects on socio-economic relations of the closely connected manifestations of the global financial crisis and the Eurozone crisis occurring in its wake. Another vital area of study concerned the extent to which different cultural, social, political and economic effects of globalization – either as abrupt or long-term processes –upset or profoundly change previous local hierarchies and practices of ethnicity, religion, race, class and gender.

It is contested whether globalization constitutes qualitatively new processes characterizing our contemporary world and era. Critical observers argue however that the current period of globalization is but the most recent period in a millennium-old series of periods of intense socio-political, economic and cultural global processes of change impacting on and spreading between different parts of the world. Changes in local working conditions, but also in locally embedded values, social relations and life trajectories popularly attributed to

current globalization, have for centuries been prompted by effects of the international reach of market economy forces and transnational impacts of powerful political actors. Hence, the workshop also welcomed papers using a contemporary perspective, as well as those applying a historical one.

The workshop was multi-disciplinary in scope and character, pertaining to any/all discipline/s in the social sciences and humanities. Papers presented could be theoretical but should contain a solid empirical component, based on single case studies or on comparative-case designs. The conveners strived for an even distribution in the workshop, in gender terms as well as in terms of the participants' stage of academic career.

Paradise Lost or Gained?

TNC Establishment and Interethnic/Interracial Relations in a Central European Small Town

Bo Petersson & Tünde Puskás

Abstract

The paper discusses the dynamics of local ethnic, racial and social relations in a traditionally multiethnic Central European small town that has been heavily influenced by the establishment of a transnational company. The town in question is the traditionally triethnic (Slovak, Hungarian, Roma) Galanta in Slovakia, where the Korean transnational company Samsung since some ten years back has established its presence. In particular, the authors address to what extent engrained ethnic and racial stereotypes are maintained among the local population and to what extent they are challenged and reconstructed.

Keywords

Interethnic Relations, Interracial Relations, Transnational Company, Labor Migration, Stereotypes, Local Responses.

Introduction

Galanta is geographically situated in Slovakia, in close proximity to the Hungarian (50 km), Austrian (70 km) and Czech borders (100 km). As far as the town's history is concerned it was part of Hungary until 1920 and 1938-45 while during the rest of the 20th century it belonged to Slovakia (until 1993 Czechoslovakia). Galanta is located within the Slovak-Hungarian language border where Hungarian and Slovak speakers lived side by side for centuries. During the Hungarian rule the majority of its inhabitants considered themselves to be Hungarian speakers, while the rest of the population described themselves as Slovak or German speakers.[1]

As of today Galanta has a total population of 13600 out of which 64% identify as Slovak, 33% as Hungarian and 3% as Roma, Czech or other.[2] In spite of this composition, at the time of the interviews that we conducted, in 2013, the town has still been considered "Hungarian-oriented" as in more than one electoral period two thirds of the members of the city council represented ethnic Hungarian parties.

As far as the religious setup of the town is concerned, until 1944, when all Jews from the region were deported to concentration camps, one fourth of the total population (about 4500 persons) was Jewish. The Holocaust changed all this, but the interviews conducted with locals bear witness to a small but active Jewish community still being present in Galanta. Several informants described Galanta as a town traditionally inhabited by Hungarians, Slovaks and Jews while the Roma, who live in small enclaves on the outskirts of the town, were barely mentioned.

Similarly to other multiethnic cities and towns in the region[3] the social life of the local inhabitants has traditionally been structured along ethnic lines; and national/ethnic (Slovak vs. Hungarian) and racial (Roma vs. white; Jewish vs. Christian) categories have formed the taken-for-granted frameworks of social experience. At the same time and according to recent figures, 1200 persons are registered as non-resident foreigners.[4]. This is noteworthy as Slovakia generally is a country with a low level of immigration (1.22 % of the population is of migrant origin). Our article purports to show how, in this context, the migrants in Galanta are pictured in local stereotypes and ethnic hierarchies.

Method

This paper presents the findings of a pilot study. Four interviews were conducted with individuals in key positions in the local community. These individuals were chosen because they are well known figures in Galanta and because they were expected to have deep insights into how the town has developed in the past fifteen years. All four informants are male, they were at the time of the interviews between 40-70 years old and had at some point during the past 15 years been members of the municipal assembly. Two of them combine involvement in local politics with being businessmen while the other two are civil servants.

Questions were posed about how the establishment of the TNC has influenced the life of the local inhabitants. Another key topic explored in the interviews was the nature of interethnic and interracial relations in Galanta and how they relate to the changes in the population structure that have occurred in recent years.

The interviews were treated as articulations of discursive practices through which individuals understand and shape their relations to the social world[5]. In the analysis of the interviews we explored the discursive manifestations of ethnic and racial stereotypes. Our focus was on the discursive (re)construction of identifications and we aimed to show how local discursive practices relate to concrete events which are considered important in the present and in the recent past of the locality. In the interviews, the stories about "who we are", "who we were" and the lived project of "what we ought to become" comprise shared narratives which embody some dialectic between dynamism and uniformity.

Local Narratives and the Arrival of Samsung

Until 2002, when the Korean transnational company Samsung Electronics was relocated from the United Kingdom,[6] Galanta used to be a sleepy, grey town that was struggling with a high level of unemployment (close to 20%) and was marked by economic stagnation. Several of the factories (furniture, construction and food processing industry) which were established during communist times had been closed and the traditional agrarian character of the town, which used to characterize the times before communism, had not recovered to compensate for the dismantling. The unemployment figures seem to have been a crucial reason why the municipal political leaders lobbied hard for bringing the TNC to the town.[7] Seemingly they were right to do so, as the establishment of the TNC led to revitalization of the town in economic terms. Since 2002 the unemployment rate in Galanta and its immediate vicinity has plunged from about 20 to about 7.5% in 2013-2014.

Within a few years the company employed 3000 persons most of whom were coming from the near proximity of Galanta, but also guest workers from Bulgaria, Romania and Vietnam as well as managers from Korea. The presence of the transnational company in the town is conspicuous. The company buildings occupy a large segment of the center of the town. Other visible signs of the presence of the company are the workers' hostel built close to company premises, the road signs showing the way to Samsung, the annual festival "Samsung Days" and the omnipresent news about Samsung-promoted events in the town in the local newspaper.

However, our interviews indicate that while in the beginning of its presence in Galanta Samsung was still considered to be the savior of the town, ten year later it has become regarded more as a traitor. As a civil servant described the situation, Samsung was in the beginning of the 2000s hailed with an arch decorated with bunches of flowers. By way of contrast, ten years after its arrival it was seen as a symbol of failed expectations. According to the interviews, the problem was not that the TNC had offered more than it could deliver. It was rather that the expectations were unrealistic to begin with. The locals considered the TNC insensitive to the particularities of local experiences and needs. They expected Samsung immediately to solve the problems of unemployment among local low-skilled workers. Contrary to these expectations, Samsung started instead early on to hire skilled workers with some knowledge of English. Moreover, as a local official explained, Samsung used recruitment methods, such as interviews, which where previously unknown for what was seen as factory jobs and which were regarded as ”foreign” or ”typically Korean”. Because of these recruitment procedures only a handful of Galanta inhabitants got a job with the company while significantly more employees were, at least in the beginning, recruited from the neighboring villages. An interesting discursive consequence of this development was the dichotomy that was established between locals (Galanta inhabitants) and “intruders”/villagers (people who commuted to Galanta from the neighboring villages). A member of the municipal council even called those who commuted to Samsung from the nearby villages ”parasites” who took the jobs from the locals.

After this initial selectivity, Samsung started in 2002-2003 to extend its production and to employ workers on a mass scale. At the time of the interviews approximately 2000 employees from Slovakia and from abroad were hired directly by Samsung while others were recruited and employed through employment agencies. According to one informant, the procedure of employing people through agencies is a convenient solution for the company since Samsung may disclaim responsibility for the employees.

The economic crisis of 2008-2009 had negative effects on demand and the number of employees dropped abruptly from about 3000 to about 1000. Since then there has again been a recovery. At the time of the interviews there were, according to our informants, around 2000 employees working in the company.

The narratives about the present and future of Samsung in Galanta reflect a love-and- hate relationship. The importance of the company for local business is revealed in stories about sub-contractors whose businesses - be it an Asian restaurant, an employment agency, or the bus company that drives the commuters from the neighboring villages to Galanta - all in one way or another depend on the future collaboration with Samsung. At the same time informants tried to emphasize that Galanta is no longer solely dependent on Samsung. Other companies have followed Samsung's lead and established branches in Galanta (though none of them is as powerful and big as Samsung).

When the importance of Samsung for Galanta's development is acknowledged in the interviews, this is also done somewhat grudgingly. Samsung is seen as big, powerful and rich but is criticized for lacking social and especially financial commitment in community affairs. As one of the informants explained, Samsung does a lot at the symbolic level: maybe above all the aforementioned annual Samsung Days, a cultural event organised every year to express gratitude to everybody who has done something for Samsung. Samsung's top brass together with representatives of the Korean Embassy in Bratislava visit the annual Galanta market days - a social and cultural event organised by the municipality. What my informants criticize the company most for is that "Samsung does not act as a socially responsible company." The narrative of social responsibility dates back to the 'good old communist times' when the chemical factory Duslo, established in the neighboring town of Sala, played an important role providing working, housing and recreational opportunities to up to 5000 employees, their families and thereby also to the community at large. According to our informants, Samsung ought not to work in isolation but should recognize its social responsibility vis-à-vis the locality. This social responsibility is formulated as an overall obligation to the locality's inhabitants in terms of employment opportunities (at least 10 per cent of the workforce ought to be locals, the interviewees argue), investments in infrastructure outside the factory and the sponsoring of local sport clubs and educational enterprises.

Dichotomies and Stereotypical Images

In general the interviews bear witness of a discursive practice within which dichotomizations constitute the general pattern. The discourses analyzed here are pervaded by dichotomies, which are all constructed at the intersection of racial, ethnic and social categories.

First of all, the self-image of Galantians is that local inhabitants uphold bilingual language competence. According to our informants, a typical Galanta-dweller speaks (or at least understands) both Slovak and Hungarian fluently while the villagers commuting to Galanta are described as monolingual Hungarian or Slovak speakers. The informants take pride in raising their children to be bilingual while they are complaining about others in their generation who only speak Slovak to their children.

Another important feature of a Galantian is the local knowledge about who is a Jew and who is not. While the Jews are an invisible minority they play an important role in the narratives about who is a "local". By way of contrast, a visible minority as "the Roma", many of whom live in social housing on the outskirts of the town, does not seem to be considered as members of the local community at all. When we posed a question about the inhabitants in an area of social housing, our informants gave either responses which indicated prejudiced attitudes or simply avoided the question and started talking about "the foreign workers who resemble the Roma." "The Roma" on the other hand are ascribed not only darker skin[8] but they are also seen as a people who cause problems for others and refuse to work. The category of Roma is thus expanded to cover not only racial but also classed aspects as it has come to essentialize a purported relationship between race and poverty.[9] This stereotype places those identified as Roma low on the local hierarchy. The Roma are by and large associated with poverty and criminality and are thus said to shun work and live off social benefits.

As explained above, within a few years after Samsung's advent the company employed 3000 additional persons, among them guest workers from the Eastern parts of Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria (about 800) and Vietnam (about 300). Most of the guest workers still live densely concentrated to a hostel in the city center. Therefore their presence is tangible in the local context.[10] Like the Roma, the guest workers from Eastern Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria are by several local representatives associated with increasing criminality in the town and with poverty. The Vietnamese

guest workers, on the other hand, are described as poor and are pitied for being far away from their homes. However, the Vietnamese guest workers are mainly seen as powerless non-locals, but Eastern Europeans are pictured as a potential threat to the local order. It should also be remembered that the presence of labor migrants is seen as a sign of certain prosperity of the town and of Slovakia generally because, as an informant explained, "they would not come if it was not better here than where they come from."

All persons of Korean origin who work at Samsung have some kind of a leading position. The interviewees perceive the Samsung Korean managers as distant and at times arrogant. The informants described the leadership of Samsung as highly hierarchical. A four-layered hierarchy, according to our informants, always consisted (regardless who these persons are) of a Korean president who lives in in Vienna, a Korean deputy president who lives in Budapest, another Korean deputy who lives in Bratislava and four managers who live in Galanta. Three of these managers are recruited from Korea and one from Slovakia. Our informants emphasized a few aspects about the manager recruited from Slovakia. He always seem to be a "he", he is usually replaced after 3-4 years in the company, he is always bilingual (Hungarian - Slovak) and he has no local attachments (at the time of recruitment). The highest-ranking Korean managers, who only visit Galanta occasionally, are ascribed high social status, while those Koreans who live in Galanta are described both in positive terms, as diligent and hard-working, and in racial terms as chinky-eyed and smelly. According to a local businessman, "the Koreans get very drunk at parties and they smell. People who rented their flats to the Korean bosses had to renovate them from the ground up because of the smell the Koreans left." The interviews indicate that everyday contacts between Koreans and locals are mostly limited to factory premises. Thus, the stories told in the interviews seem to be based on quick impressions, second-hand information and stereotypes built on hearsay rather than on more solid first-hand experiences of direct contact.

The Koreans are pictured as exotic, non-European people who deserve respect for their wealth and managerial competence, but who are thus also seen as self-centred, disrespectful to local culture and indifferent to the needs of Galanta. Our informants explained that the habits of the Koreans are impossible to understand for Europeans while they emphasized that very little contacts were established between locals and the Korean managers because "the Koreans think too much about themselves and have never intended to integrate in Galanta".

Conclusion

In the interviews with local representatives the arrival of the Samsung is pictured as a milestone for the town's economic development even if the initial expectations towards the company have not been met. The inflow of migrants challenges the existing local hierarchies and creates new ones.

The newcomers contest the previously existing local interethnic status quo in several different ways. Seen in racial terms all Asian newcomers are, regardless of their socio-economic status, categorized as non-white, just like the stigmatized category of Roma. At the same time the labor migrants represent different class positions in terms of human capital (skilled/unskilled) and employment status (managerial/low status employment). At the other end of the spectrum, Korean migrants stand at an intersection of class and race as many of them represent Samsung in managerial positions, challenging old stereotypes about white supremacy. Thus the local narratives of sameness and difference have to be understood in the intersection between race, ethnicity, and class.

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Material Enactments of Shifting Hierarchies

Emic Perspectives on Humanitarian Aid in the 1990s War in Sarajevo

Maja Povrzanović Frykman

Abstract

This paper focuses on the local perceptions of the effects of humanitarian aid, conceptualised as a specific realm of global interconnectedness. As an aspect of global moral and political order, humanitarian aid has multiple concrete implications on the developments on the ground – from saving bare life to redefining hierarchies of power and effecting, with uncertain outcomes, the existent local socio-cultural orders. My empirical focus is Bosnia-Hercegovina, a country that, due to the four-year war in the 1990s, attracted one of the largest humanitarian operations of that decade, involving all most significant international organisations. Based on fifteen interviews conducted in 2013-14 with people who lived in Sarajevo in the course of the 1990s war, this paper suggests that war events are by no means 'forgotten' but have a staying effect on the perceptions of multiple hierarchies, local and global, that people have been immersed in because of living in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Three fields of concern emerge as important from the emic point of view, namely (i) the negotiation of the position of a generic 'other' in the global hierarchy of peace and conflict; (ii) the negotiation of the locally embedded socio-cultural order; (iii) the resistance to the negotiation of the moral order. These fields of concern indicate the local perceptions of and the modes of acting within the shifting hierarchies, here analysed with regard to their material enactments and in relation to the intersected *spatial*, *socio-cultural*, and *moral* frameworks.

Keywords

Humanitarian Aid, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Emic Perspectives, Hierrarchies.

Humanitarian industry has been critically assessed as "a practice that constitutes subjects, both the operators of the interventions whose agency is cast within the humanitarian ideology, and those who would be their beneficiaries—the mute subjects whose dense sociality is reduced to thin descriptions in bureaucratic reports."[1] This paper focuses on the local effects of humanitarian aid, conceptualised as a specific realm of global interconnectedness. The central issue of interest is what impact the actual materiality of aid has on the ground, as seen from the local perspective.

My empirical focus is Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia and Hercegovina—a country that, due to the war in the 1990s, attracted one of the largest hu-

manitarian operations of that decade, involving most significant international humanitarian organisations.[2] The abrupt and radical changes of the local setting occurred due to the military violence and siege that lasted over three and a half years,[3] but that setting was, at the same time, sustained due to its multiple embeddedness in the web of globally spanning links. These links materialised locally not only in the presence of international observers and reporters, UN troops and diplomats, but also in material goods sent as humanitarian aid, which were crucial for the civilians. The so-called 'air-bridge' to Sarajevo was closed down after 13,000 flights which brought in 167,677 tons of humanitarian aid from twenty countries.[4]

During the war, 90 percent of the population relied on international humanitarian assistance for survival. However, countless titles on war and post-war aid to Bosnia and Hercegovina predominantly promote the perspective of the so-called 'donor side'.[5] This paper focuses on the 'recipient side', with an interest in the micro-level of individual experience in the particular local context of Sarajevo during the war years (not the post-war development aid).[6]

In the pilot study done in collaboration with the Sarajevo Centre for Refugee and IDP Studies, fifteen people were interviewed between November 2013 and April 2014. These are nine women and six men of different generations and with various educational backgrounds who lived in Sarajevo during the 1990s war.[7] The interviews were explorative; the question on what the interviewees remembered about receiving humanitarian aid in the 1990s enabled them to raise any issue they found relevant. The transcribed material encompasses 180 pages of text.

On the basis of this material, emic perspectives on humanitarian aid can be discerned that indicate the local perceptions of the shifting hierarchies within the intersected socio-cultural, moral and spatial frameworks. The three fields of concern pertain to the *donors' classifications of aid recipients*, to the *uneven access to humanitarian aid* and to the war-victims' *relation to the aid-providing 'outside world'* as materialised in the humanitarian aid. The first two will be presented only briefly, while the third, most prominent field of concern, will be presented in more detail.

The Donors' Classifications and the Uneven Access to Humanitarian Aid

The UNHCR was seen as religiously and politically neutral and its aid was "longed for and welcomed."[8] However, people in Sarajevo under siege had to turn also to faith-oriented organisations, with Caritas and Merhamet being most prominent.

Some interviewees praised the help they received from the organisations that were not meant to take care of 'their' group; however, several of them expressed frustration with donor-imposed hierarchies of 'deserving' aid recipients that pertained to their religious affiliation (presumably stemming from their ethnic origin and presumably signalled by their name). A few never sought help from such organisations, while others eventually succumbed to being recognised as 'deserving' recipients, even if they were not practicing faith or endorsing visible religious symbols before the war. This process of succumbing to the salience of ethno-religious identity is an important aspect of 'negotiation of normality' raised by Maček,[9] who discussed the normality of a socio-cultural order of pre-war Sarajevo where ethnic origin and religious affiliation were not organising people's daily interactions or their general access to resources. The heightened importance of ethnic and religious affiliation was by no means introduced to wartime Bosnia and Hercegovina by foreign donors, but they often reconfirmed it in a matter-of-fact manner that played into the hands of local nationalists who were responsible for the war in the first place.

On the other hand, the narrative material suggests the resilience of the pre-war moral order despite the changes of local power in relation to uneven access to humanitarian aid.

The general issue of access to resources in war, the problematic organisational aspects of aid interventions[10] and the specific issue of hierarchies of power based on uneven (legal and illegal) access to humanitarian aid are too broad and too complex to be discussed in this paper. May it suffice to say that the interviewees refused to negotiate the moral framework of proper behaviour, regardless of poverty and need in war circumstances. War profiteers and UN soldiers as providers of goods to be sold on black markets were judged in a non-negotiable negative manner. Several interviewees made clear that differences in access to aid and the better quality of aid available to people close to military and political power positions was morally upsetting, even if it was unsurprising.

One interviewee's story concerning helping others by giving them extra aid needs to be singled out. It was framed as a story of a generous helper, but it can be read as a story of relative power gained due to occupying an administrative position that allowed privileged access to humanitarian assistance. The satisfaction permeating this man's narration can be understood as satisfaction with a power-position that differentiated him from 'common' aid recipients even though they shared hunger, fear and danger in an under-siege Sarajevo.

Generic 'Other' – Between Gratitude and Humiliation

In the collected narrative material, remembering war seems to be an exercise in reconstructing respondents' own agency and resourcefulness, for example, in combining parts of different humanitarian lunch packages to produce something resembling a traditional Bosnian dish. However, this material is also permeated by frustration and humiliation, deeply felt even twenty years after the war. This frustration and humiliation became very concrete in the accounts of, for instance, heaps of badly smelling old clothes available at the Red Cross, or of plaids used to make warm overalls for children but whose stench gave them the nickname 'horse plaids'.

The ICAR can of minced meat, referred to at length by most of my interviewees, features among the most important objects in the virtual war museum[11] and has been discussed in scholarly articles,[12] in Bosnian media[13] and in social forums.[14] This can also features as "a monument to the international community" signed by "the grateful citizens of Sarajevo".[15] It is remembered as notoriously disgusting, as something that even cats refused to eat while people had to. As an iconic object, ICAR gathers layers of humiliation in the interconnected experience of hunger, necessity and charity.

The popular consensus in Sarajevo and beyond is that ICAR is the symbol of the relation between international political actors and the people living in Sarajevo in the 1990s—a relation that needs to be shielded by cynicism and black humour. In my reading, it is a symbol of Sarajevans' position as the generic 'other' in relation to the people sending them food to survive on.

At the same time, it created a generic figure of donors, since neither my interviewees nor the web discussion groups discussing "The riddle of ICAR" (see endnote 14) seem to have any idea concerning who produced these cans. However, as

stated by a middle-aged female respondent, her and other Sarajevans' interest was reduced to survival; their realm of control was reduced to one's immediate, basic needs and did not leave space for considerations of who exactly is producing and sending aid items:

> "I have no idea who produced it. To be honest, you cannot care less. When aid comes, it doesn't matter. … And you get the flour — whose is that flour? I don't care! I mean, you have that ICAR, you got what you are entitled to — OK, super, thank you. You get it, you are not interested in anything; just give it to me, to conclude this [queuing for aid], to go home."

A distinct memory shared by many concerns also the so-called 'Vietnamese cookies'—the square metal tins sealed by wax, with the year 1960 printed on them, as some respondents claimed. One of the interviewees, a medical doctor in her fifties, described them in terms of absurdity:

> "Cookies, I remember them—from the Vietnam War. … They didn't have any taste; you had a feeling that you [were eating] wood. … So, you laugh—it is really, totally absurd. Everything is totally absurd. In that moment, there is nothing else to do but to laugh."

Another interviewee remembered those cookies as humiliation materialised; in her statement, the 'us' of aid recipients in Sarajevo is juxtaposed with the generic 'them' who sent the aid:

> "That was really terrible. I saw how old they were; I saw how awful it was but I simply had no other choice but to give them to my children to eat because I didn't have anything else. If I had, I would certainly never give them that to eat. That makes me angry because I had a feeling that they just wanted to get rid of them. To give them to us to eat—even if I knew it was not good, it was not healthy—but I simply had no choice. I am a little angry since I had a feeling that those people who sent that humanitarian aid to us actually manipulated with us because they sent to us something they would never eat themselves."

The statement that she is only 'a little angry' needs to be understood in the context of the entire interview, in which this 53-year old psychologist also expressed her genuine gratitude for international help.[16] Her ambivalence between gratitude and frustration resembles those expressed in stories concerning old medicine sent as a part of aid; for example, medicine that expired two years earlier helped some

people in Sarajevo but caused serious allergies for others. Much of the medicine was not used, and a cynical local interpretation was that sending it to a country at war was a clever way of not having to deal with it as chemical waste. One interviewee told of a ward receiving a great quantity of anti-malaria medicine—definitely not needed in Sarajevo yet posing a serious problem as waste.

It is worth presenting here an instance of 'a close encounter' of the local and the global described by the psychologist quoted above. A pretense of normality was created by international humanitarian organisations' seminars, with no straightforward recognition of the needs of the local seminar participants whose pressing worries were the fear of shelling and snipers and their children's hunger. This is an example of the reality of international institutions that remains undisturbed by the reality of the place in which their agenda is implemented. Nevertheless, there was a material point of connection of those disparate realities in the shape of food otherwise unavailable to the civilians under siege. It was much appreciated by the locals whose professional background entitled them to a privileged position in yet another locally established hierarchy of access to the 'crumbs' of global resources:

> "In connection to humanitarian help, I also remember in Sarajevo it was important that seminars were organised that were financed by UNICEF, UNDP or some other UN organisation: we were getting very good lunches there. It was connected to trauma or work with people during the war, education and similar. People went there primarily for the very good lunch we had there; most of us would pack the lunch and take the bread and some things we could take home in plastic bags — we would not eat it there. The people [who] gave those seminars; they did not understand the cultural aspects at all, the nature of the war. They were sometimes… tactless in the way they explained some matters, since they were not sensitive to the emotions of the people who were surviving the war. And so, people went to those seminars, myself included, primarily for the lunch. Really, going to hotel Europe, Hollywood, Holiday, I don't remember those hotels. Europe (a hotel; MPF) was in, it was really a privilege to go there and have such an expensive lunch, which revealed the imbalance between what was outside and what we could afford at that seminar. So, generally, after lunch, after we received this, the room remained empty because everyone would take that lunch to their children. So, that was it, and if we could get a daily allowance as well—because UNICEF was giving that, too, for participation at those seminars—the income was very good."

The Open Society Fund sent USD 2 million worth of pumpkin, carrot, tomato, lettuce and corn seeds.[17] Watching the seeds transform and enjoying the fruits might have filled people with hope, confirming the existence of a framework of meaning that was not affected by war-violence: a framework of natural cycles, of *life* itself.[18] However, at the same time, this was also a message about the nonexistence of the will to deal with the root causes of the situation.[19] As observed by Maček,[20] inaction could be tolerated since the terror that informed the Sarajevans' lives made them essentially different from Westerners.

A 56-year old medical doctor had to decide between using the onion seeds to spice the food or to make a rational decision and let the seeds grow, thereby admitting the siege of Sarajevo would continue into the foreseeable future.

> "I think it was the third year of war when those seeds arrived; that is completely so cynical and ironic in the entire story. That was the feeling we had. We were not happy when someone gave us the onion seeds! I mean, I don't know, maybe someone was pleased, who had a garden, but, I mean, it is absurd! I mean, you are definitely dissappointed in everything, absolutely in everything. And you expect neither help nor a solution nor an ending. I mean, it is a torture without an end. And those seeds were, I think, just a dot on the 'i'."

Conclusion

In this paper, I have shown that as an aspect of global moral and political order, humanitarian aid has multiple concrete implications on developments on the ground. It redefines hierarchies of power and effects, with uncertain outcomes, in the existent local socio-cultural orders. In Sarajevo during the 1990s, the negotiations of the locally embedded socio-cultural order were affected by the instances of donor-imposed hierarchies of 'deserving' aid recipients pertaining to the recipients' religious-cum-ethnic affiliation. At the same time, the resistance to negotiating the moral order was affected by the perceived hierarchies of power based on uneven access to humanitarian aid. The negotiation of the position of a generic 'other' in the global hierarchy of peace and conflict was affected by the need for aid provided by the 'outside world'—particularly by the perceived humiliation contained in the material qualities of the received aid. This can be seen as a 'perverted' situation of global interconnectedness: a

global interconnectedness that sustains the life of people in a town under siege who simultaneously experience a radical physical disconnection from the outside world.

One interviewee summarises it as follows:

> "You have a very pronounced consciousness among the people here about how much you are, in fact, abandoned—how insignificant you are. And you are very much aware of that, and you do not lose a single moment; it does not matter if you are an intellectual or not—I mean, any fool understands that. Nothing has any purpose. And you just wait. So you wait for something to end, but for a long time you do not wait for a [military] intervention."

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5. See, e.g., Forman and Patrick, eds. *Good Intentions.*
6. Maček, *Sarajevo Under Siege*, provides an ethnographic account on everyday life in Sarajevo under siege. Her book is essential for understanding the context of experiences focused on in this paper.
7. Thirteen interviews (one with a married couple) were conducted in Sarajevo by Dr. Nina Bosankić, who acted as research assistant. Dr. Nina Bosankić is assistant professor at the International University of Sarajevo and senior researcher affiliated to the Centre for Refugee and IDP Studies in Sarajevo. I interviewed the fifteenth interviewee over Skype. The interviews were conducted in the interviewees' native language, Bosnian. The translations into English are mine.
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SECTION III

Education, Women's Studies, Sociology

Workshops

—

Carmina Balcanica & the Balkan *Melos*
Chairs: Mihaela Albu & Heinz-Uwe Haus

Human Rights & European Citizenship
Philosophical And Educational Challenges
Chairs: Adalberto Dias de Carvalho & Isabel Baptista

Local Voices In A Global Dialogue
The Art & Literature of Minority Cultures
Chair: Francisca González Arias

Nature & Nurture
Chairs: Beatrice Puja & Gabriele Weinberger

Ethnic Languages in the Era of Globalization
Chairs: Gennadiy Trifonov & Egor Makharov

SECTION III
Education, Women's Studies, Sociology

CARMINA BALCANICA & THE BALKAN *MELOS*

Chairs

—

Mihaela Albu & Heinz-Uwe Haus

Participants

—

Mihaela Albu & Dan Anghelescu
Marina Cap-Bun
Heinz-Uwe Haus
Magdalena Filary & Nicu Panea
Camelia Zăbavă

Presentation

Mihaela Albu & Heinz-Uwe Haus

The south-eastern European space has been analyzed through the „anthropo-geographical constants" as well as through the prism of a common historic destiny, destiny which lead to political, religious or cultural similarities for the countries in this region.

This *"natural citadel of a large geographical entity*" – as defined by a Romanian scholar, Victor Papacostea, and of a large historical entity, shall we add, has determined the multiple cultural interferences.

Balkan, Balkanism, balkanize. These terms (and similar others) have acquired – over time – a rather pejorative connotation. And the stereotypical thinking of an arrogant Western world continues to associate them with a certain stigma. It is often forgotten that what is now seen as a land of intolerance – the Balkan space – was in the past a true model of coexistence.

The spirituality, the arts, and all other forms of higher expression found here should justify rather a complimentary way in which the world of the Levant is regarded and understood. There are actually already solid arguments for this. All European civilizations have originated from the Balkanic space: the idea of Democracy was born in Athens; the concept of a Constitution appeared in Greece; the Christianity has spread throughout Europe due to the apostolic work started in Greece as well; and last, but not least, although the 1st W.W. was started in Sarajevo, it is considered at one point as the *New Jerusalem*, where three civilizations were coexisting: Judaic, Christian and Muslim.

It's obvious that a dialog, a cultural dialog between the West and the Eastern part of Europe is more than necessary in order to a better understanding the real spirituality of the old continent.

The Balkan "melos". The dictionary explain the term melos as „the succession of musical tones constituting a melody". In our acception, metaphorical, of course, we understand the word as *a succesion of cultural tones of different countries (in the Balkan extended region) constituting a unique „melody"; in fact it's a unicity produced by a wide scale of diverse identities.*

Nevertheless, a dialog between West and East is not sufficient; it's necessary a dialog between East and East, and this cultural communication can be created through different ways, through different aspects.

One of them could be – and manage to become – the literary multi-lingual reviews, such as the international magazine (with a metaphoric name) *Carmina Balcanica*.

The magazine is more and more appreciated and publishes essays, studies, poetry, interviews or book reviews signed by scholars or writers from Balkan countries or from others related to the south/eastern space of Europe.

In our workshop some scholars present papers regarding literature, traditions and customs etc. of the European south-east countries.

The International Magazine *Carmina Balcanica* and the Intercultural Dialogue

Mihaela Albu & Dan Anghelescu

Abstract

It's obvious that a dialogue, a cultural dialogue between the West and the Eastern part of Europe is more than necessary in order to a better understanding the real spirituality of the old continent.

Nevertheless, this dialogue is not sufficient; it's necessary also one between East and East. This cultural communication can be created through different ways, through different aspects. One of them could be – and manage to become – the literary multi-lingual reviews, such as the international magazine (with a metaphoric name) Carmina Balcanica. In our paper we describe the publication and its principal aim: to become a document of the Balkan identity under the cultural aspect.

Keywords

Balkan, Cultural Dialogue, Identity, Unity, Diversity.

Introduction. Western and / vs. Eastern Culture

The southeastern European space has been analyzed through the „antrohpo-geographical constants" as well as through the prism of a common historic destiny, destiny which lead to political, religious or cultural similarities for the countries in this region. This *natural citadel of a large geographical entity,* as it was defined once by a Romanian historian, and of a large historical entity, shall we add, has determined the multiple cultural interferences.

From the perspective of the *European building*, which is about to be created, culture – the spiritual dimension of the Balkans – can and must be *brought back* to Europe. At present *the West* has a perception not only incomplete but also – for reasons difficult to clarify here – even false. Along history this *complex of nations* was – and continues to be – marginalized (*isolated*) in relation to the central position of Western civilization.

Western Europe had plenty of time to give cultural expression to its soul, Eastern Europe neither had the time nor was in a position to do so and when it did, it was on rare occasions and totally insufficient. At least till now. Hence – the *avid quest for identity*, for an adequate *stylistic matrix* – as Romanian poet & philosopher Lucian Blaga termed it – in this part of Europe.

Every time the West European intellectual sets out to analyze European culture, his/her analysis will almost always focus on the European culture of this area. Thus, for a Westerner, the cultural Europe is one and its features are definitely set by Western culture alone. Eastern Europe has the only merit of continuing models, mental constructs, their aesthetics or tendencies beyond the borders of Western cultural spaces. All it can do is to add colour to the picture! This attitude is based on the hypothesis that the European's sensitivity, despite the diversity of the spaces he/she occupies, is different in the East from the West and only historical asynchrony led the West significantly outrun the East. Things tend to look this way but they are not what they look like. Moreover the wealth and originality of the Western cultural products together with the scarcity and frequent lack of originality of the Eastern cultural products seem to rightly justify this attitude.

The Connotation of *Balkanism*!

Balkans, Balkanity, Balkanism. The last word has acquired – over time – a rather pejorative connotation. And the stereotypical thinking of a haughty/ proud/ arrogant Western world continues to associate it with a certain stigma. The spirituality, the arts, the teachings and all other forms of higher expression found here should justify rather a complimentary way in which the world of the Levant is regarded and understood. There are actually already solid arguments for this. All European civilizations have originated from the Balkanic space. The idea of Democracy was born at the foothills of Athens. The concept of a Constitution appeared for the first time in Greece. The Christianity has spread throughout Europe due to the apostolic work started in Greece as well. In an interview, the Romanian Academy member Razvan Theodorescu noted that, although the First World War was started in Sarajevo, one should not forget that Sarajevo is the same place considered at one point as the *New Jerusalem*, where three civilizations were coexisting: Judaic, Christian and Muslim. And more examples could be added.

It is forgotten that what is now seen as a land of intolerance was in the past a true model of coexistence.

In his paper published in *Carmina Balcanica* no. 6/ 2011, Răzvan Theodorescu wrote also about *the cultural paths*, about their dynamics, which is able to explain, in the most part of it, the multi-millenary evolution of this area, reminding of Herder's famous aphorism (according to which) history is nothing else but a geography in motion. "They are or remind, Răzvan Theodorescu continues his idea, of *the corridors* where, especially from South to North, there circulate cultural goods, ideas, innovations, soldiers, scholars as well as the ferments and the germs of the civilization which gather together Byzantinum, Bulgaria, Albania, Serbia, Hungary, The Romanian Countries without forgetting the Dalmatian, Italo-Pontic, Polish-Lithuanian and micro-Asiatic areas, in one and unique cultural, vivid and active organism."[1]

What can the South-East bring to the Western civilization?

This is a question that is not at all rhetorical and Romanian scholar Mircea Muthu – the one who asks it – offers also some very interesting answers. Here is one of them: „Accompanied by the cohabitation of the three cultural substrata – archaic, medieval and modern – the Southeast can help Europe relearn its own past and, last but not least, to remodel its projects for the future. (....) The phenomenon can be illustrated by the imaginary, influenced by the epic (...), that links, in the same pulsatory rhythm, Kazantzakis to Ivo Andrić, to Ismail Kadare and to Romanian great novelist Mihail Sadoveanu[2] etc. (...) Beyond the accent changes, the archaic and folkloric remains particularize an area of confluences, whose vitality is the result of some paradoxical alloys between the old and the modern."[3]

According to this idea, *The Melancholy of the Unique Unicorn* meets Ioan Cucuzelos' Byzantine melos; the charm and strangeness of the churches in Nesebar, Bulgaria (the old Nessambria), or the subtle stony embroidery of the frames in the palace of Brancoveanu[4] (Mogosoaia, Romania), find themselves in a secret dialogue with the voice in *Neagoe Basarab's teachings*[5]*;* similarly, the fabulous Byzantine silver work, now in the Venetian shrine in San Marco, called *Pala d'oro,* resonates in the intoxicating *Song of the Sphynx*… from Enescu's *Oedip*; Ion Barbu[6]'s Isarlak *dream* hides also the stained-glass window glitter of the Romanian-Greek Xenachis's music[7]…

If we can speak of a consciousness common to all Europeans, since we all claim common ancestors in thinking – Greek philosophy, Judaic Christianity and Roman civilzation – , we cannot speak of a sensitivity common to all Europeans without approximating and simplifying things. Sensitivities arise from deeper recesses and their strange alchemy combines elements according to rules that are by no means common to all of Europe.

The Westerner's sensitivity is undoubtedly different from the Easterner's and the difference is a major one. If we objectively consider the crucial events in European history we can easily notice that the European's creative core was preserved for almost one thousand years in Eastern Europe, in the Byzantine Empire.

Here are some signposts: in the 4th century Christianity spread throughout Europe supported by Platonism, the dominant philosophical trend; the 5th century –St. Sophia Cathedral in Constantinople was built, Eusebius and Athanasius wrote the apologies; the 6th century – Procopius from Caesarea, one of the greatest historians of all time, wrote 'Secret History'; the 9th century – ancient Greek literature manuscripts were copied and thus their survival was ensured; Cyril and Methodius coined a new alphabet derived from the Greek one, the Cyrillic alphabet; the 12th century – the mosaic and the miniature were brought to perfection.

Meanwhile, the Occident was experiencing what was later called the Dark Ages, an era of ignorance and primitivism.

Later, for 450 years the East remained under Ottoman rule, and had very few chances to develop in any cultural domain, while the West, taking over everything the Byzantium had created and reserved in terms of culture i.e. philosophy, literature, religious writing, iconography, bloomed and culturally prospered.

During this long period, Western sensitivity cultivated its needs and improved its forms of expression in accordance with the signified, while Eastern sensitivity survived humbly and as far as its subaltern status allowed it, it transferred its features into a form of Christianity contextually adapted to old traditions and into compensatory folk productions.

Romanian cultural space, at least, excelled also in the direction of a quest of identity and in the interwar period this need turned into an obsession. Outstanding intellectuals were in search of and finally found – or so they

claimed – a *Romanian dimension of existence* (Mircea Vulcanescu[8]), a *Romanian sense of being* (Constantin Noica[9]), *the Romanian individual* and *the good Romanian individual* (Nae Ionescu[10]). We wonder what would have happened if World War II had not broken out in 1939 but in 1989 and the interwar period extended to 70 years?

Carmina Balcanica and the Intercultural Dialogue between West & East

Starting from the point of view expressed by the great Romanian historian Nicolae Iorga[11] – the Orient, by including "the Eastern Europe (...) takes part to building of the European civilization" – we founded in 2008 the literary journal, suggestively entitled *Carmina Balcanica*. In this magazine we intended to reveal not only the cultural identity of each country from this space but also the prominent features of the Western-Eastern dialogue. In other words, our intention is to emphasize the contribution of the Balkan space (geographically extended to the South and to the East) to the European culture and civilization.

Although its title is *Carmina Balcanica*, our publication is not dedicated exclusively to poetry. It is yet linked to poetry in a special way, as poetry is a fundamental and privileged act of the human spirit, capable of conferring on the artistic fact a hue of *ideality* that cancels distances and enables *encounters* beyond the particular limits of each language. According to Martin Heidegger, *any art is essentially Poetry (Dichtung)*[12]. Therefore, we think that prose, essay, architecture, painting, sculpture, graphics, music, dance have a *poetical nature* (dichterisch). In this sense *Carmina Balcanica* is connected to *Poetry*. In this sense we have asked those who got involved in this project to reveal the existing unity in the forms of expression that can be found here, rendering thus consistent the spiritual identity of the Danubian-Balkanic area.

We think that this identity is really capable of such an ostentation that includes the extinguished (yet not totally) splendours of the Byzantium.

Mircea Muthu wrote a series of works in which he offered, brilliantly we could say, an identification of rhythms and trajectories of thinking and expressing that are essential for Southeastern spirituality as *forma mentis*. His works firmly contour the *concept of Balkanity* that allows the perception of those elements that impregnate the psychology, mentality and, inter-relatedly, the artistic creation in the specific forms of *Southeastern man's sensitivity of yesterday and of today*.

In this respect, *Carmina Balkanica* is also an attempt to give substance to that concept.

It is another reason for which we intend each text to be presented also in its original language, but also in a language (English) capable to open the door towards *communication/ knowledge/ encounter* with the Western European world.

Within a dispute of the elements, which are obviously different, there is still an essence that includes also us, the inhabitants of the Levant, with our mutual identity in the same old and harmonious original lands. The historian Nicolae Iorga explained the numerous similarities that emphasize the unity of the Balkanic peoples by the old *ethnic element of Thracian origin, previous to the Latin, Slavic, Turanian and even Hellenic expansions*.

From the point of view of *consumer society*, the West exaggerated the individual against integration, sense against intuition, science against religion, etc. This type of unilateral development became alarming and caused a series of social, ecological, moral and spiritual crises. By contrast, we could say that the Levant has a spiritual experience and traditions that differ from the Western ones. We have examples in the Greek religious tradition created poetically – therefore, a notable unity of poetry and religion – the Orthodox coordinates of Christianity, the *mystical incandescence* of Dionysius the Areopagit, the hesychast of the Atonian hermits; all these offer us the image of some defining contrasts.

Nevertheless, the Westerners (Ortega y Gasset[13], Paul Valéry[14], Martin Heidegger) feel and talk, for some time now, about a *diminishing of culture and of spiritual freedom*, which is more and more obvious in the Western world. In *Carmina Balcanica* we also think that time has come for rethinking and becoming aware of these real warnings.

According to the practicableness of the Western civilization, as soon as the simply aesthetical and spiritual elements install the domination of the *transparency* which is in fact the work of art, the reception is blocked, paralyzed, deafened: the *artistic object* vanishes or totally disappears.

Carmina Balcanica also tries a re-configuration of the image of the Levant as an eminent land of poetry. Many ancient Greek poets were known under the name of *the Thracian*. According to tradition, the cult of Muses originates in Pierida and Orpheus – the symbol character of Thracia – as well as his master,

Linus, lived somewhere near, at the foot of the mountain Haemus. Here, in the Balkans, the tragedy was born, as well as the endless tragedies of some unhappy histories. This is how, probably, beyond all differences, beyond our original Thracic, Hellenic, Latin or Slavic oldness, *Poetry* – as understood in our magazine – is our possible (re)-unifying element, above history and languages. This is another *element* for what *Balkanism* could mean. Or *Balkanity*! It was stated before, in different ways: *Poetry* can be considered also a reason for the History development in the past and, possibly, in the future. Therefore, we do not think it is a simple cultural phenomenon. The fundamental similarities through which it can reveal us to the world represents *the profound truth of a spirit* that visits us all, and, at the same time, the unique impress of an old civilization that still exists in us.

The diversity, by origin, of authors who publish – in each issue - is conjugated with a given theme regarding a country from yesterday and from today: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Turkey, and also regarding the culture of the minorities living in Romania – Albanians, Bulgarians, Germans, Hungarians, Turks, etc.

Essayists, poets, literary critics, regardless of origin, will reflect upon their cultural and spiritual territory.

Although the journal is published in Romania, it is not intended specifically for the Romanian readers but rather – as it would have been expected from similar publications, to readers from all over the world: the Balkans and beyond. That is why the invited authors are encouraged to submit material in their maternal language. That is why there is an English version for all the submitted material as we try with every essay, poem or literary analysis to surpass the geographical boundaries and make it relevant for all those interested in the Balkans, a space plagued by political conflict and yet culturally and spiritually united through diversity.

Conclusion

The international publication *Carmina Balcanica* is intended to reflect the cultural musicality, harmony of the Balkan space. From a mosaic of literary expressions, it is hoped that the journal will slowly crystallize the cultural identity

of each represented country and their place, as a unified space, on the cultural and spiritual map of Europe.

In short: what do we hope to achieve in *Carmina Balcanica*?

Two things: To deal with the characteristics of an Eastern soul that, we believe, has a particular individuality, then to stimulate the artistic creation that can adequately express this soul.

Eugen Simion, one of the most important Romanian literary critic, on one occasion of an international conference underlined that *Europe's prosperity depends on the richness and diversity of its national cultures*, and also that culture should not be a dividing wall; it should bring Eastern, Western, Southeastern, Central, and Northern Europeans closer together.

Therefore – through the magazine's pages – the editors' intention is to create an intercultural dialogue. And this dialogue has to be – as also Eugen Simion emphasizes *not only between the East and the West, but also between the East and the East.*

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Endnotes

1. Răzvan Theodorescu, „The Cultural Corridors of the South-Eastern Europe after 30 Years", *Carmina Balcanica,* 6 (2011): 19.
2. Mihail Sadoveanu (1880-1961), one of the important Romanian novelists. His most famous novels have historical subjects.
3. Mircea Muthu, *Balcanismul literar românesc*, (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 2002) 142-143.
4. Constantin Brancoveanu (1654-1714) was an important Romanian ruler. He supported culture and initiated the construction of many religious or laic buildings, combining in their architecture the Romanian tradition with the neo-byzantine style and the Italian renaissance. Thus it was created a new style, named "the Brancovan style". The palace Mogosoia (near Bucharest) reflects this style.
5. Neagoe Basarab, a Romanian ruler (between 1512-1521). He is the author of one of the oldest literary masterpieces, *Învățăturile lui Neagoe Basarab către fiul sau Teodosie (Neagoe Basrab's teaching to his son Teodosie)*, that was written in Slavonic, but translated into Romanian by an anonimus (a copy in Romanian dates since 1654).

6. Ion Barbu (1895-1961) – one of the most important Romanian poet in the interwar period. He has some poems inspired from the Balkanic world, with an Oriental atmosphere. One of them is entitled *Isarlic*. It is about an ideal white fortress, Isarlic, settled "in the middle of good and bad", with people who live both for spirit and the pleasures of life.
7. Iannis Xenakis, architect and musician, born in Brăila, Romania, repatriated in Greece, after that living in France, cooperating there with Le Corbusier.
8. Mircea Vulcanescu (1904-1952), a Romanian economist, philosopher, publicist, was the victim of the communist system. He died in prison. One of his important books is *Dimensiunea romaneasca a existentei (The Romanian Dimension of the Existence,* 1946*).*
9. Constantin Noica (1909-1987), a Romanian philosopher, essayist and publisher. One of his representative books is *Devenirea intru fiinta. Incercare asupra filosofiei traditionale* (*Becoming into Being. An Essay about the traditional philosophy*, 1981*)*
10. Nae Ionescu (1890-1940), a Romanian philosopher, journalist and a professor of some important future authors, such as Mircea Eliade, Mircea Vulcanescu, Emil Cioran, etc.
11. Nicolae Iorga (1871-1940), was an important Romanian historian, a literay critic, professor and academician.
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Funerary Practices in the Romanian Urban Community

Nicu Panea & Magdalena Filary

Abstract

Nowadays, funerary practices in an urban environment differ from the ancient rituals, because everything became simplified, even the traditional burial became an on-line ritual. In an urban society, death has no longer pedagogical meanings, death is a product of the urban daily life, changing in this way the perception of liminality. In our paper we present funerary practices in the Romanian urban community, the image of death, as well as the new elements of counter-ritual.

Keywords

Anthropology, Funerary Practices, Urban, Death, Burial.

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1 Death in an Urban Context or the Funerary Counter-Ritual

In an urban environment, one is confronted with an obvious simplification of the ritualistic gestures. This depleted ceremonial is the result of a funerary desemantisation of the space which becomes symbolically neutral. More and more often, the body of the deceased is laid out either inside the church or the graveyard chapel, where the wake is enacted. In the new context, some of the ancient functions of the wake and of the body-soul-home solidarity are reoriented. The laying out of the body is generally done in the parochial church, as exceptions are not admitted by the rector. This parochial jurisdiction imitates communal solidarity in an artificial gesture that lacks ritualistic content. In reality, it is the first step of a steadfast process of alienation of the deceased person. Traditionally, the funeral procession is organised according to a self -evident logics and a binary functionality: it is initially configured at home and it is identically reconfigured when it leaves the church. In the urban environment, when the body of the deceased person is laid out inside the church, the funeral procession no longer has this identical binary configuration, but an unequal, disproportioned and alienated structure. The home-church road segment is basically deritualised. Most frequently, the coffin is accompanied only by the closest relatives, while the priest is waiting for them in the church.

In this case, none of the traditional wake gestures is accomplished. Moreover, there are frequent situations in which the church is locked over night, and the body is only watched by the painted saints. The home-church metonymy does not function, therefore this semantics of liminality becomes inoperative, even if the separation scenario is generally marked.

In the second part of the itinerary, from the church to the graveyard, the previously mentioned alienation is even better illustrated by the funeral procession. The hierarchy used to structure the procession is fairly permissive. The ancient meanings of solidarisation are replaced by those of association. A series of gestures imposed by the urban environment occur now; they unconsciously trigger the separation from the deceased person. Thus, the symbolic economy of the procession does not generate solidarity, but eliminates it. In a traditional socjety

> "… just like the wedding, the funeral is a complex manifestation in which the community participates, [...] and makes actual a phenomenon characterised by a massive participation of the village, based on ancient traditions and social practices"[1].

In an urban society, participation is reduced, since death no longer has pedagogical meanings; the illusions of transparency and communication are dismantled and replaced with false illusions spread by the media, which, by analysing everything connected to death, induce the idea that this could be an absolutely normal phenomenon, and that space or time are no longer reset according to the ritual, in an attempt to transcend daily facts. Death is a product of the urban daily life, just like any other, and it is also a judgement, if we consider the large amount of signs and gestures.

Depersonalised objects, such as cars, interpose between the coffin and the procession. The body of the car is an obstructive, separating symbol that does not create solidarity.

The gesture of closing the car door, normal in any other context, acquires the connotation of a brutal separation. Symbolically, it is synonymous with the final gesture of throwing handfuls of dirt onto the coffin.

The priest is subject to a double separation: from the community of parishioners and from the deceased person, from those who get a ride and from the walkers in the procession.

The idea of a funeral procession is undermined by the urban traffic that is chaotic and breaks solidarity.

There is a tragic inconsistency between the rules of the road taken by the procession and the rules of the funeral space: the roundabout, the right of way, traffic lights, the give way rules, normally common in any urban space, mar the unidirectionality of the other space, without being understood as having an evil meaning.

Association is mistaken for participation, as many people avoid the boring and uncomfortable walk across the city and wait for the procession at the entrance of the graveyard, only to walk a route devoid of any ritualistic signification.

The pattern built by these seven characteristics represents a *funerary counter-ritual*.

According to Bernea, any death is a dislocation at the level of the conscience: the life community becomes a communion.[2] The funeral repast is the ultimate gesture with a ritualistic dimension that illustrates this. In the urban environment, it acquires different characteristics. The chosen space is completely deprived of personality: a random restaurant, whose owner had more sympathy for his sad customers' expenses. The offerings brought by the relatives who participate in the organisation and serving of the repast and the slaughtering of the household animals are replaced by a common, deritualised service. Attending the funeral repast is now optional and irregular and does not imply the use of any social code; many people even try to offer an unprecedented economic protection to the family by not attending. It is a sad scene that ends a show of irrefutable alienation, a counter-ritual that points out the incapacity of the modern being to relate to the other world and to accompany his dead relatives beyond the gates of the sky, as peasants used to.

In town, death, just like the wedding, is first and foremost an economic matter; a genuine economic matter, as well as an image matter. They both imply expenses and awkward judgements, embarrassing worries and humiliating gestures that put the social flux and reflux in a different light. At some point, Bernea mentioned the ineffable but efficient mechanisms used in the ancient village "to reorder the social organism, when it was shattered" by someone's death. In the urban environment, these mechanisms have a random and surprising behaviour, accessing by chance reticules that had never previously had such

functions: someone knows someone who knows a cheaper restaurant, someone whose friend works in the registrar's office can easily get the death certificate, someone can get a decent price for the funeral wreaths, someone knows a person working at the local newspaper and has the funeral notices published, etc. There is also the other side of the matter. All these functions are institutionalised, taken on by funeral furnishers that establish a purely economic, customer-owner type of relation between the relatives of the deceased person and the institution suggestively called *Eternity, Memorial, Peace* or *Piety*. Death becomes a profitable trade. In exchange of a sum of money, all this ceremonial chain, including the necessary gestures, objects and logistics, is delivered by these competent specialists in the funeral ceremony. They sell funeral services, from tombs to the organisation of funeral repasts, thus eternally chasing away death. Communion, this spiritual involvement of the community, is achieved through financial means. Death becomes an instrument of social ranking of the living. The more sumptuous the funeral paraphernalia, the more respected the descendants. The funeral acquires a commercial characteristic, and the deceased person's pillow is no longer filled with his hair cut along the years, but with bills paid by those who accompany him to the graveyard.

The mental equation related to the funeral has reversed its factors. The village world is familiar with a simple form and a complex content of the ritual, while the urban environment develops intricate forms that almost lack content. This is a solution imposed by the secularisation of the urban environment. Still, it is not integration, but adaptation that is aimed for by this mental solution. Heaven is far away, while Hell is at everybody's hand, developing malformed or handicapped sensibilities.

Such sensibility was nourished by a funeral pedagogy and practice developed around a new mental attitude towards death[3], the deceased person and the funeral space: the refusal of death. The mystery of death is systematically screened by an outsized eloquence of the material gestures.

Death and burial in the urban environment are events that proclaim the fragility of human being, its insecurity and loneliness, because death is related to the concrete image of the mutilated body by accidents, devastating diseases, disgusting surgical interventions. We associate death with the imagine of agonizing old age, spaces of pain and loneliness such as the hospital and the retirement house. Death represents the concrete image of the morgue, of the label hanged by the wrist.

1.1. Cyber-Cemeteries

Those elements that make up a counter-ritual can be completed by what crowns – in our opinion – the total denial of death: cyber-cemeteries. Modern formulas of commemoration (cryogenics, ashes satelization - *„the procedure by means of which the ashes are sent to the cosmos and thrown out, becoming thus themselves a satellite floating into the cosmos"*, immersion of the ashes), which do not pinpoint so much the piety or the respect for the deceased, but more the originality, the desire to be noticed by iconoclastic gestures and often by the hyperbolic expenses of one's descendants. They put between the soul of the dead and those left behind the shield of the cheque sheet. Death is expelled through billing, fear of death is anesthetized by weight of the bank account because the sweet taste of wealth feeds the illusion of immortality as once the monarch's power brought with itself immortality.

To such formulas, we can add the *on-line cemetery* where death becomes a virtual reality. By simply accessing a website, anyone interested can build a tomb, a monument, a commemorative plaque, regardless of religion (there are also virtual Buddhist temples: Kan-non-in Temple), regardless of one's financial possibilities and of one's feelings. You have a lot of possibilities, you can choose any model from over four million tombs:

> "Find the graves of ancestors, create virtual memorials, add virtual flowers and note to a loved one grave".[4]

A special address: *changes@cemetery.org* is at your disposal if you feel the need to change the configuration of the monument or of the funerary text. Aspiring to be a space of memory (*memo-lande*), those virtual cemeteries are symbols of our loneliness, of breaking the connection with a legitimate tradition.

The phenomenon seems similar to that produced in the early industrial age: isolation of the patriarchal family, with all its effects: the division of labour, the specialization, the professionalization and the selling of labour force individualism etc. The real traditional cemetery, as an image representation of the ancestors' world, of the nation's solidarity and thus of its legitimacy is reduced to a simple website, a symbol of absolute loneliness, because of the impossibility to identify the ancestors and to establish the succession of generations in a countryside cemetery. And thus it is replaced with an artificial and isolated image.

In the same way in which functions the family were taken over by the institutions of the modern state, inducing thus alienation, the syllogism works in case of virtual cemeteries, that contrary to the initial desire, bring about oblivion. The virtual cemetery can change its shape anytime and anyway, it brings the illusion of community, the illusion of protection, the illusion of legitimacy.

1.2. Death On-line

One of these consequences is death through the computer (internet), which urges to collective suicide in a *video-chat* system.

On-line death, keeping proportions, has all the features of a performance: actors, script, non-participatory audience, critical message. Death as a representation, as a theatricality denotes the impossibility of perception of the liminality in the complexity of its meaning given by the communication with the sacred on the one hand and with the social in its entirety on the other.

The message of such a radical phenomenon represents practically the revolt against the anonymity of death, because post-modern society threw death in the most brutal anonymity. Online death is a dramatic appeal to solidarity and, in ritual terms, to reconstruction. Anonymous death, the funerary counter-ritual specific to the post-industrial urban society, the obturation of the communication channels with the sacred and cosmos generates the effort to reconstruct a coherent structure, a significant "staging" capable of manifesting again solidarity.

In this way, we can check Schechner's scheme regarding the deconstruction and the reconstruction of the ritual from the perspective of osmotic relation between ritual performance, aesthetic performance (theater) and social performance:

> "Ritual is part of the warp and woof of every kind of performance, sacred and secular, aesthetic and social."[5]

On a diachronic scale, any traditional structure, even if very slowly, tends to transform. Any transformation is the succession of a deconstruction and a reconstruction. In these stages, changes occur relatively quickly. They involve experiment, fantasy, crisis, show, an acute sense of the present and the transformation of the *liminal* into *liminoid*. This phenomenon is typical both for

the ritual performance and for the aesthetic or social performance and can be tested by various similarities although we can't speak about universal topics or performance archetypes. But the hidden force of such occurrences like on -line death, their deep meanings that exceed the apparent schizophrenic aspect shouldn't be even searched among possible performance archetypes, among its universal constants, but among the neurological processes which impose the performance qualities and which give to such gestures a significantly profound loading, also according to the above-quoted author:

> "But there are universal ethological and neurological processes shaping the formal qualities of performances: these processes yield unique experiences to those making performances and to those participating in them."[6]

And to the human species it gives confidence in the future, because it persuades us that, as a ritual being - man is a creator of solidarity.

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Popular Beliefs in the Romanian Anthroponomy

Camelia Zăbavă

Abstract

The name of a person has always been contemplated in different cultures as a symbol That is not irrelevant. This paper intends to describe and analyze popular beliefs reflected in anthroponomy work, particularly related to Romanian popular culture.

Keywords

Popular Beliefs, Tradition, Anthroponomy, Romanian Folk Culture.

Introduction

Since ancient time people have believed that there was a close connection between a person and his/ her name. In other words, one can say that the name contains in itself relations about his/ her personality; the name can be considered "a true symbol of the person to the world"[1]. Therefore, the name and its bearer formed a *totum,* and to protect the human being, his/ her name also needed protection against evil forces. Thus, in case of illness or other difficult situations, the name could be changed (in order to deceive disease or to protect from magic) through various magical practices accepted by the community.

A well-known fact is that every nation has its own rules and customs for choosing the first name of children. Linguists, ethnographers and sociologists follow closely this phenomenon, as it focuses not only on the language facts (denomination system), but also on the interpersonal relations among people, because respecting tradition involves participation in the entrustment of the newborn's name of other people who are conventionally related with the child's parents.

In many nations, parallel to this, there are some unwritten laws related to specific popular beliefs.

Thus, the Eskimos believed that in the new born baby's body the soul of the last dead in the family reincarnates, that is why baby's first mandatory name was the

one of the deceased. In the West, during the Middle Ages, children often received the name of their fathers, with insignificant phonetic and morphological changes[2].

At Christians, people's name was dictated by the calendar: the child was given the name of the saint celebrated on the day or around the day of its birth or baptism, believing that the newborn would enjoy the protection of the saint. It is true that the specialized literature mentions a different situation: giving a well-known saint name is avoided "not for drinks to be offered on name's day", but these situations are rare[3].

In Romania, sometimes children received their names according to the days or months they were born: *Dominica (Sunday), Zoe (Thursday), Marta (Tuesday), Iuliu (July), Iulia (July), Augustin (August).*

Faith and Tradition – Anthroponomy Dimensions

As Christian people, Romanians still believe that if they give the child a saint's name, it will be protected from bad things, the invoked saint offering protection throughout life. This tradition is seriously kept especially in the rural parts, where the priest has always been and still remains an important figure of the community. He was present together with parents in choosing the child's name, instilling them with the belief that saints protect the children who bear their names. Names like: *Ion, Ioan, Ioana*, together with their diminutive forms : *Ionel, Ionuț, Ionică, Ionela, Ionica* and with their hypocoristic forms: *Nelu, Neluț(u), Nică, Nela, Nica* invoke the protection of Saint John; *Nicolae, Nicola, Nicoleta,* with their hypocoristics: *Nicu, Culae, Nico* or the diminutives *Niculăiță, Niculăieș, Culiță* refer to Saint Nicholas; *Vasile, Vasilica* together with their hipocoristics *Vasi, Vali, Sile* invoke Saint Basil; Saint Stephan is invoked by names as Ştefan, Ştefania, the diminutives Ştefăniță, Ştefănică and the hupocoristics Ştefi, *Fane, Fănica, Fănică;* Saint Mary is invoked by the following names: *Maria, Marin, Marius,* the diminutives: *Marioara, Mioara, Măriuca, Măriuța, Marinel, Marinela* and the hypocoristic form *Mari.*

At Romanians, the tradition had and still has a decisive role in choosing the name of the newborn. According to it, the child shall bear either the name of one of the spiritual parents, godfathers, or the name of one of godfathers' children, or the name of one of their natural parents. The first is particularly characteristic for the South, East and Center of the country, respectively Oltenia and Muntenia, and the second one for the North and West, i.e. Transylvania and Banat. The child can also

bear the name of one of his grandparents, uncles or aunts according to the parents' preference.

There were, in the Romanian traditional society, periods in which the midwife had an important role in choosing the child's name. In the past, any woman with experience could become midwife. Later, the role of the midwife and her importance in the social relations changed, when she did not belong to the family anymore but to a medical dispensary.

"Selling – Buying" – a Way to Change Destiny

By far the most interesting reflection of popular beliefs in anthroponomy is the one about the magical function of protecting the individual through names; specifically, the tradition that requires changing the name of a sick person to repel the malevolent fate. Assigning a name-mask is meant to protect the bearer of disease, to cheat death.

Names such as *Ursu (Bear), Vulpe (Fox), Lupu (Wolf), Albu (White), Corbea (Raven), Grozavu (Terrific)* etc. cannot be regarded as first names, because we know that baptism requires a hagiographic name belonging to Christian Onomasticon. They can be personal names, resulting from changing the initial name, under certain circumstances, if we consider that assigning a name is an act predetermined by traditions and specific rules that exist in a particular social or ethnic environment. Romanian tradition also recognizes the change of name custom, but it is widespread and its age cannot be determined being lost in the mists of ancient time.

Iulius E. Lipis speaks also about the magical function of protection that the name gives to the individual, emphasizing that most of the American Indians avoided uttering names being content only to move their lips, facing the person they were addressing to, and to protect against evil the bearers with real names, sometimes they were using nicknames. In Ethiopia, no sorcerer has power over a person whose real name he does not know. In many tribes, from the same reason, it is forbidden uttering the name of the captain or ruler and in the island of Borneo a sick child is given a different name, thereby acquiring new strength to live[4].

In Romanian folk culture also changing the name of an ill person is done in order to ward off hostile fate. Assigning a mask-name is meant to protect the bearer of disease, to cheat the death.

In the absence of healthcare children often were dying. Then the old women were telling the mother that „she has no luck with children". With the next baby, the mother resorted to the act of *selling*, choosing to *buy* it back from a woman who was mother with many children that were alive.

In some southern localities there was a variation of this act of „selling": the custom of *passing* the new born „through the bosom of a mother with many children alive". The new „mother" dressed in a large and very long shirt, was receiving the child from the mother „who had no luck with kids" and, imitating birth, was bringing it to her bosom through the shirt's mouth and delivering the baby out through the hem. During the procedure she was saying three times „this child is mine and not yours". Thus she became the second mother for the child. In this situation the child's name was not changed, hence its protection through name-mask was not provided. Today this custom is no longer practiced.

In a monographic study on health in Dolj County (in the South of Romania), published in 1910, doctor Ch. Laugier noted that children's names were changed "when they get sick of syphilis or epilepsy… not to be found and worked by the evil spirit"[5].

This change of name was done in two ways: through a second time baptism and through such a *sale* of the child. Performing baptism for the second time took place until the middle of the seventeenth century, when it was prohibited by law[6].

Changing name through the sale was never prohibited; this practice representing a reality in the popular belief, much more, it benefited from continuity and is even met today in villages. To protect the child from evil spirits, the mother *sells* it to a woman with healthy children only to *buy* it back later on under a different name, name that will become official among the family members and in the community.

Other times, "the child is placed on the road and the first person who passes will purchase him and give him a new name"[7]. Their descendants were recognized by their new name that was worn by each of them their whole lives. The same process took place collaterally; the wife or the husband acquired the new

name of the other. This explains the frequency of names such as: *Albu, Grozavu, Păun, Ursu, Lupu, Vidra, Vulpe* in the historical documents and censuses, as unique names of mature people.[8]

Typically, the new acquired names had magical significance: *Lupu (Wolf), Ursu (Bear), Vulpe (Fox), Vidra (Otter)*, etc. They were preferred because, mentally, they were associated with beneficial traits of the animal, and the name was meant to protect the individual throughout entire life.

Popular mythology had an important role in choosing such names. The wolf, one of the most ferocious animals of our fauna, deeply impressed people's thinking and imagination, and that is why it appears in almost all genres and categories of oral literature and culture: in the traditions related to birth and funeral, ballads, tales, legends and anecdotes; it also generates proverbs and occupies the leading role in the folk magic system, often being invoked in spells and curses benefiting from a large corpus of beliefs and superstitions[9]. Taken together, the mythological figure of the wolf, as it emerges in Romanian folklore, "reveals two semantic levels: one of them being the evil determinations drawn from the presence and actions of the real wolf that were embodied in magical and ceremonial practices, tales, beliefs, chants, etc., on the second level we find the sacred attributes (psychopompe animal, guide, initiator, enemy of demonic apparitions) arising from the archaic mediation on connotative meanings and symbolic nuclei contained in the cultural sign "wolf"[10].

Maybe the perception of the two semantic levels defining the "wolf" figure in the Romanian popular belief determined also the two values of the anthroponomy *Lupu* (*Wolf*): using the name as a symbol of strength and health – derived from the positive meanings of the term, and using it as a nickname – dictated by the evil meanings.

The census of Râmnic Diocese from 1845 mentions the priest *Lupiţă sin popa Lupu* (*Little Wolf son of priest Wolf*) in Comanca, County of Romanaţi. In this case it is unlikely that the two names *Lupu (Wolf)* and Lupiţă *(Little Wolf)* are baptism names. Belonging to a specific social category, it is hard to believe that a priest does not baptize his son with a name from the Christian onomasticon or would resort to the practice of *selling*. Here we are dealing with a nickname that was so deeply rooted in the community, that the priest's real baptism name was forgotten. This is also reinforced by nominating the son through the *Lupiţă*

(*Little Wolf)* derivate. The meaning of the suffix *-iță* is not only a form for diminutive but also an expression for belonging[11].

Returning to the custom of selling, this was done in all seriousness of a real act, without giving the impression that in reality it was fiction.

Most times, a person who has gone through this ceremony of sale-purchase has two names: an official one recorded in the documents, and a second one, with a magical function, acquired as protection. The latter will be used in interpersonal relations.

There are situations in which the name-mask becomes the official name.

For example, the case of a family who had already lost two babies and the third one, a girl, was *sold* on the store's counter, and was called Eleonora after the store owner's name. Another child was born, but died shortly after birth. Then for the next child the "selling" custom took place in the same manner, the child was put on the counter and "sold". He received the name Venus. The family had another baby that was born healthy and did not go through the "sale" because it followed the birth of a child who lived. The last born got the name Dumitru at the suggestion of the midwife.[12]

Eleonora and *Venus* are the official names, registered in civil status. In this case no substitution of the official name happened because the „sale" took place prior to baptism and declaring the children to local authorities.

Another custom of changing name, also recorded in the specialized literature, is "the giving as alms". This action took place in the cemetery, at an unknown tomb, and the participating characters at the ritual were: the sick child, the birth mother and another person from whom she would redeem her child under a different name: "... the sick child was given as *Bogdaproste* (Bog da prosti) in the cemetery, over the tomb, to another person, and the true mother would redeem the child, as one believed that *luck must be paid* '".[13] It is noted that, although the name is changed by "giving as alms" – an act that requires devotion, not trading – a symbolic act of redemption is performed. This is explained by the Romanian folk belief which says that luck must be paid, even symbolically. It is necessary to pay a price for the child to live and be happy. In another train of thoughts, especially in rural communities, a similar habit is met today: the one of paying a symbolic amount of money when somebody takes a pet (a dog

or a cat) from someone. The new owner must "give something" on it, pay an insignificant amount of money, if he/she wants the animal to live.

This change of name custom is also found in Fiction literature. We find it in Sadoveanu's novel *Baltagul (The Hatchet).* The true name of the main character Nechifor Lipan was *Gheorghiță*. At age four he became seriously ill, and everyone thought he would die. Then his mother sold him through the window to another woman for the price of one copper nickel. The woman that *bought* him changed his name not to be recognized anymore by death and diseases. Since then his name has remained Nechifor.

Conclusions

In conclusion, popular beliefs reflected in anthroponomy work in two ways. The first direction is the tendency to give the child at holy baptism a saint's name, hoping for the protection of the saint over the child's destiny. The second direction, often independent of baptism, is manifested by assigning a name-mask, meant to change for the better the wearer's faith, revealing the magical function of the name.

In the past, choosing the name of a newborn was actually an act of worship, a message through which the parents appealed the divine protection to ensure the child life and happiness.

The relationship between onomastics and popular mythology explains the ethnolinguistic perspective through which the name is regarded as a product of the society and as a function of the culture.

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Does Wisdom Accompany Suffering?
"Melian" Notes

Heinz-Uwe Haus

Abstract

The text is an excerpt from a discussion about the "use value" of the "ruins of Greece" on which Western civilization is build. A re-reading of the "Melian dialogue" tried to locate the truth behind the "truism", while filling in the gaps in our knowledge of people's attitudes who determined much of our cultural legacy. Contemporary politics in Europe stimulated the discurse, with concepts, vocabulary, and comments frequently quite remote from the Ancient text, but within which a specific "function" of the subject is developed. The submission of the EU to Russia's usurpation of the Crimea and its imperialistic actions in the Ukraine reminded the participants of such "use/functional value"

Keywords

European Identity, East German State Security (Stasi), Peloponnesian War, Ukraine, Melian Dialogue, Thucydides.

1

Reflecting upon European identity, we not only remember our history and look ahead towards its coming developments, but we are also engaged in critique, that is to say in forms of analysis that bring into play normative standards by which actual developments are judged in view of unrealized possibilities of historical situation. Thus understood, critique is internally connected with hope, with the tenacious determination not to reduce history to a series of empirical events, but to judge and evaluate it both emotionally and morally in view of possibilities to lessen the suffering, to enhance the opportunities to experience joy and to increase the room people have to articulate what is more important for them and to increase the changes that they will be heard and understood by others.

2

When I asked recently a former dissident, who was imprisoned by the East German State Security (Stasi), "does wisdom accompany suffering", and I did not mention the context of Ancient Greek drama, his answer was straight: "No. It does not." And he explained:

"This fallacy is perpetuated by people who have suffered and somehow need to justify that suffering. The idea that human suffering tends to be purposeless is so unattractive that we have to invent reasons for it - spiritual growth, character-building experience, trials of adulthood, punishment from god, and temptations of the devil, whatever. I won't try to convince you that your suffering has NO value. My thesis is on that wisdom is not conferred by privation or suffering."

I replied: "Now what about privation? Does it sharpen our wits, make us lean and clever? Is necessity the mother of invention?" But he stood firm: "That's just something we tell ourselves so, once again, we can justify our suffering, and not have to stop. We seem to think of privation as one of our civilization's motivation techniques, and therefore, a good thing. We embrace our poverty like we embrace our pain. We have convinced ourselves that it's good for us."

Only when I added the Ancient Athenian context to our dialogue we could agree that the orchestra is neither a gulag nor a playground for brainwashing. "The Bacchai" came to mind as well as "The Melian Dialogue".

3

The Melian dialogue is a dramatic set-piece debate inserted by Thucydides in his History of the Peloponnesian War, his account of the ruinous 27-year long struggle (431-404BC) between the powerful Greek city-states of Athens and Sparta. It is one of the two most famous instances of fictionalized speeches in the book (the other being the defense of Athenian democracy in the funeral oration of Pericles in the beginning of the work). These speeches were not necessarily made just as written, but were inserted for literary effect, according to what Thucydides felt was "called for in the situation"[1]. The Melian dialogue takes place fifteen years into the Peloponnesian war, during the confrontation in 416-415 BC between the Athenians and the people of Melos, a small island located

in the southern Aegean Sea just east of Sparta. The Athenians demanded that the Melians surrender their city and pay them tribute or face the destruction of their city. The Melians claimed their right to remain neutral, appealing to the Athenians' sense of decency and mercy toward a small, peaceful, and defenseless city. The Athenians sternly replied that questions of justice did not arise between unequal powers and proceeded to lay siege to Melos as they had threatened to do, and to starve the resisting inhabitants

> "into surrender, slaughter the men of military age, and enslave the women and children. This act has become "famous as the worst atrocity committed by a usually decent society, but even more as one of the most famous assertions in history of the rights of unbridled power," according to the historian Alan Ryan, who writes that, "The Athenian insistence that 'justice is what is divided when equal forces are opposed, while possibilities are what superiors impose and the weak acquiesce to' has been discussed by practical people and by philosophers ever since. Not everyone has rejected the Athenian case."[2] Ryan also notes that although Thucydides portrays the Melians as having always been strictly neutral and wishing to remain so, in fact, this was not true. Melos was a Spartan colony and had aided Sparta at the beginning of the war[3]. In general, however, "the Dialogue is formally not about the morality of the eventual execution, but about the Melian response to the Athenians' first demand, that Melos should submit."[4]

The Athenians, in a frank and matter-of-fact manner, offer the Melians an ultimatum: surrender and pay tribute to Athens, or be destroyed. (Reading this, one can only hope that the Kiev government can resist Putin's depredations. Kiev seems to understand it needs to gain the upper hand on the ground before contemplating a settlement.)

The Melians argue that it would be shameful and cowardly of them to submit without a fight. In Thucydides' account, "If such hazards are taken by you to keep your empire and by your subjects to escape it, we who are still free would show ourselves great cowards and weaklings if we failed to face everything that comes rather than submit to slavery."[5] The Athenians counter that the debate is not about honor but about self-preservation.

The Melians argue that though the Athenians are far stronger, there is still a chance they could win. The Athenians counter that only the strong have a right to indulge in hope; the weak Melians are hopelessly outnumbered.

The Ukrainians understand (what the EU avoids to recognize) that Putin will grab what he can until Ukraine pushes back.

The Melians state that they also refuse because they believe they have the assistance of the gods. Thucydides recounts, "We trust that the gods will give us fortune as good as yours, because we are standing for what is right against what is wrong."[6] The Athenians counter that gods and men alike respect strength over moral arguments, summarizing this in the famous dictum that, "The strong do as they can and the weak suffer what they must."

The Melians insist that their Spartan kin will come to their defense. The Athenians argue that the Spartans have nothing to gain and a lot to lose by coming to the Melians' aid – mere kinship will not motivate them.

The Athenians then conclude the argument by saying there is no shame in submitting to a stronger enemy. The Melians do not change their minds and politely dismiss the envoys.

The following quotation is from the dialogue between unnamed Athenian envoys negotiate with unnamed Melians as recounted by Thucydides:

> — Athenian: "For ourselves, we shall not trouble you with specious pretenses – either of how we have a right to our empire because we overthrew the Mede, or are now attacking you because of wrong that you have done us – and make a long speech which would not be believed; and in return we hope that you, instead of thinking to influence us by saying that you did not join the
>
> Spartans, although their colonists, or that you have done us now wrong, will aim at what is feasible, holding in view the real sentiments of us both; since you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must" (5.89).
>
> — Melians: "You may be sure that we are as well aware as you of the difficulty of contending against your power and fortune, unless the terms be equal. But we trust that the gods may grant us fortune as good as yours, since we are just men fighting against unjust, and that what we want in power will be made

up by the alliance of the Lacedaemonians, who are bound, if only for very shame, to come to the aid of their kindred. Our confidence, therefore, after all is not so utterly irrational."

— Athenian: "Of the gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a necessary law of their nature they rule wherever they can. And it is not as if we were the first to make this law, or to act upon it when made: we found it existing before us, and shall leave it to exist forever after us; all we do is to make use of it, knowing that you and everybody else, having the same power as we have, would do the same as we do" (5.105.2)[7].

Later, about 2,000 years ago, the Teacher from Galilee gave a similar framework to guide his people through their troubled world. It wasn't meant to be trite philosophy or prose, but a personal anchor to securely moor them in times of great insecurity. The very night Jesus spoke it, it is believed, multiple prophecies were coming to a collective bursting point. His world and that of his followers was about to be turned upside down. In less than a day Jesus would be dead – crucified! Nonetheless, his teaching squarely laid out a blueprint of hope for generations to come to build on in John 14:27-28:

— "Peace I leave with you, My peace I give to you; not as the world gives do I give to you. Let not your heart be troubled, neither let it be afraid. You have heard Me say to you, I am going away and coming back to you."

The peace that Christ mentions, believers can tell you, is something he owns by experience and shares with those who respond to his call of "Follow Me." Such peace is a direct gift from God to those who focus on and truly believe in his promises and reach for them even in their very real moments of despair. Its "melos" expanded and enhanced during the atheist communist dictatorships for many suppressed as a spiritual perspective that realized the incredible forces engaged in God's great abiding plan of rescue. During the 1989/90 revolution, the churches in East Germany were not only saver haven's to start from than the streets, but they gave the people insight beyond the moment to strengthen their unsteady hearts! "Melian dialogues" (on "round tables") with the weakening dictatorships accompanied the rising self-liberation of the people, providing the means to rise above whatever came their way.

4

So influenced are we by the Greek origins of our thinking about political matters that the best of our political theory remains imprisoned within their forms of consciousness. A political theory raised to the height that the historical sense of the value of the person makes possible has not been developed. Our collective memory in Kraiova, at today's Melos, or in Eastern Ukraine, that history demands to be heard. If this precept so understood is explicitly held in mind, the primacy of the person looms so large that the secondary and derivative character of the state as a necessary, but limited, earthly institution, and not more, becomes sharply apparent. The state ceases to be seen as an institution universal and co-extensive with the sum of human relations that is called society. It becomes possible for political theory to break out of the bonds imposed on it by the men of genius who created it, to overcome the limits of the conditions of the Greek consciousness, and to attain the deeper understanding accessible to it on the basis of the Western doctrine of the person.

5

The view of modern Western story as "a catastrophe", as a succession of ruins-from the failed French Revolution to the successful mass-murders at Auschwitz-is central to the postmodern historical sense, to its offshoot in posthistoire, and to its depiction of the past. The unique twentieth-century intersections of rationality and genocide, of advanced technology and nuclear destruction, of an ideology of progress and praxis of barbarism, have become constitutive paradigms for the postmodern mind. Benjamin, a pre-WW II-Marxist essayist, is recently recovered as a witness for the troublesome headlines and the anguish of today's stalled social reality. He contributes to this store of images not only through his view of history as "wreckage upon wreckage" but through his view of the past as a formless potential that responds to, and emerges from, the needs of the present-which is the only incontestable reality. (...)

For Benjamin, the present dictate the past we use and remember, the past is called forth and "saved" by the needs of "now", of Benjamin's Jetztzeit. Unlike the Hegelian idealist perspective in which historical reason shapes historical evolution in an ever-perfecting progression, for Benjamin, memory is the central category of an historical consciousness. When I discussed with the dissi-

dent, which I mentioned in the beginning, this view, he quoted a old Christian view of resistance and hope: "It's been said that 'courage is fear holding on a minute longer'. As we take that brief time longer with focus on God's promises rather than our human promises, our knees may still be knocking together, but shaky walls of our heart can begin to firm up. Let's consider a few of those promises to enable you to 'let not your heart be troubled'".

Since the past is created through the needs of the present, history cannot be seen as a linear continuity, as a narrative with fixed and casual episodes. It is, after all, the victors who compose the "narrative with fixed and casual episodes. It is, after all, the victors who compose the "narrative" of the past, and they compose a "continuum" that always excludes the story of the vanquished. ...The continuum, that closed and casual narrative of the past, silences the memory of the defeated and powerless for which the past is an uneven succession of fragmented and interrupted moments. ..." The history of the oppressed is a discontinuous history," Benjamin wrote, "Continuity is that of the oppressors." Thus, in order to overcome this historicist hold on the past to those excluded, Benjamin proposed a view of history that would imitate memory, stressing the breaks and interruptions of the past and created in the form of discontinuous fragments. To really historize his view and to use it for present challenges, the Ancient Melian's demands as well as the Christian belief, that in the war against God, there is no question about who will ultimately win, determine their use value (Gebrauchswert).

6

In 1989 we reached neither the end nor the beginning of history. But the democratic awakening of the Middle and Eastern European nations and its unifying force for the continent is the dominant quality and measure. From Estonia to Cyprus, from Wales to the Black Sea, in Athens and Bucuresti count the same standards for critique and normative justication for practical humanizing activities motivated by critical analysis and practical solidarity. It is the individual person and its unique worth that is at the center of most humanist traditions of such different cultural roots. But then again: what is this individual person? How should we envisage it identity, characteristics and capabilities? In view of all that has been said already, it is clear that we can no longer

meaningfully picture the individual person according to the modern model of the subject as a rational, self-contained, disembodied and autonomous person. It is precisely this humanistic and fallocratic model of the subject that has fallen prey to such a load of convincing critique during the division of Europe. (...)

My central contention would be that any model of the subject as a multiple entity has a chance to enlighten, if it opens itself for the experiences, feelings and thoughts of a great many individuals in post- 1989 society. In my opinion and experience, this practical, individualized embodied humanism of the self-liberated also contains a promise. It is the promise that one day the angel of history will be able to do without wings, that is can become a human individual, no longer blown backwards into future by the storm of progress but able to fold its wings and kneel down at the mounts of human misery. Not to heal what was broken, nor to restore a lost unity or fulfill a promised destiny, but caring for the victims and their wounds, not leaving them alone – and thus caring for and accepting his own wounds and multiplicity and for that reason being very much alive...

As long as we use all dialectical tools to grasp the changing reality before our eyes we will gain the critical concept theatre needs to serve its audience.

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Appendix

Life cannot be destroyed for good, neither can history be brought entirely to a halt. A secret streamlet trickles on beneath the heavy lid of inertia and pseudo-events, slowly and inconspicuously undercutting it. It may be a long process but one day it must happen: the lid will no longer hold and will start to crack. This is the moment when something once more begins visibly to happen, something truly new and unique... something truly historical, in the sense that history again demands to be heard.

Vaclav Havel
("Living in Truth")

Romanian Identity between 'Cultural Narcissism' and Balkan Nostalgia
A Case Study – Ion Luca Caragiale

Marina Cap-Bun

Abstract

Maria Todorova noticed the Romanian "cultural Narcissism" (consisting in the denial of any Balkan connections of their culture and a special emphasis on the Latin origins), but also the fact that rational thinkers always recognized the important role that the Balkan Peninsula played in the development of the multiple aspects of Romanian life. This ambivalent Romanian attitude toward its Balkan connections was also reflected in arts, literature and scholarship, and the case study I propose to discuss here is that of the most important Romanian dramatist of all times, and an equally intresting prose writer, I.L. Caragiale (1852-1912), who was particularly interested in the literary perfume of Balkan identities, but also had a complex relation with the Italian culture, especially his favourite writers, Niccolò Machiavelli and Dante Alighieri.

Keywords

Cultural Narcissism, Balkan, Identity, Romania, I.L. Caragiale.

Mainly because of the geographic position and the historical and political circumstances of the country, Romanian cultural identity has always been very complex, especially after the first decades of the nineteenth century, when Romanticism brought about a new quest for national identities, so that the Latin origins of the Romanian language and people and Romania's historic destiny of being the Eastern border of a civilized Latin Europe were strongly emphasized. While investigating the self-reflective discourses of Balkan cultures, Maria Todorova has noticed the Romanian tendencies of denying the possible Balkan connections of their culture and civilization, emphasizing instead the Roman elements. She has called this attitude "cultural Narcissism", but she also acknowledged that Romanian rational thinkers always recognized the important role that the Balkan Peninsula played in the development of the multiple aspects of Romanian life.[1]

This ambivalent Romanian attitude toward its Balkan connections was also reflected in arts, literature and scholarship. While entire generations of scholars and writers were exclusively preoccupied with proving and illustrating the Latin origins of the language and culture, denying any possible influence from the Slavic linguistic, cultural and political environment (The Transylvanian School was undoubtedly the peak of this Narcissistic mentality), there were authors interested in the literary *perfume* of Balkan identities, among whom Ion Luca Caragiale (1852-1912), the greatest Romanian dramatist of all times and an equally interesting prose writer, is the perfect case study to illustrate this phenomenon.

Caragiale's complex Balkan origins might have been cause for his attitude, as he came from a multiethnic family. His father's ancestors lived on Hydra, a Greek island inhabited by Arvanites (an Albanian minority), then they left the native island and went to live in the Greek neighbourhood of Fener in Istanbul. Caragiale's grandfather Ştefan worked as a chef for Caragea, who became the ruler of Wallachia in 1812, and brought his entire household to Bucharest. Ştefan had three sons: Luca, Ion Luca Caragiale's father, who was born in 1812 in Istanbul and came to Bucharest as a newborn baby, Iorgu and Costache. [2] They contributed to the development of Romanian theatre in its early days, being actors, stage directors, dramatic authors and translators, as well as founders of one of the first theatrical schools in Romania. Young Ion Luca was one of the first students of this school, and later on he worked for the National Theatre of Bucharest, first as a prompter, then as a translator and author of original plays, and finally, he became the director of the theatre. After 1904, he moved to Berlin, where he died in 1912, exactly one hundred years after his newborn father travelled from Istanbul to Bucharest. Thus, in a century of the family history, we see Balkan, Oriental, Romanian and finally Western European identities. All of these personal experiences created a complex cultural identity, which is interestingly reflected in Caragiale's literary works.

He was 26 years old when, in 1878, he made his debut on the scene of The National Theatre in Bucharest, as translator of the play *Conquered Rome* (*Rome vaincue*, 1876), by the French dramatist of Italian Origin Al. Dominique Parodi. The premiere was a huge success, mainly due to the subject, which satisfied the public need of talking about the Latin connections of Romania. He even started to write a never finished history, named *The Beginnings of Rome*. He was also a declared admirer of Dante Aligheri and Niccolò Machiavelli all his life, and he

truly loved Italy and its culture, but that never meant denying the Balkan connections of Romanian culture. Caragiale did not only translate parts of Machiavelli's *Il Principe*, but he was also inspired by the Florentine writer in his own writings, from his most famous play *One Lost Letter* to his very last literary text, the *Unfinished Story*.

Caragiale was always proud of his complex Balkan origins. In Berlin he posed for pictures dressed in a traditional Arvanite costume. He has never cased, however, to incriminate the negative Balkan features attributed to his characters, regardless of their ethnic origins. In his lifetime, he was often accused of being a malevolent alien, insensitive to Romanian values, and he was disqualified for the literary prize given by the Romanian Academy for similar reasons, in spite of his outstanding literary works. But the real reason for the anger of his contemporary Romanians was not necessarily his ethnic origins, but his extraordinary ability to depict Balkan mentalities and attitudes in Romanian cultural, social and political life. In the mirror of his works many Romanians were reflected with the features that they have desperately tried to hide. Maria Todorova quotes John Reed, who covered the Eastern front during World War I. In his book from 1919, Reed reported from Bucharest: "If you want to infuriate a Romanian, you need only to speak of his country as a Balkan state. 'Balkan!' he cries. 'Balkan! Romania is not a Balkan state. How dare you confuse us with half-savage Greeks or Slavs! We are Latins.'"[3]

But why were Romanians so afraid of being associated with Balkan habits and ways? Todorova has identified a number of features generally attributed to the Balkan identity, as defined by both Balkan and Western observers. She also has emphasized that a negative self-perception of the Balkans anticipated the external negative perception coming from Western observers in the second decade of the twentieth century. Thus the very attitude of emphasizing the negative aspects of their life is profoundly Balkan. The inventory of Balkan features also includes: a taste of conspiracy, violence, brutality, passion, excess, instability, contrariness, stagnation and eternal transition, chaos, racial and religious mixture. All these features define the *otherness* of the Balkan identity as compared to the self-reflection of the civilized Western Europe, and all of them were illustrated by Caragiale's works in a crystal clear fashion as being part of the Romanian social and political life.

Caragiale dared to prove that we were profoundly Balkan in our late 19th century attitudes and mentalities, while the mainstream of the Romanian elite was trying to hide these anaesthetic Balkan wrinkles on our European face.

Sometimes such typically features are attributed to presumably Balkan characters, wearing Balkan clothing, making typical gestures, using Slavic words, or at least having a Balkan accent. In *Boris Sarafoff* (1900) the main character – a Romanian judge – is disguised as a recognizable Bulgarian bandit to make some reporters mistake him for Boris Sarafoff and write about him. In order to attain the perfect Bulgarian look he wears a fluffy wig and false beard and moustache, non-European clothing, and, of course, carries a heavy gun, which he ostentatiously drops, strangely enough together with Sarafoff's business card. He has a perfect Bulgarian accent and his eating preferences confirm his presumably origin: he drinks "ţuică" and eats borscht with hot pepper, and a huge portion of cabbage with hot pepper, and wine, then pork steaks with hot pepper. The obvious reason for creating such an exotic character was to give a picture of the mass media's desperate quest for sensational subjects and its power to contaminate even a representative of justice. The historical context – the so-called Romanian-Bulgarian conflict – encourages a taste for both conspiracy and amateur performance. The distorted cultural codification of the Bulgarian identifies him with the strange and dangerous *other*, who must be annihilated.

But many other stories describe Romanian bandits, even more cruel than the renowned Bulgarian one. In the novella *An Easter Torch* (1889) Gheorghe, a real brute incarnating Lombroso's theory of the specific physical appearance of the violent man, is menacing the Jew Leiba Zibal, while the authorities do nothing to protect him and his family. Here, the *other* is the fragile one, terrorized by a cruel autochthonous environment, and he hears news about another Jewish innkeeper, who was brutally murdered with his entire family, presumably by the same bandit. While the Romanian Christian community is celebrating Easter at the local church, Leiba finds his own inner strength to protect his family, he catches the thief, and burns his hand, pretending that he is lighting *An Easter Torch* in honour of Christ.

The *otherness* implied here is more religious than ethnic, involving another dimension of Balkan multiple identities. Todorova explains that the Balkans "have always evoked the image of a bridge or a crossroads" (15), "also a bridge between stages of growth, and this invokes labels such as semideveloped, semicolonial, semicivilized, semioriental" (16), and "a bridge between races" (18-19). The Balkan fig-

ure of the violent burglar is even more strangely represented in the novella *Wartimes* (1898), wherein the leader of a violent band is a Romanian orthodox priest, who, like the judge playing the role of *Boris Sarafoff*, disguised himself first as a burglar (a role which made him pretty rich), then as a soldier to escape the legal consequences. All these criminal figures that Caragiale created in his tragic novellas enforce Todorova's theory that the typical Balkan male is rude, primitive, uncivilized and sadistic, illustrating the themes of excessive violence and stagnation.

In *Firstling pastrami* (1909) there are two main characters: a Turk and a Jew. The author explains that he heard the story from a Bulgarian barber, Kir Ştefan. The Turk Iusuf squats and smokes in Turkish style, while travelling to Jerusalem for business. His Jewish neighbour Aron asks him to deliver a bag with his father's clothing to his brother who is living in the Holy City. During the trip, the Turk opens the bag, which was in fact full of pastrami and emanating a tempting smell, and eats everything, together with other travellers, with the intention of paying honestly for the firstling delicatessen he consumed. Upon his return, he learns that what he had eaten was not lamb, but human. Since Aron's father demanded to be buried in Jerusalem, his son – an ingenious Jewish businessman – salted his meat and asked his friend to deliver it to his brother in order to be buried there. So what happens is rather a case of group cannibalism, suggesting the primeval nature of this ambiguously Balkan-Oriental world. The moral dilemma experienced by the judge, who is supposed to serve justice for the two former friends, is a metaphor for the strangeness of the Oriental world and for its incompatibility with European moral standards. Who is to be blamed more for such an odd, unprecedented situation: the hungry Turk whose stomach was stronger than his promise or the avaricious Jew who lied to his friend to save the money for the transportation of the dead body? The story also challenges the theoretic boundaries of a literary text: is it a comic theme or a tragic one? Both the moral and the aesthetic ambiguity implied here certainly illustrate the exotic and strange otherness of the Oriental world, indirectly reflected over Balkan identity. Caragiale expresses here rather a Western nostalgia for Balkan and Oriental values. In fact, during this time he had become a resident of civilized Western Europe. Todorova commented this type of attitude:

> The imagined Orient served not only as refuge from the alienation of a rapidly industrializing West but also as metaphor for the forbidden. "Confected from Western desire and imagination," the East offered a sumptuous wardrobe and an even more extravagant nudity. There was an explicit relationship

> between the Orient and the feminine, and it has been argued that oriental discourses involve a theory of sexuality and sensuality in the disguise of a theory of asceticism. (13)

Turkish cultural identity is also investigated in the Oriental story of *Abu-Hasan,* the son of a rich merchant in Baghdad, who divides his inherited capital into two equal parts; one of the halves is rapidly exhausted in luxurious parties with phony friends the other half is safely kept to allow him a decent existence for his entire life. Thus Abu Hasan illustrates both the wise and the unwise version of the Oriental identity. After abandoning his former friends he takes to inviting a total stranger for dinner every evening. But one evening his unknown guest is the mighty caliph of Baghdad, Harun-al-Raşid, who was disguised as a merchant. Asked by his guest about his most secret wishes, he expresses his desire himself to be the caliph of Baghdad for one day, a wish easily made possible by Harun-al-Raşid. Abu Hasan proves to be a good caliph, but the next day he has serious problems in readjusting to his previous identity. So he grows mad and is imprisoned. This second charade played by his destiny makes him even wiser after a great deal of suffering. The reasons for locating the action in Baghdad are very obvious: the Oriental origin of the motif and the search for exotic places, mentalities and a special type of adventure.

The poem *Oriental noon* also illustrates the typically Oriental luxury and leisure, but also the passion and the tendency to excesses of any kind. Two beautiful jealous wives who hate each other surround a Turkish sultan, illustrating the Oriental passion, the desire to chat and the famous leisure. The short poem recalls a scene from the movie series *Suleiman the Magnificent.*

Kir Ianulea. Oriental anecdote (1909), a declared localized version of Machiavelli's *Belfagor*, also depicts a fascinating Balkan figure. A devil by origin, the main character becomes a married man in 18th century Bucharest, where his Black Emperor of Hell sent him to experience marriage and then report the wickedness of women. To clarify his presence and intention to settle down, he delivers a grotesque story of his life, pretending to be a Greek merchant of Albanian origin, like the author's ancestors. Romanian critics noticed the possible autobiographical glimpse of the text and hurried to emphasize Caragiale's Balkan nostalgia a few years before his death. In spite of being a devil, Ianulea is a kind and loving husband in contrast to his inhumanly wicked wife Acriviţa, who first ruins him and after that makes him run away from the creditors. But let us see what his being a Greek implies. At first he is rich, generous and lov-

ing, but he does not indulge his wife's passion for gossip. His wife's accusations of being a "pagan," an "Albanian" and a "gipsy Turk" are only a way of hiding her own bad character. In fact, ethnic otherness is an ambiguous issue here, as being a Greek in 18th century Bucharest was hardly an unusual situation. The rulers of the country and their entire households were Greeks and a great number of the merchants of that time were Greeks, so the lifestyle, the manners, the fashion and the common vocabulary were all influenced by this situation. A negative aspect of being of Greek origin is to be found in a small detail of the text: one of Acriviţa's brothers plays cards with some Greeks in Leipzig and he is ruined by them, losing all the money Ianulea had given him to start a business. In fact, it has been observed by literary critics that many of the scoundrels in Caragiale's works have Greek names. But the association of Balkan identity with bad temper does not express an individual prejudice of the author, a Greek himself. Rather it expresses a collective one, maybe a remote consequence of the cultural narcissism incriminated by Todorova.

What is really interesting here is the association of demonic nature with Ianulea's Greek origin. Even being a devil does not seem to impress the human characters such as the Romanian peasant Negoiţă. When Ianulea is revealing his real identity, Negoiţă is far from stunned and placidly accepts the terms of the contract offered by the devil. The man is supposed to hide Ianulea and help him escape from the creditors, and the devil pays him indirectly: he possesses some wealthy women of the time and he releases them only in the presence of Negoiţă, who is well paid and soon becomes a famous exorcist. When the contract expires, Ianulea possesses the ruler's daughter to take his revenge on womankind. At the royal court in Bucharest, the devil finds a homely atmosphere, as everybody speaks Greek. Possessed by the devil, the girl asks to see her real father, Captain Manoli Ghaiduri, whom the author describes as being a remarkably beautiful Greek. Negoiţă is called again but the devil refuses to go, as he has already paid his debt to the man. Thus Negoiţă asks Ianulea's former wife to come and relegate the devil. She takes over the exorcism business from Negoiţă with even greater success, as the devil prefers to flee back into Hell rather than see his wife again.

The issue of Greek identity therefore is very complex in this historic novella – one-of-the-kind in Caragiale's entire literary carrier. The idea of ethnic otherness is also projected into the theoretic dichotomy or the real and the fantastic

as irreconcilable worlds. Here, the "bridge" between East and West becomes a crossroad of different levels of existence and their literary reflections. It is probably a way of justifying themes like the epistemic and moral mixture, the improvisation or the taste of conspiracy, which are indeed favourite topics in Caragiale's works. Once more, such thematic preferences lead us back to the generic Balkan features.

The epic atmosphere is not very different in Caragiale's Bucharest, where the air of intrigue and conspiracy becomes gratuitous and almost paranoid, being always efficient in the process of escaping the banality of the real. But many features usually associated with Balkan identity are often attributed to Romanians as well. In summary, we might conclude that both good and bad qualities do not necessarily combine with a specific ethnic origin. They only describe human nature as a whole, which was the one and only favourite topic of Caragiale's world.

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Endnotes

1. Cf. Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
2. Cf. Şerban Cioculescu, *Viaţa lui I.L. Caragiale. Caragialiana* (Bucharest: Eminescu Publishing House, 1977).
3. John Reed, *The War in Eastern Europe,* (New York: Scriber's, 1919, 273, cited in Todorova, 46).

SECTION III
Education, Women's Studies, Sociology

HUMAN RIGHTS & EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP
Philosophical and Educational Challenges

Chairs

—

Adalberto Dias de Carvalho & Isabel Baptista

Participants

—

Nuno Fadigas
Francisco Javier Gil Martín
Elaine Teresinha Dal Mas Dias
Lorena Stanescu

Presentation

Isabel Baptista & Adalberto Dias de Carvalho

The thematic proposed for this workshop was the result of a 15 year old work of investigation, implemented by the Philosophy of Education Department (Gabinete de Filosofia de Educação-GFE) of the Oporto University's, Institute of Philosophy. This work developed from ethic, anthropological and of the political philosophy perspectives, has been fundamentally grounded on the critical approach of themes such as solidarity, freedom, tolerance, responsibility, etc.

All these themes refer to the central problematic of the Human Rights fundamentals, the decoding and comprehension of which are essential to the formation of young people and the construction of a new citizenship, consistent with the challenges and demands of our contemporaneity - a citizenship that cannot continue to result from a simple political indoctrination, which, keeping so, would turn into an ontological scarcity of the subjects of such citizenship, scarcity in terms of moral consciousness, of capacity of relationship and identitarian openness, incompatible with the autonomy of a citizen who, according with Francis Jacques, is conceived as a "relational person" and accepts to be, in the words of Ricoeur, "soi-même comme un autre (himself as another)".

In the meantime, GFE is keeping a very close link with SOFELP – Sociedade de Filosofia de Educação dos Países de Língua Portuguesa (Philosophy of Education Society of Portuguese Language Countries) in the quest of this problematic, as well as of others related.

The project of investigation inherent to the RG Filosofia da Educação e Contemporaneidade (Philosophy of Education and Contemporaneity) aims at questioning the concepts of educability (Kant) and of perfectibility (Rousseau) while anthropological categories in the light of the contemporaneous educative conceptions that identify education as an anthropological project of citizenship construction, to which ethic and political dimensions as hospitality, responsibility, solidarity and tolerance are inherent.

Here emerges the urgency of a critical revision on the problematic of the philosophical fundamentals of human rights and their translation as a fundamental problematic of the philosophy of education right from the contempora-

neity regarded as a situation that is positioned in relation to tradition and inaugurates horizons of meaning. The aim is thus to create the necessary conditions for surpassing the ideological function of education, received from modernity, as a merely political inculcation of HR.

The philosophical matrices of HR are: freedom in the German idealism, the individual in Locke and the subject in Descartes (Bourgeois); from the rights-credit to the rights of implication as condition of autonomy: evolution of the relationships between power, authority and the rationalist notion of State and citizenship (Foucault); the difficult contemporaneous correlation between the right to freedom and the right to protection in the educational processes (Renaut); The ethics of responsibility as ethics of solicitude toward the other (Ricoeur); conflictuality between the valuations of the subjectivist, individualist and communitarian conceptions of citizenship (Rawls, Bauman); the notion of full citizenship by reference to the concepts of relational person (Francis Jacques, Emmanuel Lévinas, Jacques Derrida), vulnerability (Pelluchon), the dialogical (Habermas) and democracy (Dewey); questioning of humanist and universalist presuppositions of HR: cultures, intercultural conflicts and the idea of a plural universality of HR as a way to avoid an exclusionary policy of these same HR.

The Universality of Human Rights and the Challenges of Relativism

Nuno Fadigas

Abstract

Universality is one of the essential characteristics of Human Rights. Nevertheless, cultural relativism is a fact that can't be ignored. In face of this (false?) dilemma, how can we see human rights: as an effective transcendence, as Deleuze thought, or just a sign of moral progress, as Raymond Boudon theorised with his notion of "axiological rationality"?

Where should the universality of Human Rights be rooted? Do we really have to choose between Modernity's Reason and Ancient Greek *ethos*? What can we learn, in this context, with Paul Ricoeur and Alasdair MacIntyre works? Can we see Human Rights, according to Raymond Boudon, as an example of good relativism?

Keywords

Rational Model Choice, Axiological Rationality, "Good" and "Bad" Relativism.

The Universality of Human Rights

"Everyone" and "No one" are the most repeated expressions in The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In fact, it was created to protect every human being, in every region of the world, against eventual disorders of any maniac. As we all know, and Hubert Hannoun underlines in *Le nazisme: fausse éducation, véritable dressage*[1], Jews were tortured and killed by Hitler and his acolytes not because of what they've done, but simply for what they were. In the end, it didn't matter what a Jewish child had done; she was just a Jew, so, like Anne Franck, she deserved a lethal punishment. This is, perhaps, what Hannah Arendt criticizes in Eichmann's judgement: the arbitrary against the universal in the meantime proclaimed. Eichmann is a man: one of the most ridiculous ones, but still a man, and a judgement is not a popular show.

Nevertheless, there's a question that can't be ignored: where shall the universality of HR be rooted? Relativism is not a fiction, and is an *ism* that is important for us to respect the Other in a post-colonialist world. How can we escape from this paradox?

History and Human Rights

HR are historically wrapped. As Louis P. Pojman argues on *Terrorism, Human Rights and The Case for World Government*[2], the Declaration of 1948 is, most of all, a retrospective answer to the evils committed by the Nazis, specially against the Jews, and also a prospective document, written to ensure that such and similar iniquities wouldn't take place in the future. For example, the article 14, which establishes that "everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in others countries asylum from persecution", is particularly related with the Jews experience during the Second World War: many countries, like Cuba, Canada or (even) The United States of America, have denied them political asylum – for example, in the shameful episode of the MS *St. Louis* ocean liner.

The article 15 declares: "everyone has the right to a nationality"; and adds: "no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality (…)". As Hannah Arendt so well describes in *Eichmann in Jerusalem*[3], the first procedure to make possible the deportation of Jews was precisely to deprive them of their nationality – and this was undeniably Eichmann's specialty.

Indeed, Louis P. Pojman affirms that several points of HR are directly related with Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, a book that has to be taken as an epitome of what the Declaration intends to fight. For example, Hitler says in his book that the individual conscience is a "Jewish invention". Part of the Preamble of the Declaration is an answer to this provocation: „(…) disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind (...)."

In short, says Louis P. Pojman, HR are social constructions whose origin is our moral understanding about how to build a better world. They are, therefore, a result of a human rationality allocated in a particular time and universal space: the wars we're talking about are *world* wars…

An Historical Fact

HR are probably one of the most consensual documents produced by mankind. The onus of proof of their useless or imperialist intention therefore belongs to those who criticise them. As Raymond Boudon exemplifies, we're still waiting for the cultural relativist who refuses to judge, from the exterior, the

stoning of adulterous women or the capital punishment for religious conversion[4]; or finally, we add, the child marriage in India, a ridiculous practice perfectly illustrated in Deepa Mehta's movie *Water*. (Here we can see Chuyia, a seven-year old girl that, after the death of her husband, is deposited in an ashram for Hindu widows to spend the rest of her life, shaven, in renunciation.) We shouldn't forget that the Universal Declaration was adopted by a vote of 48 in favor, none against, and the eight countries that didn't gave their immediately agreement, didn't also disapprove the document: they simply choose to abstain.

What justifies this large consensus? To answer this question we will appeal to Raymond Boudon's conception, inherited from Max Weber, of axiological rationality.

Rational Model Choice vs. Axiological Rationality

In *Le Sens des Valeurs*[5], Boudon pursuits an answer to the following problem: How to explain and justify human beliefs? Where can they be rooted? And specifically about values and moral beliefs: what criteria can guarantee their validity? Are they condemned to be a simple emotional expression – as logical positivism has established?

According to Boudon, there are two opposite perspectives to understand human behavior in a society. The first one, supported by neoclassical economics, sustains that our behavior obeys *interests*. On the contrary, the other one affirms that the choices we make are most of all inspired in *principles*.

The RMC, supported by the economists, is what Boudon characterizes as a "complete explication". This means that, to understand a decision, no reason is left behind. For example: before crossing the street, a pedestrian looks to his left and right *to* avoid trampling. The cost is time, but the advantage is obviously keeping himself alive.

Unfortunately, this consequentialist model cannot be applied to every situation. Sometimes we don't have all the information we need to precisely choose the alternative that serves our best interest, and occasionally time is not our allied: the action is so extended over time that an obscurity border remains, but we have to decide here and now. (An example of this experience is the labor in human resources: the recruitment of any worker is inevitably made under a fog-

gy scenario, as dissipated as possible.) In short, sometimes we have to "theorize" to take, under these circumstances, the best decision. The maximum utility is, in this kind of cases, something we can't "afford". And an example of what the RMC cannot explain is precisely the vote. Once our vote is almost worthless to change the final results, why should each one of us vote? And yet, we vote.

What other model(s) explain(s) and justify our behavior? Do we really have to reduce rationality to this kind of *instrumental* decision-making? Should we consider *interest* the unique sign of a rational behavior? A negative answer to these last questions is exactly what Boudon intends to advance. And curiously, is precisely in science that he finds the answer: in something by himself nominated "cognitive rationality". Maximization and Optimization, or the relation between costs and benefits, are no longer the substantial issues for decision-making.

In science, what is really important to "make proof" is the strongest system of arguments. That's why theories - or "paradigms" – have a central role for scientific advance. Unfortunately, we can't say that every scientific proposition is right, and to exemplify such situation we have the phlogiston theory: Lavoisier categorically showed that there's no such thing like phlogiston. But for those who believed in this obsolete theory, the answer "made sense": oxygen hadn't been yet discovered, and, in fact, combustible materials, like wood, lose mass when they burn. So, despite the wrongness of this theory, she wasn't defended by personal idiosyncrasies but at the time, for strong reasons.

And here we are again, trying to understand "the paradox of voting": if, for a rational, self-interested voter, the costs of voting will normally exceed the expected benefits, why does he vote? In fact, taking this definition into account, it seems an irrational choice. According to The RMC, he shouldn't vote. But he votes. Why? Obviously is not because of his supposed insanity. Beyond this kind of *instrumental* reasoning, there's an *axiological* rationality: he votes, without making any cost-benefit analysis, because he has strong reasons to do it. He believes in democracy. He has valid motives to prefer this political regime comparatively to any other. Despite his supported conviction that even if he doesn't vote, others will do it, and even if he doesn't choose A, B or C, others will confirm the known surveys, he still votes. This experience proves that we are not only self-interested beings, that beyond the RMC transparency, there aren't only shadows. It's absolutely true that, in many situations, we act after

measuring the predicted consequences of our acts, but also, in many others, motivated by the *principles* we judge as inherently valuable: for example, the one that advises us that democracy is something worthy or, in other words, that "we should vote".

And we enter this way in The Universal Declaration. Aren't the HR something similar? Article 21/3: "The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures."

Raymond Boudon gives us other examples to support his inherited intuition of an axiological rationality: the plagiarism, which we morally condemn (the plagiarist violates the principles that ordinarily regulate the "game" of creation), even when the victim benefits with the theft, with, for example, "publicity" of an unknown work; and the theft in itself, which we also morally condemn (the burglar violates one of the most basic principles of society, the property right), even when, like Mandeville said, such act benefits the labor market, creating jobs for lawyers, locksmiths and insurance agents, and replaces some "social justice".

In short, we act motivated not only by our *interests*, but also by our *beliefs*. If one of the latter "makes sense" for us, it becomes a sufficient condition to rationally understand such coherent behavior. Our moral principles aren't simplistically emotional expressions: they are rationally grounded. Like HR…

Human Rights as an Example of Axiological Rationality

One the most interesting things that we can find along Boudon's explanation is the remission to almost every Human Right: freedom of expression, right to strike, gender equality, etc. Curiously, this is not explicitly made: Boudon is always talking about HR, despite his rare use of the expression "Human Rights". Democracy, equal pay for equal work or presumption of innocence are, along his explanation, examples of axiological rationality, or, in other words, "footprints" from the evolution of moral ideas by *natural* – which means *rational* - selection. The HR are a product of a *human conscience* that progresses along time (Boudon determinately refuses the expression "crisis of values"), and for such evolution the human experience is important: the

context is here a necessary condition to phenomena's of *large consensus* and *irreversibility* which characterize an expressive number of moral ideas – the one's we've been talking about.

Context "gives sense" to a large number of principles that rule our behavior. And these principles are determinant, as we've seen above. It seems difficult to justify our belief that *we should help less-developed countries*. Education and health cost a large amount of money, and there's no easy way to understand this belief in a cost-benefit analysis, or simplistically nominate it "investment". The RMC monopoly, with its exclusive consideration of action consequences, makes us see this belief – and the respective behavior – as irrational. We have to agree that a world with less local wars, more education and better health is a world with less immigration – and this seems good for those who live in developed countries. But, do we have the courage to say that the reason we help is because of our… xenophobia? And do we really believe that xenophobia - or, not so drastically, our selfishness (that made someone claim "British jobs for British workers"…) - justifies our help? We believe that we should help others to guarantee the Rights they have because they're Human, because we believe in such Rights. They "make sense" for us. They are a result of a long history, of which some episodes no one wants to see repeated: slavery, totalitarianism, genocide, etc. The narrative that supported the (almost) consensual voting in the tenth December day of 1948 is only one: the end of a war that had involved (almost) the entire world, and the beliefs that during such period were forgotten. There isn't here any *a priori* or *a posteriori*, but just *rationalization inside history*: a narrative that must be told to every human being. This means, as Boudon stated, the universal under the singular; or as Ricoeur established, the primacy of ethics over morals[6]; or as Lévinas sustained, ethics as first philosophy[7].

"Good" Relativism and "Bad" Relativism

Boudon is not a Relativist, at least the way we usually understand this expression – for example, when we relate it with, *grosso modo*, *culture*: «no culture is superior to any other, they're only different». But he isn't also a Universalist, at least the way we understand Kant or Mill theorizations, by establishing a pattern of morality, whose respect is a necessary condition to identify *any* good action. After criticizing the monopoly of binary logic, and the domination of the law of the excluded middle, Raymond Boudon invites us to distinguish 'good'

relativism, which inspires respect of the Other, from 'bad', which produces the collapse of intellectual bearings, damages democracy, and fuels nihilism. This means that relativism is not, in itself, something bad. Bad is the denying of universalism that immediately results in an *absolute* relativism that makes impossible to affirm that some forms of knowledge are better succeed than others, and some moral principles can reasonably aspire to the universality – like the HR -, and others not.

Boudon, MacIntyre, and Rawls

It's impossible not to observe here a confluence between Raymond Boudon and Alasdair MacIntyre works. In fact, both of them wanted to escape from Hume's guillotine - which states that we cannot derive an "ought" from an "is" -, and the consequent emotivism that such logical and technical mechanism had shaped in moral reasoning. Also, curiously, it is the "image" created by the *After Virtue*'s philosopher:

> The hypothesis which I wish to advance – says MacIntyre – is that in the actual world which we inhabit the language of morality is in (…) state of grave disorder (…). What we possess, if this view is true, are the fragments of a conceptual scheme, parts which now lack those contexts from which their significance derived. We possess indeed simulacra of morality, we continue to use many of the key expressions. But we have – very largely, if not entirely – lost our comprehension, both theoretical and practical, or morality.[8]

History plays here a central role: the narratives are *ethical authority* behind *moral power*. What kind of implications has this situation in education?

Before speculating about *education against forgetfulness*, this historical HR encasement teaches us something more: that HR aren't something necessarily absolute. They are, in fact, Universal, but their function is similar to what the reflected intuitions play in Rawls reflective equilibrium: every good ethical theory needs to accommodate to such principles, but if such theory undeniably demonstrates that one of them is wrong – and this is not an easy task -, we need, at least, to discuss it.

There are questions – says Rawls – which we feel sure must be answered in a certain way. For example, we are confident that religious intolerance and racial discrimination are unjust. We think that we have examined these things with care and have reached what we believe is an impartial judgment not likely to be distorted by an excessive attention to our own interests. These convictions are provisional fixed points which we presume any conception of justice must fit.[9]

Boudon says that his theory is - and this is important –

…contextuelle et historique: des raisons forts ici et maintenant ne le seront pas forcément ailleurs et demain; si des faits ou des arguments nouveaux apparaissent, un système de raisons forts peut devenir faible (et réciproquement). Cela n'implique pas qu'il ne puisse y avoir de vérités positives ou normatives. Le fait que la science ait une histoire n'implique pas qu'il n'y ait pas de vérités scientifiques. Il en va de même de la morale[10].

Education, Moral Conscience and Human Rights

Moral conscience, said Hitler, is a "Jewish invention". And Hitler is, in part, right: moral conscience is an education product. Our disagreement with his point of view is related with this: it's not because of being an invention that we can, and we shall – like Hitler wished -, dispense moral conscience. Our moral principles may become illegitimate power if History remains unknown. Education must include History lessons, which are simultaneously moral lessons. And teachers must behave themselves as – why not? - Storytellers: fictions that "make sense" for each child, necessarily supported by a good-intentioned rhetoric, may become a desirable reality; and the actor – the good one, not the evil - leaves the screen this way. Like Boudon said:

1 / Une croyance se forme lorsque son contenu fait l'objet d'une adhésion de la part des individus; 2 / elle fait l'objet d'une adhésion de la part d'un ensemble d'individus lorsqu'elle fait sens pour chacun d'entre eux en particulier; 3 / elle fait sens pour un individu lorsqu'il a des raisons fortes de l'accepter.[11] (1999: 139)

Principles without recognizable justification aren't more than obligations or a coercion exercise. The moral conscience "miracle" occurs not from top

to bottom, but by upward movement. The "Old Europe" is not the decrepit and ramshackle continent that Donald Rumsfeld insinuated in 2003 – by the occasion of Iraq's War (or Iraq's "Invasion"). The "Old Europe" is a *phronesis* fountain: here we had lived the best (Enlightenment, Industrial Revolution, Welfare State, European Union, etc.), and the worst (Inquisition, Holocaust, the epicenter and the main stage of the two World Wars, etc.). And the worst can't, once again, "overshadow" our common moral conscience: our Human, and Universal, Rights.

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Endnotes

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Human Right to Peace as a Globalization Outcome

Francisco Javier Gil Martín

Abstract

The protection and implementation of human rights worldwide was linked to the aim of securing peace in the Charter of the UN and in the International Bill of Human Rights. Nevertheless, the conversion of peace into a legal category of human right has received definite outlines during nearly the two last decades and it culminates to date with an official codification process undertaken since 2010 by the UN Human Rights Council and with the expectation of the approval in 2015 of the Universal Declaration on the Human Right to Peace by the UN General Assembly. I will consider three aspects of such juridification of peace that reflect some strengths and ambivalences of globalization from which it results, one concerning the very codification process, the other focusing the status of the human right to peace and some of its political implications.

First, the most forward-looking advocates of the recognition of the human right to peace were drawn from civil society organizations and non-state actors initiatives, which were crucial for starting up and even running the official codification process. Second, the series of private and official draft declarations confirm that the right to peace belongs to the third-generation human rights and rests on a comprehensive conception of positive peace that interconnects the whole of human rights. Finally, the right to peace involves a demanding political dimension by making the states the main duty-holders both individually and as a collective of actors and by requiring the promotion of social justice at the global level.

Keywords

Human Rights, Justice, Peace, Violence.

Introduction

The value of international peace was central to the founding principles of the United Nations (UN), as well as to the constitutional reforms that underpinned the transitions to democracy of the societies that led and were immersed in the most devastating war ever known. Following the Charter of the UN, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) opened its Preamble with the assertion that "the recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world". Two decades later, this statement was reiterated in the Preambles of the two 1966 International Covenants on Human Rights. After the war crimes trials held in Nuremberg, the first Article of the

German *Grundgesetz* approved in 1949 reads: "The German people acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world." And the so-called "postwar" or "peace" Constitution of Japan, enacted in 1947, outlawed war in its famous Article 9: "Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes."

Defenders of the human right to peace (hereafter: HRP) see it strongly rooted in the aforementioned universally accepted instruments, the UN Charter and the International Bill of Human Rights, that is, the UDHR adopted in 1948 and the two treaties passed in 1966 that came into force in 1976: the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Numerous international human rights instruments have also subsequently contributed in valuable ways to the constitution of the HRP. Three main declarations on peace adopted by the UN General Assembly should be mentioned: the Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace (1978), the Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace (1984) and the Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace (1999).[1]

While the first document recognizes "the right of individuals, States and all mankind to life in peace," the poorly articulated declaration of 1984 proclaimed the "sacred right to peace" only as a collective right, as "the right of peoples to peace." In these documents, the states were required to abide by the UN Charter provisions on the peaceful settlement of international disputes at the heart of the collective security system. At the end of the decade of the 1990s, General director of UNESCO, Federico Mayor Zaragoza promoted two international codification proposals on the status of peace as a human right. Although two draft declarations were rejected in the UNESCO intergovernmental conferences held in 1997 and 1998, there was a minimal agreement between the states on considering peace a human aspiration and a moral and universal value, even a common good of humanity. As a further result of such efforts, the Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace identified a complex conception of peace with several interlinked areas of action that paved the way for the subsequent attempts to translate the human value of peace into a universal human right.

A Two-track Codification Process

An increasing number of theorists, leaders and stakeholders within and outside the human rights community came to the conclusion during the last two decades of the 20th century that the right to peace deserved to be recognized as an autonomous right on its own standing and to obtain legal codification. Nevertheless, the conversion of peace into a legal category of human right has received definite outlines only very recently, during nearly the last decade. After the impasse following the efforts of the UNESCO General director, the General Assembly decided in 2005 to continue considering the issue of the promotion of the right of peoples to peace. The juridification process led since then by the UN has also being carried out by other peacemaking organizations, like regional and inter-governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, religious groups, grassroots organizations... In fact, the most forward-looking advocates of the recognition of the HRP were drawn from civil society organizations and non-state actors initiatives, which were crucial for starting up and running the official process. In this regard, mention should be made of the Universal Declaration of Emerging Human Rights adopted at the Universal Forum of Cultures held in Monterrey in 2007, where peace was simultaneously described as a value and proclaimed as an individual and collective right. Nevertheless, the most decisive contributions to both spreading the global awareness and improving the legal formulation of the HRP came from the worldwide initiatives of the Spanish Society for International Human Right Law. Founded in 2004, when the Spanish civil society mobilized against the armed invasion of Iraq, this organization promoted first what would become the landmark document of the Luarca Declaration of the Human Right to Peace, adopted in 2006 by a committee of independent experts, and after that conducted a world campaign in favor of the international recognition of the human right to peace between 2007 and 2010. As a result, the content and structure of the Luarca Declaration was reviewed and ameliorated by a series of meetings and declarations with the aims of offering the private (i.e. international civil society) codification of the universal declaration of the HRP and of introducing it into the official agenda of the UN Human Rights Council, which had been created by the UN General Assembly in 2006 in replacement of the former UN Commission on Human Rights. In December 2010, the worldwide civil society organizations that met at the International Congress on the Human Right to Peace, held in the context of the World Social Forum on Education for Peace,

adopted the Santiago Declaration on the Human Right to Peace,[2] which ended up having the greater influence on the ongoing promotion of the right to peace.

Such a juridification somehow culminates to date with the official codification process undertaken since 2010 by the UN Human Rights Council and by its Advisory Committee. As a UN subsidiary body with the competence to recommend to the General Assembly the further development of international law in the field of human rights, the Council requested its Advisory Committee to prepare a draft declaration of the HRP.[3] In 2011, a first draft that was discussed by the Advisory Committee at its seventh session and a revised draft was presented and discussed at its eighth session, in 2012.[4] After that, the Human Rights Council decided, in its voted resolution 20/15, "to establish an Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group [hereafter: Working Group] with the mandate of progressively negotiating a Draft United Nations Declaration on the Right to Peace [hereafter: Draft Declaration], on the basis of the draft submitted by the Advisory Committee, and without prejudging relevant past, present and future views and proposals."[5] Consequently, the Advisory Committee Working Group reported on two sessions held in 2013 and 2014 respectively, when the Draft Declaration was successively discussed after conducting consultations with, and taking into account the inputs from, governments, observer states, intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations and other relevant stakeholders.[6] The official codification work should be complete with the adoption in 2015 of the Universal Declaration on the Human Right to Peace by the UN General Assembly.

Solidarity Rights and Positive Peace

The series of private and official draft declarations ratify that the HRP should be understood at the same time as a fundamental right of every human being and as a precondition for all human rights. Likewise, the declarations confirm that it belongs to those human rights of the third-generation, which includes the rights to development, to a clean and healthy environment, to humanitarian assistance, and to participate in the enjoyment of the universal common good. In doing so, the declarations are trying to overcome a traditional ambivalence towards economic, social and cultural human rights that would intensify in the case of the so-called "solidarity" rights. The historical bifurcation within inter-

national human rights law led often to regard them more as aspirations than as fully-fledged entitlements and to arrange them in a tiered hierarchy headed by civil and political human rights. In contradistinction, the declarations recognize that second and third generations human rights are not ranked in a lexical order that systematically accords them lesser priority, but that rather they are on a par with civil and political rights. On the other hand, far from being any linear progress –or a replacement of rights catalogues- from civil and political rights to solidarity rights, by way of economic, social and cultural rights, what we have is rather interconnected sets of claims that complement and reinforce each other and that have appeared or are being redefined in response to new needs, challenges, contexts and circumstances.

The new generation comes with an array of distinctive features. The HRP shares with other solidarity rights an international dimension that links them to the right to a social and international order proclaimed in article 28 of the UDHR. Indeed, they respond to problems and challenges at the global scale and consequently require cooperation among states and other actors –organizations and individuals- both nationally and internationally. Furthermore, they have a dual character, being both individual and collective rights. Consequently, the holders of the HRP are the collective as well as individuals. Like the right to development, the HRP is an instrumental and simultaneously a synthesis right. It is an enabling human right and a requirement for the enjoyment of the other rights. At the same time, it is so interconnected with the rest of human rights that the guarantee of its effective realization depends in turn on them. In short, HRP is entangled together with the other human rights as an integrated whole. Along with internationally recognized civil and political rights, including those relating to freedom of thought, conscience, opinion and expression, to participation in civil society and politics, to life and physical integrity and safety, the legal content of the HRP integrates both solidarity and economic, social and cultural human rights, including those relating to "adequate food, drinking water, sanitation, housing, health care, clothing, education, social security and culture" (as article 9 of the Draft Declaration presented in 2012 states).

The normative framework of the HRP rests on a comprehensive conception of peace which goes beyond the absence of armed conflicts and demands both the elimination of all types of violence (whether direct, structural or cultural) and the promotion of the proper economic, social and cultural conditions of

civilians. Such a holistic conception of "positive peace" has been central to the series of declarations that mark out to date the codification process. Certainly, the detachment from the narrow assimilation of peace to *absentia belli* means neither to undervalue the forms of direct and armed violence that use to originate continuous and systematic violations of human rights and to be one of the most frequent inhibitors of development, nor ignore that the eradication of these forms of violence is an enabling requirement for implementing social and economic development and realizing human rights. However, overcoming the traditional minimalist approach becomes necessary, first, because the lack of warfare and other armed violence does not exclude the emergence and the persistence of different kinds of social, economic and cultural violence that are both incompatible with peaceful ways of life and coexistence and contrary to the human rights. That is the case of the structural violence that, according to the formulation of Johan Galtung, consists in the "avoidable impairment of fundamental human needs."[7] In this vein, article 2 of the Draft Declaration presented in 2012 states that "mechanisms should be developed and strengthened to eliminate inequality, exclusion and poverty, as they generate structural violence, which is incompatible with peace." Furthermore, persistent and acute forms of structural violence, including those coming from extreme poverty and hunger, as well as prevailing forms of cultural violence and even environmental degradation are more than contexts elements that help to explain why armed conflicts may occur or have occurred. Rather, they may precipitate different forms of direct and organized violence, as well as foment, fuel and even legitimize them. In sum, patterns of structural and cultural violence are to be counted not only among the foreseeable consequences of armed conflicts, but also among their potential underlying and precipitating causes. The Draft Declaration therefore focuses not only on the core standards relating to international security, but also on standards in the areas of peace education and training, sustainable development, environmental protection, victims and vulnerable groups, and refugees and emigrants. And the standards relative to human security, disarmament, control of private military and security companies, or peacekeeping are directed toward the same objective of eliminating all forms of direct and indirect violence.

If the abolition of armed conflicts should not be uncoupled from the elimination of the cultural and structural roots of violence, the internal link between positive peace and the development-human security paradigm is brought to

the foreground. The article on "Human Security" of the Draft Declaration endorses the UN doctrine stemming from the 1994 Human Development Report: "Everyone has the right to human security, which includes freedom from fear and from want, all constituting elements of positive peace. […] Freedom from want implies the enjoyment of the right to sustainable development and of economic, social and cultural rights." The article on "Human Development" underlines once again the nexus: "States should pursue peace and security and development as interlinked and mutually reinforcing, and as serving as a basis for one another." Conversely, it is acknowledged that underdevelopment will lead in many places to conflict and failure of security, and vice versa. The aspiration to become free from needs and the menaces to human survival implies in turn issues of social and economic justice. Ultimately, it is not possible to diminish the incidence of armed conflicts without eradicating both the patterns of structural violence and the economic and social inequalities.

Political Challenges

A noteworthy corollary of the informal and official declarations, and one that has been particularly underlined by the commentaries of the world civil society organizations to the Draft Declaration, concerns the political dimension of the HRP for making the states the main duty-holders both individually and as a collective of actors and for requiring the promotion of social justice at the global level.

The Draft Declaration only recognizes individuals and peoples as the right-holders of the HRP -unlike the Santiago Declaration, which contemplated groups and humankind as well. Even so, the series of official drafts follows in part the Santiago Declaration and differentiates the right-holders from the principal duty-holders of the HRP, which are states severally, jointly or as part of multilateral organizations. In compliance with the UN Charter and the International Bill of Human Rights, states have the obligation to use peaceful means for settling disputes and to renounce the (threat of) use of force in international relations. Furthermore, states are required not only to refrain from violence, but also to actively protect both individual and peoples from the (threats of) violence and to promote the wellbeing of these right-holders. The human security discourse animates the Draft's demand for peace as a demand

for positive action and social justice guarantees. As part of their positive obligations, States are required to provide education, particularly peace education and training; to place the rights of migrants and of vulnerable groups at the centre of the relevant national policies and plans of actions; to cooperate with each other to protect and promote the right to development and other human rights and to achieve the realization of the HRP, in particular by providing resources to international cooperation for development.

Moreover, the declarations stake the claim for a new international order that would eliminate the root causes of the structural violence, which is incompatible with peace at both national and international levels. These normative claims provide grounds for questioning the international order, as we know it. What is at stake in the first place is the complex web of international actors and institutions whose decision-making has a causal impact on the socioeconomic conditions that led to or support violence. To the extent that these global players create, maintain or deliberately ignore human rights violations, the legal articulation of the HRP could catalyze the demands for accountability emanating from weaker stakeholders, such as groups, populations or nongovernmental organizations.

Of course, the fact that the Working Group currently bolsters to a large extent many theses and positions of the advocates of the HRP does not mask the enduring and complex controversies both in the academia and within the UN Human Right Council. In fact, powerful states like USA and regional actors like the UE oppose or are reluctant to recognize the HRP and other solidarity rights. A universal legal instrument that binds the states as duty-holders, both individually and as an international collective, to the promotion of (the rights of) the HRP would contribute to weaken traditional privileges in the management of peace process and to reallocate the burdens and responsibilities. As a tensions field subjected to a juridification with political impact, HRP may play a role in the new politics that should be carried out around the current and future global actors and institutions.

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Endnotes

1. At the regional level, the right of peoples to peace was recognized in Article 6 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted in 1981. At the national level, perhaps the most striking case was that of the Colombian Constitution of 1991, whose Article 22 states that "peace is a right and a duty whose compliance is mandatory."
2. See Carlos Villán, "Civil Society Organizations Contribution to the Universal Declaration on the Human Right to Peace," *International Journal on World Peace* 28 (2011), 59-126. The sequence of declarations, as well as other documents and publications of this global movement are available at http://www.aedidh.org/?q=node/407 (last visited December 15, 2014).
3. See the resolution A/HRC/RES/14/3, adopted by a recorded vote of 31 to 14 with 1 abstention. It is available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session14/Pages/ResDecStat.aspx (last visited December 15, 2014).
4. See the UN documents A/HRC/17/39, A/HRC/AC/7/3, A/HRC/RES/17/16 and A/HRC/20/31, all of them available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/AdvisoryCommittee/Pages/RightToPeace.aspx (last visited December 15, 2014). The draft declaration presented in 2012 (A/HRC/20/31) upgraded roughly 85% of the standards proposed by the Santiago Declaration; see Carlos Villán, and Carmelo Faleh (eds), *The International Observatory of the Human Right to Peace* (Luarca: AEDIDH, 2013), passim.
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6. The Report of the first session of the Working Group (A/HRC/WG.13/1/2) and the consequent resolution (A/HRC/RES/23/16), that was adopted by vote with 30 votes in favor, 9 against and 8 abstentions, as well as the Report (A/HRC/27/63) and the whole information of the second session are available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RightPeace/Pages/WGDraftUNDeclarationontheRighttoPeace.aspx (last visited December 15, 2014).
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Discrimination and Prejudice
Obstacles to the Citizenship Education

Elaine Teresinha Dal Mas Dias

Abstract

This article presents part of the results of a research was concluded and carried out in a Brazilian public institution of basic education. It discusses the obstacles to educative teaching, considering the educators´ tasks in the role they play in the pupils´ formation, mainly in the promotion of pedagogical approaches and of teaching methods having in view the exercise of democratic and multicultural living together, with emphasis on the subjective aspects, which prohibit the professional practice and that of citizenship education.

The starting point was the coordinator's and teacher's complaints during the preliminary meetings for the presentation of the project and of the survey of the adhering teachers and in the staff meetings for the evaluations of the pupils. In these moments, the complaints directed at the Bolivian and Bolivian-descendant pupils drew attention because they dealt with general aspects of adolescence such as apathy, lack of interest and disregard for learning, but they presented a particular topic: the lack of hygiene. Such indications were included in the main research proposal because they referred to phenomena linked to diversity, to culture, to teaching and to subjectivity.

Keywords

Public Education, Discrimination, Cultural Diversity.

The Scholastic Universe and the Cultural Bonds

The educational establishment, located in the central region of the municipality of São Paulo, has about 1,400 pupils and offers lessons in the morning and afternoon shifts.

In the surroundings are located popular hotels and shops, which promote a vigorous human movement as well as an insalubrious environment in physical and hygienic terms, which puts the pupils, who reside in the surroundings, in conditions of bio-psycho-social risk and of permanent vulnerability.

The pupils experience adolescence and they distinguish themselves as a social group for the defence of Bolivian culture and for the gradual incorporation of the Brazilian culture.

The culture of the immigrants is commonly preserved through the transmission and preservation of the bonds which link them to their origins, to their native language, to beliefs, to arts and to the customs as a guarantee of environmental and personnel subsistence and of social-group organisation.[1]

In this perspective, the community of Bolivian residents of the district in which there are the school and the Latin-American pupils react to the distance and to the estrangement they are submitted to and they take again characteristics of their own society by organising the *Alasitas* Festival; which gives thanks to *Ekeko*, god of abundance and celebrates the consecration of *Nuestra Señora de Copacabana*, Bolivia's patron saint; and weekly meetings at the fair of *Kantuta*, name which is borrowed from the flower that grows in abundance on the Andean Plateau.

The present estimation is that about 100,000 Bolivians live in São Paulo, in the quest of better living conditions which only consolidate themselves at the cost of much performance and of exhausting daily activities which can reach the limits of slavery, which puts them in the condition of dislocated and deprived of their territory. With respect to this situation, there is a topic, which compels and oppresses the foreigners of any kind: discrimination and prejudice.

The expression of these abominable feelings is not restricted and it is captured even in the educational environment, when we take into consideration the coordinators´ and teachers´ descriptions of the pupils on the screen, a fact which reduces and fragments the subjects, putting them in a position of subservience before the others.

Complex Thought, Subject and Culture

The epistemology of complexity Edgar Morin formulates understands the world as an inseparable, integrative and not disjunctive set, which avoids hierachisations, predominance and unilateral forces, constituting itself as a signal against fragmentation and reductionism. This means that the phenomena of nature and the human phenomena are conceived and described in the conjunction of their elements, in the confluence of their antagonisms, in the complementary identification, in the uncertainty and in the relationships, which are configured in the random, in the accidental, in the order, in the disorder, in the subject and in the object.

The guiding principles of complexity are divided into: systemic, in which the knowledge of everything leads to the knowledge of the parts; retroactive, which recognises the self-regulating processes; recursive, in which the products and results are fruits and causes of that which produces them; and dialogic, which assumes the union and the texture between complementary and antagonistic figures that are necessary to the phenomenal organisations.

In this conception, to be subject presumes an individual, "but the notion of de individual only gains sense when it has the notion of subject. […] "*Within each society each individual is, at the same time, an egocentric subject and a moment/element of a sociological whole*".[2]

Identity involves separation and unification of the I (subjective) and of the I (objective), in a unique time, it has difference and mutual constitution, it embraces the ideas of exclusion and inclusion, which discuss the interdependence between the I and the I and the action which distances and denies the possibility of inscription of others in me.

Time does not modify the self-reference which is updated in the objectivation of the I and in the constancy of the I. This I – which only I can say – occupies and fills the place of centrality and egocentrism and it maintains itself in spite of the passage of time. The I, on its turn, is the heir of the primitive impulses of the id and of the superego, psychic instances which refer to the paternal authority, which can also represent something broader such as nation, society and the other.[3]

From this perspective, subjectivity reveals itself as an organiser/disorganiser system of the subject's inner world and outside world, which is able to hinder and to facilitate personal development and growth, which relates the past to the present and to the future[4], structuring itself or destructuring itself through inter-subjectivity, which guarantees the continuity of culture.

According to Morin[5] subjectivity is a valuable psychological component capable of influencing the cognitive, perceptive and sensitive processes and indispensable to rationality which, when it is disdained, leads to the illusion of the existence of impartial thoughts and knowledge's free of affectivity.

The errors, which are energised by the emotions, are linked to human incomprehension/comprehension. According to the author, incomprehension is multiple and convergent and as a perceptive process it motivates deceitful actions

and reactions with regard to the other, which can drift into enmity, antipathy, rejection and estrangement. The modification of this situation effects itself through the subjective availability, which will alter the tendency to assume the non-I through its specificities.

Human comprehension, on its turn, contains the conditions in which the mentalities are woven and the actions implemented[6], deploying themselves in objective comprehension which is founded on situations, information and explicative principles with regard to people or to situations of daily life; on subjective comprehension, which is traced in the relational dynamics between subjects that favours the apprehension of the experiences of the others; and on complex comprehension, which articulates the others in the perspective of their singular and global aspects, and on the integration of situational and distinct polarities of a same phenomenon[7]. This set involves basic psychological processes such as thought, language, memory, perception and includes the *imaginary complexes,* which are formed by the triad projection, identification and transference called PIT by complex thought.

The emotions, which are expressed by the PIT, fix themselves in the exterior in the figure of a person, of an object or of a myth such as transference and externalisation of subjective states generators of identifications and they evidence the *homo sapiens/demens* in his position of *homo complexus*.

Individual/subject and society/culture are united by interdependent webs, which predispose people to similar actions and to the exposition of knowledge, which reproduce concepts and prejudices. It is opportune to emphasise the importance of a vigilant conservation with regard to segregation, because it reunites objective and subjective features.

The Parâmetros Curriculares Nacionais (PCN) [National Curricular Parameters], in the call for transversal topics, indicate that the teachers must be attentive to the unexpected episodes of daily life, because non-planned events are frequent and require clarity and punctual initiatives. Indication of difficult accomplishment, but which can be taken into consideration in the examination of the educative doing itself and in the impulsive reactions that the pupil-adolescent-immigrant provokes. The situation the educators describe is an example of these events.

The complexity of the act of understanding imposes the appropriation of our limitations and the perception of the feelings, which can hinder the pedagogical practice and apprenticeship at school. Introspection and self-analysis can be clues to comprehension, in spite of the enigmas they shelter because of the inseparability between subjective and objective and of the transference of ambiguities and ambivalences. The contact key is in the egocentrism apt to open itself in attitudes of reception or close itself in segregation.

The *reform of thought*, such as the theory of complexity indicates it, challenges rationalisation grounded on mutilated bases, it summons the orientation towards rationality, which defends against the error and the illusion and impels us to respect the differences. According to Morin[8] to understand "is not to understand everything, but to recognise that there is something incomprehensible" through the possibility of human action to escape from the intentions of its agents and to generate unexpected effects of the association between the environment and subjectivity. This escaping is defined as the "ecology of action" and it is ruled by two principles: "1st principle: the action does not only depend on the actor's intentions, but also on the very conditions of the environment in which it develops itself; 2nd principle: tin the course of time he effects of the action are unforeseeable."[9]

We share Lisondo's considerations which affirm that "the teacher´ s mind and his structure, his personality will be his best instrument of work in the formation of other human beings" and that the young person needs "a figure of identification and, to that purpose, a teacher must be prepared to be a good model. Because you learn to be man and woman […] by living together with another human being – man or woman".[10]

The teacher's figure is essential in the classroom and the exercise of dialogue can transcend the daily work with the adolescent and transform itself into an intermediary object in going beyond the curricular matrix and into an object of re-liaison.

Method: Ways Gone Through

We classify this research as a case study because it deals with an educational institution we chose due to its representativity and signification, it is located in an insalubrious and violent environment, which puts the residents in a situation of social vulnerability and it receives a large number of immigrants.

It observed a morning class of the second year of the Secondary Education during 950 hours-lesson during the school years 2012 and 2013, with ten Bolivian or Bolivian-descendant pupils, six female pupils and four male pupils, aged between 16 and 18, which represents 28,75% of the total number of young people.

The registrations in the field diary depict behaviours, attitudes and the adolescents´ relationships between each other, with the teachers, with the schoolmates and with the other institutional members.

On the first day of observation, the teacher explained to the pupils the reasons why they had put the researcher into the space, which is reserved to the classroom and, with ability she connected the teaching of research methods, the meaning of a field work, the permanence in a place for the observation of reality. We did not note embarrassment on the part of the teachers nor on the part of the pupils.

Results: the Pupil's Demonstrations

The classes are held on the basis of specific scripts for the discipline; they are sponsored and distributed by State organs. The contents are diversified and deal with the American Revolution, the Frankfurt School critical theory, culture, mass culture, society, racial quotas in the public universities.

The Bolivian or Bolivian-descendant pupils have a behaviour, which is different from that of the majority. Differently from what the educational members described, they are assiduous, do not miss lessons, are attentive to the explanations, make the designated tasks, do not use mobile phones or any other electronic device. The boys seem to be shy and introverted, they do not communicate very much with the others, they accomplish the multiple works and sit in the centre of the classroom; they are disciplined and polite to the schoolmates and to the teacher and they usually wear the school uniform, they are clean and take care of their clothes. The girls are spontaneous, communicative and extroverted; they respond with a certain interest to the programme and sit at the back of the classroom.

The observations contributed to another reading of the scholastic/educational circle. In spite of the difference between being in the classroom as an observer and as a teacher, the study is contributory because it puts somebody, who is distant

from the daily environment, to unveil obstacles or facilitations for teaching and apprenticeship.

Thus the pupil's positions we observed during the time of lessons – application, interest, deference and response to the scholastic and educational requirements – and in the extra-curricular activities substantially differed from the preliminary descriptions. Probably these positions stamp the confrontation of the adversities in the quest of better living conditions and of a chance of territorialisation, even if silence and introversion signal an undue occupation, which occasions shyness and fright, which tends to intensify the affection for the native culture and for the group of equals as an emotional defence against the other's authority.

The opinions the institutional members formulated about the group, beyond truth, denote intolerance and dissociation, which nourish separatist and stigmatising seeds. Intransigence and division are fixed in the generalisation of the whole and in the isolation of the part, in a recursive perverse dynamics, which separates the pupil from the context. The knowledge, which is fixed in subjective impressions, can lead to error through the projective crossing of affection and emotions and it can lead to incomprehension and in the unilateral subduing manifestations, which reduce the other to mere individualised characterisations, thus withdrawing the conditions of subject from him.

The teacher's and the coordination's discourses design their comprehensions of the scholastic context which are projected onto the pupils in a general way and in particular, onto the Latin-Americans, revealing a predisposition to the reproduction of discriminating prejudices, preventions and conventionalism, in spite of the debates concerning the importance of the educator's subjectivity or of the suggestions of the PCN to be attentive to the eventualities of everyday life. These attitudes cross the educator's formation role, intercept the exercise of the democratic and multicultural living together and consequently, a citizenship education, because they proclaim in unison a rejection which is based on estrangements founded on simplifying, conscious or unconscious personalist perceptions, and on projective actions which remove and deny alterity. The sociology teacher did not embark in this excluding current.

The self-fulfilling prophecies, as it seems, have not yet fractured the adolescents we observed. Nevertheless the part which is designated to them is that of non-belonging, that of improper life and of the less favoured part of society which, in

a certain way, will be able to influence them subjectively and to disorganise their inner world and to make their personnel development and growth difficult, thus compromising their future.

An admissible solution is the assimilation and the confrontation of one's own limits, as complex thought suggests it, because it facilitates the re-elaboration of experiences, the expansion, the acceptance and the inscription of the other in each one, directing it at complex comprehension, which integrates polarities of a same phenomenon. With respect to the pupils, their way is that of the *ecology of action* as a means to overcome the disqualification and the scholastic and personnel failure.

Conclusion

The personnel educational/scholastic manifestations of the group of the Bolivian and of Bolivian descendant pupils did not reproduce the initial complaints. We did not verify any kind of tension in the inter-personnel relationships and we did not verify either a lack of hygiene, inappropriate or condemnable behaviours, which derive or not from the maturational process, disregard or disinterest with respect to the lessons or apathy. It is necessary to emphasise that we did not observe, within or outside the classroom any situation, even near, of the situations, which were formulated at the beginning. We verified the *demens* dimension of the human fixed in a blind objectivism, which reduces the other to nothing, violates the promotion of values for citizenship and limits personnel development.

A long way will still be gone towards the overcoming of the paradox of excluding inclusion, in which simultaneously you receive and remove the different through the intermediary of concealed feelings. It will take some time until the belonging effect itself in this group of pupils so that they surmount the conditions of strange people.

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The Religious Dimension of the Man within E.H.C.R. Jurisprudence

Lorena Stanescu

Abstract

The legal concerns of this theme may be studied by distinguishing two central coordinates which although they often identify each other highlight two aspects of human existence: life in the Church and life in law, concerns seeking to identify the "hermeneutical keys" enabling not only legal research, but also in terms of religious tradition. I present the following three texts illustrating the position of normative rules within the internal life of the Church

Keywords

European Court of Human Rights, Trade Union the "Good Shepard" versus Romania, The Right to Free Association, Religious Freedom, Ratione Materiæ, Ratione Personæ.

Reddite ergo Caesari quae sunt Caesaris, quae Dei sunt Deo

Premise

Hermeneutical process of analysis itself is done by real casuistry of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as "the Court") and by the identification of the relationship between the texts presented in the first section and the reality of the legal conflict.

In this regard, I recall the case of Trade Union the "Good Shepard" versus Romania (Application no. 2330/09) brought before the European Court of Human Rights which received controversial decisions from the Court, in the first phase, the ruling of 31.01.2012 of the Third Section of the European Court of Human Rights, and, finally, the judgment of the Grand Chamber of 07.09.2013.

Summarizing the factual background, in April 2008, a group of clergy and lay staff of the Romanian Orthodox Church submitted to first instance Romanian court, under the Trade Union Act no. 54/2003, an application for obtaining legal personality by a trade union consisting of this group.

Initially, taking into account the opposition of the representative of the Archdiocese who argued that the application for granting legal personality to that group does not comply with the internal special procedure laid down in the Statute of the Romanian Orthodox, the court dismissed the case; however, the request was reiterated and, this second time, the the court allowed the union's application, granting it legal personality, and ordered its entry in the register of trade unions.

In a final judgment, the County Court allowed the appeal against the judgment of first instance, quashed the first-instance judgment and, on the merits, dismissed the request for obtaining legal personality of the so-called Trade Union of the "Good Shepard".

In consequence, the trade union filed an application to the European Court of Human Rights claiming that the Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter "the E.C.H.R.") governing the right to free association was violated.

Third Section of the Court judged in favor of the trade union considering there has been a violation of Article 11 of the ECHR reasoning that the scope of this article extends to priests because, according to the Court, they exercise their powers under the Romanian Orthodox Church under an employment contract.

Finally, the Grand Chamber held that the courts of Romania rejected the application for registration of the applicant union after finding that its request did not meet the requirements of the Statute of the Romanian Orthodox Church because its members failed to comply with the internal special procedure provided for setting-up of an association.

The focus on this case came from the impact which the decision of the Grand Chamber, in particular, the reasoning therein, will have on the limits of the principle of religious freedom and in particular, on extending the jurisdiction of national courts on issues of internal organisation of the religious community in the event of a real conflict between a right or a freedom beneath the protection of the ECHR and the freedom of religion.

Our concerns relate to the applicability of the ECHR's provisions on the facts brought before it and on the *rationae materiae* and *rationae personae* competences of the Court to decide on matters of coordination and functioning of the Romanian Orthodox Church or any other religious community, my doubts

born of the consideration that, in this case, the facts in dispute are of a religious nature, so that the alleged interference cannot represent the subject of a proportionality control of the Court which would put in balance the interests of religious organisations with those of the individuals claimed under Articles 8-12 of the Convention.

Historical Perspectives

Between 1959 - 1998, the ECHR's jurisprudence arise from the interpretation of Article 9 of the Convention is limited[1] and, in particular, in cases that concern the relationship between the state (which shall be referred hereinafter as the "*State*" for purposes of facile identification without being considered any other connotations) and the religious communities, the role of the Court is confined to the supervision of compliance of the national authorities of the Member States of the rights guaranteed by the Convention and its additional protocols, but starting with the twenty-first century, the sharp dynamics of jurisprudence and the creativity of the Court indicate a new function of the Court practiced by extending the sphere of applicability of the law enshrined in the Convention.

Having its origin in the general postulate of a "democratic society", freedom of thought, conscience and religion enshrined in the provision of Article 9 of the Convention, in its religious dimension, is among the most important elements of the identity of believers and their conception about life, but it is equally an important aspect for atheists, agnostics, skeptics and the unconcerned. By this last enumeration, the Court recognizes plenipotentiary a pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which has been dearly won over the centuries and, indicated that the scope of this freedom entails, *inter alia*, freedom to hold or not to hold religious beliefs and to practise or not to practise a religion (*Case Kokkinakis against Greece - application no. 14307/88*[2]*, Case Buscarini and others against San Marino [Grand Chamber] - application no. 24645/94*).

As mentioned above, until recently, at the examination of a case concerning the scope of Article 9 or the interference of religious freedom and other rights protected by the ECHR, the Court's reasoning was distinguished by the constant reiteration of the importance of the principle of religious autonomy and attitude of neutrality of state driven from the religious pluralism followed by

the evaluation of the situation where an eventual interference represents the subject of other limitations than those prescribed by law which a democratic society are necessary for the protection of public order, health, public morals, rights and freedoms of others.

Article 9 of the Convention can hardly be conceived as being likely to diminish the role of faith or of the Church that a community of a country was historically and culturally[3] associated which does not mean that the relationships between a Member State and the religious communities are completely beyond the control of the Court. However, under the active role, the Court assumes discussing issues of a deeply religious nature such as priests functions and qualification of the relationship between the clergy and the Church as an employment contract, while recognizing that "*it is not for the Court to resolve the controversy that opposes the union members of the hierarchy in terms of the exact nature of the functions exercised by the subjects*"[4].

The Court constantly reiterates that religious communities traditionally and universally exist in the form of organised structures. Where the organisation of the religious community is at issue, Article 9 of the Convention must be interpreted in the light of Article 11, which safeguards associations against unjustified State interference. (*see Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 30985/96, Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, no. 45701/99, and Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (Metropolitan Inokentiy) and Others v. Bulgaria, nos. 412/03 and 35677/04)*".

With regard to the sphere of action of State towards the members of a religious community, the Court details that Article 9 of the Convention does not guarantee any right to dissent within a religious body; in the event of a disagreement over matters of doctrine or organisation between a religious community and one of its members, the individual's freedom of religion is exercised through his freedom to leave the community (*see Miroļubovs and Others v. Latvia, no. 798/05, 15 September 2009*).

Focusing on the relationship between the state and religious communities, encompasing not only the collective dimension, but also the individual right protected by Article 9, that the right of everyone to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, the Court confirms the role of mediator of the State asserting that "*in a democratic society in which several religions or branched of the same coexist among a*

population, o place restrictions on this freedom in order to reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that everyone's beliefs are respected" (*Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, no. 45701/99*).

In the context of preserving harmony between national interests and those of religious organisations, specifically, ensuring pluralism and the proper functioning of democracy that offers the opportunity to resolve specific problems through dialogue, without resorting to violence, the Court develops the scope of the State's power in the area of involving the establishment of relations between the religious communities and the State, recognising in favor of the latter a wide margin of appreciation[5].

In the initial case-law of the Court, the term "a wide margin of appreciation" was understood as the possibility of the Member State to decide "*whether and to what extent an interference is necessary. This margin of appreciation goes hand in hand with European supervision embracing both the law and the decisions applying it"* (*see Leyla Şahin, cited above,; Bayatyan, cited above, and Manoussakis, cited above,*).

Subscribing to the same innovative recent jurisprudence of the Court, the measure of extending the significance of the expression "*wide margin of appreciation"* of the State can be observed by the role of the decision-making body whose importance was recognized by the Court "*where questions concerning the relationship between the State and religions are at stake, on which opinion in a democratic society may reasonably differ widely*"[6].

Lastly, the new appearance of the principle of autonomy may be identified within the further reasoning of the Court where it states that: "*the State enjoys a wider margin of appreciation in this sphere, encompassing the right to decide whether or not to recognise trade unions that operate within religious communities and pursue aims that might hinder the exercise of such communities' autonomy*".[7]

Furthermore, exercising their new competences "*by conducting an in-depth examination of the circumstances of the case and a thorough balancing exercise between the competing interests at stake"*[8], national courts must ensure, in the light of the specific circumstances of the case, if that the risk alleged (indicated as threatening the autonomy of the religious organization) "is real and substantial and that the impugned interference with freedom of association does not go beyond what is necessary to eliminate that risk and does not serve any other purpose unrelated to the exercise of the religious community's autonomy"[9].

Parameters of Comparison

Regarding the conflict between the national law and the ecclesiastical law subject to settlement in the Case of Trade Union "Good Shepherd" against Romanian, the intervening third parties have argued that "*the autonomy of religious communities should prevail and such communities should enjoy the right to determine their relations with their staff on the basis of their own internal regulations, even if these restricted or limited the exercise of certain rights*" (the Greek Government, the Polish Government, the Moldovan Government, Moscow Patriarchate).

The non-governmental organisations Becket Fund and International Center for Law and Religion Studies referring to the case-law of the Supreme Court of the United States in matters of the autonomy of religious institutions, cited case of the National Labor Relations Board v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979), where the Supreme Court ruled that the domestic authorities could not overcome the will of the bishop and recognise a union of teachers in Catholic schools, considering that this recognition would interfere with the autonomous operation of religious institutions. Likewise, in the case of Hosanna Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, no. 10-553 (2012), the Supreme Court applied the doctrine of "*ministerial exception*", ruling that the clerical staff or non-clergy staff of religious organistions is not subject of the labor law.

Contrary to the positions of the United States Supreme Court and the European Court in the matter of protecting the relations between the religious organisations and clerical staff, the Grand Chamber qualified the relationship between priests and the Church as one governed by labor law and assessed the Romanian court's rejection to register the trade union as an interference in pursuit of a legitimate aim under Article 11, paragraph 2 of the ECHR, namely the protection of the rights of others, in this case the rights of the Romanian Orthodox Church.

The Social Dimension of the Religious Freedom

Assuming that a religion exceeds the notion of "doctrine" becoming, in fact, for the members of the religious community a living way resulted in daily behavior, it shall be analyzed further the social dimension of religious freedom in the traditional churches in connection with the occurrence and legal recognition of new religious movements amid the phenomenon of secularization[10].

Inspired by the ECHR case-law, I present from a comparative manner two similar situations requiring the balance of divergent private interests or different rights protected by the Convention, in this case, it is in question the prevalence of the right to private life towards the religious freedom, settled in different ways, contradictory by the Court.

In case of Obst v. Germany (no. 425/03, September 23, 2010), the applicant was an European director of Public Relations Department belonging to the Mormon Church, who was dismissed without notice for adultery, motivated by the fact that an extra-marital relationship represents the breach of one of the clauses of his employment contract. Before the Court, Obst alleged not the breach of Article 9, but Article 8 of the Convention, which guarantees the right to respect for private life, but his application was rejected, the Court considering dismissal as "*necessary for the credibility of the Mormon Church, especially given the nature of the position they occupy*".

In the case Schüth v. Germany (no. 1620/03), the Court ruled against Germany under Article 8 for the dismissal of a former employee of the Catholic Church on the grounds that he separated from his wife and started a family with another woman. In this case, the Court granted the important aspects that a Church employee who was fired has limited possibilities to find another job.

Apparently the reasoning that underlies the Court settlement of conflicting shoulders, but if we look to the motivation of Case Trade Union "The Good Shepherd", I note that the examination of Article 9 in particular the component regarding the right to have an own opinion on the collective activities of their members that could threaten their autonomy, opinion that should be respected by national authorities, the Court states that it "*is not sufficient to render any interference with its members' trade-union rights compatible with the requirements of Article 11 of the Convention. It must also show, in the light of the circumstances of the individual case, that the risk alleged is real and substantial and that the impugned interference with freedom of association does not go beyond what is necessary to eliminate that risk and does not serve any other purpose unrelated to the exercise of the religious community's autonomy.*".

Or, having in mind the criteria ((1) the alleged risk is real and serious, (2) that interference with the freedom or right protected by the ECHR does not exceed what is necessary for its removal and that (3) does not serve a purpose

foreign exercise autonomy religious organization) which has to be meet any situation raised by the religious community as threatening to the organization and performance of that community, I note that from the above court cases there are differences in terms of the purpose for which the first case dismissal was legitimate and, secondly, unlawful.

In other words, dismissal of the European Director of Public Relations Department adulterous proves "*necessary for the credibility of the Mormon Church, especially given the nature of the position they occupy*", but the dismissal of an employee of the Catholic Church because it was separated from his first wife and, according to Christian tradition, he breached the Sacrament of Marriage, is illegal because the former employee would have limited opportunities to find another job.

Conclusions

Under the above principles, the *ratione materiae* and *ratione personae* competences of the Court to rule on the organization and functioning of religious communities is questionable in the light of assumed dualism between statist society and faith. Remembering that the origin of the apparent conflict between God and Caesar - two separate orders, man belonging to both (the law of communicating vessels being valid in this case) - is placed in the Temple of Jerusalem, my thoughts are that also here we find the answer at our dilemma described in this paper: "*Then render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to God the things of God!*".

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10.Use of the term "*new religious movements*" is preferred in sociology due to its neutral character in relation to the terms "sect" and "cult".

SECTION III
Education, Women's Studies, Sociology

LOCAL VOICES IN A GLOBAL DIALOGUE
The Art & Literature of Minority Cultures

Chair
—
Francisca González-Arias

Participants
—
Peter C. S. Adams
Taisija Laukkonen
Francisca González-Arias
Michèle Lemettais

Presentation

Francisca González-Arias

The workshop "Local Voices in a Global Dialogue: The Art and Literature of Minority Cultures" dealt with the artistic expressions of minority or "other" cultures and how they negotiate meaning within or beyond borders in today's Europe, and on a global level. Ranging from the edges of Eastern Europe to the western-most point on the European continent, and including the Americas and the far-flung community of English speakers, workshop papers addressed such questions as: While language has been recognized as a fundamental element in cultural identity, is it the only marker of identity? Can a minority culture express itself in another language? Or in another place? Participants explored the issues of the role of language or translation, and/or literature in reducing the importance of borders; the role of emigration, migration, and diaspora in the development of minority or post-colonial cultures; and the fact that by highlighting difference, plurality and hybridity are not necessarily denied and rejected, but rather enhanced and pushed forward.

In "Future Imperfect: Europe of the Past Views Europe of the Future in Literature", Peter Adams offers a detailed overview of English-language writers' use of science fiction, seeing it as a device that not only bridges present and future, but also continents and peoples, advancing the well-being of human beings and the planet. Currrent science fiction writers employ this strategy to educate the public about issues like the environment and growing inequality, and about recent European efforts to address them.

Taisija Laukkonen's "In Search of New Identities: Russian Literature in the Post-Soviet Baltic States" explores the phenomenon of Russian literary expression in the Baltic States as a minority discourse that appeals to readers across the Russian-speaking world. Her paper illustrates the different approaches to writing in Russian as represented by two writers from Baltic countries: Lena Eltang (Lithuania), and Andrei Ivanov (Estonia), whose recognition in both Russia and their countries of residence heralds a new period in the history of Baltic Russian literature.

In "Galicia in the Poetics of Erín Moure", Francisca González Arias shows that transcending borders by means of both translation and poetic creation is integral to Moure's concept of citizenship, defined as the local in dialogue with the other. The language and literature of Galicia, one of Spain's "historical nationalities" rescue this minority culture from disappearing into the global, and are used by Moure to enrich her own Canadian culture and language, as well as to affirm the role of women's handiwork in the creative process.

The Galician poet Rosalía de Castro wrote in both Galician and Spanish. Carmen Pereira Muro showed in "Constructions of a Modern Subject from the Periphery in Rosalía de Castro's *Las orillas del Sar*" (not included in these Proceedings) that while characterized by gender marginalization, and a peripheral language and culture, Rosalía de Castro's poetry nevertheless achieved that elusive modernity that Spanish literary history still attributes to more "central", canonical and "convenient" authors.

Michèle Lemettais elucidates in "Crossing Borders: *Claire of the Sea Light*, Edwidge Danticat's Strange and Haunting Tale" how the switching back and forth between languages –Haitian Creole and French-- in Danticat's Haiti not only corresponds to differences between social classes, but highlights as well crossings between the literary and cultural traditions of a culture characterized by dislocation and diaspora. Danticat, who herself crosses constantly between languages and countries, sees in the island's rich hybrid heritage an affirmation of its local identity, and a source of strength and hope for the transcendence of the ills that have plagued it for centuries.

To conclude: the expression of local voices –through these "minor" or minority or peripheral literatures and genres—dialogues with, and enriches the global.

Future Imperfect

Europe of the Past Looks at Europe of the Future in Literature

Peter C.S. Adams

Abstract

Europe is home to a rich history of literature, including the first known works of science fiction, and of important works of political theory, and sociology, and history, yet references to Europe itself in European speculative fiction are rare.

Keywords

Science Fiction, Speculative Fiction, Europe, United States of Europe, European Union, Euro, Future, Bridges, Utopia, Dystopia.

As we sit near the foot of the well known Arrábida Bridge across the Douro River here in Porto, it seems appropriate to begin with a few words about bridges, especially since, if you have been in Europe more than a few hours, you probably have one in your pocket. Euro bank notes, designed by Austrian artist Robert Kalina, contain two sets of symbols: windows or doors to symbolize openness, and bridges, symbolizing connections and unity.

When the Arrábida Bridge was inaugurated in 1973, it was the longest reinforced concrete bridge span in the world, with a span of 270 meters. The Vasco da Gama Bridge in Lisbon is the longest bridge in Europe at 17,185 m, and it is dwarfed by a railway bridge in China that totals 164,800 m. The Millau Viaduct in France is the tallest bridge in the world, with one mast's summit at 343 meters above the base of the structure, and it has the world's 12th highest bridge deck — 270 meters between the road deck and the ground below.

In *The Fountains of Paradise* (1978) Arthur C. Clarke discusses a bridge to dwarf these, both physically and symbolically:

> No ship would ever again pass the Pillars of Hercules without saluting the mightiest bridge that man had ever built — or in all probability would

> ever build. The twin towers at the junction of Mediterranean and Atlantic were themselves the tallest structures in the world, and faced each other across fifteen kilometers of space — empty except for the incredible, delicate arch of the Gibraltar bridge.[1]

By uniting Europe and Africa, the bridge was as great a symbol of unity as any in history. But there is a greater bridge to come: the book, which interweaves the near future engineering project with the history, art, and religion of Sri Lanka, describes the building of a 36,000 km tall elevator to space. And as one character put it,

> When I showed signs of vertigo at the idea of a tower going a good part of the way to the moon, Morgan said, "then don't think of it as a tower going up; think of it as a bridge going out."[2]

Bridges are not really a common symbol in science fiction, a genre more associated with star ships and teleportation than things as mundane as bridges, but Clarke manages to turn the bridge from a simple symbol of unity between peoples or cultures into a symbol of the future of all mankind and its future among the stars. Indeed, echoing Russian scientist Konstantin Tsiolkovsky's statement that "Earth is the cradle of humanity, but one cannot live in a cradle forever," Clarke's *3001: The Final Odyssey* (1997) portrays a human race thriving in space, with multiple space elevators leading to a habitable ring connecting them, and frequent space ship departures as well.

Clarke's optimism was not shared by many European science fiction writers. There were many "space operas," but most of the serious science fiction before World War II portrayed dystopic futures, usually dominated by class warfare that was an extreme version of the economic turmoil of the time. Elmar Podlasly notes that the 1873 Vienna stock market crash led to twenty years of economic stagnation and that Bismarck, like many European leaders, was afraid of the radical new ideas of the time, such as socialism[3], leading to repression and censorship. So it is perhaps not surprising that a continent plagued by frequent war and economic turmoil would look for a better future but often see a worse one, or that the science fiction of the time would frequently disguise social commentary as adventures in an imaginary place, rather than a recognizable Europe.

H.G. Wells dreamed of a better society, and wrote a number of Utopian novels, such as In the *Days of the Comet* (1906) in which gas from a comet caused people to think more rationally and abandon war. In *A Modern Utopia* (1905), Wells describes Londoners transported to a duplicate Earth, where they meet their own doubles and learn how this ideal Earth is run. Likewise, *Men Like Gods* (1923) uses the same magical transportation between worlds. A Londoner is transported to a parallel Earth 3,000 years ahead of our own, where people communicate mind to mind (telepathy) and where there is neither money nor social ills common to our society.

A utopian idea based on a world council of scientists, as in *The Shape of Things to Come* (1933) is fairly common in science fiction, for the obvious reason that a large percentage of science fiction is written by scientists. Clarke, much influenced by Wells, uses this device as well. But Wells also wrote dystopian novels, such as *When the Sleeper Wakes* (1899), in which the future society is on the brink of war between the ruling upper class and the oppressed workers.

After World War I, utopian novels and ideas became far less common. Of *A Modern Utopia*, Joseph Conrad wrote that Wells did not "take sufficient account of human imbecility,"[4] a comment that seems prescient In light of the World War's devastation. Indeed, G.K. Chesterton wrote that Huxley's *Brave New World* (1931) was a reaction to pre-war naïveté:

> After the Age of Utopias came what we might call the American Age, lasting as long as the Boom. Men like [Henry] Ford or Mond seemed to have solved the social riddle and made capitalism the common good. But […] the Slump [i.e. Depression] brought even more disillusionment than the War. A new bitterness, and a new bewilderment, ran through all social life, and was reflected in all literature and art.[5]

European science fiction, far more than American science fiction, largely abandoned Utopias and simple spaces operas for more serious commentaries on society. Perhaps this is because, as Franz Rottensteiner said, "the great difference between the mass of American SF and the (very rare) European masterpieces is their degree of seriousness, moral seriousness."[6]

In *R.U.R.,* a 1920 play by the Czech writer Karel Čapek, robots (a word he and his brother Josef coined from the Slovak word for laborer) were cheap and available all over the world. They were ubiquitous and indispensable because,

like slaves, they reduced labor costs. But the creation of a disposable working class was fraught with moral implications and indeed mortal danger, as the robots rise up against their masters and kill all of them except a laborer whom they recognize as a comrade. This theme of creation of artificial life or the use of artificial life without conscience as a permanent underclass is a recurring fascination in science fiction from *Frankenstein* to *Star Trek*. Many of these themes were echoed in the groundbreaking 1927 film *Metropolis*, directed by Fritz Lang and written by Lang and his wife Thea von Harbou, another dystopic story about a city with a rich ruling elite dominating a working class driven literally underground. It is not hard to see parallels in today's "race to the bottom" world economy with rising inequality.

Yevgeny Zamyatin used a similar strategy in *We*, his germinal 1921 novel about the walled city at the heart of the One State that rules the world. In the city, citizens have no individuality or even names, and all walls are made of glass to make sure there is no privacy. Zamyatin is believed to have written the book as a response to the Russian revolution of 1917, and indeed, the book was promptly banned by Goskomizdat, the Soviet censorship bureau. *We*, along with *1984*, was not published in Russia until 1988, in the glasnost era.

It is easy to see the influence of *We* on George Orwell's *1984* (1949), and indeed Orwell read *We,* and was inspired to base his next novel along the same lines. Orwell claimed Aldous Huxley had been similarly inspired in writing *Brave New World* (1931), though Huxley claimed to have read *We* after, not before, writing *Brave New World*. Regardless of whether this was inspiration or synchronicity, The many similarities between the three are striking: a world state with constant surveillance, no privacy or individualism, and a bureaucratic elite ruling the masses through propaganda ("War is peace," says Big Brother to justify the state of constant war with either Eurasia or Eastasia), technology, and placating of the masses through drugs, like soma, or mass consumption ("ending is better than mending" is a saying in *Brave New World* encouraging the masses to buy more and more). Curiously, Orwell's original title was to have been *The Last Man in Europe*, perhaps echoing Mary Shelley's *The Last Man* or Stanislaw Lem's *Last Men in London*. Jules Verne is most acclaimed in the public imagination for his prescience in imagining future gadgets, like faxes and videophones, but in reality he got more wrong than right, such as his complete failure to predict the lengthening of lifespans as a result of improved medicine.

It is Huxley and Orwell who seem truly prescient in imagining future culture: it is easy to look at our current society to see economies based on mass consumption, politics based on propaganda, security based on mass surveillance, and of course endless war.

The invention of a new place like Metropolis or One State is a common practice in literature and serves numerous purposes, not least a comfortable separation from the readers' world, allowing them to dispassionately consider uncomfortable ideas and situations. The very word "utopia" stems from a place invented by Thomas More. Another device is the reimagining of a current place and making it unfamiliar, as in *Brave New World*.

What is less common in science fiction is setting a story in the future of a specific current country, and that device is far more common in more optimistic American science fiction. Indeed, few writers used Europe itself as a setting for future events, even including barely recognizable versions as the London in Airstrip One, Oceania. (The British TV series *Doctor Who* is a notable example of not just optimism, but future versions of England in a variety of forms). As our colleague Michèle Lemettais wrote:

> …when [Pascal Dethurens] states in the conclusion to his survey that nobody writes Europe or about Europe after the Second World War, maybe it is because the idea, the concept of Europe has finally spread to other spheres such as politics (the latest elections), finances (the Euro), or even another literature (authors from different countries but living in Europe are nowadays more inclined to write about the lives of their compatriots in Europe).[7]

In addition to Wells' *The Sleeper Wakes*, which portrays a future London as the seat of a dictatorship based on corporate power, H.G. Wells' *The Shape of Things to Come* (1933) is considered a future history or an alternate history, but is really more a political essay than a novel. Wells predicted a Second World War with a different outcome: the war ends inconclusively but the world, exhausted, collapses into economic crisis and chaos. After the collapse of most governments, followed by a worldwide plague, a benevolent dictatorship arises from those with true global power — the heads of the world's transport systems. It is based on science, enforces Basic English as a global lingua franca, and eradicates all religions, setting the world on the road to a peaceful utopia.

Jules Verne's *Paris in the 20th Century* and *In the Year 2889* portray life in a future France in ways that are alternately prescient, naïve, and depressing. His future is a technological dream but a cultural wasteland. His is a world where war is avoided only through mutually assured destruction, including germ warfare[8], the world is divided into superpowers and subjugated colonies[9], and only commerce is really valued, with technology serving commerce and art serving no real purpose at all[10].

John Brunner's *Stand on Zanzibar* (1968) is set mostly in the United States, like *The Sheep Look Up* (1972) and many other science fiction works by European authors. Brunner mixes several plots based on his extrapolation of contemporary trends. Sometimes these extrapolations are startling, as when he shows the worst security concerns being random acts of violence, often at schools, and foreign terrorists, who manage to attack buildings within the United States. Brunner predicts a European union of nations improving their economic prospects and influence on world affairs.

This is not so remarkable, perhaps, as ideas for a "United States of Europe" date to at least 1693, when William Penn looked at the devastation of war in Europe and wrote of a "European dyet, or parliament" to prevent further war, and 1728, when Abbot Charles de Saint-Pierre proposed the creation of a European league of 18 sovereign states, with a common treasury, no borders and an economic union[11]; also, during his exile on St. Helena, Napoleon said, "Europe thus divided into nationalities freely formed and free internally, peace between States would have become easier: the United States of Europe would become a possibility."[12]

So in literature, perhaps, the future has been more a device to describe the present than to predict the future.

In closing, I would be remiss in omitting an interesting initiative by the European Commission, in which "Robert Billing, a software engineer with a taste for science fiction, speculates […] on how the world may change over the next decade [.… and at] the end of each story, readers can get an idea of current innovations supported by the European Union."[13]

As an example, in "Self-Drive Rent-a-Cow," a couple win a "green cooking" competition that requires them to use only ingredients they raise themselves in a backyard garden. Along the way they confront issues of food scarcity and food

safety in an overpopulated and polluted world. Afterwards, we learn about various EU initiatives such as CONfiiDENCE, a faster and cheaper way to detect food contamination, and SELFDOTT, which uses new aquaculture techniques to relieve pressure on wild Bluefin Tuna stocks.

Europe was the birthplace of modern science, the Industrial Revolution, and science fiction as we understand it today. It is comforting to know that not only is Europe still a leader in science fiction and the real science that inspires it, but that the European Commission recognized the value of science fiction as a means of educating the public about today's issues and current initiatives being taken to address them.

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9. "Give up our fairest province, Britain? Why not ask France generously to renounce possession of Africa, that magnificent colony the complete conquest of which cost her the labor of 800 years?" Ibid.
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In Search of New Identities

Russian Minority Literature in the Post-Soviet Baltic States

Taisija Laukkonen

Abstract

This paper discusses Russian Literature in the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) as a specific minority literature phenomenon, occurring in the post-Soviet cultural arena. Focusing on the issues of cultural identity, the author explores the intertwining forces that shape the Russian minority discourse in the Baltic States and the literary strategies of the two successful novelists, Lena Eltang from Lithuania, and Andrei Ivanov from Estonia, whose wide recognition in both Russia and their countries of residence marks a new period in the history of Baltic Russian literature. It is concluded that despite the similarities in their literary trajectories, Eltang and Ivanov embody two different ways of approaching the minority problematic and literature itself.

Keywords

Minority Literature, Russian Minority, Baltic States, Lena Eltang, Andrei Ivanov.

Introduction

Ethnic minority literature is a relatively new area of study in the post-Soviet Baltic States—Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. Several intertwining forces affect the condition of minority discourse in these countries. The first is the tendency towards ethnolinguistic nationalism, an inherent quality of the small nation that has long been oppressed by powerful neighbours. The second is the post-Soviet specifics of minority composition: Russians are the biggest minority in Latvia (26.2 %) and Estonia (24.8 %) and the second biggest minority in Lithuania (5.8 %) after Poles (6.6 %)[1]. When the Baltic States regained their independence in 1991, it was only Lithuania that granted citizenship to all the residents of the country. In Latvia and Estonia, where Russian minority was considered to be a real political force, the status of *non-citizen* was invented. Non-citizens of Latvia and Estonia share the same civic rights and obligations as regular citizens do, except the right to vote.[2]

The national politics of historical memory and the dominant political rhetoric construct the image of Russian nation as an aggressor in the past (and

also, considering the events of the year 2014, in the present), which results in widespread unfriendly stereotypes that are also applied to the Russian minority in these Baltic countries. It is important to note however that the unfriendly public minority discourse has little to do with the everyday interactions of the citizens and residents of different nationalities.

This kind of relation to the minorities is met with an opposite force, which is the multicultural policy of the European Union (all three countries joined the EU in 2004). It mostly affects the academic field and results in the appearance of studies on minority literature and culture (usually within the separate Russian, Polish, Jewish philology or cultural studies domains), seeking to incorporate minority history and culture into the mainstream national historical narrative. However, the work of the scholars does not have a long lasting impact on local cultural politics and public discourse. The situation is slightly different in Estonia. Speaking a language that belongs to the Finno-Ugric language family, Estonia shares Scandinavian identity and follows the example of Finland and Sweden in encouraging minority writers (initially through financial means) to enter the cultural dialogue. The annual literary prize awarded by the *Eesti Kulturkapital* fund for Russian writers from Estonia can be mentioned as an example here.

In the West, the establishment of minority writing studies has been accompanied by the critique of the Western canon in the light of liberal pluralism, as well as by the reconsideration of the notion of "nation"[3]. Minority voices have played an important role in claiming their right to enter the canon or to create an alternative one. The matter of language and the origin of minority groups are of great importance if we want to designate the difference between traditional minorities of the postcolonial West and the post-Soviet minorities of the Baltic States. In the case of the post-Soviet Russian minority, the transformation of a group from the status of linguistic and cultural dominance to one of a minority occurred without a change of residence, which means that they (mostly) did not lose their homes and social networks, but faced the sudden necessity to adjust to a new political, social and cultural reality. The second important peculiarity is related to the differences in the prestige of cultural traditions and the prevalence of language itself, which has a direct impact on minority literature issues. When we speak about minority literature in the postcolonial context, we usually mean a minor literature written in a major tongue. For the ethnic minorities

of the United States, Canada or France, writing in English or French does not only make it possible for them to address the audience of the host countries, but also to appeal to the world of democratic values itself. For Russians in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, however, to write in Latvian, Lithuanian, or Estonian would mean addressing their writing to a very thin and not multiculturally-oriented audience. That is why most of them choose to write in Russian.

The aim of this paper is to discuss Baltic Russian Literature as a specific minority literature phenomenon, occurring in the post-Soviet cultural arena from a comparative perspective. I will focus on the issues of the writers' cultural identity, linking them to the peculiarities of the structure of the post-Soviet literary field and the idea of transnational literature. The theoretical framework that I refer to includes the works of Pierre Bourdieu[4], Pascale Casanova[5], John Guillory[6], as well as Russian scholars, and investigates the structure of the post-Soviet field of cultural production (Boris Dubin[7], Mihail Berg[8], Marina Konstantinova[9] and others).

Russian Literature, or Literatures, in the Baltic States?

Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have shared a similar destiny throughout the 20th century. The rise of their national consciousness went hand in hand with the resistance to repeated attempts of Russification of the territories, while a part of the Russian Empire and later on, after a short interwar period of independence, within the context of the Soviet Union. Therefore, anti-Russianness can be considered constitutive of their identity formation. However, the Russian population has been present in these territories long enough to develop its own local identity, or, to be more precise, identities. The Russian minority population was not a homogeneous group and displayed a certain degree of diversity. Even those Russians who moved to the Baltic States during the Soviet period never shared a strong sense of community among themselves, belonging to very different professional and social strata. In contrast, other minority communities, like Poles, Jews or Karaites in Lithuania, are often more cohesive and active as a group and are thus more successful in politics and more visible in the cultural arena. As a result, Russians in the Baltic States are only constructed as a coherent minority group by local minority politics and social research. In Latvia and Estonia their solidarity might be stronger partly because of their

apparent mistreatment through the practice of non-citizen status. The same lack of solidarity can be witnessed in minority literature (many groups, but no shared minority identity). As far as the literary field is concerned, however, the other specific factors, like symbolic struggles between writers possessing different forms of capital, make them even less likely to reach consolidation and to act like a unified collective agent.

Despite all the historical and nation-building parallelisms and geographical proximity, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have very different geo-political identities. As mentioned earlier, Estonia maintains close ties with the Scandinavian countries. Lithuania is the only country to have a "great political past"—the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, a multicultural medieval state ruled by the Lithuanian Dukes. This period is included in the national historical narrative as the Golden Age of the nation and as an example of tolerance thereby preventing Lithuanians from perceiving themselves as a young nation, and in a way making them politically more ambitious than the other Baltic States. Despite the fact that Lithuanians and Latvians are the only nations to speak languages from the Baltic branch of the Indo-European language family, they do not share cultural affinity. Besides Russia, Lithuania's cultural history is intertwined with Belarus and Poland (the period of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) and is mainly Catholic, while Latvia has been significantly affected by Germans and Swedes and is primarily Lutheran.

If it is the case that neither the Baltic States nor the Baltic Russian minority share a common identity, to what extent is it possible to talk about Baltic Russian literature as an integral phenomenon? Or should we consider three different minority literatures? I would suggest that there are external factors that induce Baltic Russian writers to understand that they have a lot in common, and that they would benefit from combined efforts. Firstly, they are in the same symbolically less favorable intercultural situation than Russian minority writers in such European countries like France, Germany, and other countries of important world languages and rich literary traditions and larger cultural markets. Secondly, there are not enough of them in one country to create an independent literary infrastructure, so they have to search for associates elsewhere. There are different initiatives that try to unite Russian writers in the Baltic countries (like *Baltic Poets Guild* in Riga), but for the moment they are not very successful or long lasting. Most of the ambitious Russian authors from Latvia, Lithuania,

or Estonia aim at the Russian literary market and the wider Russian public, and to make that possible they need to achieve recognition in Russia and to be published by respectable publishing houses. Unfortunately, the problems of the Russian minority in the Baltic countries are not considered particularly relevant in Russia. As a result, professional writers often avoid bringing minority topics into discussion and even stress that they have nothing to do with the minority literature, which is considered to be provincial.

In what follows, I will show how minority issues are approched differently in the writings and literary strategies of the two most successful authors from the Baltic States—Lena Eltang (who was born in 1964 in St. Petersburg, and since 1989 lives in Vilnius, Lithuania) and Andrej Ivanov (who was born in 1971 in Tallinn, and lives in Tallinn, Estonia).

Russian Fowles *vs.* **Russian Kerouac**

Lena Eltang debuted as a poet and short story writer, but became famous after she published her first novel *Blueberry Shoot* in 2006. The novel appeared on the shortlists of two very different Russian awards: "National Bestseller" (which since 2001 selects the best Russian novel of the year and rewards the author with a monetary prize) and an independent "Andrei Biely Award" (established in 1978 by the group of unofficial writers with a symbolic prize, including 1 ruble, a bottle of vodka and an apple!) Since *Blueberry Shoot*, Lena Eltang has published three more novels with the big Moscow publishing houses: *The Stone Maples* (2008), *The Other Drums* (2011), *Cartagena* (2015). *The Stone Maples* won her the newly established, prestigious, and privately-funded NOS award, which aims at "identifying and supporting new trends" in contemporary Russian literature, while *The Other Drums* won the "Russian Prize" (for the authors of Russian diaspora) and appeared on the shortlist of "The Big Book" Russian national award, When Lena Eltang received her first major award in Russia, the Lithuanian public became interested in her writing and personality. However, since then, only one novel (*The Stone Maples*) was translated into Lithuanian.

The road to success was different for Andrej Ivanov. Ivanov made his debut in a Russian literary magazine in 2007 with the short story "My Danish Uncle". His first novel, *The Hanuman's Journey to Lolland,* was published in 2009 with the support of the *Eesti Kulturkapital* Fund, and received a literary award

in Estonia. The second edition of this novel appeared in 2011 in Moscow and was included on the shortlist of the "Russian Booker" prize. Later, Ivanov was nominated several times for the Russian award (with his novels *A Handful of Dust* and *Crisis)* and the NOS award for his first historical novel *Harbin Moths* (2013). *The Hanuman's Journey to Lolland* turned out to be the first title in the so-called "Scandinavian trilogy", later followed by the novels *Bizarre* (2012) and *The Sleepwalker's Confession* (2014). For Ivanov, it was the Estonian cultural industry that supported his debut and that continues to regularly award him the *Kulturkapital* prize for the best Russian book by an Estonian minority writer. All his novels are immediately translated, and published in Estonian.

These two examples demonstrate the significant difference in the status of minority literature in these two countries. Although there are obvious analogies in the literary trajectories of Eltang and Ivanov (both made late debuts, both won NOS awards, both are seen by Russian literary critics as developing marginal traditions in contemporary Russian prose and making the European "nowhere"[10] the action scene in their novels), their literary strategies are very different.

In her interviews Lena Eltang draws a clear distinction between herself and Russian minority literature in Lithuania. She often stresses that her novels have nothing to do with her life story and that she is not keeping in touch with other Russian writers from Lithuania and the Russian minority itself[11]. Although some of her characters have Lithuanian roots, the action in her novels takes place mostly in non-central Europe: Malta in *Blueberry Shoot*, Wales in *The Stone Maples*, Lisbon in *The Other Drums*, and the Italian coast in *Cartagena*. Eltang does not address post-Soviet Russian minority issues in her books or interviews. Indeed, she does not seem to be interested in discussing or portraying any social or political actualities. Her characters experience the sensual beauty of the world, the psychological complexity of human interactions, and the freedom of the imagination.

Most of Andrei Ivanov's novels are semi-biographical and the author never denies that. The narrator of his "Scandinavian trilogy" is a Russian man from Estonia, who hides his real name and country of origin in order to avoid deportation to his homeland where his life is in danger. He lives illegally in Denmark and Norway for several years, staying at different heterotopic places such as refugee camps, hippie communes, and later on, in jail, asylum, church, and other loca-

tions. The novels vividly and unsparingly portray illegal immigrants and refugees from the Third World and post-Soviet countries, the downside of the prosperous Danish society. However, the social critique or multicultural agenda is not an aim in itself for Ivanov. He seems to be more interested in revealing the existential emptiness and absurdity of any collective or collectively arranged individual aspirations directed towards the future—be it a particular form of the social order, a love relationship, or a self-fulfillment idea. Although sometimes the absurdity is so bold and irrational as to render it beautiful. One could say that in Ivanov's worldview, there is no hope, but there is beauty of people and of circumstances. In his other novels, the action often takes place in Estonia—the modern Estonia in *The Handful of Dust*[13] and the interwar period in *Harbin Moths*. The main character and narrator in these novels is a representative of the Russian minority. But again, despite the very insightful portrayal of a recognizable social reality, it is not the issues of historical or contemporary social injustice that are central here, but rather the individual search for meaningful existence in the given conditions.

For Ivanov and his *alter ego* characters, the writing process is an obsession, but also an existential necessity, a form of living and yearning for meaning. For Eltang the writing process is hard work, from early morning to late evening, yet also a game, a play, a dramatic experience, a possibility to reinvent the ambiguous world through one's imagination. Book annotations sometimes introduce Eltang as working in a tradition of intellectual crypto-detectives like those of Umberto Eco, and using refined language, which brings her close to John Fowles and Jorge Luis Borges. Ivanov, on the other hand, is compared to Vladimir Nabokov, Georgij (Gaito) Gazdanov, and Jack Kerouac. Moreover, both of them, curiously, lead some reviewers to mention the name of Fiodor Dostojevsky.

Conclusion

Eltang's and Ivanov's wide recognition in Russia marks a new era in Russian as well as Baltic Russian minority literature. The success of their first novels was largely garnered by the fact that their writing style was perceived as marginal to mainstream Russian prose (which is mostly either obsessed with reflecting on Russian political and social reality and lacks esthetic originality, or is extremely postmodern and seems a little outdated). Another novelty that they brought to the picture was European experience, which emerges on different levels of their prose.

Eltang and Ivanov embody two different ways of approaching the minority problematic—one is completely ignoring it, the second is making it one of the main themes. Most probably, their choices have a lot to do with where they were born and educated—Eltang in Russia, Ivanov in Estonia.

Whereas local literary institutions in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia are mainly interested in the participation of Russian minority literature in the cultural dialogue within the national discourse, Russian critics and prize juries prefer authors whose creative writing fits into a wider intercultural context, and only then, as in the case of Ivanov, are they ready to listen to a minority voice.

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Galicia in the Poetics of the Canadian Poet Erín Moure

Francisca González-Arias

Abstract

The Canadian poet Erín Moure devotes herself to both the creation of poetry and the practice of translation to explore how the local is impacted by the global. For Moure, an example of the local is Galicia, one of Spain's "historical nationalities", a stateless nation on the edge of the European continent, a community of diaspora, attuned to hybridity. Through Moure's ongoing dialogue with the Galician language, and with the Galician poet Chus Pato (both through translation and her own creative work), and her allusion as well to Ukraine and Eastern European communities, the poet-translator puts into practice her concept of citizenship as the local in necessary dialogue with the other. Moure's writings are enhanced by nature imagery and by her allusion to women's handiwork, employing the images of sewing and weaving to represent the interweaving of voices, both local and global, that she accomplishes in her work.

Keywords

Translation, Canada, Canadian Literature, Galicia, Galician literature, Portuguese Literature, Romanian Literature, Ukraine.

What draws me to the Canadian poet Erín Moure are two circumstances that she and I have in common: the practice of translation, and identification with Galicia, one of the "historical nationalities" of Spain recognized in the Spanish constitution of 1978. For Moure, translation is not simply a task aimed at a communicative goal, it is a process that is intimately bound to her poetics. Translating enables and requires the closest possible reading --reading with "incessant and unrelenting concentration"[1]. It is a practice that enriches one's own language. These aren't superficial words: Moure's stated objective is, through the introduction of a foreign literature, to "perturb the complacency of my language"[2].

Moure started to learn Galician in 2001 after a visit years before with her father to their ancestors' place of origin, drawn to the language's sonority, finding in it "... an ancestral cadence .... of being and thought and harmony with trees" [3].

Moure likes Galician because of its dialectical variants. This makes it an open language, full of possibilities. Moure not only translates from Galician, she gives Galician titles to her books of poetry: *O Cidadán* (2002), *O Cadoiro* (2007), *O Resplandor* (2010). She sprinkles her verses with Galician phrases, or composes entire poems in Galician, skillful at wordplay, as when writing about translation, here adopting the water imagery that proliferates in her poetry:

> "Always between two languages there is a river to cross. A river has *orelas* –banks- just as a body has *orellas* –ears. The river too is a body that listens. Made, like our body, of water. And between two languages as different as English and Galician .... there are *ríos* –rivers- or perhaps *rías* –wide inlets- or even a sea to traverse... Going from one language to another is not a simple passage. To translate, we have to touch this body, pass through the body. Through the orel(l)as (Moure, *Wager* 245).

Translation is connected to Moure's concept of citizenship, which is "a way of comporting oneself locally"; it is sited, "but not rooted in a particular territory" (*Wager* 164). Noting the example of Europe today, Moure observes that "Coming together does not necessarily entail loss of localized identity;" and that writers return "to notions of locality and the local" (*Wager* 183). A native of Alberta and now a resident of Montreal, Moure declares that for her the local is Galicia. Citizenship is movement: the local in dialogue with the other. Like the movement produced by translation: as it invites the other in, translation also signifies "the ability to enter –into the source language and culture-- from outside" (*Wager* 184).

Today the Internet permits local, minority cultures, to become known to more people beyond borders. Closed borders may lead to "fascisms, damages, exclusions" (*Wager* 169), warns Moure; a nation's being demands leaky borders. Leakages in borders, she adds, "is what makes entities (countries, persons, communities) possible... Leakages in languages, idioms, make languages possible" (*Wager* 263).

The Galician "O cidadán" accomplishes the double movement Moure refers to; it pulls a minority culture and language into English; and, looking a little like the English word, it also serves to point the reader to an other that is also familiar. It helps make English "strange" unto itself. We are reminded of Lawrence Venuti's strategy of "foreignization" intended to highlight the original

text's cultural particularities, as opposed to blurring or "domesticating" them[4]. A foreign word can upset the English reader's complacency and comfort level. Motivated by the same purpose, Moure has taken to using misspelled English words, beginning with the title of her 2012 collection, *The Unmemntioable*. But she adds, "to perturb can also be to love" (*Wager* 183).

Translation is not a simple transfer of meaning from one language to another; the poet-translator's role is to let the text speak through her own body and her surroundings, "a performative, gestural experience" (*Wager* 190). This was Moure's approach to her translation of *O Guardador de Rebanhos* by the Portuguese poet Fernando Pessoa, or rather his heteronym, Alberto Caeiro. When she was beginning to read the work in a bilingual edition, Moure was amazed to find that because she knew Galician, she could understand the Portuguese. Calling it an unexpected gift, she exclaims, "Felicity! To suddenly know a language!" (*Wager* 188). Moure constructed her own heteronymic identity as "Eirín," an old Galician version of her name. Not only as a way of expressing her attentiveness to the work, but also as a representation of her approach to translation, her inserting herself into the source text, which is also reflected in the subtitle "a trans*e*lation," inserting the 'e' of her first name between the first two syllables of the word. It's enlightening to observe the cover of Moure's translation, which reproduces an old postcard from Galicia depicting rural women at work. It's an acknowledgment of her debt to Galician, her direct entryway into Pessoa. And it's not by chance that women are depicted on the cover: it's a nod to the role of women in her poetry, and to Moure's own work as a poet.

O Cadoiro (waterfall) was written in response to the *cantigas de amigo* of medieval Galician-Portuguese poetry, expressions of "women's song" lamenting the absence of the lover. It was the sonority of the voices that caught the poet's ear. Moure describes her process, explaining that after translating a few poems, she wrote plaints of her own, "enacting, mixing, and echoing" (*Wager* 275). At the same time that she was studying the *Cancioneiros*, she was reading Jacques Derrida's *Mal d'Archive*, detecting in it a kind of longing, a *saudade*, "something of the Hebraic" (*Wager* 276) similar to that of the *cantigas*, and she incorporated that "Derridean lament into the texture of the paper" (*Wager* 277). In *The Unmemntioable* (2012), in addition to introducing foreign and misspelled words into her verses, she produced a three dimensional page in order to "disturb" and upend our conventional notion of a page in a book of poetry. The ball of yarn

on the cover previews the strategy adopted inside the book where passages from Derrida's text appear as if sewn into her poems, showing "*where writing itself scratches the lyric*, and where the thread of speech itself is palpable, illumined" (*Wager* 277). Moure makes visible this fusion of writing and the oral, of the exterior and the interior –Derrida's words flowing through her as she walked the streets of Lisbon where she came to study the *Cancioneiros*. The poet's labor is likened to women's work –the domestic task of sewing—accomplished by the weaving together of voices.

While in her translation Moure maintains Caeiro's tone and the semantic level and structure of the original, she is also dialoguing with Pessoa, as a Canadian woman of the twenty-first century, as a poet, and as a translator. Since this is a bilingual edition, Moure's visibility in the text –her gestural performance—can be observed at first glance. Each line of the original is translated into, or in her words, "provokes" an "Eirín" line, but sometimes that original line "provokes a further line," (*Wager* 185) –often because of the associations the sound of the Portuguese produce in her—so that the translation often has a few more lines than the original. Moure calls this process "translational exhorbitance" (*Wager* 199).

With this process she brought rural Portugal into twenty-first century Toronto. Instead of sheep, cats, because of her own cat; an ox-wagon –"um carro de bois"-- turns into "my neigbour's old car/Roaring pointlessly every morning on Winnett"[5]. Toronto's topography, rivers and creeks are inserted into the original's rural landscapes: the Tagus transformed into Toronto's Humber, as in this example contrasting the Portuguese version and Moure's translation:

O Tejo desce de Espanha
E o Tejo entra no mar em Portugal.
The Humber descends from up north
And the Humber enters Lake Ontario. (*Sheep's Vigil* 58-59)

Moure says that three things came of this experience: translation, gift, and water. Gift because she credits Pessoa with helping her to see Toronto, where she was living for a time as writer-in-residence, and to remember the city's creeks and ravines (water) that disappeared under asphalt with the building of Toronto's suburbs in the 1950's. Moure's translation of Caeiro's two lines:

Sentir a vida correr por mim como um rio por seu leito,
E lá flora um grande silencio como un deus que dorme. (*Sheep's Vigil* 120)

Produces four lines in the English:

I feel life course through me like Garrison Creek
under the road,
And far off, the silence so huge, like a god,
or a neighbour in a lawnchair after dusk, sleeping. (*Sheep's Vigil* 121)

By publishing *Sheep's Vigil by a Fervent Person* in Canada, Moure puts into practice her view that the introduction of foreign works into English is fundamental for the "survival of local idioms and culture" (*Wager* 197), actively promoting "the growth of a particularly Canadian English usage" (*Wager* 198): she is practicing citizenship as she defines it.

As a result of Moure's close reading of Pessoa, she created another heteronym that reappears in several books, and is first referred to in the subtitle *of Little Theatres: "Teatriños* "(with quotes from Elisa Sampedrín)" and again in the subtitle of *Expeditions of a Chimaera* (2009) "(with interferences by Elisa Sampedrín)." Moure's Sampedrín reaffirms the insertion of the translator into the work translated, suggesting in addition that this intervention triggers the creation of another work. The most extensive description of this alter ego appears in *The Unmemntioable*: Elisa Sampedrín is Galician not from Ukraine, but from Brigantium Flavium, the Latin name for Betanzos, Galicia, "who gets off the train to find Erin Moure burying the ashes of her mother ..."[6]. Both are in the same place at the same time. The absence of a detailed itinerary, and of specific place names –except for Bucharest's streets and the name of Moure's mother's native town—evokes that image of leaky borders, and corresponds to the erasure and shifting throughout history of Ukraine's places and people, where today, as Moure reflects, the past can best be recuperated through local connections.

When Elisa pilfers Erin's notes –writing defiantly "By taking her notebook I make myself responsible" (*The Unmemntioable* 57)—the grieving process is transferred and shared. In her most recent book Moure reveals Sampedrín's identity, and the need to keep her alive "in order to keep writing" after her mother's death (*Secession/Insecession*, 160). Elisa is the other whose gaze is necessary for the poet to exist, and represents the dialogue between languages and cultures that takes place through translation and the creative process.

"Translational exhorbitance" unfolds in *Chimaera*, co-written with Oana Avasilichioaei, a Canadian poet who translates from Romanian. Once again, close reading is the point of departure, provoked in this case by translations of the Romanian poet Nichita Stanescu. One section begins with the original Romanian poem "Spargere" (Broken), followed not by Oana's translation as one would expect, but by English and Galician versions by Sampedrín –who of course is Erín Moure—and then an English "translation" by Oana Avasilichioaei of the Galician. Since Avasilichioaei doesn't know Galician it can be read as a intuitive version inspired by the sound and look of the Galician words, just as the sound of the Portuguese provoked lines in Moure's translation of Pessoa. These "translations" are followed by a Galician version by Sampedrín, provoking two English versions by Oana, the second of which is called a "transleaping", then another "translation" to Galician by Elisa, followed by two more "trans-leaps" by Moure, and so forth[7]. The co-authors produce a choral creation, putting into practice the notion of poetic community. As Galician poet Chus Pato observed in a conversation with Moure: " I have never thought of the poet as an absolute and isolated individual", crediting Moure with demonstrating: "that the being of the poem, its core, is this communism, this community of poetry that is never fusion or communion but is an exposure to the limits" (Book Thug blog).

Since 2002 Moure has been engaged in an ongoing dialogue with Chus Pato, publishing so far translations of four of her books of poetry. One could say it was love at first sight –the orange cover of Pato's "M-Tala" (2000) calling out to Moure in a bookstore in Vigo, Galicia, as well as Chus Pato's "torrents of words, ... dense and winding texts, her jammed verb tenses... helter-skelter syntactical leaps, amid the forms of newspaper articles, dialogues, and theatres" (*Wager* 250). Moure calls it a life-changing moment, inspiring not only her translating, but impacting her own poetry as well.

Pato's syntactic and thematic daring is thrilling to Moure, who admires her "ignoring [of] rhythms, dissecting poetry itself, dissecting a country" (*Wager* 253). And Moure, who is sensitive to the speech aspect of poetry and of translation –the inspiration behind *Little Theatres/Teatriños*—is enthralled by the many women's voices that speak in Chus Pato's poetry. Pato offers "a wild and dense and particular sense of what Galicia is as a country" (*Wager* 254), provoking Moure's insight that Galicia, as a stateless nationality within the Spanish

state, offers a chance to rescue the local within the global: "Galicia is you, is me, trying to live in a locale under globalized capitalism, trying to pick up our fractured history, and NOT make it whole, ... but get it back, tear it away from the usurpers, and run with it " (*Wager* 254). For Moure –adhering to her concept of citizenship— Chus Pato's achievement is that through her poetry she keeps Galicia alive.

And by translating Chus Pato's poetry, Moure is aware of giving back to her home language its own voice, for Canadian English is "an English doubly colonized --by having been a British colony and by existing in the shadow of the USA" (*Wager* 255). Moure's translation of Chus Pato's collection *Secesión* (2009) shows how she has evolved beyond her "transelation" of Pessoa 12 years earlier. On the right, the literal or faithful translation of Pato's text, a combination of memoir and poetics, and on the left, Moure's own creation, an "echolation homage" (*Secession/Insecession* 6) echoing comparable events in the lives of both poets. They include visits to memory sites –Erín to the Krakow ghetto and the Plaszow concentration camp, and Chus to Auschwitz—and memories of family and beloved places, nature more prominent in Moure's evocation of rural Canada than in Pato's recollections of her youth in the provincial city of Ourense. The poetics of both are reflected in the title. *Secession* – a cut on the body—connects with the body discourse of feminist critics (Butler). In dialogue with Pato, Moure explains that *Insecession* is a book of her own, written in response to Chus's "to articulate the blade edge, gash and void of my own thinking and being" (Book Thug blog). The term "Secession" represents the divide between words and the things they signify. As Pato reflects: "being a poet means assuming the caesura, constituting oneself in secession, in the very impossibility that languages might link words and things" (*Secession/ Insecession* 119). Another meaning of secession is, conversely, the poet's insertion into the world, made possible by standing apart, to better apprehend the world, and to be alert to the sources of poetry. Pato adds, in Moure's translation: "A poet she listens to the cadence, the infinite voices of the world –freed and enslaved—... A poet he remembers the writings that preceded him, those to come, those not yet born" (*Secession/Insecession* 119). And Moure responds: "The I of a poet torques in translation, is a constructed I, a social spacing. To secede from this social spacing and speak a located body, corpuscles, the poet secedes from the I" (*Secession/Insecession* 122)". That is, she acknowledges the other and embraces community.

Erin Moure's identification with Galicia is rooted not just in her heritage and her discovery of a Galician poet who is a soul-mate, but in the fact that Galician culture itself embodies dialogue and transcends borders. Alvaro Cunqueiro, creator of Celtic magic realism, considered Galicia a hybrid nation. Galicians are united in their attachment to the land, and to a common imaginary grounded in a particular landscape and a Celtic heritage. Perched on the western-most edge of the European continent, Galicians were accustomed to the arrival of peoples from other lands even before pilgrims flocked to Compostela. And as emigrants –in massive waves spanning the nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries—they were engaged in the daily dynamics of co-existence with the other. Galicians know about flowing through borders, and are intimately acquainted with hybridity.

Moure's poetics are infused with the idea of women's work, with community, and with the *orellas*:

> POETRY [...] is a conversation, or a texture like a shawl and each one of us weaves our own particular corner, or the bit where we gently hold its edge, aware that others are pulling gently as well on the surface of the textile, contributing their own gesture to the whole. None of us are this whole, nor can any of us speak for this whole that is poetry, we can only bring our hands' work into the conversation, and raise not just our voice but our ears to it, to listen (*Secession/Insecession* 148).

Erín Moure's practice of translation testifies to her passion to bring another culture into one's local culture and language, and is interwoven with her belief that poetry must transcend borders, must recognize, dialogue with, and incorporate the other.

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Endnotes

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6. Erín Moure, *The Unmemntioable* (Toronto: Anansi Press, 2012), 14.
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Claire Of The Sea Light

Edwidge Danticat's Haunting Tale of Borders Tanscended and Shattered

Michèle Lemettais

Abstract

For those of us who love to devour literature to later on ponder on what we missed, Danticat's dense and seemingly simple novel is a gift as it is so easy to jump over the titles of chapters, trying to follow Claire's simple story. But, when the eponymous little girl vanishes from the narration as her story disappears in the past and fuses into that of other characters, one is left to wonder about the transcendence of time and space in a culture whose identity is made up of dislocations, migrations, diaspora and so many crossed and shattered borders. Danticat's latest novel is yet another beautiful and loving rendering of the Haitian ethos as the nation struggles to transcend the cycle of natural and human disasters that has been plaguing it for too long.

Keywords

Minority Culture, Language, Identity, Border Crossing .

Edwidge Danticat's novel *Claire of the Sea Light* is a shimmering tale of longing and losing, of loving and fearing, of myths and reality, of life and death. It is the tale of all wounded people, be they the original people of an island found and destroyed by those who conquered them, the people brought against their will to far away places and trying to regain some sort of freedom, the people immigrating looking for a better life on far flung shores, the people who came of their own free will, bringing with them a language and a culture emanating from Africa and Europe, the people whose identity is forever questioned, shattered, reconstructed, always multifaceted.

The novel is, at first glance, a simple enough story: a young girl, Claire Limyè Lanmè, Claire of the Sea Light, born on the sea shore of Ville Rose in Haiti, loses her mother at birth and her father, in the supreme act of love for his daughter, attempts year after year to have a local good and wealthy woman, Gaëlle Lavaud, adopt her. The tale is divided in two parts, but, in Danticat's typical clear and unassuming style, the writing takes on a vertiginous depth as more and more characters appear in the tightly woven narration and the reader slowly comprehends

that Claire's story is much broader than first assumed. Around the triad formed by Claire, her father Nozias and the shopkeeper Gaëlle, revolves a group of characters whose destinies are interwoven in the very fabric of life on Haitian soil, representing a deep, rich and complex Haitian identity.

Danticat, as a writer born in Haiti and living in the USA, is used to crossing borders, both geographical and cultural, and belongs to one of the numerous minority cultures that make up the multidimensional facets of the American culture. Her first novels were written in French, one of the two official languages of Haiti with Haitian Creole, as the French conquest and colonization of the island brought the Caribbean nation another culture made up of French language and literature, Danticat eventually switching to English when she moved to the United States. Her own multifaceted identity, fluidly navigating between countries, languages and cultures, illustrates a new notion of identity which the French philosopher Derrida opposes to the Western notion, that is to say an identity based on a stable belonging to a state by roots or blood, remarking that this notion is based on "a fallacy and an archaic concept, a primitive conceptual fantasy [...which] cannot be but more than ever obsolete in the *ontopology* that it supposes, [...] All stability in a place being a stabilization or a settlement, the spacing/the distance of a dis-placement/a move will have been necessary in order to create the movement."[1] Thus, according to Derrida, the Western notion of identity makes the very concept of identity ontologically enhancive as it is based on the illusion, the "fantasy," that our ontological value is linked to our "stable" belonging to a place, rejecting all thought of movement, of the process of dis-location which is, however, at the very origin of the human race.

The multiplicity of origins found on the Haitian part of the island defines an identity that is made of dis-location and movement, an identity achieved through the crossing of many borders, both literally and figuratively. The people encountered by the Europeans, the Taino Indians, who had migrated from South America and spoke the Arawakan language preserved in Haitian Creole, were followed by the Carib Indians. The French, who followed the Spaniards who had "discovered" the island of Hispaniola, exploited both its people and its land. Eventually, to work their sugar cane plantations, they brought thousands of people from Africa, with their cultures, their languages and their religions. After a slave revolt allowed the Haitians to claim their independence in 1804, more invasions followed by yet more Europeans and Americans, each time added yet again to the already rich Haitian culture.

It is obvious then that the characters surrounding and crisscrossing Claire's story, be they the very poor or the much better-off lower middle class, come from a long line of "border crossers" and have forged for themselves an identity which encompasses and mixes cultures, languages, religions, histories and stories through a temporal fluidity that marries the ancient ways to the modern ones. The narrative thread of the novel is in English, while the people's voices can be heard throughout in English, Creole and French, thus sparing them what Derrida termed the "first violence" inflicted to a people when a translation is required in order to be admitted into a new culture[2]. Danticat effortlessly introduces the other languages, which are fluidly translated into English as a simple repetition which can be taken as an affirmation, such as "Mèsi, thank you," or an explanation, as when Laurent asks his wife, Gaëlle, where she has been " 'Avec les grenouilles. Par le ruisseau. La douche solaire.' With the frogs, by the stream, when the sun shower began, had been a good enough explanation for him " (60), easing the reader through the people's words and feelings while giving them authenticity. The uneducated working class characters, such as the fisherman Nozias, Claire's father, and their immediate neighbors and their children, speak to each other in Creole, while the well-to-do, such as Gaëlle Lavaud, the owner of the town fabric shop, whose wealthy family came from "Sò Rose, […] the free colored woman, the wealthy affranchie, who'd founded the town after Pauline Bonaparte had left" (55), easily switch between the two languages, as the author notes while describing a conversation in the shop during a storm: "…a group of soaked passersby entered the shop's front gallery and stood, packed next to one another, in the space between the counter and the door. […] Suzanne Boncy, the octogenarian florist […] was the only one participating in the discussion in French rather than Creole." (52-3)

The discussion at the time had concerned the rain and the disappearance of the frogs from the island, two facts which triggered three radically different reactions within the multicultural population, bridging the old beliefs and myths coming from Africa, the Western culture coming through French literature and the new ecological awareness coming from modern science. Gaëlle's reaction to the frogs dying in such huge numbers is particularity interesting as it triggers in her an unconscious reversion to the beliefs of the Egyptians in whose mythology frogs were a symbol of life and fertility. Three years before the birth of Claire, Gaëlle had been expecting a child whom the doctors had said was doomed to an early death should she be born alive because of a cyst

growing in her chest, but Gaëlle had refused to abort the fetus. When she finally took notice of the frogs' death, she was 6 month pregnant and, at first, "They'd been dying so quietly that for each one that had expired, another had taken its place […] each one looking exactly the same and fooling her, among others, into thinking that a normal cycle was occurring, that young was replacing old, and life replacing death" (41), and she starts a ritual of collecting and burying them at the foot of a particular almond tree, "having convinced herself that the frogs needed her and she them" (43). Finally, growing more fearful for the health of her unborn daughter and hoping to save her, in a sudden urge, she swallows one of the dead baby frogs, rationalizing her unexpected and odd behavior by thinking that "two types of animals were now inside of her, in peril: her daughter, Rose, and now this frog. Let them fight it out and see who will win" (59), unconsciously giving credence to the power of life symbolized by the frog in Egyptian mythology.

The frogs, though, elicit a very different reaction from Louise George, who is equally intertwined in the struggle of life and death on the island, as a journalist and hostess of a radio program in Ville Rose and a writer. As such, she mirrors the author, writing "about the people in Ville Rose, tidbits she picked up from the gossip mill, or teledyòl, or what she'd gathered over the years from the interviews on her radio show." (124). Louise is intimately linked to Max Ardin, Sr., the owner and director of a school where the wealthier families of Ville Rose send their children and where Claire goes, thanks to the scholarship made in honor of her mother by the town mayor and undertaker, for whom her mother worked. Louise and Max had met while studying at the university and, back in Ville Rose after the opening of his school, Max had asked her "to tell or read her favorite stories to the children" (128). Her choice of works to read, fables by Jean de la Fontaine, is very familiar to anyone schooled in French, just as Luis Vaz de Camoès would be for children schooled in Portuguese or Shakespeare for children schooled in English. Louise, though, does not pick one of the most famous of the fables, such as *The Grasshopper and the Ant,* or *The Crow and the Fox*. Instead, she chooses *The Sun and the Frogs* and Danticat carefully gives the following original lines and continues with her own translation:

…Aussitôt on ouït d'une commune voix
Se plaindre de leur destinée
Les Citoyennes des Etangs.

…Abruptly, a cry
From all the frogs in the land
Who could no longer bear their fate.
What will we do if the Sun has children?
We can barely survive one Sun.
If half a dozen come
Then the sea will dry up, with all that is in it.
Farewell, marshes, swamplands: our kind has been destroyed…

The fact that Louise, or Danticat, does not give the moral of the fable, « For a poor untutored animal, The Frog, I think, reasons fairly well » is extremely telling. The choice of the work is not here a symbolic gesture, absolute governing power set against the oppressed masses or, in La Fontaine's time, the Dutch rebelling against Louis XIV, but very clearly enunciated by Louise herself: "Given that the town, like many coastal towns, no longer had any frogs — something that the French herpetologists had linked to the increased possibility of seismic activity and freak waves — and since the children were already familiar with their parents' or older siblings' accounts of the summer a decade ago when the frogs had disappeared, Louise thought it might be instructive to share the poem, one of her favorites, with them" (133). The reference to the French herpetologists brings us back to an earlier chapter of the novel, appropriately titled *The Frogs*, in which the French-speaking Suzanne Boncy had "pulled out a folded copy of the town's one-page weekly newspaper. She pointed to a story about the dead frogs and, for those who couldn't read, explained erpétologie, or the study of reptiles and amphibians, including frogs. The article in the paper had been written by a herpetologist who had come all the way from Paris to uncover the reasons for the frogs' dying. According to Madame Boncy, the herpetologist had stated that, given his studies of the condition of the frog carcasses and the dirt and water samples he'd taken of their environment, and given the climate and blistering temperatures in Ville Rose that summer, the frogs had probably died from a fungal disease caused by the hotter-than-usual weather" (54). French culture has provided the text, French scientific research may be providing an explanation in the French language, but the way forward, the decision to act or not to act, is in the hands of the Haitian people of today who must fully comprehend the situation in order to arrive at the solution.

If a whole chapter is given to the frogs and their disappearance, the author's concern for the fate of her country as a space suitable for life, human and otherwise, is dispersed throughout the novel. While describing "lapèch, fishing," she notes that "it was no longer like in the old days, when [Nozias] and his friends would put a net in the water for an hour or so, then pull it out full of big, mature fish. [Now] you had to do with what you got; even if you knew deep in your gut that it was wrong, for example, to keep baby conch shells or lobsters full of eggs, you had no choice but to do it. You could no longer afford to fish in season, to let the sea replenish itself […] even as the sea bed was disappearing" (9). The struggle for life transcends every aspect of the Haitian culture and the struggle for an environment able to support life is rendered more pressing with every storm. Laurent Lavaud, Gaëlle's husband, "often held meetings in the shop with the peasants who lived up- and down-river from them, warning them that the rivers were swelling in response to the lack of trees, the land erosion, the dying topsoil. 'What do you want us to do, Msye Lavaud?' they'd ask him in return. 'Help us find something to replace the wood we need for charcoal and we will stop." (52) As illustrated by the ever-increasing paucity of the fish catches and the disappearance of the forest, Haiti and its people are stuck in an endless cycle of a death for a life, in a time-transcending and recurring pattern.

The novel is written in the form of a "won," a ronde, circling around itself in a dance of life and death, the first chapter being titled *Claire of the Sea Light*, the last one *Claire de Lune*. The endless cycle, just like the dizzying circling dance in which Claire takes her friends on the beach to celebrate her birthday and to conjure up a shadow of her mother, is permeated with a menacing undertone as death circles each character, allowing a life to start or continue only when it has claimed another one. The repetition which had seemed a positive affirmation when used in the seamless translation from one language to another becomes a sinister vicious cycle allowing only for regression, the first chapter going backwards in time: "The morning Claire Limyè Lanmè Faustin turned seven" on page 3, then "The day Claire […] turned six" on page 4, followed by "The day Claire […] turned five" on page 10 and "The day Claire […] turned four" on page 14, finally stopping the falling back through time on "The day Claire Limyè Lanmè turned three" on page 16. This regression through time is not gratuitous as far as death is concerned. The day Claire turned seven, one of her father's closest and oldest friends was claimed by the sea. The day she turned 6, she realized that the sea was dying from over-fishing. On her 5th birthday, she

was aware that her mother's tomb is next to the Lavaud mausoleum and that a child has been buried there. On her 4th birthday, Gaëlle Lavaud's seven-year-old daughter, Rose, is killed in a crash. And the day she turned 3, she is returned to her father in Ville Rose, after spending her first 3 years with her mother's family as she is seen as a "revenan," a spirit or a "revenant", given that her mother died while giving birth to her and, according to tradition, the only way to keep her safe and alive is to take her away from the maternal death bed.

The temporal regression, which resembles a "danse macabre" punctuated by even more deaths — the murders of Rose's father and of Max' son's lover, accused of the murder and killed in a double act of revenge and shameful anger, along with two gang members, probably the guilty ones — finally comes to a breathless stop in the attempted suicide of the school director's son. Max Ardin, Jr., had crossed one border that could not be forgiven: he had fallen in love with his best friend, Bernard Dorien, upon whom Gaëlle's and her friends, Max Ardin, Sr.'s, vengeance had fallen. As Claire's story comes to an end, the ultimate border is shattered and death surrenders as Gaëlle breathes life back into Max Junior and Claire accepts to become her daughter.

Danticat's novel is a classical tale, but not, à la Jean de la Fontaine, with a sagacious moral at the end; rather it is a classical tragedy à la Racine, where time and being are transcended in a dance of love and betrayal, corruption and redemption, preservation and destruction, life and death. Max Ardin, the schoolteacher turned murderer of his son's lover, sums up the dilemma facing Haiti when he notes that…

> …there was something tragic about a generation whose hopes had been raised, then dashed over and over again. […] Their leaders and elders — including himself — had made them so many promises that they'd been, for whatever reason, unable to keep. Idealists had been killed to make room for gangsters. Life had become so cheap that you could give anyone a few dollars to snuff it out. When had they entered, he wondered, what Rimbaud, in his time, had called "le temps des assassins," the age of assassins? Maybe his generation was the problem. They'd built a society that was useless to their children." (187)

Obviously Danticat does not think so, as she brings forth all of her powerfully rich heritage to give us a multifaceted tale that, at the end, shimmers with a faint but tenacious ray of hope.

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Endnotes

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SECTION III
Education, Women's Studies, Sociology

NATURE & NURTURE

Chairs
—
Beatrice Puja & Gabriele Weinberger

Participants
—
Beatrice Puja
Gabriele Weinberger
Joana Ribeiro
Christos Pavlides

Presentation

Beatrice Puja & Gabriele Weinberger

In the Euro-centric occidental culture, woman's identity and her role in society have undergone considerable changes in the past 150 years. In a relatively short time span, women have come to be accepted as full-fledged human beings, endowed of human intelligence with the same merits as that of men, of spirit, will and drive comparable to that of men, with the same sexual interests, needs, desires and fears as that of men. So is it viewed at least in politically correct terms, regardless of contradictory undercurrents that nonetheless still run deep in our mores. These changes have substantially affected the world's perceptions and understanding of personal identity, gender and sexual orientation. Individual, social, political, linguistic, legal and religious dynamics have thus fundamentally shaken our idea of what is "normal".

As women have been allowed to fully participate in all realms of society, men have had to play by new rules and conform to new codes. Following women's lead, all those who had been diminished and exploited by the powerful of our all-conquering culture, have risen as well. No one accepts any longer to remain in the pigeon hole to which they have been assigned and in which they have been kept for so long.

And here we are now, not knowing what is normal and what is not. We are all afraid because we thought we knew what "nature" and "nurture" meant, as it all had been confirmed by sciences and technology: we were all convinced that we had developed the best "nurture" systems to empower men and women to become evolved human beings.

In the glaring light of today's globalized reality, we have to face our failure in ascertaining what a human being really is, beyond bankrupt, arbitrary, and dehumanizing binary systems. More than ever, Euro-traditional courage and purity of heart and mind are required to distill a revolutionary understanding of what human nature means. More than ever, European humanism is summoned to develop and implement how to "nurture" this being that we call human to full actualization.

In this workshop we discuss how to research what human nature is, and how to strive to discover a world of truth and understanding rather than a reality defined a priori by ephemeral constructs: While the presentation of the workshop's co-chair, Beatrice Puja provides a methodological frame and examination of gender using the example of females who denied their nature living as males, the presentation by Gabriele Weinberger, the workshop's \co-chair examines the life of a particular author, Etty Hillesum, and how her mentors played crucial nurturing roles which empowered her and counteracted her community's death sentence during WW II. Joana Ribeiro's presentation sheds light on the differences between the various allegorical female figures that represent the nature of European nations, Christos Pavlides' presentation grapples with the contributions of the feminist movements to achieve a measure of equality between men and women, or the degree to which progress has been achieved on this trajectory in recent history.

Nature, Nurture

Beatrice Puja

Abstract

In the Eurocentric occidental culture, woman's identity, and her role in society have undergone considerable changes in the past 150 years. In a relatively short time span, women have come to be accepted as full-fledged human beings, endowed with human intelligence with the same merits as that of men, of spirit, will and drive comparable to that of men, with the same sexual interests, needs, desires and fears. No longer is woman either virgin/mother, or "Satan's agent", subservient deceiver incarnated into the Greek Pandora or the Judeo-Christian Eve, as Jean Delumeau expresses in Le péché et la peur. La culpabilisation en Occident (XIIIe-XVIIIe siècles) (Sin and Fear. The Emergence of a Western Guilt Culture-13th-18th Centuries)[1]: such views are not deemed to be politically correct, regardless of contradictory undercurrents that nonetheless still run deep in our mores. These changes have substantially affected the world's perceptions and concept of personal identity, gender and sexual orientation in terms of individual, social, political, linguistic, legal and religious dynamics, thus shaking to the core our idea of what is "normal".

Keywords

Nature, Nurture, Humanity, Justice, Power, Language, Gender, Orientation, Woman, Homosexuality.

Introduction

World societies had felt secure within the confines of their alveoli, hermetically sealed from the inside, where arbitrarily established ideas produced credos of reality hedged in stone by science and religion, to which everyone conformed at the dramatic cost of their individual happiness and wellbeing. World War II trans-pierced all cultural membranes, and humans everywhere were left staring at each other in a universal impulse of hatred for the «other». The western world won and English, the language of the vanquisher, became universal, bringing along all its value systems, thoughts and customs, with great promises of Judeo-Christian justice and Greco-Roman democratic equality, all served with American apple-pie for dessert. Believers and disbelievers alike tried to adopt it all and adapt to its reality. By 1945, almost all the European countries that had not done so before, gave women the right to vote and to run for political appointments — although, in several European countries, the Romani people, European citizens, remained in prison camps for

almost two additional years after the end of the war because no one knew what to do with them[2]; homosexuals had to complete the sentences imposed upon them by the Nazis in their respective countries, and as criminals, never got compensation from the German government; Alan Turing, leading participant in the breaking of German ciphers during World War II, considered to be the father of theoretical computer science and artificial intelligence, was prosecuted for homosexuality and condemned in 1952 to chemical castration for it[3]; while most Nazi henchmen got to die in their beds, in peace and with their pensions[4].

Nature and Sexual Normalcy

Yet, women are now allowed, at least officially, to fully participate in all realms of society, and men seem to have to play by new rules and conform to new codes. Stimulated by women's example, all those who had previously been diminished, disrespected, segregated, stigmatized, marginalized, and cast away by the powerful of our all-conquering culture, have now a chance to rise and have new opportunities as well. No one accepts to remain in the pigeon hole to which they had previously been irrevocably assigned. However, we have lost our bench marks, and we no longer know what is normal and what is weird, what is desirable and what is loathsome, what is good and what is perverted. We are all afraid because we thought we knew what "nature" and "nurture" meant. Sciences, technology, and religions, all confirmed our belief systems, as Michel Foucault so ably demonstrates in the first volume of his *Histoire de la Sexualité* (History of Sexuality), *Le Désir de Savoir* (The Will to Knowledge)[5]. We were all so sure that we knew what human nature was, universally: we were all so convinced that we had developed the best "nurture" systems to empower men and women to become evolved human beings. As we now discover all the "cultural others", every bit as human as we are, every bit as sophisticated thinkers as we are, every bit as creative, sensitive and opportunistic as we are, craving as much knowledge and power as we do, we are brought to contemplate our boundless ignorance of what a human being is by nature, beyond our binary dehumanizing systems, that cannot but fail in the glaring light of our globalized reality. Thus, we are back to the drawing board with all those fundamental questions that plagued us since our Mediterranean antiquity, and that we thought we had so tidily answered, codified into cohesive theories, perfected into a firm, albeit rigid, modern "value-system" that justified forever our entitlement to power over others.

Social Codes and Language

What is a man? What is a woman? What is masculinity, virility? What is femininity? What is charm, attractiveness, charisma? What is normal? What is perverted? What is admirable, and what do we want our children to grow up to be? How are we to speak to them, that they may be the architects of the idyllic world we want for them? What language are we to use? Language, that unavoidable code all communities need in order to communicate, is at the same time what betrays so much of what and who we are. Language is the first paradigm used by any given community to communicate internally: whereas linguists believe that human thought is universal, each group of people organized in a culture, articulates with sounds and mannerisms, the secret code of their communication. While Romance languages have such a shortage of words compared to English, generally preferring to encode meaning into grammatical structures, they still all have two words for the English word "l*anguage*". The first word is feminine, the English equivalent to "tongue", the organ, (in French for example, it is "*langue*") and represents all the articulated sounds, infused with meaning, employed by a given community: English, French, etc. The second one is a masculine word, closer in consonance to the English word "*language*" (in French, "*langage*"): it refers to all the gestures of a given community to communicate wordlessly; it includes the way we walk, smile, dress, eat, approach others and relate to them, etc.[6] The first, being feminine is more abstract, pertains more to the world of ideas and feelings, while the second being masculine is more concrete, more visible, more an instrument of power. On the other hand, if in English we only have one word for both, it is perhaps because the two are so intertwined in the expression of a people that to separate them into two different concepts does not seem to make pragmatic sense.

Accoutrements of Power

The question that needs to be asked then is: "Are there any universal elements of l*angage*?" French philosopher Hélène Soumet has just published a book entitled *Les Travesties de l'Histoire* (*The Women-cross-dressers of History*)[7], in which she has researched women who from Greek antiquity to the present, from Europe to Russia and China, dressed as men to fully actualize their humanity, to fulfill their vocations and aspirations as human beings, and who risked uni-

versally to be executed in so doing. All over the world, women adopted a masculine identity to escape the discrimination imposed upon them everywhere on account of their gender. They were often encouraged by their fathers rather than their mothers to do so, and many of them succeeded with the complicity of men. Their level of achievement could then exceed that of most men, and while many were eventually found out, it is impossible to know how many of them carried their secret to the grave. Besides the well-known pirates, Mary Read (1691-1721) and Anne Bonny (1702-1782), and the unbelievable story of Dorothy Lucille (1914-1989) who lived as Billy Tipton in the world of jazz, there are the daring tales of Mulan (circa 610 CE), general of the Imperial Chinese Army, Martha Canary (Calamity Jane: 1852-1903) in the Far West, and Isabelle Eberhardt (1877 to 1904) in North Africa.

Two stories are particularly surprising for their content as well as their outcome.

First is the story of Dr. James Miranda Barry (1789-1799 to 1865). Born Margaret Ann Bulkley, she became James Barry, military surgeon in the British Army, and rose to the rank of Inspector General in charge of military hospitals, after having graduated from the Edinburgh University Medical School, already as a man. Only upon her death in 1865, at the approximate age of 70, was her identity discovered, and did her body bear witness that she had been pregnant and had had a child. She was however buried with full rank and military honors as James Barry, and her file was kept secret until 1951. Major D.R. McKinnon, Barry's attending physician who issued her death certificate in which she was identified as a man, justified his declaration in a letter addressed to George Graham of the General Register Office by stating that:

"My own impression was that Dr. Barry was a hermaphrodite. But whether Dr. Barry was a male, female, or hermaphrodite I do not know, nor had I any purpose in making the discovery as I could positively swear to the identity of the body as being that of a person whom I had been acquainted with as Inspector-General of Hospitals for a period of years".

The second is that of Nadezhda Andreyevna Durova (1783- 1866), also known as Alexander Durov, Alexander Sokolov and Alexander Andreevich Alexandrov, who became a decorated soldier in the Russian cavalry during the Napoleonic wars, was the first known female officer in the Russian military, and wrote her memoir, *The Cavalry Maiden*, a significant document of its era

since few junior officers of the Napoleonic wars published their experiences, and because it is one of the earliest autobiographies written in the Russian language. Upon hearing accounts of an amazon of extraordinary courage, Tsar Alexander I summoned her to St. Petersburg, awarded her the Cross of St. George, the rank of lieutenant in a hussar unit, and the pseudonym of Alexandrov after his own name.

These two stories are particularly interesting because both speak of military careers of distinction, the difference being that Durova was honored even after her identity as a woman was revealed, while for most women, cross-dressing was severely punished in all societies, the interdiction against cross-dressing being explicitly stated in Deuteronomy, and in all monotheistic religions codes of law.

Natural or Cultural Paradigms:

Why such a universal rage and fear shown to women who adopted a male identity? Dress being an element of "l*angage*", it reveals in all cultures the status of the individual who wears it; male dress constitutes the accoutrements of power, hence, a woman in man's clothing, becomes a dangerous usurper, the one who most profoundly challenges societal order. If then this woman in man clothing excels, beyond the recognized "natural" inferiority of her gender, to an even higher level than most of her male counterparts, then she is either dangerous or monstrous: dangerous, if her accomplishments prove the commonly-held belief of women's inferiority to be fallacious; monstrous, if she is the freaky exception that confirms the rule, the rule of law. If furthermore, the cross-dresser, having publicly relinquished her female identity, privately has a male lover, which implies that there are men who sexually find them desirable beyond traditionally imposed images of femininity, then all gender markers are called into question, and the definitions of the masculine and the feminine, as well as the dynamics of attraction between man and woman, are fundamentally challenged. This attack upon the norm magnifies the fears that since antiquity, plagued men holding high positions of power, who worried that women would seek vengeance for the inferiority of the condition in which they were held, and would rebel against the order men had so methodically established .

Hélène Soumet explains that these women all cross-dressed to pursue their dreams, or to escape forced marriages: for all of them, it was a fight against

the stigma and the shackles of their gender. None did it because of sexual orientation, regardless of what their orientation might have been. For men who cross-dress, it is exactly the opposite: dressing as a woman implies a degeneration, a relinquishing of power, since women hold an underprivileged position in society. Thus, men who cross-dress most often do so to act out sexual fantasies. Soumet further invites us to reflect on the fact that if in the western world women can now reach positions beyond the glass ceiling in form fitting "feminine" dresses and high heels, they nonetheless still adhere to traditional "masculine" behaviors and thinking patterns in order to succeed in their quest for power: by maintaining other aspects of masculine "*langage*", their presence in high spheres of power does not threaten nor alter nor challenge in any way the established mores of that environment or its all reigning inhumanity.

Nature and Justice

Indeed, society does not take kindly the attacks against the paradigms that have been established as reality, as "nature", for all that they might have been arbitrarily defined and ruthlessly imposed. This is illustrated in more recent times even in our democratic Western world. In France, for example, homosexuality, criminalized only for a time during the XVIIth century, had then been tolerated, although derided, until 1942, when Petain's regime criminalized it again. But after the war, the law was not changed back and only in 1981 did two jurists and politicians, Robert Badinter, a heterosexual man, and Gisèle Halimi, a heterosexual woman, fight and succeed in abolishing it[8]. Homosexuals were once again tolerated and derided: no gay bashing in France, only continuous emotional battery. It is only in May 2013, upon Christiane Taubira›s success in seeing through the «Marriage pour tous» Law[9] ("gay marriage» as it is called in the Anglo-Saxon world), further normalizing the social status of homosexuals, that an epidemic of gay[10] bashing reared its ugly head in the streets of Paris. And while no one would claim that the perpetrators of such acts were evolved members of society, conservatives still purport that this law constitutes an aberration, a danger to morality as well as to well-established scientific definitions of normality. It is worth mentioning that Christiane Taubira, minister of justice in France since the beginning of Francois Holland›s presidency, is also the architect of the Taubira Law (2001)[11] whereby France acknowledged having benefited from slave trade and slave owning for centuries, and established

a memorial date to celebrate the abolition of slavery. Consequently, being from the French department of Guyana, she was the object of vicious demonstrations of racism during her struggle to legalize gay marriage.

Main stream positions, established over the course of centuries, exclusively in order to maintain stayed power structures, stemmed from Athenians philosophical and political views dating from 500 years BCE. Such arbitrary positions have come to be accepted as «nature». Frighteningly, the same beliefs and structures have been a universal reality, even where the Greeks were unknown: in fact, where democracy did not exist, these views are upheld more fervently yet, locked in political theories of theocracy, where ideas and emotions are even more muddled.

Conclusion

Nonetheless, we undoubtedly live in exciting times when so much work has to be done to impugn these "comforting" concepts founded upon the denial of universal human dignity and of individual potential. Constructs favoring the exploitation of the greater majority of humanity clearly no longer work as is exemplified by the flaring up of violence all over the planet: the disadvantaged, be on the grounds of gender, race, creed, or socioeconomic definitions, rebel against the yoke of the principles that have governed us all, now so obviously obsolete. Since the political, economic, legal, and social constructs governing the world today are the fruit of western thinking, it is incumbent upon that very thinking to delve into its depths and redefine human identity, to reinvent what human nature is in more edifying terms. More than ever are Euro-traditional courage and purity of heart required to distill a revolutionary understanding of what human nature means, and to develop and implement how to nurture the Homo sapiens primate into full human realization. Whether we listen to Erasmus when he says "One is not born a man, one becomes one", or to Simone de Beauvoir when she emulates him by saying "One is not born a woman, one becomes it", we have to come to realize that Rousseau's "*bon sauvage*" theory may be but an illusion, and that humanity needs to be nurtured in order to actualize. If we have found it easier in the past to split reality in half, and opposed these halves making one good and the other bad, one male and the other female, one white and the other not white, one wealthy and the other poor, we

have to admit that there is nothing nurturing about this paradigm, and nothing ennobling about such view of humanity. Furthermore, it does not work. Don't we want our children, regardless of their gender and sexual orientation to grow up to be evolved, respectful, honorable, brave, responsible and altruistic human beings? Don't we want for them to be empowered to contribute to the happiness of others in peace? Are we incapable as western thinkers to evolve into the universal realm of humanists, and renaissance persons? Is it that frightening to think, talk and behave as civilized beings? Is it impossible to democratize courage, creativity and honor, and instill these virtues in the heart of humanity? Is it truly that difficult to overcome the illusion, get out of the cave, and reinvent Aristophanes' round man[12]?

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Etty Hillesum

Nature vs. Nurture

Gabriele Weinberger

Abstract

The young Dutch Jewish woman Etty Hillesum, who lived in Amsterdam during the Nazi occupation of the Netherlands, was a prolific writer. She left a large body of diaries and letters which have been researched by scholars since their first publication in the 1980s and in a 2014 complete bilingual edition. The 29 year old student of philosophy and Russian literature worked as a tutor and translator as well as the secretary to the psycho-chirologist Julius Spier, whose patient, student and colleague she became.

Her thinking is steeped in Spinoza's philosophy and her eloquent writings delve deeply into not only matters of the diaspora and contemporary life during the Holocaust, but establish a theology of survival in a tension between the individual and the community.

Keywords

Nature, Nurture, Amsterdam, Deventer, Spinoza, Julius Spier, Chirology, diaries, Jewish Community, Camp Westerbork.

Introduction

Those not familiar with Etty Hillesum's writing might, unknowingly, have stood in front of her large scale photo at the Information Center of the Topography of Terror historic site in Berlin, Germany. Her story is archived in this repository of Holocaust History. Not only is her image of a young sophisticated intellectual striking; so are her prose and her thinking. Anyone who has studied Holocaust memoirs and narratives of Jewish fates after 1933 knows that they are as varied as human fates in general. Among them, Etty Hillesum's 1500 diary entries and letters, authored between 1941 and 1943, are most distinctive. They reflect the gifted student of philosophy, aspiring writer and future leader of her generation. They show the depth of her understanding of both the shared fate of Dutch Jewry and of European politics.

Etty's Youth: Science and Pseudoscience

Etty was born in 1914, at a time when scientific research was undertaken at a feverish pace in the name of nationalisms. Many sciences were in their infancy and others were starting to metastasize into crazy science; pseudoscience such as Otto Weininger's *Sex and Character* [1] was abundant and secret societies flourished, their attraction to the masses being largely fear-based. At this time, prior to the Geneva Convention, when the majority of humans (non-Caucasians, non-Europeans) were considered racially inferior and completely expandable, the biggest target was being painted on Etty's ethnicity by the time she finished secondary education in her little hometown of Deventer, Holland. This only elevated the common anti-Semitic beliefs that many had long been holding, and not just in Germany, but around the world, to scientific knowledge and official dogma. A large number of people eagerly bought into any scientists' theories from the foremost science nation: Germany (and in many cases competed with them along the same lines). The discourse of this period in the long shadow of Darwin's insights clearly favored 'nature' denying that any non-member of the ruling society could by any means be made equal, or even vaguely be worth improving through nurturing. In other words, in this era 'nurture' was relegated to a very important, but very restrictive role within the immense power of authority and the formation of the masses as Elias Canetti so eloquently discussed in *Crowds and Power*.[2]

Esther (Etty) was the first of three children of the classics teacher, Louis Hillesum, and his Russian born wife Riva, whose relatives emigrated to the USA a year after the two married.[3] Etty's birth in 1914 was followed by two boys who both, as adults, suffered from mental illness. The older, Jaap, became a doctor, while the younger Mischa was a musical prodigy who was incapacitated by the onset of schizophrenia at age 19 and extremely mentally unstable after that.

University Studies

After secondary school Etty followed in her two brilliant brothers' path to Amsterdam where she studied law. After the completion of her bachelor's exams in 1935, she moved to the house of a Gentile widower Hendrik J. Wegerif, (Han in her diaries) where Jaap had previously lived as a medical student. The house was also shared by Wegerif's son Hans, Kaethe Fransen, the Christian

housekeeper and Bernard Meylink, a chemistry student.[4] Living in a Christian household, she became Han Wegerif's lover. In 1939 Etty took her Master's exams in Dutch Law. She subsequently decided to become a writer and turned her attention entirely to the study of philosophy and Slavic literature at the University of Amsterdam. In this period she supported that goal (following now more closely in her parents' footsteps) with the teaching of Latin and by becoming a teacher and private tutor of Russian, until her deportation to Camp Westerbork. When she was deported to Auschwitz-Birkenau, she took a bible and a Russian dictionary with her in her backpack.[5]

A brief outline of early childhood formative aspects demonstrates the link between nature and nurture in her biography. Although Etty was not a top student like her brothers, she was a deep thinker and studiously pursued knowledge for the sake of her personal growth. Part of why she thrived on the unfamiliar and on exploring the unknown is her earliest childhood experience, being moved to five different towns in very different regions of the Netherlands as her family relocated with every one of her father's assignments to different schools. In contrast to the Eastern European Jewish shtetl that provided a segregated religious and cultural environment, the very small towns of the early 20th century Netherlands did not have sizeable Jewish orthodox communities. Where her father took positions at secondary schools the family intermingled with Gentiles, so different cultural strata were part of Etty's life from the very start. She is freely conversant in four languages and in her writing often draws on more. Her broad cultural and intellectual background is reflected in her thinking and in her range of humanity. In a very large number of the diary entries, Etty implores the God in her, feels God in her nature and seeks authenticity in her prayers. While Christian scholars have embraced her for this reason, the origin of her beliefs is really deeply steeped in Jewish mysticism.

In her work, Thalia Gur Klein expertly explains 'tas' and 'tikum', the book of Zohah (light) and feminine communitas, that God is in people, only present through people and that this is the reason, why Etty does not hate, not out of belief in Christian love, as many want to believe. I concur with Klein that the God to whom she talks so frequently in her diaries is not Christian. She speaks of "the hidden face of God" which comes from the belief in Judaism that seeing God is problematic, since our capacity to describe God is limited and as God hides his face when humans behave atrociously.

The Influence of Spinoza

Besides Jewish mysticism, the most influential source of her beliefs is the Dutch 17th century philosopher Benedictus Spinoza. Etty Hillesum's ideas are largely formed through Spinoza's lens (especially her understanding of the divine), and in him Christian and Jewish influences do converge, as Spinoza's parents were the descendants of Portuguese 'conversos', or 'marranos'. These were Jews who were compelled to adopt the Christian faith on pain of death, and although compliant with Christian values, and observant of Christian rituals,' many 'conversos' continued to practice their Jewish faith in secret, in fact leading a double life. On that point Moira Gatens says that "The idea that Spinoza led a "double-life," and wrote in a "dual language," that only the initiated could understand, is not without merit" and she quotes Yirmiyahu Yovel specifically on this[6]). As Gatens reminds us,

Spinoza's repeated assertion that he did not want his writings to be read (and misconstrued) by 'the common people' or "those whose judgment was blinkered by religious dogma" does not amount to deceit, but [of course was] mere prudence or cautiousness in a time when questioning religious authority was easily lethal, even in Amsterdam. […] The charge of duplicity does not sit well with the fact that Spinoza was formally ostracized from the Jewish community in 1656, when he was only 24 years old, with the pronouncement of a particularly harsh *cherem* for his "monstrous deeds' and "abominable heresies".[7]

However, Steven Nadler rebuts the common myth of his isolation: the ban was binding on practicing Jews only, and Spinoza enjoyed rich friendships and lively exchanges with a group of "free-thinkers' and religious dissenters.[8] You can see here the parallel to Etty's life. Through her own experiences, Etty could closely identify with the situation of the marranos, as she was barred from much of the public and had to seek ways to enrich her life within the ever more narrow constraints put on it. With some of her contemporaries she raised suspicion both as a Jew and as "the Russian" as she was called in some circles.

Spinoza's definition of Substance (God or Nature) is most impactful on her thinking. Spinoza, in contrast to Descartes, conceives of God as the imminent cause of all that exists, rather than relegating God to a transcendent power which is separate from that which he creates. Etty's immense strength derives from this knowledge that God is in her, is her life force, is her love and all that

she can be in all her actions. Gatens explains very succinctly Spinoza's epistemology: "According to Spinoza, we cannot know what we are – our limits, our powers, or our "good", unless we have an understanding of the whole of which we are merely a part. This is why his major work, the *Ethics,* begins with defining and explicating Substance (God or Nature)." Etty's goal in life is indeed (in Spinoza's words) to escape from "the sanctuary of ignorance" (E, I, Appen), the force which drives her studies.

In Spinoza's view, God is Nature, including human nature and the scholar Genvieve Lloyd draws out an important implication of this view: "The divine attributes cease to be properties of a transcendent god and become instead ways in which reality is construed, articulated, or expressed."[9] Rather than a divinizing of God, Spinoza is "naturalizing". This interpretation is consistent with Spinoza's assertion that we "acquire a greater and more perfect knowledge of God as we gain more knowledge of natural phenomena." (TTP, IV, 50) – Spinoza made a living not on his writings but by applying his studies of the scientific knowledge of the time in the practice of grinding lenses.

The most crucial aspect of his philosophy that determined largely Etty's fate, or more precisely, the degree to which she controlled her fate lies in Spinoza's definition of freedom. His rejection of free will does not entail the denial of freedom. He defines freedom as self-caused activity. In Spinoza's epistemology "The distinct freedom, or power, of human beings lies in our capacity to form adequate ideas and enhance our understanding of nature: (as he states in book IV of *Ethics* "I call him free who is led by reason alone" (E, IV, Prop 68, Dem). Freedom, put differently, is not the capacity to will whatever I desire but rather the ability to understand the causes that determine all things, including my desires. It is through Spinoza's second kind of knowledge: reason, that reality can be adequately understood. Along with the third kind of knowledge, intuition, Spinoza's account of how we come to be reasonable is both developmental and dynamic." [10] Study, in this most profound aspect of Judaism, is what elevates the human being to the level of evolved being.

Crucial to understanding the effect on Etty Hillesum is the fact that reason and intuition cannot be taken purely in cognitive terms, but imply bodily activity under the attribute of extension, the third kind of knowledge in Spinoza's epistemology.

In Yovel's words, for Spinoza "knowledge is more a mode of being than of having, not something we possess but something we are or become."[11] And that is what Etty does. She becomes the knowledge of her time, because she is so vastly connected that she does understand the grand scheme of the Holocaust as it is happening. In that she is truly the exception. She is able to process bits of knowledge to understand the complete picture, and yet does not resign herself.

Yovel's quote above is reflected in Etty's writing as her knowledge is what she becomes. It is what made Etty the woman who puts herself in a very conflicted position of service to her community, working for the Jewish Council at Camp Westerbork and it is in her decision to follow along with her brother Mischa to remain with their parents.

Of particular relevance to Etty's young, connected and sexually active life was what Spinoza provides in Part III and IV of the *Ethics :* an analysis of the origins of the human affects, or emotions, and what we can do to transform our passive and debilitating feelings into those actively affirmed emotions that characterize a life of understanding and harmonious sociability."[12] Her frank remarks about her as a lover and the emotional pull towards some people can again be traced back to Spinoza, whose ethical vision does not encourage the renunciation, or repression, of pleasure. On the contrary, he says: "Nothing forbids our pleasure except a savage and sad superstition"[13] and "no deity, nor anyone else, unless he is envious, takes pleasure in my lack of power." The wise person is not a dour person but rather will enjoy his or her pleasures, whatever they may be, so long as these pleasures do not cause "injury to another" (E, IV, Prop 45, Cor 2).[14] In Gille Deleuze's words: "The *Ethics* is necessarily an ethics of joy: only joy is worthwhile, joy remains, bringing us near to action, and to the bliss of action. The sad passions always amount to impotence."[15] So, 'the *Ethics* presents a set of arguments that endeavors to correct the mistaken theological link between piety and virtue, on the one hand, and feelings of sadness on the other. It is "common notions" that provide the hinge to connect the joyful passions of the imagination with adequate knowledge and reason. Common notions arise when one body encounters another with which it is compatible and so experiences joy."[16]

Thus we see that a number of dichotomies that have dominated Western philosophy get dissolved by Spinoza: he does not oppose mind to body, reason to emotion, or freedom to necessity. Rather, his fundamental contrast

is between passivity and activity, and it is our position on the passivity-activity spectrum that will determine the shape of our ethical lives." Thus freedom is far from opposed to necessity, but is the very condition of our liberty. "Freedom does not remove the necessity of action, but imposes it" (TP, II, 42).[17] And in this lies one of the keys to understanding Etty's life.

Nature & Nurture: Julius Spier & Chirology

So the first part of my argument here is that Spinoza's philosophy largely accounts for Etty's nature, her inherent self through which she receives the impact of the social and political events around her. In the final part of my argument I now turn to Julius Spier's strong nurturing influence on her as a healer and as her lover.

In 1941, earning her living through tutoring while aspiring to become a writer, Etty Hillesum was a 27 year old Jewish university student who was keenly aware of her family's history of mental illness. In this phase of her life she is suffering clinical depression and fears that her genetic heritage will catch up with her and manifest in a manner that will require treatment and incapacitate her, like her two brothers.

One day Bernard Meylink, by invitation of his fiancé's sister who was a student of the prominent Berlin psycho-chirologist Julius Spier[18], takes Etty along, as a hand model, to the apartment where he practices since 1939 in Amsterdam.

In that one session with Spier, Etty's distinctive hands catch the analyst's attention and she is mesmerized by him. In her second diary entry she writes of him "First impression: a face that was not sensual, un-Dutch, […] not altogether sympathetic. Second impression: intelligent, incredibly wise, […] I was awed by his skill, his ability to read my deepest conflicts from my second face: my hands."[19] She decides to go into therapy with him. Over the course of a short time, she also became his student. She learned the technique herself and drew others to Spier, as well as becoming the center of a chirology circle and his secretary. And he ends up becoming one of her lovers.

What made her react so strongly to this 54 year old divorced man? Initially, it was her wish to understand more in-depth her true nature. Trained by C.G.

Jung in Zurich, Julius Spier was one of the most respected, best known chirologists at the time and had a thriving practice in Berlin. However, as life deteriorated for Jews in Hitler Germany, his fiancé Herta Levi emigrated to London in 1937/38 and he moved his practice to Amsterdam in 1939. For Etty he opens up access to a recently developed scientific method that helps her understand her predispositions and her potential when she has learned to see her genetic inheritance as entirely a liability, an inescapable morass that dooms her.

Chirology (hand analysis) is a form of analysis which was a popular form of mental health research, study and practice in the 1930s. In contrast to its current popular form of palm reading, it consists of an elaborate system of analytic criteria which include the shape of the hands and differentials between left and right hand, as well as colorization, temperature, energy, etc. Julius Spier's book "The Hands of Children" is, to this day, a classic text book in the field. It turned out to become the only publication to document his life's work. He had intended to follow it with "The Hands of Adults" and "The Hands of the Mentally Diseased", but his sudden death in September 1942 prevented him from finishing those. It was Etty whose job it became to transcribe his notes. The book was published in London in 1944 by his wife Herta Levi and republished in 1999 by her in an updated version with an appendix that shows the hands of mentally ill children and adults from his collection.

Spier's therapeutic approach to his patients was comprehensive and what, today, we would call holistic: Etty's depression required healing of her body and her spirit. To that end, he tests his patient's strength and engages with her in wrestling matches. As part of the therapy he prompts her to start a diary. Owing to this we have today most of her 1500 diary entries from March 8, 1941 to October 13, 1942 and her letters from Camp Westerbork and up to her deportation to Auschwitz in September 1943, where (according to Red Cross records) she died at the end of November of that year.

Conclusion

Etty's diary writing practice, however, dovetailed with her literary ambitions and in a short span of time the reader finds her style and content evolve from the personal exploration of her innermost self to "reflections on human situations [which are] the most arresting"(Klaas A.D. Smelik Vol. 1, p.xiii).[20]

In her early diaries she describes:

"And it's exactly the same with my work. At times I can suddenly see a subject clearly and distinctly think my way through it, great sweeping thoughts that I can scarcely grasp but which all at once give me an intense feeling of importance. Yet when I try to write them down they shrivel into nothing, and that's why I lack the courage to commit them to paper -- In case I become too disillusioned with the fatuous little essay that emerges. But let me impress just one thing upon you, sister. Wash your hands of all attempts to embody those great sweeping thoughts. The smallest, most fatuous little essay is worth more than the flood of grandiose ideas in which you like to wallow. Of course you must hold on to your forebodings and your intuitions. They are the sources upon which you draw, but be careful not to drown in them. Just organize things a little, exercise some mental hygiene. Your imagination and your emotions are like a vast ocean from which you wrest small pieces of land that may well be flooded again. That ocean is wide and elemental, but what matter are the small pieces of land you reclaim from it." The subjects before you are more important than those prodigious thoughts on Tolstoy and Napoleon that occurred to you in the middle of last night, and the lesson you gave that keen young girl on Friday night is more important than all your vague philosophizings. Never forget that. Don't overestimate your own intensity, […] Keep your eyes on the mainland and don't flounder helplessly in the ocean." [21]

This passage gives us a sense of her eloquence, from the beginning. It also introduces us to how Etty puts her aid work for community members over the accomplishments of her reasoning. Her metaphors are those of her native Holland, grounded in the culture in which her parents established themselves and where her father taught until the authorities removed him from his post.

From these very rudimentary remarks I hope you were able to glean the complexity of these two major aspects of nature and nurture, and how they impacted on this gifted young writer's life and the work she was able to accomplish in her short time.

She had grave concern over her brothers' illnesses and fear of her own genetic damage and as Spier revealed it to her through analysis (as "Philosophically and intuitively gifted"[22]). When he said this to her in their first encounter, there was no flattery or exaggeration in his pronouncement. His influence is the emotion-

al nurturing she needed whereas the intellectual nurturing she brought from home and took from Spinoza in her studies.

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Representations of Women in National Personifications

Gillian Owen Moreira & Joana Ribeiro

Abstract

Intimately connected to the symbolic production of a temporal continuity, national personifications are a space of memory and identity where the construction of identity and collective memory come together with notions of femininity.

The practice of using the female body as a visual or allegorical representation is one of the oldest and most important forms of expression that exists since pre-historic times, and the use of the female figure as the embodiment or personification of a nation has been a widespread practice across Europe. In order to have a better understanding of national personifications which persist today in different European nations, this paper will focus on gender representations, particularly on images of women where the female figure is used as the personification of a nation as well as the possible identity discourses conveyed in those images.

Keywords

Woman, Representations, National Personifications, Gender.

1 Introduction

Although National personifications are at first spatially and chronologically determined, in fact they are intimately connected to the symbolic production of a temporal continuity, since they are often reinforced and reconfigured, and a constant aspect is the instability of meaning that appears to characterise visual embodiments of the nation:

"While nations pretend to continuity and to unity, they are seen to be subject to constant change and to shifting definitions of national and gender identities. In fact, the maintenance of national identity is frequently problematic, hence the important role of visual art in representing continuities of identity whilst accommodating shifts in meaning." (Cusack, 2003)

Europe is a continent full of differences and complementarities where national identity is regarded as a factor of cultural diversity. The personifications through which nationalities legitimize and consecrate themselves are just one of the vari-

ous ways of conferring social dimension and intensifying the collective identity. Some scholars have looked particularly at gendered personification: e.g. Nash (1993); Innes (1994); Yuval-Davis (1997); McClintock (1997); Racioppi & See (2000); Mayer (2000); Cusack (2003). It has been found that in most cases, the nation is portrayed as feminine - almost always an idealised figure and not a flesh and blood woman. However, in all moments in history, whatever the message or idea that female embodiments conveyed, they were, of course, representations of feminine roles as imagined by male authors. This argument is supported by Mayer (2000) who mentions that sexuality has been a key feature in defining the nation and that definitions of both sexuality and the nation have generally been under masculine control: "the national project has been imagined by men and has been designed as a masculine construct, patriarchal hierarchies have become the foundation of the nation as much as the foundation of both gender and sexuality" (2000:18). Trici Cusack adds that "[e]ven myths and historical memories have been determined by masculine priorities" (Cusack, 2003).

2 Myth and Beliefs about Gender

The practice of using the female body as a visual or allegorical representation has existed since prehistoric times: several small sculptures of naked women have been found all over Europe and still confound scholars searching for a plausible interpretation of their meaning. These figures, named Venus, share similar physical attributes, namely, the small size; the arms, legs and face are incomplete; the swollen belly, wide-set thighs, large breasts and exaggerated vulva. Several interpretations have been put forward as to the possible uses and meanings expressed by these figures: in the palaeolithic era in which communities were composed by hunter-gatherers, "venus would be core images of female sexuality and fertility, so necessary for group survival in the hostile environment in which they lived" (M.G.B., 2011), hence the prominent belly could symbolise a good pregnancy or a safe childbirth. The first interpretations of the meaning of these venuses, however, understood them as the true picture of obese woman who were considered to represent the ideal of beauty (M.G.B., 2011).

Figure 1. *Venus* of Willendorf

Still in Europe, but moving forward several thousand years, in ancient Greece and Rome due to the importance and universal presence of myths, not only in social life but also and mainly in the written and visual arts, there was an increase in visual representations of the female form. In these cultures, images of women, whether in sculpture or painting, were seen as "an expression of desiderata and virtues", and as a way to "throw some light on the plural significations of women's bodies" (Warmer, 2000). It was in this social and cultural environment, in the second millennium B.C. that the myth of Europa took shape. Although the association between the myth of Europa and the name of the continent is not accepted by everyone, many variants of this founding myth were narrated by Greek and Latin poets, and later retold and recycled in different European cultures.

The story tells how Zeus, the King of the gods according to Greek mythology, fell in love with Europa, a beautiful Phoenician princess. Zeus transformed himself into the form of a beautiful white bull and went gently over to where

Europa stood and knelt at her feet. Europa dared to climb upon his back when suddenly the bull took off and swam away over the sea abducting her to the island of Crete. Different interpretations of this foundational myth of Europa have been represented in visual arts over the centuries. Europa is usually portrayed as a sexually attractive young woman (although her representation mutates according to the historical and cultural moment) who is seduced and abducted. According to Rolando Romero and Amandea Harris, these images confirm traditional gender beliefs on the roles of men and women: "the coming together of a man and woman in a manner that confirms the female role as sexual, supportive, and faceless while confirming the man's role as the deserving harvester of female servitude" (Romero & Harris, 2005). As a woman, Europa is the personification of a continent; as a mother figure, she gave birth to three sons, all founders of empires.

The examples of both Europa and the venuses are useful to support the idea that, although visual representations of women have evolved, specific traits associated to the representation of the female body are generally stable and have transcended time. These traits are based on socially accepted beliefs about the specific characteristics of women, and remain present in visual arts and national personifications around Europe. Studies by Deaux and Lewis (1984), Six & Eckes (1991), [and] Williams and Best (1982, 1990, 1999) have shown high cultural consensus in the content of gender beliefs, meaning that, through time, these beliefs gave rise to a mythologisation of women as sexual, maternal, nurturing, supportive, passive, submissive, weak, adaptive, and agreeable. These beliefs and characteristics, mythically associated with women, were easily passed along and often reinforced and reconfigured by visual models.

Thus we ask: are female characteristics conveyed by the images of both the venus and the gender myth that gave Europe its name also present in the female figures used as personifications of different European nations? Are characteristics mythically attributed to women present in those personifications?

3 National Personifications

This use of images of women to represent the nation emerges in several European countries. Examples of images of women as national personifications include Mother Albania (Albania), Mother Armenia (Armenia), the Finnish Maiden (Finland), Marianne (France), Germania (Germany), the Lady of the

Mountains (Iceland), Hibernia (Ireland), Italia Turrita (Italy), Républica (Portugal), Mother Motherland (Russia), Hispania (Spain), Mother Svea (Sweden), and Britannia (England). The nature of the images produced by the various nations involved, reflect national conventions as well as beliefs about gender. By studying these images, in which "the body of the state and the body of woman are conflated, scholars can scrutinise how the processes of constructing national identity and gender roles operated at particular historical moments" (Cusack, 2003). We will present a brief description of some of these different national personifications in order to identify the main characteristics that each image associates to the female figure chosen to personify the nation. The images, either paintings or statues, were selected from among several others, as the ones which better show the woman as representing and personifying the nation's symbols, ideals and beliefs.

3.1 Fertility, Justice and Peace

The allegorical representation of Italy and Spain associate women to fertility, justice and peace. In Greek culture, the image of a woman wearing a mural crown was considered as patron of a city and the embodiment of the fortune of that city: both personifications show a woman wearing long robes and a mural or towered crown.

Figure 2. *Italia Turrita*

Figure 3. *Hispania*

Although these images of women are often holding a bunch of corn ears, laurels, or an olive branch in her hands, symbols of fertility and reference to the agrarian economy, they sometimes hold traditional weapons (small spears and small shield) or a sword and scales, symbols of justice. Recent personifications of Spain present a woman usually seated next to a lion, and holding an olive branch.

3.2 Courageous, Considerate, Independent

In Greek mythology, Athena (or Minerva, in the Roman version), although a virgin maiden, was the goddess of wisdom in war strategy and the patron and helper of many heroes. The image of this female warrior figure is adopted and adapted in early personifications by some European nations, and often took the Latin name of the ancient Roman province, examples being Britannia, Germania, Hibernia, Helvetia and Polonia. Britannia is used to represent the female embodiment of England, and the image of Britannia is usually portrayed in ancient dress, having at her feet the British Lion, the national animal of England, standing or seated beside a Greek shield (which sports the British Union Jack), wearing a helmet and holding a trident (the symbol of sea power), emphasizing her power and association with the sea. In this national personification, the female figure represents the state, its political power as a united nation, as well as Britain's naval might as an imperial ruler.

Germania is a female figure usually represented wearing the imperial sword, a symbol of power, a breastplate with a black eagle on a gold field, symbolising the strength of the German empire, and holding the black, red and gold tricolour flag. She is also wearing a crown of oak leaves, commonly representing heroism, and the hemp branch around the sword represents a willingness to make peace. As a metaphor of national identity, the female figure is delineated with images of war and nature and standing against a background where beams of sunlight shine as if in the beginning of a new era. These national personifications mythologise women as courageous, considerate and independent.

Figure 4. *Britannia*

Figure 5. *Germania*

3.3. Strong, Supportive, Protective, Sexual

The classical tradition of symbolising abstract entities and associating ideas to images of gods, goddesses and allegorical personifications reappeared in the Renaissance period: during the French Revolution there were many allegorical personifications of the ideals of liberty and reason; eventually the female image of Marianne became an allegory of both these values as well as the national embodiment of France. The female figure is that of a bare-breasted woman wearing a Phrygian cap (figured the people, the plebs and signified freedom and the pursuit of liberty) and a garment made of rags, while raising the French flag in one hand and a bayonet in the other, leading the revolutionary masses. In this image the woman appears as someone aware of herself as a sexual being, as well as a courageous woman that stands out in a war where only men are fighting.

Modelled after the French Marianne, the Portuguese República is represented as a bare-breasted young woman wearing the Phrygian cap, but portrayed standing in a very secure and calm pose, wearing the national colours, green and red. Being used as a political symbol, the image was adopted as a state

symbol in October 1910, when the Republic substituted the Monarchy. While frequently used in the first half of the 20th century as the personification of the Portuguese Nation, it never gained popularity in that role, and its use today is rare.

Both images of Marianne and República use the female form as sexual, representing strength, support, protection.

Figure 6. *Marianne*

Figure 7. *Republica*

3.4 Considerate and Conservative

In the 18th and 19th centuries, scientists such as Darwin accepted and clarified the idea that men and women had radically different natures, and the Cult of Domesticity (Rosser, 2008) developed which expressed the notion of separate spheres, where women were responsible for the transmission of traditional beliefs and were confined to the private sphere of, for instance, home and children. In some Northern European countries conservative cultural and national ideals can be observed in the female figures chosen as their national personifications.

Figure 8. *Maid of Finland*

 Figure 9. *Lady of the Mountain*

One example of a national personification wishing to convey the traditional conservative principles is the Maid of Finland. The country is personified as a virginal figure, a barefoot young woman with blonde hair and blue eyes wearing a blue and white traditional costume or a white dress, probably symbolising a distant ethnic past. The images of this national personification distinctly differs from the others in two aspects: first, it represents a conservative feminine ideal, when compared to other national embodiments, such as Marianne or República, often depicted with one or both breasts exposed; secondly, there is nothing martial about her, apart from the shield which is used more to show the national symbol than to express any defensive or war like associated feelings.

Unlike the national personifications mentioned so far, the Lady of the Mountain, the national personification of Iceland, is no longer a maidenly figure. The woman is usually portrayed seating and wearing a crown of ice from which flames dart upward. She is not only the female personification of Iceland but also a representation of the national vision, the nation's dream to be an independent nation. The conservative national ideals are expressed by the raven, Iceland's most characteristic bird, and by the rolls of parchment which are intended to represent the country's history and literature. In both these national personifications the female figure presents the nation's honour and purity, characteristics traditionally associated to women.

Figure 9. *Dear Motherland*

Figure 10. *Mother Armenia*

3.5 Mother

The images of foundational mother figures, such as Motherland (Russia), Mother Armenia, Mother Svea (Sweden) and Mother Albania, became widely used in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries mainly in Eastern European nations.

The female figure of Motherland, also known as Mother Russia, appears holding the sword of justice and standing in a very active and domineering position, in a way that seems to motivate and encourage others to follow her. She does not show a gentle face, but expresses some negative associations of some irrationality or domineering control, probably complicit with and representing the conservative state ideologies. On the other hand, seen as mother, she embodies positive qualities such as warmth, fecundity, nurturance and protection to her 'sons'.

The most visual rendering of the female personification of Armenia is a monumental statue overlooking the Armenian capital, as if guarding and protecting the city. Like Mother Russia, the woman is shown standing and holding a sword although not in an emotionally violent way, but across her stomach, and there's a shield at her feet.

Both national personifications use the female figure to recall the important status and value attributed to older female members of the families, equating the national honour with female honour. As mother figures, the women in these personifications symbolise protection, as armed women they also symbolise peace through strength.

4 Representations of Women in National Personifications

Intimately connected to the symbolic production of a temporal continuity, national personifications are a space of memory and identity where the construction of identity and collective memory come together with notions of femininity. The variability of characteristics usually associated to women and the creation or re-adaptation of national personifications can only be fully interpreted according to some understanding of the political and cultural contexts in which they emerge. Seen as representations, they are not static or historically sequential; they emerged and were adapted in specific moments of history. The personifications through which nationalities legitimize and consecrate themselves are just one of the various ways of conferring social dimension and intensifying the collective identity. National personifications evolve in the sense that they are recreated and reinvented in accord-

ance with the dynamics of cultural nation-building. Nevertheless, the female national embodiments presented in this paper were looked at from outside the scope of its cultural and historical period.

5 Concluding Thoughts

Either to represent national values and ideals or to trade an illusion of continuity and unity, national personifications acquire multiple connotations over time and the given examples show that national embodiments provide ways of reacting and responding to changing social and political circumstances, as well as modes of negotiating crises of nationhood and identity.

Although varied, the examples given maintain a common identity that reveals a recurrent theme: women have been used as visual embodiments of national and cultural identity and there has been an appropriation of classical imagery to represent national civic values in the guise of ancient civilisations. These embodiments and national symbols help to construct and maintain the relationship between ideologies of nation and of gender, demonstrating that across diverse national contexts, there is a common theme expressed in idealised representations of women.

In the light of these examples, studying the cultural power of gender representations seems to be more relevant than ever, not only as a way of revealing the ideology of specific historical periods and of understanding the ideological legacy that we have inherited, but also because images and stereotypes of gender continue to influence ideologies. Stereotypes on women have proved to be timeless. They not only reflect history but may also change history since, although "diluted" in visual arts, stereotypical images on women not only shape identities but also contribute to the construction of a society's character.

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Rethinking Feminist Thought in Europe and its Role in Promoting Gender Equity

Christo Pavlides

Abstract

In this essay I focus on the term *feminism* both as a worldview and a social movement that promotes equality among men and women, and reinforcement of women's intervention in the public sphere. To this end, I analyze the term *feminist thought* in its geographical, philosophical, social and educational dimensions in Europe. Then I move to conceptions of *gender inequality* from Mary Wollstonecraft's and John Stuart Mill's *thought* to Simone de Beauvoir's feminist ideas. Since the emergence of British feminism, the horizon of feminist ideas has been broadened and many demands have been made on society. Simone de Beauvoir cultivated her ideas about woman as the 'other' in the field of essentialism and liberal feminism. *Second wave feminism* broadened the field of feminism in a social and political context to promote gender equity and achieve more social justice. Postfeminism continues the cultivation of feminist thought in our era. The analysis of feminist thought in Europe assists us in understanding (and, then, hopefully, our overcoming) the *inequalities* between both sexes. Both sexes must be able to equally contribute to and benefit from all areas of development within the sphere of social reality. We must rethink the fundamentals of feminist thought in Europe so as to understand the necessity of *gender equity* in the modern society. Yet, as the article concludes, mapping this necessity is only half of the story, since new feminist writings raise interesting, fresh challenges and important stakes in feminist discourse.

Keywords

Feminism, Waves of Feminism, Second Wave Feminism, Feminist Thought, Mary Wollstonecraft, John Stuart Mill, Simone de Beauvoir, Feminist Philosophy, Gender Inequality, Gender Equity.

Introduction

Feminism is a vision and a social movement that promotes equality among men and women: it supports and reinforces women's participation in the public sphere. It is also a collection of various movements and ideologies aiming at defining, establishing, and defending equal rights for women in the political, social, and economic arena. Feminism includes groundbreaking implementation of equal opportunities for women in the fields of education and employment. The defining characteristics of feminism are: a) acknowledging the imbalance of power between the sexes, with women in a subordinate role to men, b) un-

derstanding that women's condition is socially constructed and therefore can be changed and c) supporting women's autonomy[1].

Braidotti (1993) calls 'feminism the movement that struggles to change the values attributed to and the representations made of "woman" in the longer historical time of patriarchal history as well as in the deeper time of one's own identity. In other words, the feminist project encompasses both the level of subjectivity in the sense of historical agency, including political and social entitlement, and the level of identity, which is linked to consciousness, desire, and the politics of the personal; it covers both the conscious and the unconscious levels[2]. Therefore subjectivity and identity are both the fundamental basis upon which rest the concept of woman as active member of society, and the development of the female subject.

From Feminist Movements to the 'Waves' of Feminism and to Feminist Theories

The history of feminism is in fact the chronological narrative of movements and ideologies aimed at defining, establishing and defending equal rights for women in the political, social, and economic realms.

Feminist theories resulted from the rich and complex dynamics of the various feminist movements. Such theories aim at understanding the nature of gender inequality by examining women's social roles and lived experience. Theories have been developed in a variety of disciplines in order to fully respond to the issues of social construction of sex and gender. Some of the earlier forms of feminism have been criticized for only taking into account the perspectives of educated, middle-class, white women. This critique led to the creation of ethnically specific or multicultural forms of feminism.

Feminist theories have extended into theoretical or philosophical arenas, aiming at understanding gender inequality, and focusing on gender politics, power relations, and sexuality. They encompass work in a variety of disciplines, including: philosophy, sociology, anthropology, economics, women's studies, literary criticism, art history, and psychoanalysis.

While providing a critique of social and political relations, much of feminist theory also focuses on the promotion of women's rights and interests. Feminist theories explore discrimination, objectification (especially of a sexual nature), oppression, patriarchy and stereotyping.

The Early Feminist Thought
The Enlightenment and the Early Liberal Feminism

During the late 18th century many efforts aimed at pointing out that the Enlightenment liberal ideas could be applied to both genders. The best known book is *A Vindication of the Rights of the Women* (1792) written by Mary Wollstonecraft. Wollstonecraft defends the rights of women. As she argued,, the two sexes are equal in correct ratio and in the pursuit of virtue. Wollstonecraft argued that women had an independent right to education, work, property and the protection of civil law. According to her, it had to be ensured that women would not marry out of economic need and that, as wives, would not be entirely dependent on the benevolence of their husbands. So women had to acquire legal rights in order to have independent rational choices and acquire virtue[3].

Beyond Liberalism
John Stuart Mill's Ideas

In 1869 John Stuart Mill published his work *On the Subjection of Women* to show that the legal inferiority of the female sex is wrong, and that in fact, it is one of the main obstacles for the improvement and progress of humanity. This book is based on a philosophical theory, namely, utilitarianism, associated with the liberal theory. Mill believed that education was an essential part of the process of emancipation, because it would provide job opportunities to women and would help them change the way they perceived themselves[4].

Although Mill was far from the first writer to argue that women should have the right to vote, he was the first politician to make a serious attempt to achieve it[5].He saw education as an essential part of the process of emancipation, not simply because it would provide women with career opportunities, but because it could help change their self-perception so that attracting a man would cease to be the prime goal of a woman's life. Throughout his philosophy, education in its widest sense was key to social improvement, as women's position within the family was integrally linked to progress in other areas: as public rights improved women's situation and status at home, so would the family become a place where despotism and submission would be replaced by partnership and equality, and the democratic family would thus become a training-ground for democratic citizens[6].

The Radical Feminist Thought

Radical feminists believe that women are naturally and ontologically different compared to men and also that men are not the same as women, but historically operated as their oppressors. Therefore inequality and artificial institutions (e.g. patriarchy and capitalism that have been developed around this gender difference) must be abolished[7].

Le Deuxième Sexe (The Second Sex) (1949), by French socialist feminist philosopher Simone de Beauvoir, is a fundamental text of feminist thought. This book (which was banned by the Catholic Church due to its 'radical' positions on marriage and motherhood) made a critical contribution to feminist theory of the 'second wave'[8]. Her work highlighted the social, cultural and ideological character of 'womanhood', and the hierarchical gender dichotomy whereby the woman is the essential Other of the male Self. De Beauvoir argued that women could not have a clear idea of their own identity since they viewed themselves as they were viewed, as 'the other' in relation to men. She emphasized that the roles and characteristics assigned to women were socially constructed. In a famous passage she concluded that 'one is not born, but rather becomes, a woman', since a woman's destiny is imposed upon her by her teachers and her society'[9]. De Beauvoir did not see herself as writing in a feminist tradition but rather tried to understand women's subordination in the broader context of existentialist philosophy. Nonetheless, her work was to become key to 'second wave' feminism[10].

As De Beauvoir said, 'one is not born a woman, one becomes one', similarly, one is not born a man but one becomes one[11]. What is fundamental to De Beauvoir's claim is that *woman* is a process, a becoming, a constructing, which cannot rightfully be said to originate or to end[12]. De Beauvoir cultivated her ideas about woman as the 'other' in the field of essentialism and liberal feminism.

Feminist Movements, Gender Equity and Gender Equality

The feminist movement of the 19th and 20th century changed radically the position of women in our societies. Its contribution is not the elimination of inequalities between men and women, since such inequalities still persist, but rather that it challenged stereotypes, overturned perceptions, "outed" and delegitimized any disparities, disrupting their reproduction[13]. This is an important and creative contribution.

Gender equity is the process of being fair to women and men. To ensure fairness, strategies and measures must often be available to compensate for women's historical and social disadvantages preventing women and men from otherwise functioning with equality. Gender equity leads to gender equality. Gender equality requires equal enjoyment by women and men of socially-valued goods, opportunities, resources and rewards. Where gender inequality exists, it is generally women who are excluded or disadvantaged in relation to decision-making and access to economic and social resources.

What about Gender and Boosting Equality between Women and Men in the EU?

The overall situation of women and men in the EU is described as follows:

1 The employment rate of women increased but remains lower than men's, although women represent a majority of students and university graduates.

2 Women continue to earn on average 17.4% less than men for every hour worked and this figure remains constant.

3 Women are still too under – represented in economic and political decision – making positions, although their number has increased over the last decade.

4 The division of family responsibilities is still too unequal between women and men.

5 The risk of poverty is higher for women than for men.

6 Women are the main victims of gender – based violence, and women and girls are more vulnerable to trafficking of human beings[14].

The endeavors of the EU to achieve equality between women and men have significantly contributed to the improvement of many Europeans' lives. Although some disparities remain, the EU has made remarkable progress over the last decades, mainly due to the following:

1 Legislation on equal treatment;

2 Gender Mainstreaming (incorporation of the gender dimension in all policies);

3 Specific measures for the progress of women;

Some encouraging trends include the increased number of women in the labor market and their progress in ensuring better education and training. Neverthe-

less, gender differences remain. In the labor market, women are still over-represented in lower paid sectors and under-represented in decision-making positions. The *Strategy for equality between men and women* is the work program of the European Commission on gender equality for the period 2010-2015. It is an integrated framework that binds the Commission to promote gender equality in all policies on the following topics:

1 Equal economic independence for women and men

2 Equal pay for work of equal value

3 Equality in decision-making

4 Dignity, integrity and an end to violence based on gender

5 Promoting gender equality beyond the EU

6 Cross-cutting issues (gender roles, legislation and governance tools)

The *Strategy for equality between men and women* emphasizes the contribution of gender equality to economic growth and sustainable development, supports the implementation of gender equality in the strategy "Europe 2020" and is based on the priorities of the *Charter on the rights of women* xv. Achieving gender equality is fundamental to human rights, democracy, respect for rule of law, economic growth and competitiveness.

Suggestions for Promoting Gender Equality in the EU

— Critical in promoting gender equality is the empowerment of women, with a focus on identifying and redressing power imbalances, and giving women more autonomy in managing their own lives.

— Gender equality does not mean that men and women become the same; only that access to opportunities and life changes is neither dependent on, nor constrained by, their sex.

— Achieving gender equality requires women's empowerment to ensure that decision-making at private and public levels, and access to resources are no longer weighted in men's favor, so that both women and men can fully participate as equal partners in productive and reproductive life.

— Future Europe needs true gender equality! Europe needs a revamped gender equality agenda and concrete actions to address persistent imbalances between men and women in society.

— We need a new Path for Europe with all the EU institutions working for a more social Europe, including a true gender equality agenda.

— Education of youth at school and in the family (Education is regarded as a key instrument for achieving equitable relations among diverse social groups, particularly between women and men[16]. Therefore, reducing gender disparities in access to education is considered fundamental to empowering women.)[17]

— Equal opportunities for employment

— Economic independence, overall emancipation

— Development of women's awareness of their rights

— Avoiding exaggerations

— International political sensitivity and initiative

— Global cooperation

— Information

— Awareness of the absurdity of inequality

— Overcoming superstitions and prejudices

— Changing mindsets

— Strengthening of legislative gains

— Abolition of outdated institutions

Epilogue

We have to work for the implementation of the fundamental principles of the *European Charter for Gender Equality in Local Societies*:

1 Gender equality is a fundamental right.

2 We have to cope with the issue of multiple discriminations and exclusions in order to ensure gender equality.

3 The balanced participation of men and women in decision- making processes is a prerequisite for a democratic society.

4 The elimination of gender stereotypes is crucial to achieving gender equality[18].

The precondition to change this inequality is therefore, first and foremost, for all men and women to accept that the term 'gender' does not refer to biological definition, but is rather an effect of the dynamics of relations, behaviors and attitudes that can and must be changed. Feminist concerns, if implemented and catered for, will also affect social class divisions. In the changed context, of a new social consensus, man and woman should be treated with dignity and respect, as socially equal human beings[19].

We have to rethink the crucial manifestations of feminist thought in Europe so as to understand the necessity of gender equity in the modern society and also to strive for this important value/ideal.

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SECTION III
Education, Women's Studies, Sociology

ETHNIC LANGUAGES IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION

Chairs

—

Gennadiy Trifonov & Egor Makharov

Participants

—

Egor Makharov
Chris Bissell
Gennadiy Trifonov & Erbina Nikitina

Presentation

Gennadiy Trifonov & Egor Makharov

At this workshop were presented three reports.

The report *"Ethnic Languages in the Era of Globalization"* was made by *Gennadiy Trifonov* and *Erbina Nikitina* (Chuvash State University, Russian Federation). They approve that languages are called not mirrors, but rather lenses of the world for a reason. The world perceived by an individual refracts in the native language according to his ethnic mentality. As an intermediary between individual thinking and social reality, language sets not only cogitative stereotypes and world outlook limits, but also standards of behavior.

Cultural and linguistic unification accompanying globalization entails extinction of small and rare languages. The gradual extinction of the world languages raises the questions of language rights, language freedom, language planning, and language politics. Observations of the mentality of the Chuvash people show that for young people original positive qualities gain strength before the threat of globalization. During a modern era ethnic features and ethno-cultural activity of the population don't disappear, and it casts a doubt that the processes of modernization and integration remove ethnic problems from today's agenda.

The author of the second report *"The Celtic Languages in the Age of Globalisation"* is *Chris Bissell* (The Open University, UK). He says about the effect of UK devolution on the insular Celtic languages, which must be seen – in particular in the context of a potentially independent Scotland – in a wider international context. Interestingly, Welsh gained by far the most from the UK devolution, even though the Welsh Assembly has significantly weaker powers than the Scottish Parliament.

Similar pressures have come to bear both in Scotland and Northern Ireland. The latter is a particularly interesting case, since the Irish language there has strong political and ideological connotations. But in all the insular Celtic regions over the last few decades there have been extraordinary pressures to recognize the Celtic languages in schools, regional parliaments and assemblies, and

the media. Modern information technologies have also enabled an increasing presence of the Celtic languages in an international arena.

Report of Professor Egor Maharov (Russian Federation) was devoted to the analysis of the main problems and contradictions of the modern globalized world, the solution of which, as shown by the author, is possible only through active dialogue between East and West, as a major world system of modernity. In this dialogue, the author believes, should belong to the special role of Russia as a Eurasian power, and for the first time there was the idea of Eurasianism

Eurasian Dialogue

Egor Makharov

Abstract

The idea of Eurasianism emerged in the early twentieth century in conditions of European reality. It resulted from reflections of the Russian emigrant intelligentsia on destiny of Russia after the Russian Revolution and European culture as a whole. First of all, the ideologists of Eurasianism reflected the specifics of the historical situation in Russia of that time. Also, their ideas involved a deep thought of common between European and Asian cultures, between Europe and Russia. The foundations of Eurasianism were developed in works of N.S. Trubetskoy, P.N. Savitsky, G.V. Florovsky, L.P. Karsavin et al. The Russian intellectuals living abroad and reflecting on destiny of Russia, its position and role in history, without posing the problem of cultural transformation of literally whole continents, Europe and Asia. They put forward the idea of Eurasianism on the assumption that Russia is geographically related to two continents, Europe and Asia, and involves elements of European and Asian cultures by virtue of its historical development. S. Huntington writes on dual nature of Russia, in particular, its Asian roots: "Asiatic and Byzantine ways, institutions, and beliefs predominated in Russian society and were perceived to do so by both Europeans and Russians".

Keywords

World-System Formation, Eurasianism, European and Asian, Dialogue of Cultures, Process of Migration.

The modern world with all its contradictions, clashes, at times serious humanitarian catastrophes in certain regions of the planet arouses considerable interest and profound concern as a matter of scientific enquiry. Certainly, philosophy and social science put considerable effort into cognizing the meaning of the ongoing events and processes. New scientific paradigms are constantly being searched for, the methodological principles put forward are being revised. As S. Huntington correctly reasoned: "The challenge is to develop a paradigm that accounts for more crucial events and provides a better understanding of trends than other paradigms at a similar level of intellectual abstraction"[1].

Experts reasonably recognize and compare the common and the different between the West and the East among the civilizational models of development of society which is one of important aspects in understanding the modern world. In the public consciousness the West is traditionally associated with liberalism,

democracy, market, freedom of a person. In conceiving the East, many still think of it as a traditional society, with conservatism and traditionalism having not been overcome yet. It is known that the differences between the West and the East are historically determined by various civilizational and cultural traditions. The actual singularity of perception and understanding of the world, way of thinking and living is reflected in relations between man and the world, society and state, law and religion, man's spiritual orientation, the present and the past, perceiving material and moral values.

Today, the process of globalization certainly contributed to significant changes in the concepts of the West and the East. To some extent, the concept of the West incorporated much new, keeping some common geographical and culturological characteristics, and it reflects the Western civilization as something united. It is noteworthy that the West, the USA, European countries, and the Latin America, have common ideas of liberalism and democracy. However, they have undergone significant changes. The changes in the East are quite considerable as well. Moreover, as many experts believe, it is Asia where the greatest events in the world order in the 21st century will take place. First of all, they consider such a fact as a bias of the world economic activity towards the East. Indeed, the growth rate of the gross national product in Asian countries is quite high.

Every world-system faces its complex challenges today. Europe as a world-system formation pursues its own policy, trying to dissociate from undesirable processes, in particular, Americanization of Western Europe, although the modern American historically has European roots. Contradictions and conflicts within Europe naturally result from presence of different cultural traditions, languages, different historical destinies, military, economical, and other alliances. The preceding is characteristic for other microsystem formations as well.

Yet, Europe has its consolidating factors such as political alliances, international organizations, non-governmental associations. The European Union arose in the course of competition, struggle for influence. The European Court of Human Rights works in Strasbourg which means that important issues are settled at the macro-regional level, i.e. at the level of supranational civil society and citizens can address it directly. Further consolidating factors are Catholicism, Orthodoxy, Protestantism, economic and social theories, Marxist and

non-Marxist philosophical systems. Also, everyone knows rich scientific traditions of Europe where classical and non-classical science and philosophy as a developed system of public consciousness emerged. As T. Parsons wrote: "… the modern type of society has emerged in a single evolutionary arena, the West, which is essentially the area of Europe … The society of Western Christendom, then, provided the base from which what we shall call "the system" of modern societies "took off""[2].

In modern conditions of globalization, Europe challenges aggravation of social, ethnic, and religious contradictions resulting from the growing migration process. A massive influx of migrants from Africa, the Arabic World, and Asia is observed. Apart from economic migrants, there a lot of refugees forced to leave their country in order to escape unbearable living and working conditions in certain African countries or terrors of the civil war, for example, in Syria.

Every country experiences its own migration pressure and takes measures to rise to the challenge of the modern time, considering it a menace to national security. Supranational political and non-political institutions are making a great deal of effort to regulate ethnic contradictions. One of strong adherents of European identity J. Habermas arises the question of integrated multilevel policy for Europe up to "the EU's further expansion into a federal state"[3]. Some type of community in Europe guarantees a fruitful dialogue with other microsystem formations. From the viewpoint of experts, the European Union today possesses features of a certain type of confederative state.

The idea of Eurasianism emerged in the early twentieth century in conditions of European reality. It resulted from reflections of the Russian emigrant intelligentsia on destiny of Russia after the Russian Revolution and European culture as a whole. First of all, the ideologists of Eurasianism reflected the specifics of the historical situation in Russia of that time[4]. Also, their ideas involved a deep thought of common between European and Asian cultures, between Europe and Russia. The foundations of Eurasianism were developed in works of N.S. Trubetskoy, P.N. Savitsky, G.V. Florovsky, L.P. Karsavin et al. The Russian intellectuals living abroad and reflecting on destiny of Russia, its position and role in history, without posing the problem of cultural transformation of literally whole continents, Europe and Asia. They put forward the idea of Eurasianism on the assumption that Russia is geographically related to two continents, Europe and Asia, and involves elements of European and Asian cultures

by virtue of its historical development. S. Huntington writes on dual nature of Russia, in particular, its Asian roots: "Asiatic and Byzantine ways, institutions, and beliefs predominated in Russian society and were perceived to do so by both Europeans and Russians"[5].

Emergence of Eurasianism as a consolidating idea was related to characteristics of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. That time it was evident that Russia had a real potential to become a focus of Eurasian-Asian civilization. The base for this position was recognition and emphasis of Russia's role as a special world having unique independent history. The peoples of Russia inherently have Slavic and Turanian roots, Christian and Muslim religion-wise.

At present, the idea of Eurasianism is revived under new historical conditions. Recently, it has been the subject of interest anew in Russia. Mainly, we deal with Russia's interacting with neighboring states, particularly, in the post-Soviet area. There are serious reasons for this statement, of course, but we are not touching them upon in this case. The scope of the concept of Eurasianism might be significantly expanded with some reservations, i.e. be applied within microsystem formations of the West and the East.

The West as a world-system formation covers territorially a significant area, being extremely diverse in terms of the countries involved. Its constituent countries have their unique history and culture. At the same time, they have much in common which allows to involve them into one world-system. They have common historical past and present, going hand in hand in their development due to geographical proximity, cooperating, being at war with one another at times. Today, liberalism is a unifying factor for this world-system organization.

Almost the same is true for the East where also there are many unifying points. Although, in S. Huntington's view, if we say that the West is unified in its democratic and cultural development, the same cannot be said of the East for different cultures, religions, and traditions interact. Therefore, he believes that it is more appropriate to use "the West and the Rest" bearing in mind existence of many non-Wests. Certainly, there might be another point of view but in the scope of our statement of the problem it is more convenient to present the East as a world-system formation, e.g. like continental formations Europe, Asia, Africa, the Arabic World, etc.

To be sure, the dialogue between the West and the East occurs in various directions under conditions of globalizations perceived by politics as a fact of life. It occurs at the level of individual countries and international organizations, with dialogue relations being built in the economic, social, cultural domains of society. For example, the liberal system in the domain of economic development works not only in European, but also in some Eastern countries. No doubt that any expansion of cultural exchange significantly enriches the spiritual domain. Liberalization of the visa system enhances free travel of people which, in turn, is invaluable for mutual understanding of individuals and nations, perceiving everyday life, culture, traditions of others. Dialogue presupposes equality of the parties involved and doesn't mean loss of their identity.

A special place in dialogue between nations, countries takes interaction in the political field which is of prime importance when solving acute issues of social life. A recent example of escaping serious clashes might be the issue of Syria when the warring parties reached a certain compromise in the reduction of military weapons.

There are a lot of delayed problem in international affairs, with new serious conflict situations arising permanently. No doubt, a joint effort of the parties involved is required to overcome them. The latest events in the Ukraine, unfortunately, exceeded the boundaries of one country and affected the interests of the neighboring countries incl. Russia as a great Eurasian player in world political events as well as some members of the EU. Many rightly see only political extrication from the crisis for military solution might destructively affect the dialogue of the West and the East, unfortunately, in the Ukraine it of the parties involved to bect situations arising.

Under conditions of globalization, facing crises, challenges and risks of the present, microsystem countries have to intensively interact, enter into a dialogue to coordinate their action, to develop appropriate ways and methods. Environmental, demographic, humanitarian, and other problems usually called global can be overcome only on a basis of the comprehensive dialogue. The danger of a global catastrophe resulting from local military, interethnic conflicts occurring in individual countries and at the local level increases as never before. The question is hampered, first of all, by competence and responsibility of the ruling political forces and regimes.

Revival of the Arabic World is of greatest significance in current events. The Arabic World realizes its retardation in social and spiritual development under influence of civilizational processes in the West and the East. Nations see the advantageous experience of the other world and, naturally, movement for democratic, modernist transformation starts in society. Conflicts between social classes, between the poor and the rich remain the basic catalyst of contradiction. People cannot put up with poverty and lawlessness, they are not happy with decade long living in the state of emergency, continuous violent suppression and destruction of the opposition any more.

Against this background it is evident how outworn are regimes having caused unprecedented corruption exaggerated social differentiation. As modern history of the West and the East shows, unchallenged family and clan structures, irremovability of leaders, power usurpation by certain political forces have been the main obstacle on the civilizational way od society. This may be noticed not only in Arabic countries, but also in other regions of the world. Therefore, one of the important laws of civilizational development is modernization, first of all, in the leading political structures eliminating corruption, power usurpation, clan principle of their formation and inheritance. The issue of the role and importance of state in society must be seriously reconsidered.

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The Celtic Languages in the Age of Globalisation

Chris Bissell

Abstract

This paper examines the current situation of the insular Celtic languages in the UK and the Republic of Ireland as affected by recent developments in globalisation and devolution. After a brief historical account, the current situation is reviewed with reference to education in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. The general influence of Celtic-language media is discussed, with particular reference to recent developments in ICT, including the World Wide Web. It is concluded that, although no panacea for endangered minority ethnic languages, Internet access and the social media offer a degree of hope.

Keywords

Celtic Languages, Celtic Language Medium Education, ICT, World Wide Web, Devolution, Social Media, Minority Ethnic Communities.

Introduction

The Celtic languages are still spoken on the fringes of north-western Europe: in pockets along the west coast of Ireland and the Scottish Hebridean Islands; in north and western areas of Wales; and in the far west of Brittany. In the Isle of Man and Cornwall, the local variants of Celtic are no longer in habitual use, but in both regions there are active language revival movements of a few thousand members.

Numbers of native speakers and / or users of the Celtic languages are difficult to determine with any accuracy: census statements are notoriously subjective and influenced by personal ideological stances. Of the Celtic languages, only Welsh, with around 300 000 habitual speakers (over 500 000 claimed a knowledge of the language in the 2011 census), is not considered as endangered by UNESCO. Although Irish is supposed to have approaching two million people with some knowledge of the language, the number of habitual speakers is probably fewer than 50 000, with divergent dialects in the areas where Irish is the mother tongue. Breton, with under 200 000 mostly very elderly speakers, is

under threat, and receives little support – some would say rather antagonism – from the French state. In the 2011 census about 60 000 Scots claimed to speak Gaelic, about 1% of the Scottish population.

What I wish to concentrate on in this short paper, however – after a brief historical introduction – is the effect on the insular Celtic languages of recent changes in the UK Celtic areas, particularly the influence of devolution and modern communications. This is something which should be seen – in particular in the context of a potentially independent Scotland (a proposal defeated in the referendum held in September 2014) – against a wider international background, informed not only by globalization issues but also by socio-political developments in the national / regional areas. Interestingly, Welsh gained by far the most from UK devolution, even though the Welsh Assembly has significantly weaker powers than the Scottish Parliament. In a nation with around 20% of the population claiming significant knowledge of Welsh, the recent laws on language equality (which enforce bilingualism on many public facing functions) have radically changed the status and the acceptance of the Welsh language. Similar, but less intense, pressures have come to bear in both Scotland and Northern Ireland. The latter is a particularly interesting case, since the Irish language there has strong political and ideological connotations. But in all the insular Celtic regions over the last few decades there have been extraordinary pressures to recognise the Celtic languages in schools, regional parliaments and assemblies, and the media. The latter element is particularly important, since only recently have Celtic language news channels reported on global, rather than very local – even parochial – events. The introduction of the Welsh language channel S4C in 1982 was particularly important: for the first time, international news was presented daily in Welsh, and the profile of the Welsh language benefited enormously. Modern information technologies have also enabled an increasing presence of the Celtic languages in an international arena.

Some History

The modern Celtic languages derive from the languages spoken in the British Isles before the Roman invasion. Two families exist: Brythonic and Goidelic, the latter developing in Ireland but then being exported to Scotland and the Isle of Man, where a single literary language appears to have existed over the whole

Gaelic-speaking area until the 15th century (although the detailed linguistic situation in the late medieval period is complex). Brythonic developed into modern Welsh and Cornish; Cornish settlers then introduced the language into Brittany. There is still a degree of mutual intelligibility between modern Irish and Scottish Gaelic, although not really enough to enable free communication; Welsh and Breton have some vocabulary in common, but have evolved very differently, in particular through the influence of English and French respectively.

With the expansion of the territories ruled by the English Crown, and therefore the English language, all the insular Celtic languages declined over a period of several centuries (while retaining an extraordinary literary tradition[1]). Education for those who spoke mother tongue Celtic languages varied enormously, and was greatly influenced by religious differences. In Ireland before independence, there was considerable pressure from Elizabethan times onwards to promote the use of English, rather than Irish. So-called 'hedge schools', associated with teaching by primarily rural Catholic intellectuals, taught not only Irish and general literacy, but also sometimes history and the classics. After Irish independence the language became, rather artificially, the official primary state language, and a compulsory subject in schools, but continued to decline rapidly as a mother tongue and as a language of everyday use. In Scotland, Gaelic was relegated to a very minor second place. Some have attributed the decline of Scottish Gaelic to religious differences, not simply between Catholic and Protestant, but also between Protestant denominations. In Wales the religious connection was much more positive. Overwhelmingly Methodist / Calvinist, Welsh Sunday Schools ensured a high level of literacy in the Welsh language in those areas where it was predominantly a mother tongue – as well as a degree of standardization owing to the Welsh Bible, translated almost as early as modern English versions (the most important being the William Morgan version of 1588). Another important influence was the existence of Welsh workers' political and cultural clubs in the old industries – particularly the slate quarries – often meeting during lunch breaks to discuss issues of the day.

Unsurprisingly, it was Wales where resistance to the increasing use of English was most pronounced. The 1960s saw campaigns by the Welsh Language Society on such matters as bilingual road signs, and an extraordinary couple (Eileen and Trevor Beasley) won a victory to have the right to communicate in Welsh with local government in Welsh-speaking areas – but only after years of court cases and the seizure of many of their possessions for unpaid local taxes and court fines. Finally, Gwynfor

Evans, a Welsh Member of Parliament, threatened to fast to the death in 1980 if Welsh were not accorded reasonable rights, particularly a TV channel[2].

In recent years, the native Irish and Scottish Gaelic areas have lost their geographical integrity, and now represent rather a mosaic of small areas with comparatively high densities of speakers; the passing on of the languages to younger people has thus become less and less common. The Irish language will continue to have an important political and even social function, owing to its special status within the Irish nation, as well as developments in schools (to be considered briefly below) but otherwise both languages appear to have a very threatened future. Is there any hope?

One Irish TV presenter, tried to test the current state of Irish in a novel way[3]:

> *No Béarla* [No speak English] is a four part series in which Manchán Magan attempts to live his life (eat, travel, socialise, find accommodation, shop, etc) through Irish. It is a journey to find out whether the 1.6 million people who claim they can speak Irish in the national census really can and whether one can survive in Ireland today without speaking a word of English.
>
> In the course of his travels Manchán gets kicked out of bars, served the wrong food, given the wrong directions, the wrong clothes, the wrong haircut. He gets abused, insulted, treated as an imbecile…

Clearly, this is rather tendentious, but it highlights the unease of many Irish citizens towards the Irish language. Irish has a particular cultural connotation in the Republic, and for some citizens a lack of competence can become something approaching guilt.

Schools

It is worth making a few comments on the provision of Celtic-language medium schools, which have expanded in all the insular Celtic areas in the last decades. Although this is not a direct result of globalisation, it is a driver of a major shift in the demographics of Celtic-language speaking, and has significant consequences for the languages. Here are a few extracts from official positions from websites, in no particular order:

Northern Ireland

There are currently 29 Irish-medium schools in Northern Ireland and a further 10 Irish-medium units attached to English-medium host schools. Of the 29 schools, 28 are primary and one is post primary, *Colaiste Feirste*. Of the 10 Irish-medium units attached to English-medium host schools, 7 are primary and 3 are post-primary. In addition to these, *Gaelscoil na Daróige* in Derry City is an independent school teaching through the medium of Irish.

There are a total of 4,633 pupils in Irish-medium education in 2012/13. This includes 803 children attending Irish Medium pre-school settings, 3,061 primary school children (Years 1-7) and 769 in post primary schools years (Years 8-14).

(…)

Sir George Bain, in the Report of the Independent Strategic Review of Education (the Bain Report), December 2006, recommended that DE should develop a comprehensive and coherent policy for Irish-medium education.

The Department accepted this recommendation and initiated a major review of the development of Irish Medium Education to ensure high quality provision and outcomes for all children in the sector. The majority of recommendations are either achieved or progressed considerably. The Department is taking forward work on any recommendations which have not yet been fully implemented.

http://www.deni.gov.uk/ Accessed 21/8/14

Republic of Ireland

Irish-medium education is one of the fastest growing fields of education in Ireland for over 30 years and *Gaelscoileanna Teo* are to the forefront in its development. There are approximately 40,000 pupils receiving education through the medium of Irish outside of the *Gaeltacht*. The organisation is core funded by *Foras na Gaeilge*.

An Irish-medium school is one that teaches all subjects through Irish at primary level (*a gaelscoil*) and post-primary level (*a gaelcholáiste*).

(…)

The principal aim of Irish-medium schools is to provide excellence in education, and the ethos of Irish-medium schools helps to keep Irish as a living language in the community. Irish and international research has shown that bilingualism and immersion education have numerous benefits, including linguistic, educational and social advantages.

http://www.gaelscoileanna.ie/en/about/ Accessed 21/8/14

Scotland

You'll find Gaelic-medium education in 63 primary schools (2008/09 session), including the Glasgow and Inverness Gaelic Schools. There's also more and more education in Gaelic at pre-school, in secondary schools and in further education.

(…)

Gaelic-medium education, like all education provision in Scotland, is determined by demand for the service balanced with the educational and economic viability of each educational unit.

The Gaelic Language (Scotland) Act 2005 created a statutory body, *Bòrd na Gàidhlig, with* the functions of promoting the use and understanding of the Gaelic language, Gaelic culture and Gaelic education.

http://www.educationscotland.gov.uk/Parentzone/yourchildatschool/choosingaschool/gaelicmediumeducation/index.asp Accessed 21/8/14

Wales

The Welsh-Medium Educational Strategy is a historic milestone in Welsh-medium education and sets the Welsh Government's national strategic direction. It also sets the direction for making improvements in the teaching and learning of Welsh as a language, including, in particular, Welsh second language. In 2007 the Welsh Government committed to 'creating a national Welsh-medium Education Strategy to develop ef-

> fective provision from nursery through to further and higher education, backed up by an implementation programme'. In response to this commitment the Welsh-medium Education Strategy was launched in April 2010.
>
> (…)
>
> The Welsh Government recognises the importance of providing children and young people with a wide range of social opportunities to use their Welsh so that they associate the language not only with the classroom, but also with leisure and cultural activities and, above all, with pleasure and entertainment.
>
> (…)
>
> Raising awareness of the value of Welsh among children and young people will also be a key consideration in our work to develop a marketing strategy for the language, and our work on increasing the use of Welsh in the field of technology and digital media.
>
> http://wales.gov.uk/topics/welshlanguage/policy Accessed 21/8/14

One of the most interesting features of Celtic-language schools in the UK is that they have created pockets of Celtic speaking young people in otherwise predominantly or entirely English-speaking areas. The reasons for parents choosing a Celtic-language school in an English-speaking area – particularly when the parents themselves may have limited or even no knowledge of the Celtic language – are complicated, but raise issues of the (perceived) quality of education, social class, and politico-linguistic ideology and aspirations that cannot be discussed here. Certainly the Celtic-language medium schools often achieve significantly better academic results (in terms of the standard measures) than neighbouring English-language schools. More importantly, however, as MacKinnon has remarked in the Scottish context: "every family with a Gaelic speaker is a potential mini-Gaidhealtachd[4]"; and similarly argues for "taking 'heartland' and 'urban Gaidhealtachd' into 21st Century realities"[5]. The old distinctions – still sometimes rather romantically viewed – of mother-tongue Celtic-speaking areas versus the rest have changed enormously in the last few decades. In

Ireland, in particular, there is sometimes heated debate about the historical supremacy of the Gaeltacht and its native speakers regarding Irish-language authenticity.

Modern Media

By 'modern media' I do not simply mean modern ICT and the Internet. The insular Celtic languages have ancient literary traditions, but also a respectable book publishing history, from the first Bible translations to the language revivals in the 19th century and then onwards into the 20th century. But as far as print is concerned, there was a further minor – but very significant – revolution in the 1970s with the availability of cheap photocopiers and the rise – in Wales particularly – of community newspapers. These, with comparatively small circulation, helped strengthen Celtic identity in those areas where the languages were still spoken in significantly proportions, but not served by traditional print.

However, broadcasting, and perhaps even more importantly the digital media, have been some of the most positive influences on Celtic cultures and the preservation of the languages.

Most important of all is the influence of modern ICT, digital media and the Web. Ken MacKinnon quotes the distinguished linguist David Crystal that "an endangered language will progress if its speakers can make use of electronic technology"[6]. For all endangered or minority languages, access to web pages, native Wikipedia versions, and social media can be extraordinarily empowering – and in many cases, might represent the last hope for such tongues. Now, this may be yet another example of technological optimism, so prevalent in Web and social media communities, but in the case of minority languages – at least for populations with access to the appropriate network infrastructure – I do believe it has more truth than in many other cases. One way in which such applications are particularly appropriate is in supporting novices or less confident users – either by computer forums, or even automatic translation (however inadequate the latter may be). The recent convergence of television, the internet and other mobile apps can only improve this aspect – again, providing users have a sufficient network infrastructure. As the BBC director for Wales, Rhodri Talfan Davies, was recently reported in The Guardian newspaper:

"Just as lives in Wales are becoming more messy, media services are more rigid and uniform": they are either English language or Welsh, and he argued that they provide too few access points for people who speak a bit of Welsh. Before S4C began in 1982 one would "stumble across Welsh" on BBC1 or HTV Wales; arguably the language had a higher profile than now[7].

Maybe there is something to be said, therefore, if we wish to preserve, enhance and encourage minority languages, for fighting against separation or even ghettoization, and looking more towards plurality, where it still exists. One interesting feature of the use of the Internet by Celtic speakers is the significant number of participants outside the home nations. It does appear that digital technologies have helped create a sense of unity within the Celtic diaspora, something only possible with the globalisation of such technologies.

Devolution

Devolution of limited powers to the Celtic areas of the UK has a complex history. Briefly, the Scottish Parliament was elected in 1999 after a successful referendum in 1997. A Welsh Assembly, supported by a much narrower majority than in Scotland, was also set up, but with more limited powers, as indicated by its name. Northern Ireland had possessed its own Parliament after the division of Ireland in the 1920s, but this was later suspended owing to the civil unrest and violence known as the "troubles". After various unsuccessful attempts at devolution the current Northern Ireland Assembly was established only after the 1998 Good Friday Agreement.

Devolution in these three regions / nations has had various consequences for the Celtic languages and language planning. Wales has gone furthest, with all public bodies being required to offer bilingual services, including communication with the public by letter, telephone, e-mail and websites. An increasing number of private institutions adopt a similar approach, even when not required to by law. Bilingual signage is now virtually universal. Welsh medium schools, although they started well before devolution, have also received a boost.

As might be expected, Scotland has not gone so far in the case of Gaelic, but various bodies to further the development of the language have been established, and again there are policies for the use of the language, including a limited number of Gaelic medium schools.

The place of Irish in Northern Ireland is even more complex, as the language is associated with Catholicism and republicanism. Nevertheless there are attempts to (re)introduce it to some extent, particularly in a modest number of Irish medium schools, in which the problems of running such schools can be partly offset by at least some legal rights – if not universal political support – in the devolved regime[8].

Conclusion

Many aspects of globalisation are extremely deleterious for minority ethic languages, particularly where they have to compete with major world languages such as English, Russian, Chinese and Spanish. But where local political independence – even if only partial – can be combined with the resources to use modern digital techniques in broadcasting, web access and social networking, it could be the saving of a number of languages currently thought to be on the verge of extinction.

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The Status of Ethnic Languages In the Era of Globalization

By Example of Fate of the Chuvash Language

Gennadiy Trifonov & Erbina Nikitina

Abstract

The Chuvash people (self-appellation – Chavash) are a Turkic ethnic group of Suvar-Bulgarian origin in the Russian Federation (the Central Volga region), the titular ethnic group of the Chuvash Republic (the capital is the city of Cheboksary). The total population of the Chuvash people is 1.5 million, 1.435.000 of them live in Russia (according to the results of The Russian Census of 2010).

The Chuvash people are considered to be lineal heirs of the Great Bulgarian population (the 7th century) and later - of the population of Volga Bulgaria (the 10th century). The Chuvash language is the only living representative of the Bulgarian group of Turkic languages. It has two dialects: upper and lower.

The Chuvash culture has the peculiarities similar to Western and Eastern cultures. There is also Sumerian, Hittite-Akkadian, Sogdo-Manichean, Hun, Khazar, Bulgar-Suvarian, Turkic, Finno-Ugric, Slavonic, Russian and other traditions, but at the same time the Chuvash culture is not identical to any of them. These peculiarities are reflected in the ethnic language and Chuvash mindset. The main confession of the religious Chuvash is Orthodox Christianity, there are also followers of traditional beliefs (tribal religion) and Moslems.

Keywords

Ethnic Language, Ethnic Mentality, Language Assimilation, Bilingualism, Language Policy, Globalization, The Chuvash Language.

Introduction

Language is the main factor which most of all unites people into the nation. It is the language that is considered to be the main element of maintaining the ethnic identity. Despite the fact that, in practice, ethnicity regards to a symbol of a mother-tongue than to its actual use by all members of the community (if we take into consideration the processes of assimilation of languages in the era of globalization and use of the other ethnic community's language as native one and so on), nevertheless, the native language deeply influences the formation of the national identity of the personality, of its inner world bringing some specificity into its consciousness and thinking.

Language is the main part of developing the spiritual life of the nation, depository of its knowledge and wisdom. The Chuvash people have every right to be proud of having such a rich language, ancient written language, mythology, blessings, prayers, epic and hoodoo tales and other genres of folk literature. The survived etymology of the Chuvash language is especially valuable for researchers. Nikolay Marr, a famous scholar and polyglot of the 20th century, considered the Chuvash language to be one of the most ancient languages in the world, concluded that human speech rose from the elements of this particular language. That was not a random guess. Strict laws of the Chuvash word creation allow us to guess the meanings of ancient roofs in many words in modern Turkic languages.

For any Chuvash the native language is a symbol, the altar, the core of the national spirit. It is said in the ancient Chuvash "Book of Fate", "Let us be united in the name of our mother-tongue". The role of the language as a philosophical expression of the historical spot of the nation in the world space and as fixation of the mindset and peculiarities of the spiritual evolution of the ethnic group is high. Without his native language a Chuvash is not a Chuvash though, for example, a Jew without knowledge of Yiddish or Hebrew remains a Jew.

Different types of writing were used in different periods of the Chuvash language history, for example, Runic writing (Old Bulgarian period), writing on basis of Arabic script (Middle Bulgarian period), Latin alphabet (18th century), Cyrillic alphabet (18-19th centuries). In the period of Chuvash writing until the 19th century the Chuvash language was used in verbal communication and folk art. With the invention of new writing (1871-1872) which was worked out by an outstanding Chuvash enlightener Ivan Yakovlev, the limits of its use have expanded significantly.

However, the social status of the Chuvash language is not characterized by steady development – there were ups and downs. After the establishment of autonomy in 1920 the broad functioning of the language was supported by the government. In the 1930s the situation became worse when the article on the state status of the Chuvash language was deleted from the Constitution of The Chuvash Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. The current law "On the languages in the Chuvash Republic" was passed in 1990 and both Russian and Chuvash languages were given the status of state languages. Favourable conditions for expansion of social functions of the Chuvash language were created in the Republic.

Nowadays when performing the activities oriented to support and develop ethnic languages it is necessary to take into consideration objective processes of globalization and informatization which occur in the society. Along with scientific study of languages, their use in educational institutions, mass media, book publishing industry and library science, maintenance in the field of culture, it is necessary to promote ethnic languages in the web space.

Language as the Basis of Ethnic Mentality

Languages are called not mirrors, but rather lenses of the world for a reason. The world perceived by an individual refracts in the native language according to his ethnic mentality. In spite of the fact that the unified vision of the world by representatives of different ethnic groups predetermines an existence of universal semantic component of language, the originality of culture of concrete people brings national specifics to their language.

Each language, according to Wilhelm von Humboldt, is a worldview and it should be considered as a permanent processuality of a spiritual creative work. The idea that language plays determining role in regard to specific forms of intellectual activity underlays a basis of the concept of linguistic relativity, known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis about the dependence of the style of thinking and world view paradigms of the people on the peculiarities of their language[3]. Culture, argues Edward Sapir, is what a given society does and thinks, and language is how it thinks.

The generalized worldview of people and ethnic mentality are formed by means of the language. As an intermediary between individual thinking and social reality, language sets not only cogitative stereotypes and world outlook limits, but also standards of behavior. The best proof of this statement is the presence of many proverbs and sayings in the folklore of any nation about a man and his doings, family and collective, truth and lies, manners and customs. Proverbs as teachings, as warnings, as orders served people for centuries instead of direct instructions and promoted the development of unique features of national mentality, including social behavior.

For example, in Chuvash families proverbs and sayings are still popular. They influence children's minds better than hundreds of paternal instructions. «Don't run ahead of others, but don't fall behind either» - this is the main,

unchanging rule of conduct for all Chuvashes. «A good name is worth more than gold», «A man without friends is like a tree without branches», «A wolf catches a lone lamb», «In native land, at home talk, write, and sing in native tongue» - similar advices from the unwritten life code of the people are powerful means of forming ethnic mentality. During a centuries-old collective experience reliable recipes were found for immediate (mental) resolutions of many everyday domestic and ever philosophical conflict situations. They remain in memory of the people due to capacity of thought, brevity of speech, expressiveness of language.

The Influence of Linguistic Assimilation on Ethno-Cultural Identity

The national language picture of the world is one of the basic sources of knowledge about ethnic mentality. Language, especially its connotative zone, contains information about associations sustained in a given national tradition. In every language, symbolic and associations are quite specific. For example, since times of antiquity in Greece an owl has been considered a sacred bird associated with wisdom, because this bird can see at night and she is aware of things that other living creatures can't see. In the Chuvash language an owl has opposite connotative meanings. If a man with Chuvash mentality is compared with an owl or called an owl, it would sound offensively: "tamana" (owl) is a fool or a flathead. The adoption of the connotative zone of a foreign language for representatives of other cultures is especially difficult, because the associations in the native language seem to be the only true ones. Nevertheless, only having learned to distinguish the expressive-emotional and evaluative nuances of foreign-language statements, it is possible to gain insight into the mentality of foreign people.

Lexical foundation, peculiarities of the grammatical structure and syntactic formations of an ethnic language do not exhaust all the resources that form a basis of national differentiation of the picture of the world. The sustainability of the specifics of national perception of the world is determined by the activity and life conditions of an ethnos, by its spiritual and materialistic culture, in the scope of which an individual exists. A language merely fixes an existing and polished by centuries form of evaluation and perception of the world phenomena. The names are assigned to the perceived things with their objective

properties, actions and relations, which are differentiated by people according to the degree of their meaningfulness and importance for the vital functions of a man in certain conditions. It is known that the Koryaks and the Nenets identify and distinguish more than 50 kinds of snow, and Chuvashes know more than 40 colors of horses and the word "ylem" (beauty) in the Chuvash language has tens of synonyms.

In a strong ethno-culture even mastering of numerous lexical units of a foreign language does not lead to a cardinal transformation of the world picture. A man refracts and adds foreign words to his own, already existing vision of reality. A piece of an unknown language mosaic is combined with a world picture already existing in one's consciousness and defined by the native language and culture[4]. An example of the original Chuvash language, with ancient elements borrowed from Hetto-Akkadian, Sanskrit, Persian, Arabic, Chinese languages, demonstrates unlimited possibilities of the language «lens» to master, accumulate or pass new words of foreign origin to the neighboring people.

The inability of "ethno-lens" to master, combine the "pieces of an alien mosaic", visualize the object designated by a word, results in incorrect interpretations, erroneous translations, abruptions of cultural realities being introduced. Understanding foreign words is not just attaching new tags to the known objects. Mastering a foreign language means learning to analyze differently the subject of language communication.

In the conditions of globalization the mastery of languages of international communication is especially important - it gives the opportunity to increase social mobility and achieve self-realization outside the traditional society. However, the achievement of certain socio-economic benefits usually costs the loss of traditional ethno-cultural identity and ethno-linguistic competence. The language assimilation alters the ethno-cultural identity at social and individual levels. Since the familiar material life conditions, cultural environment, social surroundings do not always correspond to occurring changes in the mentality of a polyglot, it leads to personal and social contradictions, inter-ethnic conflicts.

Implications of language and cultural unification in the context of globalization

In the epoch of scientific and technical progress, informatization and globalization, diversity among peoples is especially notable in many respects (perspective of development, population, habitat, connections and methods of communication, types of labor relations etc.). In eyes of a single generation the whole states and people fall or rise. In Russia the traditional rural culture is being replaced by the westernized urban pop-culture. There is no place for the base elements of ethnic spirituality in a society following the way of aggressive globalization. Urbanization and cultivation of consumer lifestyle change not only traditional domestic conditions but also the entire image of the state and society, models of communication and behavior, family relations, education of young generation. This leads to the erosion of the native language and ethnic mentality.

The language situation and language processes in the country depend on the status of the state in the world, the consistency of homeland national, migrational, cultural and language policies, the status of ethnic groups in the federation. In modern societies, and Russia is not an exception, the language polyethnicity is an inalienable part of multinational cultural environment.

Cultural and linguistic unification accompanying globalization entails extinction of small and rare languages. The gradual extinction of the world languages raises the questions of language rights, language freedom, language planning, and language politics. Maybe, in the past spontaneous development of languages has been a norm, but idea of full self-regulation of the modern languages is untenable.

A huge differences in the use of languages, uncontrolled inflow of foreign words (mostly English), the pressure on the national languages from the bureaucracy etc. necessitate the regulation of linguistic processes through legal norms and promoting ethnic languages in the media and official organizations (school, church, government). Obviously, the preservation of particular ethno-languages in specific political and socio-economic circumstances requires a purposeful intervention from authorities, lawyers, anthropologists, activists, writers, journalists and linguists.

Since the overall development of ethnic groups, of their knowledge about the surrounding world and humanity was taking place in different conditions

and with different speed, ethnic languages as sign systems develop irregularly and pave their own way linked to the historical destiny of their carriers. There are 6,000 ethnic groups and as many ethnic languages in the modern world. In this enormous ocean of languages the Volga region's languages of Tatar, Bashkir, Chuvash, Udmurt, Mari, Moksha, Erzya, the Kalmyk peoples are distinguished according to their status and prognoses for further development.

The linguistic situation in Chuvashia is quite interesting. Since 1990 two state languages are officially recognized in the republic - Russian and Chuvash. Today the basic problem related to the questions of knowledge of languages is a definition of the mother tongue. The paradoxical phenomenon spread at the turn of the XX — XXI centuries is a situation when a man lives and behaves according to the rules and etiquette of native people, but thinks and speaks in another language. It is not an uncommon situation when Chuvash, Mordvinians, Mari (mostly urban) define the language of their ethnic group as native, although the degree of proficiency in their own language is much lower than the level of knowledge of the Russian language.

In the process of formation of ethno-mentality for children from biethnical (for example, Russian-Chuvash) families, and also Chuvash children growing in the conditions of the Russian-language city, from two main components (communication in native language and perception of mental and behavioral ethno-stereotypes of senior relatives) a language component turns out to be unclaimed, while the ethnic identity overshadows a weak language proficiency and dictates a choice of Chuvash language as native.

Ethnic Languages in the Internet Age

The legal equality of the national and Russian languages, enforced by the laws in many national republics, including Chuvashia, does not mean their equality de facto. As in the pre-revolutionary Russia, nowadays the social functions of the language of the titular nation are limited and not due to the small number of carriers or weakness of the ethnic culture. The fate of the languages is decided mostly by the practice and requirements, dictated by economic, political, ideological, and administrative circumstances. According to these indicators in 2010 the UNESCO experts have added the Chuvash language to the Atlas of the World's Languages in Danger.

Chuvash and other related languages of the peoples of the Volga region are in unfair competition with Russian and English languages. The chances of the Chuvash are not great, since the Russian-English bilingualism in the conditions of the enforcement of the «world» English language becomes attractive for new Internet generations in the countries of the CIS. During globalization, which links the members of the global community through the establishment of virtual worlds within the worldwide social network, English as the language of computer technologies emerged as the technical means of communication.

In theory, any ethnic language can become a world language. Not structural advantages or defects, not richness or scarcity of culture to which they are related play a decisive role in the fate of languages, in their expansion or extinction. The languages of international communication arose mainly as languages of mobile, successful in military, economic and organizational matters ethnic groups that have not isolated themselves from cultural influences of neighboring nations[5]. In the era of globalization English has become the most successful language. By its usage it surpasses (but not due to people for which English is native) not only the artificially created languages - Esperanto and Interlingua but also some ethnic languages (Chinese, Spanish) successfully functioning within the borders of vast regions.

On the other hand, the «world wide web» gives the diasporas an opportunity to cling to the native culture and language through the sites published in the national languages by ethnic culture enthusiasts. Observations of the mentality of the Chuvash people show that for young people original positive qualities gain strength before the threat of globalization. This is indicated by the widespread establishment of the centers for the language studies, studies of traditional ceremonies and history of the people, the surge of the Chuvash folklore ensembles. In response to closings of rural schools, clubs, and libraries in small settlements domestic “sereps” (family game schools) with national songs, dances, and needlework were revived. The most preserved traditional culture and the purity of the language is found in the places of compact residence of the Chuvash diaspora.

Conclusion

A living language and ethnic culture acquired from childhood define the spiritual language for everyone. Otherwise, the population of the urbanized countries with high industrial potential and citizens as carriers of processes of modernization and globalization would not be able to the preserve the pronounced ethnicity. As before, there exist the ethnic characteristics that make possible to distinguish the Germans from the British, the British from the Italians, the Italians from the Russians, the Russians from the Tatars and Chuvashes. Nonvanishing ethnic features and ethno-cultural activity of populations cast a doubt that the processes of modernization and integration remove ethnic problems from today's agenda.

Globalization of the economy, media, education, and science is an objective process. It can contribute to the progressive development of nations, but only in conjunction with the careful regard for the attributes of large and small peoples and ethnic groups, and first of all for their languages and cultures. In our opinion, there is no better law in the world than the right of all ethnic groups for the spiritual and cultural equality.

Standardization and a common space for the development of technology, industry, transport, trade, and communications are beneficial to civilization and governance, but for the development of culture diversity, uniqueness of the languages and ethnic groups is necessary. It is wrong to put the financial, economic, and technical aspects of globalization into one row with culture, education, and spirituality of the peoples. There is a good Chuvash saying applicable to the cultural values: «Bazaar is common but everyone has his own purse». What people would give away their own purse?

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SECTION IV

Art, Theatre, Literature, Music, Culture

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SECTION IV
Art, Theatre, Literature, Music, Culture

NEW TECHNOLOGIES, OLD QUESTIONS & IMAGES OF EUROPE
The Humanistic Role of Technology

Chairs

—

Carlos Caires, Luís Gustavo Martins & Cristina Sá

Participants

—

Miguel Díaz-Emparanza Almoguera
Sofia Lourenço, Luís Gustavo Martins, André Baltazar & Ricardo Megre

Presentation

Carlos Caires, Luís Gustavo Martins & Cristina Sá

Technology has been on the roots of human development and culture from the beginning of mankind, establishing an instrumental link between nature, progress and history. Civilizations and societies have configured and reflected their identity through the use and adaptations of their existing technologies, when not directly impulsing them to create new ways of expression and configuration. It is in this sense that technology has always played a humanistic role, throughout millennia and centuries. Furthermore, technological changes are so powerful and influential nowadays that we are probably on the verge of a new era.

We can apply all these considerations to the construction, development and changes of Europe and its images. This workshop intends to disclose the humanistic role of technologies for the constitution of the ideia(s) of Europe, in its different epochs and in its challenges facing the new global context. But we intend to do it very especially from the perspective of new technologies, that is, from the perspective that new technologies can offer to better understand the past, to better reveal the present in its defies and to better configurate the future, as to be done in the context of our School of Arts.

Areas like restoration or conservation are capable now of revealing hidden realities in material works in a manner that could offer a new reading of some European histor(ies). Fields strongly attached to the most recent information technologies can approach in a different way even pre-cultural parameters, as those i.e. related to sonic research or artistic interaction. Technological extensions and augmented reality prophesize the future in a way that convoke the limits/frontiers of human perception, provoking a re-view of cultural paradigms. Or new technologies can simply offer us sophisticated ways of enjoying and revisiting a cultural heritage shaped throughout centuries, as digital media do in music and other forms of art and culture.

Contributors from different fields helped us think about the humanistic role of new technologies for the better understanding of the past, present and future of Europe.

Reflections on the Use of Multimedia Tools in Learning Environments

Archival and "Digitizing" Tools

Miguel Díaz-Emparanza Almoguera

Abstract

Nowadays, the digitization of audio media has encountered the same problem that affected analog formats in the past and, at present, is suffering too from degradation and obsolescence. In coming years, digital carriers will no longer be used, and listening to music will move towards cloud computing environments. The Department of Music Science of the University of Valladolid, Spain, has a wide music catalogue –mostly conformed by the results of musicological researches– in physic format (CD), with all the disadvantages this entails, such as the probability of being lost, destroyed or deteriorated. Taking innovative learning methodologies as a starting point, the chance to develop instructional methods involving new technologies represents a major motivation on the way to excellence, and makes possible giving the student multiple alternative (or supplementary) tools.

This paper proposes some reflections on the experience developed in the Department of Music Science at the University of Valladolid. These are related to several teaching innovation projects and include two specific and simple methodological solutions for the preservation of the carrier's content, based on the virtualization of education and the professional development of teachers. Both solutions are made employing Open Source programs, such as abcde encoding tool for Linux, Java for the graphic user interface and Greenstone as digital library support, and could also be used as a GUI for any Linux platform home customer to digitize any CD or as a domestic solution for storing a digitized music catalogue. They are also flexible enough to enable the addition or removal of metadata, providing a means for the creation of such digital libraries. We expect that these actions will result in an improvement in the quality of teaching in the degrees adapted to the EHEA.

Keywords

Digitization, Obsolescence, Music, Virtualization, EHEA.

Introduction

The deployment of sound media recording and reproduction in the late 19th century radically altered the way we used to listen to music. This was certainly the most significant change of the 20th century in the field of audiovisual development, caused by the new technology digital era that brought new challenges, offered numerous opportunities and prompted the appearance of new professionals with specific expertise in this area.[1]

As stated in the first lines of this paper's abstract, the digitization of audio media currently faces the same challenges of analog media, such as degradation and obsolescence. In fact, according to some experts, digitization is to a great extent a way to give access to rare materials, which are at risk of disappearing and distant in space, and not a permanent solution for preservation.[2]

The human knowledge that is preserved in digital carriers ("presumably" for life) is deteriorating faster than the old analog media, such as paper, wood, microfilm or acetates. Within the next few years, digital carriers will no longer be used and listening to music will move towards cloud computing environments.

This paper proposes some reflections on the experience developed in the Department of Music Science at the University of Valladolid. These are related to several teaching innovation projects and include particular and simple methodological solutions for the preservation of the carrier's content, based on the virtualization of education and the professional development of teachers.

As a consequence, this article talks about, or is related to, the digital human heritage –specifically music– and its preservation, the urgent need of addressing this topic, and how we could contribute to achieve it from a local initiative.

First experience: digitization of audio media for teaching purposes in a virtualized environment

The sound recordings used as teaching materials we are referring to are archived at the Department of History and Science of Music of the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters. They are formed by commercial and non-commercial editions of music covering all periods, styles and genres; many of them consist of field recordings that are the result of many years of research and have provided ethnomusicological documents of great value. These materials are mainly found in CD-Audio, DATs, tapes or cassettes, open reel tapes and vinyl.

The UNESCO recommendation, included in its Charter on the Preservation of Digital Heritage, encourages universities and colleges to ensure the preservation of the documents related to these investigations.[3]

In accordance with this recommendation, contents have been partially digitized until today as a result of the obsolescence of certain devices which the Department no longer possesses, such as the audio open reel tape player and the VHS video player. These are the most unstable analog carriers and require immediate attention.

But, what happens with digital media such as CDs, DATs, and DVDs? What is their life expectancy?



Figure. 1, formats' service life at 15ºC with a relative humidity of 30%

This graph shows a forecast of the conservation of various types of media in typical conditions in a controlled environment. According to a study performed by the Discoteca di Stato in Rome and National Media Lab, carriers from the family of CDs maintain a 100% integrity during their operating life, which is about 10 years provided they are stored in a stable environment with 15º C and a relative humidity of 30%. Nothing to do with the 100 years some computer magazines and many other academic computing journals touted between 1985 and the '90s.

Fig. 2, formats' service life at 25ºC with a relative humidity of 50%



Figure. 2, formats' service life at 25ºC with a relative humidity of 50%

However, if the temperature increases to 25° C and the relative humidity raises up to 50% (Fig. 2), life expectancy drops drastically to 2 years before the carrier starts having read errors, which would result in a partial but irreversible loss of data.

It is also interesting to note that the most durable supports are paper and microfilm, even if the information density per unit volume is low to medium. Another compelling fact is the small difference between the quality of magnetic media and optical media, which have the reputation (not entirely deserved) of being eternal.

At present, about over 60% of the archives store their data in optical formats like CD-ROM, DVD-ROM or any of their variations.[4] CDs constitute a cheap type of support, but require an investment of time and human resources that becomes absurd if we do not take into account certain assumptions already pointed out by Nicolas Hans and Johan Koster almost

ten years ago, when they defended the need to digitize files online. [5] Their arguments were:

a) They are easier to maintain.

b) They simplify content retrieval when facing possible disasters.

c) They uphold the fight against obsolescence.

Additionally, one of the five principles they proposed in order to establish a strategy for the creation of a Digital File and that could take place in any institution regardless of its public or private affiliation or the level of resources it could handle, was precisely adopting *the Net* as the only way for digital storage.

Process for the preparation of the first tool:

We started from four methodological objectives:

Objective 1: Selection of a representative sample of the audio media.

In this first selection, we chose a set of basic auditions that are part of the music library of CDs previously discussed. Selection criteria were based on the collection of a representative sample of materials often used for developing the courses taught in the Faculty.

Objective 2: Digitization and processing of materials for remote access.

In order to play a sound recording, the original media must be in good condition and it is necessary to possess compatible equipment, as well as to have all the basic knowledge about the computer, media types, formats, etc.[6] In this case these requirements have not been so necessary, because the CD format is widely used, has a high degree of compatibility and is read correctly by multiple players.

A Creative Commons free software, specifically the EAC program,[7] was used with the aim of extracting audio tracks –actually, this does not amount to digitization, as the material of the CDs is already in a digital format– and these files were integrated into the metadata that identify each disc and its contents. Several previous experiences refer to this software as being fully able to extract audio tracks from CDs in linear format (not compressed) without changing the content. Moreover, another "access copy" was generated in lossless compression

format (FLAC).[8] From the outset, the possibility of using the MP3 compressed format was discarded because, as it is widely known, files lose quality when converted into it. The size variation between a FLAC and a MP3 file is not significant enough to impinge on the storage policy that had been set for the tool.

Copyright Legal Conditions

In the legal field, each country is regulated by changing rules that must be taken into account. Currently in Spain, the process of CD track extraction we are describing does not require permits or licenses, especially for the documents created by the Department, as the authors of the works themselves have kindly provided their materials for teaching purposes. In the case of commercial CDs, the copy is done based on two principles: the private copying right and the UNESCO principle for the preservation of digital heritage, already mentioned.[9]

The right for private copying limits copyrighting and allows making a copy for private use –provided it is not profit-oriented– from an original material that has been legally acquired. Therefore, it is also a principle of the right to access culture and information. Furthermore, in its guidelines for the safeguarding of documentary heritage UNESCO recommends "... to facilitate the preservation, by the most appropriate techniques, of world's documentary heritage ... and to assist universal access to documentary heritage..."[10] In its *Charter on the Preservation of Digital Heritage*, article 8, UNESCO also mentions that "Member States must have adequate legal and institutional frameworks to secure the protection of their digital heritage".[11]

Objective 3: Implementing a storage repository and processing TCP-IP permissions.

In this case, we chose a NAS or storage server. It consists of a redundant hard drive (RAID 1) that serves as a document repository on a local network and can be accessed through a variety of protocols (ftp, http ...).

Objective 4: Use of digitized files employing remote access from classrooms.

The NAS is directly accessed via IP address. All that remains is to set some parameters, such as creating users and users' groups and establishing a permissions policy, in order to prevent, for instance, that two different users play the same content at the same time. In fact, this situation would constitute a violation of property rights.

Second Experience: Digitaudio and MUSICAT, the Music Digital Library

At this point, some might think that this project could be enough to conduct a basic digitization with archival interests. However, in the last half a year we have been working on and are now about to conclude another project called Digitaudio and MUSICAT: a music digital library that can contain any type of digital document, such as audiovisuals or any text format –not a "digital music library", which would apply only to music.

This project was born from the original idea of making an application specifically developed by the Department of Computer Engineering –whose lead author was the researcher Alejandro López Alberdi– and our Department of Music, contributing to the interdisciplinary development and representing a continuation of the previous project. The main idea was to create a digital collection in FLAC (Free Lossless Audio Codec) format and to build a platform that enabled access to this musical collection, in order to facilitate teaching. Therefore, the project consists of two parts: first, a desktop application capable of extracting audio tracks from a music CD; and second, a digital library in which the tracks extracted through the process above will be stored, so that the professors can access them in an academic setting.

Objectives

The objective is thus to develop an application that can extract audio from a music CD and convert it to a FLAC format. In addition, it must provide the necessary tools for uploading these tracks to a digital library.

The digital library created should allow to access audio tracks using a metadata configuration and to playback them in streaming, allowing teachers to use the audio files in a teaching context. The project would include the selection of this technology, the choice of the mentioned metadata and the implementation of the library described, and would provide the necessary means so that a person of the Department of Music can easily perform the tasks of a librarian.

Technologies Used

For the first part of the project –audio extraction–, several options were studied, but only two were considered: doing it directly with a programming language or using third party software. It was then discovered the front-end for Linux abcde (A

Better CD Encoder),[12] which facilitated CD audio extraction, labeling and conversion into any audio format (FLAC included). Hence, it was thought that it would be best to create a software layer over the front-end, in order to allow the graphic interaction with abcde. Java was the language chosen,[13] as it permitted to easily create graphical user interfaces and to interact with the operating system and file management, among other things.[14]

From the beginning, we thought about using Greenstone as software for the digital library, a solution developed by the University of New Zealand and promoted by UNESCO and the NGO Human Info.[15] Greenstone is an open source and multiplatform digital library software that supports multiple languages. It also allows storing files and playing audio in streaming.

Much of the efforts made in this project have involved studying technologies, with the aim of discerning which one was the most appropriate, and assembling all the pieces so that they worked harmoniously. This project has also meant a constant dialogue between the Department of History and Science of Music of the University de Valladolid and the Department of Computer Engineering of the same University.

As previously stated, this project has not been completed yet, so conclusions cannot be drawn beyond the multiple tests performed that promise excellent results.

Contributions

A – Impact on learning

We believe that this system improves, on the one hand, the learning level by enhancing teaching quality, as it reduces the time to access sound files, avoiding the handling of discs and facilitating significant time savings.

B – Innovation

All without the expense of the innovation that involves the creation of a new and easily accessible tool for any educational institution.

C – Applicability and transference

This work is based on the principles of heritage preservation promoted by UNESCO,[16] the principle of private copying and the scalability methodology: all subsequent implementations that are made to the tool do not alter it in its original form, but they enrich it with improvements that benefit learning.

Due to their own obsolescence, materials digitization is unavoidable in all areas and, as a consequence, an open source tool like this would promote the inclusion of the system in any discipline that possesses its own audiovisual materials or has some sort of license for its public viewing or hearing.[17] For teaching purposes, digitization would be considered in most cases.

D – Technological tools employed

Although the system and its methodological application constitute a technological tool, its integration into virtual learning environments, such Moodle, Claroline, Cose, Blackboard, etc., can be expected.[18]

Results and Conclusions

The application of this system has had two main immediate outcomes:

1 – Virtualization: digitization of learning materials. Implementing a repository of very low-cost remote access, favoring the transmission of knowledge through shared tools.

2 – Professional teaching development: considerable improvement of students' learning through an open channel of significant auditions. Implementation of professional skills in the teaching practice to promote a two-way knowledge transfer, mainly easing the learning environment and the actions carried out in the classroom.

This technology would make no sense if the ultimate goal was not (as indeed is) building working teams, collaborative networks and learning communities. The main topics revolve around teacher professional development, adapting materials to the EHEA, virtualization and interdisciplinarity. All these actions will result in an improvement of the teaching quality in the degrees, taking advantage of technologies to improve personal relationships between teachers, students and those collaborative networks. Among these networks is the European Experts training project Multi. Co.M, which counts with the Spanish participation trough the University of Valladolid

I would like to finish this paper with a paraphrase borrowing a few words of this year's Porto Conference's keynote speaker, Daniel Innerarity, who gave another speech I was fortunate enough to witness two years ago, that could be resumed in this thoughts:

"The present has shrunk, it is becoming less. On the other hand, but very related, the future is becoming more imminent, and therefore more disturbing. (So we have to work in trying to preserve our past, because) the future is not what it was."

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European Piano Schools of Music Performance
Building up a Multimodal Analysis

Sofia Lourenço, André Baltazar, Luís Gustavo Martins & Ricardo Megre

Abstract

This study aims to characterize representative performances by experienced pianists in order to determine main influential trends in performance, PARTICULARLY IN EUROPE, derived specifically from traditional piano practices referred to as National Piano Schools. The methodology of this exploratory study departs from a musicological empirical analysis in articulation with recent technological developments for metric methods. It allowed an analysis of gesture and musical semantics by applying a multimodal approach for capturing the pianist performance based on the extraction of features[1] sets specifically targeted to each piano school. In this paper we describe the quantitative analysis approach based on motion capture.

Keywords

Music Performance; European Piano Schools, Motion Capture, Multimodal Analysis.

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1. Introduction

This paper aims to characterize representative performances by experienced pianists in order to determine main influential trends in performance, derived specifically from traditional piano practices referred to as National Piano Schools. Previous research (Lourenço, 2008[1], 2012 [2]) has shown strong musical correlation of particular characteristics, namely the aesthetic, the technical, the historic and the repertoire. Piano pedagogy literature of each European National Piano School has been analysed together with an empirical audio analysis of recordings through a check-list survey. Overall the main National Piano Schools consist of three essential branches: the Russian school; the French school; the German school. The identification of National Piano Schools provides a powerful framework of study and awareness of the main influential European music intangible heritage. Furthermore, as pianists use their whole body to enhance their communication of the music's spiritual, emotional and dramatic essence, this project also aims to contribute into research on performance practice.

By following the main project, *MAPP- Multimodal Analysis of Piano Performance*, we describe preliminary results of the quantitative analysis approach based on motion capture of pianist performances.

2. Background

In the beginning of the 21st century performers and audiences were confronted with versatile piano practices originated from diverse nationalities and generations. Several studies have shown that it is possible to identify major trends in piano performance. These are generally referred to as National Piano Schools, due to its strong correlation to particular characteristics, which seem to share common features within communities of practitioners. Facets such as aesthetics, technique, historical tradition and chosen repertoire have been studied by several researchers (Neuhaus, 1981[3]; Kullak, 1994[4]; Leimer & Gieseking, 1998[5]; Timbrell, 1999[6]; Lourenço, 2012). Overall the main National Piano Schools consist of three essential branches: the Russian school, the French school and the German school (Kaiser, 1989[7]; Rattalino, 2001[8]). It is acknowledged that these National Piano Schools are present in most of the piano performance practices in the 20th century and therefore its identification provides a powerful framework to study, understand and raise awareness of the European music intangible heritage (Lourenço, 2010[9]). A live performance is much more than a sonic event. Pianists use the whole body to enhance their communication of the music's spiritual, emotional and dramatic essence in straight connection between muscular contractions and the overall body posture.

Most of the studies concerning piano performance body posture descriptors were of poor methodological quality concerning validity and reliability of methods, the findings of these studies should be interpreted with caution. This means more methodologically sound research is necessary. Studies (Ortmann, 1929[10]) point to the desirability of coordination of the entire neural system with corresponding response in movement in the torso as well as the arm, hand, and fingers, account for muscular tension and fixation in joints at a time when focus was directed toward relaxation and freedom of movement. Further studies focuses on use of arm weight at the keyboard and arm movements as well as shoulder and torso flexibility, upper arm, shoulder and torso (Breithaupt, 1905), use of arm weight and relaxation (Matthay, 1903[11]) and musical interpretation (Matthay, 1913).

Techniques other than fingers are considered "a diamond mine for the pianist", for there is no superlative playing which does not use to the full all the possibilities of the playing mechanism (Whiteside, 1991[12]). The same author considers the fingers are only the periphery of the total activity involved in playing and the action at periphery cannot promote the blended coordination demanded for virtuosity. For it is exactly the same rhythmic response to the music which is so natural in dancing and skating that is needed for a thrilling performance at the piano – a response throughout the body (Whiteside, 1997).

The data extraction will be an important tool for comparison of database results to evaluate and characterize representative performances by experienced and skilled pianists in order to determine the main influential trends of their performance practice referred to as National Piano Schools.

On the other hand, recent technological developments brought into the musicology research field new metric methods and instruments that allow an accurate analysis of musical semantics. Techniques like research in Music Information Retrieval (Tzanetakis, 2004[13]; Bernardini, 2007[14]; Lagrange, 2008[15]), allow a better awareness of the performance practice providing a new framework for application design, such as in Sonic Interaction Design, Content Based Recommendation Systems or Expressive Generation of Musical Content. This project aims to objectively evaluate and characterize representative performances by experienced and skilled pianists of each piano school, based on a set of features extracted using a multimodal analysis approach. Following up to the work developed by (Lourenço, 2012) concerning the characterization of Piano Schools using a musicological approach, it will now be possible to accurately analyze and evaluate actual metric data combining MIDI, Video Footage and High Resolution Digital Audio. This multimodal approach goes beyond traditional case studies since it allows the correlation of data acquired from different sources with great potential for new insights on this specific study (i.e. characterizing Piano performance according to European Piano Schools).

The methodology of this exploratory study departs from a musicological empirical analysis in articulation with recent technological developments for metric methods. It allowed an analysis of gesture and musical semantics by applying a multimodal approach for capturing the pianist performance based on the extraction of features' sets specifically targeted to each piano school. In this paper we describe the process of the quantitative analysis approach based on motion capture.

3. Objectives and Procedure

This project addresses the topic of collecting extensive multimodal datasets of precise measurements from expressive performances by skilled musicians, representing the three identified European Piano Schools. This multimodal approach goes beyond traditional case studies, since it allows the correlation of data acquired from different sources with great potential for new insights on this specific study (i.e. characterizing Piano performance according to European Piano Schools). This will require the setup of sophisticated audio, MIDI, Video in order to acquire the different modalities involved in a live piano performance, and the subsequent storage of the captured information into databases. In order to accurately acquire the performance data according to the project specifications, UCP and CITAR- Research Center already has the required equipment, such as: MOCAP and an Acoustic Piano with MIDI triggering mechanism incorporated (Yamaha Disklavier). It follows up on previous research related with the use to study the performance style of famous artists who clearly represent each one of the identified European Piano Schools (Lourenço, 2005), and available in CD audio (or video footage) formats. However, this will depend on the availability of computational methods for precise music information extraction from audio signals, which is still an open research problem (Tzanetakis, 2004; Lagrange et al. 2008).

With this Data it is possible to analyze and process the acquired descriptors data mining computational models to in order to extract significant results from correlating the extensive multimodal datasets. The outcomes of this post-doctorate research project will be: 1- A better understanding of the main influential European Piano Schools, provided by a new approach on the analysis (multi - modality) presenting new insights on these techniques, assisting performers by fostering the exploration of musical ideas.

2- An openly available database of multimodal datasets from the performance of pianists, which complies with standards of indexation and storage formats widely used by the International Scientific Community. 3- A proof of concept application available to demonstrate the potential for automatic determination of the dominant Piano Schools' influence on Piano performance. 4- A new framework for potential application design in areas such as Sonic Interaction Design, Content Based Recommendation Systems or Expressive Generative Music. In order to conduct this research follows a multi-disciplinary

approach concerning issues of musicology, technology, computer science, biomechanics, cognitive psychology and performance practice.

In this paper we describe the motion capture results of quantitative analysis of data of the chosen repertoire works by J. S. Bach *Präludium C- Dur BWV 846* (1722) and F. Chopin, *Nocturne Es Dur op. 9 no. 2* (1830-31). Other modes of data are there for further multimodal analysis.

3.1. Method and Participants

The first experiment was conducted with 9 subjects ranging from 19 to 50 years old with professional classical piano training. In this paper we will present the most significant results.

Four piano mainstream repertoire works have been chosen for the tests with the 9 pianists. Works J. S. Bach *Präludium C- Dur BWV 846* (1722), J. Haydn, Sonate C-Dur 1st and 2nd Movement, F. Chopin, *Nocturne Es Dur op. 9 no. 2* (1830-31), C. Debussy, *Danseuses de Delphes* (1910). This chosen repertoire intended to cover the main piano music stylistic diversity in order to recognize the possible influential trends of piano performance. Namely, baroque, classical, romantic and modern styles.

4. Building up a Multimodal Analysis

For this research the applications of data analysis in musicology is a promising approach because it allows us to analyze data from many different dimensions, categorize it, and summarize the relationships identified thus allowing to discover hidden regularities of both music and performance practice. Therefore, the methodology departs from a musicological analysis in articulation with recent technological developments for metric methods that allow an accurate analysis of gesture and musical semantics by applying a multimodal approach for capturing the pianist performance based on the extraction of features' sets specifically targeted to each piano school. This technique combines acquisition of: 1. Finger movement and articulation captured by haptic interfacing with a Disklavier Piano (Yamaha Grand Piano that provides logic data from finger stroke pressure). 2. Capture of movement (which of course includes the actual performance) clean-up of data post-processing of data (it can appear as two-

dimensional or three-dimensional objects) using MOCAP (Motion Capture) of each pianist analysed. 2. Body Posture descriptors which report the association captured by Biomechanical data extracted by sensor technology applied to postural muscles of the performer. 3. Body motion descriptors by software analysis of digital recording of Video Footage. 4. Musical Performance features extracted by software analysis of High Resolution Digital Audio. 5. Musical Performance features obtained by user surveys based on the acquired piano performances. With this Data it is possible to analyze and process the acquired descriptors data mining computational models to in order to extract significant results from correlating the extensive multimodal datasets. The hosting institution for this Post-Doctorate Research Internship, the Research Center for Science and Technology of the Arts (CITAR) at Catholic University of Porto, has recently been funded by FCT with a Video Motion Capture system, provides an ideal research framework to conduct this project.

The research methodology is designed to span over a period of 36 months, including the following tasks:

1 – Multimodal Experimental Setup 1.1 - Experimental Setup design: MOCAP system sessions- data extraction. 1.2 – End of Installation and Setup of the acquisition process for the MIDI data (Disklavier Piano) and Digital Audio recording System.

2 – Performers' Data Aquisition- Tests Trial 2.1 – Results of multimodal analysis. Production of basic proof of concept data set. Validation and correction according to the researcher reports.

3 – Data Analysis and Evaluation – Statistical analysis of data 3.2 – Evaluation of Results

4 – Documentation and Dissemination of Results 4.1 – Archive and share of all data produced on the experiment 4.2 – Production of adequate report of the experiment 4.3 – Production of guidelines for composers and performers regarding the use of Multimodal analysis.

Though the results themselves are not yet very conclusive (also because of the quality of the data), results show a correlation between the pianists who do not play the same way on most of the pieces and are generally more still and others more agitated. The same analysis was done on the rest of the database.

For this first experiment the postproduction of this ongoing project is a work on progress. After pre-processing of this data, we went on to a quantitative analysis importing data to Matlab. The extraction of features continued, different percentiles calculated on the trajectories of differents points of the body, on each axis allowing to compare pianists and reveal their national piano schools.

The metric analysis of data and amplitudes (percentiles) for each pianist performance, on each piano piece considered: axis 1 = horizontal axis along the keyboard, from left to right. (joints moving left and right, with respect to the keyboard); axis 2 = horizontal axis perpendicular to the first. (joints moving forward and backward, with respect to the keyboard); Axis 3 = vertical axis. (joints moving up and down). Percentile (90%): the percentile is based on the distribution of the positions of each joint along the rendition. The percentile 90% is the interval centered on the mean of the sample, covering 90% of the data of the sample. For each joint, the percentile is calculated, ignoring miscaptured frames.

Figure 1 below shows the movement amplitudes for the most extreme pianists analysis of results on Bach work. Each bar represents the amplitude (percentile 90%) of one joint of the upper body on one axis. Observation of these graphs for the nine pianists allowed us to note that the most varying amplitudes for the nine pianists were the bust (head, neck, trunk and shoulders) on x and y-axes, and the arms (elbows and hands) on z-axis. According to this graph, pianist 1 is the most still pianist (see Fig. 3) and can be categorized in the French interpretation school. On the opposite, pianist 5 is the most stirred pianist and seems to use more the arm-weight technique, typical of the Russian interpretation school as Lourenço refers (2005, 2011, 2012).

Results show a correlation between the pianists who do not play the same way on most of the pieces and are generally more still and others more agitated. The same analysis was done on the rest of the database, but because of the too poor quality of the rest of the database, the results were not conclusive and comparison could not be done for all pieces.


Pianist 1 - movement amplitudes
Percentile 90% (cm)
Axis
x
y
z
Head
Neck
Trunk
Left shoulder
Right shoulder
Left elbow
Right elbow
Left hand
Right hand
Pianist 5 - movement amplitudes
Percentile 90% (cm)
Axis
x
y
z
Head
Neck
Trunk
Left shoulder
Right shoulder
Left elbow
Right elbow
Left hand
Right hand

Figure 1.

5. Conclusion

Further investigation with new data should thus be done (Lourenço, Martins, Tits, Wanderly, Megre, 2014[16]). Nonetheless, the features that we extracted and analyzed seem to be relevant to compare pianists' way of playing, and maybe reveal different main national interpretation schools. Further tests will be necessary in order to deep analysis and to confirm or infirm this tendency. As an ongoing project of the precise quantitative analysis of musical movements and especially of national piano schools, further studies would benefit from a multimodal approach. The results themselves are not yet very conclusive (also because of the quality of the data). Moreover, as pianists use their whole body to enhance their communication of the music's spiritual, emotional and dramatic essence, this project also aims to contribute into research on multi-disciplinary approach concerning issues of musicology, technology, computer science, biomechanics, cognitive psychology and performance practice.

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SECTION IV
Art, Theatre, Literature, Music, Culture

RATIONALITY & RELIGION
A Perspective from the Arts

Chair
—
Yolanda Espiña

Participants
—
Pavlos E. Michaelides
Oleksandr Pronkevich
Mario Farina
Migue Días-Emparanza & Ignacio Nieto Miguel
Carmen Urpí, Sophie Ward & Marisa Musaio

Presentation

Yolanda Espiña

We cannot conceive of Art in general without relating it to a specific rationality, that works not only under the form of a stated technique but also as a mediation in which the "humanity" of human being as such and the material element of any art meet in an unique symbolic encounter, full of expression and meaning. It is in this sense that a relationship between artistic practices and religious expressions has inspired throughout millennia the outcome of magnificent forms and motivated the creation of so many of the greatest productions of mankind.

This relationship reveals a rational and anthropological - i.e. "pre-cultural" -basis, which allows us to find some common features in artistic religious expressions of all cultures. At the same time, such features offer valuable keys for a reading of those manifestations in their very diversity. Hence, we can think of foundational, general roots in religious art: temples in a general sense, sacred places in which the order of the stones configures the expectation of a presence; musical manifestations, from vocal expressions attached to a text to instrumental environments oriented to raise spiritual atmospheres; visual approaches to the divinity - or their absence-, like paintings, sculptures and other forms of visual arts; or codified religious corporal expressions, committed to signalize a physical and emotional blending with mystery, as it happens in all liturgy.

This workshop brought together scholars of different fields in order to explore the rational and anthropological dimensions of artistic religious expressions and furthermore to enable a way of a fruitful specific dialogue based on the analysis of these dimensions, useful to defy some of the challenges of an increasingly multicultural Europe.

The Byzantine Icon as Liturgical Art

Pavlos Michaelides

Abstract

This paper explores the unique positioning of the Byzantine icon as liturgical art. Like the architecture of the church, dome, iconostasis, inner sanctum and so on, the Byzantine icon holds an exclusive visual presence in the Orthodox liturgy. Highlighting the golden background of the Christ, the icon, -enlivened ever so by the liturgical act-, passes into the aniconic workings of spirit effectively symbolically actualizes 'the spiritualization of all reality.' The sacramental power invested in the icon by the Byzantine liturgy points the way to transcendent mystery wherein, the imminently abundant translucency of spirit unites the anthropological cultural and natural worlds to the order that dynamically reflects the divine ground of all things. The aniconic power of the divine, never identical to the pictorial representation of it, transforms iconic art into the liturgical act that enables constantly approaching anew—in the blending of emotion thought and deed—the archetype glorified, whether it be that of the Christ, the Virgin Mother, apostle, church father, martyr, or saint; but in such way that the holy forms depicted and also people animals trees, things and the whole of the natural world, point to the dynamic emergence of their own meaningful uncreated depth and light. The icon as work of art elevates the Byzantine religious imagination heightening the liturgical workings of the Holy Spirit. The absorption of the holy icon in the liturgical act uplifts and renews the anthropological dimension of depth its height approaching the divine mystery itself.

Keywords

Byzantine Icon, Liturgy, Art, Holy Spirit, Aniconic.

This paper explores the unique positioning of the Byzantine icon as liturgical art. Like the architecture of the church, dome, *iconostasis*, inner sanctum and so on, the Byzantine icon holds an exclusive visual presence in the Orthodox liturgy. Highlighting the golden background of the Christ, the icon, -enlivened ever so by the liturgical act-, passes into the aniconic workings of spirit effectively symbolically actualizes "the spiritualization of all reality." [1] Further, the sacramental power invested in the icon by the Byzantine liturgy points the way to transcendent mystery wherein, the imminently abundant translucency of spirit unites the anthropological cultural and natural worlds to the order that dynamically reflects the divine ground of all things.

The aniconic power of the divine, never identical to the pictorial representation of it, transforms iconic art into the liturgical act that enables constantly approaching anew—in the blending of emotion thought and deed—the archetype glorified, whether it be that of the Christ, the Virgin Mother, apostle, church father, martyr, or saint; but in such way that the holy forms depicted and also people animals trees, things and the whole of the natural world, point to the dynamic emergence of their own meaningful uncreated depth and light.

The icon as work of art elevates the Byzantine religious imagination, aims to heighten the liturgical workings of the Holy Spirit. In this sense the icon an indispensable part of the liturgy constitutes a micro-liturgy in-itself. More so, Byzantine iconic art activates through the interplay of presence and absence a world fully imbued with spiritual meaning and transcendent artistic expression heightens the workings of the Holy Spirit. The absorption of the holy icon in and as the liturgical act uplifts and renews the anthropological dimension of depth its height approaching the divine mystery as such.

However, paradoxically St. John of the Cross contends that the direct perception of the deity is apprehended beyond image or icon, concept or symbol in a manner that makes it impossible to say what has to remain unsaid. Nevertheless, St. John below expresses the very *abismo* of *apophatic* unknowing through the iconic amelioration of poetic language paradoxically deity reverts to an order of positive knowledge: that transcends all knowledge. He ecstatically speaks:

I entered into unknowing
Yet when I saw myself there
Without knowing where I was; I understood great things;
I shall not say what I felt
For I remained in unknowing
Transcending-all-knowledge…

This knowledge in unknowing
Is so overwhelming
That wise men disputing
Can never overthrow it,
For their knowledge does not reach
To the understanding of not-understanding
Transcending-all-knowledge.[2]

For John of the Cross poetic language becomes iconic in the hearing, an act of faith *an œuvre* a pathway of approaching the aniconic purity of God: 'whose voice can be heard but whose form can never be seen' (Jn 20:29). St. John's of the Cross apophatic insight is similar to a Johannine 'iconoclastic' interpretation: that "no man has ever seen God" (Jn 1:18); that "God is spirit" and must be worshiped "in spirit and in truth" (Jn 4:27). As such, St. John of the Cross observes that both the form and formlessness of deity is best approached not through vision rather through hearing and unknowing.[3] His poetry therefore opens a groundless iconic ground of 'hearing' the interplay that at once represents the knowledge and holy ignorance of divinity at the foundation of the liturgical order.

But closer to the Greek philosophical tradition Theodore of Studius (759-826) who was extensively influenced by ancient and Hellenistic mostly Neoplatonic thinking, claims the liturgical workings of iconic art to be grounded primarily in 'seeing' rather than 'hearing.'[4] For Studius the icon does not merely exemplify the later Renaissance conception of 'a translucent window to the divine' or 'a doorway to the realm of the holy dimension,' rather is a totality -*emphasis tes autopsias*- already a "self-manifested vision"[5] at once uniting in-itself the iconic and aniconic form of the deity.

Aligned to Greek philosophy the Byzantine *locus classicus* of divine manifestation affirms an *iconic aesthetics* positioned in vision. Sight prioritized unites in-and-as-itself hearing and all the other senses. In the final analysis, the Byzantine liturgical order of iconic art harmonizes mind faith and spirit by highlighting the ontological participation of the sensible world. Hence, in the Orthodox liturgy icons are to be seen and venerated, also worshipped through touch and kiss in a holy atmosphere that amplifies all the senses, elevating contemplative understanding ever-more through holy prayer the burning of incense hymns and song. Through the medium of the holy forms represented in the icon our *hypostatic* being, the totality of mind emotion voice and senses is effectually transported to the *hyperlogon*.

Indeed, the iconoclast and iconophile controversy forced Byzantine culture to clarify theological and doctrinal issues concerning iconography.[6] Iconophiles had to define the limits of religious representation in art however the question was not so much what an icon showed than how and why an icon could be a truthful representation. This translates to the question of what is the truth and

limit of visual representation. But insofar as truth and beauty are directly related the question is both philosophical and aesthetic transcends the discipline of art history; bears the search for ultimate meaning and identity with the divine through its depiction in the holy art form. As such, Byzantine religious or iconic art becomes an act of faith that concerns the liturgical workings of spirit.

Art that depicts the holy form is elevated to the level of uninterrupted participation in the liturgical order of spirit and the salvation of the world. As liturgical art it is elevated to the pinnacle of aesthetic creation, art *par excellence* in the transformative religious sense. The divine image holds the power makes manifest in perfect form by way of absence the original aniconic purity of the Christ and the Holy Spirit.

Charles Barber articulates well the visionary stance of Patriarch Nikephoros (758-828) who was also well versed in ancient and Hellenistic philosophy. The Patriarch observes the liturgical workings of iconic art its *modus operandi*, elucidating that the icon makes "the absent present by manifesting the similarity and memory of the shape, maintains an uninterrupted relation" with its archetype "throughout its existence."[7] For Nikephoros Barber points out the icon is "a showing without representation or repetition."[8] Moreover, the cause of the icon exemplifies not an aesthetic datum or property rather an analogue of Aristotelian *prote ousia* (first substance). The *prote ousia* is symbolized by the golden background that represents the vertical dimension of depth and formlessness, the uncreated *Christos Logos*, or the aniconic core of uncreated and created being-ness; as opposed to the holy human figure portrayed whose attributes are depicted according to church canonical prototypes this way tradition assures that all human qualities point to the dimension of the spirit.[9]

For Barber himself the icon constitutes "a site of imaginary encounter" approaching its likeness.[10] It is a "directed absence,"[11] "…a signpost whose insistent presence directs us elsewhere."[12] The iconic art form becomes the site of the symbolic religious revelation of pure presence (*parousia ta paronta*), a constant renewal of the visionary that concurrently transcends-itself passing into aniconic purity. The site of iconic encounter is an ever changing immanence, an expanse of transcendence transcending itself in that depth and horizon where consciousness is solely devoid of an object or the processes of objectification.

St. John speaking the poetic language of spirit exclaims:

And this supreme knowledge
is so exalted
that no power of man or learning
can grasp it;
he who masters himself
will, with knowledge in
unknowing,
always-be-transcending.[13]

However, returning to theological issues, Patriarch Photius (810-893) in *Commentary on the Categories* expanded the word *ousia* beyond Platonic *eidos* (forms) as well as Aristotelean *protai ousiai* (first substances). He examined *ousia* as *pollachos legomenon*, an analogue of form and matter that includes angels (*asomatos ousia*) and immaterial *nous*.[14] But above all lays the self-subsisting *ousia* as "*hyper-ousia* (*ousia hyperousios*) productive of all beings (*praktike ton panton*)." Regarding the idea of the concrete individual "God *qua* person it was extended to apply to angels and all that is divine."[15]

In *Amphilochia* Question 180 Photius writes:

> It is through the denial of all beings that we rise to the vision of the *ousia* and divinity that is above all beings. For what is not one among all beings but better than all, that is what God is, who brought out of non-being into being everything and who thoughtfully cares for the continuance and the harmonious movement of all the things he created.[16]

Above all, God the forever uncreated creator of all things, with infinite understanding cares and provides for the drama of the salvation of humanity that is the supreme concern of the Christian person and the ultimate theme of all art and philosophy. Species, genera, bodiless angels and the ultimate mystery of the Incarnation, but also the *hyperlogon* and *hyperousion* partake in the drama of creation: 1) through the constant toiling essences, the renewal of their drudgery and labouring existence their endless repetition in the cycle of vexation, and 2) through the step by step drama of salvation.[17]

According to Photius, the human mind can grasp and apprehend the revelation made available through faith the affections and all the senses, hence the power of the arts to depict divine images or iconic representations of deity

opens to the theologically unlimited. The power of the visual art of painting to present the divine is not merely one of "technical skills to depict" the marvel and "requisite charm of any object it chooses from the sensible world." It rather "lies in the human ability to disclose in familiar ways the ontological original, the divine *archetypon*," in all its miraculous beauty truth and glory.[18] For Photius, where the world of sacred art is concerned icons are not idols works "of human hands playing with matter without any divine influence, [the artists] shaping whatever comes to their minds." On the contrary, the liturgical aesthetics of iconic art participates "in the energy that comes from above, and in those holy persons…" transporting "our minds to them…" bringing "us blessings and divine favour from them."[19]

Photius contends that the visual grasp of the object communicates directly to the mind the essence or form of what is being seen, after which event the essence is adamantly stored in memory, mostly effectuates certain knowledge. The depth of the divine marvel initiated by the holy icon depends on the careful but passive attending, a letting the divine see and grasp you, the grasping be-ing directly the ground for depositing in memory the self-manifested envisioned order of the icon. Therein, the co-emergent aniconic purity of spirit grants through vision understanding and true knowledge of the holy form, its immanently transcendent presence.

In the liturgical aesthetics of the holy icon the golden background (formlessness and aniconic purity) becomes focal, is foregrounded. Whereas as previously mentioned the once human figure seized by the holy itself utterly grasped by divinity becomes 'other directed' points not to human qualities present in the holy form portrayed, but to the moral order of the Christ and to the translucency of the liturgical and aniconic workings of the Holy Spirit. Liturgical art becomes therefore an act of faith a leap into the being of non-being at the core of created/uncreated existence—it stands in likeness to the ground of being itself, pointing to *theosis* and *theanthropos* as the ultimate *desiradum*.

The foregrounding of the golden background enlivens the icon so that in the liturgical order of things at the end of all aniconic negation formlessness and *apophatic* thought, the icon reverts to a *kataphatic* re-appropriation of the holy, pointing beyond itself to the boundless experience of the *unio mystica*, wherein the being grasped and released into the silence of the divine *Word/Logos* remains "undiminished even as superseding and overflowing all things in a single and incessant bounty that is overfull and cannot be diminished."[20]

In the liturgical act of faith the icon, as the other positive side of aniconic darkness or the formless purity of *kenotic* emptiness, is received as that ecstatic fullness of deity that enters the worshiper overflowing undiminished. The plenum co-arising with emptiness effectively enlivens the spiritual atmosphere and liturgical site of the encounter with iconic art in proportion to the veneration showed the devotional and moral stance of the worshiper that is, the formless state of spiritual adoration attained by her during the liturgical act of worship and veneration. The highest teaching and attainment lies in following the ontological original becoming oneself unified, evermore a living icon that is on the way and in close proximity to its likeness, directed by the most holy aniconic silence of spiritual love.

Below, St. John guided by the most holy night spontaneously utters the ecstatic union; herein, the poetics of the light of dawn transform apophaticism into a kataphatic re-appropriation of the fullness of iconic love:

O guiding night!
O night more lovely than the dawn!
O night that has united
The Lover with his beloved,
transforming the beloved in her
Lover![21]

MacKendrick speaking of the *silent logos* says: "Our words [are iconic] they attempt to go beyond themselves but are silent at their centre."[22] More so through the life of faith and the holy art form, the liturgical admixture of mystery insight and feeling, wherein the self becomes a living icon of love words do go beyond themselves: this is the 'secret' of their silent centre. Speaking in a more mystical tone Jacob Boehme says: "There is nothing in non-base except tranquillity without being, an eternal silence without beginning or end."[23]

Byzantine liturgical aesthetics may be likened to that energizing nothingness, the living icon passively secretly received in silence and darkness. This most treasured silence guides the self to become a living icon of spirit, enlightens the visionary beyond the threshold of knowledge; it persistently transforms *qua* the uncrossable most precious abyss of God's ineffable night. Blessed Angela of Foligno speaks of the secret that strengthens and collects faith in darkness:

> And because this treasure [say the icon] is in darkness, we feel all the more that it is most certain and exceeding all else, and all the more so because we behold it as the most secret treasure of darkness.[24]

Here, holy darkness (or saving silence) pronounces the "most certain" treasure at the heart of unknowing. It exemplifies the ever-full *hyperessential* light whose bedazzling obscurity overflows exceeding everything founded or unfounded. The passage below is from one of St. John's descriptions of the reception of God's "ray of darkness" (*rayo de tiniebla*).[25] The saint writes:

> The reception of light infused supernaturally […] is a passive knowing. It is affirmed that the person does nothing, not because he fails to understand, but because he understands by dint of no effort other than the reception of what is bestowed.[26]

Similarly, Angela of Foligno finds that the silence of darkness and unknowing is received effortlessly and passively, and that she is:

> (…)strengthened in the treasure that works powerfully through darkness (…), this treasure overwhelm[s] the soul with unutterable ecstasy so that it cannot express with its mouth or even grasp with the heart all it beholds. It sees nothing and yet sees everything. […]. And I beheld in this darkness that its treasure exceeds all other and indeed everything. […]. For this treasure that I behold is the whole, while everything else is only a part; and no matter how unutterable […] it yields bliss beyond measure, bliss that may even be of the body. But when God thus shows Himself as darkness, He works no smile upon the mouth no glow or reverence in the heart, no leaping flame of love. The body does not tremble it does not move or alter its condition as it is wont to do at such moments. And this is because the body does not see anything, only the soul beholds. The body rests and sleeps and it is as if the tongue were cut off because it is incapable of uttering a single word.[27]

In conclusion, it is precisely the aim of Byzantine aesthetics and more specifically iconic art to transport the mind to the purity of aniconic being-ness, the *Hyperlogon*; wherein, in visionary contemplation the senses are heightened and awakened by the holy darkness: that ultimately turns them mute, the complete silence that secretly surpasses all and overflows in liturgical love. Henceforth, the Byzantine icon at the foundation of the liturgical order of aesthetic reality unifies the form and formlessness of the deity; magnanimously transforms self-other and the community. Ultimately, the self-united with the ontological

beloved is transformed into a living icon of the Holy Spirit. The abundant self, God *qua* person –*entheoumenos*, empowered by the secret workings of insight form and vision, finds-herself evermore on the liturgical pathway to its likeness: artfully ingeniously guided by the holy night, unknowing and aniconic purity!

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Endnotes

1. Tillich contends that "[…] what Byzantine culture effected was the spiritualization of all reality." Paul Tillich, *A History of Christian Thought: From its Judaic and Hellenistic Origins to Existentialism*, ed. Carl E. Braaten (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1967), 97.
2. St. John of the Cross, "Poetry," in *The Collected Works of St. John of the Cross*, trans. Kieran Kavanaugh and Otilio Rodriguez (Washington, DC: ICC Publications, 1991), 44-82, 53-54.
3. Noteworthy is St. Paul's apocalyptic insight: "[…] faith comes by hearing, and hearing by the work of God" (Rom. 10:17).
4. Theodore of Studius, *Opera omnia and vita*, PG 99.
5. Theodore of Studius, *Epistle 36, to his child Naucratius*, PG 99, 1220A, 1288C.
6. The iconoclast and iconophile controversy is beyond the present scope. The literature concerning this controversy abounds in an already crowded field of Byzantine Studies. For a clear understanding of the arguments on either side and an extensive bibliography of primary and secondary sources, see Giakalis Ambrosios, *Images of the Divine: The Theology of Icons at the Seventh Ecumenical Council* (Leiden, DK: Brill, 2005).
7. Patriarch Nikephoros cited in Charles Barber, *Figure and Likeness: On the Limits of Representation in Byzantine Iconoclasm* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 119, cf. 9.
8. Ibid., 121.
9. That Byzantine iconography follows prototypical canons in the construction of icons is necessary for the harmonization of form memory and likeness; thus, the mind is best aided to achieve the contemplative *hypostatic* state of the *hyperlogon*.
10. Barber, *Figure and Likeness*, 32.
11. Ibid., 121.
12. Ibid., 137.
13. St. John of the Cross, "Poetry," 54.
14. John Anton, "The Origins of Photius' Religious Aesthetics," in *Philosophy and Orthodoxy*, ed. Konstantine I. Boudouris (Athens, GR: ICGPC, 1994), 18-40, 27.
15. Ibid., 28. Cf. Francis Dvornic, "*The Photian Schism, History and Legend* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1948).

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21. St. John of the Cross, "Poetry," 73.
22. Karmen MacKendrick, *Immemorial Silence* (New York, NY: SUNY Press, 2001), 105; my brackets.
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24. Angela of Foligno, "The God of Darkness," in *The Soul Afire*, ed. H. A. Reinhold (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1945), 310-311, 310; my brackets.
25. Deirdre Green, "St. John of the Cross and Mystical 'Unknowing'", *Religious Studies* 22 (1996): 29-40, 31. Green says that St. John in following Pseudo-Dionysius calls this silent knowledge "a ray of darkness [...]. It is 'dark' to the understanding because the powers of discursive reason cannot penetrate its secrets; it is a mysterious […] ineffable state" (Ibid).
26. St. John of the Cross, *The Ascent of Mount Carmel*, II. XV. 2.
27. Foligno, "The God of Darkness," 310-311.

The Divine and the Human in Mikhail Aldashin's Animated Cartoon *The Nativity*

Oleksandr Pronkevich

Abstract

The paper stars with description of work of religious art as a piece of creation, which contains paradox, or cognitive conflict, in its structure. On the one hand, its messages do not allow multiple (at least moral) interpretations and are to be taken as final truths. On the other hand, they are always involved in the free game with meanings and forms, which do not necessarily coincide with the pragmatic goal of salvation. The rationality of an artist creating work of religious art consists in skillful use of the anthropological artistic constituent as a tool which can help people understand God's message without converting it into religious propaganda.

The second part of the paper focuses on Mikhail Aldashin's animated cartoon The Nativity (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sJfbqZ1qrQU) because it is an excellent example of use of rationality in the contemporary religious art. The animated cartoon tells about the first days of the newly born Christ both as epiphany and as a set of symbolic situations of human (not divine) life: Motherhood, Fatherhood, Power, Love, and Hatred. The artist combines traditions of the Orthodox iconography, the Russian lubok, and symphonic European music.

Keywords

Rationality, Religious Work of Art, Traslation, Anthropological Artistic Constituents, Russian Orthodox Animated Cartoons.

Introduction

The rationality of religious phenomena is one of the most fundamental issues of human life, which cannot have simple answers. People have always been trying to find understandable explanations of God's truth, which is beyond the human mind. Looking for help, they very early discovered the importance of works of arts as tools of bringing them closer to God. However, many questions remain unclear. One of these concerns the definition of rationality in relation to religion and to religious work of art. In the paper, I will try to contribute to considering this problem at the theoretical level and then apply my understanding of the religious work of art as a means of rational revelation of God's truth to an analysis of Mikhail Aldashin's animated cartoon film *The Nativity*.

I decided to focus on animated cartoons on religious subjects because, in my opinion, they usually serve as bad examples of rationality in religious art as they are used as a sort of religious propaganda. Since the fall of communism in 1991, quite a great number of Russian Orthodox animated cartoons have been produced. Many of them are sponsored, censored, selected, and recommended by the church, which cannot withstand the temptation to use them for its educational purposes. They become illustrations and explanations of the most important dogmatic and nationalist principles. As a result, they can hardly be recognized as real works of art, as they are too pragmatic and too transparent. However, Mikhail Aldashin's film *The Nativity* is unique in the corpus of Russian Orthodox animated cartoons. It was created for an audience wider than the group of Orthodox believers. It fascinates with its beautiful images and profound respect for classical and popular visual traditions. Anna Rappoport, a popular Russian actress, states that this…

> "film strikes with the atmosphere of complete involvement in the mystery of Nativity, as if Mary and Joseph were your neighbors and such a miracle could happen to anyone. On the level of events, the film does not break the canonical text. From the emotional viewpoint, it can be called an improvisation based on the early New Testament Apocrypha."[1]

Thus, this film can serve an illustration of successful solution of the problem of rationality in a religious work of art.

The Rationality of the Religious Work of Art

I would like to start with a definition of the rationality in relation to religion and religious art. By rationality in this particular case I mean the faculty of the human mind to discover the internal logic in God's messages, which in themselves are mysterious and superior to human understanding, and to translate them into human language so that human beings are able to explain the idea of the divine to themselves and to believe in God. The religious work of art helps perform this task. As an anthropological phenomenon, it is constructed by *ánthrōpos* – man, mankind, humanity, which uses its rationality to find and employ artistic forms, the constructive elements of encoding the divine message, so that this message can then be properly decoded and become intelligible to the human brain. That is what creators do when they represent the unspeakable and

unthinkable as something which can be retold and used for the pragmatic goal of salvation.

Thus, the rationality of an artist creating a religious work of art consists in using the anthropological artistic constituent as a tool which can help people understand God. However, because all artistic creations postulate a free aesthetic game with meanings, the artistic form proves to be a very unreliable tool for the "translation" of the divine message into human language. It operates with symbols, myths, and archetypes which are taken from the subconscious and the collective unconsciousness and must be kept under strict control and doctrinal censorship in order to reconcile the human and the divine constituents. The religious work of art allows the aesthetic game but limits its freedom by accepting only those aspects of the anthropological artistic forms which incarnate the sacred truth. At the same time, art remains art. It always "cheats" doctrinal censorship, which means that the anthropological dimension always converts the divine message into an incarnation of human problems; otherwise the recipient will not be able to identify him/herself with what he/she sees, listens, or reads. The religious work of art is an open-ended text which allows a wide spectrum freedom of interpretations.

If the religious work is art and is always involved in a free game with meanings and forms, it never presents salvation as a ready-made program but shows it as a complex process. The addresser (the artist) is not supposed to provide the addressee (human beings) with answers but focus on asking questions and setting forth problems, making people think and act as free individuals looking for God. The message of any perfect work of art (and a religious one, of course, is no exception) provokes discussions and interpretations about the fundamental issues of life and death, faith, and atheism. It suggests multiple readings within the context of an uncertain present and future life, which breaks any hierarchy in the contact regulations among the artist, the work of art, and the recipient. In their relationship nothing officially sacred is left.

When an artist forgets about the contradictory nature of the religious work of art, which has been described in the above paragraph, he starts using rationality in the wrong way in order to simplify both the message and the artistic form. As a result, the religious work of art loses its independent aesthetic value; it becomes a rhetorical device aimed at imposing dogmatic values and postulates. In other words, it becomes a piece of religious propaganda, which is supposed to educate

(or indoctrinate) people in a specific way. It is not a work of art any more. As a result, the anthropological constituent is also reduced to passive "raw material" and an object of manipulation. Symbols and archetypes are simplified to such an extent that they become primitive emblems of what is good and what is bad.

Animated Cartoon as a Work of Sacred Art

Mikhail Aldashin's animated cartoon can serve an excellent example of the use of rationality which leads to creating a perfect work of the religious art but not a religious propaganda film. It shows human life as a dramatic search for truth, which means that it makes full use of understandable anthropological imagery while "translating" religious messages into the human idiom. The creative impulse for choosing the Nativity as subject matter was an ancient bas-relief which the artist saw in a book: "The angel is waking the sleeping Magi as if they were brothers, under the same blanket. A huge star like a flower is hanging over them. This image, which was cut of stone, could seem naïve and primitive but it was so sincere and good-natured that filled me with joy."[2] The divine is presented in the film as a profoundly human story seen with an innocent child's eyes: "Once I saw some images of the Early or High Middle ages, which can seem clumsy for the contemporary man and for the religious art. I was deeply impressed by their naivety, lightness and openness. I appreciate the naïve art, it has no pathos, and it has something vivid, something human."[3]

In his film, M. Aldashin does his best to speak about the most responsibility-laden and moving situations in the life of every individual: Motherhood, Fatherhood, Power, Love, and Hatred. His motto is Grigoriy Skovoroda's words: "God's Grace made all complex things useless, and all necessary things he made simple".[4] By "simplicity" here M. Aldashin does not mean the strategy of deleting the problematic and complex layer of religious imagery and converting it into visual clichés, but attempts to avoid all insincere and bombastic elements in the tradition of representing the New Testament characters: "I wanted to show the world full of light even during the nighttime, populated with kind animals and strict angels. Life appears in it thanks to love, which descends from Heaven".[5] Profoundly humanistic in the most positive sense of the word, the film completely changes the traditional canonical model of reincarnating and visualizing biblical texts and suggests re-reading them through an anthropological lense. The director uses a

number of textual strategies to bring the Nativity closer to the contemporary person. First of all, he sees the Archangel Gabriel, Mary and the baby Jesus Christ, and the Magi as human beings who have their own strong and weak points. The characters have clear cut social, gender, and psychological roles and live simple lives full of the difficulties and joys which are known to everybody.

The film starts with the Annunciation. The whole episode is shown with kindly irony. The Virgin Mary, like Remedios the Beautiful from Garcia Marquez's *Hundred Years of Solitude,* is hanging freshly washed bed sheets. The Archangel is watching her from behind the trees. Mary is a simple, earthly woman doing daily chores about the house. She is shy, timid, and naive. The Archangel looks a little clumsy. His mission is to communicate to Mary that she will have a divine baby but he behaves as if he were a man trying to please a girl whom he met unexpectedly. Instead of the Madonna lily, he picks up a simple flower growing wild by the path and presents it to Mary. St. Gabriel whispers in her ear the great mystery, which she accepts with reserved surprise and enters the house. The whole episode differs from the grandiose scenes on the canvases which we are used to seeing. It is a piece of everyday life.

M. Aldashin uses small details and gestures to make the characters act as ordinary human beings: "Thus, angel, when running away, stumbles and even falls down; he picks the apple and wipes it on his own sleeve; the shepherds drink wine and start fighting; Mary tests temperature of the water with her elbow before washing the baby. Even animals in the barn help her rock the cradle."[6] Moreover, the creator of the film looks at the whole story ironically and refuses to see its heroes as incarnations of absolute perfection but shows them in a ridiculous light. The Archangel talks to Mary as a theatrical lover would. After telling her about the miracle, he enjoys the taste of a pear which has fallen down from the tree. When landing, he jumps on one leg in order not to lose his balance. He scratches his head, puzzled by the ignorance of Joseph.

The most convincing proof of the humanizing tendency of the reading of the Gospel in this film is the family life of Mary and Joseph. She is much younger and would not necessarily be considered the model of beauty, but she becomes beautiful when she looks at her baby. He is a small, older man with a rather stupid face, bold head, and short neck. M. Aldashin emphasizes the difference in age between him and his wife. Their characters are also different: she is calm and tender; he is inelegant and robust. Joseph behaves as a typical man who has to deal with

a newly born baby and does not know what to do. He walks to and fro at night because the boy is crying and does not let him sleep.

The artist presents Joseph as a typical rural simpleton who does not possess any intellectual ability: when the angel opens the book with prophesies about the birth of his son, the poor carpenter only waves his hands trying to say that the sense of the written words is beyond him. In one of the episodes, before going to bed, Joseph takes his peasant boots off and moves the toes of his huge and course feet. Exhausted with hard labor, he sleeps in an inconvenient position. He is making a stool and does not even notice the Star of Bethlehem over his barn. In another episode, Mary and Joseph have to wash the baby before putting him in the cradle to sleep. This scene is absent from the Gospels and is invented by the artist. Here, we see the division of labor: Joseph brings the water, and Mary puts the boy into the barrel, for the father is not dexterous enough to do such a delicate job. While filling the bucket, Joseph drinks water from the stream and wipes his mouth with the sleeve of his shirt. Then he carries the bucket, bending under its weight. Mary performs the ritual of preparing the bath: she hums a melody of Beethoven, then tests the temperature with her elbow, takes the boy and tenderly puts him into the barrel. Jesus the baby is shown from his back and we can clearly see that his hair is of fair color. Mary pours water on the boy head's while Joseph stands like a rock and looks in surprise at his wife and son. Of course, such a way of demonstrating the details of life of the Holy Family is absolutely anti-canonical, but I am sure many parents who have seen the film recollected the moments when they had to wash their own babies and recognized themselves in the scene.

One of the critics who wrote about the animated cartoon film admits that "all those everyday details divert us from the canonical dogmas and show us the earthly happiness when a new human being is born."[7] I disagree with this statement, because by returning the sacred meanings to simple things M. Aldashin leads us to understanding the mysterious (religious) side of the Gospels. The artist does not divert from dogma, but completely excludes it from his interpretation; the human scenes are not a diversion, but the essence of his message. Without any doubt his *Nativity* is a perfect "translation" of Mystery into human language, and as a result is a highly pious creation which reveals the spirit of Christianity. The characters are surrounded with the aura of devoutness because their behavior is driven by Love and Grace.

In spite of his rude manners and "low" intellectual level, St. Joseph turns out to be an ideal father and husband. He repairs the barn and protects his wife and his baby. His eyes (like eyes of all other characters, including animals) are widely open, proving his credulity, and they are very often directed at Heaven. It is about him that Mathew says: "Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven" (Mathew 5:3). Mary is an ideal Mother, too. Her relationship with Joseph is in absolute harmony: they understand each other perfectly without saying a word. The spectators become witnesses of miracles, or it is better to say that the same miracle is repeated in many situations. All violence stops when the Angel spreads the Word about the newly-born Jesus Christ: the shepherds stop beating each other, thee fishermen give freedom to the fish, and the lion does not kill the rabbit. Angels, human beings, and animals come to an understanding and support each other: the cow and the donkey rock the cradle when Mary is sleeping, and the lion becomes a means of transportation for the rabbits and carries them on its back. All living creatures meet in the round dance and glorify God to music performed by angels.

The characters are immersed in the divine aura, which is created by a combination of colors, light, images, and sound-track: all those components create the effect of the holy innocence, which contain all the variety of cultural meanings. "The colors are taken from the warm part of the spectrum: they are neither intensive nor contrasting and do not distract the spectator from the action and sound-track."[8] The images are "primitive" but expressive and are able to transmit a wide scale of emotions. M. Aldashin combines the traditions of the Russian *lubok* (popular color print) and icon.

A special role is given to music. M. Aldashin says that "all dialogues disappeared and only classical music was left."[9] M. Aldashin does not use sacred music, but the secular works of Johann Sebastian Bach (the Adagio from Brandenburg Concerto No. 1 in F major and the Andante from Brandenburg Concerto No. 4) and Ludwig van Beethoven (Allegretto from Symphony No. 7). They become "a narrator, a protagonist, and a reflection of the atmosphere. As a result, the spectators see the famous Gospel legend through the child's eye, kind and a little naïve"[10], states Nadezhda Dudoladova. The Russian film director changes the tradition of interpreting the above-mentioned fragment from Beethoven's Symphony as a funeral melody and converts it into a "hymn to joy" (Nadezhda Dudoladova).

Conclusion

Thus, Aldashin's *The Nativity* is a perfect example of skillful use of artistic forms created by human rationality as a means of revelation of divine mysteries. His "film is full of the child's religious wisdom, in which the divine is not separable from the secular, and humor is mixed with delight."[11] It would not be an exaggeration to conclude that this artist transforms the animated cartoon into a new form of sacred art.

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Endnotes

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Symbol and Art in Mediterranean Cultures
A Hegelian Point of View

Mario Farina

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to define the relationship between art and religion within the context of the three Mediterranean Monotheisms. In order to accomplish this task, I will follow Hegel's precious input, in particular his theoretical explanation of the artistic effort towards the elaboration of an image of the divinity. First, I will briefly study Hegel's description of Islamic and Jewish poetry as the paradigm of the monotheistic impossibility to accomplish an artistic and symbolic representation of God; secondly, I will linger on Hegel's description of symbol as artistic instrument of signification; finally, I will follow the line of Hegel's understanding of Christian art as a demonstration of the necessary failure of any temptation towards a sensible representation of the monotheistic divinity.

Keywords

Symbol, Mediterranean Cultures, Religious Art, Representation, Hegel.

Throughout this paper, I wish to support the following claim: any attempt to artistically present a monotheistic concept of God is bound to fail, and such a failure shows the image's inability to fully expose spiritual content; the dynamics of the "resuscitation of the symbolic" into Christian or Romantic art is a result of this process.[1]

1. In order to account for Hegel's description of Islamic and Jewish poetry, I shall mainly refer to Hegel's *Lessons of Aesthetics*, and especially to the 1823 and 1826 lectures. In the first lecture on fine art (Berlin, 1820/21) Hegel classifies holy poetry as a distinctive form of classicism, that is to say as "Classic Sublimity," and he subdivides therefore classic art in two parts: on the one hand there is monotheistic classicism, on the other hand there is the Greek and accomplished classicism. This partition disappears however already in the second series of lessons, and in 1823 Hegel includes holy poetry in the symbolic form of art.

In 1823, Jewish and Islamic poetry are no longer part of Classic art, but they are still described by a proper and distinctive aesthetic category: that of

sublime. "On the one hand there is the poetry of sublime, on the other hand there is the poetry of finiteness,"[2] writes Hegel in his *Lectures of aesthetics*. As is well known, that of sublime was maybe the ruling and surely the most original aesthetic category of the 18th Century aesthetics. Kant, in his third *Critique*, had defined the sublime as something that "is to be found in a formless object insofar as *limitlessness* is represented in it, or at its instance, and yet it is also thought as a totality."[3] Thus Kant described the sublime as a sensation resulting from something enormous, something limitless, something infinite. This definition had been spreading between the 18th and 19th Centuries and many authors oriented their aesthetic position according to Kant's determination of the sublime (one may think for example about Schiller's essay *Of the Sublime*, or the early Romantic debate about sense and sensibility).

For that reason it may be surprising that Hegel, the most influential post-Kantian philosopher, limits the function of sublime to such a restricted form of art. His position becomes however consistent if the function of the aesthetic judgment in Hegel's aesthetics is also taken into account. The beauty as ideal, that is as the realization of the idea of reason, is not the result of an aesthetic judgment, but rather the concretization of the idea of *Geist*. The "beauty" is therefore more similar to a practically demonstrable effect, than to the result of some judgment. The concept of beauty characterizes, then, any successful attempt to realize the idea of reason, and any form of this realization may somehow be said "beautiful". According to Hegel , the sublime is precisely such an attempt to realize beauty. This attempt clearly echoes Kant's account, which defines sublime as enormous, infinite and disproportionate. Therefore, Hegel's conception of sublime should be considered in this specific context, that is as a non-technical use of Kant's category. Whenever describing the historical development of artistic forms, Hegel always runs into the same issue when it comes to Jewish and Islamic poetry: the position of this kind of poetry violates the chronological advancement of art. Symbolic art complies, in its progression, to the historical development of cultures: it begins with the religion of light in Persia, then it passes to the Indian cults, and finally it culminates with the Egyptian architecture. The transition between symbolic and classic is always determined by Oedipus's explanation of the Egyptian enigma of the Sphinx. The Jewish and Islamic poetries are then always placed together after this section. Such a positioning of Islamic and Jewish monotheisms triggers the following question: are they actually part of symbolic art? Or, in other words:

the relation between meaning and image as established in that kind of poetry is actually a symbolic relation? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to better describe these kind of artistic phenomena.

In the 1826 *Lessons,* Islamic and Jewish art are placed together in the fourth section on symbolic art, entitled *The become free of the spiritual and the sensible.* This part, besides the holy poetry, also contains the section on the technical aspects of poetry: parable, metaphor and so on. This fourth part is described as "the fall apart of both parts" of the symbol in general.[4] The two sides of the symbol are the sensible image and the spiritual meaning, and their reciprocal collapse is nothing but their division into two separate areas, originally united in the symbolic intuition. This fourth part is subdivided into three steps, which correspond to: the Jewish intuition; the new oriental pantheism (that is, the Islamic poetry); and the full becoming free of spirit and sensibility.

1) "In the Jewish intuition we meet a become free of the interior, of the meaning, toward the exteriority." This is the relationship where the spiritual has a leading role, as it dominates in itself the natural, that is to say the finite. The finite, which is also the exterior, is instead just an accident of the spiritual, and the spiritual is what gives sense and meaning to the particular. This understanding of the Jewish relation between universal and particular mirrors a general idea of the German Enlightenment, expressed also in Hegel's early writings. According to this perspective, the Jewish religion is a religion of domination, in which an abstract concept of God dominates the people with law and power. In his *Lessons*, Hegel expresses this idea within an aesthetic framework: "this relation gives us what in its determinate freer form is called sublimity." The first stage of this kind of relation is therefore as follows: the spiritual, the God, in its relation with the natural, is the power on this, so that the natural is placed as a negative; and furthermore Hegel adds: "this relation in its determinate freer form gives us what is called sublimity."[5]

From this determination three consequences ensue: *first*, the world of Jewish intuition is *entgöttert*, that is to say God cannot be present in the exterior and finite stuff of the world; *secondly*, the word becomes nothing but a mere prose, something prosaic, without an independent meaning; *and finally*, precisely for this reasons, miracles can appear in the world. Differently, in other worlds, such as for instance the world of India, that is a fully divinized world, there are no miracles, because the word itself is entirely a miracle. But this is not yet the true sublime: "the actu-

ally sublime is included just in the relation of spirit with this prosaic, finite, worldly thing, that is present."[6] The sublimity is therefore neither the simple prosaic world, nor the infinity of the one God, but rather the distinctive relation between God and world, between finite and infinite. Sublime in this sense is nothing but a relation, a connection, that is impossible to be accomplished. On the one hand there is the abstract infinity and on the other hand there is the merely finite, and the sublime is the unbridgeable hiatus between these determinations. As an example of this kind of sublime, Hegel mentions the Jewish hymns and in particular the psalms, especially psalms 90 and 104. Another example is *Genesis* 1, 3: "and God said, let there be light and there was light," and other examples are also taken from Pseudo-Longinus. What is specifically interesting for our position is the determination of the value of this position: this big number of hymns, of odes of God, [realizes] the classic sublimity – a model for all the times, where are brilliantly presented the sensations of men toward God. Whenever man needs to present his sensation toward the one God, he has to make appeal to the dynamics of symbolic sublimity.

2) The second accounted relation between God and the world is that of Islamic poetry: "the brilliant pantheism is at home in Orient; Arabs, Persians and Turks." Based on this kind of pantheism the relation between meaning and figure is however different from the Jewish one, actually it is the very opposite: here the substance, the One God, is placed everywhere in the objects.[7] In this regard, Hegel shows some penchant for Islamic poetry, probably at least partially influenced by the cultural context of those year (one may think in particular about Goethe's collection entitled *West-Östlicher Diwan*, inspired precisely by Arabian classic poetry).

Also in this case, one can easily appreciate the relation and immense distance between nature and God, however according to this position the One substance has an affirmative relation with nature: pantheism claims the immanence of the divinity in the objects, and the dominion of God is transformed into some sort of spiritualization, inspiration, of the objects. Therefore the phantasy of the poet is itself grounded in the object. Hegel describes the character of the pantheist poet as follows: "it is the character of the cheerful, blessed interiority, that is typical in Orient; the western, romantic interiority is more deepen in itself. […] The happy, free interiority is at home in Orient."[8] The poet is a free, independent spirit, he maintains his nonchalance also in misery; his spirit is present in the objects and he uses the objects as images for poetry.

This kind of praise of the Arabian poetry in nonetheless clarified by the abstract determination of the Oriental pantheism: "the spirit exists for itself," and "the natural appears as an accident."[9]

According to this descriptions, the attempt to produce an artistic exposition of the relationship between nature and God, as a monotheistic God, always runs into the same kinds of problems. The One God, as the meaning of the natural, stands in any case at immeasurable distance from the particular. By the Jewish intuition, this distance is represented as the domination of the One God, while in the Arabian poetry it is exposed as the complete immanence of God in the whole nature. But according to both accounts, nature just functions as a mere decoration for the presentation of the spiritual. This is the destiny of any attempt to sensibly present an infinite God: to show the deficiency of the image and to expose nothing but an immeasurable distance between finite and infinite, that is to produce the symbolism of the sublime.

2. Based on Hegel's definition of Eastern poetry, our opening question was: are those kind of artistic phenomena actually symbolic? The answer should now be both positive and negative. Provided that the symbol is just a sensible image that necessarily alludes to a spiritual meaning, then the Oriental pantheism is actually a form of symbolism. However, the symbol is also a determinate moment of an historical and cultural development. It is something that culminates with the resolution of the Sphinx's enigma, and the resolution of the symbolic presentation consists in the overcoming of symbol through the pantheistic presentation of a multiplicity of Gods in the sensible image; that is to say, it is achieved by the rising of ancient Greek Classicism. According to such a restricted concept of symbol, the holy and sublime poetry is something different from the symbolic. However, if the symbol is taken in a larger sense, that is as dynamics of significance, as a semiotic instrument, then holy poetry is actually a model for a very distinctive symbolic relation: the relation resulting from the attempt to present a monotheistic conception of God to sensibility.

Based on the thorough study of Hegel's systematic determination of art, it may be argued that the model of symbolic art is not the accomplished symbolism of Egypt, but rather the sublime symbolism of Holy poetry: "On the further side of the perfection […] lies the art of sublimity – symbolic art, in which the figuration suitable to the Idea is not yet found."[10] The ground for this description is provided by Hegel's understanding of art in the *Encyclopedia*:

according to Theunissen's account, art in fact isn't considered as autonomous, but rather in its relation with religion[11]. As religious, the symbolic art is better explained as the temptation to present the infinite in the finite, whose model is traceable in the holy and sublime poetry.[12]

3. Now, by looking into Hegel's assessment of Christian and Romantic art, a perfectly analogous account can be found : as far as the relation with the divine is concerned, "romantic art gives up the task of showing him as such in external form."[13] As Hegel says in the Introduction to the 1826 *Lessons* : within the romantic form "art continues in the opposition of Symbolic, even though in a completely other manner."[14] The weakness of Romantic art consists in the impossibility to sensibly present its proper content, that is "the absolute idea" in its perfection. The idea must be considered as free from sensibility, but art is a structurally sensible manner to present a meaning. Therefore the Christian conception of religion must fall again into the dynamics of symbol. Accordingly, based on Christian art the exteriority "can appear here as a contingent toward the its significance."[15] The same contingency, the same accidental character, marks therefore the Jewish-Islamic art on the one hand, and Christian art on the other.

According to Hegel's determination "the spiritual as spiritual becomes the meaning of the sensible; the figure becomes thus like that of symbolic. […] in the romantic art, the ruler is the spiritual in general […]. The sensible can be considered as randomness."[16]

But what is exactly the consequence of this description? My claim may be formulated as follows: the romantic, and therefore Christian art, must necessarily mirror the development of the fourth part of symbolism; such a part contains the determination of holy Jewish and Islamic poetry: it begins from the negative relation between meaning and sensible, it then goes through the affirmative and pantheistic relation, and it ends with the becoming free of the two sides. However, this mirroring acts no longer directly on the soil of objectivity, but it is rather mediated by subjectivity.

The first part of the romantic form of art is dedicated to *The religious as such*, that is to say to the *Spiritual for itself*. In this section, what is important is exactly the fate of the divine toward the sensible world. The history of Christ, his Calvary and his death are presented here; the pain of the body

and the suffering of Mary and finally the sacrifice of the flesh in the lives of martyrs are also included. This part is somehow the reproduction of the Jewish intuition: the infinite and divine is supposed to be what provides meaning to the sensible. However, this donation of meaning is accomplished by a negative evaluation of the mundane. The flesh must be sacrificed, and it is posited just in order to stand for the negative side of God. Furthermore, just as for the Jewish and sublime poetry, this is the part where miracles take place: God appears in the world and he states his power on everything particular, precisely by modifying it.

The second part of Christian art is, on the contrary, *The affirmative reflex* of the divinity in the world. As previously seen, the pantheistic position was some sort of divinization of the world through an affirmative presence of God in the object; now, in the second Christian section, some mirroring of that conception is presented, but the soil of the divine's affirmation is no longer the realm of the objects, but rather the subjectivity itself. For the infinite to act in the world, it needs the mediation of the subject, and therefore its achievement strongly shapes the personality. This part contains the description of chivalry, and the determination of its values: love, loyalty, honor and bravery. In this very section, Hegel makes an explicit allusion to the Islamic poetry and behavior, because of its capacity to explain this affirmative relation between sensible and divinity. The divinity tries to impress itself in the world through the divinization of actions, but what results is a distance between the infinite of God and the finite of the subject's action, which culminates with Cervantes's farce of all of chivalry's values: the *Don Quixote*.

Finally, the last romantic determination, precisely as the last determination of the symbol, is *The become free of material, of natural immediacy*. Here we can find "*die Entgötterung der Natur*," that is the banish of God from nature. The Holland painting and the humorist romantic poetry are then the exhibition of subjectivity itself without any sort of relation with the divine. The divine vanishes from the art's world, precisely because of the impossibility of art to present the infinite in the image. This is the well-known claim about the end of art, and it means that the art becomes aware of its inability to present directly and sensibly its proper meaning.

The end of symbolism replicates itself at the end of Christian art. The ground of this repetition is the very nature of the content of both kinds of art: the monotheistic and infinite God. Art is structurally image, sensibility an exteriority, and the monotheistic God is on the contrary meaning, immateriality and interiority. The resuscitation of the symbolic is therefore motivated by the content, which cannot find an adequate expression through images.

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Endnotes

1. See, Jeong-Im Kwon, *Hegels Bestimmung der Kunst* (München: Fink, 2001), 168.
2. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Kunst. Berlin 1823* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1998), 140.
3. Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (Berlin: Reimer), § 23, 75.
4. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Philosophie der Kunst oder Ästhetik. 1826* (München: Fink, 2004), 89.
5. Ibid, 90.
6. Ibid., 91.
7. Ibid., 93.
8. Ibid., 93-94.
9. Ibid., 90.
10. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1992), §561.
11. See, Michael Theunissen, *Hegels Lehre vom absoluten Geist als theologisch-politischer Traktat* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1970), 190-200.
12. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie*, §561.
13. Ibid., § 562.
14. Hegel, *Philosophie der Kunst oder Ästhetik. 1826*, 28.
15. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie*, §562
16. Hegel, *Philosophie der Kunst oder Ästhetik. 1826*, 29.

Ten Years Of Integral Intervention on Valladolid's Organistic Heritage

Miguel Díaz-Emparanza & Ignacio Nieto Miguel

Abstract

Among all initiatives on heritage conservation, restoration represents a necessary and mandatory first stage in many cases, regardless of the performance area to which it ascribes. Most initiatives in this regard involve several agents.

The purpose of this article is to present activities resulting from the main priorities established in the partnership agreement signed among the Provincial Government of Valladolid (Spain), the Archbishopric of Valladolid and the University of Valladolid for the promotion, dissemination and restoration of Baroque organs located in the province of Valladolid. This agreement was signed by all three parties in 2002, being subjected until present to annual renewals and incorporating relevant additions.

Initially, we will analyze the background of this agreement's signing through activities related to the pipe organ sacred heritage that have been organized by the University of Valladolid and carried out regionally in the last 25 years. This experience of more than a quarter century has turned this institution into a potential tool to mediate between organs' owners and restoration patrons.

Finally, we will present some conclusions defending the importance of intervening in the organ sacred heritage following the collaboration model exposed. Such model performs a whole process of restoration and activities implementation, putting all of them in a future value.

Keywords

Pipe Organ, Religious Heritage, Restoration, Patron, Partnership Agreement.

Introduction

As stated in the first lines of this paper's abstract, pipe organ restoration constitutes a necessary stage in the whole preservation process, and many of the efforts made in this regard require the participation of different agents. As a result, in this article we will expose the rationality that –in our opinion– should guide pipe organs restoration and we will explain how, from the academic world, we are trying to improve a sort of integral protocol.

Valladolid has been characterized for having provided shelter for individuals, associations and institutions related to the organ heritage in its territory, and that interest has remained until today.

Besides the studies elaborated by García Chico in 1953 and 1956 and according to the letters preserved[1], in the late 70's of the 20th century there arose a group of people who called themselves "pipe organ enthusiasts who are concerned about knowing and safeguarding Valladolid's organs heritage" and set forth a project for cataloging existing pipe organs in our province.[2]

This group of "enthusiasts" was the germ of many initiatives and actions that have proven to be essential to understand the current recovery of this sacred heritage.[3] The first of these actions was the development of Valladolid's organs catalogue, carried out by Jesús Ángel de la Lama in 1978 and published in 1981 by the Cultural Fund of Valladolid's Provincial Savings Bank.[4] One consequence of this publication was the need to establish an association for the defense and protection of the Castilian organ. Thus, on August 14, 1980, Valladolid's "Manuel Marín" Organ Friends Association was created. [5] After its foundation, this group was the flagship of the study, research and dissemination of organ music and instruments restoration.[6]

Back in 1982, the Department of History and Science of Music of the University of Valladolid was formed by only one professor –María Antonia Virgili Blanquet–, and consequently it was very difficult to take on research challenges within the huge documents collection on the history of each of the instruments in the province. However, in 1992 the Degree in History and Science of Music began being taught, and was enhanced afterwards being adapted into the Bachelor's Degree in History and Science of Music and extended with the Master of Research in Hispanic Music.

According to the words of Professor Virgili, we can approach the knowledge of some of the initiatives that have been put into practice over the past three decades from the University and the Music Department she coordinated in the field of historic organs:[7]

> In these years, the University, with the support of the Ministry of Education, the Government of Castilla y León and many councils, has promoted several papers related to Valladolid's organs catalogue and many actions in other provinces of the region. The catalogue, published by Án-

gel de la Lama, was computerized in the 90's, including restorations or changes that instruments had experienced until then. Thanks to the official support received in calls for research projects, we have recently computerized the catalogues of the provinces of Burgos, León and Zamora, made completely at the University, [...] as well as Ávila, Segovia and Soria, elaborated by other teams outside the University and the Association [Manuel Marín], but which were fully computerized. In March 1995, professor Elena Le Barbier Ramos defended at the University her doctoral dissertation about Palencia, conducted as a desk study of Palencia's organs.[8] [...] The documentary resources dealing with the province of Zamora have been studied by Virginia Flórez, PhD student who, in 2003, presented at the University of Valladolid her research project for the obtention of the Diploma of Advanced Studies under the title *Estudio documental del patrimonio organístico de la diócesis de Zamora* ("Desk study of the organs heritage in the Diocese of Zamora").[9]

Collaboration Agreement

On November 29, 2002, when a trajectory of work and research teams in the field of historic organ in our University had already been established, it was signed the "Cooperation Agreement between the Honorable Provincial Government of Valladolid, the University of Valladolid and the Archbishop of Valladolid for the protection and dissemination of Baroque organs in the province."

In this agreement, the three parties expressed their intention to cooperate in the "promotion, dissemination, protection and restoration of Baroque organs in the province of Valladolid as part of the historical sacred heritage". Therefore, on those days it started a journey of comprehensive intervention around these instruments (a "global agenda", as reflected in the text) that at present continues bearing fruit and maintains the agreement's original philosophy.[10]

The agreement is divided into five main lines:

a) Detailed situation of Baroque organs in the province of Valladolid, so as to examine restoration needs.

b) Selective restoration of Baroque organs.

c) Monitoring of each restored instrument, in order to analyze their tuning needs, mechanical problems, etc.

d) Dissemination of the Baroque organ musical heritage through specific courses and exhibitions, thereby fostering knowledge of these instruments.

e) Promotion of hearing and interpretation of Baroque organ music through the performance of one or more organists, with the aim of recovering the organs' original function so that they could be sounded.

During these twelve years of activity, these five lines have resulted in the following actions:

a) Detailed situation of Baroque organs in the province of Valladolid, so as to examine restoration needs: A direct review of all existing instruments has been carried out, completing and updating the data in Jesús Ángel de la Lama's catalogue. All the information has been computerized and an exhaustive graphic archive of each organ has been created. Along with the updating process, there appeared two more instruments of which we had no knowledge to date: an organ by Isidro Gil in the town of Siete Iglesias de Trabancos (1775) and another by Quintin Rufiner in the church of Bolaños de Campos (1915). During this stage of the process we took inventory of all loose fragments of organs preserved and packaged in boxes for better conservation.

The final result of this line of action was the book *Órganos barrocos de la provincia de Valladolid* (Baroque Organs of the Province of Valladolid), published in 2009 by the Council of Valladolid and written by one of the authors of this paper: Professor Ignacio Nieto Miguel.

b) Selective restoration of Baroque organs: After completing this task, we prepared a list of eligible organs for restoration, adhering to the following criteria: instrument's artistic interest, possibility of regular use, local interest in the intervention and geographical location. As of August 5, 2011 the organs restored through this collaboration agreement, in chronological order, are:

– Morales de Campos (Manuel Baquero, Gabino Ortega, 1791-1795). Restored by Ana Caramanzana & Berchtold Soergel, 2005.

– Torrelobatón (Fr. Cipriano Payueta OP. 1739). Restored by Carlos Álvarez, 2005.

– Villafrechós (Domingo Herbás, Pedro Antonio Ferreira, 1779). Restored by Luis Magaz, 2008.

– Tordesillas, church of Santa María (Felipe Urarte, 1716). Restored by Joaquín Lois, 2011.

– Rueda (Francisco Ortega, 1747). Restored by Joaquín Lois, 2014.

– Nava del Rey. Restoration in progress, by Joaquín Lois.

c) Monitoring of each restored instrument: Each of the mentioned interventions have been subject to detailed monitoring by a commission created for that purpose. In this commission, there have been representatives of the property (parish priests of the towns involved and the sacred heritage delegate of the Archbishopric) and the University (professors involved in the agreement), a technician from the Council of Valladolid and, in some cases, external experts that could evaluate the actions from outside.

d) Dissemination of Baroque organs musical heritage: This line of action is one of the core parts of the agreement, as its intention is to disseminate and publicize this sacred heritage –especially among school groups– and therefore to get a start value of these instruments and their consolidation as local cultural heritage. To this effect, two types of activities have been conducted:

Creating an informative permanent exhibition on the Latin American Baroque organ of Medina de Rioseco. In it, through explanatory panels, models, elements of organs etc., students (both of primary and secondary schools) approach the world of Baroque organs.[11] Since its creation in 2004, over 50 school groups across the province have visited this exhibition.[12]

– Carrying out educational concerts for schools in different places of the province and capital. In these activities, two professors visit schools and, in collaboration with parishes, perform brief commented concerts. Specific training materials (PowerPoint presentations, quizzes, etc.) have been developed for cases where these activities are carried out in municipalities where the organ is not preserved. Until present, we have conducted an average of 10 activities per year with very positive assessments both by teachers and students.

e) Promotion of hearing and interpretation of Baroque organ music: The enhancement of this heritage has a twofold objective: the real estate value of the instrument and the value of the intangible heritage generated, that is to say, the music itself. For this reason, it was suggested from the beginning that the collaboration agreement should include a part of "sound". To this can be added the experience that the Council of Valladolid has organizing the summer festival *El órgano y sus instrumentos* (The organ and its instruments). It emerges, thus, the series called *Órgano y Liturgia* (Organ and Liturgy) that promotes the use of the organ in its original context: the liturgical celebration. It is remarkable to note that, since the signing of the agreement, more than 300 performances have been conducted in more than 15 localities, with a high degree of satisfaction of pastors, parish communities and municipalities.

Conclusions

Many conclusions can be drawn from the facts previously exposed, but we consider that two are the main ones:

– The convenience of executing all interventions on the organ heritage in an integral, rational and comprehensive manner. And with this we mean that intervention should not be limited to the physical instrument; it should rather go beyond and promote its "musical fruit". What sense does restoration make if the ultimate goal for which the instrument was created (i.e. to be sounded) is not known? This approach, in spite of being much more difficult to implement, makes restoration policies sustainable.

– The relevance of signing more agreements as set forth in this communication. A tripartite agreement involving not only owners (the Church) and

funding bodies (the Council of Valladolid, in this case), but also a third party (the University, in this case) that performs the necessary intermediate work between the first two and may guarantee that the intervention on the instruments is done following consistent and sustainable principles, so that future generations can enjoy and value the physical and sound dimensions of this heritage.

– The great value of organ music and the liturgical organist as it is outlined in the motu proprio *Tra le sollecitudini*, written by Pope Pius X on the topic of sacred music:

"In the accompaniment chant, preludes, intermezzi and other similar passages, the organ should be played according to the nature of that instrument, and should participate in all the attributes of sacred music".

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Endnotes

1. Esteban García Chico, "Documentos para el estudio del Arte en Castilla: maestros de hacer órganos," *Anuario Musical* VIII & IX (1953 & 1956).
2. María A. Virgili Blanquet, *El patrimonio organístico de Valladolid: veinticinco años de actuación* (Valladolid: Asociación "Manuel Marín" de Amigos del órgano de Valladolid, Universidad de Valladolid, 2005), 11.
3. This group was formed by Lucía Riaño, Federico Acitores and Jesús Ángel de la Lama.
4. Is important to notice that José López Calo defined this work in *Ritmo* magazine (nº 524) as "a work that changes fundamental concepts about historical pipe organs": Virgili, *El patrimonio organístico,* 29.
5. The founders were José Delfín del Val, Joaquín Díaz, Jesús Ángel de la Lama, Mariano Nieto, Pedro Aizpurúa, Manuel Fuentes, Lucía Riaño, María Fernández Calleja and María Antonia Virgili: *Ibid.,* 16.

6. All activities carried out by the Association are fully documented in the book written by María Antonia Virgili; the Association itself published it in 2005 to commemorate its twenty-fifth anniversary.
7. Virgili, *El patrimonio organístico,* 30-33.
8. This thesis has been published in 2008 with the following reference: Elena Le Barbier Ramos, *La organería en la provincia de Palencia (1500 – 1800)* (Palencia: Institución Tello Téllez de Meneses, Diputación de Palencia, 2008).
9. Part of this work is available on the web http://www.organaria.es (only for Organaria partners).
10. The last agreement signed is dated January 2014.
11. It is worth noting that the activities with students have a practical side, as a commented audition of the organ of Santa Maria de Mediavilla is done after visiting the exhibition.
12. Nowadays, the exhibition is closed for technical infrastructure issues.

Arts And Aesthetic Education in The Fostering of a Common Place

Carmen Urpí, Sophie Ward & Marisa Musaio

Abstract

Aesthetic education through art or nature makes us human beings more sensitive (sensible) to the world. Art and aesthetics develop human sensibility towards the diversity of the real world. Thus, aesthetic education makes human beings better aware of our own life self-experience and the lives of others, instead of being anesthetised to their inner self or the surrounding outside. Aesthetic education makes a difference in life experience by endowing it with qualities such as intense perception, attachment, creativity, singularity, authenticity.

In this sense, the need of an art education (in this extended meaning of an aesthetic education) is crucial for citizenship education as well, because it widens the horizon of perception, interpretation and involvement in the existent world. Furthermore, art education brings people together and fosters a sense of community and understanding.

In this paper, attention is paid to arts and aesthetic education in the English, Spanish, and Italian pedagogical contexts so that a kind of comparison among them may bring us, at the same time of a multicultural dialogue, a sense of unity through common insight.

Keywords

Arts and Aesthetic Education, Pedagogy of Beauty, Social Value in Arts Education.

Over the last two decades concern for civic education of young citizenship has resulted in the presence of specific objectives in many national educational programs (Torney-Purta, J.; Lehmann, R.; Oswald, H.; Schulz, W., 2001). Educational experiences and applied methodologies are numerous in the field, and there is a lot of literature written about them (Browne, 2013; Finley, 2011). This paper aims to discuss the possibility offered by the arts and aesthetic education in the fostering of a common place where a sense of community and understanding brings people to live together and accept diversity -a main goal in education today.

With this purpose, the paper compares the role of aesthetic and arts education in the current pedagogical context of three European countries: Spain, England and Wales, and Italy.

1. The Spanish context and the role of Arts in Education

The promotion of citizenship education in the Spanish school curriculum during the last two decades started from a cognitive approach focused in social values knowledge acquisition. Evidence soon demonstrated the need for more experiential formulas to develop a sense of community and understanding among young people. In response to this demand, new educational proposals came from the social, cultural and political organizations out of the school context (Naval and Ugarte, 2012; Arbués, Naval, Repáraz, Sádaba and Ugarte, 2012).

In this experiential learning the arts play a suitable role to be considered (Goldbard, 2005).

Every work of art gives the chance to capture a conceptual meaning or value intrinsically linked to a material form. Thus, conceptual values are not only seen as abstraction of reality, they are appreciated also in concrete forms embodied in the real existence of unique objects or performances. From this starting point, we understand that human creativity is expressed explicitly in the art but in fact extends to all human action provided that it expresses the personal uniqueness of the individual 'actor' (or author).

Consequently, pedagogies cannot ignore the need for aesthetic education, when it is understood in this broad sense that encompasses the development of human sensibility to express personal creativity. The various forms of the arts would be a main resource for this aesthetic education, with personal creativity being its main goal.

In Spain, this concept of aesthetic education appears indirectly through the concept of art education in school. The arts *curriculum* includes a receptive and a productive approach to the arts, in which students learn to perceive creativity from others and to express their own. In this double out-and-inward exercise, the common hallmark of mankind can be discovered by the experience of the personal and non-transferable nature of freedom. Each person takes part in this common character of creativity that humans have for their condition of freedom.

With this, the role of the arts would be to help young people define a personal identity, a unique and singular personality, by means of developing that critical and creative capacity in society. The need to recognize singularity in the other is crucial in the discovery of one's own uniqueness, because each one is unique and unrepeatable only when compared with all the others.

Often at Spanish schools, arts curriculum is reduced to mere skill learning, object production, handicrafts, not taking into account this broad sense of educating the self and fostering a communion of difference. This relegates arts education to a minor position in the school curriculum whereas the Spanish social context demands a more creative and innovative citizenship.

The more we educators understand that citizenship education is not merely knowledge of social values, but consists in living the value in a personal way in every real life, the more we will appreciate the potential of arts education and creativity in society.

2. The Context of Arts Education in England and Wales

In 2010 the newly elected Coalition government announced its intention to impose austerity measures in the UK, and the arts were immediately targeted for cuts. Within weeks the government ended the state funding of arts and humanities courses in universities in England and Wales; terminated the outgoing government's flagship creativity programme for schools, Creative Partnerships, and abolished the UK Film Council (Ward, 2014). Although less serious than other austerity measures in terms of their immediate impact, we would argue that cuts to arts funding are symptomatic of the rejection of aesthetic sensibility that has, in times past, been described as the 'hatred of the barbarian for the maker' (Machen, 1907 in Ward, 2014). In support of this conjecture, we might note that alongside axing arts funding and marginalising the arts in education, Prime Minister David Cameron has given his support to a proposal to teach children as young as five entrepreneurial skills and how to make a profit (*The Independent,* 2014). It seems that, in England and Wales, transparent and calculable financial transactions are held in higher esteem than aesthetic experience.

In 2013, members of the Political Economy Club sent an open letter to *The Guardian* lamenting the cuts to Arts Council England. According to the club members, 'commercial creative activities account for a formidable 10% of national output. Britain has a leading world position, as it has in financial and business services, pharmaceuticals, and the arms trade' (*The Guardian,* 2013). Likening the arts to the arms trade forces us to ask *how* they are alike, whereupon we are directed to spreadsheets of employment data and tax returns. As noted by Knell and Taylor (2011), the intrinsic value of the arts is hard to

determine, but this is only a 'dilemma' in a performativity culture such as our own, which seeks to measure and compare everything. While we agree that value is always attributed to an artwork, rather than 'part of its essence' (ibid: 15), aesthetic experience is not contingent upon essentialising or fetishising the art object. Aesthetic sensibility, we argue, rests upon an emotional openness that cannot happen if we commodify the arts to identify their trade value and interchangeability with other commodities, such as anti-aircraft missiles, as measurement is oppositional to aesthetic experience. If, as a society, we share Eisner's (1985: 25) conviction that 'what we are able to see and hear is a product of our cultivated abilities', and that the arts play a vital role in developing our ability to 'see' other people and relate to them, then it is incumbent upon us to stop discussing the arts in economic terms, and to stop axing their provision as if they were expendable consumer goods.

In September 2014 the revised National Curriculum was published, and the government revealed that 'Arts Council England have developed a central database housing materials to inspire creative teaching across the sciences, languages and humanities as well as for dance, art and design, music and PE' (DfE, 2014b). It is disappointing, though not surprising, that the teaching of science is identified as the foremost beneficiary of the arts database, yet many educators will no doubt welcome the provision of teaching resources for creative and cultural education. The central database (see Arts Council England, 2014) has been designed to enable teachers to search for resources linked to educational Key Stages that are free and/or paid for, and the commercial aspect of this resource is therefore apparent. It is too early to say what impact this resource will have on arts education in England and Wales, but we might note that the National Curriculum does not apply to academies and free schools, who may legitimately decide to ignore the database of arts materials.

3. Aesthetic Education in Italy between Tradition and New Challenges

In the Italian pedagogical context aesthetic education has been developed with reference to the meaning of aesthetic education and to the relationship between art, creativity and experience with students of all ages.

Pedagogical reflection has affirmed the value of aesthetics in relation to the unity of the person and to his/her education (Stefanini, 1954; Scholé, 1961;

Rossi, 1980). Aesthetic dimension has been elaborated in a paradigm of human, cultural, social, ethical and spiritual education (Gennari, 1994). Through the aesthetics pedagogy one becomes aware that there are not only objective and descriptive ways to approach reality, but different, inner and creative ways. Aesthetic experience is the place where we do experience about things, situations and relationships to the beauty as a dimension of human educability (Musaio, 2007). A pedagogical perspective specified as "pedagogy of beauty" (Musaio, 2007, 2013) refers to the "form" of the person, to his/her unique personality as a harmonius "work of art". In practice aesthetic education is identified with "education to art", with expression of personal potentialities, imaginative and creative skills. Art has to be promoted also in relation to the processes of knowledge and learning at the different ages of students.

In 2012 the "Italian National Guidelines for the curriculum in pre-school and the first cycle of education" have defined the aesthetic dimension in relation to the respect of the personal originality and individual path in the different grade levels:

1) Pre-school recalls the importance of imagination and creativity, the wonder and curiosity about beauty in relation to "knowledge of self, of others and of reality". Art has to be considered as a reason to look at reality with different eyes, to explore with the senses and to observe sights, works, paintings, museums;

2) Primary school proposes art and image education with a "laboratory approach" (Dewey, 1995) and develops the ability to observe, describe, read and understand a work of art and the artistic world;

3) Lower secondary school promotes personal and creative aims to be achieved with different techniques and materials and also with the integration of media. Each student learns to read the works of art in different historical periods and recognize the main elements of the cultural and artistic space of life;

4) High school confines aesthetic education to the study of art history, and one of the unresolved issues is the aesthetic competence of teachers, because they should be able to interest the students, to avoid repetition and recognize the novelty of situations and relationships:

«Art has an original specificity and it enters in relation with activities and knowledges of various kinds: scientific, technical, histori-

> cal, sociological, psychological, musical and physical skills [...]. New means are extending from design, painting and sculpture to photography, graphic design, films, information technology and applied arts» (De Bartolomeis, 2003).

Despite these indications the aesthetic dimension is still overlooked in school planning. Actual pedagogical reflection pays attention to educate to «aesthetic sensibility» (Musaio, 2007) unifying "logic reason" and "emotional reason", to be able to express moods and experiences and to be participants in the spaces of active citizenship where people can build a "cultural complex area" including different forms of expression and different potentialities. The aesthetic experience activates the dimension of *feeling*, putting the person directly in touch with his/her deep reality, immediate emotions, experiences, desires, moral and spiritual aims. We feel that the experiences and activities with an "inner resonance" let us meet other people and overcome the feeling of detachment from others. The experience of beauty with others allows us to process an original sharing of representations, desires, symbolic universes. When in the educational practice we are able to find an *interpenetration* with others, we are able to find what basically joins us. Aesthetic experience has always been a shared experience that builds a community of subjects. When the subjects are involved in something of beauty they feel they belong to a community (Vattimo, 2012). They feel that they are looking for a *common good* as a common principle of improvement, because this principle is rooted in everyone's nature (Negro, 2014).

4. Conclusion

Aesthetics is more than the perception of beauty, it is the experience that makes us more beautiful - we become more sensitive, more empathetic through the experience of art. It seems also, however, that our school systems are not fully supporting the aesthetic experience, focusing instead on the history of art, or imagining a utilitarian function for the arts (as in the UK, where art is likened to industry). This paper makes a strong case for the special role of aesthetics in education as a means to create a better society, not simply a more knowledgeable or productive society.

The reflections on art and education in the different pedagogical contexts examined in this paper show interesting perspectives for the education of a

more "sensitive citizenship", orientated not only to artistic activities, but able to draw from the arts its ability to cultivate an empathic and valuable relationship with others in new situations. Governments have pledged their support for the creation of democratic communities, yet in the countries identified in this paper, the desire to promote civic values has not been accompanied by the promotion of aesthetics as a means to enhance sensibility and foster a sense of community. As our paper demonstrates, the values of citizenship education may also be exercised through the contribution of art, which may provide the best way to promote a sense of community, even if that perspective still requires many institutional and educational efforts.

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The autor of the first paragraph is C. Urpi, the autor of the second paragraph is S. Ward and the autor of the the third paragraph is M. Musaio". The introduction and conclusions are the result of joint work.

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SECTION IV
Art, Theatre, Literature, Music, Culture

DIRECTING "MODELS"
From Ancient Greek Drama to Brecht

Chair
—
Heinz-Uwe Haus

combined with

FROM PAGE TO STAGE
Adaptation & The Theatre

Chairs
—
Heinz-Uwe Haus & David W. Lovell

Participants
—
Heinz-Uwe Haus
Victor Castellani

Presentation

Heinz-Uwe Haus & David W. Lovell

A.

Directing Ancient Greek drama provides a compressed narrative of the European understanding of human existence over the course of nearly three millennia. It allows contemporary audiences to rediscover a heritage of fundamental values experienced and recorded by Athen's democratic polis. The performances of Reinhardt, Rondiris, Stein, Suzuki and many others since the 1920s demonstrate that these heritage is not only fundamental for a changing understanding of Europe's legacy then and now, but can be cultivated to provide a bulwark against postmodern relativism that many theatre-makers rightly view as undermining their ability to "project the theatrical, philosophical, social and aesthetic issues of the play as seen with the eyes of the time in which the production is attempted" (Spiros Evangelatos, To Vima, 2 July 1972). The challenge is, how the lessons of the past can help in confronting the problems we encounter today? "The gods have not withdrawn or abandoned us ", as Karlos Koun stated 40 years ago, "we have kicked them out". Having lost the sense of being in the world that the Greeks found so natural, should therefore not hinder directors from depicting contemporary society as capable of self transformation as our ancient ancestors depicted it. It is this question – how to regain "the call of the gods" – that has informed and shaped many productions in recent decades .

B.

Every play encounters some level of 'adaptation' as it is translated from the page to the stage. Important decisions must be made about costumes, sets and lighting, about dialogue that might be re-phrased or even discarded, about scenes and characters that are unnecessary, and about emphasis and timing. The Director has a crucial role in making such decisions, and thus in shaping the raw material of the dialogue into a message for his or her times. These reflections are sparked by the adaptation of Goethe's 'Faust' by Heinz-Uwe Haus in a production in Delaware in March 2014. And while we might be especially

conscious of the challenges of adapting plays that cross time and cultural zones, and of speaking to specific audiences, the issue of adaptation is one that confronts all directors who have a genuine desire to communicate. In the case of Haus's production of 'Faust 1', a play of perhaps more than 4 hours has been reduced by almost half. How to allow the audience, relatively unacquainted with this masterpiece of German letters, to appreciate the depths of its insights into the human condition and, at the same time, follow its epic storyline in a timeframe that aligns with their expectations of an evening at the theatre? While Haus's adaptation of 'Faust' will be a starting-point for the discussions of this workshop, we hope that others who have an interest in, and experience of, the challenges of adaptation in the theatre will share their stories and approaches. We are keen to hear from playwrights, directors, dramaturgs, critics and others who have confronted these issues.

The Call of the Gods

Directing Ancient Greek Drama or How to find a "Breathing Space" for the Audience

Heinz-Uwe Haus

Abstract

The aim of the paper is to trace the development of theatre not of interpretations of its dramatists but of the idea of what theatre is, has been or should be. The Ancient Greek roots help more than any other performance tradition to introduce to this vast and complex subject. The paper explores closely related fields of cultural studies and sociological theory, which add to the explorations of semiotics, phenomenology, psychoanalysis, and other non-theatrical approaches in "theatre making".

Keywords

Drama, theatre, Performance, Tragedy, Aristotle, Brecht.

A British historian notes that the last recorded astronomical observation in the Ancient Greek world was made by the philosopher Proclus in 475, and it was more than 1,000 years before the science made significant steps forward once more. (1) There is no doubt, that the closing of the Western mind still remains something of a mystery. I will not speculate, how much Christianity had an impact on the "gradual subjection of reason to faith and authority", in opposite I rather join the position arguing that the Greek rationalist tradition was fading away on its own accord, and "would probably", as one scholar stresses, "have taken its long sleep even if Christianity had not come along". (2)

No doubt, the colossal ignorance of the Christian West in the second half of the first millennium is fact. By the year 1000, all branches of science, and indeed all kinds of theoretical knowledge except theology, had pretty much disintegrated. Most classical literature was largely unknown. Yes, the best-educated people (all of them monks) knew strikingly less than many Greeks 800 years earlier. But this should not excuse us to focus on the changes within Greek culture before the lights went out. If we follow the existing ideo-archaeological artifacts in the fall of reason, we find the "religious and mystical strains in Greek

and Roman thought had been growing even stronger, and at the expense of the robust skepticism and empirical open-mindedness that mostly characterized Greek thinkers from Thales in the sixth century B.C. to Aristotle in the fourth" (3) It is here, where the Greek theatre is representative.

It is here, where the Ancient theatre writers, most of all Sophocles', view of personal responsibility includes some obligations to the collective good. That's their "call of the Gods", as Panayiotis Serghis defined Sophocles' basic gestus, when he worked as dramaturge for my production of **The Suppliant Women** in the 1970th in then East Germany. In general, Greek theatre regarded personal responsibility as a collective strength. Sophocles wrote plays that explored the place of humans within that order. The tragedy of his heroes typically erupts from decisions made and actions taken based on imperfect knowledge or conflicting claims.

In portraying his characters, Sophocles raised the portraying of antagonistic contradictions to high art, making the characters unwitting victims of fate or their own shortcomings. The irony was both verbal (with characters speaking words laden with meaning unknown to them) and dramatic (with characters ensnaring themselves in predicaments charged with danger that they do not recognize but that the audience well knows will lead to disaster). The audience knew, for example, what Oedipus did not know (until the end of Oedipus the King): that the man he killed and the woman he married were his father and mother. This type of dramaturgy occurs often in Sophocles' plays, allowing the audience to become engrossed with a character's response to a situation rather than the eventual outcome of the situation. In all events the audience observes how wisdom accompanies suffering. One of the central focuses was the misbehaviors of the character through pride.

Pride was considered a grave sin because it placed too much emphasis on individual will, thereby downplaying the will of the state and endangering the community as a whole. Because pride makes people unwilling to accept wise council, they act rashly and make bad decisions. Great pride, such as that of Oedipus or Creon, is referred to as *hybris*.

The Theban plays lay bar the pain, frenzy and their treatment in the dramatic events.(4)

One message of Oedipus the King is:

Fate punishes the proud and the insolent with ironic outcomes terrible to behold.

Oedipus as king of Thebes exhibits great pride (hubris) that blinds his ability to accept the truth. By contrast, the blind prophet Teiresias readily "sees" the truth.

Another reminds us: The bigger they are, the harder they fall.

Thanks to whims of fate and his own pride and arrogance, Oedipus, a great and mighty king, tumbles headlong into an abyss of humiliation, grief, and remorse in a single day.

Oedipus at Colonus makes the spectators observe:

Through love, piety, and hardship, Oedipus achieves redemption.

Oedipus, stripped of dignity, wanders in a wilderness of suffering for many years. Though blind, begins to "see" again with the eye of his soul, recognizing his faults and realizing the importance of love and right living with the help of his daughters, Antigone and Ismene.

A headline to advertise Antigone could read:

Intractability and pride cause the downfall of even the noblest humans.

Both Creon and Antigone doom themselves with their recalcitrance.

The audience is reminded: Overriding divine law with the law of the state leads to ruin.

Creon's refusal to permit Antigone to buy her brother Polynices was a violation of moral law even though Polynices had rebelled against Creon's rule as King of Thebes.

The timeless truth of the events is obvious: Injustice and tyranny can provoke justified civil disobedience.

To uphold moral law Antigone breaks the civil law. Down through the ages and into modern times, citizens have used this theme to guide them in redressing their grievances. During the Vietnam War, American protesters took

the role of Antigone as they demonstrated and sometimes rioted against the government's war policy.

Last but not least, it must have been quite provocative to recognize: Women can be as wise and as strong as men.

The Thebes of Creon is a male-dominated society that reduces women to subservient roles. Thus, when a mere slip of a girl, the teenage Antigone, dares to speak out against his unjust policy, he regards her behavior as a challenge not only to his royal power but also gender as for her defiance of this decree forbidding the burial of Antigone's brother. However, to the very end, Antigone is unshaken in her resolve, demonstrating to Athenian audiences of Sophocles' time that women can be just as wise and as strong as men—in fact, in Antigone's case, even more so.

The "use value" of theatre was that it not only illustrated the result of the recognition, but became a tool for the polis to internalize the needs for the very basic conflict avoidance. It is only in the performance as we know that driving motions, relationships, and events enclosed in the text are released to stimulate the audience members to reexamine their own contemporary events and relationships. Let me mention the 1986 production of **Antigone** at Oeniades. By transforming the familiar into the unfamiliar, by making the habitual and customary seem strange and unexpected, Sophocles wanted to stimulate his audience to ask questions, to stand back from the stage actions and wonder about what they saw there. Rather than accepting the actions of a character as inevitable, the spectator in Sophocles' theatre is stimulated to question: does it have to be this way? Has it always been so? Will it always remain so? What we discovered was that his theatre does deliver answers ready-made, but it asks questions, demanding that the audience enter into the stage events with its critical rather than apologetic faculties. Remember how the chorus is introduced by greeting the morning sun (beginning with verse 100) and how soon it becomes evident that the morning radiance of nature stands for the first day of peace: the Argives retreated the night before. The war is over. The town is free, and the citizens are freed from their fears. But even more: Nike, the goddess of victory has triumphantly bent to the side of the Thebans. So the elders of the town have come to announce the celebration of victory, Bacchus is to rule over Thebes for days and nights to come. Strikingly, the chorus does not at all lament the disastrous fate of Oedipus' sons and together with this the end of the

Oedipus dynasty. After all, Oedipus once freed the town from the Sphinx, later from the plague. What is also striking is that Creon's enthronement, which is now legal, does not play any role for the chorus after the death of the brothers. Both facts are only mentioned briefly and without emphasis. Does this imply that the citizens of Thebes are not interested in the events happening in the ruling dynasty, in who actually is their ruler, or in state affairs at all? Have they become sick of the long-lasting quarrels? Or are they furious about the scandalous Oedipus clan and glad to be relieved of their burden? Or are they just unable to realize what state affairs are and that they should be concerned by them? Or are they simply indifferent, because the prevailing power structure prevents them from having an influence? Is what they want just peace and a happy life? How important is the proclaimed bacchanal feast for them; how much does peace mean to them, and what kind of peace is this?

Audiences in Ancient Athens did not go to a play to be entertained by a plot with a surprise ending. They already knew the ending. They went to a play to see how the characters reacted to the forces working for or against them—mostly against.

Recently I have been asked to direct next year The Bachae. Remember the story of the play:

Dionysus returns to his birthplace, where Pentheus is king. He has returned to punish the women for denying that he is a god and born of a god. Pentheus is enraged at the worship Dionysus and forbids it, but he cannot stop the women, including his mother Agave, or prevent the elder statesmen of the kingdom from swarming to the wilds to join the Maenads (the women under the ecstatic spell of Dionysus).

Pentheus, has the "Eastern Stranger" (Dionysus disguised)captured, but he easily escapes. The maenad's are loosed. Pentheus, obsessed by Dionysus and propelled by his own curiosity goes to the hills dressed as a woman to spy on the orgiastic rites of the Bacchants. He is caught and, led by his own mother Agave, is torn to pieces in a frenzy. What is today's "use value" of the play. How to "re-read" the events?

As theatre maker I am confronted with both: the cult of Dionysus and the modern guise of divinity.

Let's start with the myth, with Homer. He says:

> "This is the effect of your wine for wine is a crazy thing. It sets the wisest man singing and giggling like a girl; it lures him on to dance and it makes him blurt out what were better left unsaid." (Odysseus to Eumaeus 1. Homer, Odysses.14.464)

It can no longer be left unsaid that when the contemporary theatre artist becomes engaged in a dramatic representation he is in some way or other taking part in the cult of Dionysus. Some of you may remember a Suzuki – inspired presentation in Droushia, which I had produced with two actors.

This short performance was composed of two scenes extracted from the play ("the meeting" and "the conversion"), characteristic for the transformative function of the dramatic events. The "re-reading" challenged both: the participants – actors as well spectators - imagination and interest.

Any kind of theatricality deals with the essential question, how to relate to the emotional memory of the audience.

The purpose of a basic attitude like such is:

– To make the spectator a critical observer who like the protagonist on stage must make decisions (to modify or control instinct and wil),

– To present the world (the Ancient's unity with the universe) as an object and to do this through dialectical demonstration,

– To explore the social determinism of the individual, showing the historical nature of human misfortune, the changeable order of nature, and the tragic hero's role (warning) for the demos (the collective chorus),

– To find out why self-examination was vital to the Ancient Greek ideals, and why an examined life revealed the need for order, proportion and restraint,

– To focus on the process, not the outcome of the events

The Meeting

Dionysus, or the man claiming to be the god is a foreigner, out of time and place; comparable in our day probably only to a celebrity rock star on a world tour, a secret agent working to uncover an international conspiracy or even a

member of a dangerous mafia plotting acts of terrorism. At a first glance we know he is a stranger to any possible notion of divinity. It is no wonder Pentheus doubts him and his motives. We know by looking at him by listening to the way he wrestles with words that this self-proclaimed god's most dangerous weapon is not his staff, but his "otherness" and the alienation that it creates around him.

Pentheus is a citizen of the past, rooted in tradition, the embodiment of the state; the strict stiffness of bureaucracy and the church; the inevitable inertia of mundane and ordinary everyday life.

Old notions and rules of behavior clash against new codes of conduct.

In other words:

"Old gods don't die, they just briefly exit the stage to take a break and change costume."

Like on the orchestra of Ancient times, there always exist preconceived notions about what the right way is for the dramatic events to be performed on state, but the Ancient Greek dramatist's lesson is, not to know how to do but how not to do. So when Dionysus' appearance is unfamiliar ("non-mythical"), not unlike Pentheus' reaction to the "new" and foreign" god, we are challenged.

For example, we wonder, why Dionysus chooses not to fight, instead he uses Pentheus' own inertia to instill and preserve the new mysteries. How cunning and deceitful can one be and still remain in charge?

The Conversion, the second scene, investigated:

"Inertia: 1. The tendency of a body at rest to remain at rest or of a body in motion to stay in motion in a straight line unless acted on by an outside force. Resistance of disinclination to motion, action, or change."

Dionysus utilizes Pentheus' own righteousness, doubt, resistance and incredulity to create in him a need to know, a need to see. The new uses the old to perpetuate itself, much like the way Dionysus breaks with the old and escapes captivity by using the patterns of tradition in a way, and transforming them. Pentheus too is transformed, of his own accord, into a woman to satisfy his curiosity and ultimately becoming the perfect tool to preserving that which he was eager to stop.

The highest tragedy of the Bacchae resides perhaps in Pentheus becoming the primordial element of perpetuating that which he vehemently strived to bring to an end.

Ancient Athen's theatre reinforces the idea that we have the power to shape and reshape our own lives as well as our bodies. But lately when my gaze rises from the scale of society, I wonder when taking personal responsibility means letting go of collective responsibility. For our Ancient Greek ancestors, to be human was to be potentially a hero of tragedy. The Ancient theatre makers established the reviving tension between the "I" and the "we". But today we are carrying a lot of weight and I do not mean my measly five pounds. And as a society we are trying to divine the individual from the community responsibility.

The last recorded observation in the ancient Greek world by Proclus in 475 – I mentioned that in the beginning – who was pagan and uninfluenced by Christianity, was in fact just as interested in magic and oracles as he was in astronomy. The mystery of losing heritage lies in our Self. That is why complexity and decision making as a dialectical unit are the new qualities Sophocles' characters define. The actors (for the first time 3), not the chorus, control the rhythm of the plays. Unlike writers before him, he did not need a trilogy to contain his tragedies; his plays stood alone.

"All of us carry share of weight" – that is, what all his plays remind us. Medea was not on a jihad and Freud's patient is not related to King Oedipus. But we question them rightly with our contemporary interests in mind, because their personal responsibility includes some obligation to the collective good. "The call of the Gods" is all about that. That needs "breathing space" as developed and exercised in each Ancient theatre festival's "re-reading" of the polis' dramatic memory.

German directors like Reinhardt and Jessner in the 1920thallied their work with the Ancient Greek classics portrayal of antagonists and chorus to enlighten the citizen of the newly formed Weimar Republic. Reinhardt's Grosses Schauspielhaus, transformed from a market hall and converted circus arena into a huge legitimate Ancient Greek theatre space by the visionary young architect Hans Poelzig, realized Reinhardt's dream of bridging the gap between actor and audience and making the spectator part of the action. The opening performance – Aeschylus' Orestia – was the 20th century first new interpretation of the play. Its success

reflected the audience's recognition of their needs for the upcoming democratic society. Fritz Engels, the drama critique of the Berliner Tageblatt, wrote in November 1919: "For the first time we were shown the entire trilogy. What was distant beauty eight years ago has become a real experience. A war between the hemispheres is over; Europe has fought with Asia over a whore, a warrior returns home." (5) This performance was the first representative action of a new republican consciousness, given for a people not yet aware of its importance for the savekeeping of the newly gained democracy. The appreciation of the Ancient Greeks theatre texts bridges political and aesthetic positions. From Benjamin to Lukasz they approve: "the essence of these great moments is the pure experience of self' (6). For the 1920th Ancient Greek drama's devices became rules of thumb to cut through the jungle of the raising questions.

We, who work as actors, directors or scholars with Ancient drams, wonder sometimes about the divergent viewpoints in the recent debate as to whether democracy is an ideal specifically rooted in the Western experience or whether it values are more universally valid. My position is simple: I know no example where the performance of an Ancient Greek drama did not reaffirm the need for more "breathing space" of the audience. Ancient Greek drama teaches us to restrain the actions of the rulers. It is full of subversive energy against the suppressors of the individuals rights of liberty, freedom and justice. Bessons Peace in the 1960s in East Berlin – demasked the state's justification of the erection of the wall. Rondiris' Electra, and Aspassia Papathanassiou in the lead, in the same place as guest performance, brought a timelessness on the stage, which was in sharp contrast with the official aesthetic ideology. And my own Suppliant Women at the beginning of the 1980s demonstrated for a young audience what the so-called "socialist democracy" is missing: including the freedom of speech. The victory of Western democratic values over the totalitarian dictatorships 1989 in Europe, demonstrated again, why and how democracy is the only practical alternative to tyranny. The mind set for such "breathing space" is rooted in the staging goals of Ancient Athens drama and theatre.

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Endnotes

1. Charles Freeman: the Closing of the Western Mind, New York: 2003
2. Anthony Gottlieb: When the Lights Went Out in Europe, in: The New York Times Book Review, February 15, 2004, p. 12
3. Ibid.
4. See Elladios Chandriotis: The Three Tragedians – Notes on Three Parallel Plays, Cyprus Centre I.T.I., Nicosia, 2005
5. Fritz Engels: Buehnenrundschau, in: Berliner Tageblatt,17. 11. 1919, p. 5
6. Georg Lukàcs: Soul and Form, transl. Anna Bostock, Cambridge, MA, 1970, p. 157

Voices for the Other in the Theater of Dionysus

Victor Castellani

Abstract

In Aeschylus' the protagonist Orestes says that, to get into the palace where he will kill his father's killers, he will pretend to be Phocian. Speaking the Parnassian "tongue," he will bear false news of his own death. However, his predicted lies are simply good Attic verse. This suggests that faultless Attic can have been pronounced with accents identifying Greek speakers from different regions and dialects, e.g., hateful Spartans. Yet more starkly contrasted might be non-Greeks like Colchian Medea, Trojan women in several plays, and barbarian men. Ironically, especially in Euripides, Greeks behaving more barbarically than barbarians, e.g. those same, accuse the latter of barbarity, while more accurately barbarians accuse treacherous and brutal Greeks with barbarity or worse. All of this gains aural impact if the speakers' accents are clearly contrasted. For praise or blame, Athenian characters like Aegeus in Medea may also have spoken unmistakably as such. The paper discusses a number of scenes where postulated contrast of voice would sharpen the drama.

Keywords

Accent in Theater, Athenian Drama, Barbarians on Stage, Spartans on Stage, Theater performance, Tragedy, Voices of Gods.

When at the climax of *Choephoroi* the Aeschylean Orestes asks, "What shall I do, Pylades? Be shamed to kill my mother?" the three-line answer, Pylades' only lines in the play, Richmond Lattimore's version, is:

> What becomes then of the oracles
> Declared by Loxias at Pytho? What of sworn oaths?
> Count all men hateful to you rather than the gods.

The speaker is son of King Strophius of Phocis—namely, of the region surrounding Delphi and Apollo's great oracular site *and where, according to Aeschylus, Orestes grew up.*

Did Aeschylus relocate Orestes' *Bildung* from Athens, where the *Odyssey* tells us that Agamemnon's son and avenger was raised, to the environs of Pytho?

Or did he simply choose between traditional alternatives? What matters most is that his Mycenaean prince came of age with Pylades *and Pylades' neighbor Apollo*. We may therefore wonder whether when his Phocian companion utters that stern warning, he speaks in a Phocian accent—recognizable to the audience in the Theater of Dionysus as the Pythian accent, the Apollonian. Orestes himself can have feigned that same accent earlier in the play when he was messenger of his own pretended death. This in fact is what he *says* to Pylades (and Electra) that he will do: When they approach his ancestral palace and seek lodging, "We two shall both assume the Parnassian dialect and imitate the way they talk in Phocis" (563-564).[1]

Consider this: Although in two extant plays titled *Electra* Pylades is silent throughout, in wake of Aeschylus' earlier play (of which both Euripides and Sophocles were clearly aware) every time he appears with Orestes—and that is constantly—he may remind us of the god who mandates revenge upon Agamemnon's killers. Moreover, when the Paidagōgos in Sophocles' *Electra* gives his thrilling but false account of Orestes' glory and death to his mother and sister, he, too, might speak his excellent Attic verse with Phocian accent. He would merely be using that *dolos,* "evil guile," which, according to this play, Apollo seems expressly to have prescribed, condoning a spectacular Big Lie centered on the god's own Pythian Games. Moreover, in Euripides' *Electra* Orestes, whom Apollo's matricidal command distressed all along, does not assume—also in voice?—a Phocian identity, but rather a *Thessalian* one! (Though Pylades is ostentatiously noble in *Iphigenia in Tauris*, we must think, too, of Pylades the would-be assassin in Euripides' *Orestes*, where his neighbor Apollo is hardly flattered.)

Theater Conventions

Questions about how on the Athenian stage *women* were voiced by men—and how *small children* were played at all—are not the only phonic ones. Likewise how, not only in movement and stance but in distinctive vocalization, *old persons* were presented. Almost every surviving play has a *gerōn* or *gerousa*. In comedies we must sometimes imagine hearing whole choruses of them. Intonation should have been different for *comical* old men in Aristophanes—individuals like Philocleon and Strepsiades, on the one hand, or decrepit choristers in *Wasps* and *Lysistrata*—and, on the other, the grave Argive chorus of *Agamemnon*.

Gods' voices are another intriguing matter, direct or reported by a messenger, as in *OC*.

Here we focus chiefly on the matter of how, besides visually from costume, impersonated *foreigners* can have been *phonically* recognized in Athenian drama. I hypothesize that they were "taught" distinguishing vocalization, viz., pronunciation or accent that would mark not only the farcical Phrygian eunuch in *Orestes* as a barbarian (paralleled by a ludicrous Persian in Aristophanes' *Acharnians* and a Triballian god in *Birds*), but many a wholly serious character.

"Foreigners," of course, came in two genera, as it were, barbarians (themselves, of course, diverse) and Dorian Greeks of which Phocian speech is a species, likewise Laconian, and other flavors besides Attic.

The Nurse whose monolog opens the *Medea*, for example, and the play's title character herself should have such an exotic voice as Maxwell Anderson prescribes for his adaptation *The Wingless Victory*. Thus the Colchian Nurse's Greek would contrast with that of Jason's Thessalian Paidagōgos, who joins her in ensuing dialogue. Medea, angry or cajoling, should differ in accent, too, from the two Hellenic kings she manipulates, not to mention glib and, later, distraught Jason. Euripides' barbarian monarchs should sound more Egyptian (Theoclymenus in *Helen*), Taurian (Thoas in *IT*), or Thracian (the *Hecuba*'s evil Polymestor) than regal; his chorus of Phoenician women who name a sensational late play may give it an unusual tone whenever they complement Theban characters' dialogue or monody.

We might postulate a plain, "default" Hellenic diction that belonged generically to all *adolescent* males, e.g. Theban Menoeceus in the play just mentioned or perhaps Sophocles' Hyllus, even maybe his Scyrian Neoptolemus. Euripides' Hippolytus could be another, like Achilles in his posthumous *Iphigenia*. Delphic Ion, however, may differ? Mature and men old, young, mature, and old women would similarly have a basic, unmarked, un-"accented" delivery. In neither *OT* nor *Antigone* would the cast, chorus included, sound specifically "Theban"—though in *OT* the smart Corinthian messenger, promoted over the years from royal shepherd to state ambassador, might be a bit distinctive in his Greek. Antigone might talk no differently than Macaria in *Children of Heracles* or young Iphigenia in *IA*. *Trojan* Polyxena is another matter…

Barbarian against Hellene

We return to barbarians. Choruses of several plays besides *Phoenician Women* comprise foreign women, Trojans or other Anatolians. The principal chorus of Aeschylus' *Suppliants* came with their father Danaus from the easternmost Mediterranean—exotic in dress, therefore, at Argos where the play is set and, I believe, speech. In his aforementioned *Choephoroi* chorus, their leader, and a Cilician speaking character are slaves Agamemnon had brought back from the Trojan War, while in pathos-filled plays by Euripides Anatolian women young and old, recently enslaved, have been traumatized by the sack of Ilium and massacre of their menfolk. Further slaughter is to come, perverted sacrifice of Hecuba's daughter Polyxena,. In *Hecuba* we meet and hear that maiden before her death, in *Trojan Women* we are told about it. We also hear, here, from Polyxena's prophetic, ecstatic sister Cassandra. *Her* voice must be doubly strange!

Contrast between a lone *barbarian* female and a *Greek* female chorus and Dorian-accented characters can be heightened if their accents are unlike. *Medea* and *Andromache* each include a barbarian princess, respectively Colchian and Anatolian, and a Greek king or two who confronts her, Creon of Corinth and Athenian Aegeus, Menelaus of Sparta. Recall the rapport and sympathy that those two displaced princesses enjoy from female choruses. Women identify with women. Medea, of course, goes too far for the Corinthian women, and they transition—with us—from pity for her to horror over her infanticide. The Phthian girls in *Andromache*, on the other hand, stand firmly with Andromache against three Peloponnesian villains: Hermione, her father Menelaus, and her rescuer and eventual spouse Orestes. They have no sympathy for the Spartan princess.

Two plays potentially full of un-Greek tones—enslaved female choruses from Troy with their former queen—were surely filled with exotic musical modes, choral and monodic alike. Perhaps enunciation of lyrics (overlaid upon the Dorian "lite" of tragic song) was barbarous as well, as in *Choephoroi*.

Let us tune mind's ear to two kinds of statement in dialogue where we have onstage a "barbarian" and a Hellene. Type A is when the Greek adduces something that places Greeks above barbarians, positively, or barbarians beneath Greeks, negatively. Type B is when a barbarian accuses Greeks of what might be called, in English, barbarism or barbarity.

A1 – in *Medea* Jason tells Medea during the first of their three scenes that, thanks to him, "you dwell in Hellas instead of a barbarian land and know justice (*dikē*) and to live by laws (*nomoi*), not by dint of sheer force. All the Hellenes have perceived how intelligent (*sophē*) you are, and you have acquired fame (*doxa*). If, in the other hand, you were living at the farthest edges of the world, there would be no thought-or-word (*logos*) of you" (536-541).

A2 – in *Andromache* Neoptolemus' spoiled Spartan wife Hermione commands Andromache, Neoptolemus' spoils-of-war concubine, "to know where in the world you are. There's no Hector here, nor Priam nor gold, but Greek civilization (*Hellas polis*). You are far gone in stupidity (*amathía*), you wretch, who dare to bed with the son of the man who killed your husband and to bear children from his very slayer. All the barbarous race (*genos*) is like this. Father copulates (*mígnutai*) with daughter, mother with son, a girl with her brother, nearest kin are murderers, and law (*nomos*) doesn't prevent any of this. Don't bring it among us!" (168-177).[2]

A3 – Odysseus, explaining to a play's title character Hecuba why the Greeks will honor their late champion Achilles by sacrificing her daughter Polyxena upon the hero's tomb, adds ironically: "We, if we have a bad custom (*kakōs nomídzomen*) to honor the noble person, will incur stupidity (*amathía*) [as a reproach]. But you barbarians do not treat your friends/kin (*hoi philoi*) as deserving loyalty (*philoi*), nor do you make much of the gloriously deceased (*kalōs tethnēkótes*), so that Hellas prospers, while *you* experience what matches your inclinations (*bouleúmata*)" (326-331).

A4 – Pentheus in *Bacchae* has this exchange with Dionysus (in Lydian disguise):
Pen: You've come here introducing that divinity?
Dio: Every barbarian dances these intense rites (órgia).
Pen: For they're much less intelligent than Greeks!
to which the god replies
Dio: In this they're really *more* so; but customs/laws/institutions (*nomoi*) differ.

This retort, in fact, bring us to Type B, "barbarous" objections to Greek behavior in the presence of one or more Greeks (and a Greek audience):

B1 – *Trojan Women*'s Cassandra in a sequence too long to quote describes the woes of the Greek invaders at Troy (and predicts more in future) and contrasts them with the glory and, for ten years, the survival of Trojans in their homes,

with their families. She refers in particular to Agamemnon's loss of "what is dearest" (*ta phíltata*)—meaning his sacrificed daughter and missed life with his surviving children—all for the sake of his brother's *willingly eloped* wife. She also notes Hector's unique opportunity to fight and to die in noble defense of his kin and people.

B2 – in the same play Cassandra's widowed sister-in-law Andromache learns that Hector's and her little son Astyanax, momentarily to be wrested from her arms as gently as compassionate herald Talthybius can do so, will be tossed from the high tower of Ilium to his death. Beginning another speech too long to quote at length she exclaims "O Greeks who have invented barbaric evils (*bárbara kaká*), why are you killing this utterly innocent (*oudén aítion*) boychild?"

B3 – in *IT* Iphigenia, human-sacrificial priestess of Taurian Artemis, is explaining to the local king Thoas why she cannot immediately sacrifice two unholy, polluted Greek youths whom his men have captured (Orestes and Pylades). The goddess' statue, desecrated by their approach, must first be purified, because it has closed its eyes shut:

Tho: What's the cause of that? What's the defilement (*mūsos*) of these foreigners?
Iph: This, nothing else: They have done terrible deeds (*deiná*).
Tho: They didn't kill one of the barbarians on the beach?
Iph: They came bearing homicidal blood from home (*oikeíos … phónos*).
Tho: Whose? I have a sudden urge to learn.
Iph: The two slew (one's or their) mother with shared sword.
Tho: Apollo! Not even among barbarians would anyone have such audacity!

(It amuses, of course, that Thoas is matter-of-factly aware that he himself and his nation are "barbarians.")

We return to Menelaus and his daughter Hermione from *Andromache*. They are Spartan—Laconian—in native speech. The way Menelaus, ever despicable in words and actions, delivers his Attic trimeters should indicate his Spartanness. In fact, his character in both Homeric epics is rather attractive; one almost understands why Helen would choose him from among her more violence-prone suitors. In tragedy, on the other hand, he is reprehensible. (Fifth-century interstate politics century might explain why.)

In *Helen* and *Trojan Women* Menelaus speaks with my hypothesized Spartan accent *to accented barbarians*. In the former it is to an old porter-woman

who—with a broom?—shoos the vainglorious Conqueror of Troy away from the porch of Pharaoh's palace; in the other, earlier play Menelaus addresses the chorus and Hecuba, who unsuccessfully urges him to punish Helen with death for her infidelity to him and in revenge for all the deaths she has caused for both sides. In Sophocles' *Ajax*, the Spartan chief taunts the dead hero's half-brother Teucer, born of Telamon's Trojan concubine, with being "an archer" (1120), though it is his brother Agamemnon who taunts him with his birth and even says he will not listen to "your barbarous tongue" (*tēn bárbaron …glōssan*, 1263) when this "barbarian" is sole defender of Ajax' helpless and gravely threatened spear-won concubine Tecmessa, their infant son, and the hero's own sacred right to burial.

Earlier in the play, paralleling Andromache's unforgettable plea to Hector in *Iliad* Book 6, his Trojan concubine Tecmessa had begged Ajax not to kill himself and thus abandon her and their infant son Eurysaces. Here, however, the plea is to a Greek, and from Greeks comes the subsequent cowardly threat to the late hero's Asiatic woman and half-Greek child. Nastiest of Greeks are Peloponnesians.

Hellene Against Hellene

Although Sophocles and Euripides were sharply divided in assessment of Apollo, they agreed that Menelaus was a blackguard and/or a jerk. We deplore him in *Ajax*, *Trojan Women*, *Helen*, and *Iphigenia at Aulis*. No better is his Spartan father-in-law old Tyndareus, who appears in one long episode of Euripides' *Orestes*, then continues his vindictive work offstage, prosecuting Orestes for "murder" of his daughter Clytemnestra.

Euripides' Hermiones and Helens vary strikingly in character. Good, faithful Helen in the play she names may actually contrast with Spartan Menelaus in tongue. She certainly does in brain. She is, after all, daughter of Zeus, not Tyndareus. Bad, bad Helen in *Trojan Women*, on the other hand, wants to be as seductive and seem as Spartan as can be. In *Orestes*, moreover, she should sound quite as Laconian as her opportunistic, craven husband and her putative dad. Here, however, her daughter Hermione is as good as the Hermione in *Andromache* is evil; indeed she might actually sound *different* from her parents, raised as she was since the beginning of the war by Aunt Clytemnestra, together

with Cousin Orestes for roughly ten years, with Cousin Electra for seventeen. In this scandalous "tragedy" that passes through melodrama to farce, might Orestes himself sound somehow *Parnassian* like the preposterous Apollo *ex machina* at the end?

The tragedies also include other, non-Laconian Greeks, for example Argives in numerous plays. Probably these, like Thebans scattered over all three tragedians' plays, had no marked accent. Nevertheless, Menelaus' enunciation might be contrasted with his brother Agamemnon's in Sophocles' *Ajax*, in *Iphigenia at Aulis* of Euripides, though I hardly propose such thick Laconian or Boeotian dialect as was spoken as in Aristophanes' Old Comedies. Perhaps we could hear a contrast between embattled Amphitryon and dastardly Lycus in *Heracles*. On the other hand, neither Pelasgus nor Adrastus, respectively in Aeschylus' and Euripides' *Suppliants*, might use other than "default" accent. If impudent heralds from Argos in *Children of Heracles* and from Thebes in the Euripidean suppliant play have a distinctive voice, it is more characterizing than linguistic, like "ambassador" Creon in *Oedipus at Colonus*. The same would be true of Odysseus wherever he appears—on the shore of Troy or of Thrace, near a cave on Lemnos or *in* one belonging to a Cyclops—and for Heracles in those four very diverse plays in which he appears: *Alcestis*, *Trachinian Women*, *Heracles Mad*, and, as *heros ex machina*, in *Philoctetes*. Or should he sound "Dorian," albeit hardly Spartan?

What about Thessalians? It is unlikely that in *Alcestis* father Pheres or son Admetus, Philoctetes in his plays lost and extant—or, for that matter, Jason, Peleus, or Achilles—spoke in ways that had to do with linguistic geography, but only with character.

Finally, how do we imagine *Athenians* spoke tragic Attic? Aristophanes scripted Atticisms for many speakers, including a patriotic Athenian Dionysus in *Frogs*! Added meaning would come if patriots in the audience for tragedy could hear their local speech from their national hero Theseus in Euripides' *Suppliants* and *Heracles*, and from his son Demophon in *Children of Heracles*. Intrusive Aegeus in *Medea* would be less edifying! Theseus in Hippolytus-Phaedra plays would be interesting to hear, in contrast perhaps to his *Minoan* wife. What should we overhear from her and her Nurse? What from the strange, estranged Amazon' son? Would he be like other youths, as postulated above, or distinctive in utterance, as Ion likely was?

Conclusion

We can never "scientifically" answer such questions as I have been asking, nor validate my positive speculations. There are solid reasons to doubt many, even all of the latter; still it is rewarding to speculate, and for contemporary staging to consider how persons from diverse lands within and beyond the Greek world might *sound* in Anglophone variants. It is hard to imagine that, although for barbarian characters *costume* was heterogeneous, their *speech* and Greeks' was homogenized. Whether reading, reciting, or staging in ancient Greek or in any modern language, we should be as bold as Aeschylus, Sophocles, and especially Euripides were in other aspects of performance and dramatic meaning. Why not also in identifying accent?

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Endnotes

1. Eric Csapo, "Kallippides on the floor-sweepings: the limits of realism in classical acting and performance style," in Pat Easterling and Edith Hall, eds., *Greek and Roman Actors. Aspects of an Ancient Profession* (Cambridge University Press2002), 127-147, would take surely issue with almost everything my essay proposes. On p. 141 he denies that Orestes spoke anything but "a perfectly normal poetic Attic," ruling out a suggested use of Phocian *dialect*. However, my hypothesis is not about dialect but about *accent*, which even the most eloquent and precise users of a second language, or regional users of their first one, can unmistakably retain.
2. Spoken by grand-daughter of Atreus, grand-niece of Thyestes!

Notes on Goethe's *Faust*

Heinz-Uwe Haus

Abstract

The following text is a dramaturgical reading of Goethe's FAUST 1 for a theatre production in 2014. Focus is the play's complex dramatic poetry, which defies all conventional categories in both form and content, thus combines a number of genetically disparate elements into an extraordinary and puzzling synthesis. Its poetic vitality is probably only enhanced by its stylistic diversity and what Goethe himself called its "fragmentariness" and "incommensurability". The author describes, how the Gretchen theme lends itself to "Shakespearean" treatment: abandonment of the unities of time and place, mixture of tragic and comic scenes, and certain specific motifs which may well be conscious echoes. Faust is not only the unapproachable scholar who wants to know the true essence of life; Faust is all of us whose longing for happiness and fulfillment makes us restless and temptable.

Keywords

Faust, Mephisto, Gretchen, Heaven, Creation; Plot, Form, Rhythm.

Awakening

The beginning is illegal, heretical, perilous – and eminently active. Not a trace of elegiac anguish. With the logical thoroughness of an academic and the self-indulgence of an anarchist, Faust surveys and passes judgment on the world he has known until now: the official academic world and its institutions, the society in which he has until now played a role. He even passes judgment on all his associates – none of whom can hold a candle to him – which we find believable when we later compare him with his colleague Wagner, who is not stupid, but a normal, intellectually gifted academic scholar. Here a man is burning all the bridges behind him and moving on to new frontiers. He will experience many things, but one thing is without doubt: he will never return to the narrow world of scholastic philosophy, dogmatic theology, speculative medicine and ossified jurisprudence. He is finished with the isolation of pure theory. But rejection is not freedom, and the three big attempts of this night end very differently than he wants. At dawn on Easter morning the man who had set out to seize all that the universe had to offer is left weeping with despair and uttering the words, "The earth has me again!"

The magnitude of the attempt is equivalent to the magnitude of the defeat. To get from "Am I a god?" to "I am like a worm" requires a great fall. The delights of the macrocosm soon show themselves to be delusory. The attempt to magically absorb and conquer infinite space and time is shattered from without. "You are like the spirit in your mind – not me!" Faust cannot comprehend the equivocation in this rejection – not here and now. Being forced to earn his freedom and existence is the final word of wisdom.[1]

Drawing himself back up from the collapse of knowing himself as the "most miserable of the sons of earth" and restoring his Faustian self awareness, he now counters the Earth Spirit's rejection with "all or nothing." Since "No dog can go on living like this," the euphoric programmatic suicide is the unavoidable alternative: negative self-actualization. But then he is wrenched back from this explosion turned into implosion on Easter morning by a simple, almost banal stirring of emotion: childhood memories.

But the suicide is theoretically carried out. The "all or nothing" stays with him, and he will die many such deaths. In this hour he is predisposed for the course of his life: he who does not fear death will also accept the devil.

Alternative

Easter stroll -- Faust among the people – a happy resurrection? Even great sympathy toward his character cannot hide that he is distant and aloof from other people, and that their gratitude evokes only a despairing bad conscience in him. He can understand their joy in nature, given the burden and limitation of their lives, but he can't relate to it. He remains a pained observer: where they dance, he dreams of flying, and already the protest and rebellion are there again. The failed magician will be easy prey for the poodle trailing flames.

The briefly opened door of the study closes again. The unappeased restlessness seeks the quiet of the evening in the cozy lamplight , but this is a strange self-deception: the catacombs of rebellion as reading room for a devotional hour. But already in the first sentence of the New Testament, it isn't working. Faust, the dissatisfied, translates anew, "In the beginning was the Deed!" and immediately the poodle begins to whine. Mephisto, simultaneously disturbed and called, appears on the scene after staging a short, gimmicky introductory event -- "Why all the fuss?" The action man, the practitioner, the man of the

world offers his services, explaining, "Even the coarsest company will make you feel more human." He has more of such banal proposals, and therein the solution to the riddle is hidden, though including the solution is unintended by him and not yet recognized by Faust. The solution is in the experience of living, and engaging in the sphere of human activity and individual fulfillment. But for the moment, there is no talk of this. Faust, who has nothing left to lose anyway, is deftly manipulated to a low point by Mephisto, in which he renounces not only faith, hope and charity, but also reason and knowledge, and then dedicates himself to frenzy and "the rush of incidents." Instead of identification with the universe, identification with humanity – but the step into the real is oriented in a pessimistic direction: "And with it, one day meet my end."

Mephisto's error in the wager is after all very understandable. He is convinced that the experience that he offers, and as he understands it, must inevitably corrupt Faust. That is wholly the attitude of the philistine, ("What is man, but half angel and half devil") who doesn't believe in how the experience can humanize.

But Faust is playing his own trump card at this moment: "As soon as I stop striving, I'm a slave." With these – historically sensational – terms of the wager, he keeps their duel under purely earthly and human conditions. This is where he gets his chance – but no certain victory: active striving to see, to discover, to engage in endless desire. The wager is to be taken literally and contextually: it's not only a question of "the moment" and the "Stay with me," but also a question of knowing the difference between the "the right way and the wrong" that is mentioned in the prologue in heaven. In the sense of this "double-entry bookkeeping," Faust's accounts are not settled until the end. The scales of judgment teeter between the two participants in the wager all the way to Philemon and Baucus[2]. It's not until the vision that we see a final decision, that the eternal striving has led upwards. At that point the argument about the moment becomes pointless.

When Faust exits, the student enters. Vague and yet energetic ambition encounters Mephisto's cold analysis of the facts. This scene illustrates Faust's account of his situation at the beginning. But where Faust rebelled, Mephisto shines with the escape he offers both the student and Faust: adapt to the dull misery of life, of which the highlight is poking around lingerie. Then he flies off with Faust on the magic cloak, and the "new course of life" begins in the aca-

demic neighborhood: Auerbach's Cellar. Faust, unused to this kind of academic life, is initially inhibited, then aloof. He experiences only the vulgar flipside of the milieu he has abandoned. This is only a confirmation of the break he has made from his life, and no new beginning. For Mephisto this episode represents no grand operation, but a botched start.

Observations on Plot, Form & Rhythm

After Auerbach's Cellar comes the first break – for us the intermission. After that there is a new tone, a leap into another level.

Note on the course of the plot: Faust exits his study (in the broad sense) and enters the world. He engages in lively and sensual activity, which shows the measure of this man, and changes him.

Aesthetically, this is the move from accentuated subjectivity of the first phase into a gradual objectification of Faust in the world. This objectification grows continually until the vision[3], in which he sees the potential of unifying subject & object, self and humanity, freedom & necessity.

Scenically this corresponds to the importance of the monolog. Everything is experienced with Faust, through Faust, everything is seen, shown and absorbed by him and for him. Empathy and identification are required. There's no true dialog with living, corporeal partners like Wagner. And the actual dialog partners (Earth Spirit, Mephisto) are more like counterpoints in a monolog than they are real partner. Mephisto, in his double role of both fantastic and highly terrestrial figure, leads the way into the second phase, from Faust's monolog world into his dialog world, and this world appears to him in Gretchen, as Gretchen, and through her.

It is worth noting how, after the diversity of voices that follow in *Faust, Part II*, (the scenes: Court of the Emperor, Classical Walpurgis Night, the Helen act and War), the monolog prevails again in the 5th act. Faust's journey of experience and perception manifests itself in the height of subjectivity (blindness and monolog) and yet becomes one with the deepest objectivity. ("Upon free soil with a free people" – but NOT in the placid calm of an end – "surrounded by danger" one must conquer freedom every day...)

The rhythm of the first part is rapid. The joke becomes serious: "begin with the end of the world, and then slowly build up from there..." Here there is not only external tempo on top of the events, but also painstakingly subdued fervor in the moments of rest, in the lyrical mood, and above all, there are harsh, fast, often contrapuntal montages of scenes, and they culminate in the clamoring contradiction between the static, tender idyll of Gretchen's world and the dynamic passion of her bursting into love.

This internal and external tempo, the montages of contradictions – these are not only technique, but appropriate form for the revolutionary explosive power of the fable. This is a revolution taking place in Germany – on stage (and in philosophy).

Tragedy of Love

Mephisto's plan seems to be working. Faust, who had started out pessimistically, has received an education in the witch's kitchen: he has been civilized into a man of the world and prepped for sexual indulgence, he is ready to enter the world as a lecherous seducer. The encounter with Gretchen comes harshly on cue, "With that stuff in your belly, I guarantee, you'll find a Helen in every girl you see." This encounter is the first, best opportunity to show the frivolity of the "depraved man" (Brecht).

But the "depraved man" is Faust, and Gretchen is not the "first, best." Faust breaks into an unfamiliar, parochial, self-contained world. He discovers boundaries, he discovers beauty. Mephisto has awakened Faust's libido, but not killed his emotions: in sensuality he seeks beauty, in pleasure he seeks productivity, and in Gretchen he seeks the world. But even as he slips from Mephisto's grasp, he is driven squarely back into his arms through the unavoidable catastrophe.

Gretchen is not the world, and her love is itself a Faustian escape from her world of limiting convention, rigid dogma and narrow-minded morality. This attempt to escape out into freedom fails because of what makes it great: the constraints on each of the lovers. In the most beautiful moments of their love, two individuals meet. Faust has no world to offer, as he is on a journey, and Gretchen's alternative is her world, in which she remains bound by a thousand societal shackles. Faust attempts to flee the unavoidable conflict: Forest and Cave. Using inner turmoil and self deceit Mephisto forces him to make a decision

about Gretchen, and Faust concludes, "[May] both of us hurry toward destruction." But she will be destroyed without him. Faust must choose between being disloyal to himself or to Gretchen. The decision is tragic, and no one can take the responsibility from him. It remains to be seen whether he is able to accept that responsibility.

Gretchen's major free decision is her surrender to Faust after their discussion on religion. It's not only a matter of sleeping with a man before marriage – she's giving herself to a man who is outside the framework of the laws of her world, and she's not asking about religion, law or security. Then the norms and institutions, codes, and ecclesiastical and bourgeois morality come at her, destroying her entire family. Mephisto entraps Faust in these norms (killing Valentin is a capital crime) and easily pushes him to betray Gretchen.

Mephisto has a scheme to continue to push Faust's unassuaged drives, and work against passionate emotion and regret. This plan centers on Walpurgis Night: [4] the "eternal feminine draws us downward." [5] But the Witch's Sabbath, like everything else in this story, has two sides. On one hand it is a fantastic composition of the animalistic, equivocal, reactionary, and unproductive side of the human world, but on the other hand it shows the pagan and natural world in opposition to how the clerical & dogmatic institutions denounce nature and violate the senses. Mephisto maliciously invents generalizations on human behavior and contemporary societal conditions that are verifiable through thousands of facts, and offers these inventions on the level of empiric evidence with cynical corollaries. He follows the dialectic law "everything that's been created deserves to be destroyed" with "better it had never been created." Faust is all too human enough to succumb to the temptations of the Walpurgis orgy. The memory of Gretchen calls to him and brings jarring dissonance to the scene: at this moment he's not an ascetic, but a man nearly flooded in sexuality. The contradiction is in him, however, since he produces the memory himself. His accusations against Mephisto are honest in his frantic despair, but they are not justified. Mephisto counters his reproaches with "Who ruined her, me or you?"

On magic horses Mephisto & Faust go by the place of execution on the way to Gretchen. The mood is gloomy, she's penned up in a cage, the place is not unlike a pigsty. But rescue through Mephisto's aid, by Faust, whose love is dying away

in blood guilt and a new lust for life, is not possible for her. She had based her life on love, against God and against the world. And now that love is dead. ("Where has your love gone?") *That* has driven her to madness, and in insane despair she submits to the verdict of the world from which she tried to escape. Faust has been defeated and hauled away by Mephisto, and Gretchen has been dragged out to the blood court, but above them the voice of eternity – God, history – resonates with majestic coolness: "She is saved!" We call on you to hope – the legacy, not consolation of the one who has been sacrificed.

The Usual Mephisto

It's time to leave the theatrical black, white & green demon behind us. Mephisto as devil belongs in the costume of folk tale: horns, talons, cloven foot, tail, shaggy fur, gruesomely comical. As an earthly being he wears normal human clothing and a normal human face. What kind of devil would he be if he couldn't conjure up a human appearance that inspired confidence? And what a statement! – discovering the devil in that which is "normal"! He never quite sheds being the Prince of Darkness, he must deal with the annoyances of daily life and human custom, he is happy when he is allowed to behave as he generally would in his line of work (Witch's Kitchen, Walpurgis Night), and has the mysterious and yet also ludicrous contradiction between his human appearance and his devilish magic tricks. All of these things give this figure theatrical dimensions, the appeal and wit in the combination of earthly partner and medieval specter.

There is nothing demonic about Mephisto. He's too negative for that (said Goethe to Eckermann). At the same time Goethe declares both the "dismal, unsatisfied ambition of the protagonist" along with the "derision and harsh irony of Mephistopheles" to be parts of his own nature. Mephisto is clever, with esprit, wit, and sometimes even charm; he is sharp observer and keen analyst, and he is a realist when Faust is an idealistic rhetorician. Already in the prologue the Lord declares that people need a prickly negative partner. It's clear that Faust would be lost without Mephisto – he wouldn't take a step into real life and experience. That negation begins in a dull manner and becomes nasty, but it begins, and therein lies the possibility of creating. Mephisto's magic arts are on the level of county fair tricks, but also in anticipation of technical advances (flight, military techniques, building of canals, shipping). Evil motivation cannot diminish technical quality. It is clear

that there is no human progress in which Mephistophelian characteristics have not played a role. Mephisto has something that is both attractive and necessary.

But what do these abilities add up to? Faust is always in danger from vague passion, furious desire for insight, unbridled desire for experience; he stands at the edge of chaos and is able to maintain his ground only because of the creative essence of his human existence. He needs Mephisto, but without this essence, he would be lost through Mephisto.

For Mephisto experience, intelligence, and realism (materialism) conversely add up to negative essence: pessimism, egotism and opportunism are his life's maxims. He is a philistine. There is a polarity in his character: he's attractive & appealing, but his being also inspires repulsion and rejection, and the horror at repulsion and rejection is exactly the goal. The Mephisto philistine shimmers in many shades: he is an intellectual and a back-alley plebian; he's conservative and then progressive. In his *core* he is – in complete opposition to Faust – *static*. Faust criticizes, offers opposition, rebels – there is motion from the internal to the external, and the external to the internal. Mephisto analyzes, mocks, and both practices and preaches assimilation: this is only intake from the external to the internal. Mephisto accordingly bears all the rules and laws (and restraints) of the devil's world from which he has emerged, as a matter of course. He is the chief executive officer of hell, with the tangible technical and magical skills of his business, but lacking the ambition and the ability to change anything about himself or hell. A man like Faust – a man who both possesses and uses the ability to shed his own skin and to grow beyond himself – is highly irritating to Mephisto the philistine. These abilities alone allow the Faust who is initially helpless and dependent on Mephisto and his kind in all terrestrial things to be victorious in the end.

Mephisto as an earthly being has a capable brain, is a shrewd thinker, cynical practician, and platitudinous philosopher. This life-threatening combination needs only external attributes and a dramatic introduction (the prologue in heaven), and the devil on earth is ready.

Beginning and Ending in Heaven

The play begins in heaven (after the prelude in the theater), and this scene is on the open stage, with bare stagecraft, with familiar props, very modern and direct: we and our audience.

This is a theatrical heaven: the act of theater, the deed, is to show, and then to play without inhibition. We don't want clericalism, transcendentalism or coyly underplayed atheism here. In this case one must build on Faust's earthly story.

The basic situation is similar to the milieu of a feudal medieval court: welcoming of the hosts, report, paying homage. Then further, a view of the big picture. The archangel's extolment is genuine and dreadful at the same time – they don't pay close attention to earth. "And yet your servants, Lord, revere the gentle turning of your day." Mephisto arrives late, is out of place, takes a stand against this view: nihilism against APOLOGETICS**!** Out of the old struggle (Lucifer, Adam & Eve, Job) the wager emerges: the Lord, who finds his self-confident serenity challenged, makes use of Faust as a new example: one human represents the chance for humanity. Overlying the wager is a repressed irritation and uncertainty in the Lord: the conclusion is open, the human has all possibilities in himself; Creation was ended imperfectly: humankind has the ability to bring creation to its conclusion or destroy it. With the view from the prologue in heaven onto the distant earth, Faust's story receives a general theme: does life has meaning, does humanity have a chance at advancement, of knowledge, ruling over the world, or is life only an empty cycle of forced existence between birth and death in which one chases naked self-preservation, stale indulgence, futile deeds and animal pleasures?

The prologue in heaven turns Faust into the chief witness, and the function of the prologue is to put Faust's philosophic and historic story in a prominent position. Coming out of the prologue, the audience must become Faust, then become his witness, and finally become judge. The audience must produce a positive judgment from the vision – otherwise the heaven of the epilogue [6] becomes a superfluous and empty apotheosis.

Here Faust's story leads again into the heights above time and space, out of the narrow historical reality into the unlimited reality of development. The heaven of the prologue drew humoristic elements out of the dramatic setting – it wasn't material, but still of the world. The heaven of the epilog is distant, almost crystalline, deeply earnest. The difference emphasizes that the cycle will not be closed with an enlightening answer to the wager of the beginning. Instead of that we get the resurrection of Faust as a theatrical image for the resolution of his ambition in the coming centuries. No conclusion of motion, but ever onward, upward without end: Faust, youthful,

a gigantic individual, because he has become an example, goes through all spheres of heaven, through all times. The task remains to show this movement without end: it is the essence of history.

Note: The author adapted and directed recently FAUST 1 for the Resident Ensemble Players (REP), Thompson Theatre, Roselle Center for the Arts, University of Delaware, Newark (opening March 8, 2014). The REP is Delaware's only resident professional acting company. Presenting some of the less frequently produced classics like FAUST is part of their mission to give audience and company the opportunity to engage in the diverse riches of live theatre. Scenic & Lighting Design: William Browning, Costumes: Andrea Barrier, Choreography: Joann Browning; Faust: Stephen Pelinkski, Mephisto: Mic Matarrese, Gretchen: Sara J. Griffin

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Endnotes

1. The last word Wisdom ever has to say:
2. He only earns his Freedom and Existence,
3. Who's forced to win them freshly every day. (Faust II, V:vi. The Great Outer Court of the Palace)
4. Faust, Part 2.
5. At the end of Faust II
6. Faust II
7. His quotation is from the end of Faust II – it is a deliberate alteration of the text. The quotation is "zieht uns hinan" – "draws us upward/onward." This article quotes the line as "zieht uns hinab" – "draws us downward."
8. At the end of Faust II

The Ancient Greek Democratic Ideal and its Relevance for Today's World

Heinz-Uwe Haus

Abstract

Ancient Greek Drama/Theatre reinforces the idea that we have the power to shape and reshape our own lives and social conditions. For the performers as well as the spectators, to be human was to be potentially a hero of tragedy. But their unique interaction established the reviving tension between the "I" and the "we". It discovered, how the mystery of losing heritage lies in our Self, and why complexity and decision making as a dialectical unit are the timeless quality its characters define. The essay focuses on the processes regarding personal responsibility as a collective strength.

Keywords

Polis, Democracy, Freedom, Equality, Popular Sovereignty, Aristotle, Horkheimer, Koun.

With the twenty-first century many observers see evidence that the world is entering a new era of political and economic liberalism, considering whether democracy offers a unified systems of beliefs that can be successfully applied to any setting. The ideals of democracy—freedom, equality, popular sovereignty—are so appealing that many different kinds of regimes pay lip service to them. Yet, the real issue is the machinery of government, as Jacques Barzun reminded us in 1989 (the year of Europe's democratic awakening against totalitarian suppression), "because it is how the wheels turn, and not the theory, that makes a government free or not free." That machinery cannot be imported, Barzun argues, but rather must reflect each nation's history and its people's "habits of the heart." Tocqueville, Rousseau, Burke, and Montesque come to mind with a proven human truth: political equality can be decreed, but freedom not. Freedom asks for the slow training of individuals by history. This element of time carries with it a predicament and a paradox. The predicament is "how can the peoples that want to spread freedom to the world propose their institutions as models to those institutions that depend on habits long ingrained?" and as for the paradox: "how can a people learn the ways of free government until it is

free? And how can it stay free if it cannot run the type of machinery associated with self-government?" (Barzun). These modern questions are familiar to us since antiquity, whose practices and writings on government inspired thinkers to design plans or issue warnings appropriate to their own time.

I

"Habits of the heart" was the theme of the Greek chorus, when it presents the life voyages of the protagonists to an audience who steered themselves on collision courses with society. The Ancient Athenians had begun to question how nature worked, how society should work, and what man's role was in the scheme of things. Tragedy was the poet's answer to some of these questions: How should one behave? How can one accept the injustices of life? What is the price of *hubris*? The playwright's key role is indicated by the term applied to him, *didaskalos* (teacher), for he was considered to be the instructor of both the performers (during the process of play production) and the audience (through the finished product).

The chorus, which serves several functions, plays a most complex role in the performative meaning. First, it is a character in the play; it gives advice, expresses opinions, asks questions, and, sometimes, takes an active part in the action. Second, it often establishes the ethical or social framework of events and sets up a standard against which the action may be judged. Third, it frequently serves as an ideal spectator, reacting to the events and characters as the dramatist might hope the audience would. Fourth, the chorus helps to set the overall mood of the play and of the individual scenes and to heighten dramatic effects. Fifth, it adds movement, spectacle, song, and dance, and thus contributes much to the theatrical effectiveness. Sixth, the choral passages serve as important rhythmical function, creating intervals or retardations during which the audience may reflect upon what has happened and what is to come.

By performing the mythological past the *polis* trained its citizen in the recognizability of history. When I discussed with Carolos Koun, what impact the drama may have had on the theory and practice of direct democracy in Ancient Greece, his answer was straightforward: "Its art of observation teaches that the ancient maxim is true: the world insists in being governed" (Koun 1975).

Aeschylus' *Oresteia* tells the legend of Agamemnon, the Greek war hero who was murdered by his wife Clytemnestra, and the pursuit of justice by Agamemnon's children, Orestes and Electra. Thematically, the trilogy is about the tragedy of human arrogance or *hubris*—the *hubris* required to murder a person for personal gain, as in the case of Clytemnestra and her lover Aegisthus, as well as the *hubris* to, in turn, hunt down and kill them, as in the case of Orestes and Electra. When in the end, Orestes and Electra are brought to trial by the Furies, vengeful emissaries of the gods, Aeschylus makes a point that has been echoed by historians and dramatists, psychologists and criminal court reporters for centuries since: that the root of evil and suffering is usually human arrogance. On a dramatic level, the plays convey the suffering of a family torn apart by patricide and matricide. Koun's idea (that is, Rules of government) that the performances were a kind of "exercises in historicity" implies "machinery of government" but no rules can be applied universally.

As contemporary readers of Greek tragedy, we may feel that we face different truths than did the Greek audiences twenty-five hundred years ago. How, then, do we create meaning from these plays? How do we reconcile the tensions which exist between the fictional images of life the Greeks presented and the ongoing reality of our own lives? One way to begin is to identify particular areas in which the view of life implied in Greek tragedy differs from our own. The discovery that it is possible to look at life through entirely new eyes is in itself a kind of meaning which drama has to offer.

We live in an age in which the idea of truth is linked to the process of scientific investigation. Truth is available for us, not now, but at some time in the future, when all the experiments have been performed and all the data are in. The implication of Greek tragedy, however, is that a form of truth is immediately available to those who are willing to face it and strong enough to survive. Since most mortals prefer their daily illusions, this willingness and strength must come from the tragic protagonist. Ancient Greek characters undertake extreme, audacious objectives and pursue them relentlessly to the point of catastrophe. Their actions help the community to face its fear of the implacable power of Necessity and inspire pity for the suffering which they must undergo in the process. If we empathize with the protagonist, we can vicariously test our own powers of truth-facing and survival.

II

The tragic conflict is revealed as a clash between mortal striving and a mysterious force in the universe which opposes such striving. Sometimes, it is said that Greek tragedy is about man against the gods, and it is true that a god may, sometimes, be the agent of negative forces. A large part of our understanding of the genre depends on the *Poetics* of Aristotle. The age of the great tragic writers was already long past when Aristotle first came to Athens. Aristotle himself pointed out that tragedy had already reached its highest development in the works of Sophocles and Euripides. Therefore, when he set out to examine the genre of tragedy—to construct a philosophical model for perfect tragedy—he was working with plays that had already passed into history. Essentially, the model that Aristotle constructed was based on carefully selected examples and primarily on *Oedipus the King*. That is not only an important fact in order to understand the aesthetic of Aristotle, but his political thinking too.

To discover why and how democracy is an ideal specifically rooted in Ancient Athens' theatre, a brief examination is necessary of the most important aspects of his model. For Aristotle, the poet-dramatist is not a historian but a creative artist, which means that he imitates not what actually happens in life, but what is probable and meaningful. He arranges events, not necessarily in the order of their occurrence, but in an order that is likely, believable, and, above all, inevitable. The poet who follows this pattern imitates ideal truth, the universal which grows out of the specific. (For Aristotle, this makes drama of greater import than history, which deals only in objective facts.)

In terms of specific form, the tragic plot must contain "reversal," results opposite to those intended; "discovery," which means within the play itself the change from love to hate, or from ignorance to knowledge, with consequent arousal of pity and fear (there is some justification for defining discovery as transference of knowledge from the protagonist to the audience); and "suffering," from murder, torture, or injury of the hero who passes from happiness to misery. The hero will not be perfectly virtuous and just, since, if he were, the tragic happening would be unfair; and he will not be evil or base, since the tragic event would then be only poetic justice. Instead, he will be a basically good person of distinguished standing (so that his fall will be greater), and his downfall will come about because of a flaw in his character. This flaw may be an excess of some virtue.

The Aristotelian position outlined above is certainly not a final or completely accurate depiction of Greek tragedy; of the plays that we have, it fits completely only *Oedipus the King*. It does provide a model, however—a pattern against which we can measure the existing plays—and a reasonably clear statement of exactly what the Ancient Athenians got from their tragedies. First of all, Sophocles' plays are about the folly of arrogance and the wisdom of accepting fate. Sophocles believed in the Greek gods, but his plays are suffused with existential insights that have been voiced many times since. For instance, compare this observation by Antigone:

> What joy is there in day repeating day,
> some short, some long, with death the only end.
> I think them fools who warm their hearts with
> the glow of empty hopes. (Sophocles)
> with Macbeth's famous speech:
> Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow,
> creeps in this petty pace from day to day,
> to the last syllable of recorded time;
> and all our yesterdays have lighted fools
> the way to dusty death. Out, out, brief candle!
> Life's but a walking shadow; a poor player,
> that struts and frets his hour upon stage,
> and then is heard no more: It is a tale
> told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
> signifying nothing. (Shakespeare)

The drama competitions at the City Dionysia demonstrate the need for dialogue to meet changing conditions in the society. The performances aim to achieve understanding from a variety of perspectives, standards, and criteria that people apply in their defense and criticism of judgment. It is the theatre where the Ancient Greeks trained the view that political institutions must respect differences and allow many different visions of the good to be expressed within the bounds of civility and public order. But any attempt to understand and interpret a play text mainly on the grounds of meaning on the verbal level,

ignores a basic structural principle which assumes that the meaning of the parts is imbued and, finally, determined by the structure of the whole. It should be born in mind that the same words may indicate very different acts/actions when reflecting different intentions and purposes. Unfortunately, access to the original "performance text," which should be conceived as the whole, is restricted by the "literary text," which lacks the nonverbal elements necessary to determine the performative function of the words.

Ancient Greek drama called and calls for the working out of decision-making processes, discussion, or dialogic situations that will allow actors and audience to establish acceptable procedures for tackling controversial moral or value issues. With the *Bacchae*, it was Euripides' intention to perform an act of harsh criticism of contemporaneously held beliefs, with the clear purpose of creating a conflict between the cruel nature of Dionysus and a sense of true divinity, against the background of expectations for a new and more rational concept. Agave's *anagnorisis* of her horrendous deed and her profound sorrow are not a recognition of the god's "conjunction of opposites," but rather convey a sense of contradiction to Dionysus' alleged divinity.

III

"So it was that humankind lost the ancient concept, dating back at least to the Greeks in the Western tradition, that society has a purpose that is something more than establishing the ground rules for individual striving," Harrington reflects, comparing today's democracies' struggle for democratization with the Athenian vision of a participatory, non-bureaucratic democracy. Others, like Michael Novak, reject the premodern concept of the common good for a modern free society. For Aristotle, the common good was what all things aim at; it had primacy over persons. But embracing the dignity of free persons does not mean that the concept of the common good must be jettisoned. It means, rather, that this concept must be revised. And here liberalism, in the classical sense, has proved essential. Liberalism has provided the kind of institutions most suitable to the "person-qua-person," as Novak puts it. In doing so, it has achieved a "practical reconciliation of the common good with the free person" (Novak).

But let us remember for a moment what the political ideals and aims of the Athenian democracy are. In *The Politics*, Aristotle points out that one basic principle of the democratic constitution is liberty. To Aristotle, liberty means two things: (1) "ruling and being ruled in turn," and (2) "living as one chooses." As such, liberty and equality are "inextricably linked." In fact, the first element of liberty, "ruling and being ruled in turn," is based on a fundamental conception of equality, which Aristotle labels as "numerical equality" (opposed to "equality based on merit"). "Numerical equality" means an equal share of the practice of ruling for all regardless of individual ability, merit, or wealth. "Thus understood, equality is the practical basis of liberty. It is also the moral basis of liberty" (Held).

But Aristotle was aware, that a strict adherence to the doctrine of political equality could endanger individual's liberty to "live as one chooses." The Athenian democrats believed that there must be limits to individual choices so that one's exercise of free will would not interfere unjustly with other people's freedom. As long as each citizen has the opportunity of "ruling and being ruled in turn," the risk associated with equality can be minimized and both elements of liberty can be realized. On Aristotle's account, then, Ancient Greek "democracy entails liberty and liberty entails strict political equality—a matter which caused him to express grave reservations about democracy" (Held).

Society, far from being a "perfect community," as Aristotle said, must stand the tension between natural law and history. In a famous passage of his *Rhetoric*, Aristotle put it in this way:

Justice and injustice have been defined in reference to laws and persons in two ways. Now there are two kinds of laws, particular and general. By particular laws I mean those established by each people in reference to themselves, which again are divided into written and unwritten; by general laws I mean those based upon nature. In fact, there is a general idea of just and unjust in accordance with nature, as all men in a manner divine, even if there is neither communication nor agreement between them. This is what Sophocles' Antigone evidently means when she declares that it is just, though forbidden, to bury Polynices, as being naturally just: "For neither to-day nor yesterday, but from eternity, these statutes live and no man knoweth whence they came." (1373b)

Let us briefly recall the context of these words. Aristotle is analyzing the different parts of rhetoric: deliberative, forensic, epideictic (that is, oratory that deals with praise or blame). The opposition between written particular law, on the one hand, and unwritten general law, on the other, takes place within the section on forensic rhetoric. Aristotle does not bother to demonstrate the existence of unwritten law: he takes it is natural and, therefore, self-evident. The Greek scholars among us know that the translation is not quite correct; it is sexist by eliminating the neuter terms Aristotle is using ("nobody" and "all" instead of "men" and "man"). This is not a minor detail, because, with Antigone, a feminine character speaks the voice of generality; on the contrary, the written law, in the name of which Creon forbids the burial of Polynices, is, in Aristotle's words, a "particular law." Natural law, as those neuter terms emphasize, embraces both men and women. But Aristotle seems to suggest that what is "based upon nature" is unrelated to specific times and places.

Yet, some passages of the second book of his *Rhetoric* suggest a different view. Aristotle examines in detail the different emotions used by the orator in order to convince his audience. Pity, for instance: ". . . the nearness of the terrible makes men pity. Men also pity those who resemble them in age, character, habits, position, or family; for all such relations make a man more likely to think that their misfortune may befall him as well" (Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1386a). We come across the same argument in the section about envy; people

envy those who are near to them in time place, age, and reputation, whence it was said "Kinship knows how to envy also"; and those with whom they are in rivalry, who are those just spoken of; for no man tries to rival those who lived ten thousand years ago, or are about to be born, or are already dead; nor those who live near the Pillars of Hercules; nor those who, in his own opinion or in that of others, are either far inferior or superior to him. (Aristotle, *Rhetoric*)

In Aristotle's view the emotions analyzed in the second book of *Rhetoric* are "undoubtedly" based upon nature. But he submitted them, as we would say today, to specific historical and geographical limitations. The outreaching metaphors—"ten thousand years" and "Pillars of Hercules"—suggest a time, either past or future, so remote as to prevent us from identifying, either in a negative or in a positive way, with the emotions of other human beings. And here is the connection to the "ancient concept" Michael Harrington and others see lost in today's realization of democracy, which emphasizes liberal individualism.

Men and women, Aristotle said in *The Politics*, are "drawn together by a common interest, in proportion as each attains a share in the good life"—but people are also moved by a desire "to live a social live even when they stand in no need of mutual support." Thus, the aim of the *polis* (of the city, of the government) "is not mere life, it is rather, a good quality of life" (Aristotle, *The Politics*). It is not enough that "the law becomes a mere covenant—or 'a guarantor of men's rights against one another'; it should be a rule of life that will make the member of the *polis* good and just" (Aristotle, *The Politics*). No wonder that in the nineteenth and twentieth century social critiques try to translate these thoughts into their revolutionary visions. It is the Ancient republican ideal of the citizen in which private and public harmoniously reinforce one another.

For Michael Novak, liberalism in this sense has been embodied in the American experiment, which "made central to the conception of the common good the protection of individual rights." The American founders did not try to impose a "moral-cultural system" from the top down, but left the construction of such a system to institutions wholly distinct from government (the press, churches, universities and the like). They also legitimated a new type of economic system, promoted and regulated by the political system but "free to a degree unprecedented in history from the domination of the state."

It is here where a revised understanding of the common good is happening. The most potent instrument of achieving it is not the state but the society at large, and not the solitary individual, but "the communitarian individual." The ongoing question is how self-interest and faction can be made to serve the public good. But the old phrase "common good rightly understood" means achieving it for a particular community, at a particular moment, not the common good for all times and places.

Aristotle's description challenges today's liberalism to define itself not in terms of the individual but as a social system. The Ancient Athenian model of democracy is a reminder of the need for "republican virtues" in a people who aspire to "be free."

IV

The Athenian democrats also showed a remarkable appreciation on the value of justice, rule of law, and due process. Self-imposed restraint was an essential understanding for social communication. "If the law is properly created within the

framework of the common life, it legitimately commands obedience" (Held) In contrast to later liberal positions, Athenian democracy was marked by a general commitment to the principle of civic virtue: dedication to the republican city-state and the subordination of private life to public affairs and the common good. There was no liberal distinction between state and society, between specialized officials and citizens, or between "the people" and government:

In this community the citizen had rights and obligations, but these rights were not attributes of private individuals and these obligations were not enforced by a state dedicated to the maintenance of a framework to protect the private ends of individuals. Rather,(…) they were "public" rights and duties. (Held)

Unlike the modern liberal separation between public sphere and private life, Athenians thought that the most desirable life was the life in a "*polis*," where each citizen as a political being found ultimate fulfillment through political participation and public debate. The principle of government was the principle of a form of life-long direct participation. The governors were to be governed. The process of direct and active self-government was the ultimate affirmation of Athenian citizenship.

The Athenian drama competition was an essential part of Ancient Athens machinery of government. Its ideals—equality among citizens, liberty, and respect for the law and justice—have had great influence in the Western political thought, although there have been new central ideas added during the course of history—for instance, that human beings are "individuals" with "rights." This, notably, cannot be directly traced to Athens. Today's understanding means that the individual has a capacity for freedom, for realizing himself/herself in the course of his/her actions, and that "he [sic] has inherent rights over and against the demands of any community to which he [sic] may belong" (Berger). Berger says that, in the modern world, democracy may well be the most practical way to safeguard differing traditions and values because of the "breathing space" it allows individuals and institutions other than the state. Western democracy has been founded on a specific understanding of the individual as a bearer of inalienable rights. Today's concept of "the individual as an autonomous being" (Berger) historizes the Ancient experience, including the critique of the great minds of Ancient Greece—Aristotle, Plato, Xenophon, Thucydides, which saw dozens of democratic cities perish from inefficiency, stupidity, and corruption. We remember that Jean Jacques Rousseau wrote *The Social Contract* because he discovered (for his time) that the Athenian democracy was too good for men as they are. But the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the United States Con-

stitution, the German Grundgesetz, or the European System of Laws, just to name a few examples, where character, habits, religion, economic base, and education of each people are being taken into account before setting up any constitutional machinery, constitute the convergence of two cultural streams:

the first originating in biblical religion, with Protestantism playing a decisive role in its application to political democracy; the second rooted in the Hellenic view of man, transmitted to modernity via the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, and applied to the invention of democratic institutions by the French Revolution and its successor.

We, who work as actors, directors, or scholars with Ancient drama, wonder sometimes about the divergent viewpoints in the recent debate as to whether democracy is an ideal specifically rooted in the Western experience or whether it values are more universally valid. While it is not difficult to connect the rise of democratic institutions with specifically Western historical experiences, there are also points of contact to be made with institutions in non-Western societies. I know no example where the performance of an Ancient Greek drama did not re-affirm the need for more "breathing space" of the audience. Ancient Greek drama teaches us to restrain the actions of the rulers. It is full of subversive energy against the suppressors of the individuals' rights of liberty, freedom, and justice. Benno Besson's *Peace* in the sixties, in East Berlin, de-masked the state's justification of the erection of the wall. Dimitris Rondiris' *Electra*, with Aspassia Papathanassiou in the lead, in the same place as guest performance, brought a timelessness on the stage which was in sharp contrast with the official aesthetic ideology. And my own *Suppliant Women* at the beginning of the eighties demonstrated for a young audience what the so-called "socialist democracy," including the freedom of speech, is missing. The victory of Western democratic values over the totalitarian dictatorships 1989 in Europe, demonstrated to the whole world, why and how democracy is, under modern conditions, the only practical alternative to tyranny.

V

What is needed, Max Horkheimer said in a 1942 essay, is "the Greek *polis* without slaves." The crux for many of the critiques within Western democracy is that the participatory democracy of the *polis* was erected on the basis of the unfreedom of slaves and of women and of contempt for even the free manual

laborer. "The best state," Aristotle had said on that last count, "will not make the manual worker a citizen." The vague hint that Aristotle had defined such a possibility in his discussion of the "states of Daedalus," which would come into existence sometime in the future with automation, is not fact enough, to explain why, as Orlando Patterson puts it, "[s]lavery, freedom, and empire, like father, bride, and groom, marched to the altar of Athena together." Sociological activists and ideological strategists comment as one: "The psyche of democratic Greece, then, was permeated by antidemocratic assumptions" (Harrington). But why look back to such a tarnished ideal? Because the Ancient Athenians, at their best, built a political system in which there was no bureaucracy, no state looming over the citizen, but a culture of participatory and social commitment—resting, it is true, on that so-called, immoral foundation. The forms of Athenian politics, in short, have a value that can be detached from their historical base, particularly, if we agree, that "the parts of the machine are not detachable" (Barzun).

In order for the Ancient Athenian democracy to work properly, there were several important conditions. Robert Dahl summarizes six elements. First, "citizens must be sufficiently harmonious in their interests so that they can share, and act upon, a strong sense of a general good that is not in marked contradiction to their personal aims and interests" (Daul). Second, citizens must also be homogeneous with respect to those characteristics (such as the amount of wealth and leisure time) for which wide differences might create instability and sharp conflicts regarding public good (Daul). Third, "the citizen body must be quite small, ideally even smaller than the forty to fifty thousand of . . . Athens" (Daul). Fourth, citizens must be able to assemble and directly debate issues of legislation and render judicial judgment (Daul). The Athenians found it difficult to conceive of representative government, much less to accept it as a legitimate alternative to direct democracy. Fifth, self-government not only entailed meetings in the Assembly, it also meant citizen participation in the administration of the city-state (Daul). Most Athenians served as a public official at least once during their life time. Sixth, city-state should remain "fully autonomous" (Daul). Leagues, confederacies, and alliances should not be allowed to preempt the sovereignty of the Assembly of the city-state (Dahl 18).

The Ancient Athenians "habits of the heart" are unique and indefinable, their organism of democracy is in fact indescribable, because it does not show others how to do it, but it models for observers a habit of self-help. What Jacques Barzun clarifies

for the most modern democracy, the United States, should count for the Western world's oldest democracy, Ancient Athens, too:

first, democracy has no theory to export, because it is not an ideology but a wayward historical development. Second, the historical development of democracy has taken many forms and used many devices to reach the elusive goal called human freedom. Third, the forms of democracy in existence are today in a state of flux.

Those who wish to adopt classically liberal political systems for their countries will have to learn that that it is more difficult than it might appear. By confronting the present results of democracy with the Ancient Athenian achievements, the importance of the individual person in the social process of democratization becomes obvious. It is one thing to structure a liberal government, but it is quite another, and much harder, task to develop the kind of citizenry fit for a democratic regime. The comparison is a reminder of the need for democratic virtues in a people who aspire to a free and liberal political order. (These include such virtues as enterprise and responsibility for self.)

Our problem today is that freedom calls for a government that governs least; equality for a government that governs most. No wonder that the institutions of the free world are under strain and its citizens under stress. The theorem of democracy still holds, but all of its terms have changed in nature, especially the phrase "the people," which has been changed beyond recognition by the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century and the social revolution of the twentieth century. If free persons do have primacy, then, the common good can be only something that emerges from acts taken by free persons.

VI

Notwithstanding its critics, however, the Ancient Athenian democracy remains a legacy from which our present and future generations can learn a great deal. Its theatre reinforced the existing social structure and celebrated Athenian democracy. But it was also a theatre of questions. The playwrights recognized that life is full of contradictions and that the future can be neither predicted nor controlled. The dramas that have come down to us call the community to account for its actions and charge individuals with responsibilities for their choices.

Let me return to the example of *Bacchae*. An integral part of the text's meaning is contributed by the target audience. The question for us is: how could the community of Athenian believers accept that Dionysus had caused a mother to dismember (*sparagmus*) her own son? Even if both Agave and Pentheus had committed the most tremendous sins—slander of the god and *theomachy*—that they did not deserve such cruelty is not only the opinion of a twenty-first century audience. This is not a matter of coexistence of creativity and destruction, but of sheer disproportion. Cadmus—who is punished despite being the only one to have protected Semele's honor—concludes: "We have learned. But your sentence is too harsh" (Euripides). The Athenian audience—possibly on the brink of a religious revolution—could not have accepted a god who so wildly ran against the democratic and civic values of the city.

Euripides certainly inverted the structure of tragedy: instead of linking the god with value, he associated him with anti-value. How can a god plan such a terrible double vengeance on mother and son and yet claim divinity? Cadmus concludes: "Gods should be exempt of human passions" (Euripides). The same structure is found in *Hippolytus* and *The Trojan Women*, in which Aphrodite, Artemis, and Athena reveal their unfitting human drives. Within the framework of an art which addresses large and heterogeneous audiences, which presupposes a—not necessarily sophisticated—response in unison, the theatre essentially reflects patterns of psychological response that mainly boil down to reaffirmation or refutation of held beliefs. "Relativism" was no choice. The ethic and moral principles of Athenian democracy provided certain procedural constraints and made demands on all participants.

Therefore, to the Greek audience the odes were a crucial part of the play. They set the norms of communication: norms of respect for persons, universal human and civic rights, and egalitarian reciprocity that govern such a theatrical dialog situation. The chorus, representing the community's Elders, who, in the fictional theatre world, are deeply concerned with the fate of the city, guaranteed equal opportunity to all participants—performers as well spectators—to take part in the societal discourse, to contribute to it, and to be free from coercion, be it ever so subtle or covert. Although the chorus also performed the priestly function of speaking for and to the gods in the real world of the audience, it reminded the characters and audience how to sustain those "normative practices and moral relationships within which reasoned but fair agreement as

a way of life can flourish and continue" (Benhabib 38). Aristophanes expressed the Greek perception of the chorus when he wrote:

> There is no function more noble than that
> of the god-touched Chorus
> Teaching the City in Song.

This tradition of spiritual teaching in Greek tragedy is centered in the choral odes. Its relevance for today's theatre is that it "speaks the truth for the improvement of the city": a challenge the twenty-first century theatre faces if it strives for a faithful description of reality.

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SECTION IV

Art, Theatre, Literature, Music, Culture

VISUAL CULTURE AS PARADIGM OF POWER IN THE BLURRED EASTERN LIMITS OF EUROPE

Chairs

—

Jorge Latorre, Oleksandr Pronkevich & Joanna Bielska-Krawczyk

Participants

—

Anthony Cristiano
Joanna Bielska-Krawczyk
Miguel Ribeiro-Pereira
Oleksandr Pronkevich
Jorge Latorre

Presentation

Jorge Latorre, Oleksandr Pronkevich & Joanna Bielska-Krawczyk

The reshaping of the world is now done through Internet technologies and audio-visual culture and not by the force afforded by traditional warfare. The old-fashioned war-campaigns are no longer effective. Today the symbolic victories are much more important than the triumphs on the battlefields. Within such a shifted context, digital technologies and products, audio and visual arts, have all become the new tools of indoctrination, the most effective strategy for disseminating different values and different visions of the world. Internet technologies, mobile devices and new gadgetry, painting and sculpture, book illustrations, urban graffiti, music, cinema, advertisement, parades, flash-mobs, and other mass and lone performances, are all involved in creating new paradigms of ideology and power. Much money is invested into cultural industries, which construct new identities, divide or unite people, conform entire communities to one pattern, re-affirm old empires, and reinvent new mythologies of nationalism and even newer ones of cosmopolitanism.

Europe is at the center of one of the key concepts in the battle for the constitution of a symbolic and virtual reality. Central and Eastern European countries produce their own pro-European and anti-European imagery, which proceed to prove how difficult and contradictory the process of accepting and fostering European values is. In the former USSR republics cinema is still the most important form of art, as once described by Lenin. The movies produced by the contemporary Russian film industries manipulate European historical and cultural heritage in order to induce in the viewer a sense of fear of the West and in doing so contribute to create the atmosphere of the new form of Cold War.

In such a new scenario it makes sense to ask whether Internet technologies, works of audio and visual arts, are virtual bridges between the East and the West or just tools of propaganda and for fostering new political economies which end up raising new walls, dividing the world anew. The importance of the subject has likewise commanded the attention of the

research on digital, audio and visual products, as manifestations of ethics of hospitality and ethics of hostility in a contemporary multi-ethnic world-community and rapidly homologizing civilization.

Thus, the participants of the workshop were invited to speak on the following subjects:

1. Are Internet technologies a window to freedom or to a new metaphysical prison?
2. The Image of Europe in Poland's contemporary paintings.
3. The art of composing music as a reflection of epistemological shifts in the culture of Modernity.
4. Rhetoric of visual political propaganda against the West the contemporary Russian film industries.
5. Eastern-European urban architecture as a palimpsest of European history (the case of Odessa).

Internet Technologies
Digital Paradises or Digital Hells?

Anthony Cristiano

Abstract

The traditional dichotomous opposition 'paradise versus hell' is employed to articulate the tension between the harmful versus beneficial effects of Internet technologies. Today's reality is examined through the paradigmatic lens of McLuhan's ideas, his axioms that media can powerfully transform our sensibilities, but also his prediction that they have the potential to harmonize humanity—though he did not survive to witness the arrival of the Internet, the emergence of which he 'prophesized' according to some. Where are the new digital trends leading us? There is little doubt that the new tools contribute to make our lives easier at many levels, but are Internet technologies ultimately empowering or impairing? How are we to understand and approach the totalizing nature of digital tools? Most importantly, what are we to teach the younger generation, the so-called 'digital natives' about its implications? Is the Internet addictive, and if so what makes a non-substance based medium compulsive to use? How are we to reconcile the idea that humanity is moving forward with the overwhelming effects of digital technology? Do media technologies have a trajectory of their own, and are they blending with and extending human abilities, and even 'nervous system' according to McLuhan? Are we to subscribe to a deterministic and material explanation of our transforming reality or are we to approach the matter critically, and if so how? This piece aims to articulate such issues within the appropriate theoretical and historical contexts and concludes by proposing sound answers to the questions they pose.

Keywords

Internet; Paradise & Hell, McLuhan, Baudrillard, Digital Natives, Facebook, Digital Trends, Internet Addiction, Memory Loss, Multitasking, Determinism, Dystopian; Human Values, Stereotypes, Homologizing Trends, Critical Thinking, Ultimate Meaning.

Introduction

Trends in Internet technologies are on the rise. In Canada about 80% of the population has access to the Internet.[1] As for the country hosting the conference, Portugal, from 2010 to 2012 the percentage of Internet users went from 48% to 55%, which translates into about 6 million people, more than half of its total population.[2] The top country in the world for Internet access and use is China, followed by US, India, Japan, Brazil, Russia, and Germany.[3] The numbers are increasing across the globe very fast, especially if compared to other media revolutions. One of the most important ques-

tion we pose is: are contemporary trends in digital media leading humanity to a 'digital Paradise' or a 'digital Inferno,' forward or backward?

The Western world's traditional dichotomous opposition 'paradise versus hell' is employed as a useful metaphor to articulate the tension between beneficial versus harmful effects which are regularly ascribed to contemporary digital media and Internet technologies. In the Paradiso canticle Dante describes an ascent to higher knowledge and ecstatic happiness, a crescendo of experiences beyond human language to express and memory to retain. The blessings of Paradise exceed Dante's ability to grasp its meaning and express into his poems.[4] This is evidence of grace, for angels too have no need of memory.[5] On the contrary, the Inferno metaphor stands for the experience of punishment, retributive justice, and unending torment. The Inferno is also a place of shame, disrepute: the cases of Vanni Fucci and Bertran de Born are two among many. The thieves are painfully destroyed and made to disappear over and over again.[6] Bertran de Born, sower of discord, explains the cycle he must suffer for his 'bad counsel'.[7] At the semantic and psychological levels the Internet may be replicating a similar experience: the exhilarating feeling of 'self-empowerment,' the 'futility' of memory, the ability to look at the entire world from a figurative Empyrean,[8] or the hunting experience of feeling trapped, framed, wrecked by the trickery of others, or by one's own miscalculations and/or misdeeds. There is no leaving Hell, its torment and shame within and without are unending. The Internet likewise can become a pillorying machine, a constant 'accuser,' a totem of disgrace. What's on the Internet stays on the Internet — whether one is recognized the right to be forgotten by Google's search engine or not.

McLuhan and Today's Reality
A Mixed Message

When we look at Marshall McLuhan's famous tetrad — also known as McLuhan's Laws of Media — what stands out is that three out of four of his postulates, if not all four of them, have a positive ring to them: 1) What does the new medium improve or enhance? 2) What becomes obsolete or driven out of prominence? 3) What is retrieved — that had been forgotten or made obsolete — by the new form? 4) How does the new medium "overheat" or reverse to its original characteristics? Marshall McLuhan taught that media extend: "…

our central nervous system itself in a global embrace, abolishing both space and time as far as our planet is concerned. Rapidly, we approach the final phase of the extension of man — the technological simulation of consciousness, when the creative process of knowing will be collectively and corporately extended to the whole of human society."[9]

McLuhan is a literature professor, and his language is a mix of literal and symbolic modes; he employs metaphors and puns, to articulate and support his arguments. McLuhan speaks of the profound effect media have on our psyche; he is alerting us to what is referred to as the 'ecosystem of media,' its 'environmental effects.' He expressed his 'extension' idea by saying things like, 'the wheel is an extension of the foot,' 'the chair is an ablation of the posterior,' etc. These are not to be necessarily intended literally but as referring to evolving epochal contexts, as contributing to cultural, social, and political developments. He is speaking of a transformation of sensibilities, of life-styles and social status, much like the passage from the 'print-age' to what he named the 'electric-age' — from the linear narrative of the printed page to the auditory and visual environments of radio and television and (prophetically, some would say) he also speaks of the medium and phenomenon he did not survive to witness, the Internet. In his 'the medium is the message, and then the massage' dictums, one could read the idea that language and other media influence and perpetuate the modes and ideas a society adopts and lives by. McLuhan had 'good news' for his readers, he writes: "The mark of our time is its revulsion against imposed patterns. We are suddenly eager to have things and people declare their beings totally. There is a deep faith to be found in this new attitude — a faith that concerns the ultimate harmony of all beings. Such is the faith in which this book has been written."[10]

Rather than fragmenting society, McLuhan thought that media would harmonize us if only we understood how it works or, better, if we let it work through us according to its peculiar competencies. Among other things McLuhan dealt with one of the major issues debated today: whether or not technology has a progressive trajectory of its own — what some define as 'technological determinism' — the assumption that technology drives the development of the social structures and cultural values of a society. Dystopian futures and fallacies about the direction and ultimate effects of technological developments abound, and are indicative of the general inability to determine the future out-

come of some of the choices we make. In the 1920s, 1940s, and onward some thought that machines and computers would definitely lead to a police state.[11] Those 'prophecies' failed or were not quite fulfilled as envisioned. The detractors continue to see Internet technology as the battleground for an ideological and political struggle, the fight to hold onto the instruments of mass control.

Several experts agree that among the new issues arisen in the digital era the negative effects Internet technologies are having on the younger generation is at the top of the list. They ask what we ought to teach children regarding the use they make of digital tools and the Internet; how to rear the generation of so-called "digital natives" so that they may benefit from the new age and not be harmed by it. The most worrisome changes are those interfering in a negative way with behavioural and life patterns: the loss of reading and study habits, the decreased ability to focus and develop a personal vision. The younger generations, unlike their parents, increasingly prefer to 'communicate' and 'socialize' online rather than in person. They prefer to text rather than talk on the phone. They prefer the online world to meeting on the street or at a town square. Young people feel 'empowered' by the digital tools, by their smart-phones, their ability to organize and manage their inbox, their messages and posts, their so-called 'participatory actions.' One writer, however, warns: "Misinformation — and disinformation… Ideologues and self-promoters abound. …Like any city, the Net has its charlatans and its thieves as well as its poets, engineers, and philosophers."[12] The younger tend to not question the 'how,' the mechanisms of new media — the 'totalizing effect,' as McLuhan would say. On the flip-side e-learning keeps opening up new horizons for education. Digital tools and the Web have made distant-learning possible. Web 3.0 promises to equip the virtual classroom with even better and more cost-effective tools as students take courses from the comfort of their own home, with the option of 'attending' via avatars — a graphical image that represents the person or participant, a sort of 'absent presence.' Very few people would doubt the usefulness of computer technology and digital tools; they contribute to make our lives easier and more enjoyable. Is there, however, an objective way of determining the effects of digital media? The experts answer by saying that we must look at the evidence. They argue that the potentially harmful effects outweigh the positive: cyberbullying, violence as a conflict-solving strategy, sexual objectification, online gaming, perpetuation of stereotypes, consumer exploitation, disruption of daily schedules and career achievements, 'slacktivism' and cynicism, and new forms of addiction.

Is The Internet addictive?

Some therefore rightfully ask: is the Internet addictive? Addiction is defined as an obsessive behavior, a compulsive behavior. The subject of addiction is no longer in control but at the mercy of the addiction — which has none. With regards to the digital age, the neuroscience — the neuro-mechanism related to Internet activities — is still being investigated. The new phenomenon, however, already has a name: IAD (Internet Addiction Disorder). Within the clinical field, experts have not reached an agreement on whether or not it is to be classified as a legitimate mental illness. Some justify such a scenario saying that it took decades to recognize that alcoholism and gambling were medical conditions.[13] Others may want to believe that until pharmaceutical corporations see any interest in curing the alleged 'Internet addiction disorder' through drugs — maybe by marketing an anti-gaming or anti-Facebook pill — we will not see any significant change.

Some health specialists, however, have begun to deal with it as a legitimate psychological disorder. Dr. K. Deneen, from Xian University, speaks of cognition impairment and working memory impairment.[14] Internet addition affects attention span to the point of making other perceptive states dormant. Dr. Nicholas Carr, author of *The Shallows*, observes that games enhance the ability to spot patterns, but contribute to the inability to pay attention, fully articulate, and develop one thing. The negative side of adapting to the demands of the digital tools is the weakening of old ways of thinking and functioning: which include contemplation and the building of long-time memories.[15] People affected by ADD (Attention Deficit Disorder) may be more susceptible to IAD. Dr. David Greenfield tells us that: "When we search on the Internet and we get a 'hit,' when we find that piece of information we get a dopamine surge and undergo what is called a 'variable ratio reinforcement schedule,' the same process that takes place when using slot machines."[16] At a Chinese boot-camp-style treatment center they call it 'electronic heroin,' because some kids are so hooked on online games that they prefer to wear diapers; because they think that taking a break to go to the restroom will affect their performance at these games. In China IAD is treated as a mental disorder. Mr. Tao Ran, director of Daxing Center in Beijing, says: "People who spend more than six hours a day on the Internet, other than for work or study, are most likely to become addicted to the Internet."[17]

If IAD is real, it is an addiction to a medium, and related activities, and not an addiction to a substance. People halt their stride in the middle of the sidewalk, few meters before a gate, or at the first steps of a stairway, and lower their heads over their devices cancelling out their attention to the surroundings for the length of time required to complete their online task. Students study with their mobile devices on and placed next to them; their eyes will try to scan through their assigned readings while turning and skewing to glance at the messages appearing on their devices — they call it multitasking but their grades don't always seem to support this idea. People have walked across the yellow line and into the subway tracks distracted by their personal device. An Australian pilot forgot to lower the wheels of his aircraft on landing distracted by his mobile phone.[18] In one of many very sad cases a young driver was sending a text message to a friend and her last words before getting into a fatal car accident were: "Driving and Facebooking is not safe."[19] Unfortunately there are already too many sad stories similar to this one — many of them are shared on the Internet in the hope that they may help prevent other tragedies caused by text-messaging-and-driving. In such cases we can rightly conclude that mobile technology or screens are distracting and harming us, 'leading us to damnation' in a metaphoric sense, and we may have to revise the common idea of multitasking as a far as screens and other activities which require constant focus and concentration are concerned.

Understanding Technology's Trajectory: Where Is It Headed?

How are we to understand technology's trajectory? How are we to understand the digital and cyber trends within the allegedly progressive direction of human history? In line with McLuhan's theories some read in the progressive fall of the Word and the rise of the Image a historic turn for the better, the passage from one world order to another, a constant improvement marked by a few losses along the way. It is the necessary condition of history, a sort of natural course. Some hold onto the idea that it is the medium (forms of communication, print, machines, new media) that drives history, and that we owe it much: "Modern science, modern democracy, our reformations and enlightenments."[20] This would seem consistent with the idea that machines and media are leading humanity forward, toward a digital paradise, a happy 'extension of our nervous systems', as McLuhan

put it. We become aware of our inherent connection to technology, this makes our subconscious emerge, like cubism did in the arts.[21] But can we really confuse agency and the laws of communication — the laws of media? Do they really amount to the same thing? Some more recent philosophers have overturned McLuhan postulate altogether. Jean Baudrillard, contrary to McLuhan, wrote that the medium is no longer the message and spoke of the death-of-the-referent and desert-of-the-real.[22] He made use of the same linguistic codes employed by McLuhan, however. One writer brings the two ideas to a climax:

> Now we face a final challenge: we must determine if and how the medium attributes, through the device of network attributes, mold the way we live and what we believe. It's important to recognize that the entire media studies program as set out by McLuhan rises or falls on this step. Either the medium is the message — that is, media technologies in and of themselves shape human institutions and values — or they don't.[23]

McLuhan's axiom carries a metaphoric valence, without which its meaning is lost. Technology is an extension of our abilities only if we look at it as a tool, and not as agency of our wishes. One imaginative writer offers the following progressive idea: "Why do we assume there is more truth inside us than out? Why is there not as much to learn by picking apart, rethinking, reimaging our surfaces — from a *superficial* analysis… Perhaps it is time… to return to what can actually be seen."[24] Is this the case? Are we really the descendants of media? Are we really to confuse agency and the processes that they enact? While cubism offered us a fascinating new perspective, a new mode, a style, an aesthetically provocative visual approach, it does not explain agency, nor does it explain Picasso. Materials, abilities and approaches do not explain human search for truths, meaning, purpose, nor do they, in themselves, have any power on humans' willful intentions. We are not machines, nor are machines and media extensions of human agency — this ought not to necessarily diminish the metaphoric value of some of McLuhan's puns. Media do not extend our abilities, *tout court*, just as reading glasses do not increase one's reading and comprehension skills. Agency is separate from the laws of technology and media. Computers execute algorithms, a rigid list of specific instructions; they do not select or choose intentionally, this is a peculiarly human prerogative. Machines and their programs, including computer software and apps, neither have the power of generating moral values nor in upholding them.

Conclusion

Those who neglect to recognize this important distinction will continue to assert that 'we are the media,' 'we are the Internet,' and that 'it is connecting us and making who we are.' In reality, the history of media shows that technology has followed a path by which its complexity and versatility have increased considerably by both guesswork and trial. The trajectory of this development has been inversely proportional to the decline of aesthetic and moral values, that is, while the technology variable has constantly gone up the other variable, human advancement, has gone down. As per the words of one writer, human society must either accept or reject certain actions and behaviors or carry them with it into its digital world: "The web has brought human civilization to a great crossroads. Do we use the new tools of communication to perpetuate the same old themes of commercialism… objectification… stereotypes… or do we use the technology to learn from one another in the hope of creating a world in which ideas are valued more than physical attributes?"[25]

Internet technologies are relatively young, and in constant 'evolution,' so to speak, but they already occupy much of our lives and life styles. A critical perspective is then necessary to get a complete picture of their import and impact, of how they help or impair us. What type of questions should we ask? We should ask evaluative questions. What follows is a sample:

1) What does a given online action or activity entail?
2) Is it pursuant to my short or long term goals?
3) Does it help or impair my personal and/or professional development?
4) What are the overall costs?

Given that most of the online activities are Web manifestations of business models, we should weigh the pro and cons as we do with offline accounts, memberships, and short or long term plans or contracts. People are inspired by what they hear, see, and do; if the tone and atmosphere of a given program or activity is conducive to learning, and development, to solidarity and collegiality, they tend to emulate the same. Good influences contribute to good outcomes. Technology can help us if we choose and act upon our will to harness the best out of its grand promise. Whether digital technologies become a metaphysical paradise or a metaphysical hell will be determined, to a good degree, by what humanity, collectively and individually, opts for. It is therefore imperative that the choices made be informed and meditated ones, and be carried out in due

course. In such a context the cost of the options left to each individual may depend on the general digital trends' ultimate destination.

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Poland and The Rape of Europe
It's Imagological Implications

Joanna Bielska-Krawczyk

Abstract

This article concerns Polish and German modern images based on the iconography of so called "Rape of Europe". Deals mainly with the kind of pictures which represent political or civilisational interpretation of the image and refer to the relation between Poland (or Eastern Europe) and Western Europe (or European Union). The image is here treated as the way of expressing certain ideas and as a form of reflection on the situation of certain cultural and political being. It also reflects how people belonging to a certain group judge (through images) the situation of this group, ongoing changes, and the relation with "the Other". For that reason the article basicly represents imagological implications of contemporary reinterpretations of this particular iconographical subject.

Keywords

European Iconography, Imagology, Mythology, Symbolizing Culture, Europe–Poland, Division/Integration, Art/Image, Visual Culture.

"Der Spiegel" the 1 of May 2004 was entitled "Das Neue Europa" is dedicated to the questions related with the next step of reintegration of the civilisation. This step signified incorporation to European Union countries from eastern part of the continent (previously situated on another side of Berlin Wall) – the states like: Poland. On the cover of this volume of the periodical one can see the "surrealistic" composition, containing the image of a girl sitting on a back of a white bull, who is made of two hands put in the position that is usually called: "shaking hands". So the body of the animal seems to be constructed (or reconstructed) by two hands holding each other, while the girl (seen with the sky and the circle of stars at the background) grasps one of the stars from the wreath.

The image has got its base in the traditional topic of European literature in which a girl sitting on bull's neck signifies legendary princess called "Europa" and used to be represented by popular iconographical subject called: "Rape of Europe". So for the educated member of our culture seeing a girl on a bull immediately should awake those associations with this story and in the conse-

quence with Europe itself. It is evident that authors of this cover have counted on that cultural competence of the readers of this newspaper. Without this knowledge the massage of this image wouldn't be communicative and visual modifications of the old pattern would be incomprehensible.

The iconography of "Rape of Europe" is therefore the first level of meaning of this drawing – the denotative one. The second level is based on connotations brought to the picture by the modifications of traditional iconography, by motives of bull-hands, sky and stars. The circle of stars over the figure of a girl reminds us that in this case under the image of mythological Europe hides the institution of European Union. The shaking hands indicate that the process of incorporation the next countries is peaceful and decides of the integration of Europe through the mean of agreement. Grasping a star from the sky (and at the same time from this symbolical circle – the main motive of the flag of European Union) can be a synonym of unusual gift, almost miraculous one (in Polish language there is an idiomatic expression "receive the star from the sky", which describes the situation of fulfilling the most brave dreams, getting the gift unimaginatively surprising).

The star is being taken from the wreath which is the symbol of the flag of European Union (meaning the gift is taken from European Union), which could indicate the advantages of the countries joining European Union. On the other hand though the star is taken by a girl who (according to the tradition) represents Europe, so it seems that Europe itself is the one who receives this gift – the opportunity of strength growing together with countries incorporated. Besides the bull is made by two hands shaking. Each of them obviously represents one part of the agreement – one is European Union and the other one symbolises countries from another side of Berlin Wall which decided to join those political and economical structures. This idea of a bull constructed by shaking hands reminds that for Europe the adventure would be impossible without this access. Bull can run, carrying on his neck the woman, only when the hands are hold together. So the image seems to deliver arguments both for the countries being incorporated and for the western societies.

The whole process was illustrated here with the symbolical image from remote past – image of Rape of Europe – which in this interpretation has got evidently positive meaning. The new political situation was visualised here by the use of an old iconography, creating at the same time new symbol praising

European Union. Hastings Donnan and Thomas M. Wilson in their book entitled *Borders, Frontiers of Identity, Nations and State* mention the political and social importance of symbols for the political organisms and cultures, writing:

Each culture is based on symbols shared by people and all social and political systems are structured and expressed by complex relationships of symbols and rituals [...] The symbols give people the cognitive map of the world [...] and because symbols are one of the most important elements of politics that create bond between people [...] they must become a base for each anthropological study of modern nations and states[1]

We will find similar way of thinking in the concepts of Hans Georg Pott. Writing his *Short history of European Culture*, he described culture as "creation of meanings"[2] and analysed Europe as a set of symbols and types of discourse. Owing to this way of thinking understand culture means understand its ideas, symbols and myths. It is even more understandable, justified and true in the case of Europe, because the very name of our continent and culture is derived from the mythological character of the very girl kidnapped by the bull[3]. The iconography based on this story creates one of the few versions of imagining Europe that we know from European art and cartography[4].

From the point of view of studies on Europe as a civilisation[5], as far as from the point of view of imagology[6] though, visual representations of the myth could have been interpreted as a political (or cultural) symbol, having aspect of demonstrating power of certain civilisation, as it was portrayed in 1851 by Patrick Macdowell in a statue representing Europe, being part of Albert Memorial in London. This kind of interpretations became even more popular in the second half of XX century when it occurred that this myth delivers proper symbols for European Union – which, on the other hand, influenced the location (sculptures in front of European institutions) and iconography of the presentation (as we could see at least on the example analysed here at the beginning – appears for instance the wreath of stars). The propaganda of European Union decides also of the expression of the image that becomes triumphant corresponding well with contemporary popular idea of Europe as "a global player".

Sometimes the form of representation of this myth refers to certain – important for Europe nowadays – places and events, like The Berlin Wall and its collapse. In the work by Johannes Grűtzke for example the bull with the woman

on his back is walking on the verge and top of a wall. Whereas Europe points out at the side of the wall that is still not visible. We can guess – to the East[7]. From the point of view of the analysed subject we can notice this tendency to not see this part of Europe, which seemed almost invisible. The great exposition showing pictures with the motive of rapture of Europe (Il mito di Europa, da fanciulla rapita a continente, Galleria Uffizi, Firenze 2002-2003) did not have even one work from another side of Berlin Wall. After ten years of Polish presence in European Union it is high time to fill up this gap.

There are at least three important Polish artistic creations of second part of XX century dedicated to the subject and through the mean of the iconography of the Rape of Europe, pointing out dangers and negative aspects of actual situation of Europe, showing the myth somehow in the state of decadence. All of them were painted by well known and excellent Polish painters: Zbylut Grzywacz (1977), Jan Lebenstein (1978) and Franciszek Starowieyski (1998).

Zbylut Grzywacz, artist famous in Poland for his enormous interest in tradition of European art[8], shows Europe as a fat woman with shopping bag in her hand, hardly holding onto the bull, which is not anymore this beautiful and full of vitality creature described by Ovidius, but a piece of meat shown with the queues typical for the culture of PRL (Polish People Republic) at the background. This means that the painting by Grzywacz testifies that even then Poland was perceived by the author as a part of Europe, which confirms the truth expressed by John Paul II, who in Santiago de Compostella in 1982 said that Polish nation "always considered himself as European nation"[9]. Anyway showing The Rape of Europe together with elements taken from reality of communistic Poland clearly indicates that in Grzywacz's opinion what was happening in Poland at that time was happening to Europe.

At the same time he concentrates on some dangers. He points out at least two of them: communism and materialism. Communism (connoted by those enormous queues) seems dangerous for the culture, because turns life to this gray pulp (seen at the background of the picture) and forces people to waste time on straggling for survival (thinking only about meat instead of higher ideals). Author notices that poverty takes away dignity and ideals. At the same time the work seems to criticise materialism in general (the meat can be perceived as synecdoche of what is material). The appearance of a woman and the condition of a bull help to understand that materialism destroys the beauty of ideals

(like ones present in the myth). In this pictorial interpretation of the myth, the communistic system and materialism are represented as elements destroying the beauty of our culture. What was born and existed for a long time in eastern Europe is perceived as European problem – the disease dangerous for Europe.

We will encounter the opposite situation in the picture by Franciszek Starowieyski entitled *Divina Polonia Rapta per Europa Profana (The Divine Poland Raped by Fallen Europe).* The work was ordered by official Polish institution and delivered for one of the Polish agencies related with European Union in Bruxelles. This very fact makes the work specially interesting – because of the very contradiction between the place where the painting was supposed to hang and its title. The entity of the picture of course confirms the meaning enclosed in this controversial and provocative words.

In this case Poland is clearly something different then Europe, but also evidently something better (divine). We should again remember when the painting was prepared – in 1998, so exactly in the year when debate about Polish access to European Union started in our country. The very fact seems to influence the attitude of the artist and his criticism is evidently influenced by the anxiety related with the institution of European Union. For this reason Europe, understood here as a modern civilisation (mechanical bull), is bad (profana). Besides she does not has a head (which means does not think), is surrounded by darkness (equivalent of evil) and the mechanical bull (made of metal) tramples over the fragment of Greek column (synonym of what constructed our culture)[10]. This bull has specially rich connotations. First of all, being mechanical, creates opposition to what is organic – becomes something soulless and dead. Secondly can awake the associations with machines (like tanks) that go ahead and destroy with their brutal strength everything on their way without thinking. The bull here is like a tank. Thirdly, being constructed (we see screws) also awakes associations with the horse of Troy – the dangerous gift from the enemy, a form of seduction and betray. In the context of the title and image in which we see Europe grasping the hand of Poland and dragging her it has got its special significance.

So the whole picture evidently treats about European Union and European civilisation perceived as a danger for cultures: both Polish and European itself. In this case what was born in the West seems to be danger to the whole Europe and specially to this unique country in the eastern Europe that is called Poland.

The work glorifies motherland of Chopin and expresses eurosceptic attitude of Polish painter. The scepticism is related clearly (among other reasons) with disinclination to overgrowth of technical aspect of this civilisation – which was, by the way mentioned as one of the reasons of crisis of West by great intellectuals of our times: Oswald Spengler, Arnold Toynbee and much later also by Joseph Raztinger[11].

Finally the picture painted in 1978 by Jan Lebenstein (a great admirer of literature and tradition of western civilisation[12]) can close the list of most significant Polish visual representations of this subject, being probably most pessimistic and decadent of all. After all Lebenstein goes even farther than Starowieyski and shows the bull in the state of decomposition lying like a carpet on the seashore full of skeletons of fish. The elder Europe (middle aged), though beautiful, shows the traces of time passing (the ribs, the circles around eyes). In the distance we see the smokes of fires over the shapes of a city. The picture evidently shows not the beginning of adventure but its biological and almost apocalyptic end. So it is not anymore this exciting jump into unknown, described as such by Ovidius. The modern researchers draw conclusions from the myth and describe character of our civilisation as adventurous – full of anxiety but also full of curiosity, mobile and ready to expansion. Norman Davies – British historian, probably the best expert in history of eastern Europe (surely the excellent western specialist in history of Poland) and the author of a thick book dedicated to the history of Europe commented the myth in that way:

> The travel of Europe is also the symbol of this characteristic mobility of those who followed her. In the contrary to the great civilisations if Nile and Indus, Mesopotamy or China [...] Mediterreanian civilisation was stimulated by the constant movement. The movement was causing anxiety and lack of security. The anxiety was medium for constant ferment of thought.. Lack of security was an encouragement to actions full of energy [...] At the beginning of history of Europe the world known to people was lying in the East . In the West was waiting the Unknown, undiscovered still the purpose of future expeditions. The curiosity of Europe surely became the cause of her loss, but also provoked the rise of new civilisation, which finally was supposed to receive her name[13].

In similar way the spirit of European civilisation was described by well known, and recognized in the world, Polish sociologist Zygmunt Bauman, who stated: "Europeans were seekers of adventure"[14]. For that reason entitled his

book *Europe An Unfinished Adventure.* In this context the work by Lebenstein is even more significant – showing the end of this adventure. It contains a big dose of melancholy, evidently smelling decadence and expressing lack of faith in the future of Europe, showing not the beginning, but rather the end of the long journey. This way Lebenstein occurs probably the most pessimistic of all presented here authors and seems to join those who, like Oswald Spengler, announce the sunset of western civilisation – the intuition that comes back in publications of nowadays and its titles like: *The Death of the West* or *Dying Europeans,* or *Vanishing Europe*[15].

Summarising: analysed works warn us, indicating dangers such as: materialism and communism (Grzywacz); lack of spiritual positive power and lack of wisdom (Starowieyski); mechanisation and destruction of tradition (Starowieyski), finally lack of vital powers (Lebenstein) – lack of this "will to exist" mentioned by professor Brayton Polka during one of plenary sessions during the conference in Porto in 2014. All those aspects of contemporary situation of Europe, illustrated in the works of Polish painters, were in fact indicated also (sometimes much earlier) by the greatest intellectuals of Europe, like: Oswald Spengler, Arnold Toynbee, Jose Ortega y Gasset or Julia Kristeva and the professors and heads of Catholic Church like John Paul II or Joseph Ratzinger. The intuitions of Polish painters are therefore not isolated and seem to express in visual forms the anxiety that they share with those who rethought the directions of cultural changes in the most profound and professional way. Those warnings are specially important now when Europe is tested by the danger from outside and seems to be unable to cope with it for its internal moral weaknesses.

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The Evolution of Consciousness as Expressed in Tone
An East-West Approach

Miguel Ribeiro-Pereira

Abstract

The *motto* is taken from Jacques Attali's model of cultural historiography — that the world is for hearing, not for beholding, that music is prophetic! This brief essay is an overview of the evolution of the Western mind, or consciousness, setting in parallel music and literature (the title's double meaning of "tone" is sound imbued with purpose and meaning). It focuses on three pivotal moments. 1) The humanist impulse of European Renaissance in the fourteenth century ("at the threshold") brings about the experience of the musical interval of the third and the individualism's dynamic integration of contraries. 2) The new conceptual model in the early sixteenth century ("modern worldview") gives rise to both opera and tonality with Monteverdi's music, which is coeval with Cervantes' first literary novel, as the Western canon starts anew. 3) The ultimate period of European modernity at the turn of the nineteenth century ("divided worldview") considers music as the quintessence of the poetic realm, the authentic representative of infinity (Hoffmann) or the will (Schopenhauer). Beethoven's pivotal role here is epitomized by his distinctive use of modal mixture, a novel approach to the key system, whose chromatic relationship discloses another dimension of tonality. Eventually, an analogy is disclosed between my theory of harmonic modulation in tonal music and René Girard's of mimetic desire in the novel. They both assert an actual awareness (although often intuitive) embodied in great masterpieces and mean to account for a psychological evolution of the modern individual towards inwardness and multiplicity of the personality.

Keywords

Jacques Attali, Prophetic Music, Consciousness, Third-Interval, Modern Mind, Miguel Ribeiro-Pereira, Harmonic Modulation, Diatonic/Chromatic Tonality, René Girard, Mimetic Desire, External/Internal Mediation.

> For twenty-five centuries, Western knowledge has tried to look upon the world.
> It has failed to understand that the world is not for the beholding.
> It is for hearing. It is not legible, but audible.
>
> Jacques Attali, *Noise*[1]

These are strong words, indeed, especially coming from an influential economist engaged in politics and devoted to cultural historiography. Even more than just running parallel to human society, and bearing the mark of its time, Attali conceives of music as a herald of times to come — as *prophetic*!

Broadly conceived in the title, "tone" means sound imbued with purpose and meaning; i.e. both music and speech. Thus we hear in the *Genesis*: "Then God said, 'Let there be light,' and there was light." Such is the real power of the primordial Sound, the creative Word of the Gospel of John, the dual Logos — pure harmony of measure *and* expression — which echoes in the AUM of Hindu cosmology or Vedic mysticism from Eastern tradition.

This short essay focuses on three pivotal moments, as I hear those cultural tones ringing in the course of our Western mind.

At the Threshold (c. 1300)

Around the year 1300, at the age of 35 ("nel mezzo del cammin di nostra vista"), Dante began the writing of his epic, *La Divina Commedia*, in vernacular. Immersing himself in his own soul, remaining entirely within his personality and its secrets, he was to describe the innermost experiences that lead him into the spiritual world. A fundamental change in the Western character would then ensue throughout the fourteenth century, giving rise to the modern world's dawn, as a new value is placed on *individualism* and personal genius. The rebirth of classical humanism, the undogmatic introspection and observation into the human nature, the inherent value of human life in this world, the dynamic integration of contraries — all these are distinctive features of Petrarch, the first man of the Renaissance. What a tremendous, fiery impulse this radical new movement would give to the forging of our modern European consciousness!

The fourteenth through the sixteenth centuries was a time of rebirth in music, too. This is the time when vocal polyphony was greatly refined and its main musical genres (the mass and motet) considerably developed, progressing to the *ars perfecta* (to sing "with diverse, but not adverse, voices"[2]) of Palestrina and Lasso. Its beginning is marked by the putative *Ars nova* (a treatise from the 1320s which gave its name to a period of music history) of Philippe de Vitry, a composer-theorist praised by Petrarch as "litteratissimus homo" and "the only true poet among the French."[3] Still before, at the turn of the *trecento*, the early musical humanist (translator, commentator and philologist) Pietro d'Abano "gave the first impetus at the University of Padua to the scientific movement that was eventually to lead to the discoveries of Galileo."[4] Everything changed

in the fourteenth century, accurately pinpoints Attali: within the following three-century period, the mutation from *vagabond* to *domestic* musicians, from outcast to salaried, is denoted by the shift in vocabulary from *jongleur* (an entertainer) to *ménestrel* (a functionary).[5]

But how did this novel individualistic awareness, and its attendant conception of harmony through strife or conflict, get a suitable expression in actually musical terms? My strong claim is that changes in the *experience* of musical intervals are intimately related to large-scale phases in our human evolution of consciousness. The *feeling* for the interval of the third expresses a completely new personal, subjective mood for the first time. Intuitively perceived in compositional practice, long before being duly acknowledge and recognized in theoretical treatises, notably by Zarlino's 1558 monumental *Le institutioni harmoniche*, it has since been associated with distinctive human features, such as male/female, natural/cultural or happy/sad. This plastic interval uniquely displays two forms of consonance — major and minor — as two *opposed* but *complementary* poles of our modern conception of harmony, foreshadowing Petrarch's dynamic integration of the contraries. It will fit an individual representation of the world, and should accordingly be comprehended as a system of binary opposition: it expresses a *humanistic* nature and a *linguistic* function.

Man's new freedom, mutability and power of (self-)transformation can now be working in music by way of the changeable third-interval. "If thirds and sixths [their inversion] are not admitted as consonances, there can be no polyphony"[6] — such a definitive statement, which the author associates with Kepler's astronomical thinking, is meant to describe the free, harmonic movement of simultaneous melodic lines in polyphonic texture, a multi-layered organism distinctive of the European mind and the ideal aim of its *ars perfecta*. In the evolution of the harmonic third the latter half of the thirteenth century is critically important, especially as the *gymel* (through a succession of 6/3 parallel chords) flourished in England. The early stages of its use can actually be traced back to the twelfth century,[7] which seems to reinforce Attali's prophetic calling of music. Eventually, the unity of the third and the fifth led to the recognition of the "harmonic triad" (*trias harmonica*), named in the image of the Holy Trinity, and develops into the tonal syntax and the major-minor key system of the modern European period.

The Modern Worldview (c. 1600)

In 1600 Shakespeare was writing his tragedy *Hamlet*, deepening further than ever before the human personality — a variety of personalities, indeed, portrayed through an array of different characters — and until about 1608 he would write his major tragedies *King Lear*, *Othello* and *Macbeth*. This was just the time when Monteverdi wrote his first two operas, *La favola d'Orfeo* and *L'Arianna* (1607-08), while Cervantes had just finished the first modern novel, *Don Quixote* (1605). Throughout Europe the Western canon was starting anew.

Let us focus on this pivotal moment, when a new conceptual model was emerging for the first time in European art music, when the idea of embodying a metaphysical, immutable harmony was superseded by one that seeks to represent human, changing passions; that is, when music reacquired an ethical, not only mathematical, significance. Its essence no longer lied in harmony and logic alone, but also in the text and the passions conveyed by the words. This was a shift from an *abstract* to *mimetic* paradigm,[8] which brought music to join the literary disciplines (*trivium*), without abandoning its place among the scientific disciplines (*quadrivium*) of the academic curriculum. It is the outcome long overdue of a half-century theoretical anxiety for an aesthetic renewal, great hopes harbored by a whole generation of humanists prominently led by Vincenzo Galilei (the father of the scientist Galileo, who invented the telescope in 1609, the same year Kepler published the laws of planetary motion).

Two radical new developments transformed Renaissance into Baroque style; that is, mark the arrival of modernity in European music: the birth of *opera* out of the spirit of tragedy (to reverse the terms of Nietzsche's *opus primum*), and the rise of *tonality* out of the spirit (and heart) of the third. Now, I shall single out the latter, "linguistic" feature only to trace, in the last section, a parallel with the persuasive psychological insights of René Girard.[9] Elsewhere, I develop a full-fledged theory of *harmonic modulation* based on a widespread compositional heuristic in music from Monteverdi to Mahler — the range of mainstream tonality — yet never duly recognized in theoretical sources.[10] Developed from Aristotle's original understanding of nature as "an inner principle of change and stasis," it conceives tonal evolution as dramatic and conflictual in kind, and its life-metamorphoses as stages of a modulatory consciousness. Girard draws a comprehensive theory of *mimetic desire* out of his readings of the novel from Cervantes to Dostoyevsky, thereby accounting for a psychological evolution of

the modern individual toward inwardness and multiplicity of the personality. A late development of the individualistic drive, the metamorphosis of the mimetic model — ambivalent — into an obstacle is a convulsive intensification of inner conflict and rivalry.

To disclose the analogy of both our theories is the purpose of the following examination, which is conducted in the light of a fundamental question: how can we comprehend the evolution of our modern Western mind, originally developed from the mighty humanistic impulse of Renaissance, and *hear* (without necessary being in tune with) its peculiar type of consciousness? Two such elective affinities should be singled out. One is the assertion of an actual awareness (although often intuitive) by major artists, embodied in their great masterpieces, of the laws of the human mind — a theoretical *voice* that, once heard, may unravel a real knowledge not yet grasped by current theories. The other, the double-sided character of our respective approach: his dealing with the dual concept of the behavioral imitation, which may be positive (aesthetic and educational) or negative (appropriation), this being historically suppressed, he contends; my fully integrating the dual nature of tonal harmony, a modulatory balance at all hierarchical levels of phonology (major/minor triads), syntax (plagal/authentic fields) and system (relative/parallel keys). The systemic dimension alone shall be compared below.

Ambivalence in early European musical harmony, we have seen, was brought forth by the intuitive perception of, and anticipatory humanist feeling for, the dual consonant interval of the major/minor third. With the modern recognition of discrete (vertical) chords, acting as singular *individualities*, the overarching modulatory principle is otherwise artistically expressed. Evolving between two polar opposed fields of the key — plagal and authentic — tonal syntax is an archetypal representation, fully explored, of the keynote's inner life. Ultimately, the major/minor key system was the epitome of humanist harmonic duality, as two modal patterns are differently intertwined in meaningful historical succession: first diatonic, then chromatic. In between them, however, another pivotal moment intervenes.

The Divided Worldview (c. 1800)

"If the political organization of the twentieth century is rooted in the political thought of the nineteenth century," the prophetic motto is Attali's again, "the latter is almost entirely present in embryonic form in the music of the eighteenth century."[11] The latter part of the 1700s is widely seen as marking the arrival of modernity in history, including the rise of "aesthetics" (a term coined by Baumgarten in 1735) as a philosophical discipline and the self-conscious theory of autonomy of the arts. Music, above all, is uniquely considered as the quintessence of the poetic realm — a holistic perspective seeking the revelation of the sublime in the aesthetic experience. It is from literature and philosophy, symptomatically, that came those who raise their voices in recognition and praise of music as the authentic representative of the *infinity* (Hoffmann) or the *will* (Schopenhauer). How interesting is thus Danhauser's 1840 painting *Liszt at the Piano*, a sevenfold gallery of major Romantic artists displaying an even number of novelists and musicians!

From the 1720s onward, starting with the work of J. S. Bach, the great German tradition of instrumental music came to be canonized and culminated in the Promethean figure of Beethoven. The tremendous impression made on his contemporaries by his symphonies, foremost the epic length *Eroica* of 1804, would aptly be conveyed as "absolute music" by Wagner (1846). Not coincidentally, Napoleon was the original dedicatee of the symphony. The French Revolution was a major historical catalyst that accomplished a transmutation of the human consciousness and its attendant perception of time — a tremendous élan of the Western will, the cornerstone of modern culture.

Beethoven's pivotal role is technically epitomized by his distinctive use of modal mixture — a novel approach to the key system — whose chromatic relationship discloses another dimension of the fundamental harmonic modulation. The straightforward gamut by fifths of the original diatonic system displays the whole harmonic content of *either* C major *or* A minor, running alongside each other, as both patterns coalesce into a whole system of keys (Figure 1). Instead, the extended compass of chromatic tonality requires a double framework of root progression by fifths (Figure 2). Major-minor parallel keys actually bring together two spheres of tonal activity, conflating their opposed matrices into a *split* unity. As if embracing its own shadow, each primary degree can be drastically opposed in mode (and mood), with no real syntactic movement be-

ing necessarily assigned. It is a sort of heterophonic modulation, motionless and unison-based, that characterizes the changing nature of superimposed scale degrees — truly a hybrid landscape. Instead of reciprocally defined, the identity of one key is defined against the other's — in rivalry — internalizing an essential modal ambivalence. Their harmonic recognition is thus agonistic rather than complementary, more temperamental than balanced.



Figure 1. Diatonic Tonality.



Figure 2. Chromatic Tonality.

The interchangeability of parallel keys reflects the changing condition of a new Romantic sensibility. Torn simultaneously between two modes, as contradictory patterns of feeling, it directs us to a novel image of the human personality, a modern psychological profile in Western culture. A half-millenary

road has been traveled since the mighty individualistic impulse of Renaissance humanism, reaching its final stage of transformation. Identifying itself with two simultaneous models, a new tonal personality is to emerge — split, self-centered and ambivalent.

There is a striking parallel with Girard's evolutionary account of the "triangular desire" in his analysis of the major modern novels — coeval with mainstream tonal music — whose characters borrow their desire from others, the "mediators" or "models." As subjects, they desire an object not for itself ("mensonge romantique") but because others also desire it ("vérité romanesque"), according to the blunt formulation of the original title in French. Desire is imitative in nature rather than spontaneous; it requires a metaphysical mediation (as all reality does, he asserts) between the desiring subject and the object. His categorical distinction between *internal* and *external mediation*, in particular, appears homologous in nature with my understanding of the shift from diatonic to chromatic tonality. There is no competition for the object of desire in the former species, as the model and the individual lie far apart from each other. These will then overlap (or their sphere interpenetrate) each other in the latter species, thereby becoming rivals. Let us hear the author:

> As we have seen, the approach of the mediator tends to bring together the two spheres of *possibilities*, of which the rivals occupy the respective centers. The resentment they feel for each other is therefore always increasing… As the mediator draws nearer, unity is broken up into multiplicity. We move in stages from the solitary mediation of Don Quixote, atemporal and legen-dary, to the multitude in Dostoyevsky's throng… The atomization of the personality is the final stage of internal mediation… And it is in internal mediation that the profoundest meaning of the *modern* is found.[12]

But then Dostoyevsky's major novels, not to mention Proust's, came much later than the radical turn to chromatic tonality. Perhaps music is anticipatory, after all, vibrating faster (and reverberating deeper) to the inner feelings of humanity. Eventually, it generates both deeds of the self and events of the society.

Afterword

In 1814, two hundred years ago, Goethe set to write his *West*-östlicher *Divan*, a "dodecaphonic" collection of poems that testifies to his aural engagement with *Weltliteratur* as a wide cultural exchange. A well-deserved tribute to its bicentenary, even though inscribed in the subtitle, would have to encompass a larger panorama. This is an exploratory study underway — all too brief — which was meant to outline a broad cultural framework, still fitting within the limits of this publication. It will require further development.

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Endnotes

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Spanish Flavor of the Pro-Soviet Nostalgia in Legend No 17 (Russia, 2013)

Oleksandr Pronkevich

Abstract

The historical and biographical cinema currently produced in Russia is deeply involved in forging the new Russian imperial identity and reconstructing the images of the well-known enemies – the USA and Europe. Films about World War II, everyday life in the 1960-s and celebrities of the communist are used to produce the pro-Soviet nostalgia, which is channelized against the West by the newly restored Russian Empire. The stereotypical vision of Spain is an integral part of this anti-occidental discourse. The romantic images of Spain as land of corrida de toros, of the "noble Republicans" fighting against fascism are still deeply rooted in the Russian popular consciousness and regularly reappear on the screen as representatives of the internationalized form of "the Sovietness".

The most recent manifestation of this trend is biopic Legend No 17 about the famous Soviet hockey player Valeriy Kharlamov, which was recognized one of the best films of 2013. Its popularity is due to the nostalgic pro-Soviet aura recreated by the director Nikolai Lebedev and his team. The movie is full of spirit of the Cold War, which reigned in the Soviet society at the beginning of the 1970s and is being recovered now by the regime of Mr. Putin. The creators of the film pay a special attention to the Spanish roots of Valeriy Kharlamov. His mother Carmen Oriva Abad, called in her family "Begoñita", was one of the so-called "Children of the Republic" evacuated to the USSR (her role is performed by the Spanish actress Alejandra Grepi). This fact opens the way for manipulating the Spanish imagery as a means of manufacturing the anti-American and anti-European hysteria in the contemporary Russia.

Keywords

Nostalgia, Romantic Spain, Audio-Visual Propaganda, Biopic.

Introduction

The imperialist discourse of today's Russia, to a great extent, is based on nostalgia about the Soviet past. It is a reaction to the collapse of the USSR: "…The revolutionary epoch of *perestroika* and the end of the Soviet Union produced an image of the last Soviet decades as a time of stagnation, or alternatively as a Soviet Golden Age of stability, strength, and "normalcy"—the view that was prevalent in Russia by the year 2000"[1], states Svetlana Boym. However, pro-Soviet nostalgia is much more than just an idealistic vision of the previous

epoch. As Evgeny Dobrenko proves, so-called Russian postmodernism turns out to be a simple "modernization of the Soviet culture", which simulates Western democratic values and cultural practices[2]. This culture is used by the new Russian Empire to establish ideological hegemony over the territories of the former USSR republics. To achieve this goal, Russian cultural industries have converted nostalgia into an aggressive strategy which gives a new life to Russia's well-known but almost forgotten enemies – the West and the USA. It is a weapon in the new Cold War, which has already begun.

This type of nostalgia can be defined as restorative (the term was coined by S. Boym) as it calls for a return to the "best" features of the socialist regime (solidarity, comradeship, patriotism, social justice). The problem of presenting the Soviet past as something worthy of nostalgia is solved in two ways: 1). The worst sides of the Soviet regime are deleted from memory or presented as something natural – as the only possible reaction to the challenge of the time. 2). Russian cultural industries decorate Soviet memories with numerous "noble" elements of "romantic" discourses and/ or Russian pre-revolutionary and the Civil War values and paraphernalia (the symbolic representations of the Russian Tsars, of the imperial army and of the White movement). In a very paradoxical way, the Soviet and anti-Soviet elements in today's Russian cultural memory cope together well – much better than the people who were killing each other to protect them many years ago. E. Dobrenko cites some most striking examples of this sots-art political collage:

> "there are new words in the Russian national anthem, but the music is Soviet (real Starye pesni o glavnom). The same has occurred with the flag: the state flag is St. Andrew's banner, while the military uses the Soviet flag (a real Komar and Melamid image); the city was renamed Volgograd, but the eternal flame under the Kremlin wall burns for a city called Stalingrad"[3].

In brief words, nostalgic references to the Soviet past can be seen today in all possible and impossible places and combinations. The main tool of disseminating this strategy is popular art, mass-media, advertisements, entertainment products and, of course, historical films and biopics, which are produced intensively in Russia. They contribute greatly to rewriting history, revaluating the archetypal level of the popular mythology, and restoring the atmosphere of the Cold War. The biopic *Legend No 17* about the popular Soviet hockey player Valeriy Kharlamov is the most recent and successful manifestation of this trend. Thus, it makes sense to give it a special attention in this paper.

Coming Back to the Soviet 1970s

The film *Legend No 17* was produced by Studio ThreeT, run by Nikita Mikhalkov, and it was enthusiastically received by the audience: "When at 1 or 2 o'clock in the morning the people applaud the final captions, and director Nikolai Lebedev and Danila Kozlovskiy are not in the hall, they applaud their own satisfaction. It means they really enjoy it", Nikita Mikhalkov said. In 2013 *Legend No 17* was recognized as the best film of the year and was awarded with the Golden Eagle prize and the National Prize for achievement in literature and art. Moreover, Vladimir Putin had seen and approved the film before it was released. As a result, in many senses it can be considered a prime example of the new Russian cinematographic propaganda.

The popularity of the film, to a great extent, is due to the nostalgic pro-Soviet aura recreated by director Nikolai Lebedev and his team. The central event of the film is the Canada–USSR Series in 1972, which was played during the Cold War and was seen as a fight of political systems. It aroused a huge wave of nationalism and patriotism in both countries. 40 years later, B. Jeff Klein called the Summit Series of September 1972 "a defining national event": "At the height of the cold war, two hockey styles clashed: the swift, precise and contact-averse game of the Soviets against the dogged, rugged, punishing game of the Canadians. The series played out before a rapt audience on both sides of the Iron Curtain"[4]. Although the final score of the whole series was not in favor of the Soviets, they won the first game 7 to 3, which was shocking for the Canadians.

The choice of this game of the series as the subject for a film (as well as Vareliy Kharlamov's biography) can be explained by cultural situation in today's Russia. Frustrated by the so-called "Soviet catastrophe" and by the loss of the Empire, the Russian people look for compensation and see it in the glorious past: in memories about the victory over fascism, about flights to space, and, of course, about glorious sporting events. For many Russians, Valeriy Kharlamov is a winner who made himself and became a legend. Named after the famous pilot Valeriy Chkalov, the boy was born in a car in 1948 and weighed less than 3 kilos. Valeriy had weak health (his diagnosis was congenital heart disease) and was prohibited to participate in sports. His father ignored the recommendations of the physicians and brought his son to play for children's the hockey team. When Valeriy grew up, he became one of the most famous sport starts of Soviet history. Together with the national team he won the world hockey championships eight times and

was the champion of the Olympic Games in Sapporo 1972 and in Innsbruck 1976. In 1981, at the age of 33, he died together with his wife in a car accident.

As hockey was the number one official sport in the USSR, it was generously sponsored by the government and the party. It is no wonder the victory in the game against the Canadian team was taken in the Soviet Union as a proof of the superiority of the Soviet way of life and as one of its greatest accomplishments, equal to the heroism on the battlefields of the Great Patriotic War (World War II). Playing upon this phenomenon the film director and his team directly establish links between the historical event and hockey competitions. In one of the dialogues, Anatoliy Tarasov (the coach of the Soviet team) is compared to Marshal Zhukov, the most popular Russian high-rank commander of World War II. This parallel concerns the coach's and the marshal's reputations as genius strategists and their unexpected but ruthless methods of converting the Soviet team (army) into one monolithic undefeated body: "You do not feel pain, Kharlamov!"or "Defend the gate, Kharlamov, as if it were your folks, as if it were the Motherland!", cries out Tarasov to the hockey-player. The figure of the strong and successful leader evokes admiration from the audience, which is tired of seeing Great Russia weak and disintegrated, and nostalgically dreams about the iron hand.

Another aspect of use of nostalgia in the film concerns appealing to cultural memories of those spectators who were born in the USSR, saw the Series and remember both the games and everyday life. In this sense, *Legend No 17* can be described as a biopic with elements of adventure and love story and a skilful reconstruction of the historical and cultural atmosphere of the 1970s. All the issues connected with management of hockey are solved by the decision of the CPSU. As a result, the good but not easy-going Anatoliy Tarasov is a victim of the intrigues of the hockey functionaries. The everyday life of Soviet times, styles of clothes, pieces of furniture, interiors of apartments, street and restaurant scenes, airports, and many other things are reconstructed and shown so that the audience can believe that they have come back to the 1970s. This produces the effect of physically involving the spectators in the atmosphere of the period. Sergei Struchev, designer of the film, made exact copies of hockey uniforms which the players wore in the 1970s. Even the blades of the hockey skates were manufactured especially for the film so that they look like the ones which were used many years ago.

Bullfighting on Ice Becomes the Cold War

The Spanish flavor casts romantic light on the whole story and intensifies the pro-Soviet nostalgia in the film. Nikolaiv Lebedev and his team skillfully manipulate the stereotypical vision of Spain as an idealistic land of bullfighting (corrida de toros), honor, passions, and flamenco – the quintessence of the romantic worldview and behavior. This spirit is represented in the film by Valeriy Kharlamov's mother, a Spanish woman, who as one of the "Children of the Republic" came to the USSR. Her name real name was Carmen Orive Abad, but she was called "Begoñita" in her family (her part is performed by the Spanish actress Alejandra Grepi). In the USSR, she married a mechanic, Boris Kharlamov, who worked for the same factory, *Kommunar.*

This is not the first time that the Russian film-makers have used the fact of Kharlamov's Spanish origin to tell about his biography. In 2002 the NTV channel released the documentary film *Valeriy Kharlamov – Bullfight on Ice* (2002, NTV), which contains long interviews with Kharlamov's father telling about how he met Begoñita and about their life in the USSR. The melody of the torero from Bizet's *Carmen* is taken as a musical leitmotif for the sound-track, suggesting a comparison between hockey (and life in general) and bullfighting. Valeriy Kharlamov is seen as a torero on ice. Another film, *Valeriy Kharlamov. Extra Time* (2007, director Yuriy Koroliov), tells about the hockey player's last hours and reconstructs the situation before the tragic accident in which Valeriy and his wife Irina perished. Kharlamov is frustrated by the decision of Viacheslav Tikhonov, the coach of the Soviet national team, not to take him to the 1981 Canada Cup. Among other episodes of his life, he recollects his trip to Spain in 1956. The film starts with documentary shots of a bullfight, which again hints that Valeriy Kharlamov was a torero on ice.

Nikolai Lebedev continues playing with this stereotype. If in the previous films Spain is just a name, a reference to the past of the sportsman, *Legend No 17* impresses the audience with its precise imitation of the Spanish life on the screen. The film starts with an *encierro* (running of the bulls), which was shot in Pitillas (Navarra). In 1956, Begoñita and her son Valeriy came to Spain to see her brother and took part in the celebration of San Fermín. The people are wearing the Navarra folk clothes. They are speaking Spanish, dancing, drinking, and singing the Sanfermin song: "Uno de enero, dos de febrero, tres de marzo, cuatro de abril, cinco de mayo, seis de junio, siete de julio San Fermín..."

The episode involves 350 local inhabitants, 18 bulls, and the *encierro* runners from San Sebastian. On a square covered with sand one can see bars, tables and chairs and even prices: cafés a 0,25 pesetas y vinos a 0,10. The guardia civil (the policemen), in their famous tricorne hats, is also on the square.

The boy gets into trouble because he decides to save a little puppy which is sitting in the middle of the street just before the bulls began running. Valeriy jumps out of the house, takes the puppy in his hands and stands in the way of a huge bull, which begins to destroy everything on the town square. His uncle distracts the bull from the scared boy with the movements of a torero and makes it run away. When the incident is over, the uncle asks Valeriy why he stood still and did not take the bull by its horns and throw it out of the square. "I cannot do it because I am a little boy", answers the nephew. "It is only you who decides what you can do and what you cannot", the uncle teaches the future champion. These words become the mantra of the film. They are repeated by Anatoliy Tarasov and by the hockey player himself.

When the conversation is finished, the uncle hangs a red Sanfermín scarf on the boy's neck. The film passes to the next episode, which starts the narrative about Valeriy Kharlamov as a hockey player. He is wearing the red scarf as a talisman during a junior game between Spartak and CSKA. One of the players of the opposing team offends him by asking if "it was his mother who had tied the scarf for him". Outraged by this insolence, Valeriy starts fighting with the offender, but he is heavily beaten because his adversary is much stronger and taller. The whole episode looks like one of the famous duels from the comedies of honor of the Spanish Golden Age.

Valeriy Kharlamov's character in the film is shown as a result of combination of two constituents: of his Spanishness and his Sovietness. The Spanishness comes from his mother. Alejandra Grepi, who plays the part of Begoñita, creates the image of the authentic Spanish woman: independent, strong, even stubborn, and full of dignity. The Sovietness is a product of hard life in the USSR and the ruthless educational methods of Anatoliy Tarasov. It is Tarasov who teaches Kharlamov to be a real soldier of hockey, a perfectly trained body ready to perform any function important to win the battle.

The first game of the 1972 Canada–USSR Series re-actualizes the comparison of Kharlamov's playing with the bullfight on ice. Valeriy is a torero, while the Canadians are dangerous and cruel bulls ready to kill him. His choreography on ice

is amazing. However, it should not be forgotten that he is not Spanish, but a Soviet torero trained by Tarasov. He acts as if he were a soldier on the battlefield: he overcomes pain and continues the game when the terrible Canadians throw him on the ice; he defends the gate with his body. He hears the voice of Tarasov: "Kharlamov, you do not feel pain! Defend the gate as if it were your folks, as if it were your Motherland!" He obeys the mental impulses, which his coach, who had to stay in the USSR because he had been prohibited to go to Canada by the decision of the Soviet sport authorities, sends to him from the other part of the world, and his team wins.

When reconstructing the game, the film restores the atmosphere of the Cold War. This is reflected in the images of Canadians presented as Enemies in the worst traditions of Hollywood. They are stereotypically huge and rude. Their faces are made of stone and stupid. In brief words, they look like bulls. The Russian hockey players are presented as a cohort of one-dimensional good guys. The demonstration of the game is interrupted by episodes which show people of different social groups watching the direct telecast: the action takes place in Kharlamov's home, in a prison, in a hospital and even in Pitillas. All the spectators admire Valeriy and his bullfight on ice, and while watching TV they become one "imagined community" – "the Soviet people".

The film director definitely tries to achieve the same effect through his film. He mobilizes the nostalgic desire to be together, to be one great country, the new Russian Empire, which is able to defeat all his enemies. In this context it is clear why the previous biopic *Valeriy Kharlamov – Extra Time* did not get unanimous approval and even was criticized by Kharlamov's son. It shows the hockey player as a human being with all his weaknesses (he is extremely gifted, ambitious, and vainglorious at the same time; he is a genius player who drinks alcohol with Petrov and Mikhailov). This film reveals the drama of the outstanding personality in the USSR. It exposes the system which tries to control and to limit the individual freedom and which cannot tolerate stars or other successful people who do not obey it.

Conclusion

Thus, the creators of *Legend Number 17* have produced an excellent propaganda film, which skillfully manipulates the pro-Soviet nostalgia in order to impose on the masses the idea of the renewed Russian Empire. This "authenticity effect" is supposed to evoke in the older generations a desire to return the past when they

were young and happy in spite of difficulties. The movie reconstructs the spirit of the Cold War, which reigned in Soviet society at the beginning of the 1970s and is being reignited now by the regime of Mr. Putin. The Spanish imagery, used in the film, contributes to achieving this goal. By showing Valeriy Kharlamov as a torero on ice, the director and his team want to produce a legend about the perfect Soviet man. Although this type of human being never existed, it obsessively appears in the nostalgic dream of very many contemporary Russians. Nikolai Lebedev has found a way to convert this dream into the cinematographic simulacra which his spectators willingly take as truth.

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The Story of a Staircase

Odessa as a Parable of Modern Eastern Europe

Jorge Latorre

Abstract

Odessa (Ukraine) is one of the most interesting cities in the world for an analysis of symbols pertaining to the recent history of Europe and the problems of the blurred limits to the East. Odessa is a border town, and its meaning is reflected in the name of the country where it is located, Ukraine (borderland) – a geographical and historical place that is subject to ceaseless, inexorable change. Odessa has a strong and, at the same time, transitory sense of identity which makes it both photogenic and filmogenic, and which invests it with a symbolic meaning in relation to the new Europe which is experiencing an ongoing process of transformation. In this regard, an overview of its troubled past based on an account of its most emblematic symbols may prove enlightening.

Keywords

History and Symbolism, Urbanism, Ukraine and Russia, Europe, Cosmopolitism, Odessa, Film, Art/Image, Division/Integration, Visual Culture.

Odessa was already an important port city in the time of the Greeks, and became a Tartar and Ottoman settlement but, it was officially founded in 1794 by José De Ribas, an Italian-Spanish adventurer who served in the Russian navy in times of Catherine the Great. One of the most beautiful streets in the city, Derribasáskaya, is named after his founder. De Ribas built the city in only two years, but the architect of its Damero urbanism was a Dutchman called De Voland. Another of the city's founding citizens was the Duke of Richelieu, a Frenchman, a distant relative of the notorious cardinal; after his governing role in Odessa, the Duke became prime minister of France during the Bourbon restoration, when Napoleon was sent into his final exile. He was also a mercenary in the pay of her imperial highness, the Tsarina of all the Russias, and decked out in a Roman toga as befitted the neo-classical fashion prevalent in late-eighteenth century, he is depicted at the head of the famous staircase — whose enormous steps, made from the limestone of Trieste, once upon a time went all the way down to the sea.

No expense was spared in the construction of the staircase. At the time when the project was first envisioned (1837), when the budget for the city was 1.3 million roubles, the staircase costed approximately one million roubles. In 1837, Odessa had neither plumbing nor running water, and the population of the city was 60,000. One of the French engineers who inspected the construction site described the project as a "calamitous caprice".

Indeed, from a strictly functional point of view, the staircase was only of use to those who walked the promenade along the cliff-top. However, from an iconographic perspective, the staircase was designed to function as the "main gateway" to the city, as its defining facade. Since Governor Vorontsov wanted the construction to be completed in time for the visit of the imperial family, the staircase had to be erected in only seven months, in time for its official inauguration in 1842. In actual fact, however, the construction dragged on for years; and although the commission for the project was withdrawn in 1845, work on the staircase went on into 1847. Ever since then, the staircase has functioned as the city's calling card.

In the beginning, the staircase ran down to seashore; but eight steps were later removed when the promenade alongside the port was built. In around 1870, a new quay was built opposite the promenade at the port, as well as a church, the chapel of All Saints, from which the Way of the Cross procession sets out on 22nd August of every year (2 September in the Gregorian calendar). Like all cities in the Empire, icons were sent to be housed and venerated there. Captain Dragutin, who had also contributed to the construction of the staircase, donated money to extend the chapel and convert it into a church. The building remained a church until the 1930s, when it was destroyed by the Soviets, who had taken over Odessa in 1920. However, not even they could wrest control of the city from the Jewish mafias, whose power rivaled that of Al Capone's days in America. In *Odessa Tales*, Isaac Babel, one of the most renowned Soviet Jewish writers born in the city, brilliantly portrayed the bold and beautiful atmosphere of this Black Sea Chicago of the 1920s.

Babel was a friend of Eisenstein's, and he may have had a significant influence on the decision of some of the most famous directors of Soviet propaganda to shoot such films as *Man with a Movie Camera* (DzigaVertov, 1929) there. The film career of the great director Alexander Dovzhenko also began in Odessa. In fact, the film studios in Odessa were the largest in all the Soviet Union, though they have now largely been abandoned and lie in disrepair. One of the goals of the

most recent edition of the International Film Festival in Odessa (now in its fourth year) was to draw attention to the dilapidated state of the city's studios, and to raise money to restore them to their former glory and rate of production, the ones enjoyed before *Perestroika* and the collapse of the Soviet Union. It should also be noted that the most renowned Ukrainian film director of recent times, Kira Muratova, lives in Odessa, and produces all her films there, although they are distributed in Russia and in international auteur filmmaking circles. Odessa was known as the "Hollywood" of Ukraine in the 1920s and 1930s; and indeed many of the founders of the America's Hollywood were Jews originally from Odessa.

From 1925 onwards the staircase first became known as the "Potemkin Stairs", in light of the title of Eisenstein's film. Before that it had been called the Richelieu or Boulevard Staircase, or more simply: the Great Staircase. In fact, a significant expense in the budget for the filming of *Battleship Potemkin* was due to the reconstruction of the stairs, which had fallen into disrepair: each flight of the staircase cost about 10,000 roubles (in 1920s currency rate); as a result, only three flights were restored per year. The story of the mutiny on the battleship Potemkin, which in any case took place a long way from there, is not of special interest here; rather, the primary focus concerns how cinema transformed Odessa, a space of transition, a locus of constant change, into an emblematic location. The dynamic montage Eisenstein put together springs easily to mind: the Tsar's army descending in an ordered mass and opening fire on a crowd of civilians who flee wildly in all directions, with many tumbling down the enormous steps. The white Cossack uniforms are in stark contrast to the dark hues worn by their victims; and the viewer's eye is drawn, or directed, towards the mother whose dying hand lets go of her baby's pram, which rolls downhill, bounces, and is lost in the chaos. Homage to this scene has become an almost staple feature of film history: see, for instance, *The Untouchables, The Godfather* and *Music Box*, among many others.

Because of these cinematic visions and re-visions, a "calamitous caprice" has become the emblematic landmark of Odessa, the symbol of the city's fame throughout the world. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that major events in the recent history of Ukraine are still marked by that very location. In other words, the staircase remains the site of a cultural and audiovisual battlefield on the blurred boundary of Eastern Europe.

A short distance above the staircase, in what is now known as Catherine the Great Square, a statue to the Tsarina sculpted in the grandiloquent style and aesthetics of

Soviet socialist realism was put in place in 1990, to replace a monument to the Potemkin heroes. The monument was moved to a new location near the port, where the 1905 mutiny had actually taken place, followed by the Tsar's brutal crackdown on the rebellion. Eisenstein staged the story of the mutiny on the staircase so as to reflect the ideas of the socialist revolution in Odessa. When he shot the climactic scene of *Battleship Potemkin*, the church of All Saints was still in situ at the foot of the stairs.

Figure 1. Sergei M. Eisenstein, *Battleship Potemkin* (1925) (The Stairs of Odessa scene)

Nowadays, a characterless building stands in its stead, which first functioned as a port center, before being lent out in 2012 as a car dealership: a Christian church was replaced by a monument to Soviet convictions, which has in turn been replaced by a temple to our consumerist age.

Figure 2. Jorge Latorre, *Stairs* (Digital Photography)

The reflection of the staircase can be seen and photographed from different angles in the current building. However, change in Odessa is so quick and sudden (and so evidently a reflection of changes occurring in Europe) that in time the staircase may, at some point, no longer be known as the Potemkin Stairs, but as the Car Dealership Staircase, as shown in the picture taken in 2011. However, following the election to government of the Party of Regions led by Yanukovych, the building was returned to public use, and occasionally utilized for the celebration of the International Film Festival, whose fifth edition took place on 2013, when I took the next picture (see Figure 3). After the fire in the Sindicato's (Union's) Building and the following incident between pro-Russians and pro-Ukrainians there was a big peace demonstration on the Stair which symbolized throughout the world the hope for peace and tolerance against every kind of national fanaticism.

Figure 3.

The question remains whether or not the images we have recently seen from Odessa, in favor of freedom and in support of Kiev, are related to recent anti-Russian propaganda. For this reason, until further research has been conducted into the matter, I can only support my ideas with a personal reference to some fieldwork I participated in. During the shooting of a documentary on José de Ribas, founder of Odessa, which was filmed in the summers of 2011 and 2012, we conducted a survey among the local population on their feelings and sense of identity. A very high percentage of the respondents, especially among the youngest, reported that though they were well in touch with their Russian culture (Russian is the most widely spoken language, and the Museum of Russian Literature is the most iconic place through which one may understand the history of the city), they felt more comfortable to be a part of Ukraine, rather than belonging to Russia, because it offers a clearer hope for European integration.

After the "post-Maidanm" events, the burning of the Trade Unions' House and the never-ending war on the frontier, this feeling has spread throughout the whole population, as I recently witnessed when presenting this very documentary. Despite the common history and the common linguistic identity, the nationalist imperialism of Putin's Russia represents a step back rather than hope for the future of the people of Odessa. And not even the penuries they are suffering during these days of uncertainty have dampened the pro-European sentiment that predominates amongst the citizens of Odessa — a city with a Russian culture, but cosmopolitan since its foundation, and a city that feels more Ukrainian the more Russia tries to distance itself from Europe. Europe is not only the Common Market, it is a symbol of real freedom and cultural tolerance; it embodies everything that the USSR denied its citizens, and the prevention of all that which the Russians, unfortunately, are beginning to experience once again[1].

This situation of lack of real freedom inside and propaganda outside was part of the Soviet system, but has also recent precedents in Russian Democracy as well. The anniversary of the October Revolution used to be an occasion of celebration for the USSR, and it continued being the Russian most important day till 2005; since then, this commemoration has been supplanted by the Day of National Unity, marked on the 4th of November. *1612*, a 2007 film by Vladimir Khotinenko, reminds Russians

of the meaning of their new national festival: it commemorates the day that the Poles were driven out of Moscow, in the year that gives the film its name; it symbolizes the end of stormy times, the advent of the Romanov dynasty, and thus of Russian imperialism, of which the Soviet regime was a continuation, as most historians recognize nowadays. This kind of cinema, exemplified by films such us *1612*, uses the techniques and stile of commercial Hollywood moviemaking to rewrite the history of Russia (as always, historical films speak above all of the present time), from nostalgia for the old imperial ways, which needs a common enemy to unite all the widely different racial, cultural and religious identities in the country. After the Great Patriotic War, this common enemy was the Nazis; during the Cold War, it was the Americans; and now it is the Polish.

The recent development of Poland, and other countries that have joined the EU in the last few years, amounts to the sound of a warning to former Soviet republics; and Russia cannot risk losing its political and economic sway over them, especially over Ukraine. Orthodoxy and the special relationship with Moscow (not Warsaw, not Brussels) are two ideas that have been forcefully communicated to Russian-speakers in the Ukraine, and have also been clearly articulated in another major historical super-production filmed in Russia: the latest incarnation of Taras Bulba *(*Vladimir Bortko, 2009), a Ukrainian national hero, re-appropriated in the context of Russian identity and portrayed in the most expensive cinematic production in Russian-Soviet history. The film presents again Poland as the enemy of the Ukrainian people, a source of temptation to be resisted if the purity of Orthodox identity is to be preserved. We are Russians says Taras Bulba at the time when he is being "martyrized" by Polish soldiers.

This message is directed primarily at East Ukraine, but it is also addressed to the other, predominantly Greek-Catholic, Ukraine (referred to in pejorative terms as *Uniata*) — the Ukraine of the Carpathians and Galicia of Lviv, a hot-house of the most fervent form of anti-Russian Ukrainian nationalism, which is demonized by Putin in current television propaganda. Such people were depicted as anti-Semites and the murderers of Orthodox Russians in Maidanm Square (although the newly formed Ukrainian parliament asserts that those who opened fire on people in the Square were Russian soldiers acting on the orders of President Yanuko-

vych). Wherever the truth may lie, the propaganda war is reminiscent of the fallout in the former Yugoslavia, where the first images of violence and death were broadcast on regional television channels in Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia, where the disclosure of the identity of the victims was decided in relation to the particular audience's concerns, so as to fan the flames of revenge. The civil war that ensued proved as cruel as it had seemed inevitable through propagandist Media.

It could be said that nowadays Kiev's propaganda against Moscow is working the same way than Russia's. However, Kiev's government cannot compete with the extraordinary cultural power wielded by Russia, which holds significant sway over almost half the country's population, whose native tongue is Russian. For that reason, Kiev is closing Russian channels in Ukraine's territory. The justifications are that Yanukovych's party won the elections for precisely this reason –Russian influence through media; in fact, Yanukovych gave Russian language co-official status along with the Ukrainian. As the Party of the Regions did not have total control of the Kiev's media, the goal was to ensure that the propaganda broadcast from Moscow could anchor the cultural attachment to Russia. Following the example of Putin before him, Yanukovych's next step was to attempt to wrest control of the country's media — but he was frustrated in these efforts. Indeed, Yanukovych's fall from power was largely due to such media outlets, which broadcast news and images of his Mafioso actions and grotesquely oligarchic lifestyle, of a most crudely neo-capitalist type, throughout the world.

The fall of Yanukovych, however, angered his supporter, Putin, who decided to take action by exploiting the uncertainty of the Rada in Kiev and the support that the Russian post-Soviet army enjoys in the Crimea region, which shelters a dominant Russian population. The outcome is painfully evident to all: not only the pacific invasion of Crimea but also uprisings in areas controlled by the Party of Regions (Donesk and Lugansk), with sporadic outbreaks of violence in Odessa itself. Fortunately, the war did not arrive to Odessa; there is still hope for Ukraine and for Russia coming again to good terms. Unlike other cities of the West, such as Lviv, Odessa has no links with Poland, and its population of Russian-speakers and orthodox culture and religion; therefore it could be a stair between Brussels,

Kiev and Moscow, the ground for a future and necessary dialogue. Odessa has a Russian history but at the same time it preserves a strong identity of cosmopolitism and free citizenry, the very essence of the idea of Europe. The strong positive symbol of the Odessa's staircase must go on.

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SECTION IV
Art, Theatre, Literature, Music, Culture

TOWARDS AN EUROPEAN IMAGINARY IN LITERATURE AND FILM 1930S TO THE PRESENT

Chair
—
Hans J. Rindisbacher

Participants
—
Hans J. Rindisbacher
Vera Mijojlic
Andre Schuetze
Friederike von Schwerin-High

Presentation

Hans J. Rindisbacher

Under the general conference topic of "Images of Europe: Past, Present, Future" our panel united nine contributions focused on the "European Imaginary in Literature and Film, from the 1930s to the Present." For context, this introduction provides a brief overview of all nine presentations; four authors chose to be included in the proceedings.

Starting from personal experience of living in a global space of exchanges and networks, the panelists, all of them shaped by migration or long international experience, focused their contributions on two such network nodes, Europe and the United States and their self-representations in literature and film, together with their historical contextualization. Both internal European cultural mediation and transfer between Europe and the United States were discussed and questions of how – or even whether – Europe is developing a common imaginary (and its articulation with the USA) were considered. As panelists argued with examples from their area of expertise on authors, directors, and institutions, it became clear that regional, even local diversity remains alive and well despite, and perhaps as a deliberate positioning against, the increasing forces of exchange, cooperation, and assimilation.

We began with theoretical, political, historical and explicitly comparative questions, led by David Coury's presentation (University of Wisconsin, USA) on "United in Diversity? European Cultural Plurality in the Twenty-first Century." Hans J. Rindisbacher (Pomona College, USA) then offered a broad-brush historical account of men and guns in three cases that could serve as a background to several panel contributions, "Of Arms and Men: Swiss, American, and German Attitudes to Their Military." Putting Switzerland fully at center stage, albeit in a non-military context, Richard Ruppel (University of Wisconsin, USA) focused on one of the country's favorite political issues, its potential role-modeling for a united Europe, in a paper titled "Swiss Authors Imagine Swiss Roles in European Integration." Vera Mijojlic (Director of the Southeast European Film Festival, USA), discussed European film makers who moved to Hollywood. Her contribution, "Lost in Translation," was accompanied by a

brief video that illustrated aspects of these directors' lives and work. Continuing with film and zooming in on specific countries, Peter Barta (University of Surrey, UK) first analyzed a Russian legend of nation-building and national mythography in "Writing Rome in Russia(n)"; and Maria Donapetry (Balliol College, UK) then spoke on the "Spanish Presence in US Films: Ambiguous Allures." In her contribution she analyzed, visually supported, representations of Spanishness in Hollywood movies. Turning toward literature and returning first to Russia and then to Germany, Marina Balina (Illinois-Wesleyan University, USA) discussed Soviet writers' use of their (limited) possibilities to travel to Western Europe for purposes of self-representation as well as representation of otherness. Her paper was titled "Transmitting the Legacy of the Self: European Travelogues in Soviet Literature of the 1960s-1970s." Andre Schuetze (University of California, Los Angeles, USA) drew on Christa Wolf's stay in Los Angeles late in her life and pointed out significant transfers, transpositions, and omissions in her autobiographical book *City of Angels* in a paper titled "Christa Wolf and the Flight from History: The Mechanism of Forgetting and Remembering in the *City of Angels."* The panel concluded with a contribution on an earlier and crucially important German visitor to California, Thomas Mann. He was at the center of Friederike von Schwerin-High's paper (Pomona College, USA). Her "Thomas Mann, the Library of Congress, and a European Germany" revealed aspects of the author's US presence that had thus far largely escaped scholarly attention.

Of Arms and Men

Swiss, American, and German Attitudes Toward Weapons and the Military

Hans J. Rindisbacher

Abstract

The purpose of this historical paper is to discuss commonalities and divergences in civilian-military relations in three examples over the past century or so: the United States, Switzerland, and Germany. The draft is a key point: the USA switched from a conscription army to a voluntary, professional military in 1973. So did Germany just three years ago. In contrast, in a public referendum in 2014, Switzerland decided to keep its citizen army. Another factor, both cause and effect of civilian attitudes toward the military, lies in the kinds and the degree of rootedness of the military in the history and popular culture of each society. Gun ownership regulations in civilian life and public attitudes toward, and discourses about it are a third key point. And lastly, the paper also addresses dominant forms of patriotism and the (self)-images that each of the three nations projects to the world. A loose typology of these issues shows the American paradigm to privilege military-civilian separation, whereas Switzerland shows close integration, and Germany stands somewhere in between. The US army is imperial, the Swiss folkloric, and the German ironic. The American military forces are extra-directed in the service of global power projection, the Swiss military is strictly defensive, and Germany is still assessing its post-unification military engagement policies. The discourse about private arms ownership is perennial and controversial in the US, whereas in both European countries gun debates surface only sporadically, mostly in connection with new legislation, and in a much lower key.

Keywords

United States, Germany, Switzerland, Civil-Military Interaction, Conscription, Gun Ownership, Second Amendment, Patriotism.

The relationship between men and arms in peace and war, in the military and civilian life, is an ancient topic. Military matters have a significant bearing on questions of identity, patriotism, and the related (self)-images that countries project to the world. This is clearly also the case in the history and popular culture of the United States, Switzerland, and Germany, the countries compared here. A key articulation between civilian and military life is the draft. The USA, leaning toward military volunteerism, last ended conscription in 1973; Germany in 2011; but the Swiss, in a public referendum in 2013, decided to retain conscription. This makes Switzerland one among a dwindling number of western countries thus organized.

Military matters and the interaction of men and arms are also reflected in cultural production. This article takes seriously – even if it cannot follow up in any detail – Robert Connell's suggestion to look at arms in "an expanded context, which considers arms not as something alien to ourselves but as tangible manifestations of some of our basic fantasies and experiences."[1] Patterns of representing arms and violence in modern media, such as Hollywood films, are an expression of such attitudes and reflect power-relations, social control or its absence, and forms and depictions of heroism. The three countries fall into two distinct military/civil cultures: the French or Continental tradition (of which Switzerland and Germany are examples, the latter with some deviations); and the Anglo-American tradition. The former understands draft military service as part and parcel of citizenship and a service to the nation; the latter, emphasizing individual rights, sees it more as a burden on civilians and is reluctant about mass conscription.[2]

This article can touch only on a fraction of this broad range of issues; it primarily provides a historical sketch of the place of arms in each society and the cultural attitudes and habitus, sociopolitical values, and legal codifications that influence discourse and related aesthetic and artistic production and contribute to national (self)image making.

In the USA, today's "gun culture" can be traced back to the beginnings of the country as it rose from a war of independence and encoded arms into the life of the nation.[3] The histories of the frontier and the US military cannot be told here, but the nation's role today as a global military force of order is, even if not uncontested, a fact. Domestically, arms and men are a perennial topic of public discourse that started with the militias in early America. A key piece of that discourse is the Second Amendment from 1791. It states that "A well-regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." These two lines of text were closely linked with the development of political institutions and the distribution of power between states and the federal government. They speak to early Americans' deep distrust of standing armies but have been completely recontextualized in the modern civilian context. The Second Amendment history centrally and controversially shapes America's gun debates.

As in pre-constitutional Switzerland, which also had a militia system, armament in early America was individual and at the expense of each man. Mili-

tias assembled a few times a year on muster days. As technological and legal contexts changed, so did the military, and eventually "Congress replaced the Founding era's universal militia with the modern National Guard" in the early twentieth century, as "[o]rdinary citizens could no longer make the claim to keep and bear private arms to meet their public obligation to participate in the militia."[4] The National Guards are technically volunteer state troops, but de facto the reserve military force of the federal government. There is only a small professional leadership cadre. This military organization, still largely in place today, was codified in the 1916 National Defense Act.[5] The US primarily relies on professional troops, usually supported by National Guard units, and only in exceptional cases will the so-called "National Army," i.e., the conscripted and quickly trained ordinary (male) citizenry be mobilized – the last time for the war in Vietnam.

In their history of the role of the militia in early America, Richard Uviller and William Merkel highlight the imaginary and symbolic dimension of America's attitudes toward personal weapon ownership.

"While our idea of the frontier has been colored by generations of Hollywood scriptwriters, the legend remains a vital component of contemporary notions of civic courage and individual virtues. And, to the extent that the gun figures in our image of the responsible, liberty-loving, family protector who stands at the center of our cherished self-image today, it cannot be lightly dismissed. Symbols count."[6]

Symbols are one thing and play a large role in cultural production, but Andrew Carlson points to the "over 30,000 Americans dying every year from gunshot wounds."[7] Depending on point of view, this national tragedy is perpetuated because there are either too many or too few weapons in private hands. Much of the public debate about this issue centers on the Second Amendment. While scholars agree that it "has been rendered essentially irrelevant to modern American life"[8] for separating constitutional powers via private gun ownership on behalf of the state, it is now deployed to justify *private* purposes of gun ownership. Robert J. Spitzer's explanation is that "anything mentioned in the Constitution evokes special reverence and awe … and because some writers in recent years have sought to prod courts to reinterpret the Second Amendment as protecting an individual right to own firearms for personal (that is, other than militia) uses" (43). Starting in the 1960s, it has increasingly been deployed

by pro-gun organizations for political influence and manipulation of public discourse. It provides rhetorical leverage to oppose restrictions on gun ownership and usage as a matter of *rights* (and a *constitutional* right at that) rather than a topic of local lawmaking. This approach makes the debate a priori *national*. The pro-gun lobby has increasingly used the phrase "the right to bear arms" *as if* it referred to an individual, constitutional right that any gun regulation somehow abridges. But the Second Amendment rhetoric also provides cover for politicians to say that they are bowing to popular pressure; and it is an example of the growing American "tendency to speak of what is most important to us in terms of rights, and to frame nearly every social controversy as a clash of rights" (82). With this rhetoric in place, opponent are put on the defensive in public discourse, especially in a sound-bite culture, where it is always more difficult to correct and counter established assumptions than to repeat them unquestioned. Thus an old civic *duty* – carrying arms for service in a militia – that was in many cases a burden on the individual man, now dresses up in a different context as an *entitled* individual *freedom* that requires protection against attempts to limit it. While the USA has successfully civilized its military, which is both solidly under civilian control and, at least domestically, uncontested, it has in the process also militarized its civilian life. We will return to this point.

The Swiss story has points in common with the American, notably militia service, the (initial) weakness of the federal government, and the decentralized regulation of arms and the military. Until 1848, Switzerland was a loose confederacy, where each canton mustered and administered its own troops, which were called up and unified as needed under the only central administration that existed at the time, the *Tagsatzung*, a kind of ambulatory parliament. But modern Switzerland didn't grow out of a war of liberation. Rather, the crucial moment of Swiss unification happened after a small (religious) civil war that finally gave the dominant protestant liberal forces the green light for constitution writing. Throughout Switzerland's history, two principles regarding arms and the military have been upheld: Switzerland has an army; and male service is compulsory.

In both countries personal arms ownership by males was expected and men had to appear with them periodically for inspection and drills. In the mid-1800's, the time of modern Switzerland's founding, such gatherings were often

accompanied by *Schützenfeste* that also served broad national goals of political exchange and opinion formation that mapped the new nation visibly and in colorful events onto its population.[9] Both the *Schützenfest* and the American *Muster Days* comprise county-fair activities, entertainment, food and drink. But in the Swiss case they have remained centered around target shooting, whereas in the American context theatrical re-enactments of historical scenes often make up their primary patriotic element. The two best-known Swiss writers of the time, Jeremias Gotthelf (1797-1854) and Gottfried Keller (1819-1890), both civic-minded patriots, wrote interestingly and critically about *Schützenfeste*, the latter most notably in the novella "Das Fähnlein der sieben Aufrechten" ("The banner of the seven virtuous men," 1861). Starting from a father-son exchange around the elder's firearm that the son wants to borrow for his appearance on muster day – just as in the early American militia tradition – it poignantly illustrates our discussion of guns.[10]

Over time, compulsory target shooting practice became a part of military training but was carried out individually in civilian life at the shooting ranges that were built in many Swiss communities, strengthening this explicit military-civilian tie.[11] Private-military gun use in Switzerland is thus well integrated into everyday life, with the state providing the very weapons. Additionally, the military is fully tied into civil life also by breaking up service time into units of several weeks, with every man's absence from his workplace planned for in advance. The cooperation of employers, employees, and the military is well oiled. In the referendum mentioned at the outset, 73% of the electorate voted to maintain male conscription, thus showing continued support of the draft and the characteristic Swiss folkloric approach to arms and the military.[12] Overall, Switzerland is a country with liberal gun ownership laws, low gun-violence, but a high suicide rate with guns.

Germans, historically, divided as they were for centuries into numerous feudal states, have behind them a rich history of arms and men, for long stretches marked by mercenary armies. Even the *Deutsches Heer*, the imperial army of the newly formed Reich after 1871, was made up from the armies of its constituent states, with the troops of smaller states subordinated under Prussian command – a model not entirely dissimilar from that of the early USA and the Swiss cantons. The Prussian military model became the structure of the impe-

rial army. But in a historically short time, Germany went through four distinct military formations: the imperial army, the Weimar Republican *Reichswehr*, Hitler's *Wehrmacht*, and the Federal Republic's *Bundeswehr* of the past six decade (after 1990 subsuming East Germany's NVA), since 2011 now a volunteer force. Germany's complex military history and trajectory of military-civil integration cannot be told in any detail here, but *Kriegervereine*, originally mostly WWI veterans' organizations and supporters of all things military, played an important role. Initially politically neutral clubs, they were increasingly used by conservative forces to fight workers' organizations and socialist or social democratic groups as the politicization of the public sphere became ever more intense and divisive during the 1920s and 1930s. Thus the high tide of German militarism did not end with WWI, although conscription did and strict limitations were placed on the *Reichswehr*, whose soldiers gave up their civil rights while serving. When Hitler reclaimed Germany's military self-determination in 1935 and reintroduced the draft, the new *Wehrmacht* grew rapidly and became even more than the Reichswehr a "state within the state" that expanded and geared up for war.

A key goal of Germany's post-WWII military was then precisely to assure that this "state within the state" phenomenon would not occur again. The subordination of the new German army under civil authority was a key point when the *Bundeswehr* was founded in 1955 and compulsory service was implemented. The new value of the "citizen in uniform" became the model for integrating the military into civilian life – but also the reverse: to create an army that followed and upheld civilian values. But Ute Frevert's 2004 analysis of "Modern Germany, Military Conscription and Civil Society" (the subtitle of her book) is skeptical about conscription as a model of military-civil interaction.[13] For her the arguments of its advocates that it "prevents social decay, act[s] as a reminder of civic virtues and [develops] the solidarity lying at the very heart of a democratic state" (10) are obsolete. Military values and structures are the opposite of civil society, and Frevert wants an end to the *militarization of society* that she sees as conscription's inevitable consequence, urging *civilizing the military* instead. Whether ending the draft in 2011 will achieve this any better than the *Bundeswehr* did, remains to be seen. Civilian Germany, in any case, is a country with high private-arms regulations and low gun violence.

Conclusions

Despite major differences in the three cases, here are some points of comparison. First, today's outcomes are path-dependent. From the Swiss position of political neutrality and the good luck of eschewing both world wars in the twentieth century to the German experience of causing those wars and the American trajectory from a small revolutionary military to a global expeditionary force fighting abroad – history shapes everything military, including attitudes toward arms in times of peace. Second, size matters. Although both Switzerland and the USA did not fight on their own territory for the past century and a half, they are not similar. Global unimportance allows a small country freedoms that a superpower does not have – for instance to treat one's army as folklore as much as an instrument of power. Contemporary Germany may be among the most cautious midsized nations today to draw on its armed forces – despite, or perhaps because of, its once fearsome military that shattered the nation's history at several crucial turns. Third, change, even radical change in military structures is possible – certainly if enforced from the outside. Germany is the case in point, but the military tradition the USA follows also has meant various forms of military-civilian frameworks over time. Only Switzerland has pursued one model over the long haul. Whether the Swiss are squaring the circle of military-civilian relations by retaining the draft remains to be seen in a world that is going in the other direction.

A loose typology of military-civilian relations in the three cases discussed here might look something like this: the US paradigm is one of separating military and civil realms, whereas Switzerland shows close integration, and Germany falls in between. The US army is imperial, the Swiss folkloric, and the German ironic. The American military forces are extra-directed and in the service of global power projection, whereas the Swiss military is strictly defensive, and Germany is still assessing its post-unification international military engagements. The discourse on private arms ownership is perennial and controversial in the US, partly through the anomaly of a constitutional stipulation designed to regulate civil-military relations but now confusing them. In both European countries, gun debates surfaces only sporadically, mostly in connection with new legislation, and in a much lower key than in the USA.

A final lens through which to view military-civil interaction is patriotism. It allows for addressing the role of handguns both in real life and in artistic representation. Patriotism in the US is inclusive but abstract, in Switzerland it appears ancient and organic, and in the German case, it has been reconstructed so many times that it remains uncertain. Understood as a form of solidarity through symbolic expression, Americans have developed a patriotic culture that puts the flag at its center. Pledging allegiance is, as Joel Westheimer states, an essential part of "the politics of patriotism in America's schools."[14] It is this immigrant country's established practice of instilling a loyalty in need of ongoing recharging. The national anthem, like the flag much in evidence in the life of the nation, short-circuits with it. In contrast, Germany has flown different flags and sung different national anthems over the past century and a half. But its low patriotism ratings in international polls are a result of deeper concerns. *And* they have been climbing since unification.[15] Swiss military-civil arrangements doubtless have an effect on patriotism, too, which is not missing, but appears less ardent, less emotional, taken almost as a given rather than something in constant need of regeneration. Overall, patriotism is less of an issue in the two European countries; it is less martial and less fetishized than in the USA. Thinking of patriotism with Peter von Matt as operating either in a "post-heroic society" whose grand myths have long been debunked or in a "heroic" society, where myths and national heroes are still alive, reveals the USA as a curious case.[16] America's national heroes, the "founding fathers" are *historical*, not *mythological* figures to begin with! In popular representation, however, they become larger than life to the point of acquiring *mythological* proportions. In light of these juxtapositions, we might say that the US remains a heroic society, not lastly in the way it deals with arms, while both European nations are deeply anti-heroic – even if for different reasons. History, as we said, matters.

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Lost in Translation

From Lubitschland to No Man's Land of Eastern European Cinema

Vera Mijojlic

"I've been to Paris, France, and I've been to Paris, Paramount.
Paris, Paramount is better."[1]

Ernst Lubitsch

Abstract

The paper examines contributions of Eastern, and in particular Southeastern European émigré filmmakers to American cinema and the dichotomy between a metaphorical cinematic space that is "neither in Europe nor America" in their U.S.-made films, and the perpetual no man's lands immortalized in films made by their counterparts in South East Europe. The search for what seems "lost in translation" between the two cinematic worldviews is at the center of this inquiry. Both approaches to storytelling are rooted in a cinematic construct of a landscape where the protagonists are land-locked and their actions tied to that specific surreal space found only on film. The *Lubitschland* in films of the German-American master Ernst Lubitsch is seemingly more escapist than the harsh reality of Danis Tanovic's Bosnia in *No Man's Land*. Yet while a significant time gap of 70 years stands between the two, the same emotional undercurrent inspires both: that of a space lost to transitlands and the whims of history. A space that an émigré kept re-creating under the guise of a Hollywood comedy, and a Bosnian war contemporary immortalized in a black comedy of two enemies locked in no man's land between the trenches. Examples of films by the masters of South East Europe illuminate the theme of a doomed land where black humor is a means of survival, and hidden emotions are detected only on dangerous ground, in the landscapes that are at once harsh and lyrical.

Keywords

Balkans, Cinema, Filmmakers, Eastern Europe, America, Hollywood, Bosnia, Immigration, Ernst Lubitsch, Danis Tanovic, Makavejev, Ceylan, Bezzerides, Garbo, Mungiu.

Introduction

On Santa Monica boulevard in the heart of West Hollywood's Russian-speaking community, half-hidden from view by a brick-and-iron fence is the entrance to *Bar Lubitsch*. Opened in 2006, it immediately attracted the attention of the cognoscenti with its "1939-Moscow-speakeasy-meets-disco style"[2].

Owner Sean MacPherson, known for thematic clubs, chose a retro décor of pseudo-Soviet memorabilia while paying homage to one of the Hollywood masters, Ernst Lubitsch, a German Jew of Russian parentage who settled in Hollywood in 1922. A cartoon of Ernst Lubitsch is modestly placed on a side wall, opposite a blackboard menu boasting the "Molotov cocktail" and "Moscow mule."

Down the street in Plummer Park, where Russian-speaking Jewish pensioners engage in chess while grandmas watch the toddlers, the veterans of WWII had helped erect the monument to - depending on which inscription you happen to dig from the photo archives - the "World War II Veterans from the former Soviet Union," or "Eternal Memory and Glory to Those Who Defeated the Nazism in the World War II."[3] Two vastly different perceptions of Russian-themed commemoration speak volumes about what is habitually lost in translation when Eastern European *content* is transplanted to American soil. The tongue-in-cheek, camp approach of Bar Lubitsch's American owners fares better, whereas the dedication on the WWII memorial created furor and protests by non-Russian communities of Poles, Ukrainians and others who felt the memorial was a tribute to their Stalinist oppressors. The dedication was revised, adding another small footnote to the endless conundrum: how should visual arts successfully translate and interpret Eastern European complexities for American audiences? The purpose of this paper is to examine these complexities and highlight the contributions of Southeastern and Eastern European filmmakers to American and world cinema.

The Brilliant Transplants Southeastern, and Eastern Europeans in Hollywood

Eastern European studio moguls and émigré filmmakers who came to Hollywood in the first half of the twentieth century transformed American movies with their immense talents and specific sensibility born in the little hamlets of now defunct empires. This source of creative vitality met with Hollywood's perennial knack for adopting the best talents from the rest of the world. Filmmakers from Eastern and Southeastern Europe continued to shape movies and stories with their unique perspective of resilient survivors from the *no man's land*, which like the cinematic equivalent of Géricault's painting *The Raft of the Medusa* is an imagined locality adrift at sea, suspended in time and space.[4]

The brilliant transplants became cinema's immortals: director Ernst Lubitsch (German-born, of Russian-Jewish parentage); actors Bela Lugosi (Hungary) and Peter Lorre (Austria-Hungary / Slovakia); editor Slavko Vorkapich (Serbia/Yugoslavia); directors Elia Kazan (ethnic Greek born in Ottoman empire), Michael Curtiz (Hungary), Fred Zinneman (Austria-Hungary), and, in the second half of the twentieth century, Milos Forman (Czech Republic / Czechoslovakia), Agnieszka Holland, and Roman Polanski (Poland); as well as cinematographers Laszlo Kovacs (Hungary), Janusz Kaminski (Poland) and most recently, Svetlana Cvetko (Croatia) - to name just a random few.

Vorkapich, chair of the USC Film School in Los Angeles, revolutionized film editing with what is now known as the "vorkapich," a montage sequence he pioneered, compressing time and space.[5] Vorkapich's editing work on D*avid Copperfield* (1935), *Mr. Smith Goes to Washington* (1939) and visual effects in *Meet John Doe* (1941) and *Maytime* (1937), among many other films as well as his own experimental projects immortalized his contributions to American and world cinema.

Polish-born Billy Wilder wrote some of the best Hollywood scripts, including Lubitsch-directed *Ninotchka* (1939) and *One, Two, Three* (1961) which he also directed, adapting, with Romanian-born I.A.L. Diamond, the eponymous play by Hungarian playwright Ferenc Molnar. *One, Two, Three* is satirizing both capitalists and communists embroiled in a romantic couple's East-West mess. The history of cinema's brilliant transplants in Hollywood reads like Molnar's family history: "when a [family] history has been segmented by the Holocaust and spans generations, continents, religions and ultimately sensibilities, separating truth from mythology can be like trying to unmix two shades that went into making the same can of paint."[6] That "can of paint" contains traces of lost empires, of Eastern European countries that have been made and unmade several times over, and of migrations and linguistic soups resulting from them – all in an explosive mix worthy of Pollock and infused with self-deprecating humor as a means of survival.

Hollywood owes a great debt to another great screenwriter, A.I. Bezzerides, known as "Buzz." Born in the Ottoman Empire to Greek and Armenian parents, Buzz is considered the father of American film noir. He penned classics like *They Drive by Night* (1940), directed by Raoul Walsh; *Thieves' Highway* (1949), directed by Jules Dassin, and *Kiss Me Deadly* (1955), directed by Rob-

ert Aldrich. The first two films were based on Bezzerides' own novels. Having grown up in the California's Central Valley, Buzz wrote gritty stories about the working class, nighttime truck drivers, and foreign-born farm workers. Sounds almost like Eastern Europe!

Lubitsch-Era Hollywood, Yugoslav "Black Wave" and American "New Wave"

In 1939 Lubitsch directed *Ninotchka*, starring Great Garbo in her first full-bodied comedic role. The film was a brilliant satire about the communist commissars of Eastern Europe. The "Lubitsch touch" added the playfulness that was Chaplin-esque and ingeniously humanized the character of the commissar, played by Garbo, who is transformed from a funny automaton spewing party-speak into a woman in love who laughs, dances and chooses romance over politics. The story takes place in fictitious Paris, whose merry inhabitants poke fun at both East and West in equal measure, as befits the "Lubitschland" paradigm.

This type of a metaphorical *land* also functions as a cultural bridge where Eastern European films are most likely to cross over and engage an American audience. Over decades, however, the palatable lightness of the Lubitsch-era has given way to what is now commonly referred to as the "black humor" of Eastern Europe, especially in the troubled Balkans. An entire decade of Yugoslav cinema, from the 1960s to the 1970s, is known for its trailblazing "black wave" films by directors such as Dusan Makavejev (*Man is not a Bird*; *WR or the Mysteries of the Organism*; *Love Affair, or the Case of the Missing Switchboard Operator*), and Zivojin Pavlovic (*The Ambush*; *Manhunt*; *Red Wheat*), among others.

Legendary Czech director Milos Forman's films struck a lighter satirical tone, e.g., *The Loves of a Blonde*, *The Firemen's Ball*, both made in Chechoslovakia. His first American-made film was *Taking Off* in 1971, followed by *One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest* in 1975. In contrast, provocative films by the Serbian master Makavejev created shock waves with their playful mixing of communism and sexual liberation. Forman and Makavejev were well liked by the American audiences and both had successful careers teaching at American universities.

The unique blend of Eastern European melancholy, savage black humor, and love of the absurd captivated audiences and film connoisseurs alike and influenced the new generation of Hollywood filmmakers who came of age in

the 1970s. To help them craft their groundbreaking movies, two new émigrés washed ashore and in film after film showed a visual mastery that has become the stuff that legends and cinema dreams are made of .[7] They were the Hungarian cinematographers Laszlo Kovacs (*Easy Rider*) and Vilmos Zsigmond (*The Deer Hunter*). Their impact on the "American New Wave" was such that in 2008 a film was made about their artistic contributions as well as their friendship, *No Subtitles Necessary: Laszlo & Vilmos* (Dir. James Chressanthis).

How Eastern European Filmmakers Channel the *Land*

Those filmmakers who never left Eastern Europe for Hollywood faced a tough fight on the unforgiving home turf where endless wars, ethnic strife, and clashes between harsh communism and crude capitalism eventually produced several "new waves" of increasingly bleaker movies that also maintained a subtle undercurrent of nostalgic melancholy and bottled up emotions. In turn, generations of American film students were schooled on such films, taught by the likes of Makavejev, Forman, Milcho Manchevski (Macedonia), and film scholars like Vlada Petric (Serbia), professor of cinema at Harvard, and the founding curator of the Harvard Film Archive.

Eastern European filmmakers articulate their vision of themselves within the context of a subsidized European model (Eurimage, festival co-production markets)[8] vastly differently from the American film industry and its products which are primarily intended to entertain and provide an escape from reality. Much remains "lost in translation" between the two models. Eastern European films channel a heavy load of historical references and complicated relationships between neighbors, nations, ethnic groups and individuals negotiating a hostile political climate. With the exception of American film industry professionals, the artistic purpose of such stories is sometimes lost on the general American audiences. This contributes to a larger problem, the devastating decrease of film imports in the U.S., with less than 0.7% share in the American box office.[9]

Between Eastern Europe's joint efforts at strengthening its filmmaking potential and Hollywood's economic impact on post-1989 Eastern Europe (new developments or upgrades of existing studio infrastructure and increase in location services across the region) the post-Berlin-wall map of Eastern Europe is reminiscent of Lubitsch's otherworldly realm, where "films take place neither in

Europe nor America, but in Lubitschland, a place of metaphor."[10] The "no man's land" notion of a territory that always seems to be up for grabs made a glorious comeback in the 2001 Bosnian Film of the same title. Written and directed by Danis Tanovic, the film won the Oscar for Best Foreign Language Film the following year. It is a powerful metaphor for the borderlands and transitlands of Eastern Europe, where shadows of the ghosts from the past, the Austro-Hungarian, the Russian and the Ottoman empires, still roam the land and haunt the newly minted citizens of the European Union and those left beyond the borders of the EU's Schengen area.

The recurring theme of borders, absurd wars and uneasy relations between neighbors can be found in countless Albanian and Turkish, Greek and Bulgarian, Romanian and Hungarian, Bosnian and Croatian, Serbian or Slovenian films, post-1989. Huseyin Karabey's breakout 2008 debut *My Marlon and Brando* told the story of a real-life actress in Turkey who embarked on a journey to reunite with her "Marlon and Brando," an actor locally known as the Iraqi version of the Superman. Her road takes her across the borders of Turkey and Iran into Kurdistan, another "no man's land" and the only place where the two lovers can meet during the Iraq war.

Another great road movie is the Turkish *Yol* (*The Road*), winner of the Palme d'Or in Cannes. It was directed in 1982 by Yilmaz Guney who was serving a prison sentence at the time, and by his friend and proxy, Serif Goren who worked on location. The male protagonist returns to his village after being released from prison and, having learned about his wife's promiscuity during his absence, takes her on a life-threatening trek across a desolate winter land. Only in this unforgiving landscape do husband and wife briefly reunite before the inevitable and tragic end.

Landscapes in Eastern European cinema rise to truly mythical levels, whether as the never-ending windy streets of the Hungarian master Bela Tarr's *Satantango*, or as endless country roads in *Once Upon a Time in Anatolia,* by the poet of Turkish cinema, Nuri Bilge Ceylan. In Bosnian director Emir Kusturica's *Time of the Gypsies* that sense of place is embedded in the iconic "dream scene" of a St. George's Day celebration on the river where people take the ritual nighttime bath. The haunting melody sang in the Romani language of the Gypsies became an enduring international hit.[11]

Nihilistic tendencies permeate the storytelling of Eastern Europeans. In the Oscar-nominated Yugoslav film *I Even Met Happy Gypsies* (1967) by the Serbian director Sasha Petrovic, there is another iconic scene with a Gypsy man drinking himself senseless while a melancholy song plays on until, in ecstasy, he bloodies his hands on the broken glass.... Destruction is joined at the hip with exaltation, like Thanatos and Eros. Characters in Eastern European films seem hell-bent on destroying themselves in that one moment of total abandon, as if escaping the world they're trapped in is possible only through destruction, when their bodies die but the soul soars. Gypsies, the Roma, have always personified that "no man's land" quality of living in the Southeastern region of Europe – with endless migrations, mixing of ethnicities, languages, and cultures.

One of the most lyrical films about the painful separation of peoples is the Oscar-nominated *Before the Rain* (1994, Macedonia) by director Milcho Manchevski. An Albanian runaway girl finds shelter in a Christian monastery where she befriends a monk who has taken a vow of silence. The time flows backward and forward, and the story shifts between London, England, and the monastery in Macedonia. It is a feat which Manchevski achieved independently from another film with a circular timeline made at the same time, Quentin Tarantino's *Pulp Fiction*.

A must-see for any student of contemporary Eastern European, and in particular Romanian cinema are the films by the young master in the making, Cristian Mungiu. His debut feature and winner of the Palme d'Or at Cannes, *4 months, 3 weeks and 2 days* (2007), which tells the story of an illegal abortion in Ceausescu's Romania, was universally praised as a masterpiece by virtually every critic and film organization in the world. His most recent film, *Beyond the Hills* (2012) is another devastating picture about the human condition. Set in post-communist Romania, it is based on a true story of exorcism. Mungiu was compared to French master Robert Bresson and praised as a new "Bresson-like perfectionist."[12]

When Hollywood Goes to Eastern Europe

It should be noted that Hollywood, as well as scores of international producers often take their productions to Eastern Europe. Notable films include *Kelly's Heroes*, *Castle Keep*, *The Cross of Iron, Fiddler on the Roof*, *Sophie's Choice*, *Cold*

Mountain, *Coriolanus*, *Skyfall*, *Game of Thrones* and others… The list is endless. In the last few years it has been fueled by the mechanism of incentives which can be as high as 30% cash rebate given to foreign producers who decide to film there.[13] This, in addition to significantly lower costs of filming in Eastern Europe and the availability of skillful crews makes the region attractive to Hollywood. Moreover, new or improved studio facilities in the region offer an abundance of sound stages and other benefits for a fraction of the cost of filming in a Hollywood studio. Jadran Film in Zagreb, Croatia, has a long tradition of servicing high profile productions, from *Sophie's Choice* to the *Game of Thrones*. Nu Boyana Studios in Sofia, Bulgaria, is now run by the Los Angeles-based Nu Image/Millennium Films. It provided services to productions ranging from the ultra-commercial *300: Rise of an Empire* to the Oscar-nominated Norwegian entry *Kon Tiki*. Korda Studio in Budapest, Hungary, named after the Hungarian-born British filmmaker Sir Alexander Korda, provided services for Neil Jordan's *The Borgias*, while Istanbul, Turkey hosted the crew of the James Bond franchise's latest film, *Skyfall*.

Sometimes Hollywood and non-Eastern Europeans decide to make their own films about the region's complicated history, especially the recent Bosnian war. Almost all failed and met with mixed-to-negative reactions. *Twice Born* with Penelope Cruz "projects a tumultuous love story against the backdrop of the Bosnian War for independence, and then seems unaware that the foreground overshadows it in the worst possible way."[14] Angelina Jolie's directorial debut *In the Land of Blood and Honey* "has an oddly bloodless effect,"[15] while *The Hunting Party* with Richard Gere and Terence Howard was panned as "forgettable."[16] Writing about *Behind the Enemy Lines*, the *LA Times* movie critic scathingly wondered "why no fetching femme resistance fighter materializes to help the Americans on the ground."[17] Only Michael Winterbottom's *Welcome to Sarajevo* (1997) and David Attwood's *Shot Through the Heart* (1998) passed critical muster.

Conclusion

History has a lot yet to teach us in the one-hundredth anniversary year of WWI. Commemorations of the Great War ushered back into our collective consciousness the ominous shots fired in Sarajevo in June 1914, while today

across these same Eastern European lands new conflicts are brewing. People who live there and the filmmakers who tell their stories don't have much of a choice in a space relatively small and packed with people of many different, if not *vastly* differing, cultures who live in close proximity. When all else fails, the raft-size piece of cinematic land is one's only outlet to express the anger and the love and to articulate the aching longing for a better place. Cinema has the potential to rescue rich deposits of frustrations and engineer catharsis. Ultimately all people really want with movies is to tell their own stories, in their own voice, and to be heard by an audience.

Eastern Europe is still, in spite of Wikipedia or Youtube, largely incomprehensible to foreigners because of its enduring and multiplying complexities. It also has to contend with a few more obstacles due to its unfortunate placement at the intersection of competing historical narratives: Middle Eastern, European Union, American, Russian, and its own unresolved ethnic disputes, border disputes, disputes over country names and territories, and shifting allegiances to former colonial or ideological rulers.

Communicating the richness and the complexities of such artistic material in ways that would not end up "lost in translation" is a task for the ages. Thanks to Europe's subsidizing model art house films are being made and the best of them transform this *land* into a metaphor of its better self… lyrical, yet self-mocking, tinged with a melancholy that the wondering tribes of the Roma or the Sephardic Jews have been singing about ever since they set out on their long journeys from India and Spain which, ironically, brought them to this other difficult place: Eastern Europe.

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Christa Wolf and the Flight from History

The Mechanism of Forgetting and Remembering in the City of Angels

Andre Schuetze

Abstract

In her novel *Stadt der Engel*, Wolf connects her experiences in America at the Getty Research Institute in California with her reflections on the DDR and the fall of the wall. By fleeing her own past and going to America, the narrator reaches a vanishing point, from where she can go no further. Los Angeles, a city viewed as an entity without history and without identity, represents the farthest reach of the western world. This non-place that lacks not only a history, but also the burden that comes with a past, provides the possibility for transformation. It serves for Wolf as a blank canvas that stimulates both reflection and remembrance. In the text, European history is mirrored not only in the repeatedly mentioned exile writers, but also in the many Jewish friends and acquaintances she meets there. The city of angels is therefore a city of survival, a location that facilitates a painful but cathartic confrontation with the memories of the country she left behind.

Keywords

Balkans, Christa Wolf, Los Angeles, DDR, Memory, Autobiography.

Christa Wolf's visit to the Getty Research Institute in Los Angeles at the beginning of the 1990's was a period that compelled the author to confront both her role as a writer and as a prominent figure in the recording and preservation of DDR culture. In her novel *Stadt der Engel,* Wolf connects her experiences in America with her reflections on the DDR and the fall of the wall, laying out the artistic crisis that plagues her throughout the text. Through this, the city of angels becomes for Wolf a city of survival, a location that facilitates a painful but cathartic confrontation with the memories of the country she left behind. This non-place of Los Angeles, which lacks not only a history, but also the burden that comes with a past, provides the possibility for transformation. It serves for Wolf as a blank canvas that stimulates both reflection and remembrance.

Los Angeles, the metropolis and the land of film and Hollywood, definitively shaped the German image and understanding of the United States, with its lack

of tradition and its obsession with money and success. Christa Wolf is well aware of the true nature of her destination and seeks to discover "what does it really look like, this paradise that awaits us?"[1]

Wolf's first impressions seem to confirm this paradisiacal image. She enjoys the sensations of the city to the fullest: she praises the beauty of the landscape, she is intoxicated by the supernatural light and wonders about the excess of space in her hotel. At the Getty Center she is impressed by the vast amount of resources; it seems to contain the entire European intellectual history. In a restaurant, Wolf is astonished by the overwhelming bounty of offerings upon the table: "There were unbelievable portions that the guests devoured: huge steaks, mountains of sausages, hamburgers bigger than a dinner plate, everything that the children desired was set before them."[2]

Paradies Amerika was the title of a collection of documentaries by the journalist Egon Erwin Kisch, who came to the United States at the end of the 1920s in order to gain an insider's perspective and report directly from the source. He wanted to provide a detailed examination of Germany's position vis-à-vis the United States, a country idolized by the Germans at that time and held up as an example for modernity. Kisch sought to question this perspective and the unrestrained enthusiasm for American culture. He discovered above all social problems: misery and exploitation lurked everywhere behind the pretty veneer of progress. Not unexpectedly, Christa Wolf follows Kisch in this vein of social criticism. Just as Kisch questioned the celebration of the United States as harbinger of modernity and an example for Germany to emulate, so Wolf disputes the notion of American society as a viable model for the future for Germany. If the United States represents what is to come for Germany, then what the Germans should really anticipate is inequality and gross disparity between various levels of society. This vision for Germany is intensified by the recent downfall of socialism, which makes the economic divisions even more apparent as capitalism reveals its true face. With the absence of its socialist counterpart, capitalistic society need no longer project a façade of humanism.

Wolf›s America, which at first seemed to point to the future, becomes inextricably tied to her own past. Her first visit to a drugstore on Wilshire Boulevard presents a direct correlation with memories she has from Germany during the fall of the wall. This simple trip to the drugstore reminds her again of the allure of capitalism and the tantalizing possibilities that it offers.

I appreciatively strolled past the kilometer-long aisles between shelves filled with dozens of cleaning supplies for every imaginable purpose and some unimaginable ones too, all there to make our bathrooms and kitchens and stairwells and floors gleam with germ-freedom. I wandered up and down the narrow aisles lined with perfumes, creams, soaps, deodorants, shower gels, leg and body lotions, shampoos, and hair dyes, again in countless varieties – who in the world was supposed to wash, cleanse, and perfume with all of this stuff and beautify with all these foundations, lipsticks, and mascaras? I thought the contents of all the little bottles and jars and packets in all these drugstores would be enough to cover the entire globe with lather and then, cleansed, thoroughly rinsed with ocean water, there would be enough creams and lotions to make it ready for a party.[3]

This seemingly insignificant visit to the drugstore evokes memories of the first days after the fall of the wall, when her East German comrades returned with bags laden with purchases from their first eager forays into the previously forbidden West. "That was what really mattered, at the core" she determines.[4]

At the *Zukunftsparty* at the Getty Center, where the Getty Fellows masquerade in costumes from the future, there is a serious discussion about East Germany's past, which was always preoccupied by and focused on the goal of a better future. "We didn't want our country as it was, but rather as it would one day be."[5] But just as the *Zukunftsparty* at the Center slowly empties and dwindles, the decorations falling away, dimming the festive atmosphere, so did the hope of the country crumble away. Clinging to the past and thereby ignoring the present is now seen by Wolf as a grave mistake.

Christa Wolf notices that her own interests often differ from those of the majority and it is from this that many of her problems stem. Her role during the so-called "Wendezeit" becomes a utopia both inaccessible and naïve. What does the real future have in store, the future that she believes she would find in America? The excess in the drugstore seems to point to a dark, subconscious side of American culture, to stains embedded in the fabric of society, which necessitate the abundance of cleaning supplies on the shelves and the mania for cleanliness. In spite of her sincere enthusiasm for California, Christa Wolf does not remain blind to the many injustices and the misery that permeate the city. In contrast to others she sees "the homeless people drawn to this gentle climate like little splotches of color that didn't match."[6]

A simple trip to Koreatown with friends, originally thought of as a tour of an almost forgotten example of modern architecture, turns into a visit that highlights the suffering and misery that underlies the city's glamorous façade. The humanists from the Getty Center are quickly seen as outsiders and are verbally insulted. Only a couple of months earlier, this location had been at the center of the LA riots, where the members of the poorest level of society had rebelled against the immigrants whom they perceived as the source of their struggles.

It becomes clear that in Wolf's text Los Angeles and East Germany are not such disparate entities and their relationship to one another is rather intimate. In the same summer of 1992 images of neo-Nazis carrying out arson attacks against the homes of Vietnamese immigrants in Rostock were shown around the world. Similar to the riots in Los Angeles, the neo-Nazis believed they were the oppressed segment of society and sought a scapegoat.

Throughout her stay in Los Angeles, Christa Wolf is continually asked questions about the images of the arson attack in the media and the rise of the neo-Nazis. She often interacts with the exiles, who fled Europe during the rise of the Nazis, as well as their descendants. This community of exiles is not cognizant of the differences between and nuances of East and West Germany. They can, however, relate to images of the oppressed people present in the media, and see a persecution similar to their own being replicated in modern times. For some, Christa Wolf is the first German they have spoken with and she is perceived as a representative of Germany as a whole. However, she identifies strongly as an East German and cannot fathom herself as a representative of East and West Germany melded together, as if its parts were indistinguishable from one another. But far away from East and West Germany, she is pushed precisely into this role she never wanted to occupy. She proclaims that she "…hadn't wanted to live in a Greater Germany again…"[7]

Christa Wolf as a German, as a *Bundesdeutsche*? She contemplates the possibility that she might have missed an important opportunity in her life through a mere technicality. The flight of her family had actually led toward the west. The first allies she saw were Americans, but later the Russians took over the part of Mecklenburg where her family had settled. Just a few more kilometers further and Christa Wolf would have led an entirely different life, a guiltless life, as she describes it, most likely as a teacher, most likely without writing.

Would this private life and utopia of retreat really be an alternative for her? Is life really nothing more than a contingency? The introduction to the lifestyle in Los Angeles renders this unlikely, because this "normal life" would have meant turning a blind eye to the misery and suffering around her. Whatever East Germany would later represent to Christa Wolf, in its nascent form it stood for a commitment to a better life for all and a negation of everything that she, until she was sixteen, had experienced by living in a true dictatorship. The reality of the Nazi dictatorship remains for her, even in her later years, something that cannot be compared to East Germany. This was the starting point for her life under socialism and was understood by her as an intellectual necessity. She felt that she was in possession of a higher truth, because she knew that a better society would soon emerge. To have such a compelling sense of truth always makes one dogmatic and impatient, she says, or in the words of the past: consistent. Looking back on herself she realizes this.

Christa Wolf's California text turns more and more toward the past and slowly reveals that there is another reason for her visit to Los Angeles. The scholarship at the Getty Center enabled her flight from Germany and gave her a chance to gain distance from events from her past that tied her to the Stasi. As a place of escape, the city of Los Angeles offers the German exile something special, a sort of *Weimar under the palms*. She constantly consults texts dealing with the experiences of Brecht, Feuchtwanger, and above all Thomas Mann. She avidly reads Mann's diaries, searching for problems and issues similar to those that she has confronted, for example, when Ludwig Marcuse condemns Thomas Mann because of his political past. Even Mann's process of writing, his urge to keep working, mirrors Wolf's own feelings during her visit to Los Angeles.

On a trip downtown, Christa Wolf observes even more similarities with her life in East Germany. A group of Getty fellows visit a small store where the homeless produce toys, as well as an old factory compound, where artists can rent cheap studio space in the middle of a slum. The people who are forced to live off the garbage heap are juxtaposed with this bohemian idyll just next door. Overall, her stay in Los Angeles as a privileged member of a community provides a direct reflections of her position in the DDR, where she enjoyed special rights and advantages which ultimately left her with similar feelings of impotence as she tried to confront injustice in her own society. The powerlessness that she experiences in Los Angeles is an important turning point for Wolf. She decides to leave her ivory tower, to become active again and to write.

One of the most symbolically significant places during her visit to California is the Promenade on Santa Monica Beach. Here she sits on a bench, a bench upon which Leonhard Franck perhaps once sat during his exile, and looks out over the ocean, marveling at "the feeling that there's nothing all the way to Japan but this endless expanse of water!"[8]

The expansiveness of the ocean serves as a symbol of forgetting. Somewhat later in the text Wolf drives along Sunset Boulevard to the Pacific and in the style of Billy Wilder's identically named film, is reminded of a vortex that seizes everything and empties it out into the ocean. The endless tranquility of the ocean is disturbed only once, when the calm and glassy waters are shocked by storms and heavy rain. This placid ocean of forgetting being stirred into a frenzy parallels the way Wolf struggles to dredge up her own memories of her Stasi past and penetrate the stillness and static of forgetting. The hotel MS. Victoria and the Getty Center are described in the words of Peter Gutman, Wolf's new friend, as luxury ships: "We went back and forth between the deck of one luxury liner and the deck of the other, even more luxurious vessel, and only in order to take ourselves seriously when we excreted our actually rather superfluous texts."[9] Christa Wolf feels the need to question this sterile and protective environment and ponders the need to produce something relevant. For Wolf, writing always served as a means to counteract the process of forgetting; writing is the preservation of memory. However, owing to her own bout of forgetfulness regarding her Stasi past, is it still feasible for her to take part in the act of writing as an attempt to record and preserve?

Gutman suggests that instead of dwelling on the negative aspects of her visit, Wolf should use her experiences as a catalyst to write. But this only highlights the question: who is she really and who is doing the writing? Like Thomas Mann, who expressed himself through his diaries, Wolf seeks to find herself through daily concerted efforts to write.

The question of her complicity with the Stasi as IM Margarete is not the main issue, however. Instead, the actual question is: how could she have forgotten this? "I knew, of course, that no one would ever believe I had forgotten it, they threw it in my face as my own offense. "'Vergehen', what a beautiful German word, both 'misdemeanor' and 'the fading into the past.'"[10] For her, this forgetting can only be explored at the edge of the world, far away from where the unfortunate history unfolded, where memory slackens through proximity.

Her experiences in California become an examination of her own language. Throughout the entire text, passages regarding Wolf's knowledge of English continually surface. She often speaks ironically about deficiencies in translation, and discrepancies in word meaning. For example: "to do one's best" and "sich redliche Mühe geben" or also "guilt" and "Schuld." This not knowing of words provides the possibility for, as Walter Benjamin noted, a liberation, an introspection instead of a repetition of preconceived definitions. In this way Los Angeles offers Wolf an ideal departure point for her self-reflection. The foreign language also functions as a sort of protective shield for her. However, the English language sometimes also deceives her: "agent" or "spy," words that every German knows from Hollywood films, have a much worse connotation than the untranslatable German term "Informeller Mitarbeiter," a word painfully tied to Wolf's past. Thus, against all expectations, Los Angeles serves not as a place of forgetting, but rather the space that enforces the memories of Christa Wolf's own history between the end of Nazi Germany and the rise and fall of the DDR and her role as a "state poet," a dubious title given her by the critic Marcel Reich-Ranicki.

With her arrival in the expansive city of Los Angeles, its metropolitan area almost as big as the defunct DDR, the author has reached a vanishing point, from which she can go no further. Los Angeles, often viewed as an entity without history and without identity, represents the farthest reach of the western world. Like Benjamin's angel of history, this city compels Christa Wolf to engage in retrospection, because the way forward ends at the ocean's edge, forcing her to turn around. The Getty Center proves to be the ideal workplace, since everything necessary to research the western world can be found here. The Getty and the Stasi both become archives of fallen cultures.

Los Angeles is not only the place where cultural memory fails through constant change, where everything is only a façade without history; Los Angeles is also the place of uncovering and discovering of knowledge, qualities often highlighted in the Film Noir and detective stories of Raymond Chandler or Dashiell Hammet. The hotel in Santa Monica serves as an excellent location for a mystery, where "everything [is] a little dark, everything a little frightening."[11] This becomes a backdrop for her own mystery, when one night she discovers a wallet directly in front of her door. With this event begins her acquaintance with Peter Gutman, a writer researching a philosopher very similar to Walter Benjamin. He is portrayed as an Austerlitz figure and becomes the most important dialogue partner in the

book. Christa Wolf begins to color her own detective story and in the end connects her relationship with Gutman to her own search for L., whose letters help her find her way to self-knowledge.

Eventually she and Gutman will discover something together, a treasure trove with documents of the past that show L. and Gutman's philosopher were lovers. But all of these coincidences seem too good to be true. She writes: "It was absolutely not possible" and "Such coincidences cannot be invented" and "If it would not have been so, I would have had to invent it."[12] Christa Wolf eventually discovers that she does not believe in such coincidences any more and that she was in danger of losing even the memory of joy. Yet, Los Angeles is also a place of illusions and fantasies. Here she can return to literature and this return allows her the possibility of a new beginning as well as a reappraisal of her life.

She reveals through her writing an urgent need for a utopia. She describes Los Angeles both as a patchwork city and a utopia that embraces and allows for great diversity. However, in this very diversity there also lies the threat of loss through forgetting, as Wolf illustrates with her examination of many exiles, such as Salka Viertel. Only the active engagement with literature allows one to resist this non-remembrance. Both belong together: through her experiences in Los Angeles and her deep introspection in a place far removed from her past, Wolf succeeds in achieving a self-acceptance that also integrates her forgetting.

A trip to Pomona College serves as a powerful symbol of her experience. While there she visits an art installation, which is designed to alter the way the viewer observes and interacts with light and sky. Through a glowing frame one sees the darkness of the night sky, which becomes a metaphor for one's own ego. This blind spot, which slumbers within, must be discovered through art, in the case of Christa Wolf, through literature.

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Passionate Patience

Figures of a Unified Europe and a European Germany in Thomas Mann's Essays

Friederike von Schwerin-High

Abstract

Compared to his other writings, Thomas Mann's essays — including his texts regarding Europe — have generally been underexplored. This paper examines seven of his essays and speeches written between 1923 and 1953, which display considerable consistency in their advocacy for a Europe without borders. In the early essays, Mann argues that while World War I had exacerbated the enmity between European nations, it also provided opportunities to radically rethink the concept of Europe. He sets up strong divisions between the supposedly rational West and seemingly irrational-Romantic Germany, only to deconstruct such divisions and to emphasize the continent's common roots and aims. At various times, Mann lent support to two pro-European movements led by Richard Nikolaus von Coudenhove-Kalergi and Umberto Campagnolo, respectively. During his exile from Nazi Germany Mann continued to develop and project images of a free, equal, and unified Europe in contradistinction to the site of oppression, murder, and looting expeditions into which the Nazis turned Europe under the pretext of unification. Then, in his post World War II essays and speeches Mann addresses audiences on both sides of the Atlantic with the goal of strengthening the position of Europe in the eyes of the American public as well as in Europe's own self-perception. Worrying that Europe might become a casualty in escalating conflicts between the superpowers, he highlights its special role as mediator, a role that, in fact, Mann himself symbolically assumed. Finally, Mann's postwar efforts on behalf of a European Germany are analyzed within their larger politico-historical context.

Keywords

Thomas Mann, Pan-Europe, United Europe, Germany, European Culture, World War I, World War II, Cold War.

Introduction
Continuities in Thomas Mann's European Advocacy

Thomas Mann's long life as a writer witnessed a remarkable succession of governmental change, spanning the Wilhelmine Empire, World War I, the Weimar Republic, years spent in Swiss and North American exile during the Nazi dictatorship, and Mann's ultimate return to postwar Europe, during which he settled in Switzerland, paying occasional visits to the two newly constituted

countries of East and West Germany. Examining Mann's pronouncements from the 1920s to the 1950s, this paper considers images of a united Europe as developed within Mann's shorter essayistic writings. Due to limitations of space, it leaves out Mann's monumental essay *Confessions of a Nonpolitical Man* from his pre-political phase, as well as depictions of European issues within his fictional universe, for example in *The Magic Mountain, Death in Venice*, *Mario and the Magician* or *Doktor Faustus*.

Mann created memorable constructions of Europe in seven different essays, two of which he wrote during the Weimar Republic: "European Community of Fate" (Europäische Schicksalsgemeinschaft, 1923) and "The Trees in the Garden: A Speech for Pan-Europe" (Die Bäume im Garten: Rede Für Pan-Europa, 1930).[1] Three public speeches were delivered during his years in exile, two of them in English: „Achtung Europa! (Attention Europe, 1936), „European Listeners!" (1943), and "The War And The Future" (1943).[2] Two additional efforts came out in postwar America and Europe, respectively: "Goethe and Democracy" [1949] and a 1953 essay written for *Comprendre*, the journal of the Société Européenne de Culture.[3] Reacting and contributing to larger European movements, notably to Richard Nikolaus von Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-Europe undertaking in the 1920s and Umberto Campagnolo's European political culture movement in the 1950s, each essay displays continuities as well as new developments in Mann's conceptions of Europe.

Mann's particular communicative emphasis varied with the varying occasions and locations of his speeches and written essay contributions, but his publicly declared dream of a unified Europe — with a peaceful Germany existing within it — never left him once he had uttered it in 1923. The subject of Mann's frequent, remarkably consistent Europe-friendly messaging has received rather little systematic exploration, however. To be sure, around 1990 Mann's engagement with the idea of Europe drew scholarly interest, but less so in terms of the considerable continuity of that engagement over the last three decades of Mann's life.[4] The aim of this paper is to trace and contextualize Mann's constructions of Europe's defining characteristics, its common roots, joint future, and desired role within the landscape of changing contemporary geopolitics.

Thomas Mann as an Essayist

Although Mann was in his earlier life a self-confessed nonpolitical man he could not and did not remain that way. As Theo Stammen has shown, the products of Mann's writing life, his essays, speeches, op-eds, letters, diary entries, short stories and novels approximately from 1918 onwards, all reflect his increasingly politicized approach to the practice of writing.[5] This politicization emphatically included his increasing Europeanization.

Hinrich Siefken cites three major reasons for the relative lack of scholarly attention to Thomas Mann's essayistic output: these writings are numerous and scattered; and, brimming with contemporary, philosophical, and biblical allusions and with somewhat abstract, dialectical concepts, they are difficult to decipher for modern readers. Finally Mann himself, being chiefly known for his narrative fiction, did not consider the essays a primary focus.[6] And yet, as Siefken observes, they possess "considerable substance and consummate artistry."[7]

For Mann, producing essays and speeches was a deliberately chosen method of discharging his responsibility as a cultural representative, a role that his early staggering success had assigned to him in his own eyes and those of many others. He would often enlist what he called *compurgators*, authorities who could vouchsafe for his statements. Within the pages of his Europe-themed essays, he also invokes trends and phenomena in European history to provide guidance, inspiration, and a sense of urgency for present causes: the Greco-Christian traditions of emphasizing universality and metaphysics, the eighteenth century's friendliness toward reasonability, the nineteenth century's hospitality to technological progress and to the tripling of the European population, the enthusiastic and self-sacrificial attitude at the beginning of World War I; all of these data are allegorically called upon to enhance the present and future.

In his early "nonpolitical" years Mann had developed a host of contrasting pairs of concepts, Germany vs. the rest of the west (i.e. Europe and the United States) importantly among them. Germany stood for *culture* and music, and sympathy with lost causes and death wishes; the west for *civilization*, which

included politics and democracy. As a matter of "self-correction," beginning in 1922, Mann revised these concepts, developing his telltale insistence on mediation (Ausgleich) and endorsing a gradual reengagement between German thinking and western European thought. In his political essays promoting Europe's unity, he also placed himself consistently as a mediator between selected voices and practices of the past and the readers and listeners of the present. As will be seen, it was this role of a mediator that, starting with the Cold War, Mann wished to assign to Europe on a geopolitical scale.

Europe as Providence and Horticulture
Mann's Essays during the Weimar Republic Years

In "European Community of Fate" Mann refers to US President Woodrow Wilson's resolutions in which Wilson had proposed to end World War I without declaring winners and losers and with the aim of forming a League of Nations. While many historians attribute the War Guilt Clause and other harsh peacetime conditions to the absence of Wilson from the negotiating table due to illness, Mann argues that what prevented Wilson's laudable idea from becoming a reality was Germany and its "trivial emperor" suddenly withdrawing from the war (201). Here, in 1923, Mann intends, rather anachronistically, to harness the revolutionary spirit and the willingness to make sacrifices that prevailed at the outbreak of World War I, for the cause of the new republic, intimating that the War had stood in the service of a larger revolution whose ultimate goal, for all its misery and appearance to the contrary, had been European unification.

In "Community of Fate" as well as in the speech "The Trees in the Garden," given seven years later, Mann invokes the belief in human universalism and enlightenment as particularly European, having existed since "the days of the Zeus-worshipping Greeks and again since the beginning of Christianity." He designates faith in the human intellect as that which binds Europe together (287-88), observing that the recent movement of hostility toward the human mind is being counterbalanced by a new faith in a human-universalist will to reason and political utopianism "which almost establishes a family relationship of the twentieth century with the eighteenth century" (290). Mann links the pan-European sensibility firmly to the idea of the political in general:

The word politics was mentioned — is it avoidable today? That spirit of utopianism, the pan-European idea reflects the fact that in the forefront of the world's attention, dominant, binding our consciences together, is the problem each of us is dying to discuss today: that of human coexistence, the social, the political problem. It is a political time, politics is the defining element of the epoch — and that's certainly a sphere in which the German mind does not feel very much at home... (290).

Thus coexistence on a global scale presupposes deliberate coexistence on a European scale. Germany— and here Mann includes himself as a cultural representative — cannot shut itself into its inwardness, but has to be practical and collaborative. With his signature philosophical maneuvers that tend to set up oppositions only to tear them down or reconcile them, he opposes Europe to Germany here the more vividly to remind Germans that their traditions are not just marked by the irrationalism of Romanticism, but also by Kantian rationalism: "What is it, dear listeners — reason or feeling, spirit or soul, authorial practice or poeticity — to avail myself of a favorite German distinction — that drives me and others like me to lend support with his weak words to the men who risk their lives in order to build a European ancestral home for our children and grandchildren, a political home, which is called Europe?" (293) He answers his own rhetorical question by stating that reason and feeling need to be drawn upon in equal measure in the arena of European politics.

Hope against all Hope
Mann's Warnings about and to Europe during Exile

When Mann gave his talk "Attention, Europe" in 1936 he had just recently turned sixty and invokes the cliché of the older man who does not understand the present world any more, only to assert that nobody *should* understand it. By turns, Mann blames four particular phenomena for Germany's atrocious situation: collectivism, the nineteenth century, technological advancement, and misunderstood Nietzschean philosophy: "The collective is a comfortable sphere in comparison with the individual; comfortable up to the point of licentiousness; what the collectivist generation desires, enjoys, and endorses, are the everlasting holidays from the self. What it wants, what it loves, is intoxication," which, Mann fears, in only one example "of the popular debasement of

large and venerable European institutions in modern mass-consumption and mass wear and tear" (129). He regrets that "intoxication," "myth," and "heroism" have become the new educated vocabulary chipping away at democratic institutions. The notion that democratic institutions should not be treated as naturally given but as historically fought for, perishable structures, receives as much emphasis as the insistence on "militant humanism." The tenet of the 1923 essay that unification is Europe's only recourse has now, in 1936, given way to a sense of resignation and a utopianism that seems desperate. There is now only the specter of a Europe in a historical sense: "If European humanism has become incapable of an aggressive rebirth of its ideas; if it is no longer able to become conscious of its own soul in combative freshness of life, then it will perish…" (140).

Between 1940 and 1945 the BBC regularly broadcasted Mann's addresses in the series entitled "Deutsche Hörer" (German Listeners). There was one broadcast, occurring in English and entitled "European listeners!" (January 1943), in which Mann summarizes his European stance of the past twenty years:

I speak to you as one of you, as a German, who has always considered himself as a European, who knew your countries and cultures, and who was deeply convinced that the political and economic conditions of Europe were outdated, this division into arbitrarily bordered states and sovereignties that has brought about the misfortune of the continent. To me and to those like me, the idea of European unity was dear and precious (622).

Mann appeals to the rest of Europe to stand united against Nazism, because "[o]f all of Hitler's lies the most outrageous is this European lie, the theft of the idea of Europe, the impudent interpretation of his looting expeditions and crimes as a work of unification carried out in the European spirit." By way of a utopian projection, Mann draws up a surprisingly prescient picture of a future:

The true Europe will be created by you yourselves with the help of the powers of freedom. It will be a federation of free states with equal rights able to cultivate their spiritual independence, their traditional cultures, subject at the same time to a common law of reason and morality, a European federation in the larger frame of economic cooperation of the civilized nations of the world (623).

Nine months later he speaks to his American audience at the Library of Congress. This time, again deploying a strategy of mediation, he highlights the

heroism of the European nations in hopes of portraying all of them, including even Germany, as future allies:

Years of the most brutal terrorism, of martyrdom and executions have not succeeded in breaking [the European peoples'] will to resist. …Only a corrupt upper-crust, a treasonous gang for whom nothing is holy but money and advantage, is collaborating with them. …I say all honor to the peoples of Europe. They are fighting our battle. They are our allies and they deserve to be treated as our allies. … But in speaking of Europe, I cannot omit my own country… (26-27).

Figures of Europe and America in Mann's Cold War Essays

In "Goethe and Democracy" that concluded the series of addresses delivered at the Library of Congress between 1942 and 1949, Mann triangulates American political traditions, German transnational thought, and pan-European identity. He invokes the "decidedly supra-German, European" character of his intellectual-artistic role models:

Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Wagner, and, in later years above all, Goethe, all have a decidedly supra-German, European character. What I found in them was the European in the German, a European Germany, the ultimate goal of my wishes and requirements — in contrast to a 'German Europe,' the horrid aspiration of German nationalism, which always disgusted me and finally drove me from Germany (108).

He associates Goethe with Europeanism because "Goethe resisted the German-Romantic cult of death, and fundamentally — I believe — it is as a friend to life that democratic Europe claims him as its own" (112). But Mann also casts Goethe as imaginatively anticipating the "dream-bridge to America" that plays out in Goethe's novel *Wilhelm Meister's Travels* as a "desire away from the age-burdened complexity, the grievous intellectualism of the European world, overloaded with spiritual and historical tradition and finally threatened by nihilism" (129). The future, Mann concludes, belongs "to the man of the day, whose mind and 'common sense' are directed toward the nearest, most useful matters; it belongs to him whose energy is not tainted by the pallor of thought. Not only Germany, all of Europe is Hamlet, and Fortinbras is America" (129-30). This flattering picture of America, marked by McCarthyism and the Cold

War at the time, was much toned down in Mann's 1953 *Comprendre* essay with its insistence on envisioning the mediating role a strengthened and more united Europe might play on the world stage divided into East and West. I am quoting this passage at length, because Mann's art of, and advocacy for, mediating is on particularly sharp display here:

What sometimes annoys me is an individual, usually scarcely justified cultural arrogance, which the average European thinks he can bask in before the billionaire relative and simple-minded self-made man over there. In turn, this pride is itself simple-minded... On the other hand the weak and self-forgetful addiction of Europe to America displeases and embarrasses me. It seems as strangely incompatible with that conceit, as is the deep respect over there [in America] for the older historical credentials and dignity of our continent with the tendency to treat Europe as an economic colony, a military base, a Glacis in a future nuclear crusade against Russia, as a certainly archaeologically interesting and travel-worthy piece of earth, about whose complete ruin, however, they will not care one bit when it comes to the fight over world domination (164).

According to this essay "the millennial perspective of Europe, its adeptness in suffering…, its mature skepticism" call it to the role of a balancing mediator, intent on preventing nameless disasters. Once again, Mann closes with a reference to European universalism and to Goethe: "Europe was the heart and mind of the world, and my quiet belief is that it will never cease to be that in the new world of emancipation forming before our eyes. Goethe said: 'I am not afraid that Germany would not be one.' Let us say: We are not worried that Europe is not going to be one in the spirit of knowledge, justice and peace" (168). As in previous contributions, here Mann notes the interdependencies between Europe's increased self-awareness and its unanimity.

Conclusion

To reimagine and refashion Germany as both a European player and a transatlantic factor was not only a cultural-political strategy for Thomas Mann in the texts he produced during the early years of the Cold War. It was also a chief political method that characterized the Adenauer-government at roughly the same time and contributed to what began as the European

Steel and Coal Community in 1952 and eventually turned into the European Community, the ever-expanding European Union, and the Eurozone.

In the European project of recent years Germany has played a core, complicated, and at times contradictory role. Being the country that pushed most emphatically for the expansion of the EU, it was also active in bringing about a multi-tiered EU with a core European membership group of nations that are more involved in EU aspects than other members. As the most populous nation within the EU Germany has sometimes wanted more weight and votes, but has also been careful to exercise restraint, realizing that the framework of the European Union has provided conditions that make its position more acceptable for other nations. Nevertheless, its role has changed from that of a model pupil into that of an irritated disciplinarian.[8]

Recently, therefore, European Union observers have posed the question whether it behooves Germany to "download" Europe and make itself more European through more consistent adherence to EU policy guidelines or to "upload" itself and make Europe more German by increasingly "translating" aspects of the country's political and economic institutions into EU governance structures and by assuming a more assertive political role within the EU. Or, indeed, as Simon Green and his co-authors suggest, might these two procedures be seen as intertwined and interacting?[9] Whereas "uploading" and "downloading" are metaphors of recent vintage, this paper has investigated the dialectic imaginings of Germany and Europe, or Germany *in* Europe, that Thomas Mann offered more than sixty years ago and whose figurativeness, explanatory models, and essayistic reasoning still echo in the European discourse of today. For example, in a debate with British Prime Minister David Cameron the former German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle recently called the European Union a "Community of Fate."[10]

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Endnotes

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SECTION IV
Art, Theatre, Literature, Music, Culture

TIMELESS THEMES IN LITERATURE & THE ARTS IN A WORLD OF RAPID CHANGES

Chair
—
Aurelia Roman

Participants
—
Isabel Pinto
Pierre Taminiaux

Presentation

Aurelia Roman

This workshop was inspired by the conclusion of Hannah Arendt to the first volume "Thinking" of her book *Life of the Mind*. Timeless, she writes, is not eternity; it springs from the clash of past and future. The "no-more" and "not-yet" are together in the present, and in an antagonistic confrontation. In the first part of the 21st century, Europe finds itself more than ever, "formally united" and profoundly shaken after the "dismantling" of its traditional countries' boarders, of traditional cultural and moral values, after "the loss", as Arendt writes, of the European "occidental trinity: religion, authority and tradition". To what extent, then, the literature and the arts contributed to the preservation of the past, while bearing witness to the present or even looking into the future? What was/is their role in today's Europe?

Naturalizing Politics

Metaphors of Loss in Catharine Trotter's *Agnes de Castro*

Isabel Pinto

Abstract

In the long eighteenth century, metaphors of loss, primarily seen as a mental process (Lakoff, 1993), express what is fundamentally at stake in the individual quest against an unfair world, reflecting thereby the ideology of individualism and, at the same time, accounting for the rise of an emotional community (Rosenwein, 2010) of the tragic. The loss they convey is always concerned with losing someone, or something, one deeply cherishes, e.g. a lover, a parent, freedom, etc. In Catharine Trotter's *Agnes de Castro* (1696) the use of these metaphors takes the meaning of the discourse further, making for the invalidation of gender naturalization (Daston, 1992) as a strategy to display and emphasize political naturalization instead. In other words, the collapse of a set of established differences between men and women is thought to favor the dissemination of a strong contrast between two rival nations, Portugal and Spain. Therefore, although the play classifies itself as a tragedy based on the Portuguese History, rightly settled in Coimbra, it does not fit in with the Portuguese dramatic trend about *Agnes de Castro* (Ferreira, 1587; Quita, 1766), since virtue and moral value are systematically on the Spanish side.

Keywords

Agnes de Castro, Metaphors, Gender, Politics, Naturalization.

Introduction

This paper focus on metaphors of loss, both as poetic representations and as a cultural construct, in *Agnes de Castro* (1696), by Catharine Trotter.[1] The characters use the first person, in order to assume plainly the danger of losing themselves, amidst a scenario of political conflict opposing Portugal and Spain: "Light Jealousies, like Prunings to a Plant, / The tender wound improves, and helps loves growth; / But if they enter deep, the Branches fade, / And the rich stock decays, and dies at last,"[2] says Agnes to the Princess, referring to the destructive power of jealousy.

I shall draw on the critical use of metaphors as a device to emphasize the characters' personal drama, i.e. how they have lost or, are about to lose too much, unsettling and impassioning the audience by conveying an unusual emotional

strength to the performance. Additionally, I am claiming that although metaphors of loss mainly pertained to the individual sphere, to the extent that they reflected the conflict between the inner life of the character and the environment, the emotional impact they had on the audience accounted for a collective experience of loss, defining a specific emotional community.[3]

The Debate around Eighteenth-Century Tragedy

Tragedy seems to be a proper field for metaphors of loss. The literary style that underlines the tragic score relies on figures of speech such as metaphor, comparison, synesthesia, etc. It is the literary background of tragedy that mainly brings into play an array of metaphors favoring emotions and states of passion, as both contemporary theatrical documentation and theoretical debate lead us to believe.

An article about the body technique suitable for tragic acting connects specific parts of the body, positions and postures, to the emotions on display:[4] fear is represented by leaning the head and the back; terror is expressed by shortening your neck, wandering eyes and mouth half opened; compassion and pain are conveyed by looking directly at the object of misery; the final result, which is the true aim of tragedy, is to arise the audience's rage, horror and hate towards the one causing the misery of an object so worthy of compassion.

A practical example of a successful tragic technique on stage is Sarah Siddons's performance of Lady Macbeth, which had an "overpowering emotional impact."[5] There are numerous testimonies of the great popularity she achieved in this particular role. From letters to paintings, they all attest to Siddons' success, since the first debut at Drury Lane Theatre on 2 February 1785. Allegedly, the actress could add particular emotional nuances to the character that, in the whole, made her resemble a supranatural and aural creature, half ghost and half angel. The uncanny combination of aural acting with a murderous character was converted into a new theatrical category, the "tragic sublime."[6]

In terms of literary debate, Charles Batteux in *Principes de la Littérature* [*Principles of Literature*] argued that the connection between tragedy, and catharsis in particular, and a set of sad emotions, such as fear and pity, would strongly engage the audience, and thus enlarge its sensibility.[7] For him the aim of tragedy depended on the audience's emotional response to a timeless representation of human condition. Similarly, Miguel Tibério Pedegache Brandão e Ivo, in *Dissertação sobre a Tragédia* [*Dissertation*

on Tragedy], proposes that tragedy should conform to the principles of the great Ancient Greek poets, Aeschylus, Euripides and Sophocles, and arise extreme passion and affection among the audience. [8] Only by so doing could tragedy have a role in the upheaval of the nation's taste. According to him, tragedy was expected to play a role in the shaping of national identity.

All these examples foreground tragedy's emotional value and impact. It is because the tragic provokes such an emotional experience that one can both circumscribe it and adhere to it. In other words, an overwhelming emotional content is what defines tragedy itself.

Concepts, Metaphors and Emotions

Metaphors are not merely a matter of language but of thought. [9] In this light, they are to be seen primarily as a mental process by which we are able to match, combine and map information across conceptual domains. The literary metaphor is thus an extension of everyday metaphor. Although, not all language is metaphorical, much of it is. Among a wide range of metaphorical uses, Lakoff distinguishes "image metaphors" as a particular category.[10] This type of metaphor is fitted for the purpose of mapping one mental image onto another. The mapping involved in this case is based on physical qualities and relationships, like colour, texture, proportion, position, etc.

Semino and Steen analyze metaphors in literary contexts situating them within creative uses of language. [11] In question are the functions that these creative metaphors, which the authors do not limit to literary texts, can assume: they can be used for re-conceptualisation, humour, increasing intimacy, etc. The authors link the study of metaphor in literature to research in psychology and other social sciences, broadening the field of metaphor studies.

Historically metaphors added to an expanding bourgeois theatre that relied on sentimentality as a path to moral instruction: "playwrights made use of metaphor's powerfully performative nature in the burgeoning public theater".[12] In addition, metaphor's particular connection with tragedy results from their power to name what has not been named yet: "metaphor has long been recognized as the trope that allows us to name things newly conceived or discovered."[13] Since tragedy depends on some great disclosure, one that usually puts the hero identity on the line, metaphors can be viewed as a natural reaction to the shocking events. Metaphors are thus part of the emotional pathos.

Emotion metaphors "denote various *aspects* of emotion concepts, such as intensity, cause, control, and so forth."[14] The majority of emotion metaphors seem to derive from the underlying main metaphor "Emotion is force," a basic schema. Nevertheless, they come to instantiate it in contrasting modes, enlightening different aspects of emotional experience. Metaphor links to social, psychological, biological, moral domain, etc. Accordingly, metaphors are taken as internal motivation for action.[15] A high level of emotional intensity implies great motivation for undertaking an emotional response. It can then be assumed that emotions are conceptualized through an extensive array of metaphors.

Metaphors of Loss in *Agnes de Castro* (1696)

In a time, when John Dryden justifies the superiority of English plays over the French with "a more masculine Fancy,"[16] Catharine Trotter, "a young lady,"[17] conveniently writes a tragedy, opposing sexes and nations, bringing forth a confrontation between men and women, and between Portugal and Spain.

This confrontation is not based in terms like reason (men) and feeling (women), as it claims to be more subtle than that. It entails "political virtue as women's moral purpose,"[18] temperance, tenderness on the one extreme of female side, represented by the characters of the Princess and Agnes, the only Spanish characters in the play, and passion, power and violence on the other extreme of the masculine side, with Alvaro and the King of Portugal as referents.

In the beginning of the play, although Constantia, the Princess, is acquainted with the feelings of her husband, the Prince of Portugal, towards Agnes de Castro, her maid of honor, she does not blame either, for she believes that "cruel Fate"[19] is the only one to be held responsible. Furthermore, when faced with Agnes' intention of leaving Coimbra, she begs her not to leave, since she finds comfort in her dear presence and good company. In fact, she convincingly states: "(…) My Griefs have lost already half their force, / They vanish at thy sight, like Mists, before the Sun."[20] The sun as metaphor signals the power of making the mists of doubt and disturbance disappear. In this case, loss is also involved, but no doubt with a positive outcome. The Princess is at odds with the environment, the Portuguese court, which places her among a most unwanted love triangle.

In act II, the King of Portugal addresses Agnes ordering her to marry Don Alvaro, Elvira's sibling, and his favorite. In response, Agnes challenges him by

denying herself such pursuit: "No, Sir, I value Liberty far more, / Than to forsake it, though for Golden Chains, / A shining Prison, is a Prison still;"[21] and further on: "I feel no melting, no soft Passion there; / None but for charming Liberty, and Glory, / Then Sir, wou'd you controul the Will of Heav'n, / Who made me not for Love?"[22].

Agnes chooses a metaphor, "a shining prison," to address the hypothesis of marrying Don Alvaro. It is clear in what way this particular metaphor refers to the feeling of loss, since what is at stake is straightforward: by marrying Don Alvaro, Agnes would lose what she most cherishes, her freedom.

The King resents it strongly for he feels his power has been defied. So, in the next scene, he suggests that Don Alvaro should take her by force and rape her. Don Alvaro welcomes the suggestion and rejoices in the opportunity of exhilarating his hate for Agnes. In fact, what seems to characterize Don Alvaro's feelings towards Agnes is an unrestrained violence: "I love, and hate her, both with Violence,"[23] and "That Thought has rais'd a Tempest in my Soul, / Not to be calm'd whilst hated *Agnes* lives."[24] For the tempest of his soul to vanish, Agnes is condemned to lose her life. Nature is again the conceptual ground for metaphoric meaning, depicting once more a violent and unsettling environment.

Elvira, a Portuguese court woman, has a plan of her own to set the Princess against Agnes. Bianca, her ally, is to deliver the Princess a paper allegedly written by the Prince, Don Pedro, to Agnes conveying the idea that they are already enjoying the fortunes of a shared loved. In the heat of her passion for great revenge, Elvira stabs the Princess, instead of Agnes, by mistake. The Princess dies, and Elvira goes mad.

Yet misery does not end here, for in the last scene of the play, Don Alvaro, who feels capable of anything to fulfill his pursuit of revenge, tries to kill the Prince, his sword passing Agnes instead. Don Alvaro ends up dying too.

Agnes de Castro is more a tragedy about treachery, ambition, amidst a political scenario, and the double nature of men and women, and not so much about love, in the same sense that John Dryden claimed that "Tragick Poets dealt not with that soft Passion, but with Lust, Cruelty, Revenge, Ambition, and those bloody Actions they produc'd."[25] Love is just what the Princess, Agnes and the Prince, as an accomplice of the privileged intimacy between the two women, stand for.

Elvira and Bianca, on the one side, the Portuguese, and the Princess and Agnes, on the other, the Spanish, represent different sides of the same coin, the feminine.[26] The first put in evidence how women can be misleading and perverse, consistently enacting the idea that "'Tis the peculiar cunning of our Sex, / To make Good Ill, and Ill for Good appear; / And things which seem directly contrary, / We turn, and use to compass our designs."[27] In strong contrast, the latter concur to the construction of a different feminine identity: "Dull, senseless piece of Earth! And then she smil'd, / As pleas'd her Friend took pity of her love, / Or Wept for Grief that she disturb'd their Joys, / Say, How did it affect her?"[28] Elvira calls the Princess "Dull, senseless piece of Earth" foregrounding the major contrast that exists between a woman like herself and the Princess. This metaphor points out how nature, in some cases, seems to have lost its animated force. With this metaphor, Elvira is clearly assuming that her nature has nothing in common with the Princess.

The metaphoric speech of Elvira brings into play the subject of "naturalization," which consists of "ways of fortifying various social, cultural, political, or economic conventions by presenting them as part of the natural order."[29] Going back to Aristotle's *Historia animalium*,[30] gender identities, male and female, have been viewed across centuries as grounded on natural differences that are taken to justify different ways of being and behaving.

Throughout the play, Constantia, the Princess, and Agnes' behavior shows that women can be loyal and prone to rational judgment instead of precipitating themselves into emotional behavior. These two women are isolated, they only have each other, and that circumstance concurs to strengthen and deepen their relationship. Therefore, if there is an homoerotic dimension to consider,[31] it must be acknowledged within a political frame: "In doing so, Trotter 'others' their relationship, creating a gynocentric space that exists within, yet apart from a society and relationships mired in materiality, corruption, and violence."[32]

In the whole, what the play attempts to do is to denaturalize gender in order to reinforce political naturalization. In other words, the gender naturalization speeches by Portuguese characters do not resist the comparison with what the Princess and Agnes morally represent. Nevertheless, their invalidation makes way for political naturalization regarding Portuguese and Spanish. As a result, Portuguese are viewed as naturally prone to judge badly, to be passionate, irrational, violent and unfair, while Spanish are virtuous, loyal, coherent, rational

and resilient. Gender denaturalization becomes a mere strategy to assert political naturalization.

The play takes notice on the rivalry between Portugal and Spain[33] that dates back to the definition of the Portuguese borders in the twelfth century, accompanies the imperial expansion from the fifteenth to the sixteenth century,[34] and reaches a critical point with the dual monarchy between 1580 and 1640. During that period, Portugal and Spain had a common king, which was unmistakably a Spanish one. As a reaction to this regime, there was an organized movement for the upheaval of the Portuguese identity.[35]

Already in the first scene of the play, Elvira argues that the Princess wearing a Portuguese crown should forget altogether her Spanish origins:

ELVIRA: Was it not an Affront to all the Court,
To bring her here as in defiance to us;
As if she thought none of us worth her Love,
Not one in *Portugal* for her Converse.
BIANCA: Their being bred from Infancy together,
Might make it difficult to separate;
And then their near Relation.
ELVIRA: A Princess must have none;
She came to wear the Crown of *Portugal*,
And then, shou'd have renounc'd all other Claims:
She 'as now, new Friends, new Country, new Relations,
And shou'd forget the Old; not be a *Spaniard* here.[36]

Almost at the end of the play, at act V, in the only scene where Agnes and the Prince meet alone (even then they are not really alone as Don Alvaro is sneaking on them), the Prince speaks of his reign in plain terms:

PRINCE: Where e're you take your flight, it will proclaim
The strange Barbarity of Portugal;
We shall become a Proverb to our Neighbours,
T'express the most unhospitable Usage;
But't is no matter, this ungrateful Court
Is most unworthy your Consideration.[37]

Even the Prince of Portugal acknowledges the barbarity of his reign. Portugal is depicted as barbarous, unhospitable, ungrateful and unworthy, and that well subsumes the main ideas and feelings to retain about the *nature* of this part of the world. Therefore, this tragedy does not fit in with the Portuguese dramatic trend on Agnes de Castro, from António Ferreira to Domingos dos Reis Quita,[38] which is inspired by the Portuguese interests and tradition.

Tragedy, from Ancient Greek theatre until nowadays, is thought to act upon the community, whether Portuguese, Spanish, etc., asking for a collective awareness.[39] In terms of emotional communities, we are recalled that "a history of the emotions is not only possible, but essential to understanding the human condition."[40] In fact, the concept of emotional community defined as "social groups whose members adhere to the same valuations of emotions and their expression"[41] seems to be implicit in the reception of tragedy.

The tragic comes into being through the activation of a sense of community, which seems always problematic insofar as it draws on the confrontation between the individual and the weight of the environment. Each member of the audience is asked to take awareness of his/her positioning, whether regarding gender, politics, human relationships, etc., in relation to his/her own community. The conflict/loss on stage is mirrored by the audience that also strives between the individual and the communal dimension.

Metaphors make emotions all the more recognizable in order to facilitate the audience's adherence to them. In other words, tragic emotions, depicted by a set of metaphors, some of them grounded on the semantic field of "nature," and relating specifically to the feeling of loss, compel the audience to share their social and cultural impact, i.e. the pathos, and to show adherence to a community where those emotions participate in a particular worldview.

Conclusion

I have linked the tragic dimension of *Agnes de Castro*, by Catharine Trotter, to the use of an array of metaphors that have an emotional content, which makes all the more explicit the political antagonism that fuels the plot. The denaturalization of gender stresses the irreconcilable nature of Portugal and Spain. The Princess and Agnes are the only Spanish in a hostile Portuguese court that comes to be described as "ungrateful." The privileged relationship of the two Spanish women is framed by the historical political conflict between the two nations.

The tragic is defined by an ongoing tension between the desire for revenge on the part of the Portuguese characters, with the exception of the Prince, and the exemplar abilities embodied by the two Spanish women. In this context, the use of metaphors helps to define and clarify the emotional pathos of loss. This emotional construction that lays bare the incompatibility between the individual and the environment is what accounts for a communal reception of tragedy, one that can readily be conceptualized as a specific emotional community.

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Endnotes

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Where I Was, Where I Am Not
The Unseen Subject of Photography

Pierre Taminiaux

Abstract

In this paper, I analyze a set of pictures that I took in various European countries as well as in the United States. They all relate to personal experiences and travels. They constitute what I call a *Photo-biography*, that is an autobiographical narrative embodied in a visual form.

I reflect here upon the role of photography in contemporary global culture. In a world of ongoing instant images, photographs tend to lose their esthetic aura and their existential meaning when they belong to a symbolic order of mere quantity and repetition.

This autobiographical project never entails any self-representation, since I do not appear physically in these pictures. What is emphasized here instead is the representation of places that define my own identity.

Ultimately, I attempt to underline the importance of memory for contemporary photography : this memory is tied to both European history since World War II (from communism in Hungary to the war in Bosnia) and the history of modern European art (in particular surrealism). In other words, the visual construction of the subject always stresses the need for a link between past and present. Therefore, photography resists the passing of time and the power of a global cultural order that usually confines it to the domain of commodities. This paper also includes a poem of mine that illustrates its main critical argument.

Keywords

Photography, Global Culture, Autobiography, Memory, Poetry.

Pictures play a very important role in the development of global culture. They have become essential tools for visual communication as demonstrated by their constant presence on the Internet and in the social media. In most cases, their identity is primarily social: they enable people to exchange information about both their personal and their professional life. I will emphasize here instead the artistic and esthetic dimension of photography in today's world.

My set of pictures entitled: 'Where I was, where I am not' gathers numerous shots (one hundred eighty-eight in total) that were taken during various trips in the last two decades. Evidently, photography has a lot to do with the experience

of travelling. This experience is by nature ephemeral: therefore, we feel the need to capture it through lasting images. We fear in particular that the exciting moments that we spent in a beautiful place are going to disappear forever.

These feelings usually lead to the creation of a photo album. By contrast, my pictures are not included in such object. They are meant to tell a story, but this story is neither linear not entirely realistic. I am trying here to express a sense of chance, to the extent that there is no journey that can be entirely planned. This is what constitutes for me the main characteristics of travelling. In this particular experience, we do not always know what we are going to encounter and we cannot predict all the events that will occur along the way. Therefore, photography enables me to explore its randomly nature.

These pictures were taken over the years during various trips in Europe, the United States and Central America. They assert the imaginary nature of places where I have been and where I lived for a while. In this regard, they emphasize the preeminence of space over events, a 'where I was', therefore, more than a true 'it has been'. This presence of the space within photography also reflects my own absence. The 'where I was' implies a 'Where I am not', since, as a photographer, I am constantly behind the camera and not in front of it. Therefore, I never appear physically in these works, although I was definitely there at a certain time in the past.

One can talk of a *photo-biography,* which means an autobiographical project through photography beyond all kind of self-portrait, since there is never any representation of my own face in these pictures. Places, which are provided with specific names and dates, define here my own identity and my own existential reality regardless of the fact that I am not being seen. In other words, the constant presence of space leads to the visibility of the self in spite of his invisible nature. In this process, the self stresses his own fate and his own traces. In this sense, the image oscillates constantly between the "I was" and the "I am not", between the affirmative dimension of photography and its power of negation.

This visual itinerary embraces various cultures and countries. By doing so, it includes repeated references to both modern and contemporary history. From the tomb of Imre Nagy, the leader of the 1956 uprising in Budapest, to the cells used by Salazar's secret police in Lisbon, from the Wall of the Atlantic on the coast of Northern France to the fence of the Mexican-American border and

from the ruins of Mostar, a city badly damaged by the war in Bosnia, to the image of homeless people sleeping in a Miami parking lot, one can contemplate here the work of history in its disseminated and fragmented representation, from communism to fascism, and from post-communism to globalization.

But one can also witness the permanence of art, from Yves Klein's 'blue' in a coffee shop on a Greek island to Miro's mural work in Mallorca, and from Leonardo's machines in the Loire Valley to Calder's house and studio in the same region. Art always constitutes an essential element of the experience of travelling: we are destined to encounter it, even in the most unexpected way.

Finally, this project contains images of my hometown, Brussels, a city where I was born and where I grew up. In particular, there are images of the house where I spent my teenage years, a modernist architectural jewel designed in the Bauhaus style, as well as images of the various apartments where I lived as a student before leaving for the United States. Spaces are thus not just the mirror of a casual or ephemeral situation: they also refer to an ongoing presence in the past that photography attempts to unveil.

Photography was born in the middle of the nineteenth century, in an era dominated by the industrial revolution. The instant success of the daguerreotype was motivated by the fact that pictures could be made available to almost anyone at anytime. They did not require complex equipment and were not very expensive either. This clearly distinguished the medium from painting, which was reserved to a limited number of artists with a formal training and was not as easy to handle from a strictly material point of view. With photography, one discovered the true democracy of cultural expression and art, at a time when such reality was still elusive. This egalitarian identity shocked many, in particular Baudelaire, who thought that art could only be the privileged of a few chosen, as in the Greek tradition.

This can be translated as the ongoing debate between 'high art' and 'low art'. Photography never really belonged to the former, since, from the onset, it was meant to attract a wide audience. In this regard, the popularity of the daguerreotype transcended cultural boundaries. It spread way beyond the old continent and reached the United States in particular.

Nonetheless, it did not put an end to the supremacy or the sovereignty of high art: painting and other academic forms such as sculpture and drawing continued to be dominant even in the history of the early-twentieth century avant-garde. They retained their superior legitimacy for at least another century, in spite of the claim made by Duchamp that any everyday object could be a work of art.

In its own way, photography also stated that anything could be a work of art. But this did not mean that it asserted the end of representation in the process of artistic creation. Obviously, pictures could draw their inspiration from any subject matter taken from reality. But they were not content with a mere replica of such reality. Contrary to the most common beliefs on this issue, the photographer often strived to reinvent the visible world.

In other words, his so-called claim to objectivity was only a superficial one: in this regard, Walter Benjamin stressed in *A Small History of Photography* that the pioneers and the first masters of the medium such as Atget were deeply concerned with the aura of the image, which was essentially stemming from its magic or uncanny quality.

In the title of my work, the word: 'I' is particularly important. Photography always requires the expression of subjectivity, even if it is bound to seize what is already there. With the process of globalization, the expression of such subjectivity has become more and more problematic. The overwhelming power of technology has engendered in many ways a mechanical attitude towards images. They are integrated in a consumerist cultural model in which the singular individual is most often submitted to a law of infinite reproduction that even Benjamin could not have foreseen.

In my perspective, this issue of subjectivity is related to both the issue of history and that of poetry or literature. In my pictures, history is constantly present. It is first and foremost the history of Europe. One can find in this regard references to the ancient civilization of Pompeii that was destroyed by the eruption of the Vesuvius. Valéry rightly said that all civilizations are mortals. For me, history is best embodied in the representation of ruins. These ruins are essential traces of the past: they give therefore the sense of both the ephemeral and the eternal. History is never an objective process as in the Hegelian philosophical tradition: it is lived by particular men and women who experience it firsthand and it is also constantly revived and reconstructed through the power of art.

The very logic of globalization tends to ignore the presence of history within images. A certain dogma of instant communication emphasizes by contrast the sovereignty of the present. When history is present, thus, it is merely as a spectacle: one does not necessarily relate to the past in a personal way. The mainstream media celebrates in this regard the power of the 'here and now', with its 24/7 deluge of information and 'latest news': it imposes therefore a precipitated time of the image. By definition, though, history implies a sense of duration: it is a chain of time that cannot be broken.

It is precisely this historical nature of photography that Benjamin analyzed in *A Small History of Photography.* This does not mean that photography is tied to the representation of history. But it rather expresses the need for a different time than that of social reality, a sort of suspended time that makes the viewer aware of his own relationship with the past. This relationship is evidently questioned by the constant technological changes stemming from global culture.

Technology states in many ways that images are valid and meaningful as long as they fit the latest cultural trends: if this is no longer the case, they become rapidly obsolete. In other words, one image replaces another and will itself be replaced in the very near future. In such world, visual forms are only precarious entities. Photographs themselves become quite unstable objects that are very easy to erase.

In my argument about the role of history in photography, the history of art plays a decisive role. History does not just include the remembrance of past political events: it includes also and maybe more importantly the profound consciousness of a particular cultural legacy. Globalization has imposed by contrast the power of instant artistic expression and of the ever-growing speed of its dissemination. A genuine memory of art becomes therefore a real challenge.

The avant-garde artists of the first part of the twentieth century did not deny the relevance of such memory: they only stated that it could not be solely framed by the academic tradition. That is the reason why this set of pictures entails various references to modern art, from Miro to Calder. By definition, the artist is always someone who forcefully tries to stop the passage of time. He refuses to be overwhelmed by the frantic pace of the outside world. By essence, such pace contradicts the meaning of his work, which is both speculative and imaginative. In other words, the modern artist is not someone who breaks with the past, but rather someone who

wishes first to distance himself from a present that is often felt as unsatisfactory.

Moreover, the modern artist, even the most radical and original one, is always rooted in a particular culture. What would be the work of Miro, for instance, without the intellectual and artistic background of Catalonia? This sense of rooting is also crucial for my own perspective: it somehow fights the forces of both collective and individual displacement that are so much part of globalization. Therefore, photography searches for a unique location within an array of different spaces.

The memory of art cannot be the sole property of museums and established cultural institutions like the Guggenheim Foundation in Venice, for instance, which appears in my pictures. It has to be preserved by art itself, and in particular by contemporary photography. This memory is not set once and for all: it is constantly modified through the experience of new places. One can talk therefore of the 'perpetual motion of memory', a specific motion that my pictures attempt to capture.

In 'Where I was, where I am not', I am also interested in bringing together photography and poetry. By doing so, I want to oppose a preconceived attitude towards the medium which, most often, identifies it with realist esthetics. This preconception is definitely enhanced by global culture. In this regard, I introduce this set of pictures with a modernist poem that is deliberately experimental and non-linear. In this poem, the confusion between seeing and being is worth noticing. ('was'/'saw'). But the text also stresses the existence of an invisible subject within photography:

WHERE I WAS WHERE WAS I THE IMAGE IS BOTH SPACE AND TIME WHEN I WAS WHEN WAS I THERE I WAS THEN I WAS THE NAMING OF PLACES THE SPACING OF NAMES TIME IS OF THE IMAGE WHERE I SAW THE IMAGE SAYS: I SAW THIS IS WHAT I SAW WHEN I SAW WHERE I SAW SAW WAS WAS SAW SPACE IS OF THE IMAGE IMAGES BOUND BY IMAGES BEYOND ANY CHAIN WHAT COULD I SEE IF NOT THE IMAGE TO COME AFTER BEING AND SEEING OUT THERE IN HERE WITH OPEN EYES THE IMAGE OPENS WHAT I SEE THE IMAGE OPENS THE I IN ME NO END IN SIGHT I AM NOWHERE

TO BE SEEN BESIDE MY SHADOW I AM THE INVISIBLE OF THE IMAGE SOMEONE SEEING WHAT I SAW WHERE I AM NOT AFTER SPACE AND TIME THE WHERE IS THERE THE I IS NOT I WAS SOMEONE SOMEWHERE SOMETIME SOME EYE SOME IMAGE TELLING I WAS HERE SOME IMAGE TELLING I WAS

In this sense, my work is not strictly autobiographical, to the extent that any true autobiographical endeavor implies a self-representation within a narrative or a visual form. In this case, such representation does not take place. In other words, the subject remains blurry, although it definitely leaves its mark on the particular meaning of the pictures. Ultimately, what matters most is the conceptualization of a memory that does not belong to a single person but to an imaginary community instead.

Therefore, photography escapes here the danger of narcissism or self-absorption. The identification of space prevails over the identification of the subject. Such process is threatened by globalization, to the extent that in a global world, all spaces tend to be confused and deprived of differences. Nowadays, traveling often means in this regard going to an airport and taking a plane before landing somewhere and going to a hotel. These airports, planes and hotels that characterize much of our experience as travellers are too often standardized: they end up looking all alike, in spite of the sometime immense distance that separates them. In this context, the naming of spaces becomes an urgent task that has yet to be accomplished.

In a world where absolutely everything can become visible at any moment, regardless of its actual content, art suggests therefore the possibility of an unseen reality. In other words, it contradicts a cultural model of transparency that is now paramount. The unseen subject of photography needs to be imagined and not just presented or reproduced. It contains the image of a secret or of an ambiguous truth that resists any unilateral definition of his existence.

The metaphor of the ruins is again particularly relevant: for ruins are by definition the visible remains of an architectural structure or a monument. They definitely express a sense of loss and destruction. But they also reveal their absence for the gaze as complete entities. In other words, through ruins, something remains unseen, that is the original aspect and material identity of these buildings.

Finally, the representation of my own origin (or at least a definite attempt towards it) fosters this set of pictures. In this regard, I went back to the city of Brussels several times to take pictures of the house in which I lived during my adolescence, but also of various apartment buildings in which I lived as a University student. I was happy to find out that these buildings still existed. What struck me the most was that all these pictures provided me with a sense of emptiness. Some will call this a form of nostalgia, for nostalgia always implies the negative feeling of a missing reality. In this case, though, there were no ruins. The past had somehow remained intact: it is precisely what troubled me, as if nothing had changed since my youth.

The sentence 'Where I was, where I am not' unveiled here its most profound significance. It did not just refer to the fact that I was not present on these various images: it also meant that I had lost some ties to my past along the way. To put it differently, the 'Where I was, where I am not' should have been written: 'Where I was, where I am not anymore'.

In this perspective, photography reveals the need for a close relationship between the subject and the spaces that define him. These spaces should never be taken for granted, since they can vanish from our personal and concrete horizon through time. In other words, these pictures also evoke a form of existential wandering that is most common in this day and age. The myth of interconnection and perpetual communication cannot hide this reality. It fails to recognize the fact that sometimes, we are not where we should be and even more, that where we should be no longer exists. The keyword of my title becomes therefore the verb: 'to be', whether it is conjugated in the past or in the present tense. To be is also to inhabit a particular place and to dwell in it. Such inscription

within a particular location is not always possible, due to various social and practical constraints. But it can nonetheless be reached through the eternal magic of art and poetry.

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SECTION IV

Art, Theatre, Literature, Music, Culture

LANDSCAPE & CITY REPRESENTATION IN POST-EXPANSION EUROPE

Chairs

—

Adriana Veríssimo Serrão, Maribel Mendes Sobreira & Moirika Reker

Participants

—

Adriana Veríssimo Serrão
Maribel Mendes Sobreira
Luca Vargiu
João Marques-da-Cruz & Eduardo Costa Pinto
Moirika Reker

Presentation

Adriana Veríssimo Serrão, Maribel Mendes Sobreira & Moirika Reker.

All history is made from the integration and intersections of diverse cultures. (Pre-colonial) Europe itself is the result of assimilations and confrontations of diverse traditions (Iberians, Celts, Phoenicians, Greeks, Romans, Goths, Visigoths, Vikings, Saxons, Vandals, Swabians, Arabs...). Not only did the Renaissance incorporated the ancient culture as the Roman Empire built its own representation of the world based on Greek culture (itself already the result of other influences).

Likewise, colonial towns were built as European replicas: Ouro Preto, Bahia (Brazil), Willemstad (Netherlands Antilles), among many others... But in the opposite movement, could it be that the contact with indigenous cultures has, in the opposite direction, influenced the thought on urban structure?

European explorers encountered new landscapes foreign to their concept of Nature, being confronted with elements dissonant to what they acknowledged as "landscape". In which ways have their descriptions been received in Europe, and integrated into the very concept and representation of European landscapes?

The transformations that took place within Europe upon contact with new cultures, as is example the use of tropical trees in public space, or the creation of botanical gardens that replicated newly-found flora (at the sight of the Old Continent) have expanded into, or contributed to, a new way of conceiving the relationship with our surroundings?

Landscape and City representation in post-expansion Europe has as a starting-point the changing concepts of landscape and city. The concept of Landscape will be analysed from its onset in modern Europe to its present condition, setting out possible mediations of this synthetic category that is proposed as a concept for the future. Attention will be drawn to the aesthetic-ethic transition regarding landscape appreciation and safeguarding. For its part, the evolution or modification of the idea of city will have as base Plato's view. We intend to present how Plato influenced the way architecture was thought and is thought nowadays, as a concept and practice. For this, we will start by clarifying some concepts of Plato and how it relates to the architectural thought of Marcus

Vitruvius, Andrea Palladio among others, thereby influencing the thinking of European Architecture in the structure of thought. We will try in a short way, to make explicit what from our point of view is close to an architectonical thought, comparing it to Vitruvius, where we could find some similarities of structure of the tought

Also addressed will be the relationship between identity and landscape, focusing particularly on the constitutive elements that connect people with *their* landscapes. The discussion of the changing landscape cannot ignore the role played by the various professionals who have had a hand in its transformation, from the explorers of the discoveries, to the natural scientists and botanical gardeners of the 18th and 19th century, to present day landscape architects and urban planners. A case-study will demonstrate how trans-Atlantic imaginaries have ignored local character and traditions.

Finally, an attempt will be made to understand how trees in the public space can enhance social integration, be a source of food and intensify the aesthetic experience of the city.

A New Awareness of Landscape
Converting Landscape into Unitary Vision of the World

Adriana Veríssimo Serrão

Abstract

If the concept of landscape arose in modern Europe as a separating act in relation to the idea of nature, its present revaluation has been fulfilling an inverse function: to allow connections in a reality severely segmented by cleavages that seem in many cases impossible to overcome. Threatened as the idea of nature is while originating principle and omni-encompassing reality, landscape may come to occupy a unifying condition, either by ensuring articulations between Nature, Culture and History, or in view of the specificities of the human place and its being in the world, values that the scientific objectivity of Environment is unable to integrate. The paper sets out possible mediations of this synthetic category valid for the future, with particular attention to the ontological transition between totality and singularity; and to the aesthetic-ethic transition, being that neither sentimental fruition nor ecological awareness are capable of appreciating and safeguarding the plural diversity of landscapes.

Keywords

Landscape, Nature, Aesthetics, Ethics, Natural Beauty.

The reappraisal of the concept of landscape has reached in the last decades such amplitude that is far from being the repetition of old conceptions. The present awareness of landscape critically revisits the past, but proclaims above all the urgency of a turn in the direction that from the present leads and prepares the future. It is worth asking why this reappraisal and this prospective direction. Being that the essence of landscape was always the double, reverse and symptom, of the course of civilization, namely of the intense transformation of the city and the complexity of the ways of the human living, the present raising of the problem could only be also determined - in a moment in history that sometimes seems with no return, sometimes presents itself as a possibility of change - by the pressing sense of crisis, that could be synthesized in three nuclei:

a) Destruction of the traditional city and balance between city and countryside. Inhospitable cities, with the emptying of their historic centers and the expansion of suburbia without an identity, have generated as correlate degrad-

ed landscapes and a countryside equally dominated by the industrial growth model, composing the crude reality and giving the impression of widespread desolation. Breaking with the centenary complementarity of the city and surrounding areas, differentiated but inter-communicable, from the agrarian fields to forest or wasteland, to the rivers that cross it and the mountains on its fringe, the proliferation of uncharacteristic, uniform, destroyed or abandoned sites has inevitably installed barriers and space partitioning. The more the city is subject to artificialness and the built areas spread, the more landscapes are pushed to distant ends as protected or still untouched remains, but no longer real spaces of common life. Much has been the aesthetic disfigurement of the world attributed to the effects of industrialization, uncontrolled urbanization and uniformity of International Style architecture, not adverting sufficiently the hegemony of automobile transportation expressively for which continuous routes are created and multiplied that, conversely, subject the natural to constant interruption. Some connecting means between the human and the natural are jeopardized, like the experience of walking, but also means of interpersonal proximity, structuring of communicability and conviviality in public space.

b) The "crisis of nature" as ground and the doubt on the naturalness of the natural. The synthetic designation of "crisis of nature" usually points towards the depletion of a "source of resources", an unfortunate designation suggesting all too easily the analogy with warehouse economics and the right to make use of available goods. Ignored is the radicality of Nature as first origin of life, self-generative force, self-regenerating and autotelic, in a word, basis and foundation of existence. Unfortunately, identical mercantile vision also contaminates the pseudo-valorization of landscapes, explored by tourism agents and urbanism policies as "beautiful views" and "beautiful places", downgrading natural beauty to yet another commodity subject to market quotation. The fundament's agony would still be aggravated by the doubt casted upon the naturalness of the natural. The present difficulty lays no longer in distinguishing natural areas and artificial areas - a clear distinction before massive industrialization -, but even more in the near impossibility to determine with precision what may (still) be *natural* in the (yet) *nature.* This uncertainty - striking in itself of a rupture in the history of civilization - inevitably falls upon landscape, inverting the traditional question of the origin: not the one of understanding how this one emerged from Nature, but if, to what extent and for how long will the natural persist in landscape, and be able to vivify it with its substratum.

This has not been the single epoch in History upon which fell the fear of the end of times. It is certain, though, that our epoch lives under the dim but incisive foretelling atmosphere that such an end will be in large measure due to human action.

c) The advent of the environmentalist awareness. The advent of the environmentalist awareness as the answer to the naturalness' crisis has contributed to an ethical perspective of safeguarding eco-bio-physical media, with particular focus on pollution levels, climate change, extinction of species, orienting a pedagogy critical of behaviors and a surveillance of public and private action. But by placing future sustainability on a global scale, planetary, precisely due to its comprehensiveness it can neither advert nor contain the concrete dimensions of individuality, history and culture, that singularly identify each landscape while unique local configuration.

The option, present in many current guidelines, of subsuming the concept of Landscape in the Environment has given rise to a series of misunderstandings, with implications in the edification of an aesthetics and an ethics "in natural context". This option avoids, above all, facing in-depth the very idea of Nature, reducing it to a series of physical-biological and/or ecological dimensions, or to the set of non-human entities, falling, paradoxically, in the strict separation between human and non-human, between "us" and "the others", exactly what intends to overcome. It is obvious that mediation is lacking, a transitional element between the comprehensive or transversal categories of Nature and Environment, and that will be the function to be played by Landscape. Once freed from the traditional association to view, scenery and panorama, the understanding of landscapes as integrated unities and surrounding spaces, will enable the reconciliation of the natural fundament with constitutive human dimension, as history and culture, and will more easily respond to present and future burning issues, from city design to the invention of alternative lifestyle practices.

The connection between divided terms may only be fulfilled by a homogeneous reality that could enable the synthesis of the heterogeneous. Such capacity partly explains the category's current valuation: the acknowledgement of its capacity, not only intermediate - by being situated between sealed zones -, but effectively mediating, allowing through its

permeability to resume links and stimulate harmonies. It is fair to recall the philosopher Rosario Assunto that in a pioneering meditation understood landscape as an *a priori* synthesis:

> "landscape" is the "form" in which the synthetic *a priori* unity is expressed (in the Kantian sense: not the "unification" of separately received data, but the necessary "unity" that conditions its presenting in conscience) of "matter (territory)" and of "content-or-function (environment)".[1]

The difficulty in determining a fixed concept derives precisely from this composite and mixed character, loath to whatever canonical definition, to which we should renounce, even if useful in the operative scope of each of the sciences that study it and of the legislation that protects it. Existences closer to the idea - to a regulating idea with heuristic function - than to empirical concepts, by multiplicity and visible variety but also by its invisibility, landscapes are *without concept*: bereft of real and conceptual rigid boundaries, each landscape is in its own way a peculiar mediation between singularity (real) and universality (thinkable). Therefore require the explanation of characteristic features and inherent proprieties, following a mediation-thought between singular and universal that Kant in his *Critique of Judgement* named of *reflective* thought: the invention of the universal from the careful consideration of the particular. A discovery and clarification procedure departing from the thing itself, guiding the multiple possible pathways of approach that derive from it and in it converge again. Landscape viewed in this light, in the transition between reality (sensitive) and idea (intelligible), avoids syncretism of the coexistence of compartmented perspectives and developing in lines without contact. On the contrary, departing from a possible concept, regulating and not invented, paves the way to exit the alternative between un-realizing fiction and strict scientism descriptive of the existent. The possibilities contained in this recognition process are multiple - philosophy can provide a significant contribution to it. It requires to overcome the reduction of landscape to representation and image, and to accept it as reality and region of the Being.

Cohesive natural spaces, landscapes are unique examples of a complex ontology that in them, and in no other mode of being - from isolated natural beings to human artifact -, is revealed: the solidarity of the elements joined on the horizontal axis of a space that besides *surface* is also *depth* and *height*. Delimited by the horizon and in the open, in them the spatial stability is traversed

by temporal changeability. The vertical axis of temporality brings, in its turn, the co-present diversity of natural times and human temporality. We cannot overemphasize that without temporality there is no landscape, only physical extension, land area or "green spaces".

As in History, there is temporality in nature, a temporality inclusive of its three "realms", each, in their turn, of their own age. In no other case than in the ontic region landscape, do the ages of the world coexist and unfold simultaneously with the presence of the human. Rosario Assunto insisted in this entwining of nature's time with the duration of the individual, only possible when the relation with nature is not of the distanced perception that captures it in lines and forms in a plane, but the lived experience, the "experience of us living in it":

> "I do not propose an artificial abstraction - anyone can verify the concrete character of this definition, provided that he reflects as no territory reveals itself as such, nor any environment; for "territory" and "environment" are conditions to which we can only access through an effort of abstraction of the concrete character of the landscape we live in and experience and know as territory and environment in its indissoluble unity. [...] The concrete environment, the environment we live and from which we live living in it is always the environment as the form of a territory: landscape."[2]

Only in the immersion in unities of nature awakens the vital feeling that preexists to elaborated aesthetic feeling or reflexive hermeneutics, mediating the awareness of finitude: to be in something that, unlike art (our work), requires decentering. Decisive in this existential level, a stepping out of ourselves and inclusion in the sphere of broader space-times is, still according to Assunto, the contact with the animal - both in the rhythm of the promised absolute freedom, as in the confrontation with dangers arising from a menacing, rival presence, subject as ours, to death. It is in special through the animal in the landscape that, besides perenniality of the mineral and vegetable cyclicity, eternity becomes existential as perishable finite time.

Through depth and height, ontology opens up to metaphysics; duplicity united of duration and eternity, of materiality and spirituality, of visible and invisible, to the presence, even if only lightly perceived, of the fundament's absolute alterity: there, nature unfolds sometimes as permanence and stability, sometimes as unceasing generator of life, as *physis*.

The interrelationship between the natural and the human has often been underlined, primarily by the culturalist orientations of the twentieth century, putting emphasis on the human shaping of the territory as if they were two equivalent terms. It would be man, with his work, the main craftsman, or even the very author of landscapes, so many other works or artifacts of his. We must now at last think in opposite direction as if it were landscape, with its own idiosyncrasies and innate qualities, to request, both in aesthetic fruition and in the sphere of the action, the most adequate attitude. In view of the primacy of the ontological - and with it, the transition of a visual status to a subsistent reality - aesthetics does not lose its function as the expression of the genuine admiring attitude, but has to reinterpret the framework of values that sustained both classic calology and the proclamation of the rights of personal taste. Beauty, Light-Idea, that in Plato irradiated from the perfect and orderly *cosmos,* confronts today the proliferation of negative focus (from ugliness to destruction); hence, when resumed without further ado by some currents of thought within environmental aesthetics, the beautiful appears devoid of density, as an abstract principle position, and has its correspondence uniquely in a pristine nature unaffected by human action, whose recognition must be based in scientific knowledge, thereby causing the dilution of the aesthetic in the cognoscitive. Also in ethical terms the Environment's global notion is imprecise, precisely by the impossibility to contain both diversity and singularity of concrete manifestation.

Once dimmed the substantiation in universal human reason and in the consonance between man's freedom and the freedom of nature, the second orientation, trusting in empirical taste - so fallible at a personal level and subject to constant historical and cultural oscillation -, easily breaks down landscapes into beautiful and not beautiful, projecting in them an unjustified anthropomorphic hierarchy, or even the temptation of embellishment and constant artialization. Alongside massive destruction, we watch the just as worrying temptation of obsessive embellishment, with the threat of extinction of the wild and, with it, the loss of the sense of the sublime.

Founded less in seeing than on being at, less in feeling than on the sensation, the experience of the landscape is relational, "almost intersubjective"[3]: it is the sensation that bonds being with being. The ontology of sensibility pioneered by Ludwig Feuerbach back in the nineteenth century shows that it is in the sensuous - original link of man and world - that may lie a thought of the relationship,

genesis of feelings of love and admiration, of ethical attitudes as gratitude and reverence or a pedagogy of care and respect:

> "Human sensations do not have [...] an empiric, anthropologic meaning [...]. They have ontological meaning, *metaphysic*: in sensations, yes, in everyday sensations, harbor the most profound and elevated truths." [4]

To accept the immediacy of the sensuous is the same as understanding that being exceeds thinking and that the access to being implies the passivity of a subject situated in the world through his body. Resumed in our times by thinkers as Rosario Assunto and Arnold Berleant, the multi-aesthesic experience has as condition man's immersion in his life contexts. This is one of the reasons for which "landscape"- mediator between the isolated beings and the totality inapprehensible by the senses - is preferred to a "nature". We must understand, even more so, that in this reversibility - in the double influence of the natural in the human and of the human, also natural, in the natural - the positions are asymmetrical. Relational and inclusive, conserves change, beneficial or damaging, laid by human action. It may still serve us here as guide Feuerbach's clarification of the concept of nature. In an intensely transformed world, one must distinguish between humanized nature and non-human nature, being that the latter must impose itself as the independent being from which man is effectively - and should of that be aware - dependent of:

> "because it is in nature that we live, work and exist; it is she that encompasses man; if withdrawn from her, it is also his very existence that is suppressed; it is solely thanks to her that man subsists, it is solely from her that he depends upon in all his activity, in all his steps."[5]

Incognoscible from the theoretical point of view, thing in itself that transcends any human measure, the non-humane nature imposes itself in the practical order as limitative criteria for action:

> "even though nature does not see, she is not, however, *blind*, even though not living (in the subjective, sensitive sense of human life in general) she is not, however, *dead*, and even though not formed according to intentions, her formations are not *casual;* for where man defines nature as dead and blind, her formations as casual, there he converts his own being (that is, *subjective)* in *measure* of nature, determines her solely *according to*

the opposition to himself, refers to her as a disabled being, because she *does not* have what he has."[6]

A landscape ethics while ethics for the future will be non-anthropocentric, because not everything should be human work, transformed in work of art, museum piece or leisure space. Assuming that the intangibility of landscape situates it, ultimately, in the sphere of the incomprehensible, we might safeguard both landscape's rights and our right to landscape.

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Endnotes

1. Rosario Assunto, "Paesaggio, Ambiente, Territorio. Un tentativo di precisazione concettuale*", Bollettino del Centro Internazionale di Studi di Architettura Andrea Palladio*, Vicenza, XVIII (1976): 47-48 (my translation).
2. Assunto, "Paesaggio, Ambiente, Territorio", 48. Landspace's temporality is central theme in several chapters of his major work, *Il paesaggio e l'estetica* (1973; 2005), particularly "Le immagini del tempo" and "Il tempo della natura e la sua immagine".
3. The expression is due to Paolo D'Angelo, *Estetica della natura. Bellezza naturale, paesaggio, arte ambientale (*Roma-Bari: Laterza, 2001), XII-XIII.
4. Ludwig Feuerbach, *Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft*, § 34 (my translation).
5. L. Feuerbach, *Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft,* § 34 (my translation)
6. L. Feuerbach, *Vorlesungen über das Wesen der Religion*, *Gesammelte Werke* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag), vol. 6, 91, Lecture 10 (my translation).

Plato and the Idea of Europe through Architecture

Maribel Mendes Sobreira

Abstract

Proceeding from the idea that for Plato, Architecture is one of the essential disciplines of human life to which classifies (*Philebus* 55d) as a pure science, where through mathematical and other criteria such as weighing, measuring, counting, confer the possibility to materialize buildings that did not exist before.

Etymologically speaking, the word Architecture comes from the Greek arkhétékthon and it combines two separate words. There is first the arkhé which means something like "beginning" or "that which was there before". It points to a place of departure, a foundation, by which Plato, on his *Laws*, book VI (775e), associates with some kind of divinity that bound in man transforms him in a creative potency of all cognitive activity (Phedo, 79d); Then there is tékhton which means "construction", "to build", "worker". So by this we can assume that Architecture would be the operation that materializes the *arkhé*, giving it shape. Architecture would be, and is, an activity of creation that transforms potency in act.

We see for example in the Menon dialogue where Socrates asks the slave to (re)discover the geometric figures for himself, decomposing mathematically sensible reality, thus accessing the intelligible, where those figures remind to the soul the visualization of the pure idea. Which means, the *tékhton* – of Architecture - should materialize the intelligible through a geometrical language by meeting the Beauty/Universal Good, through its stability and solidity and beauty, as Vitruvius explains in *De Architectura* as *utilitas* (utility), *venustas* (beauty) and *firmitas* (solidity).

We intend to present how Plato influenced the way architecture was thought and is thought nowadays, as a concept and practice. For this, we will start by clarifying some concepts of Plato and how it relates to the architectural thought of Marcus Vitruvius, Andrea Palladio among others, thereby influencing the thinking of European Architecture in the structure of thought.

We will try in a short way, to make explicit what from our point of view is close to an architectonical thought, comparing it to Vitruvius, where we could find some similarities of structure of the thought.

Keywords

Aesthetics, Plato, Architecture, Vitruvius.

Introduction

Plato in *Charmides* 165d: "And if you were to ask me, what is the result or effect of architecture, which is the science of building, I should say houses." in this sentence we start to determine that Architecture is able to materialize the places and buildings that we inhabit. And who conceives the abil-

ity of passing from non-being to being will be the architect for having the two types of knowledge that Plato explains in *The Statesman* and *Philebus* (55d sg): one practical (manual labor) and other theoretical - which will be the domain of mathematics (arithmetic and geometry) that provides the knowledge of the intelligible.

As we shall see in the *Meno* dialogue where Socrates asks the slave to discover the geometry figures by itself, mathematically decomposing the sensible reality. In this passage we have a brief presentation of the reminiscence theory of Plato in which, without knowing how, through the sensible world, and in this case breaking it down into geometric figures, we have "access" to the intelligible, in which the beautiful figures reminds the soul of it's visualization of good. That is, the 'tekton' should materialize the good through figures of a universal beauty.

For this, the architect needs these two kinds of knowledge in order to Command (practical) and Judge (theoretical), thus he conceives useful things to the community, for bringing to being something which initially did not exist, thus moving away from the craft of those who have a mimetic relationship with the sensible world. The utility, which comes from the ability to execute the places we inhabit, is very important because it is through it that architecture approaches the intelligible paradigm of criation where the good and the beauty are connected, as we see in the *Hippias Major* (295d) "(...) the useful we call beautiful(...)" The Beauty should be identified with the Good, that should reproduce the model of the eternal ideas, in architecture this happens through mathematics (geometry and arithmetic), not just imitating the sensible world but achieving a stable and useful work for the Man and good for the community.

In the conception of Architecture the ethical and aesthetical must go together, "For neither could the good be beautiful nor the beautiful good, if each of them is different from the other." *Hippias Major* 303-304a.

The Ideal City

Etymologically the word 'City' derives from the latin word 'civis', free member of a city; citizen, originating *civita*, *civitatis*, that which is associated to the idea of nation, forum established in a particular location, this fixation movement of a city is reflected in the Indo-European kei -1: to lay down; to rest;

resulting the sense of residence, address, attributes of a city. In this sense the city would be like a shelter where the citizen rests.

But there is another way of expressing the City, for the greeks it was the πολις [polis] associated to the place where a number of people has its roots; where one lives; residence; that in indo-european has the prefix pelo-1, stronghold, tower.

If we follow the platonic thought in *Charmides* (165d), this places had been turned to πολις [polis] or civitas and it's basis expresses by the ontological realization of the cosmic model associated to architecture. As by it's etymological signification, this will be, par excellence, that one that makes the link between the inteligible plan and the sensible world, becoming places.

Understanding the αρχη [*arché*] as the thing previous to reason, the city would be the materialization of the cosmos, through an architectonical geometry that would be representing Nature, i.e, the dialogue between reason and the invisible element of Cosmos. The citty would be its artificial conversion, like the other side of the mirror, sheltering man and converting the shelter into a community, transforming it into a place of ontological belonging.

The need of place that transforms into the city, occurs because it is inherent to the most primitive phisical dimension of man, the φύσις [phýsis] – through the inter-relation of man with it's natural environment. In other words, this primitive relation with φύσις [*phýsis*] it's awakened when man gives shape to things. Such as the need felt by man, made explicit by Mircea Eliade, of coming up with it's archaic roots of the construction rite in order to understand it's simbolic relation with the landscape.

For Plato the ideal city would be the representation of the eternal model, but would first have to be organized through a Political, Social and Cultural planning and only then move on to the planning, respecting the idea of City-Country. This would be divided into three fundamental circles: Acropolis; Urban (housing) and Agricultural.



Figure 1. Neo-Magnesia, in Munőz Jiménez, *La ciudad como obra de arte: Las claves del urbanismo en la Antigua Grecia*. (1996), p. 30.

Physical Division of the City

1 Acropolis
2 Urban
3 Agricultural (rural).

Classes of Society

1 Priests
2 Warriors
3 Artisans/farmers

Division of the Soul

1 Rational
2 Emotional
3 Appetitive

This city had a radial structure, that would become the object of theorization in the Renaissance, through the analysis that Vitruviu's describes in his *De Architectura*, as we can see on the following images of Sforzinda, idealized by Filarete (1457-1464) and the City described by Vitruvius.

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Identity through Landscape, Identity of Landscape

Luca Vargiu

Abstract

Assuming as a guideline Paolo D'Angelo's theory of landscape as "aesthetic identity of places", the paper discusses two ways of considering the relationship between identity and landscape: 1) identity as collective identity of a community, of a social group, or of a nation (*identity in or through landscape*); 2) identity in an ontological sense (*identity of landscape*).

The first meaning insists on the identifying function of landscape for the people who live in it. It's a meaning subject to demagogic dangers, which do not stem from the ambiguity inherent in this particular meaning of identity, but rather depend on the difficulty of recognizing it in the forms of landscape.

The second meaning deals with the search for the constitutive elements that allow to identify a landscape as *that* specific landscape and without which that landscape is not that any longer. Such elements are to be considered both in the sense of material ones and in the sense of experiential ones.

The paper ends touching on the issues of the transformations of landscape and of the role played by the professionals who deal with landscape design and planning, in order to make every intervention respectful of the identity of the places.

The examples given are taken from the context of Sardinia, witness of exemplar transformative interventions in the recent past, but today facing up to alarming alterations of its own landscape patrimony.

Keywords

Landscape, Identity, Identical vs. Identitarian, Sardinian Landscapes.

The concept of identity is at the center of discussion in many fields as well as in several debates: from philosophy to politics, from anthropology to geography. Landscape studies make no exception, with as many as 139.000.000 hits for searches in which the words "landscape" and "identity" occur together. Curiously, among the results of this search, one even founds that Lego, the popular line of construction toys, manufactures an "Identity and Landscape kit."[1]

In this regard, the unavoidable starting point is Paolo D'Angelo's theory according to which landscape is to be thought as the "aesthetic identity of places"—an incisive formulation that greatly contributed to its reception, not only within Italy, but also abroad. D'Angelo shares with the Italian landscape

studies mainstream, mainly Rosario Assunto, the idea that every landscape possesses its own individuality and singularity, in which nature and history are intertwined[2]. In his view, the aesthetic dimension is an essential part of a territory's physiognomy; therefore it allows us to identify a place as *that* specific place, different from any other[3].Such a theory serves as a guideline for the whole debate as long as identity is intended not as the collective identity of a community, a social group, or a nation—whose corresponding adjective is "identitarian"—but, first and foremost, in an ontological sense—whose corresponding adjective is "identical."

When this notion is understood in a collective sense, that is, social, political, and so on, it is possible to speak of an identifying function for the people who live in a specific landscape and, more generally, for all the people who come in contact with it.[4] It's a concept that can be summarized as "identity *in* landscape" or "identity *through* landscape." We can find countless examples of this way of understanding the relationship between landscape and identity in various contexts: in how people relate to landscapes, in scientific studies, juridical texts, and political writings. Formulations such as "identitarian landscapes," "identitarian value of landscape," "landscape as identitarian element," or similar ones are signs of it.

However, defining identity in this way raises some issues. First of all, claiming that landscape possesses an "identitarian value" risks being elusive and ambiguous, or being subjected to demagogic ends. This may happen even more when such a claim covers a central role in legislative texts. For example, in the *European Landscape Convention* landscape is seen as foundation of identity of the people (art. 5) and in the Italian *Codice dei Beni Culturali e del Paesaggio* landscape is conceived as a "territory expressive of identity" and, more in particular, of the national identity (art. 131).

The risks of ambiguity or of demagogy does not stem from the ambiguity inherent in this particular definition of identity. To this end, however approximately, it would be sufficient to refer to Jan Assmann's definition: "The collective or 'we' identity is the image that a group has of itself and with which its members associate themselves."[5] Rather, such a risk is associated with the fact that it is difficult to recognize this kind of identity in the forms of landscape[6]. Hence the rise of some narrow, particularist, or localistic perspectives in theory as well as in practice. A prime example, in Italy, is the separatist party *Lega*

Lombarda, or *Lega Nord*, who has used the river Po landscapes in an ideological way with the purpose of cementing the invention of an identity: the identity of the people living in North Italy, whose origins are claimed to be different from the rest of Italy. The so-called "rito dell'ampolla" ("flask ritual"), celebrated for many years by the party leader, Umberto Bossi, is telling from this point of view: to make things short, it consisted in filling up a flask with the water taken from the source of the river Po, "father" of the North-Italian people.

Other risks concern a sort of identitarian ambiguity which even the Italian *Codice dei Beni Culturali e del Paesaggio* seems subjected to. While it is clear that landscapes can play a role in recognizing local identities, apart from the particularist currents seen above, it is much less clear how landscape and national identity are connected. For an "Italian landscape" as such, to be opposed to other national landscapes, does not exist.[7]

For these reasons, although they are not the only ones, it is necessary to approach the matter from an ontological point of view. From this perspective, claiming that landscapes have an identitarian value will make more sense, and it will have more operational effectiveness. An ontological approach will serve to clarify what makes a landscape a landscape, and what makes this or that landscape exactly this or that landscape. Thus, the problem is finding those constitutive elements that allow us to identify a landscape as *that* specific landscape and without which—or in the event of their loss—that landscape is not that landscape any longer. Such constitutive elements are to be considered both in the sense of tangible, material ones and in the sense of—broadly speaking—experiential ones. That is, elements involving memory and history, both individually and personally as well as from a collective (social-cultural) and biological-environmental point of view.[8] Considering the relationship between landscape and identity in this manner can be summarized as "identity *of* landscape."

Taking into account the material and the experiential elements, it is worth noting that landscape is chiefly connected with the sense of sight. This idea is prominent in mainstream landscape studies, both in past theories that limited landscape to a panoramic view and in contemporary ones which insist on the deep relationship existing between "the modern usage of landscape to denote a bounded geographical space" and "the exercise of sight or vision as a principal means of associating that space with human concerns," to quote De-

nis Cosgrove.[9] This implies that even an analysis of the multisensorial character of landscape experience cannot downplay the importance of vision and of the sense of sight. After all, as W.J.T. Mitchell states, "to live in any culture whatsoever is to live in a visual culture."[10]

On the other hand, focusing on the multisensorial, that is, synaesthetic aspects of the landscape experience means to deal with those theories that in these last decades, even from heterogeneous points of view, have been insisting on comprehending the relationship with the landscape not as an objectifying distanciation, but rather as a primary experience of bodily involvement, intimate and affective. To make at least one reference, it is worth mentioning Jean-Marc Besse's thematization of an "être au monde paysagere," according to which "the body occupies a central place in atmospheres and in landscape experiences" or, more precisely, "the sensitive body is the core and the condition of possibility of landscape experiences."[11]

Besse's use of the term "atmosphere" is an eloquent sign of the fact that the bodily situatedness relates to the sensory experience and to the sphere of feelings and emotions without the former preceding the latter—ontologically and chronologically—or vice versa. Rather, as the adage goes, they are two sides of the same coin. The two aspects are coessential and are part of each other. Philosophers who thematized the notion of atmosphere, such as Gernot Böhme, Michael Hauskeller, and Tonino Griffero, highlighted that atmospheres are "half-things" or "quasi-things."[12] They are neither completely objective nor wholly subjective, but rather "a 'between' made possible by copresence (corporeal but also social and symbolic) of subject and object and not only difficult to trace back to the two poles but, strictly speaking, even previous to them."[13]

The path followed so far should have brought to light further elements that allow us to reconsider in a deeper way the crucial relationship between nature and culture, or—which is the same—between nature and history in the landscape experience. For landscape is always cultural and we must speak of a compresence, or better still, of an essential co-belonging of nature and history. This is also claimed, albeit more weakly, by the *European Landscape Convention*, as it acknowledges that the character of landscape "is the result of the action and interaction of natural and/or human factors" (art. 1).

It must be not forgotten that the identity of every landscape can always change, that landscape is constantly subject to modification and transformation, otherwise we run the risk of providing fertile ground for particularist conceptions, as exemplified above. What is more, just because landscapes imply an essential co-belonging of nature and history, it does not necessarily mean that their preservation must be thought of in terms of mere conservation and protection. Rather, as D'Angelo claims, preservation "must have a *project* component. […] A landscape, to be really such, must be a *living* landscape, which evolves along with history."[14] Because of this, terms such as "mixing," "mestization," "hybridization," and similar ones have become commonplace—as in other fields—within landscape studies.[15]

Here the issue arises of which modifications are accepted by the people who live in a given landscape, and which are not. Or when a modification is approved of, even to the extent of becoming a typical feature of that landscape, which is to say, a constitutive element of its identity. It is a problem concerning all those who experience a landscape, but also—and maybe first and foremost—the professionals who deal with landscape design and planning: architects, town planners, gardeners, and landscape planners. In general terms, it is necessary to acknowledge that in some cases landscapes have undergone violent and irreversible transformations that, nonetheless, have been experienced as non-problematic. This is a sign that such modifications, however radical they may have been, have reshaped the identity of those places and given new sense to those landscapes in a positive way.

In Sardinia, a telling example is represented by lake Omodeo, one of the largest artificial lakes in Europe, created by a huge dam on the river Tirso between 1919 and 1924. This reservoir, built with the purpose of supplying water and electricity for agricultural needs, now looks as if it had always been there. It blends seamlessly with the landscape—as the so-called "Guida rossa" of the Italian Touring Club acknowledges[16]—and has become an economic resource and even a tourist attraction (fig. 1).

Figure. 1. Sedilo, Sardinia, panoramic view of Lake Omodeo (Photo by Maurizio Frongia, Ente Foreste della Sardegna. Taken from www.sardegnadigitallibrary.it, download permitted).

The forming of the lake submerged fields, woods, villages, and archaeological and architectonic remains. The only thing that was saved, due to its historical and artistic value, is the church of S. Pietro di Zuri, one of the jewels of Sardinian Romanesque architecture. Under architect Carlo Aru's direction the church was dismantled stone by stone and rebuilt uphill. This restoration is one of the best examples of anastylosis in Italy to this very day.[17]

Whereas lake Omodeo can be considered a positive example of landscape integration, the nourishment of Cagliari's Poetto beach carried out in 2002 is without doubt a glaring case of irreversible disfigurement, besides being a crime for which the local administrators, starting with the province president, have been recently sentenced to a near three-million-euro reimbursement.[18] After decades of neglect, the beach was in bad condition. This was due not as much

to natural erosion, but because the local construction industry had used it as a cheap quarrying site probably as late as the 1970s. Consequently, numerous debates arose and, along with them, several projects for the beach replenishment were presented. In the end, it was decided to dredge the sand from offshore and pump it onto the shoreline. However, the sand revealed itself to be completely different, radically altering the beach, probably forever (fig. 2).[19]

Figure 2. A postcard against the nourishment of Cagliari's Poetto beach, 2002 (Associazione per il Parco Molentargius Saline Poetto, www.apmolentargius.it, Creative Commons License).

An interpretive grid based on what has been considered so far can help understand what has been damaged.

– Visual aspects. The color changed: the sand, originally white, is now dark.

– Tactile aspects. While the original sand was fine-grained, almost impalpable, the new one is more granular and coarser due to the presence of shell fragments and other fragments.

– Polysensorial and atmospheric aspects. The whole physiognomy is now different as well as the relationship between the beach, the shoreline and the sea. The water, once crystal clear, has become cloudy. Concerning depth, while before the nourishment the water was shallow for quite a distance from shore, now the seafloor is irregular and the water generally deeper. Furthermore, the sand's darker color made it hotter, making it unpleasant to walk on during the hottest hours of the day in summer.

– Emotional and cognitive aspects. Some experiences that everybody once easily had and shared, are now consigned forever to memory. As Allan T. Williams and Anton Micallef point out in conclusion of their analysis, "since any solution is technically, legally and politically difficult, the white fine sand will probably remain nothing but a recollection in the minds of elderly Cagliaritans."[20]

After having seen two opposite examples, the issue of understanding which modifications are accepted and which ones are not should have gained more depth. To sketch a conclusion, albeit provisional, it is possible to gather from what has been said so far that every landscape intervention should respect and preserve its identity while trying to recognize its typical features and distinguish them from the spurious elements—however difficult this task may be, considering the changeable and even hybrid character of landscapes as such.[21] From the designer's point of view, in any case, the task is exactly this. As Steven C. Bourassa argues, meaningfully in an interrogative form:

Questions about the role of the designer or planner can be viewed as questions about the role of personal strategies within the context of cultural rules (and, rather more speculatively, biological laws). In other words, how should the designer's creativity be constrained by existing cultural values? When should the designer be subservient to existing values? When should the designer attempt to change the "rules"? And when should designers merely employ different strategies within the context of existing rules?[22]

In brief, the matter is still largely open to debate.

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Round-Trip Landscapes

Figueira da Foz, a Tropical Illusion in North Atlantic Reality

João Marques-da-Cruz & Eduardo Costa Pinto

Abstract

The relationship between the landscape of the metropolis and that of the colonies illus-trates the cyclical and continuous movement between the objective material construction of the landscape and the representations and values of those who construct it - *trajection*. Since the sixteenth century, the landscapes of Portugal and Brazil have been transformed and shaped under these Transatlantic movements.

The "colonial grid" planning system, or the construction of replicas of cities in Brazil, such as Ouro Preto and Salvador da Bahia, is the affirmation of metropolis cultural mod-els in conquered lands. In reverse, the landscapes found in the colonies have always in-fluenced the metropolis either through territorial domain - the botanical gardens and zoo-logical, the introduction of natives in noble houses, etc. - or through the countless de-scriptions of such new landscapes observed directly, such as the *Letter to D. Manuel I*, King of Portugal.

The *Copacabana* boardwalk, in *Brazil*, or *Figueira da Foz* promenade (also called Avenida do Brasil) in Portugal, are good examples that demonstrate this circulation of the "waterfront model", that animated people's lives and the elegant seaside resorts, on both sides of the Atlantic. In the case of Figueira da Foz, the urban configura-tion of their wa-terfront has became obsolete due to significant environmental and social changes over the last decades. We propose a new paradigm, by presenting the project for "Figueira da Foz waterfront - Living the Atlantic Coast", in order to build a "trajective continuity", activat-ing regionalism dialogue between heritage, tourism, and traditions.

Keywords

Landscape, Trajection, Heritage, Regionalism, Waterfront, Figueira da Foz.

The relationship between the landscape of the metropolis and that of the colonies (Portuguese empire, British empire, etc.), or between Classical Antiquity and Renaissance, illustrates the cyclical and continuous movement between the objective material construction of the landscape and the representations and values of those who construct it - trajection. In the words of the French geographer Augustin Berque, "the movement in which the subjective world and objective world never cease to interact, so to speak, in a spiral, thereby producing one trajective reality (semi-subjective, semi-objective), which is our means."[1]

As with the "round-trip wine", the landscape models produced in Europe and implanted in the colonies, although well "bottled", returned to the metropolis changed by regional influences that they had absorbed abroad. Of these Transatlantic encounters emerges the sedimentation, in space and time, of cultural and physical strata. And from this metropole-colony interaction comes a visibility of a fundamental ethical principle to the idea of landscape and world transformation– a "trajective continuity" between the two dimensions of the landscape, "in visu and in situ"[2]: the former seemingly more subjective, landscape as a repository and portrait of the values of a community; and the latter synonymous of objective, physically and scientifically measurable, which plays the role of supporting life, with the fluxes and energies that transform the face of the visible world. In a landscape transformation process, building good communication between this dual essence (an "achieved trajectivity"), means that the result reflects the values that underpin this transformation, and materialises in consistence with a certain physical reality and according to the particular functioning of this reality, where the community will later see itself.

Since the sixteenth century, the landscapes of Portugal and Brazil have been transformed and shaped under these Transatlantic movements. From the perspective of the Metropolis: by the assertion of power; the need to to bravely organise a new and unknown world, staying true to its cultural models, which are so contrary to those found in the new lands; or by the need to celebrate and raise awareness of the exotic in the capital and other lands of the empire. "Most of these modern colonies are founded in a zone where the climate, the produce, the sky and landscape, all differ completely from Europe"[3], wrote Alexander von Humboldt in his Personal Narrative of a Journey to the Equinoctial Regions of the New Continent. As an example, the "colonial grid" planning system (or the construction of replicas of cities in Brazil, such as Ouro Preto and Salvador da Bahia), is the affirmation of metropolis cultural models in conquered lands. Or even more recently, the colonial grid used by architects Fernando Tavora and Siza Vieira for Macao's New Outer Harbour Area project (NAPE, 1983-1984), or the architectural style known as "Português Suave" firmly implanted in the colonies, are other examples that demonstrate this modular circulation. Five o'clock tea at a cricket club in British India is another more modest, but no less demonstrative, example of this mechanism. Note that the five o'clock tea habit was introduced to England by Queen Catherine of Braganza, who came across the custom in Portugal, a custom itself

with Oriental roots. "Similarly, the Romans introduced the Portuguese to the method of frying fish in egg batter (tempura), which the latter took with them to Japan"[4], only to return to Europe under the concept of "world food". Inversely, the landscapes found in the colonies have always influenced the metropolis either through expressions of territorial domain – the coffees plants in London's Kew Gardens kept in greenhouses with hot water tubes, the vineyards at the Sanssouci Palace near Berlin, or the Orangeries in Versailles, the botanical and zoological gardens, the introduction of natives in noble houses, etc. – or through the countless descriptions of such new landscapes observed directly, such as the Letter by Pero Vaz de Caminha to D. Manuel I, King of Portugal, or from descriptions made by explorers, such as Dürer's realistic Rhinoceros, or Theodorus de Bry's fantasy engravings. In the words of Pero Vaz de Caminha, we found the differences that separated these two worlds, Metropolis and colonies, quite explicit: "Up until then, there was no more talking to or getting on with them, the extent of their barbarity meant no one could understand or listen to anyone…"[5]

Whether it is a metropolis or a colony, with the passing of time, these new models move away from the cultures that gave rise to them, to gain new meanings and build new individual and collective semantics.

The discovery of New Worlds brought new dimensions to the idea of landscape and a breath of fresh air to the imagery of the unreachable "natural world": Eden's location, the Island of Utopia, sea monsters, etc. It should be noted that only in the eighteenth century, did the concept of landscape truly get a second dimension as a physical object of scientific study, with the geographer and naturalist Alexander von Humboldt and his Transatlantic studies. From this moment onwards, landscape was no longer limited to a representative dimension (in visu) and a sphere of values, to exist as a physical support, i.e. in situ, which can be studied, analyzed, mapped, etc., independent of its own subjective value, or at least that was the illusion that the "technical world"[6] introduced to us.[7]

Despite acknowledging that European expansion highlighted the awesomeness, the importance and the knowledge of the wild world, at present, in Europe, the wilderness and the wild has finally been confined to Natural Parks and other similar places, and its role in the construction of landscape is set aside by engineering of the Modern, rising from the technical-scientific revolution. The "spiral" movement between the subjective world and objective world

does not fit in with the mutual exclusion attitudes between the anthropic and wild world, between cultura and natura. Modernism's attitude in constructing landscapes without taking into account their energies, metabolisms and natural and cultural dynamics, including myths, religions, etc., may be accomplished within the scale of a building (Corbusier's dream: a temperature of 24º from the equator to the poles), but this is unsustainable regarding landscape. Let's look at the example of the erosion problem of the Portuguese coast – the pseudo-solution of which has seen the use of heavy engineering, such as the construction of rockfills, as an alternative to the natural and cultural systems.

By presenting the project - "Viver a Orla Âtlantica (Living the Atlantic Coast) - Figueira da Foz Waterfront" – as a case project, we propose a definition of landscape "like sailing a yacht" [8], that will enable us to understand the "layers of information"[9] and manipulate nature - as "cultural artefact"[10] - including it in the construction of the landscape.

A Transatlantic Round-Trip of the Waterfront Model

More recently, and since the advent of seaside tourism in the late nineteenth century, this transatlantic movement between Portuguese and Brazilian cultures has extended new dimensions, with the flows of peoples and collective ideals, which build up a new heritage. The "Promenade des Anglais" in Nice, the Copacabana boardwalk, in Brazil, or Figueira da Foz promenade (also called Avenida do Brasil) in Portugal, are good examples of the "waterfront model", that animated people's lives and the elegant seaside resorts of the last century, on both sides of the Atlantic. In the early 1960s, coastal planning from southern latitudes, with the model of the waterfront, reached as far as Northern Europe (Figure 1). However, ignoring the reality: "cold climates should not be marketed as hot climates; local character should not be ignored."[11]

994 Figure 1. "The Annual Problem" (Turner, 1996).

In the case of Figueira da Foz, the urban configuration of their waterfront has became obsolete due to significant environmental and social changes in the last decades. By presenting the following project for Figueira da Foz waterfront, we will try to demonstrate that an effective enriching Atlantic dialog should take into consideration, not only the overseas reality, but also that of the local, the "regionalism" [12], in order to build a "trajective continuity" able to activate the dialogue between heritage, tourism, and traditions.

Living the Atlantic Coast – Figueira da Foz Waterfront[13]

Figueira da Foz, the "queen of Portuguese beaches" until the sixties, continues to be one of the larger scale holiday destinations and one of the busiest in Portugal. Confirming the attractiveness and sustainability in competing cities and between tourist destinations in the near future, which require transformations that respond to the continuing world transformation, in relation to Figueira da Foz beach, this is not metaphorical.

As is known, the extension of the northern jetty of the Mondego river led to an increased beach area by about half a kilometre, silting up the big bay Buarcos-Figueira and leaving the Promenade, designed to be near water, facing a confusing and uninhabitable "desert" that must be crossed in order to reach the ocean. The large sandy beach of Figueira da Foz intruded as a "no man's land", separating two contrasting worlds: the city, extremely artificial, and the Atlantic Coast, very "natural". However, this situation created by the extension of the jetty, in conjunction with longshore drift and aeolian processes, represents an opportunity for Figueira da Foz to build a unique relationship with its Atlantic coast, while in coordination with the instruments of territorial management, in particular, the Ovar - Marinha Grande Coastal Zone Management Plan (POOC).

The project area is a notable point and a natural shelter on Portugal's Atlantic coast due to its sheltered situation at Cabo Mondego (Cape Mondego) and Serra da Boa Viagem (Bon Voyage Mountain). However, with partial silting of the Buarcos-Figueira da Foz bay and the advancement of the shoreline, the exposure to Nortada (Portuguese trade winds) and open seas increased dramatically, compared with the beach situation in the 1960s.

At present, two permanently flowing streams flow into the beach, more precisely in the Galante and Buarcos area (Figure 2). For this reason the conditions of these streams and their watersheds - waterproofing, erosion, pollution, water quality, vegetation, etc. - are reflected directly on the area of intervention.

Figure 2. Intervention area: streams and related watersheds.

In the case of Figueira da Foz, the urban transformations that have occurred in recent decades along the town's seafront, triggered a set of dynamics of a different nature, which not only made the existing model obsolete, but also created the need for a new paradigm to answer the problem. Figueira da Foz, to paraphrase René Magritte, "ceci n'est pas Copacabana".

General Principles of the Proposal[14]

From the analysis of the current situation, and in response to programmatic requirements, comes the proposal for a park, able to mediate the relationship between the city and the Atlantic. And with it, the desire to activate and en-

hance the energies in the area. On the one hand, taking advantage of the natural forces of a coastal system of this nature, returning the lost diversity and complexity back to the ecosystem. On the other hand, attaining the ideal of the city by the sea, protected from the sun, wind and ocean. In this way, the project bases its proposal on four general principles: Nature and Artifice, phasing and flexibility, carrying capacity versus the fluidity of the substrate support, stratification and materials.

The dichotomy nature-artifice, visible in Western landscape, possibly since before the Roman conceptualisation of ager and silva, or so it is thought, will have dissolved with the mastery of Man over nature, as achieved unequivocally throughout the XX century. In this way, a flexible and phased colonisation of the beach is proposed, promoting a meeting between the city and the Atlantic coast, Nature and Artifice, which despite their striking contrasts, do not have to be spatially exclusive. Turning the beach into a space of mediation between the city and the Atlantic coast, done through an artificial construction of a stable system (as the beach itself today is an artificial construction), but metabolic and evolving in time, made with natural elements and these functioning in collaboration with artificial-inert elements (Figure 3).

Figure 3.Aerial view of Figueira da Foz and Buarcos beach and sea front.

The principle of flexibility and phasing throughout the project's lifetime, comes from the experience that an intervention of this scale, with an area of approximately 85 ha, becomes problematic when governed by a project that requires a static final image. A "Firmitas" to use the Vitruvius term, especially when we are working in unpredictable socio-economic situations, uncertain completion deadlines and building with living materials, dune dynamics, etc. Beyond a fixed base, the proposal is completed by a collection of "pieces", like a "lego" set, which can be assembled in different ways. The relative flexibility of the rules of assembly of these pieces also confers flexibility in phasing and the implementation of the proposal. The project presented is therefore an example of one embodiment possible for the proposal which, with the information we have now, seems the most suitable (Figure 4).

Figure 4. Stages of the proposal based on one scenario over time (0. corresponds to the present situation).

From the promenade of Figueira da Foz to the ocean, from concrete and tarmac to sand and water, the fluidity of the substrate support is increased and, inversely, its carrying capacity decreases (Figure 5). The system design arises from the possible manipulation of the fluidity of that substrate respecting the immutable rules of nature. On the one hand, solidify to obtain carrying capacity (palafitte pier, vegetation cover, gravel paths, sports fields, etc.). On the other hand, maintain fluidity (dunes, lakes, beach, etc.) that is essential for the absorption of the energy of the streams, wind, waves and tides, which, we do know, would be enough to ruin the whole system, literally, with a breath of wind.

Figure 5. View of the retention basin supplied by the Galante stream.

The stratification and project materials emerge as a general principle resulting from the identification of 4 main horizontal strata in the area of intervention: water, sand, vegetation cover, and pavements (Figure 6). Therefore, the following materials are proposed in the area of intervention: - water (fresh and salt); - sand and soil with different levels of organic matter; - vegetation cover (trees, shrubs and herbaceous); - pavements (for the Avenues - stone, bituminous, inert; for the paths on the ground and car parking - permeable and stabilised gravel; for the palafitte piers and buildings - wood).

Trajective Continuity, Dependence or Death!

The Urban Planning here suggested derives from our being aware of two realities: - that cities are not static objects – on the contrary, they are extremely dynamic systems that evolve throughout time and which have difficulty in identifying with finished planning images or objects; - cities cannot cancel the natural and cultural processes that are inherent to the landscape and to the manner in which they function, without becoming unsustainable, thus, these are the bases for their planning.

This proposal does not suggest only one possible end. It is an open dynamic system, with several options that can be adopted as the project comes to fruition, thus introducing the necessary flexibility to respond to the inevitable contingencies of the future, the sequential energies and logic of the natural and cultural processes arising in the intervention area, serving the objectives of transformation defined in



Figure 6. System of walkways and footbridges.

the programme. Thus this project does not provide a "final image", i.e. one final plan, but a sequence of images with possible variations that will arise over the lifetime of the project.

Consequently, we suggest that the traditional opposition and mutual exclusivity between the urban system and the natural system be reviewed. Cities should thus be built by a hybrid and eclectic system instead of merely using the natural system in areas that compensate modern cities' lack of sustainability and balance, and which has, in fact, become clearly inefficient due to its abstraction and increasing dimension.

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European Cities and Public Orchards

Moirika Reker

Abstract

Both native and exotic species are part of our European cities. We grew so accustomed to them that several tropical trees became part of local traditions (as spotting the first Jacarandá to blossom in Lisbon), cherished as living monuments of cultural interest.

If the introduction of ornamental trees is a consequence of the scientific/economic interest in the Natural History of the colonies, what about fruit trees? How long have we been eating "exotic" fruits?

The presence of inedible fruit trees in the city of Lisbon will be challenged by the discussion of the implementation of urban orchards, not only as a source of food and means of social integration, but as a stimulus to transform the aesthetic experience of the city.

Keywords

Aesthetics, Orchards, Urban Food, Native vs. Exotic Trees.

Travelling Arboreta

Several of the trees we see in the public spaces of European cities (as well as in our forests, woodlands and countryside) are originally from other parts of the world. The result of a long tradition of searching for better life conditions, and consequence of the integration and intersections of diverse cultures.

Once we start tracing back the history of fruit trees, we are bound to be surprised by what is indeed exotic or which species are endemic, as food has been travelling with us throughout history, from the first migrations and settlers, to the multiple "invasions" by different tribes in Europe, or the trading civilisations that took goods, and foods, from one country to another.

In Portugal, despite the lack of consensus in respect to some species being native or introduced (as is the case of the chestnut [*Castanea sativa* Mill.] and the walnut [*Juglans regia* L.], that are referred to by some authors as Roman introductions, while others declare them native, due to occurrences of fossil pollen of such species that seemingly prove their precedence), it is accepted that the native trees that pro-

vided food were mostly those of the Quercus family (oaks), pine trees (*Pinus pinea* L.), hazelnuts (*Corylus avellana* L.) strawberry trees (*Arbutus unedo* L.). Purportedly, the olive tree came with the Phoenicians (at least the knowledge and custom of extracting its oil was a Phoenician introduction), fig trees, quinces and almonds were introduced by the Greeks. Carthaginians introduced the pomegranate (*Punica granatum* L.) native to Northern India, and finally the Romans introduced many fruit trees, like plums (*Prunus domestica* L.), native from Oriental Europe and Occidental Asia, cherries (even though there are wild edible cherries native to Portugal, the *Prunus lusitanica* L. and *Prunus avium* L.), peaches (*Prunus persica* L. Batsch), apricots (*Prunus armeniaca* L.), and citrus fruits (although the "true" sweet orange was brought in much later, from India, with the Portuguese discoveries)[1].

Explorers took seeds and plants in the caravels to grow along the way to provide food. Once the "new world" was reached, they were amazed by the profusion of plants, totally unknown, and brought them to Europe, dramatically changing Europe's diet (even though this change happened very gradually). This movement was not unidirectional, as species travelled between continents: known plants from Europe and Asia were planted in Central and South America, while species that were valued by local populations in the new world were introduced in West Africa and Asia. Of particular importance in this exchange of food were the Atlantic Islands, as Cape Verde, a "middle ground" were plants carried both to and from Europe were planted and acclimated, as the different altitudes of the islands allowed for the proper adaptation of tropical and temperate climate plants, shortening the distanced travelled and so enabling the success of such ventures[2]. The contact with the "new" continent and all this novelty amount of species had a profound impact in Europe since the onset of the discoveries, but had its heyday in the 18th century, when several expeditions or philosophical journeys were conducted to study the three reigns of nature[3]. Samples were collected, described, examined, catalogued and sent home for further studies. The first "Philosophical Journey" to Brazil, was supposed to be carried out by a team of several researchers: natural philosophers, botanist, illustrators, mathematicians, chemists, professors, military, etc., but in the end, the whole enterprise was undertaken by a group of four (a natural scientist, a botanical gardener and two illustrators). Therefore, the leading scientist, Alexandre Ferreira, had to overview everything, from the actual research, to administrative tasks, studies on agriculture, cartography and elaboration of population maps, verification of the material conditions of life and resistance in case of foreign incursions (the dispute of land with Spain was one of the pressing matters of the journey)

as well as the economic potential of the colony. The results being that with the amount and extent of responsibilities, the scientific research was not carried out with the depth it deserved. Many of the samples Ferreira sent to Portugal ended up never being analyzed (several of the boxes with samples and specimen were taken to France by Saint-Hillaire with the French invasions, becoming French "discoveries"). Hence, for instance, many of the fishes Ferreira recollected and studied have only been scientifically described years later by other natural scientists. This lack of scientific strategy, if you will, remained for years to come. The quantity of species to study was immense, but the investment of the state was far too short to ensure rigor and success.

Nevertheless, the creation of Botanical Gardens allowed for the study of many trees, which, once acclimated, could surpass the gardens' walls and enter the streets and public spaces. Curiously, most of the species introduced were ornamental. The presence of trees such as Jacarandá, Dragon Tree, Cockspur Coral tree or Magnolias, in the streets of Lisbon and other cities is a direct consequence of the "discoveries", one that profoundly transformed both the city and the landscape. Besides the profusion of colour brought in by such species when flowering, many became true landmarks and are classified as trees of public interest.

This travelling of plant species brings an interesting twist to the exotic/native debate: as we know today, exotic species fight for natural resources. They menace the native biodiversity of a given place and the dangers for the ecosystem posed by exotic species that become invasive are widely acknowledged. Curiously though, if all this exchange of seeds and plants was not only a result from the discoveries, but a practice taking place since the dawn of agriculture, can we trace a clear line separating spontaneous varieties and introduced ones? Should we avoid growing oranges in Portugal – country that was once so deeply associated with oranges that *portugal* became the name to call that fruit in several languages –, or would such a ban only apply to species that pose a risk to the survival of more ancient ones (like plants that have been covering our forests for centuries)? There are many examples of the radical transformation of the landscape by the introduction of trees that were not spontaneously there. Sintra is internationally admired for its beauty; it even became a World Heritage Unesco Site in 1995, becoming the first to be classified under Unesco's "Cultural Landscape" criteria. Notwithstanding, its celebrated woods have been planted mainly by King Fernando II, with trees from different continents, in an area that had mainly shrubs and rocks, as well as by Sir Francis Cook, who con-

verted a farm previously dedicated to the production of fruit into a botanic garden with about thousand trees, replicating the flora of the world with "great collections of plants from many parts of the old and new world, many being specimen of superb quality, extremely rare, maybe even unique of their kind in Europe"[4]. Such was the depth of their intervention that it is difficult to imagine Sintra without Pena and Monserrate parks or without all the different trees that have gradually spread into other areas are now so well adapted that are apparently "native".

Trees in the City

Native species require less water and are definitely more adapted to soil and climate. But either native or exotic, there are several reasons for planting trees in the public space: for the improvement of air quality, shade and temperature control, for the aesthetic enrichment of the city, for the enhancement of positive feelings like friendliness and cooperativeness[5], or for economic reasons: streets with trees increase real estate value[6]. There is, however, another reason, one that is frequently disregarded, but that deserves our fullest attention, and which is the growing of food.

 Figure 6. Neighbouring area of the Faculty of Letters of the University of Lisbon. Red dots signal existing fruit trees.

There are about 600 000 trees in Lisbon from about 100 different species. Many of which are fruit trees, as can be seen in the rather small area showed in Fig.1. Despite such a remarkable amount of fruitful trees, most of these fruits are inedible. Either due to the trees being bitter cultivars (as is the case of oranges and garden plums, or strictly ornamental varieties, producing large amounts of flowers but no fruit (as is the case of ornamental pomegranates). Throughout the city there are several edible species that are, nonetheless, also not harvested: fig trees, strawberry trees, medlars, olive trees and even grapes. People tend not to pick them because they don't recognise them as edible, for fear of incurring transgression or due to shame (to pick one's own food being a sign of not being able to buy it – this should precisely be a motive for the public policy on public fruit, not only to fight shame, but to endow people with the possibility to provide for themselves, and, quite important as well, to develop a healthier relationship with food, which, as noted by Timothy Beatley, is best achieved through direct engagement in the growing process.[7]

So, we have fruit trees that are planted with ornamental purposes, and edible ones whose fruits are not harvested. A peculiar case is that one of Quinta dos Lilases, a 19th century property, which like most historic "Quintas" (landed estate) was organised in distinct areas: a main residential house, a house for the caretaker, a cart house, stables, a perchery, a granary, a greenhouse, and in the garden a vegetable garden, an orchard, a recreational garden, and on the rim, a woodland. Once it became a public park, the buildings were attributed to public institutions (like the Portuguese Academy of History) while the vegetable garden and orchard disappeared. The visitor can stumble across the occasional fruit tree, but those have either grew too high to be reached, or were replaced by ornamental varieties (oddly, the park has several ornamental pomegranates used as hedgerows). There are several strawberry trees along the main lawn, but visitors seem to fail to recognise them as fruits. In short: an orchard that upon becoming property of the city was transformed into an ornamental (non-productive) garden.

What is worthwhile questioning is why such avoidance of productive trees. Why would an orchard be replaced with ornamental trees?, and why would a landscape architect choose ornamental cultivars over productive ones when opting for fruit trees – if one is planting a tree for its beauty, then why choose one that produces fruits that are not harvested, and that for that reason create

great amount of dirtiness and nuisance, as the mature fruits fall on the ground (clearly this presents no problem in parks, as fallen fruit creates compost for the tree, but with alignment trees in streets, non harvested fruits fall on the pavement creating a potential hazard as the ground becomes quite slippery) –. Naturally, not being harvested by humans does not mean that other animals will not eat those fruits. Planting food for bees, birds and small mammals could be seen by some as a way to compensate for the tremendous shrinkage of natural habitats that we, as a species, are responsible for. However, until this moment we have not found any notice of such mindset influencing city tree plantation. The question remains, thought, that in a time of such expansion and growth of cities, when food has to travel increasing distances to feed urbanites, why would the urban production of fruits be avoided? Could it be a fear of theft? That someone would benefit from public fruit, stealing part or a whole crop from trees paid through public funds? But, wouldn't such a fear prove pointless, or better yet, absurd? If one considers the direct benefits of producing food in the city, ornamental fruit trees might loose some of their allure to productive trees!

The orchard in the public space is thus a form of addressing several topics:

— Ethical issues (having the city plant fruit trees means that everyone can share its fruits: the community, the neighbourhood and passers-by. Of course it can happen that a particular tree crop get harvested by someone who takes it all for himself or with selling intentions, notwithstanding, it is a possibility for a community to share fruit and knowledge, taking care of trees together and having the opportunity to take hold of their own nourishment);

— Aesthetic notions (not only in terms of the aesthetic appreciation of the city as a whole, but as well as in what concerns contemplation as such, the fruition of a specific kind of garden that allows for a peculiar connection between contemplator, the garden, and a sense of immersion in the element that is source and sustenance of life);

— Environmental questions (the existence of orchards contributes to a number of environmental benefits, as CO2 retention, improved air, water and soil quality, less soil sealing, better temperature control, increased biodiversity, etc.);

— Political questions (as how public is the public space? How autonomous is the individual regarding his own food? Participation in municipality decision making processes: should the city provide for its inhabitants? Spatial planning issues regarding the analysis of areas destined for gardens and food production, etc.);

— Sustainability, food sovereignty and food security (urban orchards diminish the need for transporting fruits from outside the city; increase the city's capacity for producing part of its food; increase inhabitants independence and security by being able to gather (part) of their own food);

— Community enhancement (the existence of edible fruit trees can promote contact among citizens, exchange of knowledge and expertise as well as social bondage);

All these issues are inter-related. That is to say, taking the orchard as a starting-point we can reflect on several aspects relevant to the daily life of those who live or work in the city, and is, therefore, a starting-point for thought and for urban intervention.

Regarding aesthetics, the urban orchard is the place for a comprehensive aesthetic experience, one that welcomes both individual fruition and collective gardening practice, in a specific form of contemplation involving all the senses: an active multi-sensory perception of co-creation, as contemplation is deepened by the perception of our profound and close dependence on nature. An orchard is quite a unification of beauty and utility, as usefulness does not mean abuse or mass production, rather, trees are beauty in their utility[8].

We have started this article tracing back the origins of trees commonly seen in Europe. Returning now to the species brought to Europe with the philosophical journeys of the late 18th century, such was the impact of tropical flora and fauna that one wonders if there were no attempts to grow some of those fruits. Certainly, the introduction of "European" fruits in Brazil, like oranges, was much easier, since oranges are, after all, from a tropical climate. Other temperate climate cultivars were successfully introduced to provide food to which settlers were accustomed to[9]. However, growing tropical fruits in Europe was a much harder adventure (with pineapple or

passion fruits as the few exceptions). Just recently are mangoes, papayas, guavas or kiwis successfully produced in mainland Portugal, probably due to more advanced fruit growing techniques.

Anyway, let us imagine how would an orchard look like if only certain tropical species had acclimated well (Fig. 2.)…



Figure 2. An imagined tropical orchard in Quinta dos Lilases, Lisbon.

… Could such fruit trees change the relation of city dwellers with urban trees? Would passers-by stop to admire their beauty and pick a mango for the road?

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SECTION V
Language, Philosophy, Anthropology, Psychology, Religion

Workshops

—

Reason & Religion Facing Law & Science
Chair: Irene Briones

—

The Contribution of Portuguese Thought to the Mutual Recognition of Cultures & Peoples
Chairs: Jorge Cunha & José Acácio Aguiar de Castro

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The Theological Origins Of Modernity
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Understanding Perspectivism & Nietzsche Perspectivism in Art, Science, And Philosophy
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SECTION V

Language, Philosophy, Anthropology, Psychology, Religion

REASON & RELIGION FACING LAW & SCIENCE

Chair

—

Irene Briones

Participants

—

Irene Briones
David Chapman
Ksenia Gerasimova

Presentation

Irene Briones

This workshop aimed to approach some questions related to the dialectics between social and cultural developments and their relationship to those structural considerations that reason and, furthermore, religious foundations can offer, in order to confront what Law and Science, in their dynamic development, have to say about the need – or not – of some ultimate references able to transcend this very dynamics.

Law and Science currently are living in the "spiritual anarchy". Secular States confuse neutrality in religious matters with the need to secularize society, eliminating the irrational religion.

With respect to science, just the kind of certainty resulting from the interplay between mathematical and empirical elements can be considered scientific. This method as such excludes the question of God, presenting it as a problem to be unscientific or pre-scientific. But in this way we have a reduced field of science and reason that is needs to be questioned.

Moreover, the development and structuring of law are not immediately theological problem but a problem of "recta ratio" of right reason. This line should try to discern reason (beyond the views of fashion and fashion trends of thought) what is just, the law itself, which is under natural need of human beings, and which distinguishes it from that which is destructive to a person, otherwise, a human being is threatened in their dignity and in its essence.

A reason which is deaf to the divine and which relegates religion into the realm of subcultures is incapable of entering into the dialogue of cultures, and protect appropriately religious freedom.

In this workshop, Professor Irene Briones, University Complutense-Madrid, explained that awareness of citizens of a state, sometimes not identified with religious citizenship, so that faith and reason are not adequately ally when ritual circumcision is practiced in a foreign country with different rules and traditions.

Professor David Chapman, The Open University-UK, following Albert Borgmann identified three roles for information: information about reality; information for reality and information as reality. His presentation analyzed the information about, for and as religion.

Professor David Schaefer, College of Holy Cross-US, studied the Israeli scholar Yorem Hazony's 2012 book: " The Philosophy of Hebrew Scripture", that constitutes an important contribution to the understanding of the Hebrew Bible as a work of political theory - an enterprise initiated, most importantly, during the past century by the great philosophical scholar Leo Strauss, and elaborated by such scholars influenced by Strauss as Leon Kass and Robert Sacks, as well as other political theorists and Biblical scholars including Michael Walzer, Aaron Wildavsky, Daniel Elazar, and Jacob Wright.

Professor Ksenia, University of Cambridge, addressed the question of the perception of science and its role in the contemporary Europe, illustrated it with the example of genetically modified (GM) crops.

Ritual Circumcision

Irene Briones

Abstract

Religious reasons and cultural traditions are facing medical and criminal reasons in Circumcision issue.

From the point of view of its effects, it is not a practice that threatens public order, surpassing the limits of freedom of religion or belief. However, the operation is performed on infants, who do not have a minimum capacity of discernment, whose parents make the decision to be acted upon her body, raising the issue of possible usurpation of personal rights as the physical integrity, of which only the minor may have.

Lawmakers and Courts cannot judge religious beliefs or a dogma of faith. The dialogue between faith and reason, or rationality of faith, warns the contemporary atheism of the imperative need to avoid state totalitarianism options regarding religious freedom of its citizens.

Keywords

Religion, Culture, Traditions, Law, Public Order, Minors, Faith, Reason.

I Moral Panic on Cultural and Religious Traditions

Although traditions are a sacred part of a secular civilization, the right to bodily integrity is also a sacred and fundamental right, which derives its compelling indispensability from the instinctual desire for self-preservation common to all sentient beings. The instinct to protect one-self is palpably present in an infant from the moment it emerges from the womb[1].

Baseman describes how a ballot measure to ban the traditional practice of male circumcision in San Francisco made national news[2]. Most people in the United States consider the choice to circumcise a male infant as a normal part of having a child. But Matthew Hess, who spearheaded the bill proposal in San Francisco, believes that the debate on circumcising male children should be revisited by legislatures. He is not alone. Over 7,100 Californian voters signed a petition in the spring of 2011 to see a measure banning male circumcisions on the November 2011 ballot. While the measure was removed from the ballot-for technical reasons that will be

discussed later-there were few questions answered on what would have happened if the ballot had passed.

On Thursday 19th of July 2012[3], just prior to the parliamentary summer holidays, the Deutscher Bundestag (German Parliament) passed a resolution based on a rather irritating motivation[4]. The parliament intended to guarantee that "Jewish and Muslim religious life will be further possible in Germany". The resolution itself consisted in only one sentence: The German Government is requested to provide until fall 2012 - in due consideration of the constitutionally protected legal positions of the well-being of the child, the right to bodily integrity, the right to religious freedom and the parental rights in education – draft legislation in order to safeguard that professionally performed male circumcision, without unnecessary pain, is generally lawful under German law. What had happened to provoke such extraordinary political action in defense of religious freedom? The resolution responds directly to a decision of the Landgericht (Court of Appeal) Cologne from 7 May 2012[5] which declared that male circumcision in children amounts to criminal battery, even if performed *lege artis* and with the consent of the parents unless there is a medical indication for the procedure. In doing so, the court followed a restrictive position within the German criminal law literature that has been advocating the criminalization of male circumcision since 2008 with almost missionary zeal. From a comparative perspective the proposed blanked criminal prohibition of male circumcision in children - virtually excluding Jewish and Muslim religious life in Germany-would be an exceptional case.

II Legal Status of the Issue in Spain

— 1 The Best Interest of Minors in Religious Options

At present, no law in Spain prohibits circumcision of males. Indeed, Spanish law favors circumcision, providing special exemptions and dispensations that are not available for other medical procedures.

Parents have legal responsibility on their children, looking after them, seeking their physical and moral integrity[6]. The lawmakers establish a legal presumption on a natural instinct, the search of the best interest of our children, but State could become *pater* if that conjecture is evidenced false.

When will the presumption against interference in a parental decision be rebutted? It is clear that the mere existence of an alternative decision, closer to the child's objective best interests, is not enough to rob a parent of his decision-making authority. It is worth noting that, in any case, in Irish and Spanish law, *the child's welfare, although paramount, is closely aligned with the welfare of the family as a whole*. The Irish and Spanish courts interpret the rights of individual family members harmoniously where possible, recognizing the interdependent relationship of parent and child[7]. Thus, the Irish and Spanish courts discover conflicts of interest between parent and child only in the rarest cases. But, where such conflicts occur, the courts have explicitly said that the presumption in favor of parental decision-making is unrelated to the goodness or correctness of the choices a family makes for its children.

Ritual circumcision may be legally qualified as a manifestation of the right to practice religion or belief. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which the Spain has ratified, provides under Article 14: "States Parties shall respect the freedom of thought, conscience and religion.. .and shall respect the rights and duties of parents to provide direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child".

To deny a Jewish or Muslim child a circumcision removes from him the ability fully to participate in the religious life of his community and as such undermines his freedom of religion[8].

Religious reasons and cultural traditions are facing medical and criminal reasons. Circumcision is an intervention on the body which produces irreversible or permanent modifications, but is considered a low risk intervention from the medical point of view, the effects that are not harmful or dangerous to health as it does not alter the functionality or sexual reproductive man and even defends his conduct by infants prophylactic reasons or for hygienic reasons in some environments.

From the point of view of its effects, it is not a practice that threatens public order, surpassing the limits of freedom of religion or belief. However, the operation is performed on infants, who do not have a minimum capacity of discernment, whose parents make the decision to be acted upon her body,

raising the issue of possible usurpation of personal rights[9] as the physical integrity[10], of which only the minor may have.

A doctrinal sector understands that parents are not entitled to make the decision to circumcise their children and if they do, do a wrongful act prohibited by law because they cannot represent the child if it is his personal rights, and so therefore cannot replace him in the exercise of their religious choices.

However, this interpretation is inconsistent with the right of parents to educate the children in the exercise of religion according to their convictions, provided they do not impair their physical or mental health or to their full development (Article 5 of the UN Declaration of 25 November 1981 on the removal of intolerance and discrimination in matters of religion). Religious neutrality is a duty of the state, but not for parents, who are entitled to initiate and train them in their rituals, ceremonies and practices within the framework provided by law[11].

Therefore, parents are entitled to decide because they are covered by their own right, not his son, according to Spanish Constitution, art. 27. 3[12] and Religious Freedom Act, art. 2.1[13].

Despite a potential clash of loyalties for parents, States meet their national and European requirements and the needs of a democratic society, the principle of social adequacy and the principle of proportionality in any action, even religious, especially if it involves minors.

Lawmakers and Courts cannot judge religious beliefs or a dogma of faith. The dialogue between faith and reason, or rationality of faith, warns the contemporary atheism of the imperative need to avoid state totalitarianism options regarding religious freedom of its citizens[14].

Although Constitutional, International and EU guidelines require to parents a component of reasonableness, it could not coincide with the dialogue between faith and reason of a singular religion because they are not identical languages or not come from the same source.

— 2 Integrity in Secular and Religious Languages

However in 1971 and again in 1975 The American Academy of Pediatrics concluded that routine circumcision of all male babies was not medically

warranted. Benjamin Spock, whose best-selling medical guide for parents had originally endorsed circumcision, changed his mind. In light of current medical opinion, he reported, the operation seemed "unnecessary and at least mildly dangerous". The medical debate continues unabated.

The controversy has led to call for government intervention and the prohibiting of male circumcision. If the courts were to hold that a parent could not consent to a child's circumcision, the circumcision could constitute the tort of battery and the crime of occasioning actual bodily harm.

In Spain is not declared illegal this religious practice, both ritual and medical circumcision, in short, are freely available under law, exempting bad practices against physical integrity producing injuries[15], psychological, sexual or moral harm[16].

Arises who is to perform it. To the extent that it is an act that produces changes in the human body, the general rule is that it should be practiced by medical professionals, whatever their motivation, prophylactic, therapeutic or ritual, and whatever the age which is performed. But if you intervene on infants, some argue that, given the ease and simplicity of the act may be performed by *a minister of religion* have recognized competence in the practice of this nature, whether or not medical professional, always with scrupulous observance standards of hygiene and asepsis and further medical follow-up implementation.

In a broad sense, it is understood that medical treatment for body modification, made according to the rules set by science, to improve physical or mental health of the person or their beauty. It must be prescribed by professionals, who must act according to the *lex artis*, corresponding to the tenets of ethical code. To such conclusions Italian Bioethics Committee arrives in his paper on "Circumcision: bioethical aspects" of September 27, 1998.

If a child dies after being circumcised by their parents, convinced of complying an imperative religious duty, or by a minister of religion[17] convinced that such an operation is a specific function of his office, we might ask whether such action as an act of faith, even being illegal or criminally punished, it could be the result of an unavoidable error[18]. Furthermore, it is considered a mitigating cause, or causes to act as powerful stimuli that produced outburst, blindness or other similar entity status passionate, and have proceeded to blame repair the

damage to the victim, or decrease their effects. However, the blood relationship or of affection are considered an aggravating criminal liability.

Awareness of citizens of a state, sometimes not identified with religious citizenship, so that faith and reason are not adequately ally when circumcision is practiced in a foreign country with different rules and traditions.

A way of avoiding a fatal result is the possible funding of religious circumcision for public health in Spain. Religious freedom is not configured as a performance based law, but the promotional function that corresponds to the authorities by express mandate of the Constitution (Article 9.2) justify the assumption by the State of the provision of such a nature, though, to our trial, this should be the result of voluntary agreement State / Confession and reflected in a bilateral instrument.

III Legal and Religious Pluralism. The Two-Pronged Challenge of Democratic States

When we think of ritual circumcision, we must consider that accepting religious practices that come from a sacred text, or simply followed the tradition from generation to generation with deep religious significance, involving the reception of religious law, written or oral.

The matter of legal pluralism or cultural and / or religious pluralism is the concurrence of rules with different sources inside the same territory, and cultures that become standards that guide the life of one sector of society, are duties of conscience and imperative behavior patterns.

In addition to complex decisions of religious freedom of the parents with a secular translation of lawmakers, internal autonomy of religions is usually immersed in an intense political debate.

Andrea Büchler[19] deemed to be granted autonomy to the people to decide the applicable law. However, in this personal option is also discussed the 'ability to choose without being coerced', especially in family matters.

The national democratic management of cultural and religious diversity and dilemmas of identity require '*reasonable accommodation*' through the recognition of self-governance of religions. It should be noted that the reasonable accommodation stems from the fundamental principles of equality,

equity and fairness, but the rule of equality sometimes requires different treatments and therefore no privileged. The absolute rigor of the law is not always synonymous with fairness, flexibility is required.

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6. Artículo 154. Código Civil: ……. La patria potestad se ejercerá siempre en beneficio de los hijos, de acuerdo con su personalidad, y con respeto a su integridad física y psicológica.
Esta potestad comprende los siguientes deberes y facultades:
1º.- Velar por ellos, tenerlos en su compañía, alimentarlos, educarlos y procurarles una formación integral.
2º.- Representarlos y administrar sus bienes.
Si los hijos tuvieren suficiente juicio deberán ser oídos siempre antes de adoptar decisiones que les afecten.
Los padres podrán, en el ejercicio de su potestad, recabar el auxilio de la autoridad.
This article is modified by Act: Ley 54/2007, de 28 de diciembre, de Adopción internacional («B.O.E.» 29 diciembre).
7. Máiréad Enright. "Whither White Western Values? Comparative perspectives on culturally motivated decision-making for the Child". Hibernian Law Journal. Vol.7, nº 1 (2007): 2-3.
8. Simon Baum. "Religious circumcision: Free from interference?" UCL Jurisprudence Review. 1 (1999): 17-18; Irene Briones. "The revival of religion". Available at htttp://www.cesnur.org/2008/London _cyberpro.htm: 12-14 (09/07/2014).

9. Artículo 162. Los padres que ostenten la patria potestad tienen la representación legal de sus hijos menores no emancipados.
Se exceptúan:
1º. Los actos relativos a derechos de la personalidad u otros que el hijo, de acuerdo con las Leyes y con sus condiciones de madurez, pueda realizar por sí mismo.
2º. Aquellos en que exista conflicto de intereses entre los padres y el hijo.
10. Artículo 170 Cc. El padre o la madre podrán ser privados total o parcialmente de su potestad por sentencia fundada en el incumplimiento de los deberes inherentes a la misma o dictada en causa criminal o matrimonial.
11. María Moreno Antón. "Libertad religiosa y salud en clave multicultural". Available at http://www.imdee.com/descargas/archivos/02_11_20_308.pdf (18/07/2014).
12. 'Los poderes públicos garantizan el derecho que asiste a los padres para que sus hijos reciban la formación religiosa y moral que esté de acuerdo con sus propias convicciones'.
13. Artículo 2. 1. La libertad religiosa y de culto garantizada por la Constitución comprende, con la consiguiente inmunidad de coacción, el derecho de toda persona a:
a) Profesar las creencias religiosas que libremente elija o no profesar ninguna; cambiar de confesión o abandonar la que tenía, manifestar libremente sus propias creencias religiosas o la ausencia de las mismas, o abstenerse de declarar sobre ellas.
c) Recibir e impartir enseñanza e información religiosa de toda índole, ya sea oralmente, por escrito o por cualquier otro procedimiento; elegir para sí, y para los menores no emancipados e incapacitados, bajo su dependencia, dentro y fuera del ámbito escolar, la educación religiosa y moral que esté de acuerdo con sus propias convicciones.
14. Vid. Meeting with the representatives of Sciences. University of Regensburg. Available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2006/september/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20060912_university-regensburg_en.html Ratzinger.
15. Artículo 147. 1 Código Penal. El que, por cualquier medio o procedimiento, causare a otro una lesión que menoscabe su integridad corporal o su salud física o mental, será castigado como reo del delito de lesiones con la pena de prisión de seis meses a tres años, siempre que la lesión requiera objetivamente para su sanidad, además de una primera asistencia facultativa, tratamiento médico o quirúrgico. La simple vigilancia o seguimiento facultativo del curso de la lesión no se considerará tratamiento médico.
16. Artículo 149. 1 Cp. El que causara a otro, por cualquier medio o procedimiento, la pérdida o la inutilidad de un órgano o miembro principal, o de un sentido, la impotencia, la esterilidad, una grave deformidad, o una grave enfermedad somática o psíquica, será castigado con la pena de prisión de seis a 12 años. 2. El que causara a otro una mutilación genital en cualquiera de sus manifestaciones será castigado con la pena de prisión de seis a 12 años. Si la víctima fuera menor o incapaz, será aplicable la pena de inhabilitación especial para el ejercicio de la patria potestad, tutela, curatela, guarda o acogimiento por tiempo de cuatro a 10 años, si el juez lo estima adecuado al interés del menor o incapaz. Artículo 177 Cp. Si en los delitos descritos en los artículos precedentes, además del atentado a la integridad moral, se produjere lesión o daño a la vida, integridad física, salud, libertad sexual o bienes de la víctima o de un tercero, se castigarán los hechos separadamente con la pena que les corresponda por los delitos o faltas cometidos, excepto cuando aquél ya se halle especialmente castigado por la Ley.
17. 7º. El que obre en cumplimiento de un deber o en el ejercicio legítimo de un derecho, oficio o cargo.
18. Art. 14. 1 Cp. El error invencible sobre un hecho constitutivo de la infracción penal excluye la responsabilidad criminal. Si el error, atendidas las circunstancias del hecho y las personales del autor, fuera vencible, la infracción será castigada, en su caso, como imprudente. 3. El error invencible sobre la ilicitud del hecho constitutivo de la infracción penal excluye la responsabilidad criminal. Si el error fuera vencible, se aplicará la pena inferior en uno o dos grados.
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Information and Religion

David Chapman

Abstract

Increasing numbers of workers in an ever-widening range of disciplines have been discovering that a theory of information provides new insights into their field. Hans Christian von Baeyer, for example, argued in his 2003 book that information is the new language of science. Wolfgang Hofkirchner argues that our understanding of information is undergoing a paradigm shift with far-reaching consequences, and the philosopher of Information Luciano Floridi has put forward the thesis that information underpins a fourth revolution (following the three due to Copernicus, Darwin and Freud) which repositions our sense of identity.

Albert Borgmann identified three roles for information: information *about* reality; information *for* reality and information *as* reality. This paper explores information *about*, *for* and *as* religion.

Information *about* religion concerns the use of information-thinking to describe and understand religion. Information *for* religion concerns information as a tool of religion. Information *as* religion is information replacing religion or delivering a religion itself.

The potential scope of an exploration of the value of information ideas to religion is very large. This presentation suggests a framework for thinking about the field and points to a few specific examples.

Keywords

Religion, Information, Information Theory, Cybernetics, Semiotics

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Introduction

Alongside the rise of digital technologies in the past few decades has been an increasing awareness of the importance of understanding the nature of information, and a recognition in an increasing range of disciplines that understanding the discipline requires understanding information.

Hans Christian von Baeyer[1] drew attention to one aspect of the new interest in information in his book "Information: the new language of science", where he suggested that science was increasingly being discussed using the language of information. Diverse fields other than science are also finding merit in using the language of information. A few examples include art[2], literature[3], and architecture[4].

In recent years there has also been work that draws on informational ideas for religion (see some of the work referenced below in the section on information for religion), and further back some of the pioneers of cybernetics explored the relationship of systems and cybernetics thinking to ideas in religion[5].

The aim of this paper is to draw together recent informational ideas of relevance to religion in order to frame an investigation into whether there are insights useful for the study of religion to be gained through exploiting the language of information. The paper uses the categorisation put forward by Albert Borgmann[6] for information in relation to the world: information *about* reality; information *for* reality and information *as* reality; and explores information *about*, *for* and *as* religion.

First, though, it is necessary to address the question of what information and religion are.

What is information?

Broadly speaking, we know how to measure information, but we don't know what it is. In the words of Terrence Deacon[7]:

> For more than half a century we have known how to measure the information-conveying capacity of any given communication medium, yet we cannot give an account of how this relates to the content that this signal may or may not represent. These are serious shortcomings.

The most widely used definition of information is some variation of 'meaningful data', such Sue Holwell's "data plus meaning in a particular context at a particular time"[8] but like all definitions it is itself only data which requires context to inform. Gregory Bateson's description of information as "a difference that makes a difference"[9] may be more useful, but another approach is a relative definition based on distinguishing information from matter and energy.

Consider, for example, a digital device such as a smart phone. We can identify three categories of matter, energy and information, somewhat reminiscent of the way that the ancient world identified the fundamental elements of air, earth, fire and water[10]. Matter is the metal, plastic, glass, silicon used to build the phone energy the charged battery and then, what is important about the

phone, the information: the multimedia (text, audio and video) but also the design of the phone.

What is religion?

If information is difficult to define, so too is religion.

For the purposes of this paper Paul Tillich's suggestion that to be religious is "to be grasped by an ultimate concern"[11] is taken together with the idea that a religion will include:

— a particular world-view or grand-narrative, which may or may not include the supernatural but usually includes creation myths;

— an ethical framework of some sort;

— a personal or cultural identity.

Information about Religion

Information *about* religion concerns the use of information-thinking to describe and understand religion, which might be described as a scientific study of religion.

It was suggested above that identity is one defining feature of religion. Identity is inherently a concept of information[12], and the definition of information as a "difference that makes a difference" could be an identity-based definition of religion too. To be a Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Jew… is to be different from someone who is not the same as you, and that difference makes a difference to your life. As digital communications break down geographic separation's ability to maintain distinctions (so that 'geography is history'), the informational nature of identity becomes more apparent and there is a three-way relationship between information, identity and religion[13].

But do we get anything out of thinking of religion in this way? What do we learn about religion from thinking of religious identity in information terms? To take one example, information has been shown to be inherently provisional. It is not that information sometimes changes: it is that information cannot be other than provisional[14]. Religious identity, therefore, from an informational perspective, cannot be anything other than provisional.

Behind the definition of information as the difference that makes a difference is a recognition that information is founded on differences. A religion seen as information likewise exists only by being different from other religions.

Creation stories can be interpreted in information terms of difference and identity.

From the Hebrew scriptures the Genesis description of God separating night from day and land from sea has echoes of the 'difference that make a difference", and the same link can be made to the role of Yin and Yang in Taoism. This aligns with a fundamental insight from information: that there is nothing without difference, and so creation is the creation of difference. Similarly, St John's gospel in the Christian New Testament begins with the words: "In the beginning was the word", expressing the primacy of information.

Names are very important to many religions, both as part of creation myths, in which giving things names is part of how they are created, but also with naming ceremonies found in most religions, and this takes us back yet again to identity. In Genesis again, God names 'night', 'day', 'sky' and 'land', and then later "the man gave names to all livestock and to the birds of the heavens and to every beast of the field". From Native American beliefs we have "The ground, water and grass say, the Great Spirit has given us our names. We have these names and hold these names"[15]

Associated with a religion are religious texts and/or other artifacts. Understanding a religion requires an understanding of the artifacts, and a perspective from information recognises them as informational objects. If information is meaningful data, then the artifacts of religion are data, and we need to understand how they are meaningful. This is the territory of semiotics, and it is not a new idea to apply semiotics to religion[16] which is relevant not only to the artifacts of religion but the rituals as well. However, new thinking on information provides a different context.

Information for Religion

Information for religion concerns information as a tool of religion, which might be described as the practitioner perspective.

Writers coming from within various religious traditions have drawn on informational thinking either for apologetics or to formulate doctrine in line with concepts of information theories. The following brief examples reflect the back-

ground of the author's background of a western, largely Christian, tradition. Further research is required to identify the use of informational ideas in other world religions.

From a Christian tradition, *Information and the Nature of Reality* (Davies and Gregersen, eds[17]) contains a collection of chapters exploring some of the possibilities arising from a changed perception of reality which displaces materialism/physicalism and emphasises the primacy of information. Arthur Peacocke, for example, proposes "The science of complexity: a new theological resource"[18] and Keith Ward talks of "God as the ultimate informational principle"[19]

Information theory has also been harnessed to justify creationism, most extensively in Werner Gitt's *In the Beginning was Information*[20], though this is not supported by some other Christian writers[21].

From an Islamic perspective, Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd in *Rethinking the Qur'an*[22] explores the communicative dimension of the Quran ("the Qur'an as discourse"), distinguishing this from an approach which reduces it to a text alone. Although not explicitly expressed in the language of information, this is inherently an informational approach. Similarly, Amer Gheituri and Arsalan Golfam combine the informational concepts of communication and semiotics in *God-Man Communication in the Quran: A Semiological Approach*[23].

Information as Religion

The idea that science is a substitute for religion is not new. It has been a theme in the writing of, for example, Mary Midgley (see "Science as Salvation"[24] and "Evolution as Religion"[25]) and John Gray[26].

In the introduction to the 2002 edition of "Evolution as Religion" Midgley says that she was inspired to explore the idea of Evolution as Religion after seeing "certain remarkable prophetic and metaphysical passages that appeared suddenly in scientific books about evolution, often in their last chapter". This 'last chapter' phenomenon has been happening in books about information, too, and suggests the authors are "grasped by an ultimate concern".

The sense of being grasped by an ultimate concern can be illustrated by the language which appears out of proportion with the subject matter, as may be illustrated by a number of quotes.

Vlatko Vedral[27]

"Information is the underlying thread that connects all phenomena we see around us as well as explaining their origin. Our reality is ultimately made up of information."

Gregory Chaitin, discussing Algorithmic Information Theory (AIT)[28]:

"AIT will lead to the major breakthrough of 21st century mathematics, which will be information-theoretic and complexity based characterizations and analyses of what is life, what is mind, what is intelligence, what is consciousness, of why life has to appear spontaneously and then to evolve."

David Deutsch's Constructor Theory[29]

"There is one big thing that I'm pretty sure the constructor theoretic way of looking at physics has to offer our worldview in terms of everyday life: and that is optimism. … the optimistic view is not that problems will not occur, but that all problems and all evils are caused by lack of knowledge, and the converse of that is that all evils are soluble given the right knowledge."

Luciano Floridi on information ethics (IE)[30]

"IE argues that there is something more elementary and fundamental than life and pain, namely Being, understood at an informational level of abstraction as equivalent to the infosphere, and entropy, understood metaphysically as any decrease or impoverishment of Being/infosphere."

Beyond the general association of religion with being grasped by an ultimate concern, it was suggested earlier that there are three features to a religion: a world-view/grand-narrative; an ethical framework; and a personal and cultural identity.

A world-view or grand-narrative. In the work of all of the writers quoted above there is a conviction that thinking grounded in informational concepts provides a

basis for a coherent worldview explaining fundamental questions of life. For some of them, the formulation based on information provides a creation story, such as Vedral's discussion of "Creation ex Hihilo"[31] and Chaitin's claim that Algorithmic Information can explain "why life has to appear spontaneously and then to evolve". There is also the work of Wolfgang Hofkirchner which explicitly calls for an information science paradigm – a new "Weltanschauung"[32] – that Hofkirchner believes can provide a means of addressing the global problems arising from technological development (including climate change), enabling a global, sustainable, information society[33].

An ethical framework. Good and evil are often equated with information/structure and entropy/randomness respectively, but this is explicit and central to Luciano Floridi's Information Ethics (IE). IE is, for Floridi, a macroethic in which the fundamental good is existence, being, as an informational entity, and morality is assessed in terms of creation, destruction or harm to informational entities.

A personal and cultural identity. Although there are academic communities clustered around those researching information and there are international organizations and conferences such as those of the International Society for Information Science[34], it would be difficult to claim that this demonstrates any more of a cultural identity than would be found in the societies and conferences of any other discipline.

Another way in which work on information has resonance with religions is when it makes reference to meaning and is implicitly or explicitly teleological. In this context, reference should be made to the work of Søren Brier on cybersemiotics. As reflected in the title of Brier's primary account of the theory, *Cybersemiotics: Why Information is not enough*[35], Brier's work draws on information theories but is strongly transdisciplinary. Importantly, cybersemiotics draws on phenomenological awareness and intentionality arguing that any explanation of life must include the experiential aspects in a scientific manner[36].

Conclusion

The purpose of this paper is to frame an inquiry into the role of information in religion. Drawing on Albert Borgmann's classification it has explored information about, for and as religion.

Information about religion is the use of the language of information in a scientific study of information. Ideas from semiotics have been used extensively in the study of religions in the past, but there appears to have been little work using the language of information more explicitly and this paper suggests that new informational thinking could fruitfully be applied to the study of religions.

Information for religion is the use of informational ideas by practitioners of religions. Informational ideas have been exploited for apologetics and for new formulations of theology from a Christian perspective and to a lesser extent in Islam.

Information as religion is the perspective of information as a religion in its own right or as a substitute for religion. Some of the writing about information demonstrates a religious fervor, and many of the workers in the field believe that informational thinking can not only address the fundamental questions of humankind (such as the origin and meaning of life) and but offers a means to overcome some of the most pressing problems facing humanity. In this respect, some recent writing about information looks very much like religion.

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Endnotes

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Genetically Modified Crops
Why Europe is against?

Ksenia Gerasimova

Abstract

This paper addresses the question of perception of science and its role in the contemporary Europe, illustrated with the example of genetically modified (GM) crops. The discovery of the recombinant DNA technology in the 1970s has opened a wide range of opportunities for research and practical applications. Europe, with its traditional established science, was leading in the research. Since then, however, Europe has become a stronghold of the GM opposition. This paper will investigate the factors that brought in such situation. This will include a role of civil society in communicating and interpreting results of the scientific research, the contemporary phenomenon of advocacy scientists (Grundmann, 2011) and a historical-philosophical question of importance of traditions to the Europeans.

Keywords

Europe, Genetically-Modified Crops, Science.

Introduction

Genetically Modified (GM) crops is an interesting example of interaction of science with business, civil society and general public. Europe is particularly known for its opposition to GM agriculture. The result of this opposition is the absence of GM food in Europe. While the main object of the debate, the genetically engineered plants, is a product of scientific research, the debate has gone beyond the discussion of purely scientific topics and turned into 'an ideological debate inseparable from political and economic conflicts, where rational thinking is mixed with irrationality and hysteria'[1]. The opposition to GMOs can be found around the world, but Europe is the current stronghold of the anti-GM movement.

Thus, this brief essay aims to examine the causes of such strong resistance in Europe opposing a seemingly scientifically proven product and understand the regional specificities. The case of European debates over GM crops is a real complex one. First, it can reveal some of the complexities in the European inter-

ests in sustaining competition in international agricultural market. Secondly, it is a good illustration of 'advocacy science'[2] and can provide interesting insights in recent challenges faced by the science to communicate its work to wider public and capacity of civil society's networks to influence and even shape public opinion. While some of the anti-GM arguments have stemmed from religious convictions at the beginning, the further development of stand of the anti-GM opposition is centered on multinationals and trust to science. Finally, the paper will try to address the diversity of opinions at national level.

Brief History of Opposition to GM crops in Europe and Possible Reasoning

First of all, one should refer to the statistics on European resistance to GM crops. Only 27% of Europeans indicated a positive attitude to GM food according to a 2005 Eurobarometer poll, which is still a rise in comparison to 21% in 2002[3] . While national public opinions do vary from year to year, it is possible to identify that Austrians and Germans have the highest degree of mistrust to GM technology: 41% and 33% respondents in two countries assessed effects of biotechnology as negative in 2010. The German public has also claimed to be the most knowledgeable on GM foods, with 95% of the population have heard of the GM technology[4]. So what are the reasons behind this opposition?

As a matter of fact, genetic research started in Europe. Europe has greatly contributed to genetics: Charles Darwin, Gregor Mendel, Freidrich Miescher and Archibald Garrod, Francis Crick were the Europeans who laid out important foundations for the contemporary research in genes. The Flemish Prof. Marc van Montagu led the research on transfer of genes between bacteria and plants and founded one of the first biotech companies as early as in 1982.

The first approvals of field trials of GM plants started in the early 1990s. The first commercial GM product was GM tomato. There were several research to produce GM tomato, and successful version of biotech tomato came from Don Grierson's program at the University of Nottingham. Campbell Soup Company has granted rights to use the genetic technology on fresh tomatoes to the American company Calgene produced first commercial genetically engineered tomatoes (Flavr Savr) for the American market in 1994. The licensing of the same technology for processed tomatoes went to Zeneca, a biotech company based in the UK[5] . Thus, in 1996 Zeneca released canned tomatoes for the

British market and they were sold initially successful through Sainsbury's and Safeway supermarkets. The same year was also known for the discussion of dangerous impact on human health from bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and for the British public food safety became a sensitive topic, resulting in "widespread public distrust of regulators and scientific assessments"[6].

Another incident which outburst public distrust to genetic science was the Puzstai affair increased even more this distrust. Arpad Puzstai, a Hungarian biologist, was working for the Rowett Research Institute in Aberdeen. His project involved the transfer of gene from a snowdrop plant to potato. In 1998 he gave an interview, where he said: "If I had the choice I would certainly not eat it," and "I find it's very unfair to use our fellow citizens as guinea pigs"[7].

Anti-GM movement and its media took up the argument and framed it as 'Frankenstein food' and compared it to Chernobyl catastrophe[8]. Puzstai was criticized for his public appearance and lost his job. Biologists, such as Nina Fedoroff published their critique of his researching, blaming for methodological flaws[9]. Since then, Puzstai was claimed a hero by NGOs and has given more than 200 lectures on GMOs. In 2009 he received the Stuttgart Peace Prize for his advocacy. As a result of this case, activists started to ask a question 'Can scientists still be trusted?'[10], which was then translated in political decision making process.

The European authorities adopted with the Novel Foods Regulation in 1997, which also covered GM food. However, it was 'largely inoperable', as there were no specifics on implementation provided, individual member state had to define thresholds, testing methods, products to testing and the content of labels. This led national governments to adopt their own measures. Austria initiated the process, by being first to ban GMOs in 1997. This example was followed by Luxemburg, France, Greece and Germany. And in 1999 the Council of Environmental Ministers stalled the approval process until updated regulations were adopted[11].

As a result, less than 100 field trials were approved over the period 2001-2006. In 2006 the moratorium was removed, but many experiments were still disrupted[12].

The new president of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker in his opening statement claimed his plans to review the legislation on authorization

of GMO and aimed "to give the majority view of democratically elected governments at least the same weight as scientific advice, notably when it comes to the safety of the food we eat and the environment in which we live[13] .

In contrast, the USA, whose scientists closely followed their European counterparts, have created more favorable conditions for approving field trials and patents and have the highest acreage of biotech crops in the world[14] .

What seems to be a matter of internal choice has direct international implications. In 2003 the USA, jointly with Canada and Argentina, opened a case for dispute settlement panel in WTO demanding the European Union to justify its moratorium on GM imports[15]. Another example of the influence by the European anti-GM stand is Africa. African producers have been receiving informal messages from the EC trade representatives over a substantial period of time[16]. Robert Zoellick, the US Trade representative in Africa have even called the European policymakers 'Luddites' and pinned African rejection of GM food aid on them[17].

Economists have identified three possible explanations for the European strict policy on GM crops. First, the European policy makers run the anti-GM regime as a part of protectionist policy to allow European companies 'to catch up with American competitors'. Secondly, for European farmers it is economically beneficial to remain GM-free. This can be partially proved by the fact that in the densely populated Europe farmers would need buffer zones between GM crops and non-GM which would ultimately increase the costs. In contrast, the American land resources allow to avoid zoning. The third explanation is that governments are 'appeasing the anti-GM protesters'[18].

While Jackson and Andersen, cited above, do not consider this version as the main explanation, one has to add to the hypothesis the fact that the European Union is much more heterogeneous institutional environment than the USA. European politicians come from different backgrounds and susceptible to lobbying from different groups. For example, the EU has funded a number of environmental NGOs active in anti-GM propaganda and also two GM projects AMIGA and GRACE which are kept 'in shadow' rather on purpose[19]. The recent example of Prof. Glover, a Scottish biologist, who served as chief scientific adviser to the president of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso and made public her public views on GM, is an example

of how much power anti-GM movement has in the European politics. In November 2014 her post was disappearing, allegedly because of the lobbying from the European green lobby[20].

Role of Civil Society Groups in GM Opposition and their Tactics

The importance of the economic argument should not be downplayed, but the role of civil society groups in Europe to influence political processes and form public opinion has been exceptionally high. Two strategies of civil society groups' lobbying can be identified: direct blockage and 'advocacy science'.

The first strategy is aimed to physically destroy crops. It has been adopted by a number of radical NGOs, particularly Greenpeace. Greenpeace first engaged in the debate over GM crops in 1994. By the end of the century, the campaign reached its momentum accompanied with much attention from media, who picked up 'the problem with public consent' and invented the term 'Frankenstein food'. In 1997 Greenpeace protesters blocked the ship carrying genetically modified soybeans in Rotterdam[21]. In 2000 protesters blocked a ship off Anglesey, UK and placed a banner with the words "Europe says no to GM"[22]. On numerous occasions protesters destroyed trial crops, in 2000 in the UK, in 2006 in crops were destroyed in France, in 2010 in France and Spain, in 2011 in Germany, just to name a few. Such campaigns appeared to be viral, although they have been arranged by a different, rather independent groups, since Greenpeace operates as a network[23].

Another, more elaborated, strategy aims to question the validity of scientific research on GM crops, lead their own research and put the public in anti-GM mood. For example, Sir Peter Melchett, former Greenpeace-UK director, opposed Prof. Sir David Baulcombe in the Norfolk area during the meeting with locals to explain about GM trials. The biologist was outvoiced and a local NGO Norfolk Genetic Information Network tried 'to undermine credibility' of the scientist by saying on their website that he lied about his research[24].

Another example of such 'advocacy science' is the Seralini case. Gilles-Éric Séralini, professor of molecular biology at the Caen University, France, chairs the scientific board of the NGO CRIIGEN (Committee of Independent Research and Information on Genetic Engineering). To promote his research, which was retracted by the journal that had initially published it, Seralini and

his supported created a website called GMO Seralini, which is 'owned and maintained by a group of concerned citizens and scientists'. The managing editor Claire Robinson, a British activist, has also teamed up with the English anti-GM biologist Michael Antoniou. The website is illustrated with stomach disturbing photos of internal parts of rats with pathologies[25].

The comparison of two cases – the Pusztai affair and the Seralini affair, reveals common tactics. Both scientists have turned to civil society's domain when they could not win the debate in the traditional academic space and formatted the presentation of their research into a different language that tuned in with fears of an average citizen over biotech and food. That is what is called 'advocacy science', when boundaries between scientific research and civil society activism have started to dissolve, as the 'lay' element often overshadows the official scientific community.

It is also common for anti-GM groups to tune into emotions of their audiences and that is why it is so difficult for scientists to lead a scientific debate with activists. This is how Rao describes an experience of a German scientist:

> I went to a panel at the nearest high school with a green member of the state parliament. There were 500 people in attendance and it was packed. I was winning the argument, and suddenly (his opponent started to scream and cry. So I said to her, "don't you think we should stop being so emotional and be more objective/factual about this?" At that point a 50 year lady in the audience stood up and said, "Mr X., are you only a brain or do you actually have a heart in this issue, too?' That's when it became very clear to me that...the problem for the big corporations is that they are already anonymous and faceless, perfect target for activists, you can't win with the rational staff, have to show a human face[26].

Another point is that these debates focus at addressing popular fears and ethical concerns. For example, a Greenpeace activist explained his participation in the trial destruction:

> 'When I saw those yellow rapeseed fields in spring, I would want to cry, because I felt that in some years, even this will be totally artificial plants, constructs made by humans rather than nature, and where are we going with that? For me that is the end of nature. ...We should not play God, not only based on ethical issues but also based on the ethics

of environmental protection. It makes sense that a rose cannot make babies together with a horse!'[27].

Some have tried to explain the high number of concerns about GM technology by the lack of comprehension provided by scientists and 'scientific jargon' which led to misunderstanding and even hostility in public[28]. Even scientists themselves have started to raise questions about science: either resolving uncertainties 'through a social process, and not by inexorable logic driven by a set of crucial experiments' or ignoring 'other human ideas' in the Dawkins style. For Perry, both sounds counterproductive and there is a need in a third approach that could even include the Christian belief of a scientist[29].

Thus, the European debates over GM crops seem not to allow a scientific discussion based on the supremacy of logic over emotions and uncontested authority of science. That is particular unique for Europe, whose civilization Weber praised for its 'empirical knowledge, reflection on problems of the cosmos and of life, philosophical and theological wisdom of the most profound sort'[30].

Weberian Questions: Logic, Tradition and Religion in Europe and GM debates

Another question, rather in the Weberian style, came up through the discussion of this paper, and was about the national peculiarities and preferences about GM crops. A year ago I had a chat with an Italian sitting next to me in the airplain. The person was convinced that GM food tasted badly and could be against the ideals of the Italian cuisine which builds its strengths through freshness and natural tastiness of its ingredients. While some scientists insist that biotechnology can even improve the taste of tomatoes, the flag ingredient of the Italian cuisine[31]; in the field of gastronomy, however, the concept of progress is often misleading. As the historians of the Italian cooking culture Capatti and Montanari have shown, 'the most archaic procedures may turn out to be superior to modern techniques' and 'taste is never simply a reflection of innovation'[32]. Many European countries are famous for being proud of their traditions and this may lead to resistance of change[33]. And in fact tradition is 'social inheritance, which is subconscious ("ancestors have not consciously directed us and we have not sought their guidance, we the moderns cannot escape the force of the traditional influences in the actions of living from day to day, from youth to old age")[34]. So perhaps one may suggest that the European loyalty to traditions can also contribute

to the rejection by Europeans to eat genetically engineered food, given that the region does not face food insecurity, as for example Africa does.

To continue the Weberian line, I was asked by a co-member of the panel, if religion (Catholicism and Protestantism) correlated with acceptance of GM crops. Indeed, Weber proclaimed 'the spirit capitalism' and distinguished that the Catholic valued the most security and the Protestant were more entrepreneurial[35]. In terms of GM crops acceptance, this does not seem to be such case. As shown in the introduction, based on the opinion polls, the two very anti-GM countries in Europe in 2010 were Austria and Germany. While Austria is in majority Catholic, Germany has more Protestants than Catholics. However, what seems likely to be a hypothesis is the sensitivity of the question of genetics to the two societies being afraid of resurrecting the Nazi eugenics and genetic discrimination of the past, the fact which is often used by NGOs and politicians[36]. It is also true that two countries have the oldest tradition of organic agriculture which is often opposed to GM crops. The two founding fathers of organic movement, Rudolf Steiner and Ehrenfried Pfeifer were of Austrian and German origin.

Conclusion

To sum, the debates over GM crops is a contested matter. Since the 1990s or even earlier Europe has become a bulwark of anti-GM movement which thrives in the region and dominates regional politics. There could be a number of speculative explanations for this trend. The economic reasons include protectionist agricultural policies and higher costs for European farmers to grow GM crops than in the USA. Europe has a well-established civil society and the institutional environment favouring different social networks and their close links to governments and ruling European institutions, which allows them to influence policy-making in many areas, including biotechnology policy.

The debate has also raised questions of philosophy of science about validity and limits of scientific research to the attention of wider public. The traditional role of a scientist working in a laboratory is now challenged with new needs to introduce research results in a comprehensible manner to wider audiences, to build up PR and branding skills. The border between science and civil society has become very lean and GM crops debates are the perfect example of the current society's phenomenon – 'advocacy science'.

Finally, it might be useful for future research on GM debates to investigate the national differences and perceptions of GM in Europe and investigate what role traditions and different religions play in it.

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SECTION V

Language, Philosophy, Anthropology, Psychology, Religion

THE CONTRIBUTION OF PORTUGUESE THOUGHT TO THE MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF CULTURES & PEOPLES

Chairs

—

Jorge Cunha & José Acácio Aguiar de Castro

Participants

—

José Acácio Aguiar de Castro
José Pedro Angélico
António Martins da Costa
Jorge Cunha
Manuel Lázaro Pulido

Presentation

Jorge Cunha & José Acácio Aguiar de Castro

The ancient, modern and contemporary Portuguese tradition holds excellent cultural, philosophical, theological as well as ethical references in order to surpass the dividing particularism and the segregating prejudice of cultures and peoples. From Pedro Hispano to Agostinho da Silva, Portuguese thinkers granted privilege to the openness towards the other, to the exchange of ideas and to the sharing of experiences, which enable a closer relationship between human beings, albeit their diversity. The following contributions explore the validity and legitimacy of such perspectives. In order to legitimate — or disaffirm — such idea, we invited those who could be concerned with these issues to share the fruits of their reflection and research. This discussion provided the material now presented in this chapter.

The "Universal Man (Homem Universal)" by Teixeira de Pascoaes, and The Human Rights

José Acácio Aguiar de Castro

Abstract

Teixeira de Pascoaes is a Portuguese poet and philosopher whose work, in the first period, was dominated by a gnostic and pantheistic vision of the world, although with a gradual an approach to Christianity .

There he developed a universal perspective of humanity, where we find values which we consider to be of high importance to the conception of human rights a few decades later. In this sense, Teixeira de Pascoaes may be regarded as thinker ahead of his historical time.

Keywords

Anthropology, Christianity, Gnosticism, Human Rights, Pantheism, Values.

Teixeira de Pascoaes is a Portuguese philosopher and poet who lived between 1877 and 1952 in a small town in the north of Portugal called Amarante.

He was one of the leaders of an important cultural and philosophical movement named *Renascença Portuguesa*, which main purpose was to think in new and spiritual terms the major philosophical issues. They were at the same time far from the traditional catholic church, and the revolutionary and republican movements at that time.

After a first and long period dominated by a gnostic and pantheistic vision of the world, Pascoaes progressively makes an aproach to Christianity, and in the end, a more mature period of his live, he adopts this perspective.

In anthropological terms, this means the transition from a restrict and regionalist to a more universal perspective of human being, namely concerning the social, national and international comprehension of human life.

In 1937 Pascoaes wrote *O Homem Universal (The Universal Man)* (1), a book of maturity, one of his lasts, where this universal anthropological perspective is developed, in clear Christian terms, far away from the telluric and pantheistic early books, too much inspired by the landscape and natural ambience of his birth land.

However, a previous reflection must be undertaken.

Since almost the beginning of his literary life Pascoaes tried to deepen into a particular type of Portuguese feeling expressed by the word *saudade.* And at the same time afirmed the need to also deepen *"a spiritual iberism, wich calls for a common understanding and action"*, in his words. This means that Pascoaes was firmly convinced that it was possible to define a common sensibility between Portugal and Spain, common cultural patterns and common philosophical intuitions. This was not completely new. Oliveira Martins e Antero de Quental developed the same ideas, the same afirmation of the lack of a deeper Iberian dialogue throughout the nineteenth century.

I would risk to say that as the ancient and renaissance world came to an end, and the modern thought was coming to daylight, some of the most important Portuguese philosophers felt the need to reapproach the two cultures, the two nations. Perhaps trying to retrieve a distance which the time of discoveries had shaped. But in all cases these thinkers defended an Iberia not closed in itself, but rather opened to Europe, which should mean an opening to modernity. Portugal and Spain alone, in the nineteenth century, were really blocked to Europe. Being together would be perhaps the first step to a desirable reapproach.

But this movement was not unidirectional. Among the cultural and spiritual friends of Pascoaes, the spanish Miguel de Unamuno occupied a very special place. They really shared the same love for both cultures and the common dream of bringing together their several branches, specially *literature* and *poetry.* In 1941, Unamuno wrote a splendid book entitled *Por Tierras de Portugal y de España* (2). There we can read genuine studies on the most recent Portuguese authors, but also Spanish ones; a literary picture of both countries' regions and cities, and a particularly refined analysis of Portuguese and Spanish sensibilities, in a common and general approach.

In a passage of his work we can read: " I represent Portugal as a beautiful and sweet country girl with her shoulders stand in Europe, set in a long beach aside the sea, with her unaware feet rounded by sea foam, (...) looking to the sunset over the infinite waters" (3). The same Iberian and still more European perspective can be found in another great Spanish philosopher, Ortega y Gasset.

With a similar poetic inspiration, a few years earlier, in his book *Mensagem,* Fernando Pessoa had already described Portugal as the *face of Europe* contemplating the Atlantic Ocean.

However, I think there is a substantial difference between them. While in Unamuno the gravity centre is in the girl's shoulders, in Pessoa the representative density is concentrated in the eyes of the contemplating face, desiring the sea. According to the Spanish writer, Portugal is attracted by the continent, by Europe, while Pessoa sees Portugal's destiny dispersed over continents and seas, moved by the discoveries.

These are the two essentials perspectives of drawing Portugal's place and interaction in the concert of nations, that we find in almost every author from modernity on.

Pascoaes and Pessoa are often pointed as the opposed faces of both tendences.

Eduardo Lourenço, one of our more distinguished contemporary philosophers, interprets an Iberian perspective in these terms:

"Our destinies (Portugal and Spain) were always parallel or crossed, never opposite as cultures , because, like Oliveira Martins said, we make part of an unique structure created centuries before both peoples defined two nations. And never our culture was most creative than in periods when there was an intense and internal dialogue between the different centres of the peninsula, and at the same time immersed in an organic Christianity". And he further says: "Today, Spain must be for us not a space of repulse, but a privileged space, naturally capable and open" (4).

And I would add that when it happens, and it happens often in music and literature, for instance, both cultures find deeper their specific originality as well as their common sensibility.

The *Universal Man* is a book of maturity in which Teixeira de Pascoaes exposes his anthropological and metaphysical ideas, and, inevitably, the way he understands the universe of values particularly those which are the basis for human rights.

It is a book in which the spiritual dimension of man is thought in terms of the values of modern twentieth century society. In particular, the values of freedom, equality, social justice, scientific and artistic progress, but always in the relationship with God and the spiritual dimension of man. And one of the goals of Pascoaes is trying to integrate the new scientific vision, in particular the evolutionism, with the traditional vision of philosophy and poetry. Nowadays we would rather say: reason and sensibility, logics and emotion.

Quoting his own words:

"In my work I always considered the man as an absolute value in his spiritual activity, which is the conscious synthesis of the Universe: conscious and emotive, or scientific and poetical" (...) "As a live and conscious expression, our soul is the conscience of the Universe" (5).

"The complete man is the physical and the metaphysical human being, which exists from the root to the leave and the perfum, if we compare the Creation to a tree, an organism capable to transform the wonderful invisible things in the spectacle of things and reality" (6).

"Our soul expresses the natural supernaturalized, I mean , in an original way, because the soul, being everywhere, is master of everything. She is all the trees and the tree. When she exalts and sings in a Poet she reaches the Divinity, she overcomes the time and space" (...). "But the universal man, the true man, remains through everything. We find him in Plato, Dante, Newton, Dostoiewsky, Einstein. We find him in all creatures unscripted in the Book of Life. He is a memory of the infinite, and by means of this memory each man is an absolute " (7).

"The man is the world in a living conscious synthesis (...) Integrated in his cosmic truth or in his representative power of the universe, which is interior and essential to him, he resounds and reflects all voices and clearness of Nature" (8).

"The god of fishes is the sea, the god of men is the Man, in his unlimited environment, spreading, beyond time, in eternity, and beyond space, in the infinite. It is there that appears fraternal love, brotherhood, the humanization of the identity, the incarnation of the Divine Word, Jesus Christ. Without the cult of brotherhood the creature is only an intelligent beast. The cult of brotherhood is for our moral being the field where he shapes himself and he grows as a human being. The man is the habitat of that moral being, the field of those eternal values." (9).

Teixeira de Pascoaes presents us an anthropology with a strong mystical character, where the spiritual dimension of man is never forgotten. And in final works the Christian perspective is really dominant, showing Jesus Christ as model of all humanity.

But in what directly concerns our subject is relevant that he presents man, the person, as the centre of all moral life, the field where all values really live and can be estimated. It is an abstraction for him to speak of values out of their natural habitat: the man and his circumstance as Ortega y Gasset has expressed.

But this realistic personalism is always connected to an universal perspective of humanity. Values only have value if they refer to all mankind, independently of sex, race, age or social class. And here, Pascoaes' thought is really modern, thinking spirituality not in ancient terms, but in a way that would generate a consistent conception of human rights a few decades later.

Pascoaes' distance from the traditionalist and conservative church would become positive for a Portuguese thought and a culture open to the modernity and the European contemporary thought.

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The Portuguese Colonial War (1961-1974) and a Political Theology of Peace

A Theological Reading of the Homilies of Peace (1970-1974) by Mgr António Ferreira Gomes

José Pedro Angélico

Abstract

Within the context of an ongoing reconstruction after the World War II, and sixteen years after its end, the Portuguese colonial war in Africa begins, only ending in 1974. Following the freshness brought by the open windows of II Vatican Council (1962-1965), the Pacem in Terris by John XXIII (1963) as well as the "Populorum Progressio" by Paul VI (1967), the bishop of Porto, Mgr António Ferreira Gomes, once returned from his forced exile, writes his Homilies of Peace, which he delivers every 1st of January, between 1970 and 1982. This brief essay is a reading of those homilies which coincide with the last years of the Portuguese war in Africa (1970-1974), in which there are some key elements for the development a political theology of peace.

Keywords

Political Theology, Theology of War and Peace, Portuguese Colonial War.

> Therefore we can ask ourselves today: religiously speaking, what Europe carried out was Christianity? In fact, it is enough if someone feels himself as Christian to realize and discern it did not, that what Europe achieved was not Christianity but rather the European version of Christianity. Is it possible a new born Christianity as a dawn, although European but especially Christianity?[1]
>
> Maria Zambrano

For the first time published in 1945, in Buenos Aires, thus was the way María Zambrano wondered about the situation of Europe in its relation to Christian values. In her fundamental questioning, the problem is mainly linked to the issues raised by political theology: what is the real contribution of the Gospel values and of the proclamation of the Kingdom of God for a more human political, social and religious consciousness? On the other hand and once seen the failure of Christendom (or, in different terms, the civilizational Christianity), the challenge raised by the Spanish philosopher is simultaneously disturbing

and prophetic: is it possible to think of a Christianity which would not merely serve as mythical justification of cultural and political structures, which, in its historical praxis, deny and make Christianity impracticable?

The problem – of which we are sufficiently warned by the structurality of evil – is that the justification of brutality and violence is, perhaps, the greatest temptation of civilizational structures which paradoxically see themselves, through the mythical accounts of their own history, above other peoples. Though probably unconscious, this attitude reveals an irrational ethnocentrism while denouncing a perverse pride which can only flows into the sea of tyranny, normally born of a rude ethnic prejudice.

On the basis of this mythical construction, Eduardo Lourenço identified the neurosis of the «prodigious unrealistic image the Portuguese have of themselves»[2], pathology, more or less unconsciously, which justified the thirteen years of colonial war, during which we can actually and oddly listen to the silence or even to some disturbing declaration by the members of the Portuguese ecclesiastical hierarchy concerning the African situation. Within the recent publication of unpublished texts by Eduardo Lourenço[3], words by Cardinal Traglia on the occasion of his visit to Fátima, quoted from the newspaper *O Século* (May 14, 1961) of the previous day in that same shrine, can be read. The war had just begun in Angola, and thus the member of the Roman Curia made his prayer of petition for peace as it follows:

> «Grant a proof of your kindness to the noblest Portuguese nation. You have promised peace for those who would listen to your advices. In the course of centuries, that is what the faithful people of Portugal have been doing so, and especially after your apparitions, they have been being an example of fervent and faithful docility to your appeals. Preserve peace for your beloved children of Portugal; for the wisdom of their governants, behold with particular grace the Head of the Nation. Make these days of distress and trouble in the lands of overseas come to an end, the lands to which the Portuguese brought the Christian civilization enriching them with their work and blood, earning therefore the right to the gratitude of the peoples thus benefitted»[4].

Built upon this messianic vision, in fact in line with the mythical construction of a country bigger than it was[5], there was a subliminal, condescending and

patronizing message, on the one hand, as well as ethnocentric and arrogant, on the other. One can actually hear the complaints of a wounded paternity in its role of salvific mediation.

A few decades before, there was an ongoing debate between Carl Schmitt[6] and Erik Peterson[7] on the issue of the possibility or not of the theological justification of a particular political system. After the World War II, the reconstruction of Europe was being done along with the growth of a new political consciousness, mainly emerging from the working classes as well as from student movements. Furthermore, the II Vatican Council and the emergence of new trends in Catholic theology cleared the way for the strenghtening of what would be called later *new political theology*.

After the well-known letter to Salazar (July 13, 1958) by Mgr Ferreira Gomes and the suggestion of holidays to him made by Mgr Costa Nunes, the Bishop of Porto left the country on the 24th of July of 1959, something which would lead him to the exile for about ten years. Returned on the 18th of July of 1969[8], and after eight years of bloodshed in the lands of Africa, the prelate would surely feel himself disturbed with such a situation.

Rooted on the claims of a shallow and rethorically constructed imperialism, made of an unrealistic assumption and of an ecclesiastical structure serving the consecration of the system, and especially of its head as the *Optimus princeps*, the only theological concern was that of a *theologia civilis*, in terms of an old political theology. Nonetheless, and inspired by the natural law thought of Francisco Suarez[9] as well as by the gentle breeze of change of the Council, Mgr Ferreira Gomes used to think at least differently. With the exception of some good examples, the vast majority of Portuguese bishops and hierarchy in general would rather preach the political system instead of the Gospel.

Even at the very end of the war, in the early 70's, probably they had already forgotten the Christmas message of Pius XII, 1944. Surely they had not yet read *Gaudium et spes* (1965), *Pacem in Terris* (1963) by John XXIII, the Christmas message of 1964 or the *Populorum Progressio* (1967) by Paul VI. There was, however, along with the bishop of Porto and other priests, a group of Catholics who were acutely aware of the internal contradictions of Christianity with more crusade features of Christendom, and fearful of the ghost of Marxism itself, than with the appeal of an evangelical humanism rooted in the Sermon

of the Mount: «Catholicism was then identified with a timeless idea of Nation and Church, defending the Salazarism of the 1960's and the idea of a territorial integrity of a pluricontinental Portugal, on the hand, and underestimating in practice the developments of the Social Catholic Teaching, on the other»[10]. Facing this situation, that group of Christians wrote a document, which became known as the *Manifesto of the 101*, on the exact same day when Paul VI visited the UN and made his speech to the General Assembly, on the 4th of October of 1965: «You give sanction to the great principle that relations betwen peoples must be regulated by reason, by justice, by law, by negotiation; not by force nor by violence; not by war, not by fear, not by deceit»[11]. On the one hand, the statement of recognition of peoples and cultures, and their autonomy, in clear conflict with the political and religious practice of a country of Catholic identity; on the other hand, a theology of peace understood as development, the «new name for peace»[12]. Based on Truth, Justice, Solidarity and Freedom[13], John XXIII would defend what could actually denounce the incoherence of a colonial war with the values of the Gospel:

> «The first point to be settled is that mutual ties between peoples must be governed by truth. Truth calls for the elimination of every trace of racial discrimination, and the consequent recognition of the inviolable principle that all nations are by nature equal in dignity. Each of them accordingly has the right to exist, to develop, and to possess the necessary means and accept a primary responsability for its own development. Each is also legitimately entitled to its good name and to the respect»[14].

In this line and within the context of his conciliar memories, António Ferreira Gomes asked what sort of presence was that of the Portuguese missions in Africa[15]. Concerning the silence requested to military chaplains, Mgr Ferreira Gomes states:

«(...) that a [chaplain] thought this way, or even that he professed that it was good and just to do anything in the name of the "Motherland", the civilization or whatever it might be, well, as much as it was hard to me to understand, I knew there were people thinking likewise and considering in order with their conscience; nonetheless, to justify the alienation of consciousness of a man, a Christian and a priest on the "altar stones" of hierarchical obedience, that would be against the very essence of the Church, as a Gospel mission and a salvation organism»[16]

Regarding the African situation, this was the fundamental conviction of the bishop of Porto. The *Homilies of Peace* (1970-1982) represent the core of pastoral reflections on the construction of peace. Few references are explicitly made to the colonial war. However, theological insights are given for the understanding of what could be called a political theology of peace.

According to the Church's teaching and in disagreement with the colonial agenda as well as with the Portuguese ecclesiastical hierarchy in genereal, the *Homilies of Peace*, mainly those pronounced between 1970 and 1974, reveal a deep concern with the role and mission of military chaplains in the lands of the overseas. In this context of military chaplaincies, it is significant, strange as it may seem, the military *virtues of chaplains*[17]. On the 1st of January 1971[18], the bishop asks an uncomfortable question: *Are you Christians, the Portuguese?* In some sort of litany, the homilie makes the attentive reader-listener clearly understanding the context from and to which Mgr Ferreira Gomes speaks. In this particular case, the problem of War and Peace is closely related to the mental confusion between the love for the Gospel and the love for the country:

> «Peace – and therefore war – depends on you, Christian, if you believe and preach that the Church or Christianity cannot advance except by means of a temporal sovereignty and the royal patronage must or should always be the model of Christian evangelization.
>
> (...)
>
> Peace – and therefore war – depends on you, Christian, if you use the Gospel, if you subordinate the Kingdom of God to the kingdoms of cesars, if you limit the Word of God to reason or human reasons, if you make Faith a servant of individual and collective interests, if you limit the Universal Christian Ethics to the border of a nation, a state or a class, if you turn back to the tribal or the imperial god; well, for today, if you instrumentalize the Gospel in favour of both the social revolution or the social conservation.
>
> Peace – and therefore war – depends on you, Portuguese Christian, if you are thinking of "converting the Gospel" or "preaching another Gospel", and still want to be called Catholic and be considered as one of their best»[19]

Considered this, it is important to remember what this bishop thought to be the origin of every war:

«There are many causes and occasions for war: ambition, bragging, interests, resentments, phobias, fear, fanatism, Manicheism, and so forth. However, the last and universal reason is yet the lack of love for truth or the lack of truthful courage and of its consequences»[20]

In this sense, the main task of theology is to search through the intelligence of faith the Truth and Freedom, as they are rooted and understood by the dynamics of Revelation, Tradition[21] and Reason[22]. This would be the only way, according to Mgr Ferreira Gomes, to avoid the indifference to human life and suffering as well as its direct consequence of war. Therefore, it is an important mission of theology the effort to desconstruct the apparent truth of certain cultural, political and social dogmas. At the head of such doctrinal body of violence and oppresion, the following is a perverse short-prayer of the Roman Peace (*Pax Romana*): *si vis pacem para bellum*. The bishop of Porto suggests a differente one: *si vis pacem... para pacem*.[23]

The «balance of horror»[24] is not the same as Peace! What peace is that which is built on the thunderous drums of war, with all its triumphal percussionists and their choirs of weeping? What peace is that which gets thrilled with the smell of gunpowder and the odour of burning flesh? What peace is that but «the Peace of victory, the Peace of conquer, of crushing of others, of ravenousness, of opression and repression!?»[25]. The mission of the Chruch was, then and now, the denouncing of the falacy of such principle, as well as the descontruction of the dualisms[26] and superstitions[27], and all of them fed by the worst of political theologies, which are those justifying power instead of service.

Thus, for the Portuguese prelate the Charter of Peace should be the Gospel and the Sermon of the Mount[28], understood as an achievable utopia of a Universal Brotherhood. But first of all, it is very important to think[29]; for to feel it possible and think it is the true way to prepare it.

The Kingdom of God is all about humanity[30]. The Kingdom of God is a matter of human rights. The Kingdom of God is about growth and development of the human being. Henri de Lubac would put this way: «Shall I refuse my brother a glass of water, telling him that I am fully occupied in recovering

the meaning of God»[31]. The answer is given by Paul, in his *Letter to the Romans*: the Kingdom of God is a matter of Love, Justice and Peace:[32]

«*Opus iustitiae pax*: peace is the work and the fruit of justice and justice is the work and the fruit, no doubt, of human will, but rather of intelligence».[33]

«But it is also the content of the Sermon of the Mount – and we must affirm that those who do not believe it are not Christians, no matter how religious they are.

Blessed are the pure in heart, the poor, the weak, the merciful, the starving for justice (...)

It is thus as promoter and worker for peace that the human beings become children of God, and therefore achieve the Universal brotherhood».[34]

«Peace – and therefore war – depends on you, Christian, if you forget that, in Christian civilization, the only saviour is Christ, i.e., only the "weakness of God God, in his Christ Jesus, can save us" (Bonhoeffer), that it is the only way to save the human person, to civilize mentalities and peoples.

Peace – and therefore war – depends on you, Christian, if you turn the Cross, supreme sign of redemption, peace and reconciliation of individuals and peoples, into a guide for crusades, natural ally of the sword and labarum of conquers and violent pacifications».[35]

«"If you want Peace, work for Justice"».[36]

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12. Cf. PAUL VI, Populorum Progressio, 76-80.
13. Cf. JOHN XXIII, Pacem in Terris, 31-40.
14. JOHN XXIII, Pacem in Terris, 31.
15. «Mas, se eles hão-de ser sempre menores, se hão-de ser sempre "objecto" da missão do homem branco (...) será o Evangelho apanágio do homem branco, responsabilidade e privilégios permanentes do europeu?! Mas, se então as Missões andam "em missão" de portugalidade, se andam a acumular títulos de gratidão e lealismo, estão as Missões ainda ao serviço da Igreja Universal e "em missão" de Evangelho?! Mas se as Missões fazem parte dum plano geral de "integração", ainda alguém saberá dizer o que é política e o que é religião?! Então se a verdadeira prova de ter o preto atingido o nível da civilização portuguesa (...) e de ser capaz de pleno direito português é ter sido baptizado e ser "um bom católico" (...), se pois a religião é um meio para chegarem à plenitude dos seus direitos, não será também a mesma religião o meio e a causa de lhes serem negados os seus direitos naturais, civis e políticos?!» [A. Ferreira Gomes, Pareceu ao Espírito Santo... E a nós?, Porto 2000, 239]
16. Ibid., 240.
17. A. Ferreira Gomes, Homilias da Paz (1970-1982), Porto 1999, 46.
18. Cf. ibid., 69-82.
19. Ibid., 73-74.
20. Ibid., 36.
21. Cf. ibid., 23.
22. «Só uma sã filosofia, baseada numa verdadeira teologia, pode fundar uma boa política» [Ibid., 50]
23. Cf. ibid., 34.
24. Ibid., 33.
25. Ibid., 28.
26. «A primeira e mais ordinária violação da Paz é precisamente a violência irrogada à Verdade. E é aí, no mais íntimo e mais fundo da inteligência, que é preciso detectar a origem da manipulação da objectividade, das verdades mercenárias, das mentiras elaboradas e rendosas. A nossa causa é justa, porque nossa: a causa do adversário é causa injusta, porque adversa. Verdade, de cá do rio ou da montanha: falsidade do lado de lá; e reciprocamente, já o denunciava Pascal» [Ibid., 26]
«Falar da paz como dom de Deus e da guerra como castigo do mesmo Deus, no pretenso sentido dos fenómenos naturais ou, na sua alternativa, de factos miraculosos, que não passassem pela inteligência e vontade dos Homens, será uma superstição fatalista que, trabalhando contra a paz, ofende, ainda mais, tanto a Religião como a Humanidade» [Ibid., 26]
27. Cf. ibid., 39-40.
28. Cf. ibid., 58-59.
29. «Todo empenho no crescimento da qualidade da vida da pessoa humana e do ambiente em que ela vive é participação no poder vitorioso do Ressuscitado e, por isso, deve ser defendido e estimulado por uma ética

pascal que encontre no serviço histórico da promoção humana e na responsabilidade ecológica para com todas as criaturas formas autênticas do seguimento de Cristo e, por conseguinte, vias mestras de realização da consumação através da santidade. A esperança escatológica se transforma, aqui, em praxe libertadora, em acção transformadora do presente a fim de torná-la menos dissemelhante do futuro da promessa de Deus» [B. Forte, Teologia da História. Ensaio sobre a revelação, o início e a consumação, São Paulo 1995, 357.] 30. Cf. M. Rodrigues Linda, "D. António Ferreira Gomes e a discussão sobre a guerra colonial", Humanística e Teologia 24/1 (2003) 122-123. Cf. J. Baptist Metz, Mistica degli occhi aperti. Per una spiritualità concreta e responsabile, Brescia 2013, 13-24 e 34-38.
31. H. De Lubac, Paradoxes of Faith, San Francisco 1987, 151.
32. Cf. Rm 14: 17.
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34. Ibid., 39-40.
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The Self and the "Other" in Leonardo Coimbra's and Levinas's Philosophy

António Martins da Costa

Abstract

Leonardo Coimbra's and Levinas's anthropology is built on the basis of the relationship between the self and the other in a perspective not only immanent but also transcendent, that is, on the openness to the infinity that is manifested on the face of the other in an ascending dialectic. To Leonardo the man is in an essential relation with the other and with the others, in a cosmic horizon. Therefore, the man is released aiming for the infinite and eternity, in a historical and trans-historical perspective. Also for Levinas the relation with the other is an essential relation having the time as element, as if time were the transcendence and the infinite.

Keywords

Ethics, Self, Other, Relationship, Experience, Transcendence.

The ethical requirement is a presupposition in the philosophical thought of Leonardo Coimbra as well as in Levinas. This requirement led the two philosophers to rethink the relationship of the self with the other, not in a perspective of domination but of symmetry. On the other hand, this immediate openness to the other led the two philosophers to open the self to a dimension of transcendence and to the absolute.

Although starting from different philosophical and anthropological presuppositions and living experiences, it is certain that the two philosophers were concerned with the ethical dimension in its direct relationship with the other and with society in an anthropological and social responsibility line.

In the case of Leonardo Coimbra, the man is a being of infinite possibilities. This means that man is also open to the infinite, to the absolute and to a personal relationship with God. However, to Levinas this relationship with God has never been directly stated. The man as open to the being and to the world is on a path of ascension of spirituality, that is, the Leonardo's anthropology emerges completely in its creationist conception of man. The man as a mystery feels rapt up, feeling inside himself an invincible force that exceeds and surpasses him in infinite heights.

It is this possibility that man has, while being who thinks and acts, that opens him to new paths and to the others. It is also in this perspective that the Leonardo's anthropology assumes a moral and ethical dimension, in the sense of the accountability of each man towards the other man. However, in spite of being built in society, the man doesn't end nor drowns in it. The man is freedom and it is in this context that decides to choose what he wants to do with his life. The individual consciousness, enriched in free thought, will assign the moral value of its actions, not only in relation to itself, but also in relation to the others. It is the philosophy of freedom that allows man to open up to new horizons, leading him to a moral and religious metaphysics. It is this dimension that allows man to be in connection with the others and with the universe.

The man takes his eyes through the infinite space and he comes across to lots of possibilities. That way, the Leonardo man is released in eagerness to infinity and eternity. The farther the man manages to get this metaphysical and spiritual desire, the richer he becomes. There is a need, to the man, to see his spiritual understanding increasing by the joy of the widening of his human relations. The relationship of the self with the other is not the result of a linear and immanent relationship, but it rises higher towards the others, the cosmos and God.

The relationship of the self with the other is not a static and individual relationship, but it is the result of an action and a strong intention of approach and correlation, that removes the man from the center of the universe and forces him to receive the other in a perspective of welcoming the other that is equal to me. That's why it is a relationship that goes beyond the limits of human experience. It is a relationship that is the result of a superior and liberating experience of asceticism. This relationship allows man to return to the source, to his origin, pulling him from the time of chronos to the time of eternity. The anticousismo that Leonardo Coimbra talks about is the cry of the return to the sources, the purest of the thought, where the being reveals itself in grace and hosts itself by godsend, where the human being finds itself and the others again. This way, to Leonardo Coimbra, the study of human relationships, states its intrinsic humanism and the reason of the absolute verb that the infinite human anxiety spells in a last and decisive effort of the thought in seeking an answer to the whys that beset us on our existence.

The philosophical conception in Leonardo Coimbra is the result of a very

strong philosophical position of ontological, ethical, metaphysical and religious nature. The man is not only a rational being. The relationship of the self with the other is not only rational, but moral, ethical, metaphysical and religious. The full view of the person, that Leonardo Coimbra has, makes this Portuguese philosopher bestow man a dignity which is based on a deeper anthropological view of the person's relationship with the others. A relationship which is based on a reciprocal relationship, an inner unity of every being that extends to the level of a cosmic society, making the man a sort of partner in the entire cosmos. This way, the persons, are just persons by the reciprocity of the oral action, by the cooperation, by the superior unit of the self and the others, asserting, that way, the person as a place of true universality.

To Leonardo Coimbra the man cannot be explained only by the relations of biological mechanisms and by the relationships that are merely social and immanent. Moreover, one of the most serious errors of positivism was exactly to forget the intentionality of the self to the other, which opens man to a multiplicity of pathways that are developed out of the deterministic coordinates of fixed and invariable laws. Because of that, Leonardo's Humanism is an authentic personalism.

It is this intentionality that Levinas will recover from the phenomenology, under the influence of Husserl, which will allow him to animate his own existence and understand better the relationship of the self with the other. Leonardo´s and Levinas's humanism are also imbued with an ethical emergency in the sense that the other is equal to me, without being the sameness and respecting the ontological and existential difference, from the "I" already in direction to the other, together with all that it implies the philosophical point of view. The ethics of Levina's infinite allowed him to rethink the relationship of the self and the other in a similar way to that Leonardo Coimbra had, although Levinas has had very different presuppositions and philosophical influences.

Levinas, since at least *L'existence a l'existant*-1947, *Le temps et l'autre*, 1947 until *Totalité et infini*. *Essai sur l `extéorité* 1961 until *Ethique et infini*, 1982, among other works, developed his reflection on the self and the other, or, more specifically, the otherness of the other, as relation to all other, to the infinity and God. For Levinas "The look that begs and demands - which can only beg because it demands (...), that gaze is precisely the epiphany of the face as a face. (...) To recognize the Other - is to give (...). It is from this starting point that the

self is positioned and that the world is captured from a point of view which is independent from the selfish position. (See Levinas, TI, p. 62). The epiphany of the face consists in asking us by its misery. Therefore, Levinas says the other faces me. This face to face is irreducible and it is irreducible from the idea of infinity in us. That way, "the idea of the infinity is the transcendence itself, the overflow of a suitable idea. If totality cannot be built, it is because the Infinite does not let integrate. It is not the failure of the self that prevents aggregation, but the Infinity of Others (See Levinas, TI, p. 66). It is this face to face with the other that makes us liable and responsible for the other. That's why there is a direct relationship of the Face with the ethics.

It is true that "others remains infinitely transcendent, infinitely strange, ma so your face, where it gives his epiphany and that appeals to me breaks with the world that may be in common and whose virtues falls"(See Levinas, TI, p. 173). The ethical relationship arises when I call into question and that I soak the part of the other. So it says that I am responsible for the other, (See Levinas, TI, p. 174). While the other does not capture leaves for me. This is because in the - the other is an opening into a new dimension. "The face speaks to me and invites me like a relationship without parallel with a power that is exercised, be it enjoyment whether knowledge"(See Levinas, TI, p. 176).

For Levinas, the question arises immediately in the following manner: but how is that even if producing as selfishness, can enter into relationship with one another without depriving the outset of his otherness' Of what nature is the relationship? The metaphysical relation cannot be a representation, because the dissolving Another would be the Same. The power I do not traverse the distance indicated by the otherness of the Other. Thus, the other is metaphysical Another otherness is not formal, otherness is not a simple inverse of the identity or otherness made of a same resistance, but a previous otherness that constitutes the content of the own Other another of an otherness that does not limit yourself, because in that case the Other would not be strictly another. The compliance of the border, it would within the system, still the same (See levinas, EI, p. 26). "How the Other is presented, exceeding the idea of the Other in me, call it, in fact, face. Way This does not consist in figuring as a theme under my gaze, in exposing themselves as a set of qualities that form 's face a picture of the Other at each moment destroys and overcomes the plastic image it leaves me, the idea to my measure and tailored to your ideatum -.. adequate idea (See Levinas, EI, pp.37-38 it is here that the ethics and the other meet

and relate in a profound way Levinas says that the 'strength' of the Other does not make me violent, not negatively acts, has a positive structure:.. ethics the first revelation of the other, supposedly in all other relationships with him, not to catch it in its negative resistance and surround you in the morning. mourning not with a faceless god, but respond to its expression, its revelation. (See Levinas,TI, p. 176).

While open to all possibilities, the "leonardian" Man is also open to a relationship of transcendence, each being is the epiphany of the infinite that is in every human being, however, Levinas is more radical in the establishment of the principles of this relationship and, it goes further, removing thence important philosophical, anthropological and even theological consequences.

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Catholicism and Citizenship

Jorge Cunha

Abstract

This text focuses on the discussion of whether the Christian religion promotes democracy and defense of civil liberties or not. It provides an example: the case of the struggle of the citizens of Porto against the bishop for the autonomy of their city, in the XV Century. And concludes two things: it was the religion that gave the people the legitimacy and strength to resist both the royal and the ecclesiastical centralism and that was the central government that encouraged the fight against bishop, considered the king power limiter.

Keywords

Christian Faith, Human Rights, Democracy, Oporto.

The following text is intended to enroll in the general theme "Images of Europe" and the sub-theme "The contribution of the Portuguese thought for the mutual recognition of cultures and peoples". When approaching the concepts of "Catholicism" and "Citizenship", we aim to show how Catholic faith, open to rationality, was an element of progress in the recognition of civil rights and democratic organization of the political community. We do not ignore that this point is target of a major conflict of interpretations.

Historically speaking, there were times when Christianity founded the recognition of civil rights and there were other times when the service was the legitimization of an iniquitous state of things with regard to such recognition. All in all, we believe that democratic Europe was thought on the basis of a Christian leaven.

Our aim is to show how this idea can be seen in Portugal, in precise moments of our history. We will monitor the reflection that, in his time, produced a bishop of Porto, Mgr António Ferreira Gomes (1906-1989). Before that, we will try to find an interpretive principle that shows how it is possible to think of Catholicism as the historical origin of plural contexts regarding citizenship requirements, ie, a democratic political ethics.

Catholicism as Ethics and Moral

Catholicism can be seen in two ways: as an ethics and as a moral. In Ricoeur's line, we mean by ethics "an aspiration to the good life, with others and for others, in just institutions" (Ricoeur, 1990, 202). In turn, a moral is the submission of ethical aspiration to trial of the norm (Ricoeur, 1990, 237). The first moment is teleological. The second is deontological. The confluence of these two theoretical moments can serve to interpret very different historical moments as well as the realities of social life, we can see dialectic between the instituting moment and the moment set of normative legitimation of a given context.

Catholicism as an Ethic

Catholicism can be seen as a religious feeling. A feeling that gathers believers around a memory that comes from Jesus Christ, this memory which includes an older imagery, the biblical tradition. In this sense, Christianity is a mystical tradition, an experience. This experience follows a certain description of what is an achieved vision of existence, the situation of humanity in the cosmos, the destination and the origin of the universe, the fair institution and the brotherhood.

While mystical experience and religious sentiment, Christianity is not characterized, leastwise provisionally, by its universality nor by ready source of binding rules. By horizontal and vertical transmission, Christian religion will reach more or less people. But Christianity as a religious faith is very personal and, in a sense, is incommunicable and not even comparable.

However, it is impossible that the reality of religious faith does not become concept, doctrine and personal and social life standard. Otherwise it would have no identity and historical visibility.

Catholicism as a Moral

But Christianity can also be seen as moral. In this second sense, Christianity is seen as culture (language, political and ecclesial institutions, rule of moral life). It is time to assert that Christianity becomes visible and communicable through a dogmatic, a moral, and one worldview. Both embodiments are complementary

and inseparable, but are not entirely coincidental. That is why Christianity met so many historical variants, many forms of inculturation, and so many churches.

This second sense is the one in which Christianity seeks universality, the universality of a culture that is informed by certain principles that can be shared and may order the world according to their source revealed. Christianity became Catholicism, in the original sense of the word.

The process of institutionalization of a feeling is always precarious and surrounded by dangers. This process is guided and founded in human reason. Reason is by nature a fixist reality. In turn, the feeling is unstable. It is characteristic of the latter challenge the reason to go further by instituting a program of life more in line with the teleology of life. The reason, in turn, resists change and tends to close in its final deontological horizon inapprehensibility teleology of life.

Catholicism and citizenship are located in this complex set of interactions. The Catholic ideal of fair institution continuously establishes an ideal of fair institution. The reason appropriates this ideal and gives it moral strength. When the force becomes stiff, it is necessary to think of it again, making evolve founded reality by virtue of founding factor.

Catholicism and Human Rights in Portuguese Culture

Who made an interesting exercise to show the virtues of Portuguese Catholicism to found the demands of citizenship and respect for human rights was Mgr António Ferreira Gomes. An emblematic text issued in1973 will examine this question (GOMES, 1974). Being a text located on the eve of the 1974 Portuguese revolution, it is noted by a certain desire of a change that, in fact, was imminent. However, there is in the analysis of the Bishop an element of timeless reflection that allows us to read the text in a social ethical horizon.

Catholicism and Citizenship: The Case of the Oporto City

For the former bishop, Catholicism was the factor that put the germs of the development of urban democracy in the City of Porto. António Ferreira Gomes alludes to a study by Jaime Cortesão on "The democratic factors of the formation of Portugal", to show how Porto is a special case throughout the country, as a growing commercial society, increasing wealth and civic consciousness, cosmopolitan

view and a claim of autonomy, in the general context of the new nation, promoting democratic participation and a special sense of social justice. These elements put the City of Porto in a unique tradition of that point of view in Portugal.

This growth of civic autonomy generated a conflict that seems to be against the bishops of Porto, seen as limiting this autonomy. But things may not be so.

Mgr António noted that historians in general, even Jaime Cortesão, take sides against the bishops, when it comes to interpreting the conflicts that arose in these urban democracies. But, in his view, this point is poorly explained. Popular struggles would be instigated by the central power, which prevented the urban autonomy to pursue its integration policy. Therefore, there wouldn't be a fight of the City against the Church but, in the background, another fight. In a deeper sense, the fight would not be the people against the Church, but the central government against the Church, as it is the sign and guaranty of the civil autonomy. Increasing the fight against the bishops, the Crown was trying a way to impose the absolute power that was arising in the XV century. The democratic factor is the people, as a believing people, who, just as believer, is opposed to the despotic political power. The author justifies his thesis with a historical analysis of detail; nonetheless, this is not the time to expose it here.

We could give other examples, having regard to the text, including the testimony of Bishop Thomas Becket resistance to the pretensions of the King, the same who was forced to sign the Magna Carta by the nobles and the people. One can also mention the case of the Swiss Confederation that was set up as an example of democracy under the influence of St. Nicholas of Flue in The Stans Convention.

The conclusion is obvious: Christianity with its worldview and its political morality, lays the foundation for recognition of civil liberties. Catholicism and culture were in tune to give in Porto, an urban democracy. This balance was in danger when the king wanted to include the City the general political and bought the lordship to the Bishop. This intervention of the central government led to the regrow of the political rights of the people. The same happened in Spain with the process of royal centralism promoted by the Catholic Monarchs.

Catholicism and Human Rights

There is no doubt that theology played a positive role in the development of the concept of fundamental human rights. Let us quote a passage from St. Thomas Aquinas: "Two points are to be observed concerning the right ordering of rulers in a state or nation. One is that all should take some share in the government: for this form of constitution ensures peace among the people, commends itself to all, and is most enduring, as stated in Polit. ii, 6. The other point is to be observed in respect of the kinds of government, or the different ways in which the constitutions are established. For whereas these differ in kind, as the Philosopher states (Polit. iii, 5), nevertheless the first place is held by the "kingdom," where the power of government is vested in one; and "aristocracy," which signifies government by the best, where the power of government is vested in a few. Accordingly, the best form of government is in a state or kingdom, where one is given the power to preside over all; while under him are others having governing powers: and yet a government of this kind is shared by all, both because all are eligible to govern, and because the rules are chosen by all. For this is the best form of polity, being partly kingdom, since there is one at the head of all; partly aristocracy, in so far as a number of persons are set in authority; partly democracy, i.e. government by the people, in so far as the rulers can be chosen from the people, and the people have the right to choose their rulers" (S. Th. I-II, 105, 1).

Portugal was born in the context of such acknowledgments. The country has his fictional creation (the Cortes of Lamego). The rights of the people are visible in certain institutions and in moments of the history. The restoration of independence in 1640 resorted to a foundation like this used in Salamanca and Coimbra.

The justification of the "ius gentium" (law of nations) by Francisco de Vitoria, and continued by Francisco Suarez, develops as a continuation and deepening of this medieval Catholic theory. Modernity is not as original as is sometimes assumed.

For much interested in the justification for the existence of human rights rooted in biblical and Christian idea of dignity, interiority and indefinability of the human person. Apart from Greek and Roman elements, this older idea is at the basis of any democratic system.

Catholicism and the justification for a Rational Morality

One of the elements that enable civic coexistence in a pluralistic society like ours, is the possibility of a rational justification of moral, dispensing, methodically, but not really, of religious beliefs and other elements own particular worldview of ethics, in the sense we gave it before. Nevertheless, this justification was a battle of the schools of Salamanca and Coimbra since at least the XVI century. In this sense, the theoretical possibility of overcoming the Old Regime, ironically taken against the absolutist and "Catholic", has its basis precisely ... Catholic theology.

We can also give another example. The portuense thinkers who argued for the Republic (especially Sampaio Bruno) justify its republican moral in a metaphysical (ethical) root believer, not to say Christian (Gnostic). Admittedly, that was not the idea prevailed in 1910. But we can say that retains the shape of Christianity, when you develop something, a keen sense, resembles the old thinking of "natural law", as a principle of limiting power and defense of the person within the political institution. This idea prevailed in Porto thinking, by Leonardo Coimbra and Alvaro Ribeiro.

Conclusion

We are aware of the controversial nature of the rereading that we present. Someone can certainly ask how it was possible that Catholicism has been the ideology that legitimized monarchical absolutism, the Inquisition, a certain type of colonialism, the Portuguese "Estado Novo"? The purpose is not to whitewash the past. Theology and theologians have their responsibilities when they accept the strange role of justifying unjust politic powers. Each historical context has its theologians, in this bad sense. But theology has more senses. Our intent is to show the other side that usually is not called into evidence. The Christian religious sentiment is always available to found new forms of moral and social setting. Ernst Bloch said that the Church best possibility is… to generate heretics! On many occasions, these "heretics" represent the true feeling and the ability of moral regulatory innovation. We could say the same of cultural evolution that we say about Catholicism.

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The Contribution of the Apocalypse Nova, by the Blessed Amadeu da Silva, to the Mutual Recognition of Cultures and Peoples and its Projection

Manuel Lázaro Pulido

Abstract

Current studies on the history of thought emphasize the importance of 15th century, concerning the change of the mental universe experienced in the West. It is indeed a change with spatial impact and also a temporal change. This change is displayed in a very special way during the 16th century. The effervescence of ideas, thoughts and philosophies of the first half of the century requires a channel with the context of a new Europe, dominated by the emerging nationalities and their monarchies (especially the Hispanic). This situation entails finding a theory of the historical time, not only able to unify its meaning from a new understanding of Christendom, an eschatological time ("already and not yet"), but also capable of founding "a new heaven and a new earth" (Rev. 21: 1). In this context we presents the work of the Blessed Amadeo da Silva, religious of the Order of St. Francis of Observance, Apocalypse Nova. Itwas very important for the project of the New World, which is built in Europebut carried out in the New World. The Apocalypse Nova assumes a project towards the completion of the Catholic World, a chance for political redemption, the primacy of Christ embodiedin a political project which will fight in Europe and will extend itself in the utopian New World.

Keywords

Blessed Amadeo da Silva, History of Ideas, Joachinism, Portuguese Thought, 15th Century, Apocalipse Nova, Catholic World.

Current studies on the history of thought emphasize the importance of the 15th century, concerning the change of the mental universe experienced in the West. It is indeed a change with spatial impact: the dialogue with the Eastern Christianity, the disputes with the Muslim East along with the Ottoman impulse and the discovering of new spaces not only led nations and peoples to places with no defined borders, but also projected into human life the drawn perspective on canvas as an extension of the depth of mind. But then a temporal change as well: from the inauguration of the *cristianitas* based on the *latinitas* to the splendour of the *latinitas* emerging from within the *cristianitas*, i.e., from the Middle Ages up to the beginning of the Modern Age. This change is displayed in a very special way during the 16th century; albeit imperfect as any be-

ginning, it is however the 15th century that faces such a change, the Renaissance expressing a new theory of Christianity rooted on humanism: a human being anchored in dignity, whose value depends on himself as well as with a reference to the assuredness of faith. By the mid-century, the council of Basel stresses the need to search for a channel of ecclesial certitude (doctrinal, social, political, and religious) in dialogue with the news trends of thought. The effervescence of ideas, thoughts and philosophies of the first half of the century requires a channel with the context of a new Europe, dominated by the emerging nationalities and their monarchies (especially the Hispanic). This situation entails finding a theory of the historical time, not only able to unify its meaning from a new understanding of Christendom, an eschatological time ("already and not yet"), but also capable of founding "a new heaven and a new earth" (Rev. 21: 1).

An apocalyptic and eschatological perspective will somehow become a reality by the end of the century. A new world appears to the eyes of Europe. The discovery of the American continent offers a new world to Europe. At this crucial moment, many people will stand out. We know the human and intellectual adventure entailed by the new discoveries as well as the widening of the mental cartography implied in the new configuration of the world map. The new world was seen by many as an opportunity to carry out a new evangelical project, more spiritual and humane, away from the problems which affected the world with the change of Europe, aggravated with Protestant Reformation in the 16th century. Reformation implied a religious division, the impossibility of a common worldview in Europe, the failure of a shared spiritual context, the fragmentation of Christianity, and therefore of Europe, inciting new ways of thinking.

By the beginning of the 16th century, the problem of either division or union does not affect the association of interests of Western Europe, united not only by the "Latin" but also looking towards the Byzantine world. This is an atmosphere open to the interior of Christianity itself, more tolerant, as it can be observed through the theological production. Concerning the other religions, there is an idea of purity, accentuated along the century and attaining the very core of Catholicism in the face of Lutheranism. In the last quarter of the 15th century, the Iberian monarchies become more and more intolerant. Insofar as it is defined as a new nation – and to define implies limitation – the Hispanic monarchy needs to mark off its identity and geography. The new spatial borders imply new mental ones, a defined identity of which epicentre was the Catholic

monarchy (the Catholic Kings). The reigns of Manuel and João III will be influenced by this environment. Nonetheless, such atmosphere of identification had to be combined with the humanist thought, which is, by definition, a borderless movement. While the national identification would opt for the vernacular languages, the humanism adopted the Latin. Thus, and in the face of the imperial Latin (*latinitas*) and of the vernacular languages, something interesting arises: the appearance of Latin literature made by Portuguese, Spanish, and Italians, as well as the attempt to find a common space within the new European identities.

Another vestige of the struggle with the intrinsic difference concerning the new national process was the projects of religious life which understood Catholicism in an evangelical way. Catholicism is a mark or characteristic of the Church implying universality of the Christian faith and of the Gospel message. In an exclusive way, Catholicity a Church facing other forms of Christianity constituted on the basis of deviation, i.e., heresy. In the 15th century, it meant the division within papacy and the difference with the Orthodox Church. In the 16th century, Catholicism is the opposite of the Protestant "heresy". Thus understood, Catholicism exists only when all the deviations return to Catholic Church teaching. In consequence, a new project of the Catholic world begins (a new empire for a new time). In an inclusive way, Catholicism presupposes the opportunity to build a new world as an age of the Spirit, a new apocalyptical project implying the spiritual purification of all humankind: a new man, a new Church, new heaven, new earth, and a new Age. The problem lies in the fact that a divided space obstructs its achievement. By the end of the 15th century and the beginning of the 16th century, the new space as well as the new earth appears, and the Franciscans will be the protagonists of such deed.

The New World becomes the privileged place to test the new projects, whether they are philosophical, scientific, political or religious. The American project is made of certain apocalyptical, millenarian or even utopist tints, at least at the beginning of the colonial era. This is not strange, though. Millenarian and apocalyptical ideas were always present during the Middle Age, going beyond the end of the millennium itself and acquiring over time a meaning of purification. It is not linked to "a perspective of horror and melancholy for the end of world. It was experienced as achievement of a process which had its roots in the sixth age, and was part and parcel of it, understood as the restoration of the fourth empire of the Daniel's Book"[1]. There are a group of authors, theologians, men of letters

as well as preachers, who refer, in several occasions, to the apocalyptic issue in a moralizing tone, even in the 15th century. In the 13th century, for instance, the preaching of Arnaldo de Vilanova admits, in his *Tractatus de tempore adventus Antichristi*, the didactic value of the apocalyptic fear[2]. Nevertheless, and as we have already noted, the apocalyptical tone projected in America is not linked to the Antichrist. In fact, this negative although actual perspective was condemned in the decree *Supremae majestatis praesidio*, promulgated by the 5th Council of Lateran in the year of 1516. Within the context of the medieval apocalyptical literature, there was a restorative perspective, which stressed the theology of history, as well as the need for spiritual purification, a perspective warmly welcomed by the Franciscans. We are actually referring to the theology of Joachim de Fiore. This is a prophetic thought based on the trinitarian theology of history and on a concordist exegesis of the Bible.

The prophetic theology of Joachim de Fiore, the one which made him well-known, asserted that there were three fundamental ages within the time of the Church, which is the historical time in which God becomes present. These three ages are in accordance with the trinitarian model, through which we can discern an Age of the Father, and Age of the Son, and an Age of the Holy Spirit. The Age of the Father corresponds to the Old Testament, covering the time from Adam to Uzziah, king of Judah (784-746). Mainly fearful of punishment, the dominating figures of this Age are the prophets. The Age of the Son explained in the Gospel and capitalized in the event of Christ's birth, ranging from Uzziah to 1260. Full of a faithful feeling, this Age has the priests as its main figures. Finally, the Age of the Holy Spirit, from 1260 to the "Sabbatical Millennium", is the age of the brotherhood in Christ, a warless age with no enmities, with its major figures as being the monks. There would be an atmosphere of peace and freedom in the grace of Christ. In this Age, it is be possible the authentic understanding of God's Word, a moment of complete freedom when the immediate contact with God is given to the human being. He himself offers, in his book *Concordia Novi ac Veteris Testamenti*, an explanatory introduction to his historical perspective, asserting the following:

"For us, who do not have an everlasting inheritance in this world, but rather looking for the future one, nothing can be healthier and more useful than to remember the Lord's judgments, emerging from history, on the basis of its comparison, and the lesson taken from the consideration of the limits of things

and continuously thinking on how little worthy are the pleasurable things we have, but which we will have to leave"[3].

What is proposed by Joachim de Fiore is a reflection on the historical time as from the vanity, futility, and insignificance of the human receptor. Man usually seeks to possess time (the lived days as a human conquest) and space (the physical as well as mental possession of natural things). In view of this, he suggests the possession of the authentic meaning of space and time not in the possession itself but rather in its authentic experiencing. In other words, time and space as places of encounter within our intimate vanity, so that they may be surmounted in transcendence, i.e., time and space as a place of projection of humanity into a (divine) reference. What the Calabrian abbot intended was to show that the interpretation of the New Testament could be enriched if inspired by the Holy Spirit (let us remember that the gift of Wisdom is given by the third person of the Trinity). Therefore, the most known legacy of Joachim de Fiore is no doubt his prophetic theology, with its eschatological projection and in consequence with a theological project with historical implications.

The theology of Joachim de Fiore was always present at the debate on the theology of history within the Franciscan Order, assimilating the Age of the Spirit by the time inaugurated by St. Francis of Assisi. The Franciscan friars felt themselves as the heirs of the monks predicted by Joachim de Fiore. The peninsular 15th century, where the Franciscans along with the Dominicans were the religious orders that had grown the most, was also imbued with this apocalyptical spirit, let us say, restorative spirit. This form of understanding the apocalyptic prophetism was much more propitious to a territory in expansion, defending itself from a common enemy, the one that was not the exclusionary identity: Islam and Judaism. The mendicant Orders were sometimes the voices of this identity, once they were elected by the authorities of the time, and they would blur their preaching effort with the ecclesial and political situation on the time, particularly in the Iberian Peninsula[4]. Their preaching effort was an authentic exercise of communication of and on the Concilium doctrine[5], the issue of the Jews, as well as the constitution of a political, religious and social project[6] in respect to the crown, mainly within the Iberian Peninsula (not only in Portugal but also in Castile). However, at least in what concerns to the Franciscans, this mission never pawned the need for apocalyptic restoration, understood in different terms as the encounter of St Francis with the Sultan of Damietta well

expresses, a paradigm of an inclusive way of understanding the crusades. Thus, the restorative-apocalyptic message could not walk by the hand of such a restoration, which had as its paradigm the "expulsion-exclusion"; and this at least for a large number of Franciscans of those times. What should be carried out was rather what it was kept by the Order's memory.

To sum, there was a prophetic and apocalyptic spirit, rather historical and restorative than negative and antichristic, as it was still common during those times (e.g., *Libro del Anticristo* by Martín Ampiés, 1496). There was a number of Franciscans who had their perspective, inspired by Joachim de Fiore, based on the ideal of an inclusive catholicity, but often in close and concomitant relation to the exclusivism as well. There is a moment of revival of the prophetic spirit by the second decade of the 15th century, and especially of those prophecies with identitarian features, as is the case of Rodrigo Ponce de Léon's prophecies. Among other things, will lead to the Franciscan missionary restoration project of a new age for the Church (new age) in the New World of America (new earth), a new Heavenly Jerusalem, wherein it would be possible to recreate a world rooted on the values of the Spirit incarnated in Francis of Assisi and in the Franciscan rule, characterized by poverty, simplicity and humility, shared by the universal brotherhood of the children of God in Christ. This project was firmly encouraged by the certainty of the completion of the times, a project in which the political power is at the service of a Gospel-inspired society instauration, in a land free of what had made the European moving away from the early apostolic spirit. And it was lacking a work able to serve as a bridge in these terms.

A note of Pedro de Alcántara gives us a clue about a possible nexus of union. This is the writing of the *Certificado de Fr. Pedro de Alcántara sobre el "Comentario al Apocalipsis" del B. Amadeo de Silva (… 1482) copiado por el P. Antonio Ortiz*[7]. Just a reference that is not anecdotal. The certificate shows the commitment of the Franciscan province of San Gabriel and the observance of Amadeo's vision, despite the problems facing the Spanish Inquisition[8]. This is an investment that makes more understandable the Franciscan missionary zeal, once that Br. Antonio Ortiz was one of the first Franciscan missionaries embarking to America in 1528. On the mental backpack of these missionaries, willing to design a new evangelical world, one of whose characteristics is the equality of evangelized and evangelizers, was the work of the Blessed Amadeo da Silva, author of the *Apocalypsis Nova* or *Comentario al Apocalipsis*.

The Blessed Amadeo da Silva (Amadeus Ispani[9]), religious of the Order of St. Francis of Observance, comes from a family active in public and religious life. His father, Rui Gomes da Silva, is the mayor of the border town of Campo Maior and his mother descended from the Counts of Barcelos and Ourém. Her sister is the founder of the Conceptionists (Order consecrated to the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary), Santa Beatriz da Silva Meneses, which in turn is close friends with Queen Isabella of Castile. These elements are key to understanding the meaning and the projection of his work.

His own life assumes a path which spiritually begins around 1442, in the Extremaduran monastery of Our Lady of Guadalupe, ruled by the Jeronimos, a meeting with the cloistered life which is opposed to his missionary zeal. After several failed attempts to go on a mission to Africa, he decides to embrace the Order of St. Francis of Assisi, which leads him to Italy, namely Milan. There, he stands out for his preaching and, with the support of the Duchess of Milan, he travels to the Pope[10]. His restless spirit makes him start a reformed Franciscan community, which will be named as amadeítas[11], with the support of the General of the Franciscans who will become Pope Sixtus IV. He dies on the 10th of August, 1482.

Amadeu da Silva stands out for trying to give active response to cultural issues of his time, something that was recognized. That is why his work should be taken into account. *Apocalypsis Nova*[12] is a prophetic and historical project composed of eight *raptus* (ecstasy). In itself the adopted form indicates its nature. The problem of the ecstasy is not simple and is actually quite common in certain significant authors of the Middle Ages, as is the case of Joachim of Fiore, and in the fifteenth century is adopted by many mystical and prophetic authors. This situates the reader in a state of high mystical experience and cognitive state, once that the ecstasy is a state of contemplation in which one experiences a direct vision of the divine, which is itself an extraordinary situation in order of experience.

Summing up the work in a few lines, we could say that it prophesies and reports the revelations Amadeu gets from the Angel Gabriel, in which he narrates, given the decline of the Church, how the seven angels (princes) defenders of the Immaculate allow a coming of an Angelic Pope which, in alliance with a universal monarch, would win the Antichrist and give way to the end of time. The summary itself sends us back to an ecclesial and secular prophecy,

in addition to the inmaculist feature, and therefore ecclesiological and mariological. The background of the work has necessarily to do with the context of the Constitution "cum praeexcelsa" of February 27, 1477, in which is defended the doctrine on the Immaculate Conception of Mary and which had already been proclaimed by the Council of Basel, on 36th session (September 17, 1439). Taking the theological tone of the work into account, work is concerned with the theological anthropology as well as with Christology. As already said, the narrative form of the work can deceive us. Having regard to its structure, it can be said that it is a theological treatise which is formed between the vision and the legend, taking and receiving influences of hagiographic literature, especially under the influence of *Leyenda aurea*. This is a work of theological divulgation, so that anyone could understand is but with the proper deepness of a Commentary. Eschatology is also present, illuminating the apocalyptic feature, and focusing on a Christological perspective around the figure of the Immaculate Virgin, the Woman of the Apocalypse, a common theme in his time and which was widely used in the homiletical literature. Mary represents all the virtues as well as the win against heresy, the final victory against the demon[13]. Any human project (and pastoral) needs Mary, the strongest and holiest woman[14].

The Immaculate Virgin is like the icon of a proposed redemption, which is the act of God's will. In this act, intervenes human freedom and thus the human being becomes collaborator. In the Church, many men established covenant with God, listening to his voice in order to speak to the people. This is what is by prophetic spirit: announce a pastor who could appease the flock. Hence the angel tells Amadeu, in the third ecstasy: "God shall choose out a man according to his heart, and will put it to feed the flock of his people"[15]. God works for man through mediations. However important the *parousia* (for Christ is the centre of time[16] and the inflection point of a cosmic time which makes saving time in history salutis), the time that interests the Church, according to the revelation of Amadeo, is the mediations that God offers. In this sense, the Virgin Mary is linked to the time of redemption and salvation both as a sign and guide of the alpha and the omega. Therefore, at this time (and in a special way), the Immaculate Conception is related to the Assumption, as an eschatological sign of a pedagogy of salvation. The assimilation that Amadeo does, linking the New Jerusalem to the Church of Rome of his time confirms this. This is the confirmation of what was shown in the fifth ecstasy: the fullness of salvation in time is associated with the time when the Pastor shall reveal

what has been hidden in the Gospel. The new Apocalypsis is not a function of time, but rather a function of the divine pedagogy, as well as a political and ecclesial task: the Shepherd unifies the Church and when a King decides to make alliance with him, then the "God's will be done"[17].

We can now understand the importance of the *Apocalypse Nova* for the project of the New World, which is built in Europe but carried out in the New World. It can thus be understood the importance of the image of the new woman of the Revelation in the common mission of the Viceroyship of the New Spain, concentrated around the Immaculate and the devotion of Guadalupe, in the same way that one can understand the consequences that will have the ideological program of the new Spanish monarchy: the *Apocalypse Nova* assumes a project towards the completion of the Catholic World, a chance for political redemption, the primacy of Christ embodied in a political project which will fight in Europe and will extend itself in the utopian New World. It is a project of brotherhood to be led by the friars. At the time of the Habsburgs, the work of the Blessed Amadeo da Silva subsists in the Jesuits and in more than a few American iconographies, indicating the relevance of a project of Catholicism, a universality based on fraternity, the encounter of cultures and a common project headed by a Gospel-inspired life.

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SECTION V

Language, Philosophy, Anthropology, Psychology, Religion

THE THEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF MODERNITY

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Presentation

Stephen Gardner

Since Hans Blumenberg's Die Legitimität der Neuzeit (The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, English 1983) first appeared in 1966, a number of writers have revisited his claim that European modernity arose not from the overthrow but from breakdown of medieval Christendom. Blumenberg defended modern "self-assertion" against various "secularization" hypotheses and the notion that modernity is simply "indebted" to Christianity as its cultural "heritage." The picture is far more complicated than that. Modernity, he argued, was an escape from insoluble theological and philosophical failures of medieval orthodoxy, particularly its inability to overcome Gnosticism (the main rival against which it had defined itself). Willful rebels did not subvert medieval Christendom; rather, modernity arose (in the wake of its internal collapse) as an original way. Blumenberg's picture registered a broad starting point (affirmatively or negatively) for a number of critics (such as Anthony Levi, Charles Taylor, Marcel Gauchet, Michael Gillespie, Brad Gregory, René Girard, John Milbank, and Robert Pippin) who decline the invitations either to post-modernity (as in Nietzsche, Heidegger, or the post-structuralists) or to pre-modernity (such as Voegelin, Strauss, or MacIntyre). As these writers sympathetic to modernity show, though, it is still deeply problematic. Though modernity conceives itself as a break with history and its own Christian past in particular, it has never been able to bring this break to accomplishment, or to extricate itself fully from its theological origins. The papers of this panel examine various thinkers ancient and modern in connection with the theological backstory of the modern world.

Augustine, Luther, and Modernity

Matthew Drever

Abstract

I examine the relation between Augustine, Luther, and modernity, and attempt to plumb the origins of the crisis of modernity. Neither the discontinuity thesis of Michael Gillespie nor the continuity thesis of Charles Taylor adequately captures Augustine's relation to modernity or the Reformation. Against Gillespie, the Reformation (and by extension modernity) is not a clear break with the classical and medieval traditions. Here we can trace positive lines of continuity between Augustine and Luther. This relation, however, problematizes rather than confirms Taylor's continuity thesis. This is because the lines of continuity that run from Augustine into modernity are ambiguous. Modernity prioritizes nature and the individual self in a manner that both Luther and Augustine would characterize as metaphysically unfeasible and morally sinful. This generates a twofold situation that is explored. First, modernity's prioritization of nature and the self above God fails for similar reasons along Reformation and Augustinian lines, intimating the continuity that runs between them. Second, the supposed failure of modernity that Gillespie traces to its inability to reconcile the freewill/ determinism antinomy latent in the Renaissance and Reformation debate might also be traced to modernity's inability to reconcile with the Augustinian roots it presupposes.

Keywords

Augustine, Luther, Modernity, Self, Autonomy, Ex Nihilo.

Examinations into the theological origins of modernity are loaded endeavors within the framework Michael Gillespie and Hans Blumenberg propose. Within their model, modernity rises from the intellectual rubble of the Middle Ages as a response to the theological crisis generated by the fight between nominalism and scholasticism.[1] Arguing against Löwith's secularization (continuity) thesis, Gillespie contends that the Reformation, Renaissance humanism, and modernity emerge from the nominalist revolution and offer genuinely new, if also ultimately untenable, trajectories that attempt to answer the theological problems left in the wake of the collapse of Medieval Christianity.

Certainly Augustine must fit into this picture somehow since he stands as one of the great representatives of the patristic Latin tradition moving into the Middle Ages, and one can trace lines of continuity between him Bonaventure, Aquinas, and other seminal medieval thinkers. This would seem to make

Augustine an unwitting collaborator in the supposed medieval collapse. The picture, however, is complicated because scholars such as Charles Taylor, not convinced by the Blumenberg/ Gillespie discontinuity thesis, have traced lines of continuity between Augustine and modernity.[2] The disagreement here intimates that the relation between Augustine and modernity is a complex affair, as is the related question of Augustine's relation with the Reformation. It is complicated further by the attempts of Taylor and Gillespie to subsume their respective claims on Augustine within a larger project that seeks the sources of the supposed collapse of modernity within our postmodern context.

In this essay I will examine the relation between Augustine, Luther, and modernity, and attempts to plumb the origins of the crisis of modernity. What we will see is that neither the discontinuity thesis of Gillespie nor the continuity thesis of Taylor adequately captures Augustine's relation to modernity or the Reformation. Against Gillespie, the Reformation (and by extension modernity) is not a clear break with the classical and medieval traditions. Here we can trace positive lines of continuity between Augustine and Luther. This relation, however, problematizes rather than confirms Taylor's continuity thesis. This is because the lines of continuity that run from Augustine into modernity are ambiguous. Modernity prioritizes nature and the individual self in a manner that both Luther and Augustine would characterize as metaphysically unfeasible and morally sinful. This generates a twofold situation that will be explored here. First, modernity's prioritization of nature and the self above God fails for similar reasons along Reformation and Augustinian lines, intimating the continuity that runs between them. Second, the supposed failure of modernity that Gillespie traces to its inability to reconcile the freewill/ determinism antinomy latent in the Renaissance and Reformation debate might also be traced to modernity's inability to reconcile with the Augustinian roots it presupposes.[3]

As evidenced by Gillespie and Taylor, Augustine's relation with modernity elicits a range of proposals. But there is a tendency either to read Augustine as its progenitor or to exculpate him completely from it.[4] I would suggest, however, that the situation is more complex. To get a sense of this I want to focus on the issue of human self-autonomy, which Gillespie identifies as a defining characteristic of modernity.[5] Various scholars argue for continuity between Augustine and modernity on this issue, and it does seem that one can trace an Augustinian trajectory here. Taylor has given Augustine the distinctive (or du-

bious) honor of being the progenitor of the autonomous self, arguing that Augustine's genius is in the way he grounds the search for truth within first-person subjectivity.[6] Taylor goes on to argue that Augustine's search for truth and his grounding of it in the radical reflexivity of first-person subjectivity leads him to develop the 'cogito' argument Descartes would later make famous.[7] Frank Farrell carries forward Taylor's basic premise in his examination of subjectivity and postmodernism. He argues that Augustine, in his negotiation between Neoplatonist and Christian anthropologies, is one of the first to develop the notion of an autonomous, self-standing inner space.[8] Along somewhat similar lines Phillip Cary argues that Augustine "invented the concept of private inner space" through a Christian interpretation of the Plotinian notion of the inward space of the soul.[9] Cary concludes that this is "the first version of what we in the West now call 'the inner self'."[10] Cary goes on to note importantly that this space takes on a degree of autonomy only when the soul sinfully turns away from the truth of God.[11] As such, the autonomous state of the soul is not natural but rather the result of the fall. Nevertheless, this unnatural soul becomes the cornerstone for modern, Western concepts of subjectivity and personal identity.

In this brief survey we see scholars from various fields combing through intellectual history in search of the Augustinian roots of modernity. Certainly there are Augustinian echoes within modern notions of subjective interiority and selfhood. There is also at least a formal similarity between Descartes' cogito argument and Augustine's earlier version of it, a similarity Descartes and his contemporaries had already noticed.[12] It may be then that modernity owes much to Augustine and is bound to an Augustinian view of things. It is an open question, however, whether Augustine himself would make a good Augustinian, at least in the way modernity has appropriated him. The story, that is, is less clear-cut than Taylor and others suggest.[13] The Augustinian scholar John Cavadini raises the first note of caution in reminding those who would derive modern notions of the self from Augustine that in Latin there is no actual word for 'self'.[14] Augustine uses various terms and pronouns to designate what we call the 'self', but we should not move too quickly to assume that these concepts are synonymous.

Indeed, key dimensions of Augustine's understanding of the human person are lost when autonomy, self-transparency, and privacy become valorized within a supposed Augustinian notion of the self. Here the route modernity

chose to tread appears distinctive from Augustine, as Gillespie and others have argued. Interestingly, however, this parting of paths brings Augustine close to Luther, which Gillespie's metanarrative largely ignores. This in turn complicates his claim that the Reformation, and by implication modernity, arises from the rubble of the Middle Ages and forges wholly new paths forward. One of the sources of Gillespie's error is that he reads Augustine within a strongly Neoplatonist framework and fails to diagnose the modifications this framework undergoes through Augustine's working out of Christian doctrines on creation and the incarnation.[15] Focusing on the doctrine of creation, we can see that despite Augustine's Neoplatonism and Luther's Nominalism there is a distinctive resonance between their accounts of human existence.

This resonance can be glimpsed in their handling of the issue of human autonomy. Here we can track a similar line of critique that runs through Luther and Augustine. This issue is perhaps more straightforward on Luther's side, at least within Gillespie's metanarrative. This is because, despite the continuity he finds between Luther and modernity at the ontological level, he positions modernity as a distinctive alternative to the Reformation at the ontic level.[16] Here Luther casts God as the fundamental ontic principle and orients creation in radical dependency on God, while modernity opts to position nature as the starting point for its discussion of God and the human person. Various recent studies have highlighted the way Gillespie's point is borne out in Luther's utilization of the doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo*. As with the wider Christian tradition, Luther draws on the doctrine to highlight the absolute dependency of creation on God for both its sheer existence (creation) and its happiness (salvation).[17] Johannes Schwanke has shown that Luther draws on the doctrine widely, though often implicitly, throughout his lengthy commentary on Genesis not only as a cosmological principle on the origin of the universe but also as an anthropological principle that highlights humanity's dependency on God.[18] Similarly, Jon Mackenzie argues that *creatio ex nihilo* serves a basic twofold function in Luther's characterization of the human place in creation—its being-in-the-world—that restricts the possibility of human transcendence.[19] First, the doctrine operates at the ontological level to establish a qualitative distinction between divine (necessary) and human (contingent) being and to cast human existence in absolute dependence on God's creative act. Second, the doctrine works at a subjective and epistemic level to restrict all human inquiry to the place of creation. We cannot transcend creation in search of the

mystery of God that lies behind it because our existence and identity is rooted in creation. In this twofold sense humans are rooted in their place and have no resources—literally nothing—beyond creation upon which they can draw to transcend or move outside their created place. This in turn undermines strong claims of self-autonomy in its modern iterations of both subjective individualism and Kantian transcendentalism.

Luther's conflict with modern notions of self-autonomy is in keeping with Gillespie's narrative. The problem comes in the way Gillespie contrasts Luther and Augustine on this issue in his attempt to promote the Blumenberg discontinuity thesis between the classical and Reformation worlds. In particular, Gillespie's Neoplatonist reading of Augustine misses the way Augustine's account of creation, especially his appropriation of *creatio ex nihilo*, resonates with Luther in the critique both might develop against modernity. Here both the Gillespie discontinuity reading and the Taylor continuity reading of Augustine and modernity fail to account for Augustine's relation to modernity (and Luther).

Taylor may have a point that the autonomous self derives from a certain appropriation of Augustine, but it is one that is also unstable and even alien within Augustine's view of creation. Phillip Cary's observation that for Augustine a private, autonomous interiority is synonymous with a sinful soul alerts us to some of the difficulties of the modernist reading. For Augustine sin deforms the human will, moving the soul from God's goodness while also drawing it away from the forming powers of God and back to the *nihil* roots of its origin.[20] In this model the private interiority of the sinful soul is a deprived state: the sinful claim of autonomy (*de-privatus*) slides into the privation of *nihil* (*de-privatio*). This is not the supposed interiority of modernity: private, rational, and autonomous. This is interiority gone awry, the unnatural soul that in claiming itself loses itself. Humans are left in the impossible situation of trying to achieve immutable perfection, which for Augustine is the telos of human life, through their own resources, which are always mutable given their created nature.[21]

The problems of aligning Augustine with a modernist trajectory arise not only in the way universal anthropological principles are drawn from him without acknowledging the universal sin that accompanies such principles for him—the way the unnatural soul becomes the new nature. There are also problems in the interpretation of how Augustine constructs the divine/ human

relation within his doctrine of creation. Cary is the best here again in the way he traces Augustine's move from the interior divine space of Neoplatonism to the interior created space of Christianity. The point that Cary misses, however, is that while this opens a space between the soul and God that requires a qualitative distinction and difference from God, distinction here must be cast as dependency rather than autonomy and difference as otherness rather than separateness. This comes out of the way the doctrines of the divine image (i.e., humans created in the image of God) and creation from nothing work in tandem to shape Augustine's account of the origin and nature of human existence. Both doctrines differentiate the human and divine along the mutable/immutable fault line of otherness. Humans are created according to the image of God *ex nihilo*, and so image God from their mutable, finite origins. The Son of God (Christ) is also the image of God, but he images God *de deo*—from God's own substance—and so within the immutable eternity of God. Despite this fundamental difference between God and humanity, these doctrines also position humanity within an ever-abiding relation to God.[22] How can an image exist outside a relation to the original? How does something that is literally nothing exist outside the power that drew it out of nothing? In positioning Augustine's account of interiority at the foundation of modernity, Cary does not acknowledge fully how dependency and relation factor into Augustine's account of creation. Charles Taylor's also misses the point. It may be, as he claims, that Augustinian interiority moves toward a new subjectivity, which he labels 'radical reflexivity'. It is also, however, a 'radical reflectivity', and the difference is crucial: between a movement that shows the self through its own (reflexive) activity and a movement that shows the self paradoxically in itself (reflectively) through the act of another (i.e., God). The Augustinian "self" is not selfsame. It is *ex nihilo* not *de deo*, which points to the spiritual suicide, so to speak, of a self grounded in itself.[23]

What then are we to make of Augustine's relation to modernity? I have argued that this question has no straightforward answer. On one hand, various scholars argue for continuity between Augustine and modern notions of personhood, and it does seem that one can trace an Augustinian trajectory here. On the other hand, Augustine's notions of interiority and personhood stand distinct and often opposed to modern notions of subjectivity. This is glimpsed starkly on the issue of autonomy, the hallmark of the modern self. The autonomous self may derive from a certain appropriation of Augustine, but it is one

that is also in deep tension with Augustine's view of the soul. Here the route modernity chose to tread appears distinctive from Augustine, as Gillespie and others have argued.

And yet, what Gillespie and company fail to acknowledge is the extent of the lines of continuity that run from the Middle Ages to modernity through Augustine, even if along divergent readings of him. This is one place where Luther enters the picture. Gillespie's metanarrative misses the lines of continuity that run between Augustine and the former Augustinian monk. What may in fact be the case, if Gillespie is right that modernity via Descartes and Hobbes transcribes and carries forward the Reformation/ Humanist debate into a naturalist framework, is that Augustine through Luther is also brought forward into modernity.[24] Against Gillespie, this would establish lines of continuity between the classical world and modernity, though not in an unambiguous manner. That is, we are not lead into Taylor's continuity thesis on the relation between Augustine and modernity. Rather, it would seem that the Augustinian framework that gives birth to and makes sense of the modern project is also a framework that when brought home to Augustine undoes this very project. The crisis into which modernity falls, then, is not simply its inability to resolve the antinomies that swirl around notions of divine providence, grace, and free-will, but also its more basic failure to reconcile with its theological sources.

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Endnotes

1. Michael Gillespie, *The Theological Origins of Modernity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 11-12.
2. Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), 127-142.
3. Gillespie, *Theological Origins*, 261-2.

4. Taylor credits Augustine as the forefather of modernity. In a recent response to the Taylor thesis, Michael Hanby argues strongly against Augustine's relation to modernity. Hanby, *Augustine and Modernity* (New York: Routledge, 2003).
5. Gillespie, *Theological Origins*, 2.
6. Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, 131. Taylor defines radical reflexivity as a type of first-person, existential knowledge. This is the immediate awareness that distinguishes my experience of myself from my experience of other people. See also, Thomas Nagel, "What is it like to be a bat?" *Mortal Questions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979): 165-180.
7. Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, 132-3. Likewise, Gareth Matthews acknowledges differences between the two thinkers, but argues for a close enough relation between them that he can refer to Augustine's view of the mind as a "nearly Cartesian philosophy of mind". Augustine, *On the Trinity Books 8-15*, ed. Gareth B. Matthews and trans. S. McKenna (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) xii. See also, Gareth B. Matthews, *Thought's Ego in Augustine and Descartes* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992).
8. Frank Farrell, *Subjectivity, Realism, and Postmodernism—The Recovery of the World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) 8-10. See also, Mark C. Taylor, *Erring: A Postmodern A/theology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984) 35-40.
9. Phillip Cary, *Augustine's Invention of the Inner Self: The Legacy of a Christian Platonist* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 3.
10. Cary, *Augustine's Invention*, 63-4, 115-6.
11. Cary, *Augustine's Invention*, 117-122.
12. In an often-referenced letter to Colvius, Descartes maintains that the formal similarities give way to basic differences: Augustine connects the proof of self-existence to the divine image and the relation between knowledge and love, while Descartes connects it to the immaterial substance of the mind. *Oeuvres de Descartes*, eds. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (Paris: Vrin, 1974-83) III, 247.
13. Jon Mackenzie traces a similar, and ultimately erroneous, attempt to read Luther as the progenitor of modernity on two distinct counts. First, certain 20th century Catholic scholars (e.g., Maritain) argue that a subjectivism and individualism latent in Luther's psychological turn lays the groundwork for modern individualism. Second, among non-Catholic philosophers there is a move to read Luther's doctrine of justification as offering a proto-Kantian methodological transcendentalism. Mackenzie contends that both interpretations miss the theological way Luther positions the individual within the place of creation, a placement that undercuts modernist readings of him. Mackenzie, "Luther's Topology: *Creatio ex Nihilo* and the Cultivation of the Concept of Place in Martin Luther's Theology," *Modern Theology* 29:2 (2013) 84-86.
14. John Cavadini, "The Darkest Enigma: Reconsidering the Self in Augustine's Thought," *Augustinian Studies* 38:1 (2007) 119–132.
15. Gillespie, *Theological Origins*, 113, 133.
16. Gillespie argues that the Renaissance, Reformation, and modernity each assume a nominalist ontology but develop it within a distinctive ontic horizon: humanity (Renaissance), God (Reformation), and nature (modernity). Gillespie, *Theological Origins*, 16-17.
17. References to Martin Luther are found in: *Luther's Works*, 55 vols. (St. Louis: Concordia Press, 1955-86) (henceforth LW); *Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe* [*Schriften*], 65 vols. (Weimar: H. Bohlau, 1883-1993) (henceforth WA). LW 1:7-9/ WA 42:6-8; LW 1:17-22/ WA 42:13-17. Gillespie, *Theological Origins*, 16-17, 169, 262.
18. For example, Luther, LW 8:39/ WA 44:607. Johannes Schwanke, *Creatio Ex Nihilo*: *Luthers Lehre von der Schöpfung aus dem Nichts in der Grossen Genesisvorlesung* (1535-1545) (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2004).
19. Mackenzie, "Luther's Topology," 101-102.
20. Augustine, *Confessiones* 4.10.15, 12.11.13.
21. Augustine, *Confessiones* 12.11.12-13.
22. Augustine, *Confessiones* 12.7.7, 12.11.11; Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* 4.16.27, 5.16.34, 7.2.3, 7.11.17, 7.28.43.
23. Augustine, *De Natura Boni* 1, 19, 27.
24. Gillespie, *Theological Origins*, 17, 262.

Merleau-Ponty and Kant
Intersections on the Problem of Evil and Adversity

Michael Berman

Abstract

The dual thrust of this essay is to open a discussion about certain theological issues that consistently arise in Merleau-Ponty's writings, and secondly to identify further examples of Merleau-Ponty's constant dialogue with Immanuel Kant. Merleau-Ponty's thought is thoroughly phenomenological and existential, thus the role of God in his philosophy has not received a sustained or adequate treatment in the secondary literature. Merleau-Ponty holds that arguments from the problem of evil can serve as adequate and sound refutations of the theological God, or at the very least, the property of being all loving. In his essay, "Man and Adversity" (1951), Merleau-Ponty paints a mid-20th century depiction of the radical contingencies and ambiguities that mark our understanding of humanity and the troubles it faces. His essay's final paragraphs explicitly speak to issues in the philosophy of religion, with Merleau-Ponty identifying one of the most important by what he calls "the contingency of evil". The conclusion of this present project will assess whether or not Merleau-Ponty's position regarding the problem of evil is affected by his explanation of adversity.

Keywords

Phenomenology, Religion, Theology, Politics, Judgment, Contingency

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I think it is proper to man to think God,
which is not the same thing as to say God exists.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*

I. Introduction

The dual thrust of this essay is to first open a discussion about certain theological issues that consistently arise in Merleau-Ponty's writings, and secondly to identify examples of Merleau-Ponty's constant dialogue with Immanuel Kant. Perhaps because Merleau-Ponty's thought is thoroughly phenomenological and existential, the role of God in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy has not received a sustained or adequate treatment in the secondary literature. Any treatment of the place of God and the theological implications of Merleau-Ponty's ideas must be performed in the context of his own admission of atheism:[2]

> I don't spend my time saying that I'm an atheist, because that is not a concern, and because doing so would transform an entirely positive philosophical consciousness into a negation. But if, at the end of the story, someone asks me about it, I say "yes."[3]

Merleau-Ponty holds that the arguments from *the problem of evil* can serve as adequate and sound refutations of the theological God, or at the very least, the property of being all loving.[4] In his essay, "Man and Adversity" (1951), Merleau-Ponty paints a mid-20th century depiction of the radical contingencies that mark our understanding of humanity and its troubles. His essay's major sections critically address the hermeneutic situation, Freudian psychoanalysis, language, world politics and humanism. Yet the final paragraphs explicitly speak to issues in the philosophy of religion, with Merleau-Ponty identifying one of the most important by what he calls "the contingency of evil".[5] He, however, radicalizes the theological issue by claiming the "fear of contingency is everywhere, even in the doctrines which helped reveal it."[6] These doctrines are not simply the dogmas of religion, the so-called "Syllabus", but also the political ideologies that structured and served as the rationalizations for the Cold War's events and actors. The conclusion of this present project will assess whether or not Merleau-Ponty's position regarding the problem of evil is affected by his explanation of adversity.

Given this overview of "Man and Adversity", in what ways does Kant perform as interlocutor? My reading here is partially informed by both Hannah Arendt's *Lectures on Kant's Faculty of Judgment* and Dennis Schmidt's *Lyrical and Ethical Subjects*. Arendt and Schmidt's interpretations of Kant's *Critique of Judgment* open new ways to understand the roles of meaning in politics and freedom (the latter of which is not a topic herein). More importantly, Kant's third *Critique* explores what is uniquely *human* cognition, unlike the first *Critique* that examines cognition in general and the second *Critique* that grounds morality in what it means to be a rational being. In the first two critiques, Kant's faculty psychology places the imagination in a subservient position to the understanding and reason (speculative and practical), whereas the third, in exploring aesthetic *judgments of taste* in terms of beauty and the sublime, considers how the faculties work in harmony with each other and allow the imagination to have free play in the cogitation of judgments. These judgments are unlike those of the judgments of perception (subjective instances of sensibility) or judgments of experience (deter-

minant judgments in which the intuitions of sensibility are subsumed under and synthesized with *a priori* concepts), for the judgments of taste are *reflective* judgments. Reflective judgments are subjective and (aim to be) generally (or universally) valid for all human beings. Hence, we get a non-Kantian, yet very Kantian type of judgment that is a mixture of the *a priori* and *aposteriori*, wherein the individual instance (e.g., artwork) is raised to universality as a rule or category of its own. But it is not the object itself that generates the reflective judgment—at best it serves as the catalyst; it is the human being who cognizes in the peculiarly human fashion that creates such a judgment. The reflective judgment is marked by the feeling of pleasure, in terms of the subjective interest that the person takes with respect to how an artwork affects them, as well as, and more importantly, in terms of the disinterested pleasure which follows from reflecting on how their own faculties work in harmony with each other in ascribing beauty to said artwork or sublimity to said experience of nature. Merleau-Ponty understood this, for in the Preface to *Phenomenology of Perception* he writes,

> Kant himself shows in the *Critique of Judgement* that there exists a unity of the imagination and the understanding and a unity of subjects *before the object*, and that, in experiencing the beautiful, for example, I am aware of a harmony between sensation and concept, between myself and others, which is itself without any concept. Here the subject is no longer the universal thinker of a system of objects rigorously interrelated, the positing power who subjects the manifold to the law of the understanding, in so far as he is to be able to put together the world—he discovers and enjoys his own nature as spontaneously in harmony with the law of the understanding.[7]

Judgments of taste are as much feeling as cognition; the two are necessarily blended together. Furthermore, they shed light on the essentially pleasant nature of what it means to be human. But Merleau-Ponty's realism or cynicism will not allow him to uncritically adopt such a view of humanity, for the contingency which marks our relationships to each other is marred by mistreatment, ignorance and violence directed at others (and even ourselves). These adversities or evils are spelled out in Merleau-Ponty's essay, and he says that "the worn out forms of theological explanations"[8] fail to address these troubles. The traditional approaches to conceiving the problem of evil have proven to be inadequate not only in their theistic or atheistic goals, but also in their understanding of the then contemporary world of Merleau-Ponty's era, and perhaps ours as well.

II. Kant and Meaning

There are three key passages that are indicative of the implicit dialogue that Merleau-Ponty's "Man and Adversity" has with Kant. In wrestling with Freud's understanding of consciousness and the body, Merleau-Ponty says that "the body is enigmatic", it is the site of "ambiguous perception", and it is "the natural face of the mind."[9] These descriptions decenter our experiences of ourselves and others: "sexuality is relationship to other persons, and not just to another body…"[10] The Cartesian framework of subject-centered consciousness and experience is an oversimplified view of the person and does not provide an effective explanation of the complexity of human relationships. At the end of this section, Merleau-Ponty writes, "As we approach mid-century, it becomes increasingly evident that incarnation and the other person are the labyrinth of reflection and feeling—of a sort of *feeling reflection*—in contemporary works."[11] Merleau-Ponty need not have turned to writers like Malraux or Sartre to justify this claim.

Kant's reflective judgments exemplify this mixture. Since only human beings can make such judgments, the judgments themselves necessarily involve interested and disinterested pleasure; such cognitions are imbued with affect. Our emotional responses to what is designated as beautiful (or sublime) are part and parcel of such reflections. But this still does not, at this point, escape the Cartesian framework. What does this job is language, which is the next section in Merleau-Ponty's essay. He says therein, "What is proper to expression is to never be more than approximate."[12] While Kant would not have completely agreed with such a claim—after all, determinate judgments can be accurate and true discursive statements about phenomena—reflective judgments are indeed required to be communicable. Reflective judgments have to be expressible and are mutually understandable via our *common sense*. Kant holds that our judgments must be based on our senses, especially in a community of subjects who can share these judgments with each other via language. However, the beautiful and the sublime cannot be gleaned from mere sensibility, we must rise above the senses and make use of our cognitive faculties in order to attain at least a *common understanding* of these notions.[13] Kant states,

> under the *sensus communis* we must include the idea of a sense *common to all*, i.e. of a faculty of judgment which, in its reflection, takes account (*a priori*) of the mode of representation of all other men in thought, in order as

> it were, to compare its judgment with the collective reason of humanity, and thus to escape the illusion arising from the private conditions that could be so easily taken for objective, which would injuriously affect the judgment.[14]

We proceed to compare our judgments, from which are abstracted all subjective content, to the possible judgments of (all) others. Only the "formal peculiarities of our representation" of that which is to be compared constitute the material operated upon by this faculty in our search for a "universal rule" based on the specific object.[15] There are three characteristics which elucidate the nature of this faculty: (1) be self-critical in the sense of avoiding biased thought; (2) by way of thinking, we are to take up the position of *everyone else*, thus producing a sense of an *enlarged mentality*; (3) and lastly we must follow a habit of rational thinking and analysis. In regard to the enlarged mentality, Kant tells us that this is indicative of a *universal standpoint*.[16] This (ideal) standpoint is representatively "*communicable universally*"[17] to everyone. This is the *one* mental faculty that presupposes the presence of others.[18] Arendt makes much use of this presupposition of an intersubjective world.[19]

Merleau-Ponty echoes this in "Man and Adversity", which serves as the second allusion to Kant's aesthetic philosophy. He writes,

> It is true that the totality of beings known by the name of men and defined by the commonly known physical characteristics also *have in common a natural light* or opening to being which makes cultural acquisitions communicable to *all men* and them alone. But this lightning flash we find in every glance called human is just as visible in the most cruel forms of sadism as it is in Italian painting. It is precisely this flash which makes everything possible on man's part, and right up to the end.[20]

What Kant refers to as the common sense of humanity, Merleau-Ponty names "a natural light" ("which appears through the movement of history," and is also an indirect reference to Descartes).[21] This opening to experience is essentially communicable, i.e., can be shared by all human beings via verbal linguisticality and non-verbal or bodily expressivity. Such acquisitions are not limited to positive aesthetic judgments, e.g., the beautiful artworks of the Italian tradition, for that which is awful or sadistic, perhaps even *ugly*, is no less fascinating and communicable.[22] Whereas Kant's reflective judgments (when sound) have a necessarily positive valence—for the beautiful can be a symbol

of morality, and reflective judgments can have a Kantian practicality to them insofar as they ready the individual to be more prepared to act in morally worthy fashions—Merleau-Ponty's human cultural acquisitions can also express adversity. This leads to the third passage that connects Merleau-Ponty with Kant, yet is critical of the latter.

In the final paragraph of "Man and Adversity", Merleau-Ponty considers the ideality of universal communicability between "all men" or persons, especially when merely conceived "in thought" (Kant):

> Sometimes one starts to dream about what culture, literary life, and teaching could be if all those who participate, having for once rejected idols [e.g., ideologies, doctrines, or dogmas], would give themselves up to the happiness of reflecting together. But this dream is not reasonable.[23]

This reiterates Kant's aspirations for aesthetics, namely that reflective judgments are pleasurable guides toward morally worthy actions, which in turn, can make the judges worthy of happiness. While Kant's deontology is non-consequentialist, acting in morally worthy fashions does make the individual deserving of happiness, even if such happiness does not concretely occur in this world or the (postulated) afterlife. By "reflecting together", humans can pleasantly judge various instances, whether these be artworks, persons or events. Arendt's political interpretation of reflective judgments emphasizes this human ability (or even imperative…) to judge together. This is indicative of human community and plurality, for by taking account of as many viewpoints as possible via the enlarged mentality, individuals cognize according to our similarities *and* differences. This spectatorial version of judgment is disinterested because of the distance the community of judges has from the objects being judged. This opens the door to generating meanings that are meaningful to the judges as humans because of their embodiment, linguisticality and plurality, not because they hold some abstract status as cognitive subjects.

Merleau-Ponty similarly comprehends this, but is critical of this dream or ideal in two ways. Firstly, and this accords with Arendt, when particulars are judged, their meanings (the rules they provide in Kant's sense) are always marked by ambiguity; again, expressions are only approximate. For example, when political events are reflected upon, he says,

> In addition to its manifest meaning, each political act bears a contrary and latent meaning. [In addition] it seems to us that governments get lost in these double meanings and, in the extraordinary subtlety of means-ends relationships, are no longer able to know themselves what they are actually doing…In all this we see less duplicity than confusion, and less wickedness than perplexity.[24]

Governments, particularly the super powers of the Cold War (USA and USSR), simply do not understand what they are doing to each other, themselves and those others around them; more contemporary examples can be seen in the current events in the Middle East or the Ukraine in relation to the foreign policies of the USA and Europe. Governments hold to the rationalizations provided by their ideologies and fail to see that these "doctrines are too narrow"[25] to address the problems posed by the contingencies of human situations, as well as the problems *caused* by policies and actions motivated by such doctrines. Political actors believe (or hope) that their actions determine the meanings of events, which is akin to Arendt's *agonal* model of action. But it is the spectatorial model to which both she and Merleau-Ponty gravitate. In essence, the audience (citizens) in its collective and reflective judgments actually generate the meanings such actions have. The misunderstanding by the political actors is not intentional or malevolent per se, but rather grounded in the myopia of their doctrinally informed perspectives.

The second critique that Merleau-Ponty could level at this dream of reflective happiness is not as strongly stated in "Man and Adversity", but it would sound like the following: it is not concretely possible to have humanity in its entirety to think and reflect in the same fashions. The conceptual and linguistic *apparati* that we have at our disposal are not fundamentally identical and translatable into univocal and ideational equivalences. Merleau-Ponty would reject the *ahistorical* assumption behind Kant's faculty psychology and its *a priori* conceptual frameworks, for this would not be reasonable. Contingency is just as much a part of human existence as the world in which we are situated. There can be no escape into ideality, for it too is necessarily informed by the historicity of its own origins, that is, contingency.

III. The Contingency of Evil (and Good)

The last section of "Man and Adversity" opens with a discussion of the contingency of good and evil. To describe Merleau-Ponty's view of contingency, we could say, "It basically describes what is present with brute facticity."[26] There is never any absolute that exists beyond experience actually given in experience, which would be non-sensical or meaningless. Everything in experience is both diachronically and synchronically conditional and relational. But we should further flesh this out by recognizing the perspectival nature by and in which we perceive or are given "facticity". Contingency is not defined or treated by Merleau-Ponty as if it were the logical and metaphysical counterpart to the necessary being *qua* God as found in theological thought. Such a view of contingency "cannot be reconciled with the manifest content of religion…"[27] Rather contingency marks the provisional and limited grasp we have on a world that constantly overflows our conceptualizations and outruns us. This is clearly evident in the "contingency of evil": there is no destructive, chaotic force or *malin génie* that is out to get us; rather, "it is only a matter of a sort of inertia, a passive resistance, a dying fall of meaning—an anonymous *adversity*"[28] that plagues us. The antagonistic camps of the Cold War exemplified this in their M.A.D.[29] stagnation and proxy violence with all of its concomitant collateral damage.

An important distinction here is that the problem of evil can be divided into moral and natural evils. Ostensibly moral evils pertain to human relations; whereas the latter refers to environmental calamities and events that are outside of human influence, but influence human beings directly. Certainly this distinction holds, but only contingently or relatively. The effects of human endeavours, especially technological agriculture and industrialization, have demonstrated our intimate and direct causal relations to the environment: e.g., strip-mining, desertification, pollution and global warming/climate change. Then again tsunamis and meteor impacts also beset us; nature is indifferent to humanity in such instances. With respect to what humans do to each other, in "A Note on Machiavelli", Merleau-Ponty states, "There is a circuit between the self and others, a Communion of Black Saints. The evil that I do I do to myself, and in struggling against others I struggle equally against myself."[30] We necessarily draw ourselves and others into suffering, whether we intend it or not. Hence, the anonymity of adversity stands outside of the notion of intentionality, for it is a broader and more ubiquitous aspect of the indifferent world.

The good is also likewise contingent: "Progress is not necessary with a metaphysical necessity…"[31] This too stands in opposition to Kant's position, articulated in his essay, "The Idea of Universal History towards a Cosmopolitan Intent", in which nature's secret ruse of reason's guiding moral thread has lifted humanity out of barbarity into a world of civilizations and culture.[32] The most optimistic that Merleau-Ponty can be here is to say that "experience will very likely end up by eliminating false solutions and working its way out of impasses. But at what price, by how many detours?"[33] And even if things improve, there is always the possibility that it could all come crashing down or that we will suffer some unforeseen catastrophe. This is the cynical edge one can expect of an existentialist, which need not be fatalistic, but is realistic and pragmatic.

These explanations of the contingency of good and evil are cast in the mould of ambiguity. The experience of each is never given as an absolute. Certainly the brutality of some actions leave scars, and the benevolence of good acts have positively contributed to the world or history. Neither are pure, unconditional events. They are shaped and understandable by way of the context in which they occur, as well as through the perspectives that *judge* each act to be good or evil. The implications of the above discussion can now be brought to bear on the problem of evil for Merleau-Ponty.

IV. An Atheological "Solution"

In the essay, "Metaphysical in Man", Merleau-Ponty considers the problem of theodicy:

> …in the last analysis [the problem] perhaps consisted—even for Leibniz himself—of evoking the existence of this world as an insurpassable fact from which the first solicits creative actualization and therefore of rejecting the point of view of a worldless God. God then appears, not as the creator of this world—*which would immediately entail the difficulty of a sovereign and benevolent power forced to incorporate evil in His works*—but rather as an idea in the Kantian and restrictive sense of the word. God becomes a term of reference for a *human reflection* which, when it considers the world such as it is, condenses in this idea what it would like the world to be.[34]

The explicit reference to Kant continues Merleau-Ponty's dialogue with the philosopher. The problem of evil is embedded in the more general theological discussion about God: the existence of the world necessitates a God; there is no God without a world. Merleau-Ponty said, "For me, philosophy consists in giving another name to what has long been crystallized under the name of God."[35] Yet, this cannot be a creator God, for this would mean that the evil that we experience in this world would have been intentionally designed into existence or creation. This does not accord with the traditional theological attributes afforded to God: omniscience, omnipotence and omni-benevolence. Suffice it to say, anonymous adversity entails that God did not know enough, was not powerful enough or did not care enough (or some combination of the three) to avoid the inclusion of evil in the world. From the Kantian philosophical perspective, deontology requires that rational *qua* moral beings postulate a divine law giver as the ever present sovereign of the kingdom of ends,[36] yet in terms of human reflective judgments we are led to morality through the beautiful (though it does not give us the moral law), or we are cowed into belief by the over powering and inescapable presence felt in the experience of the sublime.

It can now be asked; does Merleau-Ponty's notion of adversity buttress his understanding of the theological problem of evil? In short, the answer is no. It actually undermines this standard atheistic objection to the theist position. If evil is subject to contingency, then a perspectival shift, contextual change, or subsequent event can shift the valuation of the occurrence such that what was once deemed evil can be assessed as neutral or even good; the same claim could be applied to the contingency of the good. If good and evil (and the neutral) are ambiguous, if judgments about events evolve over the course of history, then adversity too would be subject to constant dialectical revision. One would then be hard-pressed to claim that evil really has been incorporated into creation. Hence, it would seem that the theistic position could once again be asserted. Yet Merleau-Ponty's acknowledgement of the contingency of the good would not be strong enough to support the contention that the traditional theistic God could serve as the creator because the cynical realism Merleau-Ponty articulates precludes the necessity of a happy ending. The only way for theists to surmount this *aporia* is to take-up magical or *occult thinking*

that "would like to establish institutions, customs, and types of civilizations which answer our problems much less well, but which are supposed to contain a *secret* we hope to *decipher* by dreaming…"[37] But as Merleau-Ponty stated, this is not reasonable. It has no and can have no impact on the philosophical enterprise.

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Endnotes

1. *The Primacy of Perception* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964), 41.
2. Bannan, John F., "Merleau-Ponty on God", *International Philosophical Quarterly*, September 1966, Vol. 6, 343. Lowry, Atherton, "Merleau-Ponty and the Absence of God", *Philosophy Today*, Summer 1978, Vol. 22, 121-2. Luijpen, William A., *Phenomenology and Atheism*, (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1964), 159. Merleau-Ponty's treatment of religion in *In Praise of Philosophy and Other Essays* (*In Praise of Philosophy and Other Essays*, 1988, 41-47) further qualifies and adds certain nuances to his position; essentially the positions of theism and atheism do not touch the philosophical project, for the latter continues its critique no matter the label attached to it by theologians or sceptics (46).
3. Toadvine and Lawlor, *The Merleau-Ponty Reader*, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 235, 238.
4. *Phenomenology of Perception*, 358-9; see "Reflection, Objectivity, and the Love of God, A Passage from Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception*", *The Heythrop Journal*, (XLVIII, 2010, pp. 1–11).
5. Merleau-Ponty, "Man and Adversity", *Signs* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964), 239.
6. "Man and Adversity", 242.
7. *Phenomenology of Perception* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1962), xvii.
8. "Man and Adversity", 242.
9. "Man and Adversity", 229.
10. "Man and Adversity", 230; see also Merleau-Ponty's lecture, "The Child's Relations with Others", wherein he says, "This is what Freud would have wanted to explain regarding sexual behaviour; sexual behaviour is the bearer of relationships with others" (*Child Psychology and Pedagogy* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2010), 277.
11. "Man and Adversity", 232; emphasis added.
12. "Man and Adversity", 233.
13. *Critique of Judgment* (USA: Hafner Press, 1951), 135.
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17. *Critique of Judgment*, 138.
18. Arendt, H., *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982), 74.
19. *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*, 67; see a more extended discussion of the issues here in "The Situatedness of Judgment and Action in Arendt and Merleau-Ponty", *Politics and Ethics Review*, (Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 202-220, Fall 2006).
20. "Man and Adversity", 239-240; emphasis added.
21. *The Primacy of Perception*, 30. In René Descartes third meditation (*Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998)), for "the light of nature" see 73/40 or 80/52.
22. Levinas's discussions of the sufferer exemplify this understanding; though Arendt's contentions about how the Holocaust exploded our moral concepts may fit more inline with Kant's view that reflective judgments are non-conceptual.
23. "Man and Adversity", 242-243.
24. "Man and Adversity", 239-240.
25. "Man and Adversity", 238.
26. Lowry, 120.
27. *Sense and Non-Sense*, 96.
28. "Man and Adversity", 239.
29. M.A.D.: mutual assured destruction.
30. *Signs*, 212.
31. "Man and Adversity", 239.
32. Immanuel Kant's "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent" in *Perpetual Peace, and Other Essays* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983), 29-40; see also "Man and Adversity", 240.
33. "Man and Adversity", 239.
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The Plane of Immanence

Radical Orthodoxy and the Origins of Modern Spatiality

Andrew Lewis

Abstract

Accounts of how modernity and postmodernity are expressed in time are central to historiographical analyses as found in philosophies and theologies of history (e.g., Karl Löwith, Hans Blumenberg, Reinhart Koselleck, and more recently, Mark C. Taylor, Charles Taylor, and Michael Allen Gillespie). In this paper I suggest that in contrast to an underline emphasis upon temporality, the theological movement known as Radical Orthodoxy (RO) offers a unique perspective as it points to the ways that modernity has affected conceptions of space. Namely, RO points to social atomism and spatial homogenization as modern spatial discontents. In this paper I trace the spatial analyses of three key members of RO (Catherine Pickstock, John Milbank, and Graham Ward) and conclude with their inadequacies. I contend that in equating space and its correlative 'spatialization' with representation, these authors fall in the pitfall of utilizing a binary logic that needlessly positions space against time, stasis against flow, immanence against transcendence, thus missing the intricacies of space-time relationships.

Keywords

Radical Orthodoxy, Space, Immanence, Univocity, Modernity, Postmodernity, Social Atomism, Spatial Homogenization, Representation.

I Introduction

What do we mean by modernity? What do we mean by postmodernity? What role have theology and philosophy had in the historical development of modernity, postmodernity, or whatever word we so choose to characterize our contemporary period? These are questions that have remained central to theological and philosophical historiographical explorations, as embarked upon by Karl Löwith, Hans Blumenberg, and much more recently by Mark C. Taylor, Charles Taylor, and Michael Allen Gillespie. Here I present another group of voices that have contributed to the conversation—the theological movement known as Radical Orthodoxy (RO). In contrast to an emphasis upon the theological origins of modern temporal structures (e.g., Löwith, Blumenberg), I will highlight RO's attention to shifts in the spatial structures of modernity. RO largely attributes these shifts to the Scotist

cum nominalist univocalist rupture—a move that reconfigured the God/world relationship. RO argues that this unhinged creation from analogical mystery and the metaphysics of participation.

I suggest that RO brings together two interrelated arguments about modern and postmodern spatiality. The first argument is that 'spatialization' is a form of cartographic reason that has come to afflict the modern and postmodern eras—periods characterized by an emaciated metaphysics and a representational epistemology that has flattened out reality into a Godless plane of immanence. The second argument is that modernity has altered space(s) in ways that are not beneficial to human flourishing. Namely, spatial homogenization and social atomism are viewed as two modern spatial discontents. Spatial homogenization, informed by modern cartographic reason, is the consequence of a secular and nihilist immanence without depth in which case reality is cut off from transcendent analogical reference. Social atomism is the result of modernity's mantra of self-volition and a pure nominalism of endless difference. In exposing RO's historical narrative and what it views as the consequential effects of modernity and postmodernity on space (and vice versa), I will focus upon three of RO's voices: Catherine Pickstock, John Milbank, and Graham Ward. After showing the intricacies of the spatial analyses put forth by these authors, I will conclude with what I view as the pitfalls of their constructive solutions to mitigate modernity's spatial discontents.

II Catherine Pickstock

In *After Writing,* Pickstock draws from Part II of Descartes' *Discourse on the Method*, to describe the "Cartesian City."[1] Here Descartes uses a bundle of spatial metaphors to describe the organization of human knowledge. New cities built upon a grid under the guidance of a single legislator are more pleasing in comparison to ancient cities, which are so often a great mixture of conurbations. Descartes uses this spatial imagery as a metaphor for knowledge. It is better to build reason upon a new robust foundation that is one's own than the old crumbling foundations that have been handed down to us. Descartes' ontology hinges upon the knowing subject and therefore epistemology. Yet, antecedent to the Cartesian epistemology is a move that Pickstock calls a "politico-architectonics." Being comes to be understood as that which is imma-

nently known by the cogito, as a Cartesian subject placed within a homogenous city. The city is no longer constituted through relational content, and through ecstatic civic strivings toward the good; it is contained within the catacombs of the mind and opened up by the *cogito*.

As Pickstock follows, the Cartesian dictum that the mind must be directed only towards those things that can be indubitably conceived via cognition was a move that stressed the 'being' of things as that which can be known. An object's representation now takes precedence—a departure from previous ontological understandings that pointed to being as having "unknowable and unanalysable depth."[2] However, for Pickstock, the breach that changed how being is understood was not Descartes, but his scholastic predecessor Duns Scotus. With Scotus, "a new model of truth as transparently available and immanent began to emerge."[3] The root of this modern 'epistemology of representation' is found in Scotus' theory of univocity. With univocity, a creature is not defined through analogical relations, but through a "logic of self-possession" rendering it "identical with its own space."[4] This move toward representation is further evidenced in Scotus' theory of individuation. The medieval scholastic project sought to solve the conundrum of individuation—whether it occurred in reality, in the mind, or some of both? The Scotist 'formal distinction' solution was midway between a real distinction and an intellectual distinction. For Scotus, there is a common nature between individual beings and what can be known of them in the mind. The similarity is however formal; it is prior to each being's existence. The unity amongst individual beings lies not in existence but in essence. The actuality of being is, as Éric Alliez notes, a virtual "real-possible."[5] Without an existential ontological grounding to objects, their common nature is based upon a proto-Kantian judgment. The mind, not wholly dependent upon an object's 'real' cognitive status, nevertheless uses cognition to think of "material reality in terms of isolated atoms of information streaming in from the outside world, which the mind must then synthesize."[6] A being can be thought of in abstraction, in its own self-possessive atomized space and divorced from co-constitutive relations of emergent participation.

With the Scotist metaphysical grounding in the possible over the actual (essence over existence), we discover the roots of the modern privileging of epistemology over ontology. Objects come to be understood independently of their material reality, and are defined according to their representation.[7] With this

move comes the modern preoccupation with the visual, which "can be seen to anticipate, or perhaps accelerate, the full unfolding of the process of spatialization…the early-modern move towards a cartographic and encylcopaedic epistemology."[8] Pickstock argues that a consequence of this preoccupation with ocular representation is the "centralization of liturgical form" that took place at the Council of Trent. The liturgical mystery of the Eucharist becomes a spatial rite in which the "invisible was made visible, in the local, authoritative—and authorizing—moment of spectacle arrangement."[9] Pickstock thusly brings together two modern spatial discontents. On the one hand, the consequence of univocity is a cartographic logic that renders space flat and homogenous, emptied of any analogical depth of mystery. On the other hand, univocal being is manifest through the dialectics of absence and presence, in atomized self-same locations—in a world where beings are isolated from each other and God.

III John Milbank

Throughout his body of work, Milbank explores the ways in which the medieval univocalist metaphysical paradigm shift has come to affect modern political ontologies. He points to the voluntarist-nominalist rupture as the impetus for a representational epistemology that haunts modernity. Throughout the Milbankian corpus, the category of space is a motif, at certain times more explicit than others. For instance, his earlier *Theology & Social Theory* expresses a spatial imagery in terms of the nominalist-voluntarist creation of "dominion" and the territorializing of the secular and the sacred—a boundary that Milbank claims did not exist in the pre-Scotist mediaeval analogical worldview.[10] After the Scotist univocal transposing of being, we are left on a secular immanent plane of sheer difference and no God. These differences are left to their own violent devices—a violence in the image and likeness of the voluntarist gnostic demiurge that the secular ultimately evacuates from its Godless plane of immanence.

In *Being Reconciled*, Milbank continues his discussion about the plane of immanence, differentiating between the spatial discontents of modernity and postmodernity.[11] In pre-modernity the world received its value in light of its participation in transcendence, and in reference to a teleological finality. After the Scotist-nominalist metaphysical rupture circa 1300, the world received its

value in terms of itself without reference to the transcendent. Rather than teleological hierarchy we come to an era of "spatiality" and the dawn of the plane of immanence. With modernity, this is realized as type of "fixed spatial grid" (e.g., *mathesis*) that utilizes cartographic reason.[12] Although modernity does away with verticality and height, the modern fixed grid remains placed upon cultural norms and upon human nature. However, with postmodernity reality no longer retains any depth and individuals find themselves on a thin surface in constant flux. Modernity is the era of spatial homogenization and fixity, while postmodernity is the era of the "obliteration of boundaries, the confusion of categories."[13] Through this blurring of boundaries between culture and nature, humans have come to question the legitimacy of natural law and wonder whether it is a cultural artifice.

With information technologies comes a confusion between inside and outside, between the real and the virtual. Gone are the days of meaningful encounters in the public piazza. In its place are disjunctive "semi-private spaces" that are in constant bombardment by public capitalist media and government surveillance.[14] With the information age comes the increased freedom and deregulation of traditional boundaries found within capitalism. This does not however equate to a postmodern post-capitalism, but rather record profits from an increase in surplus labor and abstract forms of commodities. Globalization marks the merging of the political and economic spheres through the sharing of functions and blending of dominions in a postmodern "global empire" that forever finds new ways to create "under-capitalized enclaves" upon which to exercise its power and reap for accumulation.[15] This postmodern blurring of boundaries is supposed to usher in a univocal emancipation from analogical order (e.g., Deleuze).[16] Yet, the postmodern subject is placed on an immanent plane forever in flux, with no way to meaningfully relate to others. Thus, while postmodernity is possibly an escape from the fixed spatial grid of modernity, we are left with social atomism as another spatial discontent.

IV Graham Ward

In *Cities of God*, Ward looks to the ways in which the postmodern city structures the signs and cultural metaphors that we live by, and conversely, how the city inherits from these signs a "geographical mapping."[17] To explore this map-

ping, Ward looks to Baudrillard's analysis of the simulacra.[18] The postmodern city is infiltrated by the hyperreal, as not simply that which can be "endlessly reproduced, but that which is always and already reproduced."[19] When everything is reproducible, and everything therefore becomes 'real,' reality loses it particularity. Hyperreal spaces become homogenous—they become "embalmed."[20] The basis for this hyperreality is a "nominalism, which divorced things from their names."[21] There is no longer any substance and pure representation remains. Paradoxically, on the other side of this homogenizing of space is a social atomism founded upon a representational nominalism of sheer 'endless' difference and an alienation from the referent. In the "city of endless desire," desire endlessly desires its nihilist fulfillment in a search that endlessly commodifies, homogenizes, and totalizes social spaces in the process.

Meaning is however sought after in this postmodern urban wilderness. Yet, the reactionary movements only promulgate atomism, what Michel Maffesoli, and Zygmunt Bauman after him, call 'neo-tribalism.'[22] The postmodern subject seeks tribal affiliations as a form of self-definition. Yet, tribal membership only lasts so long that one sports the "symbolic tags of tribal allegiance." The tribal existence is thusly "transient and always in flux" as tribes ceaselessly proliferate and dissipate.[23] Ward expands this discussion of postmodern fluidity, drawing from Manuel Castells' analysis of cyberspace. In the cyber-spatial hyperreal city, the "space of places" is replaced by the "space of flows."[24] Localized places and cultures have become destabilized. In this dizzying infiltration of flows we find a social atomism wherein the postmodern subject cannot find its "orientation regarding alterity (the other)."[25] In the cyber-spatial 'space of flows' knowledge is itself "atomized…completely catalogued and known."[26] The virtual is no longer the 'other' of what is real and we are left with the "ultimate encoding of a soft ontology."[27] Without a referent, the postmodern subject is left in a free-flowing nihilistic spiral.

Ward continues his analysis of postmodern spatiality in *The Politics of Discipleship*, discussing how cyberspace has come to influence the postmodern worldview, as a "virtual immateriality" that influences capitalism, globalization, and politics. Christian missiology is integral to the modern western colonial consciousness, and economic theory proceeds from a voluntarist legacy informing notions of covenant and contractual law. Globalization then went hand in hand with secularism, as liberal humanism fostered a "secular eschatol-

ogy" that turned into a capitalist neo-gnosticism that fetishizes commodities. As Ward continues, there is a spatial consequence to this secularized capitalist colonial logic. Globalization fosters a cosmology that "speaks of liquid realities, protean selves, the collapse of geographical space into flows, the erasure of national and continental boundaries."[28] This dematerialization and dehumanizing of the globalized capitalist political economy not only signals the spatial homogenization of the world through the obliteration of boundaries as rooted in a cartographic colonial logic that has transitioned from the material to the virtual (and from the Christian to the gnostic-capitalist)—it also signals a social atomism engendered by a consumerist culture and an individualism at all costs.

V Conclusion

RO has not been immune to criticism. For instance, while Charles Taylor sees RO's project as fitting in with his, he sees it lacking in its explanation of how the thought of European intellectual elites "emerges as a mass phenomenon."[29] Maarten Wisse points to an ironic nominalism in RO, given its commitment to doing away with platonic and plotinian dualisms through a so called theurigic brand of iamblichian-proclean neoplatonism, in which case the "only thing that I can say abut the being of beings is that they all participate in the Real."[30] However, more often critiques of RO point in the other direction, to an inherent dualism. This trajectory is probably in line with my critique, for I see a dualism at hand in RO's spatial narrative that brings into question its solutions for the mitigation of modernity and postmodernity's spatial discontents.

The constructive solutions that Pickstock, Milbank, and Ward all offer are various spatial metaphors that communicate an analogical 'metaphysics of participation.' Pickstock looks to the "liturgical space" as one filled by divine space—a space in which time and space adhere together.[31] Milbank looks to the "gothic" and more recently the "trans-organic" as metaphors that communicate a hierarchical "complex space" that evades not only modernity's 'fixed grid' and thus a representational "simple space," but also the logic of the one and the many at the root of modern leftist and rightist politics.[32] Ward looks to both the Body of Christ and the Trinity as offering an excess in meaning that resist an onslaught of the secular cultural signs that order and represent the world as a cyberspatial hyperreality.[33] While these sounds like meaningful proposals, the problem lies within RO's spatial imaginary. Why is 'spatializa-

tion' equated with 'representation'? At the heart of this is a binarism that posits space against time, stasis against flow, and immanence against transcendence (not to mention, a positing of space as feminine lack and time as masculine extension). As geographer Doreen Massy notes, there is a slippage that occurs between thinking of spatialization as an activity that slices up reality into "static time-slices," to thinking of 'space' as a static dimension, divorced from relational content.[34] Spatialization is understood as a process that flattens out time. Through an unfortunate guilt of association, "space conquers time by being set up as the *representation* of history/life/the real world."[35] While RO's metaphysics of participation and its particular brand of Christian neoplatonism supposedly communicates a divine incarnational self-diffusiveness that evades a dualist logic, and a transcendence that includes immanence, then why do we discover such rhetoric as Milbank's proposal that we need a "politics of time" to counter a secular logic of spatial security,[36] or that we need a "biological" gender equality of difference that affirms both "male abstraction" and the "feminine settled"?[37] I conclude with a question: how is RO's call for transcendence to thwart the modern representational spatialized 'plane of immanence' not itself steeped in cartographic reason, a colonial logic to re-conquest the immanent/nihilist/secular other?

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Girard
From Idealism to Apocalyptic Visions

Per Bjørnar Grande

Abstract

In Girard's early work, the apocalyptic starts when man imitates the sacrificial and violent behavior of other men. One could speak of desires run wild as the natural urge to imitate each other leads individuals to rivalry and violence. The desire to have what others have makes human desire unstoppable and mainly unfulfilled, creating endless strategies in order to fulfill futile goals. There is no stoppage mechanism for this kind of desire. In Girard's middle phase from Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World, there is a certain idealism and optimism in the way destructive desire can be overcome. In Girard's latest phase concerning apocalypse, the approach is darker and more pessimistic. The emphasis is now on the danger of absolute violence and a real meltdown of civilization. Instead of world peace, the sacred boundaries fall apart, paving the way for violence in the extreme. The earlier positive attitude towards greater concern for victims seems overshadowed by a scenario where the loss of order in society combined with heightened technological skills, will, at any given moment trigger a mass catastrophe.

Girard's point that the Passion has rendered collective murder inoperative, does not, in my view, necessarily mean that it aggravates mass violence. A typical Western country experiences much less killing than a society where the scapegoat mechanism is still very much at the fore. According to the criminologist Manuel Eisner, there were in England in the 14th century 24 homicides per 100,000 people while in the 1960s it had fallen to 0.6 homicides per 100,000. Another objection to Girard's apocalyptic thought is the lack of multiple scenarios. As regards to apocalypse, there could clearly be room for different outcomes, different hypotheses. For example, Girard does not reflect on the possibility of the world continuing for thousands of years, where people will be capable of regulating one's desire in new ways and inventing new life strategies amidst nuclear and environmental threats. Man has, as history has shown, an incredible ability to change when the stakes are high enough.

Keywords

Desire, Imitation, Mimesis, Violence, Apocalypse, Historical Development.

In Girard's work, the apocalyptic is initiated when human beings imitate the violent behaviour of other humans. One could perhaps speak of desires run wild, as the natural urge to imitate one another leads to rivalry and violence. The desire to have what others have means that human desire is unstoppable and generally unfulfilled, and endless strategies are generated in an effort to achieve futile goals. There is no mechanism for interrupting this kind of desire. This is unlike the animal world, where instincts create a natural barrier for one's

needs. The tendency to desire more and more also creates an urge to try to hide the fact that one constantly desires the desires of someone else.

Apocalypse and Desire

In Girard's first major work, *Mensonge romantique et vérité romanesque* (English: *Deceit, Desire and the Novel*) from 1961, there is a chapter called "*The Dostoevskyan Apocalypse*" in which the apocalypse is seen as a revelation of our deceitful desire for autonomy, or as what Girard at the time called the "*Manichean division between Self and Other*."[1] Dostoevsky, according to Girard, was one of the few novelists to show us the basic structure of inter-individual desire. Desire comes from desiring the other. It is not a linear desire, but rather triangular, which means that there is always somebody there to mediate the free flow of desire between the subject and the object. If our desires were not impacted by a mediator, there would be some possibility of desiring freely, but as long as there is a mediator present, there cannot be any linear desire. The mediator can receive and hinder desire. He or she transforms desires into secondary and rival desires, which Girard calls *metaphysical desire*.[2] In *Deceit, Desire and the Novel* Girard concludes that there is no such thing as autonomous or spontaneous desire. All desires are interdependent and mediated. This insight is the insight of being possessed by the other persons' desire as a desire which one wishes to attain to oneself. The nearest one can come to a free, spontaneous desire is through religious conversion, through imitating Christ. This freedom and spontaneity, however, is also mediated.

By using the novel to investigate how our desires crave autonomy, authors like Dostoevsky and Proust are able to describe both the gap between self and other, and how this gap can be bridged. This gap is very small, if it exists at all, and becomes smaller and smaller as the antagonists become more and more possessed by each other. At the same time desire encourages the display of individuality and difference, thereby revealing the individual's strategies of dependence and desire to others. Bridging this gap, letting go of our cherished uniqueness, is a difficult process as it requires a transformation of desires. The act of overcoming the opposition between self and other is what constitutes the apocalyptic in Girard's early work. This means reaching the highest level of thought based on the act of understanding that, when one is judging others,

one is judging oneself at the same time.[3] Through that process, there will be an upheaval of the individual's dearest illusions which creates some kind of apocalyptic effect, either negatively in the form of insanity and suicide, or positively in the form of religious conversion.

In this respect, there is both a dimension of hope (escaping from negative desires) and idealism in Girard's understanding of an individual revelation of desire. The road to freedom lies in the conversion process, which basically stems from the power of Christian conversion – even if the person himself is not conscious of it. Thus, the apocalypse becomes a sort of confession. Apocalypse in this phase requires a change of heart, both psychological and ethical.

Apocalypse in the light of Sacrifice and Violence

Since the 1970s, all Girard's attempts to deal with apocalypse have been linked to violence. Over time, the solutions have become increasingly grim, which, I suppose, is a consequence of viewing human interrelations as increasingly sacrificial. The notion of the apocalyptic has changed, from the effects of confessing one's hidden rivalry with the other to a more classic understanding of the world's destruction due to violence. The theme violence is first worked out through analyses of archaic myths in *La Violence et le sacré* (English: *Violence and the Sacred, 1972)* and then, gradually, been fused into a modern day discussion on the threatening aspects of violence in *Des Choses cachées depuis la fondation du monde: Recherches avec Jean-Michel Oughourlian et Guy Lefort* (English: *Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World*, 1978). In the course of this development, *sacrifice* becomes the main factor contributing to an understanding of the apocalypse.

Girard criticises the fundamentalist view on the apocalypse as divine violence. This view, by turning the apocalypse into a scenario of divine thunderbolts, implies that the apocalypse poses no threat to anyone as it is either an aid to salvation or does not exist at all.[4] In Girard's view the end will come as a result of man's violent desires. Girard's apocalyptic thinking through the 1970's clearly contains a non-sacrificial view, which demystifies theological violence and places great hope in the act of imitating the ideal of Christ. There seems to be a certain belief that society as a whole can take a different and healthier path. The emphasis is clearly on man's potential for violence, but there is also a

considerable hope that man will be able to stop the cycles of violence and create a climate of peace and forgiveness. In this respect one can claim that despite Girard's emphasis on desire and violence, he seems, all along to be hopeful to some kind of change of mentality caused by the Gospel revelation. Christianity has created a new mentality where forgiveness and longing for peace.

In this period Girard seems to be close to many secular thinkers who claim that Christianity is a force behind secularization and modernity. Girard claims that desire liberates humans from certain maleficent forms of sacralisation. In other words, desire has a positive effect on certain sacrificial phenomena.

Everything that makes our world the most energetic and creative that has ever been in art, politics, modes of thought and, especially, science and technology is a consequence of the liberation of mimetic desire.[5]

This statement indicates that Girard in *Things Hidden* regards desire in a rather positive way. Desire can, when linked to the process of permitting rivalry and demystification, be seen as a creative force. It is therefore essential to focus on the liberating effects of desire, in order to understand the double effect of desire. One of the liberating effects of desire consists in tolerating rivalry.

Modern society is extremely refined and developed in the symbolic sense. It can permit and encourage growth of mimetic rivalries that are normally forbidden to man.[6]

Rivalry in a sacrificial society has to be controlled by strict prohibitions in order to avoid violence. In a desacralized world desire is let loose. The consequence is enhanced rivalry and a speeding up of production. The threat from violence, however, is less strong as people find other ways than violence of letting off steam. Toleration towards desire can only materialise when violence is moderated, or aggressions have been channelled.

In Girardian thought this kind of desacralization constitutes a progress, but progress not in any straightforward way such many liberals imagine it. That is because the victimage mechanism is seen as partly beneficial since it has, historically speaking, regulated society and limited violence. This also means that violence is less motivated by contingent and absolute violence.

There is also the case that deconstructing prohibitions creates a world of individual rivalry, which leads to new and differentiated forms of violence. The tensions, how-

ever, caused by heightened rivalry can also lead to creativity, for example in the technological field, which in due time may lead to mass destruction.

The liberation of desire creates a freer society, but desire is still there to create new kinds of problems. The liberation of desire demands that individuals are able to control their desires, and so the question arises: can a society dominated by desire, control undesirable desire? Girard seems, through the 70's, 80's, 90's and stretching into the beginning of the new millennium, to be partly optimistic in thinking that desire can be controlled in a positive manner. As late as in 1999 Girard writes in *Je voir Satan tomber come l'éclair* (English: *I See Satan Fall Lightning)* about the modern concern for victims:

> Never was society, we often hear, more indifferent to the poor than ours. Yet how could this be, since the idea of social justice, as imperfectly realized as it may be, is found nowhere else? It is a quite recent invention. (….) In our perpetual comparisons between our world and the others of the past, we always use two weights and two measures. We do everything possible to conceal the overwhelming superiority in our world which, in any case, is in competition only with itself as it takes on the entire planet. (…) our is also and by far the best of all worlds, the one that saves more victims than any other.[7]

And about modern democracy:

> Yet modern democracies can defend themselves by pointing to a mass of accomplishments so unique in human history that they are the envy of the rest of the world.[8]

Apocalypse and Total Meltdown of Civilization

The optimism of the past, however, changes dramatically in Girard's last book, *Achever Clausewitz* (English: *Battling to the End: Conversations with Benoît Chantre*), from 2010. The book which is based on an analysis of the Prussian General Clausewitz's thoughts on war marks a new and more sombre view on the future. This work ends the development from the initial view of apocalypse as a conversion bridging the false divisions between self and other (in *Deceit, Desire and the Novel*) to belief in a non-sacrificial attitude to violence (in *Things Hidden*) and finally to a global scenario in which the sacred has lost its grip on man.

In this view, a vision of world peace is replaced by one in which the sacred boundaries fall apart, paving the way for extreme violence. In this escalation of conflicts to the ultimate pitch, there is no Hegelian hope of reconciliation, rather the contrary.[9] Girard seems, somewhere along the way, to have given up the pacifistic idealism of his earlier writing as regards society at large. In this phase, a more historical approach to the apocalyptic replaces his previously phenomenological and psychological approach. The positive attitude of concern for victims seems overshadowed by a scenario in which the loss of order in society, combined with heightened technological skills, may trigger a mass catastrophe at any moment.[10] Apocalypse is not, however, a scenario involving "forces of light" versus "forces of darkness". It is rather a complete collapse of the bittersweet "good" yet violent mechanism that previously kept our world under control.

Christianity's global concern for victims and its ability to dispel mythological violence is unable to stop the massive rivalries and tensions, with their devastating consequences. Increasingly, cultures are now developing without the shelter that sacrificial society previously provided,[11] despite the use of moderate violence. Positive human development, as is evident in the demystifying of violent myths and the increased concern for victims, cannot stem the power of global terror. Girard seems to indicate that nothing, not even Christianity, has been able to stop the cycle of violence:

> Normal religion, which creates gods, is the one with scapegoats. As soon as the Passion teaches people that the victims are innocent, they fight. This is precisely what scapegoat victims used to prevent them from doing. When sacrifice disappears, all that remains is mimetic rivalry, and it escalates to extremes.[12]

Historic Christianity has failed to put societies on the right track again.[13] Christianity made humans more human, but at the same time, the freedom that resulted from a less violent and retributive society has also created a society in which the freedom to act on one's desires has created mass violence. According to Girard, this means that societies are developing towards a crisis, due to a continual breakdown of institutions. Violence is no longer a part of a "gentleman's warfare,"[14] but appears at random, depriving people of any safe haven and giving them the feeling that there is nowhere left to hide.[15]

Girard still seems to uphold the ideals of non-violence,[16] but he is increasingly inclined to view the use of scapegoating down through the centuries more as being effective, even useful, in efforts to reduce violence. Nevertheless, the notion that violence can serve as a means to put an end to violence is ultimately dismissed since Girard goes so far as to say that sin consists in thinking that something good could come from violence.[17] In *Battling to the End* he also claims that today's massacres of civilians are thus simply sacrificial failures, proof that it is impossible to eliminate violence through violence, to expel reciprocity violently.[18]

Girard's attitude towards the possibilities of creating peace in society has clearly changed, perhaps because his focus is more on specific historical conflicts. In his analyses of wars between nations, in particular, he has become more outspoken, supporting legitimate use of violence in certain conditions. This shift from interdividual desires in human relationships to war between nations can be considered an extension of the "enemy twin" scenario of his first apocalyptic phase. Seen in a broader perspective, this scenario has made his outlook much more sombre. Viewing the way societies deal with war and conflict he now perceives the world as being almost totally caught up in mimetic rivalry. Some would claim that in this later phase Girard actually thinks that it is necessary to sustain the ritualisation of these mechanisms in order to maintain social order, to the extent that this is possible in our current world.

Thus, according to Girard, humankind cannot handle its own darkness without collapsing into social chaos. In a way, it seems as if he has withdrawn somewhat from his non-sacrificial understanding of how society can be able to function. Although he still maintains that Christianity revealed the scapegoat mechanism and has thereafter created a climate of compassion towards victims, this non-sacrificial attitude is now more one-sidedly related to theology.

In Girard's conception, the sacrificial mechanism is in the process of being revealed and broken down, giving humankind a glimpse of itself. However, the process seems inevitably to create an apocalyptic scene. Man, confronted with his own darkness and satanic enslavement, will attempt to demolish the mechanism that has worked thus far to sustain the peace. Without the scapegoat mechanism in place, and without an alternative mechanism to replace it, chaos and uncontrolled violence will reign. The world, according to Girard, looks as if it is inevitably moving towards this kind of breakdown.

Girard now seems pessimistic about the ability of humankind to ever learn how to stop the violent mimetic cycle. His only hope is that, through the model of Christ, people will finally learn to love their neighbours as themselves. However, this hope is now more distant than in his earlier works, and the possibility of avoiding the apocalypse, meaning extreme rivalry and mass violence, is small—although this is still an open question.

One of Girard's more unsettling statements in phase three implies that Christians are in some way to blame for the apocalyptic mess:

> The destruction will happen one day because of the growing imperium of violence; deprived of a sacrificial outlet, it is unable to establish the reign of order except by escalating. It will require more and more victims to create an ever more precarious order. This is the terrifying future of the world for which Christians carry the responsibility.[19]

The explanation lies in the fact that the Christians have not been able to make non-sacrificial society function; they have instead created liberal and human societies of advanced technological refinement. At the same time, Western societies have paved a way for societies with fragile moral and political borders, enabling desire to flow so freely that everybody is engaged in fighting each other. While many Christian countries are, historically speaking, caring societies, Westerners are currently living in societies in which fulfilment of the most secret individual desires has become the central concern. At the same time, because of all the other desiring individuals, people are constantly being prevented from fulfilling those desires. This incredible freedom entails so much rivalry, so much spending and such depletion of the world's resources, that the apocalyptic seems, in the eyes of Girard, to be inevitable.

Qestioning Girard's View on Extreme Violence

Girard's point *that the Passion has rendered collective murder inoperative*,[20] does not, in my view, necessarily mean that it aggravates mass violence. There appears to be much less killing in a typical Western country than in a society where the scapegoat mechanism is still very much at the fore. According to the Harvard professor, Steven Pinker, the number of prehistoric skeletons with axe marks and embedded arrowheads suggests that the proportion of men in pre-state societies who died at the hands of other men was considerably higher than

today. Even though people in pre-state societies were unable to kill vast numbers of opponents, as is the case today, the clashes were much more frequent. Pinker suggests that, in a prehistoric society, around two billion people would have been massacred if the population had been the same as during the whole of the 20th century, which indicates a rate of killing around 20 times as high as in the 20th century.[21] In addition, there has been a positive development in the recent past. Pinker refers to political scientist Barbara Harff, who claims that between 1989 and 2005 the number of mass killings of civilians decreased by 90 percent.[22] Pinker also refers to the criminologist Manuel Eisner, who discovered that in England in the 14th century there were 24 homicides per 100,000 people, while in the 1960s the rate had fallen to 0.6 homicides per 100,000.[23] In Bergen, the town where I live, there were between 30 and 50 homicides per year in the 16th century, while in the whole of Norway today, with a population of five million, there are (with the exception of 2011) around 50.

Another argument against Girard's apocalyptic views is the focus on a single scenario. With regard to apocalypse, there is clearly room for a variety of outcomes, involving different hypotheses. For example, Girard does not reflect on the possibility that the world may continue for thousands of years, giving people time to develop new ways of regulating their desires, and to invent new life strategies amidst nuclear and environmental threats. Man has, as history has shown, an incredible ability to change when the stakes are high enough. One should also take into consideration the fact that the apocalyptic predictions of the past, although based on precise and impressive analyses, have all predicted an early end of the world. Girard hints at a major catastrophe and warns people to be alert and wakeful, but, at the same time, it is important to be aware that no one really knows "that day or that hour" (Mark 13:32).

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Endnotes

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René Girard

Christian Apocalypse of Modernity, or Modern Apocalypse of Christianity?

Stephen Gardner

Abstract

René Girard argues the modernity is the end of history, in effect the apocalypse foreseen by the Book of Revelation, if not in a literal sense. Given the "scientific" terms in which he claims to assert this, though, this thesis invites reversibility: It suggest more likely that modernity is the apocalypse of Christianity, a fatal moral crisis of a civilization generated by Western Christendom. Secular modernity 'realizes' (Western) Christianity by way of its breakdown (which it exacerbates), the consequence in part of a utopian logic derived from Christianity, translated into the idea of progress or other historical eschatologies, like those of reactionary apocalyptics such as Juan Donoso Cortés, the Catholic theorist of dictatorship. Despite Girard's own convictions, there is nothing in his theories that enables us to decide one way or another whether modernity is a Christian apocalypse or an apocalypse of Christianity. I suggest this scenario by examining his hidden debt to or affinity with Catholic reactionaries such as Joseph de Maistre and Donoso Cortés and their twentieth-century heir Carl Schmitt, and the underlying impasses or antinomies in Girard's apocalyptic construction of the conversional "decision" he claims is imposed on us by modernity. Paradoxically, he is a utopian anti-utopian, pushing utopia through to historical self-destruction, but without actually abandoning it. Thus his all-or-nothing approach to the problem of violence in history.

Keywords

Girard, Apocalypse, Modernity, Violence, Progress, Utopianism, Katechon.

> The despair of this man… often bordered on insanity; according to his philosophy of history, the victory of evil is self-evident and natural, and only a miracle of God could avert it.
>
> Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology*

What Carl Schmitt said of his soul brother Juan Donoso Cortés, the 19th century theorist of dictatorship, might apply equally well to René Girard. The politics of the French-American anthropologist of historical doom are of course diametrically opposite those of rightists and monarchists such as Schmitt or Donoso Cortés. Girard's view of history, though, derives from the same mythical and rationalist roots evinced by the great Catholic reactionaries of the Counter-Enlightenment, echoing St. Paul's image of the *Katechon*, the great plug or

"restrainer" that prevents spontaneous human combustion from exploding by calculated releases of pressure. This notion of politics assumes a certain anthropology. The natural condition of fallen humanity is chaos, a Hobbesian war of all against all whose natural tendency is escalation, and the function of politics and religion is to keep a lid on it. It is difficult if not impossible to achieve this aim without altar, throne, and not least, executioner—religion and sovereign power wedded in the sword. Law must be imposed from above; order is repression through a holy matrimony of love and terror; and punishment maintains an economy of compensation keeping the cosmos in equilibrium. Joseph de Maistre originally epitomizes this trinity of order:

> And yet all grandeur, all power, all subordination rests on the executioner; he is the horror and the bond of human association. Remove this incomprehensible agent from the world, and at that very moment order gives way to chaos, thrones topple, and society disappears. God, who is the author of sovereignty, is the author also of chastisement: he has built our world on these two poles; *For Jehovah is the master of the two poles, and on these he makes the world turn*.[2]

The executioner foundationally effectuates the whole. In sovereign power, religion and blood meet and sustain each other; it is that mixture of the sacred with the sharp edge of order that makes the latter what it is. Where there is no sacred blood, there is no religion, nor order either.

De Maistre is not just stating a long-standing conviction of Christianity that goes back to St. Paul, who declared the sword divinely instituted. There is a modern stress that the sword be sacralized to be effective—and that the sword is equally essential to the sacred. This one could not find in Paul, for whom Roman imperium was a secular force, amongst the other "powers and principalities," long before Christendom itself became a "power and principality," a sacred order. Theorists in this modern vein had to contend (as prior generations of Christians did not) with the de-sacralizing onslaught of the Enlightenment. They were spiritually closer in some ways to those Romans who attacked Christianity as responsible for the tottering of the Empire. Refugees and exiles, they washed up from the traumatic disintegration of medieval Christendom, culminating in the French Revolution; for them the experience of modernity is apocalyptic, a crisis of civilization that puts history itself in the dock. Even the Revolution seemed to be divine wrath of divine justice, a scourge modernity brought upon itself. Their politics is not just directly theological but involves a reflective meta-politics of the

sociological dynamics of order; it stresses the political function of theology, and it is profoundly historical. And so they rob the Enlightenment of its claim to represent the teleology of history. In refuting its utopianism, the impossible ambition to base polity on reason or progress, they create another one, under the auspices of Catholic authoritarianism and later of fascism. Girard brings this utopian project to completion, where it refutes itself.

This Counter-Enlightenment point of view would not be possible without the Enlightenment, of course, but neither would it be felt necessary. It is so to say a self-refutation of the Enlightenment, a reasoned defense of non-rational authority, a refutation of any authority based solely on reason, in which sociological demands of order justify religion, as much as religion justifies order. It is impossible to disentangle the political motive from this theology. Even though human beings are social by nature, in the absence of supernatural authority community brings out the worst. And there can be no transcendental anchorage, a divine reference outside the system, unless there is a living element within it that links the two levels. That is the sacrificial victim or his analogues and relatives, such as the King or the priest. In de Maistre's account, the executioner is also such a sacred individual, a boundary figure (as the mere soldier is not), both human and non-human, inside and outside human community, unlike the others in a particularly terrifying but still holy way. In a sacred exchange, he assumes the anathema of his victims (criminals whom he punishes) as he renders them to God in judgment. In a certain sense he saves them by taking their sins upon himself. The executioner incarnates Christ, because he sacrifices himself—puts himself outside of the community, isolates himself within it—in a drama welding the community, a sacrificial exchange of punishment. For punishment is a ritual on this view. This lucid defense of mystery or rather of mystification as the mantle of authority is uncannily akin to that of the Grand Inquisitor in Ivan Karamazov's tale.

Girard of course does not approve of this; at odds with dominant Christian tradition, he rejects the divine institution of the sword asserted by Paul. If there is any political sentiment consistently characterizing his thought, it is neither conservatism nor progressivism but suspicion of politics as such.[3] Practically, though, he asserts the effectual truth of the Counter-Enlightenment insight, for him, too, the fatal reality of the human condition. The breakdown of medieval order exposes the anthropological need of authority all the more sharply.

Girard's visceral repudiation of the Grand Inquisitor (whom Schmitt endorses[4]) is not a repudiation of the Inquisitor's view of politics so much as of politics itself, hopelessly tainted by Caiaphas ("Better one man, etc."). From Girard's point of view, de Maistre and his descendants would remake Christianity as if Christ were the sacrificial founding of social order. The Inquisitor was right to have him immolated again, not just to save that sacred economy from his return but to reenact its original ground. For Girard, though, the Christ who says nothing whatsoever in response to the Inquisitor is the true Christ.[5] He makes no attempt to reply or refute. He doesn't have to; the Inquisitor himself in effect admits the futility of his efforts in the long run, by the very arguments that justify him in the short term. An order that rests on sacrificial violence may certainly work up to a point, but in the end it is mortal, like everything else. When the masses lose their sense of mystery, sacraments, and authority, all hell will break loose, sooner or later, and the man of spite will emerge from Underground to destroy the Crystal Palace of the Enlightenment once and for all. Dostoyevsky predicted it in the rise of messianic leftism in *The Demons* and other novels. There is one insight the Inquisitor displays missing in the Catholic reactionaries, though: The "freedom" Christ offers can only have cannibalistic consequences. If Girard rejects the Inquisitor, he agrees with Dostoyevsky's fictional Torquemada on one decisive point: "the divine Incarnation has made everything worse." Contrary to the Inquisitor, so much the worse for man, not Christ. For Girard, too, Christ leads ultimately both to the Crystal Palace of democratic modernity, and thence to the cannibalism of the triumphant race of subterranean men who cannot live up to the demands of pure love, through no fault of his own. Rejecting the Catholic Right's drift towards dictatorship in the 19th and 20th centuries, Girard still shares their radical repudiation of democratic politics, in the sense best exemplified by Raymond Aron in the after math of WWII and against the Red peace. For Aron, democratic politics was a lucky, skin-of-the-teeth escape from the apocalyptic ideologies of the prior century and a half. For Girard, it was the real beginning of the end.

What are we to make of René Girard's notorious attempt to resurrect Christian apocalyptic in the mantle of the human sciences, a kind of fundamentalism for intellectuals? Not biblically literal, to be sure, but one that nonetheless envisions a catastrophic end of history, of civilization, and of humanity itself. Girard resurrects two core features of Christian apocalyptic: Armageddon, the symbolic place of a decisive battle between good and evil at the end of history,

consuming the world without remainder; and Revelation, the return of Christ in glory defeating the Anti-Christ and Satan once and for all, in an altogether new Jerusalem. Girard insists that these features be deduced from a "scientific" (neither dogmatic nor literalist) point of view, an "anthropological" analysis of the evolutionary origins of history and humanity. Christ, Christianity, and Christendom are historical agencies, actors or forces competing against others but ultimately pushing history inexorably to its conclusion, the unraveling of sacrificial order and the escalation of violence to the point of civilizational self-immolation. His theories of ritualized scapegoating mythically disguised as sacrifice and of desire as imitation that on a purely immanent (inter-personal) level tends to degenerate into mortal conflict, afford him the Archimedean leverage with which to cast modernity as the end of history in the Christian sense of a terminal working out in salvation or damnation. Apocalypse neatly ties everything into a narrative whole. In the end, humanity must succumb to the violence of its beginnings.

Historically and personally, mimetic desire is for Girard apocalyptic; it leads either to conversion or to perdition. The blind teleology of violence rules by an implacable "mechanism." Sacrifice—"religion" in the original sense—is an evolutionary strategy saving the human species from internecine violence that would have destroyed it. It is destined to fail in the long run, though, because it creates culture and history, a space of revelation in which its own workings will be exposed and rendered powerless. Its spell is irreparably broken by the judicial murder of Christ, the turning point of history. The political lynching of God on the Cross strips humanity of its only strategic defense against itself. On Girard's reading, the Passion of Christ is essentially a political story, but one robbing politics of its mythical covers, what we today might call its ideological disguises. Once this secret has been leaked, sacrificial institutions will eventually crumble away, at first slowly then with increasing acceleration, leading into the modern *saeculum* of human dignity, individualism, rights, science, law, markets, party politics, and popular government. Ethically, recognition of the victim is a revolutionary advance. Yet violence paradoxically increases, Girard believes, thanks to the simultaneous emancipation of mimetic desire from traditional religious constraints.[6] The basic structure of this regime of morality/violence is modern equality, which Kierkegaard described as the "negatively unifying principle" of modern life (that is, envy).[7] Institutions are more just, but human beings are mimetically as violent and concupiscent as ever, only

now, the religious means to tame them are lacking. Amplified by technology, democratic resentments must spiral out of control. The very moralization of life in the modern period invites the return of the war of all against all, the chaotic origins for which sacrifice afforded an exit. Modern politics, ultimately a consequence of Christian de-mythologization and de-sacralization, is more moral, just, and rational, and more cynical, calculative, and violent, than any previous regime. It promises individual freedom and delivers the herd mentality if not the mob. Thus its catastrophic periods, rhythms of peace and prosperity alternating with social explosions in which each successive episode is worse than the last.

That leaves humanity with a stark set of alternatives: Either transform itself collectively into a peaceable kingdom by universal conversion, or be done in by its mimetic violence. Given the power of modern technologies, even the slightest remnant of resentment carries a catastrophic potential. And given globalization, a war of all against all threatens to engulf the planet. The combination of high technology, egalitarian resentments, diminishing resources, and environmental distress, create the conditions for a perfect apocalyptic storm. The drift of actual history seems to be irresistibly approximating the mad visions of the biblical imagination. Real and metaphorical senses of apocalypse seem to be converging asymptotically.

To Girard, this confirms the dream at Patmos nearly two millennia ago. The anthropological theory of history underwrites what is perhaps the central ethical notion of Christianity, absolute decision. The finality of the disintegrative teleology of history demands total renunciation of violence, of the *lex talionis*, and so of politics. Apocalypse entails cosmic choice, between two and only two exclusive alternatives. The battle between ultimately superhuman forces of good and evil, freedom or mechanism, to determine the fate of the world and man crystalizes the demand for a totalizing decision, the world-shattering all-or-nothing of biblical monotheism. This is not a choice between empirical alternatives but one that transcends all natural and social horizons. In this sense the transcendental concept of "will" is uniquely biblical. All middle ground vanishes. Decision cannot appeal to reason. Christ comes with a sword because he cuts the world in two, and ne'er the twain shall meet. There is only one God; all others are dispatched to perdition with their idolaters in train. Revealed monotheism has historicity embedded in it, as eschatology. Known

only be revelation, the true God must reveal himself to and through the elect in time. Revelation envisions history, in which revelation triumphs against its adversaries. Girard's account is adamantly, even fanatically Christian in this sense. His entire work is a theodicy aimed at conversion.

In the modern age, the only thing that can forestall the self-destruction of the species, Girard asserts, is wholesale conversion to non-violence. The either/or Christianity imposes guarantees perdition, since humanity can never decide so decisively for or against violence or peace, the City of Man or the City of God. Radical decision judges the entire world, not part of it within it; it must stand outside of it. The world is always peace and violence, unable to disentangle them, except perhaps in the most extreme of cases. They are relative to each other. As Gillian Rose argued against Girard, violence enters into love too.[8] Nothing shows this better than Girard's own equivocations on the subject of politics and war, in which he occasionally displays a sensible realism his pacifism doesn't support. In the absence of total conversion, even pacifism, he admits, may feed violence rather than deter it. The very shape of the specifically Christian bid—yea, yea, or nay, nay (Matt 5:36), all or nothing—damns humanity, always inevitably trapped in the middle.

Girard's thesis invites a certain reversibility, though, in which modernity is not so much an apocalyptic vindication of Christianity, as an apocalypse of (Western) Christianity itself. Rather than see modernity as Girard would like us to see it, perhaps we should see Girard in terms of modernity, and modernity as a continuation of the crisis of Christendom whose medieval breakdown first gave rise to it. Even on Girardian grounds, we may ask if the ostensibly apocalyptic dimensions of modernity confirm Christian revelation, as Girard argues, or if they are historical effects of Christianity itself, the breakdown of whose theological antinomies in the late Middle Ages gave birth to secular modernity, which it was able neither to escape nor to resolve. On this view, modernity realizes Christianity (as for example G. W. F. Hegel argues), but *by way of* its insoluble crises and internal breakdown (as writers such as Hans Blumenberg, Anthony Levi, or Michael Gillespie suggest). It is not a teleological realization (as Hegel would have it) as its effectual truth. There is something at least metaphorically "apocalyptic" about modernity, but it might be the fatality of Western Christendom, not of the world as such, however global its implications might be. The modern imperative to dominate nature and subdue the race to

a single moral idea—one that is utopian and thus self-destructive—owes to its Christian genome, the principal source of its utopianism and of the idea of progress, according to John Gray.[9] Despite his own convictions, there is nothing in Girard's argument that enables us to decide these differences, or even to preclude that they might both be somehow true (paradoxical as that may be, the truth of Christ and the failure of Christendom). The Girardian account lends itself equally well to either of these seemingly exclusive sets of alternatives, if we shift our angle of vision, as with a lenticular image. Girard's Christian apologetics effortlessly convert into a critique of Christianity.

The flip side of the view that order depends on sacrifice is that justice and enlightened reason, however true, are not only not social bonds but actively weaken the social bond, intensifying social conflict and even the breakdown of society. This may be the single most important error of the Enlightenment, the naïve assumptions that justice brings forth peace, reason brings forth consensus, and equality brings forth fraternal sympathy. Moreover, morality, justice, and law come into being only through their opposites, the most cruelly arbitrary violence. The entire Girardian opus is caught in this antinomy, the most unrelenting moral severity versus the historical conditions of morality itself. Justice and truth in excess undermine order as much as their complete absence does. Girard expresses a crisis in modern conscience even more acutely than the existentialists of the 50s and 60s who declared rhetorically, "Who can judge?" The Holocaust inaugurated the age of the victim, the foundational category of contemporary politics, and perhaps of ethics too. Nearly every major political battle since has sought to claim the mantle of victimhood. In the victimary, ethics and politics intersect, quickly degenerating into the victimological, as victimhood itself acquires a coveted aura and offers new disguises for victimization. It is the last refuge of the sacred, nearly the only place today from which one can presume to sit in judgment, or at least get away with it.

Enlightenment universalism supplies the noose by which modernity closes the circle and strangles itself in post-modernism. Public discourse, politics, media, entertainment, and educational institutions in the West are consumed litigating past injustices, real and imagined, ever since this threshold was decisively crossed in the Sixties. Politics has disintegrated into "culture war," in principle non-negotiable (unlike ordinary politics, where nearly everything is negotiable). Victimary revelation splits modern culture into fraternal enemies,

the sacred and the profane, the religious and the secular, the archaic and the progressive. The inherent relativity and indeterminacy of the notion of the victim renders it inherently polarizing. No culture can be unified on the basis of respect for victims merely, and the tenuous peace between rivals on which modernity depends goes to pieces.

If we follow Gray, Enlightenment utopianism owes ultimately to Christianity, to the apocalyptic conviction that evil can be definitively defeated. Girard deconstructs modernity by driving the utopian element—the pursuit of the impossible, subduing of nature to spirit or an idea—to the point of self-annihilation, but without actually abandoning it. Girard both completes and destroys utopianism by pulling it back to its Christian provenance. Only in his dispensation, the inevitable failure to defeat evil entails the destruction of the world. All the utopianisms sustaining modernity, laissez-fair and socialist, liberal and fascist, traditionalist and neo-liberal, neo-conservative and post-Soviet pacifist, have crumbled or crashed one after another. The West has run out of ideologies to sustain its historical vision of itself. The insolubility of this dilemma not only rules, it constitutes Girard's work. He not only thinks this impasse, but exemplifies it in his own person, his intellectual personality, which is profoundly ambivalent. Girard condemns modernity both for pursuing the impossible and for failing to achieve it. Those who read his work seeking a solution to his frustrating ambivalences miss the point. It is a mistake to think one can resolve them by discovering in him a liberal or conservative, or a social democrat or neo-liberal. He is all of these and none of them. He declares the end of utopia not in the name of a kind of realism (like John Gray), but to the contrary, by pushing secular utopianism to annihilate itself in the notion of a kingdom of non-violence, not of this world. But for him, the failure of utopia vindicates God and condemns the world.

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Endnotes

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SECTION V

Language, Philosophy, Anthropology, Psychology, Religion

UNDERSTANDING PERSPECTIVISM & NIETZSCHE

Perspectivism in Art, Science, and Philosophy

Chairs

—

Endre Kiss & Uschi Nussbaumer

Participants

—

Cristiana Senigaglia
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Presentation

Endre Kiss & Uschi Nussbaumer

Friedrich Nietzsche fundamentally elaborated perspectivism both in epistemology and in the sociology of knowledge, and with these two aspects further increased the complexity of his philosophy. Philosophical perspectivism can well be seen as Nietzsche's most important philosophical innovation in its already generalized form. This perspectivism is in its authentic form no starting point, but rather the end result, in which, directly or contextually, numerous other philosophical innovations may arise. Nietzsche's breakthrough in the field of perspectivism was directly oriented towards the change of the philosophical perspective itself.

Nietzsche's late conception of perspectivism is connected with the philosophical reflection of his middle period, in which he criticizes the epistemological issues of his time. In doing so, he aims at undermining all traditional categories conferring substance, objectivity, and stability on the world, but also all the assumptions which imply a reductive and simplifying perception of reality. On the other hand, Nietzsche takes into consideration inputs deriving from significant scientific discoveries of his epoch, which stress the relevance of quality, discovery, and probability. In relation to this, perspectivism is to be interpreted as the effort to establish a new paradigm, which implies creating a new frame for knowledge and world understanding, and trying to overcome deficiencies by valorizing new aspects and approaches. In particular, perspectivism opposes the assumedly objective and neutral attitude of the sciences by emphasizing the relevance of the standpoint from which a phenomenon is considered and the methodological significance of integrating the different points of view. Perspectivism as a new paradigm is also productive from a practical point of view, since it shows interesting possibilities of application in this respect.

For example when we consider Nietzsche and Islam, notably the enormous claims made by both of them. Can a kind of master-perspective be made out in both Nietzsche and Islam, and in how far could they be related to one another? Could a master-perspective model enable Moslems, for example with respect to the attempts of IS/ISIS to appropriate the interpretation of the Qur'an, in

the sense of a quasi postmodern „anything goes," to bring Islam closer to Nietzschean perspectives, maybe even to his presumed master-perspective? Could they perhaps even work together to shape the world as a global village in an innovative and constructive way?

Since recent developments in the European Union (EU) raise the question which form can be considered as the most adequate, and since important arguments speak against a centralistic superstate, it seems reasonable to look for other forms of supranational organisation. States may form alliances or confederations. A new proposal is to organise the EU as a *network*. The growing together of networks can enable a peaceful development on earth. While Nietzsche in his early texts expresses a highly critical view of the state, which, in general, is given a final purpose, to guarantee the freedom of its citizens or to compensate for biological weakness, etc., whereas he finds in ancient Greece a tendency to transcend these functions of the state and sees its main purpose in paving the way for the genius, i.e. an increase in wisdom and knowledge – the network concept now would open the space for free play and free intellectual and spiritual development.

Nietzsche's Perspectivism as a New Paradigm

Cristiana Senigaglia

Abstract

Nietzsche's late conception of perspectivism is connected with the philosophical reflection of his middle period, in which he criticizes the epistemological issues of his time. In doing so, he aims at undermining all traditional categories conferring substance, objectivity, and stability on the world, but also all the assumptions which imply a reductive and simplifying perception of reality. On the other hand, Nietzsche takes into consideration inputs deriving from significant scientific discoveries of his epoch, which stress the relevance of quality, discovery, and probability. In relation to this, perspectivism is to be interpreted as the effort to establish a new paradigm, which implies creating a new frame for knowledge and world understanding, and trying to overcome deficiencies by valorizing new aspects and approaches. In particular, perspectivism opposes the assumedly objective and neutral attitude of the sciences by emphasizing the relevance of the standpoint from which a phenomenon is considered and the methodological significance of integrating the different points of view. Although Nietzsche does not present a systematic conception, it is possible to ascertain in his reflection the confrontation with the paradigm of sciences prevailing at that time, the definition of new contents, and the indication of methodological devices. Perspectivism as a new paradigm is also productive from a practical point of view, since it shows some interesting possibilities of application in this respect.

Keywords

Perspectivism, Nietzsche, Paradigm.

The Roots of Perspectivism in the Critique of Knowledge

Nietzsche's conception of perspectivism is developed especially in his late period and is connected with expressions such as forces, drives, and will-to-power. However, the thought of perspectivism roots already in Nietzsche's middle period and links up with the criticism he levels against the predominant epistemological standpoints of his time. From this point of view, it is not by chance that perspectivism in his late reflection openly relates to his former undermining of all traditional categories which confer a conceptual frame of substance, objectivity, and stability on the world.

First of all, Nietzsche, in his middle period, decidedly attacks metaphysics, which is considered as the paramount form in which philosophical knowledge

has been conceived of. Metaphysics grounds on the false conviction that human beings and their cognitive faculties (the realm of the subject) as well as the world and its phenomena (the realm of the object) are eternal, perennial substances, which do not change or transform themselves and which therefore represent undeniable truths. The fictional character of the "I", the substance, the reason, and their progressive metaphysical hypostatization have implied a fatal consequence for knowledge: they created rigid separations and dualities such as appearance-reality, phenomenon-noumenon, subject-object, the "I" and the others. Perhaps, suggests Nietzsche by contrast, their oppositeness should be rather interpreted as a difference of degree.

This kind of criticism is extended by Nietzsche also to language, grammar, and especially to logic. According to him, logic firmly proceeds from the assumption that things are identical in different moments of time. In doing so, logic creates the notions of identity, equality, and universality, which do not correspond to the phenomena and the course of events occurring in reality. By means of the procedure equalizing the similar, logic contributes to creating the subject and its stability and to underpinning its metaphysical consolidation. However, this propensity to identification and to the creation of substances is in reality not logical at all, that is, it has no logical foundation and no logical argumentative support.

Fallacies are ascertained also in presumed exact and objective sciences.[1] By analyzing the conception of world presented by physics, Nietzsche discovers the same incongruities as in metaphysics and logics.[2] Most of the physical theories namely center their comprehension of the world on the atomic theory, in which atoms are considered as individual and indivisible particles. In doing so, they share the same wrong conviction about substances, unities, and identities.[3] Moreover, physical procedures tend to isolate phenomena and to investigate them by refraining from the context of their relationships and complex constellations. By striving after the discovery of universal laws and rules which apply to all reality, they equalize phenomena, ignore their qualitative specificity, and they inevitably reduce their richness and multifariousness.

At the end, the fictional character affects also the science which is taken to be the most exact and perfect. Mathematics owes its exactitude and perfection to the abstraction, equalization, and quantification it performs, but it pays for it by creating an unbridgeable distance to reality. In the world of phenomena

and appearance, which is according to Nietzsche the only existing world, there are no exactly straight lines, no perfect circles, and no absolute and unequivocal measure of quantities.

Scientific Inputs to Perspectivism

Nevertheless, Nietzsche admits that there are some new sciences (or parts of them) which develop in an alternative direction. Second, Nietzsche himself tries to present an analysis of reality by utilizing some terms and views which are borrowed by the sciences. In this sense, Nietzsche's criticism can be read as a comprehensive attack against a paradigm which is judged as inadequate or antiquated, in order to introduce and to set on foot a *new paradigm* and a pioneering field of investigation.[4]

This can be confirmed by the acknowledgement that Nietzsche openly makes by referring to some sciences and their epistemological acquisitions.[5] A pivotal function is ascribed by him to chemistry, whereby chemistry seems to be an umbrella concept also for dynamics, thermo-, and electrodynamics. The extended field of sciences that he summarizes in the concept of "chemistry" indicates a unifying tendency in stressing the continuous process entailing change, modification, and movement. Sciences such as chemistry and electrodynamics show for Nietzsche that there are no enduring conditions, no indivisible unities, and no persisting substances: moments of harmony and stability are due only to a form of precarious equilibrium, which can be overwhelmed by the smallest supervening change. Moreover, chemistry is attentive to the specific, to every single and little action and reaction, so that the circumstantial and the qualitative are permanently emphasized. In fact, chemistry can contribute to completing the dissolution of the atom-unity which had been already asserted by Boscovich,[6] to whom Nietzsche explicitly refers on more occasions, and is also thematized by some leading branches of the physics of the time.[7] In doing so, it enables a conception focusing on polarity, plural centers of force, and multifarious processes of transformation.

Some fundamental aspects are also borrowed by Nietzsche from the most recent developments of the biology of his time, and from the doctrine of Darwin's self-preservation, to which nevertheless he opposes that it does not sufficiently take into account the tendency to exceeding and to thriftless thriving which is also intrinsically entailed in life. With regard to the instinct of self-preservation,

Nietzsche offers a plausible explanation for the predominance of identity, substance, and stability, over difference, force, and change, since the quick equalization and generalization were indispensable to rapidly find food and recognize the enemy. He, who hesitated and preferred to make more distinctions, underwent the risk of being defeated. Nevertheless, argues Nietzsche, the development of cultural life should provide for a reevaluation of qualitative distinctions.

Perspectivism, on its part, can also be rooted in an original inclination to self-preservation, which tends to confer more relevance on the surrounding elements which are taken to be more relevant for the sake of life. However, with the improving of the conditions of life and the development of culture, it becomes possible to elaborate new perspectives and visual angles, which reevaluate the aspects of the dynamics and of the becoming as well as of a more accurate differentiation.

The Worthiness of Perception

In a group of fragments of the year 1880, Nietzsche conceives of the philosophic-natural framework which makes it possible to modify the prevailing paradigm of knowledge and sciences grounding on identity and substances, without reducing the human condition to a mechanical or physiological process. Instead of basing knowledge on fictitious subjects and objects, it is indispensable to underline the way we perceive the world through sensations, which is always different, changing, and depending on the varying focuses to which we direct our attention.[8] According to Nietzsche, this kind of process has to do with the nature of the "I", which is not a fixed entity dominating the instincts, but a varying constellation of driving forces, in which the momentarily prevailing instinct takes the upper hand and forges the whole "ego". Yet, this does not necessarily imply an egoistic or isolated attitude of the "I", since the other components constantly interact and exert an influence on that constellation, so that, also with respect to the external, there is always a plurality of forces at stake, which interweave and relate one to another.

By analyzing the modality in which perception occurs, it is possible to reconstruct the way in which things and objects come into being for it. They are namely not the result of immediate impressions, but they are constructed in virtue of successions of images which are collected and annexed one to another, until the unity of an object is obtained as a synthesis. This reveals the processual character

of perception which can be accomplished only in the course of time, as Nietzsche highlights by mentioning the example of the third dimension: "The third dimension 'completes itself only in the course of time'. We bind superficies to a unity, which become visible to us one after the other".[9] This acknowledgement allows us to ascertain several aspects concerning knowledge: the temporal dimension, the primacy of relations over objects and things, the character of construction, which constitutively includes the presence of an interpretation, and also the possibility of improving the perception of things by focusing on them more attentively and from different vantage points.

Perspectivism as a New Paradigm

Considering this standpoint to nature and science as a new paradigm implies undergoing a deep transformation and proposing an alternative modality of seeing and experiencing reality.[10] It entails: first, the criticism of the prevailing and still persisting paradigm; second, to articulate a new form of knowledge which stresses alternative aspects and criteria (a new embracing theory), and, third, to conceive of a new methodology (or at least some innovative methodological indications).

— *The Contention with Positivism*

In his critical assessment toward the existing paradigm, Nietzsche confronts with the limits of positivism. Although in his middle period he assumes an attitude more open to sciences and adopts some positivistic methodological devices such as comparison and classification, he opposes the fundaments of positivism, in particular the exclusive reference to sciences and the emphasis on the "fact". First of all, he contests the conviction that natural science is the only source available to knowledge, and that all fields of investigation have to be inspired and defined by it. In this sense, he finds that science should be integrated by other forms of knowledge, such as art[11] and literature, since they can provide alternative and complementary explanations for non-logical and metaphysical aspects insinuating in natural sciences and are also able to detect them. Secondly, he criticizes the hypostatization of the "fact" by subjecting it to the same objections concerning substances, essences, atoms, and other so-called original elements: they all implement a simplification and quantification of reality by forgetting its qualitative richness and differentiation.

— *The Contents of Perspectivism*

Perspectivism rests on the plurality of forces as well as drives and is the congruent epistemological position in a world dominated by chaos and disorder, entailing a complexity of structures and a labyrinth of paths crossing them. The conflation of forces can only create precarious forms of equilibrium and organization, which can be quickly destroyed and furthermore require a large amount of energy to be supported: the mere maintenance of the equilibrium would namely imply their enfeeblement and death. The intrinsic dynamism characterizing these complex structures and configurations invalidates the hypothesis of a mere mechanical order, functioning with the regularity and repetitiveness of a machine.

Congruently with this complexity and with order exceptionally originating from disorder,[12] it appears impossible to speak of an absolute certainty and necessity concerning scientific laws. Gnoseological parameters such as absolute truth, exactitude, and predetermination, have to be substituted by a notion of probability, which allows much more room for indetermination, possibility, and the supervening of the new. Probability allows us to introduce a gradation of the evaluations. Moreover, probability is compatible with accepting the influence of the different vantage points and of their subjective evaluations. Finally, probability can also be modified by the plurality of the interacting factors and forces as well as by the occurring of specific human interventions.

Concerning the specific characteristics of new knowledge, perspectivism is narrowly connected with quality. As it is not only the result of a multifaceted interacting of forces, but the driving forces are supposed to have an incorporated eye evaluating and judging the surroundings and the happenings from their peculiar vantage points, quantity is unable to furnish an exhaustive explanation of reality, especially because the eye needs qualitative effects in order to be stimulated and to appropriately catch differences. This does not exclude considering quantity; rather, it implies a constant interaction between quality and quantity and their turning over into each other.

What perspectivism offers as an alternative, is the difference and specificity of regard entailed in every perception, sensation, and also in every form of knowledge. The diversity of regard concerns the intensity, the extension, the difference between fore- and background. Above all, the perspectival standpoint impedes on principle the neutral and objective consideration of reality, which is

erroneously supposed to be an irreplaceable parameter of scientific knowledge. Instead, it emphasizes that every vantage point has its pros and cons, and entails therefore a form of injustice. Yet, this has to be seen not only as a limitation, since it accustoms to evaluate the opposite aspects involved by employing a logic which takes the "on the one hand" and "on the other hand" factors into account and tries to reckon with them, so that a form of justice can be reinstated by multiplying and integrating the different standpoints.

— *Methodological Devices*

Concerning the methodological aspect, a profound revision of the cause-effect rule is intended to take place, entailing a radical reversal of the perspective of causality, which focuses not on the consequences, but on the provenance of a determinate phenomenon. Looking for the provenance, the derivation, and the source (a method which also characterizes genealogy[13]), implies looking backwards why things have become so how they are and not in another way and to connect problematically further development with what happened in the past. Seeking provenance and its reasons also entails taking into account a plurality of factors and forces playing a role, and abandoning the linearity and inevitability of mechanical determination by substituting it with refined constellations of multicausality and complex interaction.

Perspectives themselves are not neutral and objective. Nevertheless, they are not unmodifiable: they can be strengthened, enriched, and improved.[14] As neutrality and objectivity are only products of fiction and illusion, they cannot be proposed as epistemological ideals. Rather, it is preferable to speak of the *pathos of distance*, with which an involvement is explicitly admitted and taken into account, and nevertheless a strenuous effort is undertaken to improve the vantage point and to extend its range. In particular, Nietzsche insists on the necessity to stand away from the object of analysis, in order to attain the right insight and survey: "Of the things you want to know and measure, you must take leave at least for some time. Only when you have left the city, you see how high its towers rise over the houses".[15]

Furthermore, what Nietzsche proposes is to try to collect a plurality of perspectives and to be open to perceive and to grasp them. Through the perspectival manifoldness it is possible to increase the chance that one of the view-points

considered or one of their combinations proves itself to be the adequate one. An appropriate combination can produce a fulfilled and meaningful unity, and this result can be compared to a prismatic image, which can converge into a unity, but also make room for many different nuances, qualitative peculiarities, and gradations of optical effects.

To this more quantitative consideration, a qualitative one has to be urgently added. It is fundamental for Nietzsche to distinguish between perspectives which are an expression of reactive forces (for instance resentment and envy), and perspectives which are an expression of energy and positive activity. But also the quality of the perspective itself is relevant and has to be improved: more articulated visions, which explain a multiplicity of aspects and present an elaborate conception of life, are more meaningful and worthy.[16]

As a suitable way to deal with perspectives and their interrelation, *comparison* constitutes a paramount procedure, since it accustoms to confront with different vantage points and also to look for and choose the more adequate one. It offers the possibility to establish contact with different and even distant points of view, seeking forms of understanding and of bridging differences, but without ignoring their discrepancies and their possible aspects of collision.

Practical Implications

Perspectivism takes into account a naturalist standpoint,[17] insofar as it recognizes that perspectives are characterized at the beginning by an attitude stressing things and events which are close, and setting in the background the others. Yet, perspectivism also entails further, more subtle and refined, potentialities of dealing with the world. By centering on the eye, it is determined by the mobility of the glance, which possesses the faculty to continuously change its focus and to catch different qualities and nuances. This inner dynamism characterizing perspectives also allows for overcoming restricted egoistic visions.

In doing so, perspectivism becomes relevant also from a practical and ethical vantage point, because it does not negate egoism, but it relegates it to a shortsighted and restricted perspective. By privileging the pathos of distance and the bird's-eye perspective, it is possible to become oblivious to narrow-minded egoistic impulses and open oneself to new and wider horizons. Considering things at a distance improves the sense of measure and strives after seeking a form of

moderation which is not provided by the appeasement of forces, but by a dynamic and powerful equilibrium between polarities which sets free new energies.

The overcoming of egoism thanks to a perspectivism which prioritizes complex and far-sighted visions is an ineradicable premise also for the conception of an authentic European policy. For Nietzsche, it was uncontestable that Europe wanted to be united, but the particularisms affecting each nation were a weighty obstacle to the realization of that project.[18] In his view, a united Europe is conceivable only by means of surmounting closed and narrow-minded views focused only on restricted horizons.

Perspectivism gains relevance also with respect to the radical transformation of social and cultural life occurring in a globalized society. The risk that the plurality and richness of perspectives is reduced to a relativistic acceptance and blind equalization can be prevented by referring to a paradigm which stresses diversity and at the same time proposes criteria of distinction and evaluation.[19]

This does not preclude from intensifying the efforts, especially when global problems are at stake, in order to integrate and to mediate between the diverging perspectives, and to evince from them really far-reaching world perspectives. Nietzsche makes the example of world economy and international politics, mentioning them as fields which have to overcome the particular standpoints and look for embracing solutions. To this proposal, Nietzsche wishes "as many international powers and potencies as possible - in order to practice the *world-perspective*"[20].By developing this idea, it seems possible to imagine a platform of mediating visions and a plurality of powerful political entities, which, by interacting, become accustomed to think in a responsible way on the worldwide entangling questions, to cooperate, and to find far-sighted solutions.

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Endnotes

1. Although the middle period has been considered by the interpreters as a positivistic one, a relevant criticism of the traditional scientific visions is made by Nietzsche at that time. See Josef Simon, "Grammar and Truth: On Nietzsche's Relationship to the Speculative Sentential Grammar of the Metaphysical Tradition", in *Nietzsche's Theories of Knowledge, and Critical Theory,* ed. by Babette Babich and Robert Cohen (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer, 1999), 129–151.
2. See Britta Glatzeder, *Perspektiven der Wünschbarkeit. Nietzsches frühe Metaphysikkritik* (Berlin: PHILO, 2000), 40–4.
3. From this point of view, Nietzsche's criticism can be considered as a forerunner of the further development of sciences. See: Daniel Thierjung, *Erkenntnis und Kunst in der Philosophie Friedrich Nietzsches. Weltspiel einer nachmetaphysischen Zeit* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2014), 93–99.
4. See Endre Kiss, *Erkenntnis als mächtiger Effekt* (Cuxhaven/Dartford: Traude Junghans Verlag, 2003), 39.
5. See Walther Zimmerli, "Nietzsche's Critique of Truth and Science", in *Nietzsche, Epistemology, and Philosophy of Science,* ed. Babette Babich and Robert Cohen (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer, 1999), 252–277, especially 264–268.
6. On Nietzsche's relation to Boscovich, see Greg Whitlock, "Roger J. Boscovich and Friedrich Nietzsche: A Re-Examination", in *Nietzsche, Epistemology, and Philosophy of Science*, ed. by Babich/Cohen, 187–201.
7. To this proposal, it can be said that many inputs (for instance Maxwell's studies on electricity and magnetism, which Nietzsche knew) already came from sciences themselves, but that there was no comprehensive paradigm entailing them and giving a framing explanation.
8. See Babette Babich, *Nietzsches Wissenschaftsphilosophie* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2011), 69–70.
9. Nietzsche, NL 1880, 6[413], *Friedrich Nietzsche. Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe (KSA),* ed. by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (München, Berlin/New York: dtv, Walter de Guyter, 2005), vol. 9, 304.
10. About the epistemological theory based on this assumptions, see Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 4th ed. 2012).
11. On the complementary role of art, see Annamaria Lossi, "Genealogie der Wissenschaft. Über das Verhältnis von Philosophie und Wissenschaft bei Nietzsche", in *Der Tod Gottes und die Wissenschaft. Zur Wissenschaftskritik Nietzsches,* ed. by Carlo Gentili and Cathrin Nielsen (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2010), 183–201.
12. For a more recent application of Nietzsche's paradigm to science, see for instance the works of Ilya Prigogine, who based his physics on complex systems and dissipative structures as forms of order originated by chaos.
13. As Gianni Vattimo has rightly observed in his book *Dialogue with Nietzsche* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 58–59, genealogy cannot summarize Nietzsche's entire method. Rather, it could be hypothesized that genealogy provides an alternative concept of causality, based on multicausality, on the tracing back of diverse or contradictory aspects leading to a particular phenomenon, and on the reversal search for grounds.
14. In this sense, Conant speaks of an internal dialectics of perspectivism, entailing several levels. See James Conant, *Friedrich Nietzsche. Perfektionismus* (Konstanz: Konstanz University Press, 2014), 179–230.
15. Nietzsche, *Der Wanderer und sein Schatten* (WS), KSA 2, Aph. 307, 689–690.
16. See Michael Zichy, *…aber die Wahrheit ist sehr, sehr kompliziert. Der Begriff der Wahrheit im mittleren Werk Friedrich Nietzsches* (Berlin: VWF, 2002), 31–33.
17. In fact, Nietzsche's naturalism is not a substantive one. See the "Introduction", in *Nietzsche on Naturalism and Normativity*, ed. by Christopher Janaway and Simon Robertson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 1–19. See also Marco Brusotti, "Naturalismus? Perfektionismus? Nietzsche, die Genealogie und die Wissenschaften", in *Nietzsches Wissenschaftsphilosophie*, ed. by Helmut Heit, Günter Abel and Marco Brusotti (Berlin/Boston, 2012), 91–112.

18. On Nietzsche's conception of Europe, see Georges Goedert and Uschi Nussbaumer-Benz (eds.), *Nietzsche und die Kultur - ein Beitrag für Europa* (Hildesheim: Olms, 2002).
19. See Katrina Mitcheson, *Nietzsche, Truth and Transformation* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 48–52.
20. Nietzsche, NL 1886–1887, 5[84], KSA 12, 222.

(Post-)Postmodernism

An Islamic or Nietzschean Cultural and Political Perspective?

Uschi Nussbaumer

Abstract

What do I mean by (Post-)Postmodernism? And why did I choose this title, i.e. the seemingly incompatible forces of Nietzsche and Islam for my presentation on rethinking the European tradition to gain a clearer picture of its reflections beyond its geographical borders; to rethink the role of fundamental European values, ways of thinking and doing, in shaping the new Europe and the post-colonial world, at a time when the global village has become an undeniable reality – ideas ISSEI's 2014 conference called for.

Firstly, I refer to the question whether we live at present in the age of postmodernism, meaning approximately: "anything goes," or do we live in the age of a post-postmodernism where the crucial question is whether we have to deal with some kind of master-perspective. I wish to propose that from a Nietzschean point of view there might be – among the innumerable and diverse perspectives taken on by Nietzsche in his texts – one perspective that could be seen as his master-perspective. Whereas in Islam, a different kind of master-perspective would be the belief in the absolute authority of the belief in the one and only God as revealed to Mohammed in the Qur'an. Could they work together to shape the world as a global village? This paper proposes some new ways.

Keywords

Arabs, Buddha, Enlightenment, Hamas, Interculturality, Islam, Islamophobia, Israeli, Jews, Pluralism, Master-Perspective, Mohammed, Nietzsche, Postmodernism, Post-Postmodernism, Post-Colonial World, Protocols of the Elders of Zion, Qur'an, Secularization, Terrorism.

Introduction

I felt urged to compare Nietzsche's perspectivism with an Islamic kind of interculturalism in postmodern times already around 2 April 2014, when I came in somehow closer contact with Islam, having been asked by a colleague in a Swiss NGO, the Lucerne Initiative for Peace and Security (LIPS), whose co-founder I was and whose co-president I am presently, to prepare a conference on religion and force, armed force, and the prevention of terrorism. It took place in spring 2014 at the University of Lucerne. The three main speakers were: the deputy of a Swiss bishop; Rabbi David Bollag, an Israeli, who presently teaches at the

University of Lucerne, who advocated enlightenment, enlightened religion, and pluralism to prevent armed force and terrorism. The third main speaker was Elsayed Elshahed, Professor (recently emeritus) at the famous and highly respected al-Azhar University in Cairo, since 1996 member of the Supreme Council of Islam in Cairo as well as founder and head of the Institute for Intercultural Islamic Studies/Research in Vienna. Since Elshahed propagates interculturality (as well as a historical perspective) in the realm of Islam, it seems that some kind of perspectivism might be acknowledged in this faith, too.

What is especially interesting in our context is that Elshahed (a) is aware of the necessity to adopt an intercultural perspective in postmodern times and makes this explicit; (b) adopts a historical perspective and stands for the original Islam, a Sunnite version of the teachings of Islam. In Lucerne, too, Elshahed focused on the original teachings of Mohammed, his field of research. And he referred to the previous peaceful living together for centuries of Arabs and Jews, as well as Christians, for example in his home country, Egypt.

An Islamic Perspective

Elshahed made it clear that Islam claims it respects the Jewish and Christian religions as well as their prophets, all three of them being Abrahamite faiths, with their belief in the one and only God, in Allah, in ethic monotheism, at their very hearts.

There are, however, at least three distinct perspectives in Islam with regard to Christian and Jewish positions: (1) Mohammed as being a successor to former prophets, above all Moses and Jesus, who figure in the Qur'an; (2) Mohammed as being the last and most perfected prophet; (3) Islam as having been in existence even before Moses and Jesus, namely in Abraham's ethical monotheism. Especially in this third view, the Jewish and Christian faiths figure as distortions of proper ethical monotheism.

According to Elshahed, Jews are focused too much on the thisworldly, Christians on the otherworldly aspect of their common faith in the One God. There is, however, another point, namely the implication of polytheism in Christian faith – to non-theologians of today this might seem to be a really strange point to make since, as I suppose, nobody thinks of polytheism today when talking about Godfather, Son and Holy Ghost. However, this obviously is how Christianity

is seen from the external perception/perspective of Islam, Sunnite Islam, which moreover also refuses Christian – as well as Shiite – belief in saints. Elshahed, who studied Christian theology at the University of Tübingen, too, makes another point, a more scientific one: he refers to theological research which takes into consideration that there is no literary proof for the ascent of Jesus to heaven.

It is not my intention to ponder this last point, however. The point I do wish to forward here is that as far as scientific research and findings are concerned, Nietzsche has a lot to say to Islam, its view concerning monotheistic tradition, and the origins of a common ethical ideal.

Prevention of Armed Force – in Mutual Understanding?

In Lucerne, the Christian representative unfortunately seemed to confirm Elshahed's criticism of otherworldliness in the eyes of not just a few conference participants. Whereas the Jewish representative impressed the audience with a clear and distinct development of his arguments concerning his insight that the enlightenment and continuous enlightenment are prerequisites for prevention of force and terrorism. David Bollag also highlighted that Jews had never had the intention to make proselytes, to convert others to their own faith or their God. However, both Elshahed and Bollag expressed their appreciation that their respective views had been welcomed for presentation at the Lucerne conference, in Switzerland, a rather calm and safe country. Bollag made clear that, nevertheless, although these might be steps in direction of a mutual understanding, the reality of war and terrorism is a far more scaring and existential challenge in regions such as Palestine for example.

Elshahed laid stress on the fact that Islam is a peaceful religion, the word's original meaning being (a) subjection (to God) and (b) peace, just like the Jewish expression "Shalom". As a consequence of the Lucerne conference, Elshahed published a text on the term "Unglaube bzw. ungläubig," nonbelievers, as used in the Qur'an/Islam, where it refers only to the idol worshippers/idolaters in Mecca in Mohammed's lifetime. In April 2014 at Lucerne University, Elshahed complained about a progressive islamophobia taking on more and more "religionistic" or "religious racist" traces, not only in Austria. Well, I think islamophobia has not diminished since spring 2014 …

Before Elshahed's flight back after the Lucerne conference, I gave him two articles written by a German scholar, Matthias Küntzel, who discovered how much Hamas and even the honored al-Azhar Professor (and military) Tantawi drew upon the notorious *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* taken from Hitler's *Mein Kampf*. The *Protocols* were and are enormously influential in the Arab world. – Here I must confirm its wide acceptance even among Arabs/Moslems in Switzerland, as my network has made clear to me. – Moreover, Tantawi asserted that there are unchangeable characteristics in Jewish personality, a view still widely accepted in anti-Semitic, or rather, anti-Jewish strands: breaking contracts/agreements and alliances, greed for life and thisworldlyness, selfishness, undue egoism or cant / dissimulation / mendacity. (This might perhaps to some extent also result from the fact that Israel did/does not respect the UN boundaries).

Küntzel stresses on the other hand that this "phantasm" has nothing in common with the image of the traditional / original Jew in Islam. The Nazi broadcasting station located in Zeesen near Berlin with its director, the Mufti of Jerusalem, says Küntzel, first brought European anti-Semitism into an original Islamic context. Whereas classical Islamic literature had presented Mohammed's quarrels with Jews in Medina as relatively minor episodes in the Prophet's life. Nazi Germany discovered the origins of Islamism, according to Küntzel, i.e., the Muslim Brotherhood, at the end of the nineteen-thirties as an anti-Western ally, whom they also supported financially.

Elshahed's fist reaction to Küntzel's two texts I had given to him, a reaction he transmitted via email, was: "not very good" … three words – open to various interpretations.

In the meantime, a Hamas VIP at the time of our conference residing in Qatar confirmed via media that Islam is a peaceful religion…

Nietzsche's View of Islam

In the following, I'll try to advance some new thoughts, ideas, points to be made from a Nietzschean perspective.

Did Nietzsche know Islam at all? If he did, how much did he know about it? And – first of all – what is the status of Nietzsche within Islam? Elshahed wrote in an email that for him "Nietzsche is one of the greatest thinkers of the nineteenth century. His works contain ingenious thoughts and inspire deep thoughts. Whereas his 'theological saying' such as 'yesterday I buried God' is more than implausible" (my translation of Eshahed's German answer).

How crucial it is to look at the original wordings of any text can be demonstrated here – perhaps just as much as when interpreting the Qur'an. Nietzsche is saying that, together with the old metaphysics and the belief in an afterworld, he has carried the old morality to the grave. This is why I answered Elshahed that I would not take it as a theological sentence, nor the "God is dead" expressed by the fool, i.e. "der tolle Mensch," in *Thus spoke Zarathustra*. Further, I wrote: What matters in Nietzsche's texts is the question about the pluralism of potentially incompatible perspectives now that we can no longer refer to and rely on something absolute keeping them together in the course of scientific research and findings.[1]

Nietzsche's famous lines: Do you know what the world is in my view?, and the description that follows, of an undulant sea of quantums of power[2], refer to latest findings at the time in physics.[3] Despite this reference to science, Nietzsche's opening words: "in my view" ("was mir 'die Welt' ist," "in meinem Spiegel" ist) make it clear that it is not an absolute perspective, it is one of his own views/perspectives following the pathway of science. This goes very well together with Nietzsche's saying that we are dissolved when we find ourselves at the end of our wisdom[4]. In my view, this is closely linked with Nietzsche's thoughts about Buddhism. He even noted that he could become the Buddha of Europe, although an antipodal one[5] whose intention is to find a way or ways (plural!) out of nothingness into existence. – Which reminds one of the corresponding words in Zarathustra: " T h e way, namely, does not exist!"[6]

There was no need for Islamists, Taliban, on orders from leader Mullah Mohammed Omar, to destroy the famous Buddha statues of Bamiyan, Afghanistan, in March 2001, the world's tallest (53 and 35 meters) upright Buddha statues, because they believed Buddhism is something not compatible with Islamic faith, in order for us to realize that Islam has been widely unable to understand Buddhism as a faith/culture worthy of every respect, as does Nietzsche when he accords to Buddhist thought braveness, courage, manliness

in intellect. Nietzsche even ascribes such traits to himself and his kind, specifically to the absolute will to truth resulting from the faith in one God, in the absolute. Could this be a challenge to true Islamic intellect?, to Elshahed and others keen to discover and foster the true teachings of Mohammed, the truths in Islam and Qur'an?

A Newly Discovered but Ancient Concept in a Nutshell

Furthermore, I have been presenting at conferences for quite a few years[7] now my thesis that Nietzsche, with the famous or notorious photograph/image taken at a Lucerne studio – picturing himself and his friend Paul Ree, a philosopher of Jewish origins in the foreground, on the right-hand side of the 'double harness' of a cart, while Nietzsche placed himself slightly in the background, on the left-hand side, and inside the cart their common friend Lou Salomé, with a trace of a smile swinging a miniature whip decorated with a lilac bloom, the right wheel of the cart in the foreground, beneath Salomé, nearly producing the impression of a fourth person in the picture –, that Nietzsche is referring us with this photo to the corresponding picture, i.e. corresponding text, in one of the holy Buddhist scriptures. This written image refers to an even older conception, dated back to three or four thousand years before our common era by a widely known and respected indologist, Ernst Zimmer. Since – firstly – the conception of a king, a perfected man who with his more than thousand sons conquers the world, without violence and only by instituting justice, stability, and general welfare in each country, and since – secondly – this great, perfected and upright human being is described with precisely the same words as the Jewish Messiah, I have been proposing that this image stems from Jewish tribes passing through regions today called Afghanistan and Pakistan at the time, which is why their, the Jews', proper time dates back to the inspired and inspiring creation of this image (and not to the alleged creation of the world), and has, moreover, nothing to do with the Jewish belief in one God.

A daring suggestion? Maybe, but one that widens our horizons, in case one is "manly" (Nietzsche) enough to consider it. Could it be a challenge to upright Islamic thinkers, Islamic researchers, too? Especially since it can be seen as the foundation of Jewish ethics and striving for the world's wellbeing and peace, i.e. justice, peace, and protection of the weak (let us leave aside Israel's politics of today).

Nietzsche and Islam

As to Nietzsche, from the start he strived to do justice to Islam, insofar as he showed a critical attitude towards the contemporary distortions of the image of Islam in the Western world. He dismissed for example Voltaire's early assessment of the Prophet as a resentment against higher natures.[8] Johann Figl has shown that Nietzsche had become acquainted with Islam quite early in his life, namely in his school times at Pforta. Ian Almond, in the first chapter of his 2007 book *The New Orientalists,* writes about "Nietzsche's peace with Islam"[9] and refers to further readings of Nietzsche on Islam (Palgrave, Wellhausen, Max Müller, Benfrey). He cites a letter written to Heinrich Köselitz in 1881 where Nietzsche says: "Ask my old comrade Gersdorff whether he'd like to go with me to Tunisia for one or two years … I want to live for a while amongst Muslims, in the places moreover where their faith is at its most devout; this way my eye and judgment for all things European will be sharpened" (Almond's translation).[10] As Almond writes, Islam was for Nietzsche the closest example of a life-affirming, yes-saying Semitic religion, in *The Antichrist* even more so as an enemy of the crusade Christians. Nietzsche lauds Islam as a monotheistic metaphysics more manly than its Judaeo-Christian sister faiths.

On the other hand, Islam is for Nietzsche, according to Almond, a post-Platonic example where the idea of an afterlife, similarly to the Christian faith, is used to control the followers. – Indeed, this was my impression, too, when reading an online text on Islam written by a renowned Shiite teacher[11] – it even appeared as an openly acknowledged intention.

Perspectives on Both Nietzsche and Islam

There are only very few texts dealing with Nietzsche and Islam. One was a presentation at a Nietzsche conference organized by James Luchte in the year 2008 at the University of Wales, where Hanina Ben-Menahem identified a striking parallelism between headings, imagery and features of Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* and the Qur'an. Ben-Menahem thinks it is almost certain that Nietzsche read the Qur'an, most likely in a new and the first complete German translation by Ludwig Ullmann, i.e., Rabbi Baruch Lion Ullman.

The second book known to me dealing with *Nietzsche and Islam* is the one of Roy Jackson, published by Routledge in 2007. Jackson expresses his hope that

"Islam … learn from Nietzsche's religiosity and embrace a 'living God' that does not perceive secularization as an enemy", an aim motivated by the need to "save" Islam from its own Platonic tendencies, by fostering a pluralist, "liberal" stance toward its truth claims to "broaden interpretation of its main principles" – according to a review by Michael McNeal. Another reviewer of Jackson's book, Peter S. Groff, states that Jackson provides a valuable contribution to cross-cultural discussions, not least by showing that "Nietzsche does not reject the religious as such, but rather just particular life-denying or otherworldly manifestations of the religious impulse." According to Groff, Jackson "argues that Nietzsche's insights can help Islam confront the force of secularization on the one hand and revitalize itself on the other through a critical-historical return to its 'key paradigms': The Quran, the Prophet Muhammad, the city-state of Medina, and the four Rightly-Guided Caliphs." "Not surprisingly they also lie at the heart of the utopian 'Golden Age' narratives that contemporary political revivalists (Islamists) employ to justify the establishment of a pure Islamic state" envisioned by "reactive, authoritarian, and stultifying forces" (– a "transhistorical", Platonic version of Islam?).

This reminds me of Ronald Dworkin's 2013 book *Religion without God*, the basis of his "Einstein Lectures" held by him at the University of Berne, and intended to curtail (or even prevent) the new religious wars, cultural wars, such as for example between traditionalists ("Strenggläubige") and atheists like Dawkins.

Conclusion

Moslems use to say the Qur'an is comprehensible for everyone, that their prophet Muhammad (s.a.a.s.), as well as the Infallible Imams (a.s.) always spoke in a way that could be understood by everybody: simple and without long phrases and circumlocutions. In fact, IS understands its own activities as the Qur'an put into practice, and according to a survey carried out in Saudi Arabia by the (IS) newspaper *al-Hayat* in August 2014, 92 percent of their respondents do think that the IS activities are compatible with Islam.[12] Whereas renowned Islamic scholars differentiate and distinguish for example between absolutely valid sentences in the Qur'an and sentences which are only valid under certain conditions etc.[13]

From the start, Nietzsche's texts, on the other hand, run the gamut from ambivalent to contradictory, according to one's perspective. That is why "given" is often used as a reference to a specific perspective. Nonetheless, there is a kind of master-perspective, as I tried to show. Nietzsche presents an agonistic concept of a "different" type of aristocracy which consists of true individuals, i.e. of individual wheels rolling out of themselves.[14] Accordingly, the aristocracy fostered by Nietzsche's Zarathustra consists of a nobility which opposes everything despotic. For Nietzsche it is even a sign of atavism in a physiological sense to react with cruelty.[15] The turn-around to the better is achieved in the ancient narrative and in Nietzsche's texts (as well as in the Jewish and Greek traditions) by highest and deepest self-reflection.[16]

After having put Nietzsche, Nietzsche's vision of himself as the great divide of a time before him and a time after him, to the test, I would like to propose, in terms of "Grosse Politik" (Nietzsche) implying the grandeur of culture(s) and deeply felt magnanimity, in an atmosphere of mutual trust and inspiration on the one hand, and of constructive contests, friendly strifes, open competitions on the other hand, to envisage a "house of peace and welfare", an Umma, stretching out into "all four directions" of the world – while Muslims of course might continue to speak of the house of Islam, while Jews speak of the house of Shalom and Westerners call it the house of United Nations … on the basis of a new common foundation reaching far back: to the deepest roots of Jewish culture.

We have, however, to realize that the presence and growing influence of European states in the Arab world led to an expansion of the European term "nation," which seems to be incompatible with Islamic, partly imperialistic, world view, i.e., with a kind of universalism in its concept of an Umma and its loyalty to Allah (let alone the so-called IS, formerly ISIS).

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Endnotes

1. Compare Friedrich Nietzsche. Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe (KSA), ed. by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (München, Berlin/New York: dtv, Walter de Guyter, 1980), vol. 5, 409 ff.; Zur Genealogie der Moral, Dritte Abhandlung, no. 27: „die christliche Moral selbst, der immer strenger genommene Begriff der Wahrhaftigkeit, die Beichtväter-Feinheit des christlichen Gewissens, übersetzt und sublimirt zum wissenschaftlichen Gewissen, zur intellektuellen Sauberkeit um jeden Preis. [...] An diesem Sich-bewusst-werden des Willens zur Wahrheit geht von nun an – daran ist kein Zweifel – die Moral z u G r u n d e: jenes grosse Schauspiel in hundert Akten, das den nächsten zwei Jahrhunderten Europa's aufgespart bleibt [...]".
2. KSA, vol. 11, 610 f.; posthumous fragments, June–July 1885 38 [12].
3. See Uschi Nussbaumer-Benz, Nietzsche – Nadelöhr der Philosophie? Eine Einführung in die Wille-zur-Macht-Thematik (Cuxhaven: Junghans-Verlag, 1991), notably 100–131.
4. KSA, vol. 13, 397; posthumous fragments, spring 1888 14[225].
5. KSA, vol. 10, 43; posthumous fragments, summer–autumn 1882 2[1].
6. KSA, vol. 4, Also sprach Zarathustra, III, Vom Geist der Schwere, no. 2, 245: „Das – ist nun m e i n Weg, – wo ist der eure?" so antwortete ich Denen, welche mich ‚nach dem Wege' fragten. D e n Weg nämlich – den giebt es nicht!"
7. Compare for example Uschi Nussbaumer-Benz, "In Search of the Wellsprings of the Future and of New Origins", in Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Before Sunrise, ed. by James Luchte (London / New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2008), 151–164; „(Wieder-)Geburt des ‚andren' Ideals. Zur (nicht nur) politischen Bedeutung einer verborgenen Quelle Nietzsches" (a paper presented at the Nietzsche-Kolloquium in Sils-Maria in 1999), in Neuere Beiträge zur Nietzsche-Forschung (Band II), Reihe Nietzscheana, vol. 15, ed. by Sabine S. Gehlhaar (Cuxhaven / Dartford: Traude Junghans Verlag, 2001), 109–120; "Nietzsche's Vision of Europe: On the Thousand and One Goal(s)", in The New Europe at the Crossroads, ed. by Ursula E. Beitter (New York: Peter Lang, 1999), 187–191.
8. KSA, vol. 11, 64; posthumous fragments, spring 1884 25[187]: Voltaire, when he misunderstood Mahomet, is on a pathway a g a i n s t higher natures (my translation).
9. Ian Almond, The New Orientalists: Postmodern Representations of Islam from Foucault to Baudrillard (London: I. B. Tauris, 2007), 7–21.
10. Friedrich Nietzsche. Sämtliche Briefe. Kritische Studienausgabe (KSB), ed. by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (München, Berlin/New York: dtv, Walter de Guyter, 1986), vol. 6, 68; 13 March 1881.
11. Alámeh Tabátaba'i (Professor, Gelehrter und Korankommentator), Das „ABC" des Islam, an online-publication.
12. "islamkonform", Tages-Anzeiger, (Zurich, 18 October 2014), 13, readers' forum.
13. Compare http://www.lettertobaghdadi.com/pdf/Booklet-Combined.pdf.
14. KSA, vol. 4, 31; Also sprach Zarathustra, Erster Teil, Von den drei Verwandlungen.
15. Compare KSA, vol. 10, 117; posthumous fragments, November 1882 – February 1883 4[34]; as well as KSB, vol. 6, 287 f., letter to Heinrich von Stein, beginning of December 1882.
16. KSA, vol. 6, 365 f.; Nietzsche, Ecce homo, Warum ich ein Schicksal bin, no. 1.

The European Union — State, Confederation or Network?
About Superstate Organisation

Klaus Wellner

Abstract

Normally there is given a final purpose of the state: Liberty or compensation of the biological weakness etc. Differently Nietzsche finds in ancient Greece a tendency to overwhelm these purposes as work of the genius. Differently Nietzsche identifies the present time with a decline of this sphere. Nietzsche thinks that the perfect state of Plato is a kind of preparation of the genius by winning wisdom and knowledge. With Thales started sciences as coherence of a system. The State of Plato realizes this ideal, too. States may form alliances or a confederation. During the new development in Europe (EU) the question arises as to the form of the state. Important arguments are found against a centralistic superstate, it is reasonable to give up this tendency. Because it is evident that in the EU none of the models is realized, it is necessary to describe it phenomenologically otherwise. The new proposal is, the EU is a network. Elsewhere similar constellations are developing. The growing together of these networks will enable a peaceful development on earth. Returning to Nietzsche's reflections the question arises as to Nietzsche's further development. One can find a very critical judgement about state. But in a network there will be a free play for more mental developments. In this case state could become an instrument for favouring the genius as *Übermensch*. His *wisdom* as meditation about the limits of sciences can conciliate Nietzsche´s thinking with the state.

Keywords

Nietzsche, Genius, State of Plato, Theory, State, System, Confederation, EU, European Union, Superstate, Subsidiarity, Empire, Network, Net-Models, Overstate Organisations, *Übermensch* (Supraman).

Normally there is given a final purpose of the state: Liberty or compensation of the biological weakness of human beings in relation to nature or to tame their asocial manner like wolves among wolves or to tend towards common wealth. Differently Nietzsche finds in ancient Greece a tendency to overwhelm these purposes of the state in the struggle for life by justifying it by the illusion in arts. Our eagerness of the struggle for life is counterbalanced in Hellas by a requirement of arts. In ancient Greece existence has no value in itself and the necessary work is an insult. But appearing in a seductive illusion it seems to become worthy. (GrSt[1], 209) This requirement of arts is based on a frightening cruel nature. To get a basis for the development of arts, a majority has on

duty of a minority to work like slaves more, than they need for themselves. Therefore it is a cruel truth, "dass zum Wesen einer Kultur das Sklaventum gehöre:…" (GrSt, 211 f.).[2] Only the Moderns have mendaciously glorified origin and importance of the state (GrSt, 214 f.). They have invented the mendacious significations of "Dignity": *Equality of Rights for everybody*, *Fundamental Rights, Dignity of Labors.* (GrSt, 209/210) Only the cramp-iron of the state compels the masses in that way together, that in the society a pyramidal construction has to happen (GrSt, 209/210), and there is no law, which is not in its foundation presumption, violence. Nature uses a cruel instrument, the state. This history has been forgotten. Now the state is considered as the goal and summit of sacrifice and duties of persons. (GrSt, 214 f.) Nietzsche thinks that the ancient Greeks estimated the state like a patronage of the genius. For the development of the great works of arts they made use of the state. Differently Nietzsche identifies the present time with a decline of the political sphere. People without the tendency of sacrifice utilize the state selfishly to their private advantage and hide this in a liberal-optimistic point of view. (GrSt, 219 ff.) In the philosophical view Nietzsche thinks that the perfect state of Plato is in contrary a kind of preparation of the genius, but his destination is wisdom and knowledge and not arts. (GrSt, 224)

Thereby for us three eminent points of view are introduced in the occidental thinking: 1. There is a natural necessity in the struggle for life in an organization of the community; 2. In ancient Greece there was a will to glorify the necessity by the beauty of culture; 3. In the *State* of Plato the ideal of complete theory is given. It is well known that Plato did not succeed in realizing his project. Although the opinion occurred that the forms of dominions, which historically happened, had realized something of Plato´s imaginations. Recently the theory has appeared, that a state corresponding to this ideal has not been formed before the end of the 17th century.[3] Without entering in a historical discussion it seems to be reasonable to ask for the characteristics of the state, which are underlying this theory. The state is declared a legal person with the following characteristics: 1. a territory of exclusive dominion; 2. a nation as personal association; 3. a supreme power, (a) the exclusive privilege of internal physical violence, (b) judicial independence of external courts.[4] Strictly speaking this is no definition of the state, but the necessary condition of its realization in space and time. But the form of the state has been described by Plato in a logical system, which was the scheme for his realization.

To estimate this fact sufficiently, there is briefly to ask for the system. With Thales the ancient Greeks started to develop, what nowadays is called sciences. Knowledge had for them to get the coherence of a system. This is a building of thoughts, depending from a principle (basic proposition) without logical contradiction. Before Aristotle has described logic itself as a system, they used it intuitively and developed a sequence of systems, whose principles they took from reasonable thinking and observation. Plato is the first who applied this procedure to the society giving in that way the first theoretical description of the state. It is depending of the true knowledge of the reality, and it means for him, that the structure of the state and in the same sense the regulation of the society has to be a copy of the true order of reality. Thus the system of the state gets an analogous order equivalent to his metaphysical design of reality depending on the world of ideas. Its intrinsic principle is the idea of the ideas, the Agathon (the good). The illustration shows the principle at the top of a triangle, so that all other propositions are subordinated to it. This is equivalent to the ontological order of the Antiquity: the higher values and more important beings are at the top near the sphere of divinity, beings of less value, appearances for instance, are below, on the earth. According to Plato the true reality has this hierarchical order and depends on the true entity, which is the same as Agathon. Human beings have the same constitution, provided that they are acting reasonably. Therefore the constitution of the state ought to be the same as it is to be found with reasonable men. These already exist sometimes, but the reasonable state is only a project. It is well known that Plato has comprehended and regulated all human activity in his system of propositions, in his theory: The structure of the state, the procreation, the education in all spheres and also arts – nothing has been left out. All this has gotten a goal: the augmentation of wisdom and knowledge, so that truth in itself can be seen.

All existing states are characterized by their reality and a formality, which is fixed by scripture. This may be related to more or less extensive parts of the community. Mostly there will be a difference between what it ought to be and its reality. Furthermore the written descriptions will not unconditionally be logically faultless. Notwithstanding there are leading thoughts and therefore principles at the basis. This fact may be the reason for some historians to have reached the opinion, states were essentially not formed before the end of the 17th century.

Now it is appropriate to discuss the *system*. As a cohesion of propositions free of contradiction, which are depending from one or several principles, it is called a *theory*, able to describe a certain sphere of facts. This is the convenient form of scientific presentation of true connections. In Plato´s ontology the principles are the top of a pyramid, the deduced propositions are beneath them. Meanwhile the point of view has become converted. The principles are at the bottom called basic propositions. Here the deductions are starting and any amount of them may proceed to the top. Singular propositions produce the relation to facts belonging to the sphere, which is intended at the outside of the theory. The propositions at the inside are universal. They are necessary rules. Applying this idea to the state the mode of the universals is changing, so that they become normative and prescribe how something ought to be. They do not express facts any longer. Now their sphere is all that belongs to the state: all men in the region of its validity, its citizens and all objects in its region. In empirical scientific theories the propositions are hypothetically universal. They are to be verified furthermore by observation and experiment. The propositions of a theory of state are differently influenced by lawsuits and judgements. And political legislation is of eminent importance. Therefore a political system is never completed. The described model is the ideal of an unitary state.

States may form alliances for common interests. In this case it is only necessary to have a treaty and the intention to guard it, and there is no need of any further unity, especially not in the system of propositions. If they form a confederation, a certain internal correspondence is necessary: if they are monarchies, democracies or totalitarian regimes. Then we have some common principles. In a confederation there should be differences only in the organisation of the partial systems. During the new development in Europe again and again the question occurs, what kind of system is the European Union and what should be intended. It is well known, that there are comments supporting more centralisation like an unitary state. This discussion happens on the basis of the opinion there would be only a choice between the enumerated models. Here will be an attempt to establish as new a kind of organisation – the network. This is based on the view that a formation like EU would get great difficulties by centralisation.

A first objection may already be that a super state by cause of the extension and the quantity of inhabitants would be difficultly to be administered and

governed. The accommodation to changing circumstances would be extremely heavy. The historical empires are suitable examples. A second objection is, that by growing dimensions very different ways of life, cultures and mentalities should be administered by a central office. A third Objection is that the EU already has a very great number of members, which are of different size in different aspects. A regulating participation of them in important functions can not be ensured. The resulting predominance of the great nations would be perceived as unfair as now already the distribution of votes to the nations. A fourth objection is resulting of the discontent with the eagerness of the commission in producing unworldly laws and prescriptions. The consequence is a cry for more subsidiarity. A fifth objection is following from the observable facts, that once introduced regulations, if they are recognized as foolish, in consequence of the big number of co-regencies, are scarcely to be abolished.

If thus important arguments are found against a centralistic super state, it is reasonable to give up this tendency. Because it is evident, that in the EU none of the models is realized and therefore the existing organisation seems to possess a form beyond the enumerated ones, it is necessary to describe it phenomenologically otherwise. The new proposal is, the EU is a *network*, which consists of several different states. This fact is to be realized, to direct further intentions of evolution consequently in this way. As we know the meaning of the word *net* sufficiently, we do not have a problem in using it in this new relation. Science was characterized as a logical system of true propositions, as a theory. A net is a system likewise. It may be a real object, for instance a rail network, or an ideal object, the geometric form of it. But this system can not be illustrated by a triangle or a pyramid, but in the sphere of mathematics, in which logic is illustrated in space and time, we find a relation of the positions of points in a chosen system of coordinates, which are designated by numerals. The projection may be issued in a plane of two dimensions or in spaces of several dimensions. The kinds of systems of coordinates and the kinds of spaces are destined by the species of objects, which are seized. Differently to the classic system a net is extremely variable. Real intersections and connecting lines may be differently weighty. The success of neurosciences in describing physiological processes by net-models has led this conception to high popularity.

The attempt to take this new kind of system for states does not mean to substitute classic system by network. But the coherence of a manifold of states shall

be formed as a net. In real politics such relations are already originated unexpectedly. Recognizing this fact, one is receiving new possibilities to improve the cooperation of the EU and to procure more importance to the desirable principle of subsidiarity. Here is an attempt of an outline of the status. The member states of the EU are pyramids and their constitutions contain their principles. One pyramid is overwhelming the EU members and therefore connecting lines are going from the principles of the EU to them, but some lines are of different importance. Within the EU there are mutually independent pyramids, from which lines of sometimes different importance are going to the members, for instance the European Central Bank and the European Central Court. The economic regulations of the EU are including some necessary prescriptions, but otherwise the economic procedures are not centralized. From the Commission several lines are going to several spheres, for instance to agriculture, traffic, techniques etc. It is surely desirable, that the commission would not produce so many laws and prescriptions, but only general conditions. The different regions could create suitable regulations. In that case the lines coming from the commission would have different intensity. Already now the relations between the different organs of the administration are not always hierarchical, corresponding to the classic system. The German Constitutional Supreme Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) does not accept the priority of the European Law without reservation.[5] It is not the task now to describe the existing circumstances, it is the business of an empirical investigation. The described reality is to be brought to a concept, to prevent the installation of a centralized state. A network is the better aim. Its advantage is in connection with subsidiarity a better accommodation to regional differences. If there are different economic procedures by the states, the consequences would be observable, and it would be easier to modify the economics in a smaller region. Elections have more influence in the member states than in the EU.

The proposed clarification of the theoretical relations is naturally to be used out of the area of Europe. The reflection about the essence of the state has finally to be extended to the administration of the whole earth. In this debate the models empire, alliance and confederation have been treated. The network model may start a new period of reflection.

In the view of the historical development of present time, we have to ascertain that a plurality of organizations has arisen, which is between or beyond the

states, including the United Nations, which indeed do not posses any supreme power. Of the EU it has been demonstrated, that besides the classic organization there is an additional character of a network. One could optimistically suppose that it could be a nucleus of Kant's republic.[6] This will only be decided in a far future. But it can not be denied, that between Europe and America there has arisen an important network. Surely the NATO here is the most steady connection. But IWF or OSCE already have important influence. Elsewhere similar constellations are developing, even though they are not yet comparable to the European and American involvements. The growing together of these networks for the purpose of a peaceful development is really possible. The future administration of the earth can in fact take place in a network of states, which themselves are classic systems.

Empiric observations show that the state as classic system, existing already for a long time, inclines to a more efficient structure and thereby gets higher inflexibility. In this constitution the states clash vehemently together by their frontiers. Networks have more variability, but become sooner anarchic. Therefore it would be better to combine both structures, so that their occasional superiorities in given circumstances come forth. Between the states may develop a net of relations, and especially overstate organisations may form a net which makes the communication of states easier. In a large historical period it may happen that the possible forms of cooperation are examined to prove their efficiency. It may happen that a central state develops, but it will perish again because of its difficulties. Other forms of organisation will develop corresponding to the principle of evolution comprehending variation and selection. The most stabilized one will last for a longer time. There could be a quasi evolutionary process by variation, selection and stabilisation.

Let us return to Nietzsche's reflections about Greek state and culture, which gave higher meaning to the state, and ask for Nietzsche's further philosophical development. Later on there is to be found a very critical judgement. Aphorism 179 of *Morgenröte* has the title *So wenig als möglich Staat!*[7] By the best means one should strive for other aims than amelioration of the state. An argument for this position is to be found in a notice in *Wir Philologen*: "Je besser der Staat eingerichtet ist, desto matter die Menschheit."[8] In *Götzen-Dämmerung* he writes that culture and state are antagonists.[9] Well known is the negative description of the state in *Zarathustra's* speech with the title *Vom neuen Götzen.* At the be-

ginning the vitality of peoples is contrasted to the state as the coldest monster at all. As consequence of the expansion of sciences and techniques over the earth he asks: "Wer soll der Herr der Erde sein?"[10] But if Nietzsche is interpreted as being guided by the conception of the state as classic system, his critique is not necessarily valid for the organisation by networks. They may guide to more possibilities of free mental development. This point of view could not have been conceived by Nietzsche, because the network model was not developed. A future plurality of states, which is located in a network, is opening a free play for more free mental developments. This could be able to prevent mental dullness in a world-wide state. In this case state could become an instrument for a more spiritual way of life by favouring the genius as *Übermensch* (supraman). His attitude should be *wisdom* as meditation about the limits of scientific knowledge and its technical application.[11] It is possible to conciliate Nietzsche´s thinking with this new nature of a future constitution of the state. His initial idea of a higher destination of the state could be realized.

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Endnotes

1 GrSt = *Der griechischeStaat*, Kröner, vol. 70; *Friedrich Nietzsche,* Kröner Taschenausgabe, vols. 70–83 (Stuttgart: Kröner Verlag, 1955–1956).
2 "the essence of culture is slavery" (transl.: K. Wellner).
3 Wolfgang Reinhard, *Geschichte der Staatsgewalt – Eine vergleichende Verfassungsgeschichte Europas von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart* (München: Verlag C. Beck, 1999).
4 Reinhard, *Geschichte der Staatsgewalt*, 16.
5 Ulrich Fastenrath: „Retten, was zu retten ist", *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ)*, 19 July 2005, no. 165.
6 Immanuel Kant, *Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf*, Werke, vol. 9, ed. by Wilhelm Weischedel, (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1964).
7 *Friedrich Nietzsche, 1. Kritische Gesamtausgabe der Werke*, ed. by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, (Berlin: Verlag de Gruyter, 1967 ff.).
8 Nietzsche, *Wir Philologen*, no. 192, Kröner, vol. 71.

9 Nietzsche, *Götzendämmerung*, Was den Deutschen abgeht, no. 4.
10 Nietzsche, *Also* sprach *Zarathustra*, Das trunkene Lied, no. 5.
11 Nietzsche has discussed this problem in an early plan with the title: *Wissenschaft und Weisheit im Kampfe*, Kröner , vol. 70.

Perspectivism in Epistemology and in the Sociology of Knowledge

On the Perspectivist Turn in the Philosophy

Endre Kiss

Abstract

The *philosophical perspectivism* well applies as Friedrich Nietzsche's most important philosophical innovation in its already generalized form. In that form of the perspectivism, which we look for reconstructing in this attempt, the most original achievements of Nietzsche's thought can find their place. The perspectivism is in its as authentic form *no starting point*, rather the *end result*, in which, directly or contextually, numerous other philosophical innovation can rise. These anticipations cast also their shadow on the problematic of whether the perspectivism (in Nietzsche's sense) is now a *relativism* (let alone a *radical* relativism) or perhaps a kind of its *opposite*, for the pure fact that the multiperspectivism *in general* contains a relativistic velleity (especially and undoubtedly in comparison with any monoperspectivism), while precisely the indicated anticipations would just work towards the opposite direction (no single perspective is *in itself* relativistic). The *sociological* perspectivism (wissenssoziologisch) takes the existential positions motivated by sociological position as starting point and deploys the totality of the own perspectives on this basis, while the *epistemological* perspectivism must comply, in its individual perspectives, with the legitimate expectations of the epistemology. This insight into the historical process of the philosophy goes however also, under another aspect, together with an unexpected understanding. Nietzsche comes, with a total conscience, to the elaboration of the epistemological perspectivism. His real objective was in the epistemology, methodology or theory of science itself! *Nietzsche's breakthrough in the field of the perspectivism was directly oriented toward the change of the philosophical perspective itself!* He wanted to free himself from the chains of the monoperspectivistic view.

Keywords

Friedrich Nietzsche, Perspectivism, Epistemological Perspectivism, Sociology of Knowledge, Verification, Relativism.

The *philosophical perspectivism* well applies as Friedrich Nietzsche's most important philosophical innovation in its already generalized form. In that form of the perspectivism, which we look for reconstructing in this attempt, the most original achievements of Nietzsche's thought can find their place. The perspectivism is in its as authentic form *no starting point*, rather the *end result*, in which, directly or contextually, numerous other philosophical innovation can rise.

Such as it is often inaccurately or even wrongly judged in Niezsche's context of the perspectivism, it happens as well, that just as inaccurate, if not false insights about the *perspectivism* become prevalent.

The one, ultimately problematic, insight imagines a closer „multiperspectivism", not to be directly determined, in which the *common and simultaneous* validity of the results of the numerous perspectives constitutes the higher degree of the philosophical establishment of the truth. The problematic side of this vision consists in the fact, that the closer determination, of *how the results of the miscellaneous perspectives are adding up and give a common insight, is necessarily missing*. So it happens that, here, a fairly blurred contoured multiperspectivism must suit the well-defined contours of the mono-perspectivist thinking.

Another widespread opinion about the concept of the perspectivism built due to Nietzsche's philosophy contains the assumption, that a discourse of the perspectivism must contain contents of perspectives, which are *equal in rank*. This assumption, whether true or false, contains the conscious or also not conscious hypothesis, that to speak of a perspectivism only makes sense, if (for the moment, not yet defined) similarities or other forms of the same validity are existing among the diverse concrete perspectives.

This also assumes, that alone the concept of multiperspectivism already supposes *in advance* certain thematic and conceptual definitions, which point in the direction of the equality and the simultaneous truth of the perspectives. It is why these anticipations are also remarkable, because one might hardly enunciate really such comprehensive judgments about a method, because it always summarizes a number of current perspectives, about which one would not yet be able to formulate in advance any statements.

These anticipations cast also their shadow on the problematic of whether the perspectivism (in Nietzsche's sense) is now a *relativism* (let alone a *radical* relativism) or perhaps a kind of its *opposite*, for the pure fact that the multiperspectivism *in general* contains a relativistic velleity (especially and undoubtedly in comparison with any monoperspectivism), while precisely the indicated anticipations would just work towards the opposite direction (no single perspective is *in itself* relativistic).

There are not common problems, which are already emerging with the simple thematization of a possible philosophical perspectivism. A similar possibil-

ity appears, if one compares, for the time being, a quite generally presented perspectivism with the functions and characteristics of the *everyday consciousness*.

In the first description of a philosophical perspectivism, the fundamental duality is therefore articulating: *from the philosopher's side* the perspectivism appears in itself, without further definitions as a new philosophical idea, while the same perspectivism equally adopts from the *representational side* the dilemma, that a *strictly* contoured monoperspectivist view faces a clearly *less contoured* multiperspectivist mode of thinking. The less abstract degree of definition of an entire perspectivism takes back by no means the truth of the individual concrete perspectives. So, a difference is emerging between the validity (Gültigkeit) of a single perspective and that of an entire perspectivistic concept.

Let us think of this difference, then the demand of a specific criterion leads to the insight, that the perspectivism should have been capable in itself of *unification of two fields of knowledge*. We can distinguish from each other the *epistemological* and *sociological* (wissenssoziologisch or existential motivated by sociological position) perspectivisms.

The *sociological* perspectivism (wissenssoziologisch) takes the existential positions motivated by sociological position as starting point and deploys the totality of the own perspectives on this basis, while the *epistemological* perspectivism must comply, in its individual perspectives, with the legitimate expectations of the epistemology.

At this point, we gain an unprepared and unexpected look at the *historical* process of the philosophy as well. The genuinely sociological approach is namely *ab ovo* bound to the perspectivistic view (because it consists in positions, that are constituted of the existential perspectives motivated by social position). The suggestion occurs then, that Nietzsche has „only" brought the existential perspectivism motivated by social positions into the epistemology.

As clear as it is however also, that the sociological perspectivism is in its profoundness a *tautology*, so it is from the other side just not so clear, that therefore we can however not speak about it, because *in Nietzsche's philosophical time, no sociology of knowledge yet existed*.

So, we have to assess differently this fact, according to which in Nietzsche's perspectivism the sociological and epistemological moments appear united. For this coexistence *emerged* in its reality *fundamentally as a unit of two simultaneous*

innovations! Nietzsche makes the innovation of the epistemological and sociological perspectivism at the same historical, philosophical and personal time. If this has been precisely enquired, he could even also distinguish both types from each other. Therefore, no opinion can refer to Nietzsche, which dissolves also the epistemological perspectivism (e.g. in assessing the so-called *third phase* of the philosopher) in the infinity of the sociological perspectivism. It is however a phenomenon, that it is mostly caused by that real and not at all ordinary fact, that the deployment of both perspectivisms must be conceived in detail as both individual parts of a comprehensive parallel process.

This insight into the historical process of the philosophy goes however also, under another aspect, together with an unexpected understanding. Nietzsche comes, with a total conscience, to the elaboration of the epistemological perspectivism. His real objective was in the epistemology, methodology or theory of science itself! *Nietzsche's breakthrough in the field of the perspectivism was directly oriented toward the change of the philosophical perspective itself!* He wanted to free himself from the chains of the monoperspectivistic view.

With this change, the whole philosophy came to a serious crossroads. For it is clear, that the theory building is a much more direct and easier task of a central perspective from, than from the always non-defined and non-definable variety of the diverse perspectives. Nietzsche's revolutionary turn has this however accepted. *What is easier can reveal, under circumstances, as the more difficult*. While the monoperspectivist center in the theory bulding is a clear advantage, *one center may show itself pecisely in the integration of the theoretical contents of the increasingly complex reality as insufficient!*

Initially, and also therefore, the epistemological persectivism cannot be exactly separated historically and psychologically from the sociological perspectivism motivated by the different existential positions, because both are deployed in parallel in Nietzsche, certainly so that they corroborate each other always in the form of the *positive feedback* in their final consequences. It belongs to this special component that, under such circumstances, one can therefore not blame Nietzsche, precisely under these circumstances, it could by no means be his duty, to conduct a specific reflection on the duality.

In a perhaps paradoxical way, the methodologically interested reader finds himself again in a similar situation. He is by no means interested in the thema-

tization of the relationship and/or the difference between both domains. Moreover, there is the fact that Nietzsche himself is not only not interested or even obliged to distinguish the two types of perspectivism. Even with an astonishing evidence, he subjects the epistemological perspectivism to an investigation by the sociological of perspectivism, while the case can be also in reverse. Quite strictly formulated, the discourse about both types of perspectivisms can also be the discourse about another dimension and it is that of a *„metaperspectivism",* in the center of which the individual perspectivisms are related to each other.

A critical description of the general insight about „perspectivism" or „Nietzsche's philosophical perspectivism" led us necessarily to a more general characterization of Nietzsche's methodology. It seems to us, that this method loses its surrounding „infinity" and „non-definition", the criteria of the verification and of the possible generalization rejoin their rights. The difference between *verifiable* and *non-verifiable* perpectivisms is full of importance.

If we speak however already of a verifiable perspectivism, then the perspectivism can be comprehended, now just *only in a very abstract* and only later to be defined *sense*, as *skepticism*. Also this train is pointing in the direction, that the relevant modern criticism shows itself in many systematic trains of integration, the types of the traditional philosophical systematization of the *philosophia perennis* are increasingly pushed into the background.

What can however be irrelevant in the context of the *epistemological* perspectivism, might still be right for the *sociological persektivism.* Products of the sociological perspectivism can appear, in a larger context, without any problem, as skeptic, or in the given case, demonstrate a skeptic cognitive interest.

One of the decisive definitions of the philosophical perspectivism concerns both types very differently, even paradoxically. The two starting points represent a *different priority* in the relationship, whether there is or not in the thinking a leading perspective in the context of the perspectivism. In general, we tend to the fact, that we see the lack of an only concrete leading perspective precisely as a defining criterion of the philosophical perspectivism (realized in Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy). No doubt, that it is also generally true (e.g. in the comparison of Nietzsche's philosophy with the efforts related to him, in which a monoperspectivism however works in a formal or non-formal context).

Viewed from close up, this general impression reveals however as a *transition phenomenon* in the reflection. As far as the sociological perspectivism is concerned, it is clear, that its concept in general is equivalent to the fact, that there is no leading perspectivism.

If we go just one step further from this level of the questioning, it appears then at this point, that there is again only one leading perspective, for the sociological perspective is precisely one, that is the *sole* and *exclusive* at this level, because precisely a sociological perspective can never be removed, in its concrete, *hic et nunc* determining resolution, from its thinking „point of view". Thus, there is a striking difference in the sociological perspectivism between its general concept (*no leading perpective possible*) and its concrete application (*this perspective is necessarily exclusive*). In this opposition, it is most clear, that the general skeptic-relativist dimension of the sociological of knowledge perspectivism mainly does *not* come from this difference, rather from its general applicability in every possible *comparison* with every other monoperspectivist philosophy.

If we consider under this aspect the epistemological perspectivism, then we find, under the level of the generality, again *another priority*. It is understandable, that a single epistemological perspective applies only in itself, if it is verifiable.

The fundamental criterion of the verifiability has no compelling consequences on the various varieties of perspectivisms. The perspectivism does not remove the verifiability, the verifiability does not stipulate the perspectives, the criterion of the mono- or multiperspectivism cannot be the verifiability.

The question then, whether a mono- or multiperspectivism arises now in the context of a perspectivism cannot be decided at this point, because whether there may be or not several correct epistemological individual perspectives, *is a question of the philosophical and scientific interpretation of the world*. The whole original question can thus also be modified. For it becomes clear, that there is not only an epistemological, but also a *systematic* perspectivism and that the systematic monoperspectivism was the one, which performed its great struggle with every multiperspectivism.

The epistemological perspectivism represents thus *in itself* no new criterion of truth, while the sociological perspectivism represents *a genuinely sociological criterion of truth*.

Nietzsche himself, as indicated, makes no significant effort to distinguish both these parallel innovations from each other. This non-distinction may appear many times, its reasons are also to be multiply interpreted. In his wide philosophical dynamics, Nietzsche makes even also attempts *to describe, sometimes even to criticize, a perspectivism from the position of the other*. This may apparently blur the limit between both types, in reality in the literal sense, a new perspective is arising, from which the two can refer to the other. In his important statement about the perspectivism as the „fundamental condition of all life", the sociological of knowledge and the epistemological perspectives can, for instance, coexist harmoniously.

The sociological perspectivism applies as the result of a long and complex development. In this process, it applies really, that each *endpoint* itself alone can become a *new starting point* and thus a new perspective. There is no perspective, that could not be put into a sociological space. This does not mean, that such a generated statement would be already verified, of course, one should always bear in mind, that the verification in this context can only mean, from the beginning, something completely different, this in the framework of the epistemology.

Both types of perspectivism, along with their eventual relations and the so emerging „metaperspectivism" pass through Nietzsche's entire oeuvre of the philosophy. We notice that, at some places, where it would be a logical consequence, to make reflected statements on the perspectivism and to further elaborate the already functioning and called by its name method, Nietzsche does not do it. What he does at this excellent point is usually the criticism of the Platonism, which thousand years old domination means for Nietzsche the biggest current problem. It is quite consistent, that the Platonism be interpreted as a bad perspectivism, as a bad perspective, even as the oppression of the perspectivism as basic form of all life.

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SECTION V
Language, Philosophy, Anthropology, Psychology, Religion

IS THE FUTURE OF EUROPE SECULAR OR RELIGIOUS?

Chair
—
Anna Makolkin

Participant
—
Larry D. Harwood

Presentation

Anna Makolkin

Europe as we know it was conceived as a *secular domain*: over 30,000 Greek gods and additional Roman deistic clones and their counterparts peacefully co-existed on the margins of the fundamentally secular entity. All the flourishing European civilizations, until the Judeo- Roman conflicts and ultimate victory of Christianity, managed to re-affirm their commitment to cultural pluralism and secularism.

The Graeco- Roman secularism had its roots in the Sumerian and Phoenician disdain for deities. In fact, ancient Tyre, the cultural parent of ancient Greece, had clear demarcation line between the polytheistic world of Belief and secular science, engineering, art, philosophy, transmitted to the Greeks along with literacy. (Hardly, anybody today remembers that Europe owes her literacy to the Phoenicians or the land of Tyre, as well as her urbanism).

The 30 000 Greek gods had enormous power over Greek collective imagination, inspiring rich mythology and the seeds of early science. The conflict between the secular and the religious never disappeared, tearing Greek society apart. The tyranny of Belief and physical extermination those questioning Belief would reoccur every now and then in the land of freedom and democracy-- enough to recall the fate of the ancient martyr Protagoras (483-410 BC). The wisdom of the ancient sage Aristotle (384-322BC) embodied the eternal conflict between "Church and State" which would permanently divide European continent and even the rest of the globe.

The founders of European secular civilization, the Romans, had secured all the preconditions for the successful secular pathway of entire humanity. In the opinion of Machiavelli, the victory of Christianity was responsible for the decline of Europe where art, philosophy, and life in general had been stifled by religion.

Machiavelli's despair expressed during the Renaissance was basically the fulfillment of the "prophecy,' uttered by the Roman poet Lucretius(99-55BC) in his longest European poem DE Rerum Natura:

"Religion breeds wickedness and had given rise to wrongful deeds."

This workshop invited a discussion about the negative and positive roles of religion, as well as open debate about secularity and the Machiavellian paradigm.

Nietzsche's Quest for the Spiritual

Larry D. Harwood

Abstract

With some trepidation Frederick Nietzsche attempted to chart a future course for a Western culture in his tale Thus Spake Zarathustra. In this work, Nietzsche speaks of the "last man," as a kind of culminating man living at the end of modernity. While Nietzsche takes it to be perhaps the greatest error of Christianity to have exalted the spirit over the body and he never tires of reversing the traditional religious prioritizing of the soul over the body, the last man reveals a new problem, however. In Zarathustra Nietzsche confronts a generation of last men firmly at home on earth, but indeed the last men are lost men for Nietzsche, and to a significant degree their fate is a product of their secular upbringing. In this paper I shall analyze the spiritual vacuum that Nietzsche sees in these last men.

Keywords

Nietzsche, Last Man, Zarathustra, Christianity, Secular, Modernity, Religion.

Introduction

Frederick Nietzsche both celebrated the cultural loss of religion and with some trepidation attempted to chart a future course for a Western culture without it. One of Nietzsche's charts is his tale *Thus Spake Zarathustra*. In this work, Nietzsche speaks of the "last man," as a kind of culminating man living—indeed lingering—on the end of modernity. At the same time, Nietzsche takes it to be perhaps the greatest error of Christianity to have exalted the spirit over the body and he never tires of reversing the traditional religious prioritizing of the soul over the body. The last man reveals a new problem, however. Nietzsche must now confront a generation of last men firmly at home on earth, but indeed the last men are lost men for Nietzsche, and to a significant degree their fate is a product of their secular upbringing. In this paper I shall analyze the spiritual vacuum that Nietzsche in some manner desires to remove from these last men.

Nietzsche often sees the residue of Christian ideas in a dissolving modernity, and at the same time frequently attributes the end of modernity to the impact of Christian influence upon culture. Adding more complication is the fact that

Nietzsche can appear reactionary in his estimation of a future culture prepared to leave some things behind[1]. For example, in a passage from *Beyond Good and Evil*, he writes:

> There is a point in the history of a society when it becomes so pathologically soft and tender that among other things it sides even with those who harm it, criminals, and does this quite seriously and honestly. Punishing somehow seems unfair to it, and it is certain that imagining 'punishment' and 'being supposed to punish' hurts it, arouses fear in it. 'Is it not enough to render him undangerous? Why still punish? Punishing itself is terrible.' With this question, herd morality, the morality of timidity, draws its ultimate consequence. Supposing that one could altogether abolish danger, the reason for fear, this morality would thereby be abolished too: it would no longer be needed, it would no longer consider itself necessary[2].

In the above quotation, concerning the punishment of criminals, one sees Nietzsche's contempt for those who would "altogether abolish danger." We find the same criticism of the last man in *Zarathustra*.

I

Nietzsche's "last man" has been the focus of much study of Nietzsche, but with little attempt to interface Nietzsche's contempt for the last man with his criticisms of Christianity. The last man is the counter, indeed the opposite, to much that Nietzsche advocates, and in fact is referred to as "the most contemptible thing," by Nietzsche in *Zarathustra*. This last man is the culmination of modern culture, a man who will not go beyond himself, as Zarathustra exhorts his listeners to do, but an individual who is satisfied by not being subjected to too much difficulty. The last man does not exert himself very much, but more importantly, he is identifiable primarily by what he avoids. The last man is complacent because of the tendency to avoid pain at the cost of pleasure. Therefore, the avoidance of pain comes to outweigh the pursuit of gain, and so life becomes a matter of small pleasures, for the dreamed of big ones risk too much pain. The last man is vulnerable in other words, but by choice and by avoidance. By regress, the stomach becomes a most important part of the human entity, for happiness and material pleasures are the gods of last men. Deigning to purge life of all pain, the inevitable end of life is not left to run its natural

course, and so there is "much poison at last for a pleasant death."[3] Suffering must be eliminated, but at the expense of life and living. Life will still be lived, but it will be truncated in the effort to avoid suffering and pain.

This affirmation of life, of the will to live, is of course a major theme of Nietzsche's philosophy. It is in that context, moreover, that Nietzsche's criticisms of religion and much of the lamentable history of philosophy surface. Nietzsche's historical analysis of how this degenerate way of life came about is told at various places in his works, with Nietzsche assigning significant blame to Socrates and to Plato for a cultural world that stood historically ready to embrace a religion such as Christianity. The last man, however, is no conscious Platonist, nor even consciously Christian. He may know nothing of Plato's world of forms nor of Christianity's heaven or God, but he like them, according to Nietzsche, seeks to be at rest. He prefers the bed over the battle, and sexual skirmishes to weightier ones. He therefore bends the world tighter and tighter around himself, for himself, which means to avoid and ignore much of it. Live in it and with it as it is, he cannot.

However, life lived this way does not look the same anymore, even to the untrained eye. As Nietzsche describes the world view of the last man in Zarathustra:

> The earth hath then become small, and on it there hoppeth the last man who maketh everything small. His species is ineradicable like that of the groundflea; the last man liveth longest.
>
> 'We have discovered happiness'--say the last men, and blink thereby. They have left the regions where it is hard to live; for they need warmth. One still loveth one's neighbor and rubbeth against him; for one needeth warmth. . . . One still worketh, for work is a pastime. But one is careful lest the pastime should hurt one. One no longer becometh poor or rich; both are too burdensome. Who still wanteth to rule? Who still wanteth to obey? Both are too burdensome. No shepherd, and one herd! Every one wanteth the same; every one is equal; he who hath other sentiments goeth voluntarily into the madhouse.
>
> 'Formerly all the world was insane,'--say the subtlest of them, and blink thereby.[4]

In Nietzsche's eyes, the world of last men has become domesticated. This attenuated life is hardly displeasing to them anymore, because insofar as is possible they have removed what is displeasing. Dangers are averted, disruptions

minimized. The last man is not so much lazy as he is lazy because he is fearful, but fear too is disruptive, so fear too he seeks to eradicate. Last men are scarcely capable of ascension anymore, for that necessitates a willingness to court error, to embrace risk, or the unknown. Furthermore, differences among last men are looked upon with suspicion by last men who desire equality more than aspiration, and the elimination of suffering over the desire for success.

Nietzsche, by contrast, views man as a bridge, capable of the high and the low.[5] The last man, however, is the lowliest man. He will not ascent, but descend, and indicative of his deficiency, be satisfied. Nietzsche's Zarathustra, however, is a Petrarch climbing mountains, and a Prometheus, bringing fire down into the valleys.

II

"Zarathustra's Prologue" reveals Nietzsche's intention to cast Zarathustra in a comparative and contrasting role of a Christ figure. When Zarathustra is thirty years old he ascends into the mountains for ten years of solitude. After this time, and feeling full of wisdom, Zarathustra descends the mountain "to empty himself, and Zarathustra is again going to be a man." Zarathustra has been reborn (with obvious analogy in religious life) in his solitude and is now prepared to teach his collected wisdom, but just as he descends the mountain he encounters another preacher of sorts, an old saint of the old religion, searching for edible roots. The old man remembers the youthful Zarathustra's ascent to the mountain ten years earlier, but stronger than the memory is the change he notices in the new Zarathustra, who suggests more a Prometheus than an ascetic or monk.

Zarathustra's first sermon of sorts falls not only on deaf ears, but is met with ridicule, as it would be with last men as the audience. Discerning that he has failed to excite them by announcing that humans can transcend themselves out of last men into supermen, he proceeds to criticize the languishing comfortable but terminal men they are. Zarathustra's rhetoric for presenting the *Ubermensch* for men who will retake themselves and their earth back from God and heaven, is full of directives away from their traditional religion. A set of beatitude-like exhortations are set forth, in which Zarathustra reverses many of Christ's teachings.

Zarathustra, however, does not present himself as light, but, reminiscent of John the Baptist, as a herald. But this precursor of what is to come is scarcely nor merely a bearer of the light that is to come, but the lightning, which is the *Ubermensch*. Zarathustra, unlike Christ, is not a messiah, but one who announces that individual men can be *Ubermensch*. The relationship between Zarathustra and his fledging supermen is always tentative because disciples are to be their own men — followers of no one.

The last man is utilitarian in Nietzsche's eyes, calculating for his pleasure, his happiness, and repulsed by any pain and discomfort. Of course Mill had maintained that the Christian ethic was at bottom a confirmation of Utilitarianism.[6] Nevertheless, it is the charge that the last man is a culminating Christian man that is of interest here, but strangely, last men don't appear religious, though they are the first men Zarathustra meets after leaving the old religious hermit in the forest. They, like the hermit, are living a demented life, but it is different from that of the ignorant and religious hermit, who is unaware that God is dead. Any religion left in these last men is residual, and not overt as in the hermit. Rather, it is the desire for safety over success, the desire for care over courage, the desire for mediocrity over excellence that is on trial here. Of course, these are utilitarian considerations, but the residual Christian trait that Nietzsche may have in mind here is the social leveling quality that he perceives in Christianity. That is, the ultimate Christian denial of distinction among persons before God grates at Nietzsche's social hierarchialism.

The last man, perhaps, is residually religious, in terms of how Nietzsche has analyzed religion, and specifically, Christianity. That is, he too takes flight from life but not to forms or to heaven, but to self and the satisfactions of self. He is therefore this-worldly, but he has lost something that Nietzsche treasures. The last man appears as an unequivocal materialist because material creature comforts are his life, and therefore appear to constitute perhaps the sum total of his requirements for life. Nietzsche, however, is relentless in his criticism of the Christian religion, as cowardly Platonic in attitude toward the material sensual world. So, the last man must be lacking in something else, since he seems to have embraced that world in the fullest sense. So, what is it? I would suggest that the last man has no Nietzschean spiritual component.

As the opponent of all mass movements, whether democracy or Christianity or socialism, Nietzsche has no truck with any idea which would suggest a compromise of the individual for the larger group. It is nevertheless true that Zarathustra speaks to a select group in *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, but Zarathustra explicitly states that he is not a redeemer, and furthermore distances himself from religious founders. Nietzsche writes in *Ecce Homo* that "Here no 'prophet' is speaking, none of those gruesome hybrids of sickness and will to power whom people call founders of religion."[7]

When we look at the last man, and how Nietzsche has portrayed him, it seems apparent that the last man cannot be wholly identified as a Christian man, but something else. To begin with, lacking with last men is a vision—that is why they are so herdable. Certainly, the last man has a vision of sorts, but it is small, circumscribed, selective and selfish: his material wants and comforts.

Furthermore, equally repulsive about last men to Nietzsche is that they are egalitarians and that both the egalitarianism of the Christian religious tradition, and the modern secular variety are opposed by Nietzsche. It seems, however, that in his derisive judgments against the last men in Zarathustra, it is the modern and particularly socialist egalitarianism that is in focus. For the last men are seeking the comforts they desire, and therefore accepting of herdsmen who can provide them. There is scarcely any thought for the compromised freedoms that will make the rise of the *ubermensch* difficult if not impossible. Freedom is, in many ways the springboard of difference, and a necessity for the rise of the *ubermensch*. Disdainful as he was of followers, Nietzsche could have no truck with social levelers who would force down a wave for the sake of smooth water.

Moreover, part of the intent of the "down-going" on the part of Zarathustra is a repudiation of many religious intentions which Nietzsche judges as masks reflecting the maligned human in the distorting quest for religion and God. A religion that has contempt for the material world is a constant enemy in the pages of *Thus Spake Zarathustra*. Living before and beneath God, moreover, was to live in a fence and a prison. To be rid of God is to see that indeed there are no fences, only those we have constructed. God has been felled and supermen rejoice: "Before God!--Now however this God hath died! Ye higher men, this God was your greatest danger. Only since he lay in the grave have ye again arisen. Now only cometh the great noontide, not only doth the higher man become--master! . . . God hath died: now do we desire--the Superman to live." (204).

Zarathustra wants a new man, but before he can become new, he must be reborn from an old religion that smothered humans. For Zarathustra, as men will live, so will the idea of God die, and as the idea of God dies, so then men can live. Zarathustra is therefore a prophet and a teacher, announcing a death and a rebirth and what the new life shall be like. His message is worded at points as deliberately religious, but distinct from traditional religion: "Ye lonesome ones of to-day, ye seceding ones, ye shall one day be a people: out of you who have chosen yourselves, shall a chosen people arise:-- and out of it the Superman. Verily, a place of healing shall the earth become! And already is a new odour diffused around it, a salvation-bringing odour—and a new hope!" (50).

With God gone Nietzsche can announce a new human world in which "'Nothing is true, all is permitted,'" (194) and he compares that new human experience to that of a crab reddened by waters hotter than it has been used to. The liberated self, however, now has the world for self, so the initial shock, like being born, is merely temporary and will be overcome. This new self will have nothing denied to it, because there is nothing to dictate to it outside of itself, and this is the ultimate liberation: "For me—how could there be an outside—of me? There is no outside!" (153). Furthermore, "I am a law only for mine own; I am not a law for all." (203). All *Ubermensch* are creators; none are followers.

Conclusion

For all of Nietzsche's chiding of truth-bearers who have no humor, he takes life and living serious, but the last men appear to have lost all seriousness about life, except for their own. The earlier platonic and religious error had taken life so seriously it tried to move life to another plane, that of forms or heaven, but the last men, though firmly at home on earth, are as anthropomorphic as their predecessors in creating a world around them to keep them from the larger world. The earlier religious error in Nietzsche's eyes was to take life so seriously as to never laugh. Last men do laugh, when it does not pain them, and they laugh at those, like Zarathustra, who, in his initial speech to the last men was laughed at and mocked. They cry out to Zarathustra "make us into these last men."(7).

The trouble, however, is that Nietzsche seems to not envision that the excesses of his own criticisms of the spiritual focus of prior religious may find analogy in last men who are thoroughly at home in a material world to the point that

none of them want anything else. They certainly do not want to be an *Ubermensch*. Nietzsche, therefore and in my view, must bear some responsibility for the nature of these last men. His criticisms of the prior religious culture are simply too hasty.

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Endnotes

1. This is perhaps most evident in Nietzsche's criticism of Socrates, and particularly how Socrates turned the Western world in another direction after the pre-Socratics. Nietzsche, however, is critical of a conservative tendency to "look back" and yearn for an earlier time. There are exceptions in Nietzsche, nonetheless. The most famous example is perhaps his preference for Homer over Plato.
2. *Beyond Good and Evil*, page 432, in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, Modern Library Reprint Edition, 1992.
3. *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, p. 7, Dover Publications, 1999.
4. *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, p. 7, Dover Publications, 1999.
5. Nietzsche however does not think of man as "an aeterna veritas, as something that remains constant in the midst of all flux, as a sure measure of things. Everything the philosopher has declared about man is, however, at bottom no more than a testimony as to the man of a very limited period of time." *Human, All Too Human*, p. 13, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
6. Mill, *Utilitarianism*, writes that "As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility." In *Utilitarianism*, Dover Thrift Edition, p. 14, 2007.
7. *Ecce Homo*, page 675, in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*.

SECTION V

Language, Philosophy, Anthropology, Psychology, Religion

EUROPE & THE IDEA OF ONTOLOGY

Chairs

—

Rita Šerpytytė & Tomas Sodeika

Participants

—

Rita Šerpytytė
Tomas Sodeika
Danutė Bacevičiūtė
Lina Vidauskytė
Vaiva Daraškevičiūtė

Presentation

Rita Šerpytytė & Tomas Sodeika

The idea of ontology is central to the tradition of the Western thought and has to a large extent shaped its identity.

Although the notion of "ontology" emerged only in the dictionary of philosophers of 17th century, soon enough it was used as the reference to the main branch of philosophy („first philosophy"), the name which marked the general theory of being, establishing the fundamental background to any other (both philosophical, and non philosophical) form of sense-giving activity. Kant's doubt about possibility of such theory provoked an intense and still ongoing discussion. One of the major thematic axes of this discussion is a condition which Martin Heidegger termed "oblivion of being" and "nihilism", at the same time raising the question about the condition of the possibility of its overcoming.

Thus, although ontology becomes the most fundamental discipline of so-called European 'continental philosophy', the current status of ontology in European thought is far from being self-evident. What kind of transformations has ontology experienced in 20th and 21st centuries? To what extent has the contemporary thinking changed the concept of Being itself? What are the main trends of the post-Heideggerian transformation of ontology and what is its current status? What is the relationship between ontology and ethics, politics or science? Can the contemporary ontology give a new meaning to reality? Or are we living in the era after the ontology? These are questions that could be raised whilst considering the cultural identity and the intellectual future of Europe.

The authors of the texts of the workshop "Europe and Idea of Ontology" aim to analyze different aspects of the transformations of ontology.

The paper "Nihilism and Ontology of the Accident", presented by Rita Šerpytytė, deals with the extention of the idea of plasticity into the ontology of the accident in the Malabou's philosophy. Departing from the reconsideration of the well-established Western ontological paradigms, Malabou does not refer to the ordinary ontological context; she rather appeals to something that previously had no place in philosophy. Thus, we stand before some kind of ontological scandal or scandalous ontology, an ontology which, while searching for a place

for these ”new beings” or ”new forms” born from the accident and by chance, and which themselves are some kind of the accident, is obliged to legitimize this very accident as „substantial“ ontological feature.

This task of creation of ontology of the accident is performed by mainly focusing on the very process of the change of *form*, on its trans*formation,* meta*morphosis*.

The paper entitled ”Ontology in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” by Tomas Sodeika starts with statement that the morphological structure of the word “onto-logy” can be read as the suggestion that the exclusive medium through which the meaning (*logos*) of being (*to on*) is disclosed is the language. The author tries to show that Vilem Flusser’s “model of cultural history” allows to conceive the units or calculation and computation as a kind of ontological ”logos” too.

The paper “Ontology and Ethics: In Search of Responsibility for the Technological Age”, presented by Danutė Bacevičiūtė, deals with the question of relationship between ethics and ontology, that is, the question about the changed nature of human action and human condition in our technological age. This paper discusses how Hans Jonas’ orientation towards genuine ethics allows us to consider aforesaid challenges. By comparing the positions of Hans Jonas and Georg Picht, it analyses the problem of the constitution of ethical subject.

The starting point of the paper ”Orality, Literracy and Heidegger’s *Verwindung* of Metaphysics”, presented by Lina Vidauskytė is the fact that Heidegger’s attitude to philosophy of pre-Socratics is determined by his intuition that at this stage *the oblivion of Being* had happened. Heidegger associates *the oblivion of Being* with a predominance of metaphysics in Western philosophical thinking. The paper tries to show that the “metaphysical” way of thinking is associated with the formation of phonetic writing which transforms the essence of truth.

Vaiva Daraškevičiūtė, in her paper ”Ontology as Practical Hermeneutics”, aims to highlight the distinction of two Italian thinkers Luigi Pareyson‘s and Gianni Vattimo‘s concept of ontology as practical hermeneutics by comparing it with Hans-Georg Gadamer‘s position and establishing two main distinctions between these different points of view.

Nihilism and Ontology of the Accident[1]

Rita Šerpytytė

Abstract

The article deals with the extention of the idea of plasticity into the ontology of the accident in the Malabou's philosophy. Departing from the reconsideration of the well-established Western ontological paradigms, Malabou does not refer to the ordinary ontological context; she rather appeals to something that previously had no place in philosophy. Thus, we stand before some kind of ontological scandal or scandalous ontology, an ontology which, while searching for a place for these „new beings" or „new forms" born from the accident and by chance, and which themselves are some kind of the accident, is obliged to legitimize this very accident as „substantial" ontological feature.

This task of creation of ontology of the accident is performed by mainly focusing on the very process of the change of *form*, on its trans*formation*, meta*morphosis*.

It is obvious that the very plasticity of form is what makes it possible to talk about the emergence of "new" beings and persons and to enquire into their ontological status. This search for legitimization of ontology of the accident, however, draws focus on *another* negative side of plasticity. Nonetheless, Malabou, is not prone to dissociate negative and positive plasticity, as such an attitude is made possible by her dialectic strategy. This is the way to consolidate plasticity's negative and annihilating power/force *par excellence*. This consolidation of negativity appears as the main "ontological" argument for the legitimization of the accidental.

Keywords
Ontology, Plasticity, Accident, Negativity, Nihilism.

It is the idea of plasticity, which is one of the most daring ideas in contemporary philosophy in general and in contemporary ontology in particular, introduced by Catherine Malabou, is itself related to renewed interest in the philosophy of Hegel, to the particular "future of Hegel".[2]

The axis for the reflections related to this idea consists of the renewed considerations concerning *form* as philosophical "category" and, simultaneously, of the resultant act of "putting it into circulation", of its practice. Referring to *The Phenomenology of Spirit* of Hegel, Malabou reflects on plasticity and practices it namely as the plasticity of form.

In Malabou's writings, this concept assumes quite a particular meaning, mainly due to the fact that, as Malabou sees it, plasticity might have the ability to annihilate the very form, as, for instance, in a plastic explosive. It is important to note, however, that this ability to annihilate the very form is nothing else but the inherent capacity of the form itself, *i. e.* its auto-plasticity that enables any change or transformation. This means that Malabou's form cannot be seen as some "raw" material substance, which can be formed, transformed, dismantled, destroyed, or annihilated by something else, by some transcending force. Form has the capacity to empower itself, *i. e.* form itself gives itself the ability to shape, receive and blow up forms.[3]

Although Malabou acknowledges the evident philosophical roots of plasticity, the specificity of her position consists of the application of plasticity to the areas which, in Western tradition, have been considered as quite distant from philosophy; such as, for example, research in brain processes. The extension of the "idea" of plasticity and its application in the neuroscience and brain research is, probably, the most radical and the most relevant to the modern times Malabousian position.[4]

This extension of the application of idea of plasticity is not, however, a goal in itself. It is determined not only by theoretical insights of Malabou, but also by a particular "existential" amazement in the face of new beings and new forms.

"As a result of serious trauma, or sometimes for no reason at all, the path splits and a new, unprecedented persona comes to live with the former person, and eventually takes up all the room. An unrecognizable person whose present comes from no past, whose future harbors nothing to come, an absolute existential improvisation."[5]

Such an "extension" of ontology, the discovery of "new beings", is accomplished first of all with the help of neuroscience. It makes Malabou raise a question: "What is this form? A face? A psychological profile? What ontology can it account for if ontology has always been attached to the essential, forever blind to *alēa* (risk, uncertainty) of transformations?"[6]

It follows that extension of the application of the Malabousian idea of plasticity requires reconsidering the well-established Western ontological paradigm. Malabou undertakes to disclose and put into practice what she calls "ontology of the accident".

"A form born of the accident, born by accident, a kind of accident. A funny breed. A monster whose apparition cannot be explained as any genetic anomaly. A new being comes into the world for a second time, out of deep cut that opens in a biography."[7]

It is important, however, to draw attention to the very usage of the term "accident". The English equivalent for the Latin *accidentia* is "chance", "accidentality". In the Western philosophical tradition, the term "accident" refers to a non-substantial, temporal, shifting, contingent property of an object. In this sense "accident" is an opposite for "substance": this division into substance and accident stems from the Aristotelian philosophy; it marks the distinction between immutability, autonomy/substantivness (necessity) and contingency. In everyday language, the term "accident" refers to an unexpected, unfortunate event. It is evident that Malabou, putting the term "accident" into circulation, balances between these two variations of the meaning of the term. At the intersection of these meanings, a particularly important accent is put on the ontological one, as well as on the (psychological) aspect of contingency (as opposed to necessity). But is it possible for something that is related to the accident, something that is unnecessary and contingent, to assume an ontological dimension?

It should be noted that Malabou does not refer to the ordinary ontological context; she rather appeals to something that previously had no place in philosophy. She writes about the emergence of the accident of such new beings as Alzheimer patients, individuals suffering from war trauma or any kind of brain damage, or simply from old age.

Malabou argues: "We must all of us recognize that we might, one day, become someone else, an absolute other, someone who will never be reconciled with themselves again, someone who will be this form of us without redemption or atonement, without last wishes, this damned form, outside of time."[8]

But these "we" that lose themselves, who suddenly feel like being "someone else", have been subjects of various types of psychology and psychiatry. In other words, this "becoming someone else" has almost always been considered to be either pathological feeling, or at least illusory, unreal state; and this, needless to say, not without influence of Western philosophy and Western substantive thought.

Whereas that appearance of new beings and new forms has, from ontological point of view, no precedent.

Thus, we stand before some kind of ontological scandal or scandalous ontology, an ontology which, while searching for a place for these "new beings" or "new forms" born from the accident and by chance, and which themselves are some kind of the accident, is obliged to legitimize this very accident as "substantial" ontological feature.

This task of legitimization of ontology is, as Malabou puts it, a search for an answer to seemingly very simple questions: do these new beings and new forms express the preservation of identity, or, on the contrary, destroy it? In other words, what is that new necessity, new person, new being? Is it something that is "the same" or is it "something else"?

Those questions are not purely rhetorical. They are real and require to be answered. In this theoretical context, their non-rhetorical nature is particularly well expressed by a relatively provocative and problematic thought:

"Bodily and psychic transformations do nothing but reinforce the permanence of identity, caricaturing or fixing it, but never contradicting it. They never disrupt identity."[9]

Thus, this task of creation of ontology of the accident is performed by mainly focusing on the very process of the change of *form*, on its trans*formation,* meta*morphosis*.

However, before moving to the analysis of the processes of transformation/metamorphosis, it is important to draw attention to the absolute point of departure of Malabousian position, *i. e.* to the concept of *plasticity* and its significance for various scientific disciplines, first of all, for neuroscience, psychology, and others. It is obvious that the very plasticity of form is what makes it possible to talk about the emergence of "new" beings and persons and to enquire into their ontological status. What we face here, however, is not some kind of real or assumed novelty, but rather something that can be perceived as deviation or digression. As Malabou notes it, in the realms of science, medicine, arts, and educational practice we are accustomed to deal with such connotations of the term "plasticity" that have always been perceived as positive.

But the search for legitimization of ontology of the accident, however, draws

focus on another, negative side of plasticity. Malabou makes it clear: she writes about this destructive plasticity; she signals this in the very subtitle of the book we just quoted. Prior to discussion of the meaning and practice of the so-called destruction, one should also draw attention to the fact that this destructive plasticity emerges namely as "explosive" plasticity. Thus, what Malabou links to the negative plasticity, is, on one hand, that destructive plasticity and, on the other hand, it always emerges as suddenly deviant, as deviating form; in this sense it is "explosive plasticity".

Nonetheless, Malabou, is not prone to dissociate negative and positive plasticity. Such an attitude is made possible (or maybe even determined) by her dialectic strategy.

„No one thinks spontaneously about a plastic destruction. Yet destruction too is formative. A smashed-up face is still a face, a stump of limb, a traumatized psyche remains a psyche. Destruction has its own sculpting tools."[10]

This is the reason why we can come to a conclusion that plasticity in general, and something that, in our case, Malabou calls "plastic construction" in particular, would not be possible without certain/some negativity. This is the way to consolidate plasticity's negative and annihilating power/force *par excellence*.

For Malabou, in general, plasticity is, first, annihilating, then, self-annihilating power/force. This is the reason why plasticity as transformation and metamorphosis is a certain kind of transgression of a given form, its overcoming and its transcendence. It is often noted that these motions (as motions of overcoming) refer to the transformation of one form into another. Thus, what is transcended or overcome, is nothing else as a certain particular/concrete form. At that very time, the very form itself contains the potential to overcome and annihilate. And this is what constitutes the plasticity of form.

What is the core of the problem? One can be sure: Malabou does not seek, through one systematic motion, to make neuroscience, psychology, or a part or a section of ontology. Her optics is quite different: she raises a hypothesis that something what we can call the *accident* and something that has its place in the above mentioned disciplines, probably overcomes their boundaries and discloses an ontological dimension of its own. This hypothesis sounds more like a question. It could be rendered in a simple, everyday way: is your aged mother who is disorientated both in space and time and who hardly recognizes

you "the same" person who cared for you while you were a child? Or is she completely different and unknown person to you? And if you became an alcoholic, are you the same person or someone else? Is a person who suffered the atrocities of war able to "remember" himself before this dreadful experience and consider himself the same person as before? Do you consider this personality "the same" or "somebody else"? In almost ironic way, Malabou uses the term of "transvestitism" to name all of these transformations that psychologically can be considered as schisms.

But why and how this problem gets an ontological dimension? The position of Malabou emphasizes the existence of such accidental cases where the change in personal situation makes it possible to question the very identity itself.

Malabou links this ontological inferiority of the cases explained *via* explosive plasticity mainly to a certain notion of *metamorphosis* that is well-established in the Western tradition. Explosive plasticity is metamorphic, but in these cases the metamorphic becoming discloses something unexpected, unforeseen, and dark.

But what is, in fact, *metamorphosis*? What is its representation in the Western tradition?

In the Western representation of metamorphosis one can also discern an idea that if something changes, the change affects only the exterior form of beings, but never affects their nature. This is important theoretical insight of Malabou: in the change, being remains themselves/itself. "The substantialist assumption is thus the travel companion of Western metamorphosis. Form transforms; substance remains."[11]

In the mythology-based tradition of Western thought metamorphosis is understood as something that does not affect the nature of the Being/being.

Should this nature, this identity be able to change its essence and its substance, one would not need to return to the previous forms and the cycle of transformation would be interrupted, "since what came before would suddenly be lacking in the ontological tangent it pursued."[12] Thus, the finiteness of the metamorphic cycle, the very cyclical nature of metamorphosis becomes a counter-argument against the emergence of new identity.

This critical Malabousian reexamination of classical Western "notion" of metamorphosis has an exceptional character due to the fact that, in it, "transformation intervenes in place of flight."[13] Malabou uses a metaphor of "flight", which has already been put into circulation by Freud to relate the character of transformation in classical metamorphosis. Malabou gives an example of Daphne who attempts to "flee" from Apollo who pursues her. The metamorphosis of Daphne is seen by Malabou not as a "run", but as a "flight". Daphne cannot be fast enough to escape, so she chooses transformation and turns into a (laurel) tree. And this change, this metamorphosis is a "flight". For classical metamorphosis, a "flight" is its structural paradigm.

Malabou, however, refines that classical structure of metamorphosis in order to oppose it to the transformations that do not embrace or exhaust that structure, or do not comply with it.

"…metamorphosis by destruction is not the same as flight; it is rather the form of the impossibility of fleeing. The impossibility of flight where flight presents the only possible solution. We must allow for the impossibility of flight in situations in which an extreme tension, a pain or malaise push a person towards an outside that does not exist."[14]

What can be the "way out", when there is no "out (side)" of any kind, no "somewhere else"? Malabou takes the Freudian term of "drive" and bounds that metamorphoses engendered by destruction not only with impossibility of flight, but with "arrival" of what comes to be formed.

"The only possible way out from the impossibility of flight appears to be the formation of the *form* of flight."[15]

This very "formation of the form of flight", which emerges when there is no possibility of "flight" (escape, going somewhere else, beyond oneself), is the act of the constitution of the very *attempt*. In other words, it is both formation of a flight type or *ersatz*, and "the formation of an identity that flees itself, that flees the impossibility of fleeing itself. Identity abandoned, dissociated again, identity that does not reflect itself, does not live its own transformation, does not subjectivize its change."[16]

In the place where one usually sees only appearance and no certainty, Malabou searches for a dimension of Being. Since there is no escape and no possibility of "somewhere else" or "flight", she sees an ontologically (not psychologi-

cally) significant transformation in that very formation of the form of flight. It is namely that destructive plasticity that makes emergence or formation of the otherness possible, when the other is absolutely missing/absent, does not exist. As Malabou puts it, plasticity is that other form of otherness, when there is no any kind of transcendence, flight, or escape.

It is important to note, however, that the optics of the destructive plasticity changes drastically the very notion of metamorphosis. The destructive plasticity annuls the "flight" that emerges in the Western perspective of metamorphosis. This is why the move of Daphne has to be seen as an impossibility of flight. Malabousian reflection on what happens in the case of destructive plasticity aims to solve ontological issue concerning the rise and emergence of otherness. It is precisely explosion of form, as she argues, that brings about the (self) formation of new individuality.

In this sense, the classical metamorphosis can be seen as a form of redemption (but as a form of redemption or atonement/salvation of *the same*). In the case of destructive plasticity and its "flight" there is no atonement/salvation of identity, it does not provide for any "redeemed" identity.

One should note here, that since Malabou has always been focused on the notion of form transformation, metamorphosis, little by little she comes to treat the concept of destructive plasticity not as adjusted concept of metamorphosis, but rather as opposing concept. Her main concern becomes clear: it is a question of how to make possible the ontological emergence of otherness in the case of destructive plasticity. Theoretical background of this task, no doubt, remains almost Kantian: "what are the conditions for the possibility of the emergence of otherness?"

It was clear from the very beginning that the answer to that question would entail a paradox. After all, when we question the conditions of possibility, we are looking for regularity, law, and necessity. Whereas the only and particular "condition for possibility", as Malabou points it out, is the accident. Malabou describes the "conditions for possibility" of the accident in a nihilistic way; she writes about such "cases", when the exteriority is missing and, at the same time, one faces the non-existence of interiority, when "there is neither an inside nor an outside world."[17] It is obvious, however, that from such a nihilistic perspective one speaks of unique, accidental experience, which cannot even be called a

"case". In the search for the paradoxical ontological legitimization of otherness formed by destructive plasticity Malabou makes use not only of neuroscience, but also of literature: writings of Kafka, Blanchot, Marguerite Duras.[18] These authors "feel", "grasp" that metaphorical moment of experience that can be called the accident. "True: here the accident is the experiential dimension of ontology."[19]

However, this ontological recognition of the accident is the toughest task for philosophy. This is most probably due to the "relation" of the accident with destructiveness, because of the negative nature of the accident.

"…destruction should be seen as a species of accident, so that the ability to transform oneself under the effect of destruction is a possibility, an existential structure."[20]

This structural status of the identity of the accident, however, does not eliminate contingency, chance, and virtuality. In other words, destruction is not something that comes to pass. Destruction and destructive plasticity act like the annihilating ability of form, that makes the accident possible and consolidates its ontological status.

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Endnotes

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Ontology in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction[1]

Tomas Sodeika

Abstract

The term "ontology" appeared in a philosophical vocabulary of the 17th century. It was introduced in 1613 in "Lexicon philosophicum" by Rudolphus Goclenius and was popularized by Christian Wolff. Yet the classical paradigm of ontology was established by Aristotle. Although Aristotle does not use the term "ontology", it is easy to observe that his "first philosophy" is nothing else than an ontological investigation. Such transposition presupposes that the ontologist has contemplated the being through some kind of medium which is a condition of meaningfulness of being, *i.e.* allows showing being as a meaningful item. The morphological structure of the word "onto-logy" can be read as the suggestion that the medium through which the meaning of being is disclosed is *logos*. Onto-logy is unconsciously conceived as the investigation of being as "spoken being". Is language an exclusive and ultimate *logos* of onto-logy? Maybe there is any alternative *logoi* which can disclose the meaning of being too, but in another way than language does it? Vilem Flusser's "model of cultural history" seems to be very useful because it allows to expand the notion of "logos" (respectively the notion of "ontology"). In this paper an author shows that each rung of Flusser's model contains the peculiar form of ontology. It can help us to draw a sketch of multiplicity of ontologies.

Keywords

Ontology, Media, Techno-Image.

As it is known, the term "ontology" appeared in a philosophical vocabulary of the 17th century. It was introduced in 1613 in "Lexicon philosophicum" by Rudolphus Goclenius and was popularized by Christian Wolff. And yet it can be said that from the very beginning philosophers had to do with ontology *avant la lettre*. It seems that for the first time ontology became manifest in Parmenides' thesis on the identity of thinking and being. Yet the classical paradigm of ontology was established by Aristotle. Although Aristotle does not use the term "ontology", it is easy to observe that his "first philosophy" is nothing else than an ontological investigation. Aristotle defines the "first philosophy" as "a science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature (epistēmē tis hē theōrei to on hē on)" (1003a22). Let us turn our attention to the grammatical structure of the phrase "being as being" (*to on hē on*). At first glance it seems to be a tautology: "the same as the

same". But is it really? A subordinating conjunction „as" (*hē*) suggests that by the "investigation" (*theōria*) of "being" (*to on*) we rather have to do with some kind of transposition or transfer. "To investigate something" means "to disclose the *meaning* of the investigated matter". Thus, it can be said that by the ontological investigation the being as *something what simply exists* is transposed into the *being as meaningful one*. Such transposition presupposes that the ontologist has contemplated the being through some kind of medium which is a condition of meaningfulness of being, *i.e.* allows showing being as a meaningful item. In this respect the morphological structure of the word "onto-logy" can be read as the suggestion that the medium through which the meaning of being is disclosed is *logos*. But what kind of medium is it?

In *Categories* Aristotle provides an account of the beings (*ta onta*). According to this account, beings can be divided into ten distinct categories. Of these categories, it is the first, substance (*ousia*), to which Aristotle gives a privileged position. In *Metaphysics* Z he notes: "Indeed, the question which was raised long ago, is still and always will be, and which always baffles us—"What is Being?"—is in other words "What is substance?" (esti tis hē ousia)" (1028b4). Substances are independent items; the items in other categories, however, all depend somehow on substances. However, the fundamental criterion which allows to distinguish between the substantial and non-substantial modes of being, Aristotle describes as the relation of "said of something as a subject" or "predicated of something as a subject" (kath' hupokeimenou tinos legetai). In *Metaphysics* Z he defines substance as "that which is not predicated of a subject (hupokeimenon), but of which all else is predicated (*nun men oun tupō eirētai ti pot' estin hē ousia, hoti to mē kath' hupokeimenou alla kath' hou ta alla*)" (1029a7). It is clear that "to say of…" or "to predicate of…" is the fundamental form of linguistic activity. Consequently, we can admit that for Aristotle, the medium which decides that the meaning of being becomes a manifest is the language. As Emile Benveniste has noted, Aristotle "thought he was defining the attributes of objects but he was really setting up linguistic entities; it is the language which, thanks to its own categories, makes them to be recognized and specified"[2]. "No matter how much validity Aristotle's categories have as categories of thought, they turn out to be transposed from the categories of language. It is what one can *say* which delimits and organizes what one can think. Language provides the fundamental configuration of the properties of things as recognized by the mind. This table of predications informs us above all about the

class structure of a particular language"[3]. Thus, we should admit that by the investigation of "being as being" Aristotle unconsciously makes some kind of transposition of the investigated matter. Being as that-what-exists is transposed into being as that-what-is-said. The subordinating conjunction "as" which occurs in Aristotle's phrase "being as being" signifies the subordination of being as a self-sufficient entity under the appearance of being in (or through) the medium of language. Onto-logy is unconsciously conceived as the investigation of being as "spoken being".

For a long time, no one has ever doubted that except for language there is no media which can allow the disclosure of meaning of being. Even today, many members of the scientific community are thoroughly convinced about such *onto-logical* exclusiveness of language. It seems, however, that the situation has slowly started to change. I would like to quote a fragment of the text written by Michel Serres. In his book "The five senses" (1985) he writes:

"This wide-spread idea that everything must be said and can be resolved by language, that every real problem is a topic for debate, that philosophy can be reduced to questions and answers, that one can only cure oneself by talking, that discourse is the only way of teaching anything, this theatrical, garrulous, publicity-seeking idea, lacking shame and modesty, is oblivious to the real presence of bread and wine, their unspoken taste and odour, it forgets how to raise infants through barely discernible gestures, about connivance and complicity, and things that go without saying, unspoken expressions of love, impossible intuitions that strike like lightning, the charm that lingers behind someone's outward bearing (…) I have known so many things without texts, so many people without grammar, children without lexicon, the elderly without vocabulary; I have lived so much in foreign lands, mute, terrified behind the curtain of languages, would I have really tasted life if all I had done was listen and speak? The most precious things I know are embedded in silence. No, neither the world nor experience nor philosophy nor death will allow itself to be locked up in a theatre, or a tribunal or in a lesson".[4]

A melancholic pathos of this beautiful text inspires me to ask: is language an exclusive and ultimate *logos* of onto-logy? Maybe there is any alternative *logoi* which can disclose the meaning of being too, but in another way than language does it?

In his book "Into the Universe of Technical Images" Vilem Flusser offers "a model of cultural history and the alienation of human beings from the concrete"[5]. In this model the cultural history is presented as a ladder with five rungs.

The first rung corresponds to the prehistoric period of the evolution of humankind. On this rung, which Flusser defines as the "level of concrete experience", human (or more accurately – pre-human) beings are completely immersed in a homogeneous four-dimensional space-time continuum.

On the second rung (approximately two million years ago) human beings stood as subjects facing an objective, three-dimensional situation comprising graspable objects. The characteristic feature of this level is producing and using of primitive tools such as stone blades or bone needles.

According to Flusser, the third rung was raised approximately forty thousand years ago. It is the age of homo sapiens. On this rung two-dimensional zone of images was introduced between the human being and one's environment. Flusser describes this rung as "the level of observation and imagining characterized by traditional pictures such as cave paintings"[6].

About four thousand years ago the fourth rung came into existence. The characteristic feature of this rung is one-dimensional zone of linear texts. This is the level of understanding and explanation.

Flusser notes that texts are concepts strung together like beads on an abacus, and the threads that order these concepts are orthographic rules. The situations described in a text appear by way of these rules and are grasped and manipulated according to them. It means that the structure of the text impresses itself on the situations. These rules come from our own texts.

Since we recognize that those rules could also be other than they are, the linear texts are collapsed into zero-dimensional particles that can be neither grasped nor represented nor understood, but can be only calculated and computed.[7] It is the main characteristic of the fifth rung, on which the writing subject disintegrates into a swarm of bits and bytes and situation into a cloud of particles without dimension.

Of course, Flusser's "model of cultural history" is an oversimplified scheme. And yet this model, in my opinion, at first seems to be very useful because it

allows to expand the notion of "logos" (respectively the notion of "ontology").

I will try to show that each rung of Flusser's model contains the peculiar form of ontology. It can help us to draw a sketch of multiplicity of ontologies. As we have seen, on the first rung a human being is totally immersed in the four-dimensional continuum. The absence of distance between the human being and one's environment causes that in this state there are neither possibility nor necessity for any kind of mediatization. Being and logos are absolutely identical. The *logos* through which the meaning of being is disclosed is the being itself.

The situation seems to be like Parmenidian *eukyklos sphairos*. However – with one difference. In contrast to the poem of Parmenides there is no possibility of verbal expression of the immediately experienced coincidence of being and meaning. It may be said that we have to do with that what Wittgenstein had in mind when in the seventh thesis of "Tractatus" he declared: "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence"[8]. It is the ontology constituted by "silent" logos which is the being itself.

The second step in Flusser's model can be interpreted as the step of waking of the objectifying consciousness. The primordial movement of reflection results into the splitting of meaning (logos) and being (to on) which can be now comprehended. On this step the four-dimensionality of the primordial space-time continuum is reduced to three-dimensionality of *thing*. The human being becomes aware of external world as three-dimensional realm. It is the realm of things, "thingness" of which is experienced through the medium of tools which play the role of logos. It is noteworthy that on this step the meaning of being is not to be experienced in the form of notions which can be expressed through words. And yet the relation between human being and his/her environment is obviously meaningful. The mode in which the human being is aware of the meaning of being here is his/her own skill to handle the tool. It is the mode of disclosure of the meaning of being which Heidegger calls "Zuhandenheit". It is no accident that, as Heidegger notes, "[s]peaking ontically, we sometimes use the expression "to understand something" to mean "being able to handle a thing," "being up to it," "being able to do something." In understanding as an existential, the thing we are able to do is not a what, but being as existing"[9]. Let us turn our attention to the fact that such form of understanding is a mode of disclosure of the meaning of beings. If so, it seems to be legitimate to admit that

already the handling of primitive tools constitute some kind of "onto-logy". It seems that it is the reason why Heidegger regards this mode of disclosure of the meaning of being as more fundamental in comparison with the mode of "Vorhandenheit", *i.e.* the mode of disclosure which allows to express the meaning in objective categories.

The process of abstraction, described by Flusser, continues on the third step. The three-dimensionality of things is here reduced to two-dimensionality of images. Now the medium through which the meaning of being becomes manifest is the two-dimensional surface of image. Respectively, the mode of comprehension of this meaning is no longer a skillful handling but rather an attentive observation and creative imagining. And again there are no obstacles to speak here about the specific "onto-logy". It can be said that images meet the requirements of "logos" as well as the customary form of the theory of being which appears on the fourth step.

This step is the step of next movement of abstraction which causes that two-dimensionality of images becomes reduced to the one-dimensionality of linear texts. It is easy to observe that the ontology in its classical shape belongs exactly to this type of the mode of revealing of the meaning of being. Being is grasped here through one-dimensional medium of text constituting elements of which are notions and judgments.

It is interesting to note that at the same time when the first classical ontology has emerged, *i.e.* when Parmenides wrote his poem *On Nature* in which he declared the identity of being and mind, the work of Gorgias *On Non-Existence* has appeared. As Barbara Cassin has noted in her famous book *L'effet sophistique*, "Gorgias shows that the [Parmenides'] poem itself (...) is primarily a narrative, discursive performance. No any primordial reality is announced through its poetry, any "there is" or "exist". The poetry creates its own matter by the syntax of its phrases. Being (...) is not something what the word uncovers, but something what is created by a discourse"[10].

Cassin emphasized that "being itself - as it happened in the Homeric poem with Odysseus - de facto is produced as an effect of language, of that language which functions in the poem: the being of ontology is always nothing else as the effect of speech"[11]. Using the term of Novalis, Barbara Cassin defines the Parmenidian "ontology" as "logology". "Beingness" of being itself is not some-

thing that is *revealed* through medium, but rather is *constituted* by the medium of "logos".

Nonetheless, long time this "logologic" character was ignored and classical ontology has been handled as ontology par excellence.

But now we are living in the situation in which, according to Flusser, the last movement of abstraction from the concrete is accomplished. It is the movement of reduction of one-dimensionality of texts to the zero-dimensionality of the units of calculation and computation. What kind of ontology is supported by such medium? In which form being discloses itself in it?

The process of fourfold movement of abstraction has leaded us to the peculiar ontological situation.

If logos is that, through what the meaning is revealed, then it seems possible to speak about four different but equally ranked types of "logoi": "tool-logos", "image-logos", "text-logos" and "digit-logos".

On the level of four-dimensionality the being is experienced immediately. On the level of three-dimensionality we have to do with things which are graspable with a skillful hand. The two-dimensional images are designed for the focused observation. The one-dimensional texts unwraps the described content to the attentive reading sight. But how is with the units of calculating and computation? Zero-dimensional unit is no notion, no image and no thing. It may be said that it is nothing. In this respect we can say that on this step we have to do with perfectly nihilistic ontology. Moreover, the units or computation are not the matter of human comprehension. They are processed by apparatuses. The effect of this processing is what Vilem Flusser has defined as "technical images".

Nothingness paradoxically became visible. As Vilem Flusser has noted, the universe of which meaning would be revealed through the zero-dimensional units is at the same time the universe of technical images and technical imagination.

Does it mean that the ontology of image-logos turns back? Indeed, it may be said that here occurs some kind of "magic turn", "pictorial turn", or "iconic turn" – but not quite in the sense in which those terms are used by Ferdinand Fellmann, William John Thomas Mitchell, or Gottfried Boehm. Flusser has noted that traditional images are something else as the images which he defines

as "techno-images". According to him, "the difference between traditional and technical images […] would be this: the first are observations of objects, the second computations of concepts. The first arise through depiction, the second through a peculiar hallucinatory power that has lost its faith in rules"[12]. Flusser speaks here about "a new kind of magic" - "the programmed magic of technical images"[13]. This "hallucinatory power" and this "magic", however, have nothing in common with Apollonius of Tyana, Merlin or John Dee. The difference between ancient and modern magic Flusser states as follows: "Prehistoric magic is a ritualization of models known as "myths"; current magic is a ritualization of models known as "programs". Myths are models that are communicated orally and whose author – a "god" – is beyond the communication process. Programs, on the other hand, are models that are communicated in writing and whose authors – "functionaries" – are within the communication process"[14]. Programs make possible mosaic-like combinations of particles – a computed universe in which particles are assembled into visible technical images. Technical images are *trompe l'oeil* which perfectness forces us to forget its very nature. It is the narcotic charm of perfect illusion of beingness as well as meaningfulness of illusive being shown on the screen.

Allowing us to *experience* the non-being as something what exists, the technical images provide a peculiar kind of ontology: paraphrasing Aristotle, it can be said that in the case of "technical images" onto-logy turns out in "a science which investigates no-being as being", "no-thing as some-thing".

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Endnotes

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Ontology and Ethics

In Search of Responsibility for the Technological Age

Danutė Bacevičiūtė

Abstract

The paper deals with the question of relationship between ethics and ontology, that is, the question about the changed nature of human action and human condition in our technological age. We could notice at least two big challenges that our search of responsibility is to be reckoned with: 1) the growth of techno-scientific power is not ethically neutral and involves our responsibility for the very future humanity; 2) the age of technology is marked by the crisis of traditional autonomous ethical subject. The implication is that the expansion of the area of responsibility causes the "inflation" of responsibility; furthermore, responsibility is increasingly often turned into an anonymous insurance mechanism. On the one hand, such situation induces us to reflect on genuine responsibility as arising from ontological thrownness (in terms of Heidegger's ontology), but on the other hand, it motivates us to call our attention to the problem of constitution of ethical agent (individual or collective) and look for the counterbalance for dominant anonymity of modern technology. The question is: whether the essence of technology involved us in such a way of being that as persons we still remain anonymous? This paper discusses how Hans Jonas' orientation towards genuine ethics allows us to consider aforesaid challenges. By comparing the positions of Hans Jonas and Georg Picht, it analyses the problem of the constitution of ethical subject.

Keywords

Responsibility, Technicized Society, Ontological Thrownness, Anonymity, Constitution of Ethical Subject.

Introduction

In the age of technology the question of relationship between ethics and ontology has emerged anew. It is not as much the question concerning the grounding of ethics, but mere the one related to the changed nature of human action and human condition in our technological age. In his central work, *The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age* (1979), Hans Jonas, one of the most significant contributors to philosophical reflection on science, technology and ethics, distinguishes four characteristics of the previous traditional ethics which have become inadequate to our present situation. I shall specify these characteristics in brief as: 1) all dealing with the nonhuman world, i.e., the whole realm of *techne* (with the exception of medicine), was ethically neutral; 2)

ethical significance belonged to the direct man-to-man relation; 3) the entity "man" and his/her basic condition was considered constant in essence, and not an object of *techne* for reshaping; 4) the good and evil about which action had to care lay close to the act.[2] Jonas and other authors of 1970s and 80s attempted to reformulate ethical principles and expand their research into all spheres of technologically mediated reality. Social and ethical aspects of science and technology were elaborated in the fields of development ethics, bioethics, ecological ethics, environmental ethics, engineering ethics, etc. Thereby we can speak about new codes of ethics in these fields. However, this extension of ethical principles into technologically mediated reality is not as simple as it might seem from the first sight. There is a danger to treat these ethical codes just as we treat new rules of etiquette and overlook the question of genuine ethics in this technologically mediated reality. In other words, the main problems are related to the expansion of ethical principles and are based on the ambiguous relationship between ethics and ontology as well as on some structural features of new technologically mediated reality itself. In order to narrow my investigation I will focus on the problem of responsibility which is vital in the contemporary age.

At least two major and mutually interrelated challenges could be identified, that the search of responsibility needs to be associated with: 1) *the growth of techno-scientific power is not ethically neutral* and involves our responsibility for the very future humanity; according to Jonas, such responsibility urges us to develop both understanding of new facts (the consequences of our actions) and new values (what is permissible and not permissible in this new situation)[3]; 2) however, at the same time it is noticeable that extended and increased range of responsibility is accompanied by its "shallow" devaluation and degradation – *the age of technology is marked by the crisis of traditional autonomous ethical subject and its responsibility*.

Traditionally, responsibility is defined as the state of being of a person who acts freely and is answerable or accountable for his or her actions. In our global technologically mediated world more and more often we find ourselves in such situation of responsibility that presents itself before or without any particular our own action. For example, in his book *The Gift of Death*, Jacques Derrida speculates about aporetic nature of responsibility and shows the paradoxical tension between the responsibility of a general nature and the absolute responsibility leading to an immeasurable virtually introduced responsibility:

"By preferring what I am doing here and now, (…) by giving priority to my work or my activity as a citizen or professorial and professional philosopher, (…) I am perhaps fulfilling my duty. But I am sacrificing and betraying at every moment all my other obligations: my obligations to the other others whom I know or don't know, the billions of my fellows [*semblables*] (without mentioning the animals that are even more other than my fellows) who are dying of starvation or sickness".[4]

One can say that this aporetic character of responsibility, described by Derrida, is intrinsic to responsibility and is conditioned by finality of human existence; therefore it does not depend on the changed nature of human action in technological age. However, responsibility evidently extends as far as our powers do in space and time, and this extension is conditioned by the power of technology. Responsibility loses its "substantial" bond with the individual person's blameful action and transforms into responsibility for the vulnerable others, the potential victims of harmful effects. The awareness of this virtually endless field of our responsibility as well as of our irresponsibility and powerlessness was perfectly embodied in internet and actualized by mass media technologies. Derrida proceeds:

"From time to time the television displays – while keeping them at a distance – a series of intolerable images of it [this sacrifice], and a few voices are raised to bring it all to our attention. But those images and voices are completely powerless to induce the slightest effective change in the situation, to assign the least responsibility, to furnish anything other than alibis."[5]

Derrida's reflections on responsibility reveal that the crisis of the autonomous ethical subject is concurrent with the issue of relationship between ethics and ontology. In summary, on the one hand, these reflections encourage us to realize that the question of genuine or authentic responsibility should be raised taking into account ontological thrownness (in Heidegger's ontology terms), as well as considering our existence in the world in terms of the essence of technology, but on the other hand, these reflections draw our attention to the issue of constitution of ethical agent (individual or collective) and the counterbalance for dominant anonymity of modern technology. The question is how to deal with such a situation when the essence of technology involves us to the level of anonymity. How can we speak about responsibility, if the initiative of an effective change of the situation belongs not to an individual, but to the technologi-

cal system which is designed for risk management, but not for responsibility? Is this kind of distributed responsibility possible in such a situation?

Hence, in response to these questions several analytical steps need to be made: 1) to discuss the relationship between ethics and ontology in order to highlight ontological conditions of responsibility; 2) to analyze the problem of constitution of responsible agent in a technicized society.

Ethics and Ontology: Towards the Genuine Responsibility

The changed nature of human action in technological age inspires the discussion on relationship between ethics and ontology. First of all, one must admit that the distinction between ethics and ontology, between practical reason (*phronesis*) and theoretical reason (*sophia, episteme*, *nous*) was elaborated by Aristotle. For Aristotle, practical wisdom (*phronesis*) "is a true and reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man" (*Nicomachean Ethics*, book 6, 1140b), whereas scientific knowledge (*episteme*) is the knowledge of things that are "not even capable of being otherwise" (*Ibid*., 1139b). This distinction was likely observed by Kant; with the exception that Kant extracts and purifies practical reason from any "residues" of heteronomy and formulates the law of practical reason as categorical imperative. However, it is Heidegger's ontology that opens a possibility to re-think the relationship between ethics and ontology by refusing to treat Being as a substance or to objectify it. According to Françoise Dastur, "ontology for Heidegger is not without a practical dimension: it does not give priority to pure seeing, to pure *theoria*, but on the contrary to the "practical" freedom of existence. Such existence unfolds historically as a relation to self and to the other, and such a relation constitutes humanity".[6]

There are two important aspects in Heidegger's transformation of ontology. The first one concerns Heidegger's assertion that every "ontic" ethics, i.e., every ethics as a discipline, should be deconstructed in order to show anteriority of the truth of Being with regard to any "ontic" law. Moreover, in Heidegger's ontology the genuine responsibility (*Überantwortung* or commitment) is possible as a relationship between man and Being, as non-indifference to Being that becomes a condition for morality itself. For Heidegger, responsibility is included in the facticity of existence. It is not an ego, a consciousness, a person,

but *Dasein* ("being-there") that is discussed in terms of responsibility. The facticity of existence reveals itself as a tension between thrownness (*Geworfenheit*) and projection (*Entwurf*). The thrownness supposes that *Dasein* is always "late" in respect of its Being; this Being-thrown can not be appropriated and made explicit. Even if *Dasein* projects itself towards its existential possibilities, that does not mean its absolute freedom. Heidegger states that "freedom, however, *is* only in the choice of *one* possibility – that is, in tolerating one's not having chosen the others and one's not being able to choose them"[7] (*SZ* 285). Here not only an aporetic character of responsibility, as in Derrida's case, is observed, but also its ontological rootedness in the very Being of *Dasein*. As François Raffoul notes, "I am not responsible, as Kant argued, because I am subject as that which begins absolutely <…>, and therefore as a subject to which actions can be assigned. Rather, I am responsible because I am thrown in an existence that I have to answer for".[8] In contrast to Kant's formal ethics that preserves its logical rigidity regardless temporality, Heidegger's responsibility to keep one's ears open to the call of Being remains dependent on historicity of Being. It is not defined by the formal rules; rather it is described as a state of vigilance, as a waiting that opens dimension of actuality (*Wirklichkeit*). The analysis of relationship between ethics and ontology demonstrates that the concept of responsibility can not be reduced to any particular set of rules in one or another sphere, be it legal, political or moral responsibility. It leads to the formulation of the concept of the "genuine responsibility" and look for a context which makes responsibility most concretized and authentic.

However, the second aspect reveals that this dependence on Being is quite ambivalent and is mostly criticized by those who dispute on ethical Heidegger's interpretation. Dependence on historicity of Being gives no guarantee of a rescue from anonymity and irresponsibility. Here Jonas' point about "terrible anonymity" of Heidegger's Being is relevant: "Not by the being of another person am I grasped, but just by "being"!"[9] Similarly, in his article "*Hier is kein warum*: Heidegger and Kant's Practical Philosophy", Jakob Rogozinski suggests that the temporality of practical reason should be understood from the horizon of the Law. According to Rogozinski, it is exactly the phenomenon of a call (the voice of consciousness) that opens up the uncanny character of existence. It allows to perceive the Law as the call, as the *singular* imperative of the Law, beyond the semblance of an objective, universal rule, and nevertheless, to perceive it as the end in itself that can not be reduced to any "subjective" ends. In his

interpretation of the call of consciousness Rogozinski tries to find a point where the Heideggerian and Kantian thoughts can converge. At the same time Rogozinski acknowledges that Heidegger refuses the notion of the end in itself (for him, the notion of the end (*telos*) is related to technological or metaphysical approach). Therefore, according to Rogozinski, Heidegger is unable to maintain the difference between forgetfulness and wakefulness and all his description of finality is caught in aporia. Rogozinski concludes:

"If every end is "technical" (i.e., metaphysical), our salvation can only be found in a play without end, and this play hurls us into the darkest distress. One cannot answer that it is not the same play, the same mode of being-without-an-end, for Heidegger's thought gives us no criterion, no law that would permit us to distinguish them, to differentiate the two faces of Janus' head. For want of Law, *Ereignis* and *Gestell* become indiscernible <…>. Here again, the existent has no choice, no power to decide whether to heed the call or wander in forgetfulness".[10]

It can be admitted that Heidegger's responsibility becomes aporetic, because of his ontological approach. But it is mainly this approach that refuses to transcend historicity and faces up to phenomenon of technology.

The Problem of Constitution of the Responsible Subject

Heidegger's ontological approach allows to bypass certain threatening closure. It seems that all reflection is inevitably going to be limited by two options: either, from the point of view of morality, to condemn anonymity of technology and its autonomy in regard to values and ethics; or to construct ethics on the basis of technology and in line with the terms of technology.[11] The first possibility can be illustrated by ample discussions about irresponsible growth of technology. The second option can be realized as an attempt to justify new values that are replacing the old ones. For example, in the contemporary society the concept of responsibility is observed to be transformed into the system of insurance or risk management, which promotes more effective functioning of the technological system. It can be assumed, the Heideggerian alternative enables to keep the distance and tension concerning both positions.

From ontological approach Heidegger describes technology as a way of revealing. Accordingly, the revealing that rules the modern technology "has the

character of a setting-upon, in the sense of a challenging-forth. (…) Regulating and securing (…) become the chief characteristics of the challenging revealing."[12] Can we recognize this "challenging-forth" in the extended field of universal responsibility, within the process of its exaggeration or downgrading, and within the process of its transformation into the notion of risk management? While considering destining of revealing, Heidegger evades two earlier mentioned possibilities – either to condemn technology, or to surrender against it. According to him,

"in this way we are already sojourning within the open space of destining, a destining that in no way confines us to a stultified compulsion to push on blindly with technology or, what comes to the same thing, to rebel helplessly against it and curse it as the work of the devil. Quite to the contrary, when we once open ourselves expressly to the essence of technology, we find ourselves unexpectedly taken into a freeing claim."[13]

How this freeing claim correlates with our search of responsibility? Is the constitution of a responsible subject is possible in our technological world? These issues are real challenges to the contemporary philosophers. For example, Hans Jonas pays his attention to the cumulative dynamics of technological development and emphasizes that a contemporary performer is not an individual, but the aggregate. So, according to him, the issue of responsibility should concern public policy: "Knowledge, will, and power are collective, and therefore control of them must also be collective: it can come only from forces within the public sector"[14]. However, who are the addressees of Jonas' imperative "Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life"[15]? The humanity as a whole, politicians, managers, scientists' community? For the people to better understand the extent of upcoming danger, Jonas tries to visualize the long-range effects of technological enterprise, but his "heuristics of fear" is not as effective as he expects. The threatening of the development-conditioned apocalypse is not evident and is hardly perceptible; it always has a future-oriented dimension. It seems that Jonas understands the responsibility of the technological age as a concern of the elite of society. However, the question of constitution of such responsible elite remains open. Consequently, we suspect that Jonas statements more concern risk management (which is an issue of technological system) than

genuine responsibility. This system of protecting society from possible harm is nearly related to the disciplinary society described by Michael Foucault.[16]

It seems that the German philosopher Georg Picht is more coherent. He recognizes that the problem of constitution of the ethical agent is central in our age, since we can no longer avoid universal responsibility, which is a distinguishing feature of the contemporary technicized world: "we can't avoid the universality to which we are being led by the concept of responsibility – but it is specifically through this universality that the entirety of obligations may lose the entire obligating power".[17] By following Heidegger's analysis of temporality and historicity, Picht reveals that it is not the subject or his moral decision, but the *event* plays critical role in the formation of responsibility. In other words, it is not the subject himself/herself that sets a task, but every task selects a responsible subject who recognizes this task as his/her own. According to Picht, the criterion of such responsibility is a competence that is required for a particular task. The concept of competence involves understanding that the subject determined to perform the task and be responsible for it will be assessed, and will never be sure whether he/she performed the work responsibly or not, as he/she only strives for responsible conduct. Picht's description demonstrates how the distribution of responsibility could be accomplished without reducing the problem of responsibility to sheer risk management.

This analysis shows that it is inevitable either to exaggerate or downgrade the responsibility in our technical age, as it emerges even when we have already decided to confine ourselves to a concrete responsible decision. Therefore Pichtian efforts to search for criteria of responsibility should be conceived not as knowledge or wisdom that belongs to an acting subject or some historical Absolute, but as an attempt to be responsible; an attempt that never makes itself free from the risk of irresponsibility. This analysis does not offer any "efficient" solution to the problem of responsibility in technological world, rather it raises further questions: Is the ontological perspective, revived by Heidegger in terms of phenomenological *Dasein* analysis, useful when dealing with responsibility in the technological age? Or maybe, as the French philosopher Dominique Janicauld suggested, we should retain essential distinction between descrip-

tion and prescription, between ontology and ethics, but at the same time have a notion that ethical prescriptions "must not block the horizon of unrestricted and probing thought"[18] but still there are things which could never be justified.

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Orality, Literacy and Heidegger's *Verwindung* of Metaphysics

Lina Vidauskytė

Abstract

A special Heidegger's attitude to philosophy of pre-Socratics is determined by his intuition that at this stage *the oblivion of Being* had happened and as a result, the issue of ontology became problematic. Heidegger associates *the oblivion of Being* with a predominance of metaphysics in Western philosophical thinking. In *Introduction to Metaphysics,* Heidegger articulates some kind of problem solving program: we seek to win back intact the naming force of language and words. It seems that Heidegger endeavored to "revive" ancient Greek words, which eventually became philosophical terms, by highlighting the focus on the etymology of words as well as the morphology of the connotations of meaning. As always with Heidegger's writings on the Greeks, the point of his interpretative method is to bring to light the original meaning of philosophical concepts, especially to free up these concepts, which in the subsequent tradition have become overlaid by secondary and even quite different meaning, to their intrinsic power. But connotations are experienced "more deeply" when the word is brought back to the acoustic, live-sounding word medium. This fact raises the idea that the "metaphysical" way of thinking is associated with the formation of phonetic writing, and eventually the oral culture is displaced by literally culture. Alphabetic writing transforms the essence of truth and Heidegger recognizes that as other famous researchers such as E. Havelock and W. Ong did, when regarding the orality-literacy question.

Keywords

Orality, Phonetic Writing, Metaphysics, Pre–Socratics.

Introduction

One of the articles by famous Canadian philologist Eric Alfred Havelock announces that an alphabetic mind is a gift from Greece to the Modern World. The gift is ambivalent: on the one hand, it created a basis for radical transformations, and on the other hand, these transformations have brought *the oblivion of Being* in terms of Heideggerian vocabulary. Actually, it was a crisis that occured in the history of human communication when Greek orality transformed itself into Greek literacy. Greek phonetic alphabet is more or less responsible for the mentioned confusion and for the metaphysics: the main branch of philosophy.

A special Heidegger's attitude to philosophy of pre-Socratics is determined by his intuition that at this stage *the oblivion of Being* had happened – a coincidence between thinking and being (the key word in Parmenides' text) disappeared, and as a result, the issue of ontology became problematic. Heidegger associates *the oblivion of Being* with a predominance of metaphysics in Western philosophical thinking. In *Introduction to Metaphysics,* Heidegger articulates some kind of problem solving program:

"But now we leap over this whole process of deformation and decline, and we seek to win back intact the naming force of language and words; for words and language are not just shells into which things are packed for spoken and written intercourse. In the word, in language, things first come to be and are."[1]

It seems that Heidegger endeavoured to "revive" ancient Greek words, which eventually became philosophical terms, by highlighting the focus on the etymology of words as well as the morphology of the connotations of meaning. As always with Heidegger's writings on the Greeks, the point of his interpretative method is to bring to light the original meaning of philosophical concepts, especially to free up these concepts, which in the subsequent tradition have become overlaid by secondary and even quite different meaning, to their intrinsic power. But connotations are experienced "more deeply" when the word is brought back to the acoustic, live-sounding word medium. This fact raises the idea that the "metaphysical" way of thinking is associated with the formation of phonetic writing, and eventually the oral culture is displaced by literally culture.

Alphabetisation of Greek Mind

Between Homer and Plato the information became alphabetised, and as Eric Havelock puts in *Foreword* to his famous book *Preface to Plato*: "corespondingly the eye supplanted the ear as the chief organ employed for this purpose."[2] It means a huge transformation of epistemological abilities.

Havelock insists that direct evidence for mental phenomena can lie only in linguistic usage.[3] Heidegger expresses a similar idea: "(…) philosophy originates only out of a sufficient understanding of language."[4] He called to be more attentive to language. The written word created Greek philosophy and metaphysics: perhaps the most abstract thinking in philosophical field. Reflections on impact of literacy in Havelock's works show how it came true. But Havelock notes another essential

question: classical scholarship attempted to interpret the earliest philosophers of Greece that they were engaged from the first with metaphysical problems and formulated solutions which presuppose a mastery of the abstract: that in fact they were philosophers in the modern sense of that word. Havelock notes:

"The publication of Diels' *Doxographi Graeci* in 1879, while it demonstrated the dependence of these reports upon the metaphysical portions of the lost history of the physical philosophers by Theophrastus, did nothing to impair their ultimate authority (…). The findings of Cherniss (1935) established the conclusion that the metaphysical interpretations of pre-Platonic thinkers which are found in Aristotle's own works are in large measure accommodated to the problems and indeed the terminology of his own system."[5]

Heidegger in his text *The Anaximander Fragment* expresses a similar idea: Theophrastus has become a source for interpretation of pre-Socratic philosophy. "In the meantime, even when philological and historical research treats philosophers before Plato and Aristotle in greater detail, Platonic and Aristotelian representations and concepts, in modern transformations, still guide the interpretation."[6]

Aristotle's philosophy is already a brilliant work of literate mind which is capable for abstract thinking contrary to pre-Socratics (Havelock insists for pre-Platonic definition because it is more correct in the light of orality-literacy question). And neverthelless, "the complete results of literacy did not supervene in Greece until the ushering in of the Hellenistic age, when conceptual thought achieved as it were fluency and its vocabulary became more or less standartised. Plato, living in the midst of this revolution, announced it and became it prophet."[7]

Plato's Doctrine of Truth

Thus Havelock calls Plato a prophet of literacy. Plato's theory of Forms and his educational aspirations declared in his book *The Republic* are an obvious testimony of that. Heidegger starts to develop the question about Being in his short essay *Plato's Doctrine of Truth* (*Platons Lehre von der Wahreit*). According to him, Plato began metaphysiscs, and Nietzsche's thinking became decisive as the fulfillment and the end of metaphysics. Plato's philosophy is not only the way of abstractions; it is a way of visual cathegories. Here one can see the essential replacement: instead of the ear comes the eye.

For Heidegger, *unconcealment* as supposed concept represents early Greek thinking. It is very important that Heidegger recognized this word as supposed concept and found an opposition to it: Plato's eidos. Platonic *eidos* means different kind of truth and Heidegger made a brilliant explication of these issues. He has shown the difference between truth as the "unconcealment of beings" and truth as the "correctness of propositions." Truth turns into correctness from unconcealment.

Unconcealment vs. Corectness

It seems that such transformation of truth is an analogue with an alphabetic mind. E. Havelock in *Preface to Plato* empahsizes that Plato's doctrine of Forms is a consequence of the use of the alphabet. Alphabetic writing transforms the essence of truth and Heidegger recognises that as other famous researchers such as E. Havelock and W. Ong did, when regarding the orality-literacy question. For Walter Ong, "[l]iteracy is imperious. It tends to arrogate to itself supreme power by taking itself as normative for human expression and thought."[8] Language thus is an indicator of transformations caused by alphabetisation. Heidegger critisised a modern science and its relation to language, especially its product "metalinguistics":

"Analytical philosophy, which is set on producing this super-language, is this quite consistent when it coincides itself metalinguistic. That sounds like metaphysics – not only sounds like it, it is metaphysics. Metalinguistics is the metaphysics of the thoroughgoing technicalization of all languages into the sole operative instrument of interplanetary information. Metalanguage and sputnik, metalinguistics and rocketry are the same."[9]

But in the case of Aristotle, Theophrastus is evidence that "ancient interpretations, no less than their modern equivalents, seemed to require that a metalanguage be imposed on the originals."[10] Harris Cherniss work *Aristotle's Criticism of Pre-Socratic Philosophy* (1935) opened up the whole metalanguage issue by exploring with precision how Aristotle's own physical conceptions had infected his account of pre-Socratic first priciples.[11] Phonetic alphabet is a powerful technology and this

"[p]ower has been derived from the mechanisms of written communication. Communication is not merely the instrument of thought; it also creates thought. Alphabetic communication, which meant literate communication, brought into

existence the kind of thinking which remodels the dynamic flow of daily experience into "are statements," of one sort or another. This permits a conceptual analysis of what happens in the environment and in ourselves and creates the power not merely to reason about what happens but to control it and to change what happens. This power is not available in oral cultures."[12]

Havelock questions "the whole assumption that early Greek thought was occupied with metaphysics at all, or was capable of using a vocabulary suitable for such a purpose."[13] But if the early Greek mentality was neither metaphysical nor abstract, what then was it, and what was it trying to say?[14] Let us look at a potrait of the oral mentality and the manner of its discourse.

A Portrait of the Oral Mentality and the Manner of its Discourse

In the analyses of different narratives, Havelock shows how oral and literal mind functions.[15] Homeric and Hesiodic cosmos represents two different consciousnesses. Havelock argues that Homeric architecture and geography of the physical cosmos contains obvious incoherencies.[16] And nevertheless, he insists that it is a mistake to seek for or expect reconcilation of such confusions and contradictions. These are not organised accounts of a physical environment consistently conceptualized. Homer constructs eight "epizodes", not a static description of fixed relationships. Each epizode is separately imagined, not thought of in relation to an overall system. "The cause of this goes back to the genius of orally preserved speech, which requires that reflections of any kind upon the human or cosmic condition be incorporated in the narrative context."[17] In sum, description occurs as it is prompted by and occurs within the actions or speech of agents in the story. The same rule of narrativization requires that the digressions themselves become not descriptions formally conceived but little episodes of action to which descriptive detail is attached incidentally.

It seems that Homeric world tends to be perceived kinetically, as things-in-motion, rather than objects possessed of determinant properties. The language used to describe this experience is itself kinetic.[18] Havelock uses this term in his account of pre-Platonic philosophical language. It becomes applicable not only to verbs but also to nouns, adjectives, and adverbs. The Homeric mind represents orally preserved discourse, whereas Hesiod's thought represents the transition from orally preserved discourse to literate formulations' characteristic of systematic discourse.

In other words, a conceptual framework replaces the myth.

Havelock argues that, nevertheless, literate successors who were to create language and the mentality of philosophy and science did not create *ex nihilo*. They had to build on what was given in the oral discourse as this became written down, and there was something to build on. Early Greek thinkers were on the border between orality and literacy.

"The Presocratics themselves were essentially oral thinkers, prophets of the concrete linked by long habit to the past, and to forms of expression which were also forms of experience, but they were trying to devise a vocabulary and syntax for a new future, when thought should be expressed in categories organized in syntax suitable to abstract statement. This was their fundamental task, and it absorbed most of their energies. So far from inventing systems in the later philosophical manner, they were devoted to the primary task of inventing a language which would make future systems possible."[19]

The Muse Learns to Write

Havelock in his book *Preliteracy in the Pre-Socratics* (1966) supposed that the first four pre-Socratics composed as oralists either in verse or in aphorism, i.e. in a style which embraced the language of Homer and Hesiod as a matter of source, and that they even accepted the cosmic mythologies of Homer and Hesiod as traditional models which had to be revised.

Later, in his monograph *The Linguistic Task of the Pre-Socratics* (1983) Havelock drew a conclusion that Milesian School had not been a pionner in the use of a conceptual vocabulary. Havelock examined the claim of Theophrastus that the supposed concept of *the Unlimited* (to apeiron) is evidence of presocratics' use of high theoretic language. Milesian School (and this title was proposed in later antiquity), like its successors, had been composing for oral publication, in oral idiom, and probably in verse.

"The primitive theoretic language which was being extracted from Homer and Hesiod and hammered out was on the pre-Socratics wishes to apply to the physical cosmos. The terms thought were primarily physical such as body, space, motion, change, quality, quantity, and similar cocepts – basic and rather simple (as they appear to us)."[20]

Havelock describes the living body of oral language as such: "[t]his living body is a flow of sound, symbolizing a river of actions, a continual dynamism, expressed in a behavioral syntax, or [...] a "performative" syntax."[21] It means that in primary orality the oral specialist, whether bard, priest, prophet, or seer, translates his memorable instructions into active examples.

For Heidegger, the spoken word is greatly superior to the written. In his lectures *What is called Thinking* Heidegger's central intuitions are about nature of thinking. He is directly concerned with the way language relates to thinking and its response to the call of thoughts. Heidegger insists on the independent role of a kind of thinking that is at once poetic and philosophic.

It represents his attempt to translate the famous saying of Parmenides about the relation of saying and thinking to Being. What Heidegger is suggesting here is that thinking is a conrete seeing and saying of the world.

"The advance Heidegger wishes to make on the basis of Greek thought is to learn to think non-conceptually and non-systematically, and yet with rigor and strictness about the nature of Being. By doing so he hopes to avoid the subjectivity involved in separating human being and Being, i.e. subject and object. He desires a thinking that it is at once receptive in the sense of listening and attending to what things convey to us and active in the sense that we respond to their call."[22]

Pre-Socratic thinking becomes a way which can lead to overcome *the oblivion of Being*, or rather to show the essence of metaphysics. Heidegger argues that "[m] etaphysics cannot be abolished like an opinion."[23]

In the lecture *Hölderlin and the Esssence of Poetry* held in 1936 Heidegger tries to find the essence of poetry. The word "essence" he uses in an unusual way. According to a traditional use of the word "essence", it defines the subject, its "whatness". "The Essence" is understood as generality which we get after the action of abstraction when we go away from what in objects are concrete. Heidegger considered such generality as an abstract mean which does not express the Being of subject but that Being is overshadowed by the abstraction.

Whereas Heidegger expresses Being in the concept of "the essence". Rising a question on the essence of poetry he does not seek for information about Being, but rather intends to extend existential relation with a language as such. One might say that Heidegger's approach to poetry is a return to pre-Socratic tradition, when philosohy and poetry was considered as one. Anaximander, Heracleitus and

Parmenides were not philosphers in a modern sense, but rather they were thinkers.

For Heidegger, "(…) thinking is poetizing, and indeed more than one kind of poetizing, more than poetry and song. Thinking of Being is the original way of poetizing. Language first comes to language, i.e. into its essence, in thinking. Thinking says what the truth of Being dictates; it is the original *dictare*. Thinking is primordial poetry, prior to all poesy, but also prior to the poetics of art, since art shapes its work within the realm of language. All poetizing, in this broader sense, and also in the narrower sense of the poetic, is in its ground of thinking. The poetizing essence of thinking preserves the way of the truth of Being."[24]

Conclusion

As was previously mentioned, an alphabet was a Greek gift to the modern world, and there is no possibility to escape this gift because a phonetic alphabet is the technology which transforms human mind. Metaphysics is a destiny. "The decline of the truth of beings occurs necessarily and indeed as the completion of metaphysics."[25]

Perhaps the line from *The Aeneid* by Roman poet Vergilius can serve as an example of a stance in a presence of Greek gift: Quidquid id est, timeo Danaos et dona ferentes (Publius Vergilius Maro, Aen. 2,49). Its literal meaning is "I fear the Danaans [Greeks], even those bearing gifts". The gift of Danaans modifies oral language, i.e. the saying. Heidegger does not pay special attention to a question of literacy, and nevertheless, his effort to reach primordial Greek thinking through the way of etymology is an attempt to comeback to oral culture or rather an attmept to reach the essence of language: "Poetry and thinking are modes of saying. The nearness that brings poetry and thinking together into neighborhood we call saying here, we assume, is the essential nature of language."[26]

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Ontology as Practical Hermeneutics

Vaiva Daraškevičiūtė

Abstract

The paper aims to highlight the distinction of two Italian thinkers Luigi Pareyson's and Gianni Vattimo's concept of ontology as practical hermeneutics by comparing it with Hans-Georg Gadamer's position and establishing two main distinctions between these different points of view. First distinction would lay in the manner both, Pareyson and Vattimo, discuss hermeneutical ontology. They see it as a theory of interpretation, extended over the *logos* sphere, and not only as the universal theory of understanding as Gadamer does. In Pareyson's philosophy we see this in his theory of *formativity*, presented as *praxis* of interpretation, and in Vattimo's case, in the latter's *weak ontology* construct, which treats postmodern and nihilistic concept of hermeneutics as the play of interpretations and as the only possible *praxis* in the contemporary world. This aspect supposes the second point by which the distinction between Gadamer's and Pareyson's-Vattimo's positions becomes even more clear. The second distinction in my opinion is related to the manner they describe the *praxis* itself. In Gadamer's philosophy hermeneutical *praxis* is, first of all, the dialogue which leads to understanding, whereas for Pareyson and Vattimo the hermeneutical *praxis* means the conflict, leading to interpretation and this can be described not only as understanding, but also as the failure.

Keywords

Ontological Hermeneutics, Practical Philosophy, Understanding, Interpretation, Dialogue, Conflict.

Introduction

This paper discusses two versions of ontological hermeneutics – one concept of ontology is represented by Hans-Georg Gadamer, and another is represented by two Italian thinkers – Luigi Pareyson and Gianni Vattimo. These three philosophers share a belief that in post-metaphysical thought ontology is possible only as practical hermeneutics. However, in my opinion, the Italian philosophers Pareyson and Vattimo attain practical approach in a different way than Gadamer who is traditionally associated with hermeneutical *praxis*. This paper states that in the perspectives herewith distinguished, i.e. those of Gadamer and Pareyson-Vattimo, ontology as practical hermeneutics differs in two aspects.

The first distinction is related to the manner these authors, representing two distinct positions, construct their concepts of hermeneutics. Gadamer sees her-

meneutical ontology as a universal theory of understanding, whereas in the perspective of Pareyson-Vattimo we encounter a theory of interpretation that goes beyond the dimension of *logos*. Hence, in the first case we speak of *hermeneutics of understanding*, and in the second case – of *hermeneutics of interpretation*.

The problem discussed in this paper leads to the question how the focus of ontological hermeneutics on understanding in the first case and on interpretation in the second implies differences in practical approach. With the aim to answer this question, and before I start discussing Gadamer, Pareyson or Vattimo, I will remember Martin Heidegger who in the first part of his "*Being and Time*" reversed the sequence between the moments of understanding and interpretation. According to Heidegger, it is not interpretation that forms understanding, as held in traditional hermeneutics, but in reverse: understanding is the basis for interpretation. In the philosophy of Heidegger understanding and interpretation are not psychological, but ontological categories – understanding in this case is an existential, defining the way *Dasein* exists in the world, whereas interpretation is the dissemination and specification of the possibilities implied in understanding: „All interpretation is grounded on understanding"[1]. According to Heidegger, the moments of understanding and interpretation are recognized by moving in a modus of the hermeneutical circle – a man finds himself in the world as part of the whole surrounding him, and develops this understanding by defining the relation between himself and the world. In other words, an individual exists in the world by interpreting, which means choosing and actualizing one of the many possibilities available to him. Thus, for Heidegger understanding and interpretation are integral parts of the hermeneutic circle, but for the purposes of this paper understanding will be defined as a rather meditative and passive state an individual finds himself in, and interpretation will be treated as an active action of a man by which he chooses one of the possibilities rejecting all the others. We will see this distinction reflected in the two perspectives of practical hermeneutics distinguished herewith.

Hermeneutics of Understanding

So, Heidegger linked ontology and hermeneutics, but it was Gadamer who first started treating ontological hermeneutics as practical philosophy. The universal nature of hermeneutic experience, according to Gadamer, may be explained

through the principle of *phronesis* (practical wisdom), linking theory and practice of human action. The term taken from Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* illustrates, that the choices of a separate individual are based on individual's belonging to a certain social condition. According to Gadamer, having forgotten the lesson of Aristotle who opposed *praxis* as *phronesis* to actions of a craftsman – *techne*, rather than to theoretical knowledge, contemporary thought demonstrates an opposite trend, opposing practical philosophy to theoretical knowledge and, at the same time, linking it to philosophies of action[2]. Whereas Gadamer believes that hermeneutics is *praxis*, and not because it is linked to philosophical action by performing the function of application of theory, but because hermeneutics is based on rationality implied in human action itself. In other words, it is not a possible coercion by the environment that Gadamer wants to emphasize, but the fact that an individual reflects on his possibilities and makes decisions guided by political impulse – belonging to the polis. Therefore we may state that Gadamer constructs his practical hermeneutics as radically non pragmatic philosophy and bases this position on making understanding the central axis of his hermeneutics.

For Gadamer ontological hermeneutics is a universal practice, first of all, because it is a theory of understanding. Unlike exact sciences, hermeneutics does not pretend to become the method leading to pure knowledge unrelated to the living world – on the contrary, according to Gadamer, understanding is a source of unifying experience. It means that ontological nature of understanding is not just treated in an abstract manner – "I understand that I exist", but also seen as social practice limited by certain conditions – "I understand that I exist among others". Hermeneutic understanding places a subject in a particular relation towards the world – as Gadamer states in *Truth and Method*: „Understanding is to be thought of less as a subjective act than as participating in an event of tradition, a process of transmission in which past and present are constantly mediated"[3]. Understanding is also linked to *praxis* in the sense that it leads out of the relation described by the subject-object dichotomy. In a relation described hermeneutically we see the hypothetical subject dissolve in a medium between an individual and an object, i.e. in tradition, history, art or language. Therefore, for Gadamer the hermeneutic act of understanding is not only related to the change in an individual, but also means a certain transformation enriching the field of meanings of reality as a whole.

Hermeneutics of Interpretation

The philosophy of the Italian hermeneutic thinkers Luigi Pareyson and Gianni Vattimo is not about the theory of understanding, but about the theory of interpretation. It has to be admitted, that in certain aspects more points in common can be found between Pareyson and Gadamer, rather than between Pareyson and Vattimo. If we analyze the problem of truth which is very significant in hermeneutic philosophy, we will see that the hermeneutics of both, Gadamer and Pareyson, retain a part-transcendental concept of truth, while the postmodern thought of Vattimo identifies any concept of truth with violence, and therefore rejects it. Whereas in this paper the positions of the founder of the hermeneutic school of Turin Pareyson and his disciple Vattimo are treated as representing the same perspective, as I seek to highlight the distinctiveness of the philosophical school of Turin in a more general context of ontological hermeneutics. The researcher of hermeneutic philosophy Jean Grondin described Vattimo's *weak thought* as an attempt to "latinize" German hermeneutical tradition[4]. It is hard to disagree with this observation of Grondin – only adding that to a large extend the differences between Vattimo's and Gadamer's hermeneutics were inspired by Pareyson's philosophical principles that were taken over by Vattimo and radicalized in his *weak thought*. One of the particularities of the "latinized" or Italian hermeneutics is precisely the focus on interpretation, rather than on understanding.

In Pareyson's philosophy the concept of interpretation defines an ontological relation that is always linked to a specific personal approach, opening up the perspective of being and truth. As notice Pareyson in his book *Truth and Interpretation*: „of truth, there is only ever interpretation and there is no interpretation, lest it be of truth"[5]. It is important to note that in Pareyson's ontology interpretation is identified with action – an individual does not explain reality in a rational way, but forms it by interpreting. Comparing this view to the approach to practical philosophy found in Gadamer's hermeneutics, we see that Gadamer performs a double act – for him understanding is *praxis*, because it is placed in *logos*, while for Pareyson hermeneutics of interpretation is practical, because interpretation as such is an action establishing ontological relation. According to Pareyson, each human action contains a formative element leading to interpretation that is manifested as the sole truth possible in a particular case. In Pareyson's hermeneutics ontological pluralism and perspectivism based on the concept of truth as interpretation is contradictory – personal interpretation is the only accessible modus

of truth, and yet no interpretation is capable to express truth, which as Pareyson believes is impossible to know.

Gianni Vattimo disagreed with the concept of transcendence of truth postulated by his teacher, but took over Pareyson's concept of interpretation as an active action and the ontological model of pluralism of reality, both of which he radicalized in his *weak thought*, presenting a postmodern view. Relying on the thesis of Nietzsche „There are no facts, but only interpretations"; Vattimo stated that the only way to describe the world of today is to see it as multiplicity of interpretations. As states Vattimo: „Up to now philosophers believed they were describing the world, now the time has come to interpret it" [6]. In Vatimmo's ontological hermeneutics reality is the entirety of interpretations, and not of facts, and interpretation itself is treated not as description of reality, but as a way of action

Obviously, by constructing his hermeneutics as a theory of interpretation Vattimo seeks to disprove the reputation of hermeneutics as conservative and "inoffensive" philosophy that had formed under the influence of Gadamer's thought. In one of his last books, *Hermeneutic Communism*, written together with Santiago Zaballa, Vattimo presents an anarchistic concept of interpretation, according to which hermeneutics is practical in the opposite sense to Gadamer's theory of understanding. The Italian philosopher believes that critical function is essentially implied in hermeneutics, and therefore a political project of hermeneutics does not require the basis of metaphysical ideals. Hermeneutics as a political project, according to Vattimo, „relies on a plurality of individual developments, that is, active interpretations"[7]. In this case the practical approach of hermeneutics is explained not through the principle of practical wisdom (*phronesis*), but in the very sense criticised by Gadamer – Vattimo links interpretation to active *techne* and opposes it to theoretical knowledge *theoria*, which he associates with conservativism, neutralization and violence.

Dialogue vs Interpretation

In my opinion, the controversy between hermeneutics of interpretation and hermeneutics of understanding is related to the choice of different models of hermeneutic application. This is the second aspect, distinguishing the perspectives of Gadamer and Pareyson-Vattimo in the view of practical hermeneutics. In Gadamer's philosophy hermeneutical *praxis* is, first of all, a dialogue leading

to understanding, while in the perspective of Pareyson-Vattimo hermeneutical interpretation is established by way of conflict. It means that in the first case we have hermeneutics of dialogue, and in the second case – hermeneutics of conflict.

In Gadamer's hermeneutics individual understands himself as placed in an environment independent of him – in tradition, history, language, etc. This "in between" implies the ontological nature of understanding and its dialogue-like structure – a man inevitably recognizes that there exists a world independent of him, and by being a part of this world he opens up to it. An ontological event defined by the term of dialogue sets the dynamics of the relation between an individual and the world, prevalent in Gadamer's hermeneutics – a dialogue is a revelation of truth transforming the individual and the environment surrounding him. As stated in *Truth and Method*: „To reach an understanding in a dialogue is not merely a matter of putting oneself forward and successfully asserting one's own point of view, but being transformed into a communion in which we do not remain what we were"[8]. On the other hand, it also means that for Gadamer the entirety of possibilities an individual finds himself in is more important than actualization of one of the possibilities.

The hermeneutics of interpretation of Pareyson and Vattimo puts forward an idea that the driving force of reality is not dialogue that seeks compromise, but conflict, and therefore hermeneutics as practical philosophy should focus on conflict. In Pareyson's thought this thesis is not postulated directly, but according to Vattimo, it was precisely Pareyson's theory of formativity that provided the basis for his hermeneutics as philosophy of conflict[9]. What Vattimo has in mind here is a very important aspect of Pareyson's aesthetics of formativity that is defined by the Italian word *riuscito* (successful), which describes the result of an action of an artist as one that is not self-evident in its accomplishment. An interpretation can be successful, but it also can be a failure. In other words, the relation between an individual and the environment, as well as the very event of truth can be equated not only with a successful dialogue, but also with conflict.

In his *weak thought* Vattimo restated Pareyson's idea adopting the perspective of philosophy of action. Hermeneutics of conflict is closer to reality as reality itself consists of contradictions, and this is not a pessimistic, but a realistic treatment. Acknowledging that in postmodern world truth is only possible as interpretation, we must also acknowledge the fact that interpreters are multiple, and their "truths" are not always compatible. Vattimo believes that conflict of interpreta-

tions is an inevitable condition, and therefore Gadamerian hermeneutics, focusing on peaceful aspects of reality, naively hopes to "extinguish" conflicts in dialogue; and even more dangerously, the condition of peace sought by the practice of dialogue results in ignoring and neutralizing the multifaceted nature of reality.

Conclusions

In Gadamer's hermeneutics an event of understanding that inspires *the fusion of horizons* implies the premise of dialogue towards the world we live in; in Vattimo's hermeneutics an event of interpretation that inspires *conflict* implies the demasking of violence, which is equated with any interpretation that makes a claim to truth. It means that hermeneutics of understanding and hermeneutics of interpretation are based on different treatments of ontology – for Gadamer hermeneutics leads to the condition of opening up – "to understand means to be among", and in the case of Vattimo and Pareyson hermeneutics is equated with action – "to be, means to interpret". The one, who is used to hermeneutics of dialogue, can have some difficulty in understanding what Vattimo seek to achieve by postulating his hermeneutics of conflict as practical philosophy. *Weak thought* does not delve into the ways practice of conflict should manifest itself, neither into its consequences – action as such is most important here. Perhaps this is the time again to remember Pareyson's aesthetics of formativity and the principle of action stated there, i.e.: „making but making in the sense that invents the way of making while make it"[10] – so, hermeneutics here is a practice of interpretation, in which subsequent way of acting is discovered at the time of interpreting.

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SECTION V
Language, Philosophy, Anthropology, Psychology, Religion

THE POST-SECULAR CONDITION

Chair
—
Manuel Sumares

Participant
—
António Martins da Costa

Presentation

Manuel Sumares

In generic terms, with the expression 'Post-Secular Condition' we wish to refer to the cultural situation in which 'secular reason' has effectively failed in tis intent to police and marginalize modes of thought — nihilist as well as theist — that effectively give witness to the fragility of secularist pretentions. At the end of the day, 'post-secularity' might describe better what many of us face than 'post-modernity', for instance. Perhaps. But if so, what would this entail for human culture as we find it in contemporary Europe?

The Concept of Tradition in MacIntyre

António Martins da Costa

Abstract

MacIntyre addresses the tradition issue from Aristotle's theory of the virtues. However, MacIntyre moves quickly away from the Aristotelian perspective, since this philosopher does not have an omni-comprehensive vision of the truth, about the notion of tradition and virtues in general. On the other hand, MacIntyre incorporates in the notion of tradition a dynamic historical element. The present can only be understood in its relation with the past in order to understand and plan the future. Only this way can one understand that the tradition in MacIntyre is the foundation of culture and social life.

Keywords

Tradition, History, Virtue, Practice, Rationality.

For MacIntyre, and unlike Aristotle, there is no omni-comprehensive vision of the truth, tradition, or any other virtue. The concept of tradition is, to this author, highly related to the history. So, he prefers a partial view, to a more global view of the reality and the reason itself. The reason and the thought in general have to be inserted in an evolutionary and historical perspective. We cannot, therefore, dismiss or pretend that there is no past or, worse, that we do not learn anything from it: "thinking this way is to exclude the notion of tradition of thought" (AV, p 185.). This is one of the main critics that MacIntyre makes to the concept of virtues in Aristotle and more specifically to the concept of tradition. For the philosopher of *After Virtue*, for the concept of tradition, it is central that the past is never something simply refused, but that the present may be understandable as a comment and a response to the past and that, if necessary and possible, the past may be corrected by the present in a more open and proper perspective (Cf, Ibid, p. 185.). The notion of tradition, in MacIntyre, incorporates a theory of knowledge that is not Aristotelian.

When a tradition is well structured, when progress takes place, there is always a cumulative value. It does not mean by this that all things are overcome or understood in the future. This lack of historical element relating to the concept of

tradition, in Aristotle, poses problems, according to MacIntyre, since it prevents us from recognizing his own thought as tradition and limits a lot what he says about the narrative. Do not forget that for MacIntyre tradition is a historical narrative. However, Aristotle, in the Ethics to Eudemo, as well as in the Ethics to Nicomachean, more in the latter, provides an interpretation and a narrative of virtues and moral, which represents the classical tradition of the moral thought from the rational standpoint, which allowed later authors to insert the whole notion of virtue and tradition in the historical thought, opening the debate and interpretation regarding the relationship among the moral, rational and historical thought.

From the latin *traditio* - "tradition" means transmission of ideas, beliefs and customs, relationship, narrative, practices and rituals - religious, moral or social - that are carried from generation to generation. The word tradition refers to something that is transmitted, which is important and vital to the future of a community or a society, which allows us to say, according to MacIntyre, that any intellectual inquiry is, as a human activity, a practice company that is constituted as a moral and social project, that is, the ethics research can only be properly conducted if it is integrated into its respective social and historical context (cf. FPR, pp. 50-51). To the extent that the human being is a social being, his identity is built from the community and it is there that he develops his moral dimension and seeks concrete goods, because it is only in the community that those goods exist. So, the moral is always a social moral. Thus, the identity of the human being is shaped by community narratives, which provide the necessary resources to the individual so that his identity can be built. Those resources can only be found within a tradition.

The tradition involves agreements and fundamental commitments, as well as disagreements among members who are part of it. These agreements can be moral, scientific or other, and are shared by people who constitute a real basis for the tradition, presenting itself more like a set of references critically assumed, than a range of solutions dogmatically established. Such agreements and shared attitudes are based, for example, on beliefs and accepted theories and on canonical texts, that work as "an authorized starting point to the investigation constituted by tradition (...) those texts, on which a canonical value can be assigned, are considered possessors of a fixed sense, at the same time that they are always open to a re-reading, so that each tradition becomes, to some extent, a tradition of critical reinterpretation (...) "(WJWR, p. 363).

In *After Virtue*, MacIntyre considers tradition as something dynamic, alive, composed by several practices and ongoing discussions, which are always historically contextualized in space and time. In this sense, the author defines tradition as it follows: "A tradition with life is a discussion historically unrolled and socially embedded. Within a tradition, the pursuit of goods unfolds through generations, sometimes for many generations." (AFV, p. 222)

The concept of tradition is presented as a research practice, a rational research, historically rooted, therefore, marked by a kind of rationality that incorporates a set of practices expressed by communities in which the debates and conflicts are essential elements for the development of traditions, to the extent that any tradition always includes problems and inconsistencies, from which comes up the reflection and the reception of some external elements with the purpose of getting improvement throughout the time.

MacIntyre notices clearly that the human being is, in large part, the result of the inheritance of a past, made up of a story and, in that sense, each of us, regardless of whether we recognize it or not, is a support of the tradition. It is within the tradition that it is possible the development of true discussions, in a way that it only makes sense to perform a real research when the one who investigates is part of a tradition of research. A As MacIntyre refers in his work *"Whose Justice? Whose Rationality?"* There is no basis, no place for research, no way to advance, evaluate, accept and reject reasoned argumentations that is not provided for this or that particular tradition." (WJWR, 350) The lesson given by MacIntyre seems clear and unquestionable: it is not possible to start from anywhere, from a zero point and neutral, that allows us to situate the philosophical inquiry and the sequence of actions in time, as well as the meaning of history.

In the thought of MacIntyre, tradition presents itself as something inevitable and undeniable that conforms the human life, having on account that it is always the heir of an incarnated past in a context, of a set of stories transmitted over many and successive generations. In *After Virtue,* MacIntyre really believes that the demand of the individual well, can only occur within a specific context defined by a tradition of habits and customs that it provides. It is through tradition that the knowledge of other human beings also becomes my knowledge, therefore the need to grant trust; it is a way of being with the others and break the isolation of my "self", presenting itself as the fundamental anthropological

structure. However, it is pertinent to refer that despite the tradition provides the rational resources for the moral research, that does not mean that the human being is limited to inherit passively and uncritically those resources. Moreover, a tradition is always subjected to crises, to develop a certain type of rationality and facing an always disturbing problem that is the relativism. Epistemological crisis, rationality and relativism, these are three important themes in the thought of MacIntyre, to which we will refer in the next moment of this work.

A narrative history of a tradition always implies, according to our philosopher, two situations: first, the discussions that take place within the tradition itself, secondly, the existing debate between traditions. In the first case we talk about the internal conflict, consisting of debates on issues such as the identity of the tradition, institutions, professions, which, if they are deep, are likely to cast doubt on the concepts and modes of reasoning to then considered valid by tradition. In the second case, it is conflict between rival traditions, different ways of justifying theories, worldviews, etc..

Despite a tradition constantly face many crises, it is not of MacIntyre, and most often, a deep problem because their resources will usually outweigh the difficulties. Thus, the reader will ask: When can we then speak of epistemological crises? MacIntyre says: "Generally, only when traditions fail and disintegrate is that its members begin to theorize about them" (WJWR, p. 8). What does not happen as traditions remain stable. See, eg, cases in which political parties succeed in power in democratic countries. The alternation of ideologies does not, in most cases, any radical questioning about the democratic regime. In any event, overcoming a crisis always involves supporting the schemes of tradition, ie the resolution of the difficulties that arise as they always have support and backdrop inherited beliefs. MacIntyre acknowledges that "In any moment can happen to a survey constituted by tradition, by their own standards of progress, it ceases to progress. Their research methods hitherto trusted, they become sterile. "(WJWR, p. 388). That is, the tradition becomes unable to respond effectively to new situations from their own schemes and its internal resources. What then are epistemological crises? For MacIntyre, the epistemological crises consist essentially of a "(...) the dissolution of certainties founded or established historically" (TRV, p. 120). Thus, an epistemological crisis also means "(...) systematic research failure before a number of unsolved problems of a particular scheme beliefs" (TRV, 120). As dissolve, however, these certainties and we determine that a set of problems are not likely to be resolved? For MacIntyre, the

resolution of an epistemological crisis demands that the new design of theories and concepts, sometimes entirely new, solve, constant and consistent manner, the problems that hitherto seemed intractable. When this occurs, the new scheme should enable understanding "A solution to the problems that had previously shown intractable systematic and coherent way" (WJWR; 362). As MacIntyre says, "Overcoming an epistemological crisis empowers followers of a tradition of research redescribe your story in a more meaningful way." (WJWR, 363). However, we must not forget that "Not all epistemological crises are solved so successfully. Some certainly are not solved, and their lack of solution disqualifies tradition that ended in similar crisis "(WJWR, 346). Although not always the crises are resolved by the standards of rationality of a tradition, this does not imply that the losing tradition has adopted the standards of other research tradition. This is in view of MacIntyre, a range of possibilities not covered by what he describes as relativist objection, to the extent that this objection posited that "(...) if every tradition has it internally at their own standards of justification rational as the research traditions are genuinely distinct and different from each other, hence there is no way each one can establish a rational debate with any other, and no tradition can therefore claim their rational superiority over the their rivals" (WJWR, 39)

That is, for the Scottish philosopher is false that a tradition constituted by their respective practices of rational justification cannot be defeated by other traditions. (See WJWR, 395). Think, for example, in the case of traditional communist bloc of Eastern European countries and their inability to dialogue with the democratic regimes of Western Europe. Perhaps these countries have been forced to recognize the need for new narratives to respond to what caused the crisis, establishing new certainties absorbed by rival traditions, superior to those they had before the crisis, for example, adopting the free market and privatization of institutions public, consumer goods, etc..

The relationship between tradition and rationality becomes therefore extremely important, inasmuch as this is the place that, with the rationale that is internal to tradition. So there is no rationale outside the tradition because, as MacIntyre says "The person outside the tradition lacks rational resources needed for research (...)" (WJWR, 347). For this author the way to ensure the rationality moral level requires that a person be envisaged in coexistence with other human beings. Hence the need for recognition of community ties, without which the moral will be excluded as rational inquiry.

Rationality always mean to MacIntyre, the demand for elaborate explanatory continuities within the tradition. It is a historical and narrative rationality. Historic because this can only be understood in the light of the past; narrative, in the sense that the human being is born and develops within existing narratives and stories. But once but you can ask the reader: if rationality is internal to each tradition, how to explain the dialogue between different traditions? This is because we may be led to think that there is a universal, impartial rationality, which is capable of evaluating the various points of view in conflict. For MacIntyre that is not somehow possible, to the extent that "there is no rationality as such" (WJWR, 352). The way we characterize the disagreements and the relationship between traditions has admitted presupposes a particular kind of rationality. MacIntyre rejects the possibility of rules independent translation of a tradition. There is an independent perspective from which to compare, for example, Kant and MacIntyre but from the perspective of one of them, or compare both with another point of view as Marxism.

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SECTION V

Language, Philosophy, Anthropology, Psychology, Religion

ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS & ITS LEGACY

Chair

—

Ann Ward

Participants

—

Christina Mavropoulou
Mostafa Younesi
Anne-Marie Schultz
Ann Ward
Paul Ulrich
Ruhtan Yalçıner
Negris Canefe
Lee Ward
Naomi Couto
Steven Robinson
Paul Carron

Presentation

Ann Ward

This workshop explores Aristotle's ethical theory and its legacy in the history of philosophy. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle defines moral virtue as an activity of the soul in accordance with reason. Determining the mean, reason guides the passions to it, which is then followed by an external action of the body. Actions, internal and external, that "hit" the mean, as it were, are virtues, excesses and deficiencies are vices. Aristotle identifies and discusses eleven moral virtues and their corresponding vices: courage, moderation, generosity, magnificence, greatness of soul, ambition, gentleness, friendliness, truthfulness, wittiness, and justice.

Despite Aristotle's apparent embrace of the moral virtues, his analysis brings to light significant problems with these phenomena. The end of all the moral virtues, according to Aristotle, is the noble, and as such virtue incorporates a drive toward autonomy that abstracts from the political grounds of its existence. Second, moral virtue appears to rest on inequality, both psychological and social. The conflicts within moral virtue push the citizen toward an intellectual realm that may be distinct from the moral realm. The morally neutral character of some aspects of intellectual virtue, Aristotle suggests, can lead to the problem of lack of self-restraint in which one knows the good but does what is bad nonetheless. Potential solutions to the problem of lack of self-restraint to which Aristotle points are political philosophy and friendship. Both appear to allow for contemplation, the highest of human and divine activities.

The historical context and legacy of Aristotle's ethical theory is quite far ranging and diverse. In antiquity Aristotle suggested that his ethical theory departed in significant ways from the Socratic-Platonic understanding. In the Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas appeared to embrace Aristotle's philosophy, referring to Aristotle as "the Philosopher" and writing a commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Yet, whereas Aristotle contends that the great souled person, who possesses moral virtue entire, seeks the external good of honour, Aquainas argues that it is an internal good for which they seek. Moreover, for Aristotle pride is foundational for moral virtue, whereas for Aquinas its opposite, humility, is the

key to a virtuous life. In early modernity philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes redefined virtue in such a way that it would be unrecognizable from an Aristotelian point of view. Far from the rational control of the passions, virtues for Hobbes *are* passions. Hobbes thus liberates the passions from the control of reason, and reason is put in the service of self-fulfillment rather than self-control or autonomous moral decision making.

Recently there has been a revival of scholarly interest in Aristotle's ethical theory. The focus on human virtue and flourishing in Aristotle's thought compels many scholars to reconsider both the foundations of contemporary liberal democracy and the desired aims of liberal society. Contemporary neo-Aristotelians, as Susan Collins points out, tend toward either a "political" or a "perfectionist" reading of Aristotle's philosophy. *Political* neo-Aristotelians such as William Galston look to Aristotle for guidance on the qualities of character necessary to support the liberal political order. Virtue is thus primarily understood as civic or "liberal" and hence instrumental to the regime. *Perfectionist* neo-Aristotelians such as Martha Nussbaum uncover in Aristotle a roadmap for human flourishing simply, and argue that liberal democracies should seek to foster the virtues that make such flourishing possible. In this case virtue is understood primarily as pertaining to the individual and necessary for individual happiness, and thus as intrinsically valuable rather than instrumentally so. Politics is to serve the ends of the individual rather the ends of politics itself.

These and other themes are the focus of this workshop. Gathered together in this collection is a diverse group of international scholars from the fields of Education, English, Philosophy, and Political Science, coming from various corners of the globe including Canada, the United States, Europe, and the Middle East including Iran. The articles address Aristotle's ethics and its legacy ranging from Aristotle's philosophy itself all the way up to the big screen in Hollywood, California and in Hollywood "North"— Toronto and its embattled but ever entertaining former Mayor, Rob Ford.

Teaching as a Way of Good Life
Aristotle's Ethics and Teacher Education

Christina Mavropoulou

Abstract

In this paper I attempt to explore the view that it may be necessary for teachers to be intellectually and morally virtuous for themselves and for others' flourishing. As many researchers do, Donaldson observes that 'evidence suggests, perhaps unsurprisingly, that the foundations of successful education lie in the quality of teachers and their leadership. High quality people achieve high quality outcomes for children.'[1] Besides, a justification for teaching someone is needed and if that is toward a vision of the good life, then a teacher may have to be able to experience that through the cultivation of virtues and this has implications for teacher education. I attempt to explore my questions partly by looking at Scottish teacher education and Aristotle's ethical theory as presented in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Due to the limited space, I only look very briefly at some aspects of the Nicomachean Ethics concerning *praxis*, *endoxon* and *meson* in relation to Scottish teacher education. My intension is to develop the concepts in depth in future research. This is a philosophical investigation in teacher education. Therefore, I mainly use, as Hansen suggests, the methods of conceptual analysis, comparison, contrast, analogy and exegesis of texts.[2]

Keywords

Aristotle, Teacher Education, Eudaimonia, Virtues.

Introduction

Is it necessary for teachers to be morally and/or intellectually virtuous for theirs and others' *eudaimonia*? 'Evidence suggests that the foundations of successful education lie in the quality of teachers and their leadership. High quality people achieve high quality outcomes for children'.[3] However, it seems there is a gap in teacher education concerning an explicit interest in teachers' *eudaimonia* for themselves and for others through the cultivation of virtues.[4] Besides, a justification for teaching someone is needed and if that is toward a vision of the good life, then a teacher may have to be able to experience that through the cultivation of virtues and this may have implications for teacher education. Higgins notes that we should offer a vision of 'teacher education that is not only about learning how to teach, but about learning how to learn through teaching: a teacher education

for practical wisdom that helps teachers further their own self-cultivation' and well-being.[5] In this paper I attempt to explore my question(s) partly by looking at Scottish teacher education and Aristotle's ethical theory as presented in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Specifically, due to the limitations of this single study, I look very briefly at some aspects of the Nicomachean Ethics concerning *praxis*, *endoxon* and *meson* in relation to Scottish teacher education. Any unexplored question will be considered for future consideration.

Recently, teacher education has been in the centre of policy makers' and politicians' interest. For instance, in 2010, Donaldson conducted on behalf of the government a review of Scottish teacher education, with the title 'Teaching Scotland's Future', which covered a full range from Initial Teacher Education [ITE] to Continuous Professional Development [CPD].[6] In regard to this, he provided fifty recommendations. Similar examples may happen in other countries as well. Biesta notes that policy makers' and politicians' recent interest for teacher education is positive and Donaldson argues that this may be due to the fact that 'evidence suggests, perhaps unsurprisingly, that the foundations of successful education lie in the quality of teachers and their leadership and 'high quality people achieve high quality outcomes for children.'[7, 8]

On the other hand, politicians' and policy-makers' interest in teacher education seems problematic, because, as Biesta observes, having established in many countries curricula which combine 'prescription, testing, inspection, measurement and league tables, they now show an interest to teacher education so as to establish total control on the education system.'[9] In any case though, it seems that teaching as a way of good life as well as the cultivation of teachers' virtues for themselves and for others may be overlooked in teacher education programmes. Thus, as Higgins suggests, we should offer a vision of 'teacher education that is not only about learning how to teach, but about learning how to learn through teaching: a teacher education for practical wisdom that helps teachers further their own self-cultivation. If (teacher) education does not help you at all to answer the question 'what sort of person are you going to become', you should ask for your money back.'[10]

Aristotle's significance here in regard to teachers' well-being and the cultivation of virtues may be beyond question because on the one hand, his investigation regarding how best to live one's life concerns any society with rational reflection on human aims.[11] On the other hand, his answers to this investigation about

the right and wrong ways to act and feel as well as the conception of the human good based on an understanding of the human nature is always an inexhaustible source of insight and inspiration. [12] To this end, I believe that Aristotle's ethical ideas may be a significant source of insight and inspiration for teachers and teacher education. Nonetheless, I do not imply that Aristotelian ethics is the only or the most important way to explore the issues under examination and there may be a need to look at a combination of theories and ideas. Besides, due to the limited space of this paper, I will be constrained in exploring only some ideas in the Nicomachean Ethics in relation to teachers' well-being through *praxis*, i.e. the cultivation of moral virtues, *endoxon* and *meson* as well as their significance for teacher education.

Method and Context

This work constitutes a philosophical investigation in education, so it requires the selection, organization, validation and analysis of philosophical and educational data. To this end, as Hansen suggests, I mainly use the methods of conceptual analysis, comparison, contrast, analogy and exegesis of texts. [13] Besides, philosophical queries or investigation are not the type of questions on which scientists may invent experimental ways to explore them as they are not reducible to logical formulae and scientific proof.[14] Similarly, as Aristotle notes in Nicomachean Ethics, our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions.[15]

It is also essential to remember the context in which Aristotle composed Nicomachean Ethics. He was writing two and a half millennia ago, being himself a nobleman for noblemen in a city-state, having a world view quite different from that of any modern writer. Hence, Aristotle should be read carefully and thoughtfully, with an understanding of the historical, social and political context, as one of the best sources of examination of the human ethical condition rather than as an ally in a modern debate. Besides Aristotle's audience were aiming at making a career in legislation and political influence. Therefore, it was essential for them to understand what was to be rewarded and punished. Nevertheless, almost all the topics in *Nicomachean Ethics* are central to modern moral philosophy and their significance seems to be beyond question.[16]

Praxis and Teacher Education

To continue, according to Aristotle, *epistêmai*, i.e. sciences, can be divided into three categories: the theoretical, practical, and productive. The purpose of the theoretical science is the pursuit of truth through contemplative life and its *telos* (end) is the achievement of knowledge for its own sake; the aim of the productive science is to create something and its *end* is the production of some artefact; the practical science is the one which copes with political and ethical life and its end is practical wisdom and knowledge.[17] What I particularly attempt to explore here is *praxis*, i.e. a way of good life through the cultivation of moral virtues and any implications for teacher education.

Knight refers to Aristotelian *praxis* as a human action or activity in the realm of the contingent, which could be other than it is and which we seek to affect by our actions.[18] *Besides, praxis* is useful and effective and designates virtuous ethical action that contributes directly to the one's *eudaimonia* rather than serving ends determined by others. It is a life of informed, committed moral actions which encompass specific criteria such as individuals' well-being for their own sake and for others.[19] Taylor also says that word and activity, activity and reflection, theory and practice may be aspects of the same picture. This activity is not just the act of doing something, which Aristotle describes as *poiesis* (working with objects). On the contrary, *praxis* is creative, dialogic; it involves the idea of others. [20] Likewise, (teacher) education by definition involves the idea of others.

Aristotle seems to suggest that the connection between virtuous activity and good pleasure is something that from my point of view teacher education should integrate in its programme in order to be right. It should also involve both the notion of the self and other; not the latter at the expense of the former or vice versa. So, educators who themselves first exercise the moral virtues and experience *praxis*, i.e. a way of well-being for themselves and for others, may be able to experience and deliver a part of what Aristotle names as right education. [21] Likewise, Higgins argues that it should 'not be only about learning how to teach, but about learning how to learn through teaching: a teacher education for practical wisdom, i.e. for happiness, that helps teachers enter the practice of teaching, sustain a vocational conversation and further their own self-cultivation' which from my perspective may be partly accomplished through *praxis*.[22]

Teacher Education Programmes qua Endoxa?

Let me now attempt to apply Aristotle's method, i.e. *endoxa*, in the context of this paper. For example, teachers' competence might be perceived as *endoxon,* i.e. as most people's view or the wisest ones' view according to Aristotle that educators should be competent. Besides, 'who would argue that teachers should not be competent?' Biesta asks.[23] Nevertheless, as Aristotle might argue, this is only a first step in the given enquiry due to the fact that opinions differ concerning what this competence consists of. For instance, could teacher education programmes be considered as *endoxa?* I think not, because they are not merely what most people or even the wisest do want from teachers, but also they are *endoxa's* data processing by policy makers, politicians, administrators etc.

Similarly, extending the notions of Greene and the World Bank, though they argue from an entirely different point of view, it seems that when it comes to teacher education the prevailing voices are still those who take for granted that the most important mission of teacher education today is to satisfy national economic and technical demands and teachers should be conceived as raw materials to be formed to the market needs.[24] [25] This model of teacher education though, which seems to overlook the significance of living a good life within educational life, approach teachers as human resources rather than persons.

Specifically, Donaldson argues that teacher education needs to emphasize educators' knowledge competence and professional skills such as work in partnership and self-evaluation. He also highlights the need to focus on teachers' high levels of pedagogical expertise, including deep knowledge of what they are teaching, able to work in partnership with other professionals and to engage directly with well-researched innovation.[26] Whilst he talks about the importance of teaching candidates' diagnostic assessments, of their competence in both literacy and numeracy as well as in teaching, and also about the significance of the marketability of skills and education degrees, as I see it, he seems to focus unilaterally on teachers' professional development disregarding their entire well-being and development for their own sake and for others, thus, there may be a lack of concern about teaching as a way of good life through the cultivation of virtues.

Truly, the language of contemporary education and teacher education in particular may emphasize something quite different from engaging in a good life, in *praxis* or such an interpretive thinking.[27] As Noddings notices, schools have the

responsibility to train the intellect, but when within institutions deliberately the intellect is promoted and the moral is put at risk, then, she emphasizes, priorities may be confused dangerously.[28] Likewise, I think that teacher education is responsible for teachers' skills training, but when the technical/scientific training is deliberately promoted and the significance of the cultivation of the intellectual and moral virtues as a way of the good life of teaching is overlooked then something is wrong.

Noddings also suggests that rationality – the unique characteristic of human nature which according to Aristotle is the ability to think and perceive according to *logos* – as trained intelligence is not at all an aim that should not be valued; while important and prized, it must serve something higher, and this in my view is teachers' well-being for their own sake and for others.[29] Hence, how educators, whilst they may be caught within the system and not free to choose, can affect restructuring and transform their classrooms and especially within modern unfavorable conditions?[30] How educators will be also able to experience teaching as a way of *eudaimonia*? A possible answer to this might be what Griffiths says: 'The only strategy it seemed to me then – and I still think this was right – was to be hung for a sheep rather than as a lamb. Or, rather, to be a sheep in wolf's clothing.'[31] I find the idea challenging and interpret it as a suggestion that 'an educator should take the risk of risking' and begin choosing the good life equally for oneself and for others.[32] Teacher education as well, in my view, should take the risk of risking and perhaps undertake a supportive and leading role to this next to teachers.

Meson as Equal Mean or Mid-space and Teacher Education

Modern scholars refer to *meson* as intermediate[33], middle[34] or mean.[35] [36] [37] On the contrary, Chatzopoulos disagrees with the translation of meson as mean. He takes as example one of Aristotle's translated quote that courage is the mean between cowardice and recklessness and argues that this is wrong because the original word includes both the mean and dispersity. In antiquity, Aristotle alike other people did not have available any statistic tools. This is why they used the methods of example and analogy to form their explanations, e.g. the right quantity of food that a man may consume as an example of what may mean for one to achieve virtue. Nowadays, using statistics we are able to quantify the amount of

food that a man needs by a sample taken by a group of people and by calculating both the mean and the dispersity. Translating *meson* as mean one may destroy arête because one seems to remove the degrees of freedom, the range that dispersity gives to *arête*, while Aristotle shows exactly the opposite. Therefore, according to Chatzopoulos one should translate the term as 'mid-space' and not as 'mean'. However, here, I use the term 'mean' as others do.[38]

Aristotle's doctrine of the mean is interesting and bold as Pakaluk notes, but it may not be obviously true and certain issues in it may need further examination. The philosopher highlights that *eudaimonia* and *arête* are essentially related, i.e. no one can be *eudaimon* unless one is virtuous and these are key concepts upon which the idea of the equal mean is based. According to his theory *eudaimonia* and *arête* consist of the equal mean between two extremes, i.e. an excess and a defect.[39] The philosopher's theory about the equal mean seems to constitute a core theme of his ethical treatise in the sense that if somebody wants to conquer *arête* and become *eudaimon*, one should avoid extreme choices. In this respect, if mere scientific competence and others[40] are on the one edge and intellectual/moral cultivation and individual are on the other edge, it seems that teacher education programmes seem to emphasize the edges rather the equal-mean and in my view, they particularly seem to stress the former than the latter.

The key point to this is *logos* that is a human being, unlike to other creatures, is able to think or perceive. Therefore, one is *eudaimon* when one acts according to *logos*. *Logos* aims by nature at balance and symmetry, at something that is not extreme, neither an excess nor a defect and therein lies *eudaimonia*. Besides, to be in a state of excess or deficiency in relation to a virtue is to have a vice; it is not to have too much or too little of a virtue.[41] Pakaluk also comments that success, i.e. to be *eudaimon*, consists in the correct manner, but manner suggests degree and degree suggests striking a balance and adjusting things correctly.[42] Urmson seems to interpret the notion of mean quantitatively that is in terms of too much or too little concerning the *deon* (right) in any case an intermediate between two other things[43], but Hursthouse seems to disagree with this view. She points out that it is not possible almost anyone/anything to be simply straightforwardly measurable and that Aristotle himself gives us the very image of the centre of a circle.[44]

Thus, eudaimonia is not virtue but a virtuous activity and particularly, according to his function argument about human's *ergon* (function), it consists in the activity of the rational part of the *psuche* (soul) in accordance with virtue.

Nevertheless, who determines the equal mean? Aristotle claims that *phronimos* man who is distinguished for one's *phronesis*, i.e. practical wisdom, the reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regard to virtue is able to determine the equal mean in any case.[45] In other words, if Aristotle is right, teachers should be found in the process of becoming *phronimoi*, in order to be able to distinguish the equal mean in any case, i.e. to have a disposition to be virtuous. In that case, there are implications for teacher education.

Conclusion

In the present paper, I looked at some aspects of *praxis*, *endoxon* and *meson* in relation to teachers' well-being and Scottish teacher education. The presentation was very brief and obviously covered only a minimum of the concepts which I intend to develop in depth in future research. On the one hand, it aimed at showing a gap in education and particularly in teacher education about the good life of teaching per se, i.e. a lack of concern for teachers' well-being for themselves and for others apart from emphasizing teachers' scientific knowledge and skills as well as students' well-being. On the other hand, it aimed at proposing a way of dealing with this gap through Aristotle's concepts as presented in the Nicomachean Ethics.

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Endnotes

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Traces of Aristotelian Ethics in Denkart VI

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Abstract

It is said that, "Book VI [*Denkart*] contains the largest collection of Zoroastrian moral maxims and precepts and is the fullest exposition of the ethical wisdom of Zoroastrian Iran in late Sassanian times" (Yarshater 1979, IX). As any collection it is not a homogenous text and in some parts of it we can explore the possibility of Aristotelian ethical traces (Menasce 1958, 52f) together with its own specific character. (With regard to this initial image, it is necessary and prudent we have a discussion about ethics and morality and their (un) usefulness (un)applicability to Book VI of *Denkart.)*

When we read B14- C 47 as a part of the *Denkart VI* as a whole, two topics become salient: Centrality of virtue; and the Mean. Accordingly, I arrange my paper in these three main parts in order that through a co-reading of both *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Denkart VI* the appropriate and analogical reception of the then available and extant Aristotelian ethical treatise in another thought, language and text is explored.

In the first part, the legacy of Aristotle "philosophical ethics" under the title of "virtue ethics" with the centrality of eleven virtues and their corresponding vices (Bartlett and Collins 2011, 303-304) which in *Denkart VI* they are about thirty two virtues / arête / hunar [the capacity of this Pahlavi term will be discussed later on] and vices in a specific kind of "gnomic ethics" will be explored and examined. Accordingly, there are two kinds of texts / ethics: treatise / philosophical; gnomic / religious.

Then at the second part, the introduction and application of the Aristotelian mean or middle alongside a gnomic version of it will be explored. Here in place of a single mean / meson/ payman there are two middles, both positive and each one with its own exaggeration will be discussed. After it in a comparative way it will be explored which human's faculty will find the mean.

Thereby in a holistic way the interconnections among the quality and priority of virtues in these two mentioned texts; their middles; and the role of logic in shaping sentences and statements can give us some hints about the traces of Aristotelian ethics in Denkard VI.

Keywords

Virtues, Vices, Middle, Ethics, philosophy, Gnome, Aristotle, Emetan.

Reading Denkart VI as a ca 9th century gnomological collection of sayings which is composed in a particular social, political and religious context, we come to words, phrases and sentences or parts with special quality that attract the interest of an individual who is familiar with *Nicomachean Ethics*.

Our intended text contains a "collection of religious dicta and moral maxims, rules of conduct, and a description of the characteristics of good and evil" (Yarshater 1979, xi). Accordingly, as a "collection" it is gathered from different texts of the different authors who belong to different periods and it cannot be homogenous and we cannot construct a uniform and unitary reading of it. At the same time we should bear in our mind its specific context for in responding and challenging it this is prudentially constructed. Therefore it would be better that according to the rationale of its environment we make our reading and explanation of those pertinent words and sentences which form a meaningful set.

The text begins with its own words in this formulaic chiasmus way: "in men's mind there is thought, sometimes a god holds a throne (in it), sometimes a demon holds up the way. In thought there is speech, sometimes…., sometimes…. In speech there is deed, sometimes…, sometimes…"(Shaked 1979, a. We can reread this line of thinking in 1b, 1c, 77, 78 in different wordings too). Accordingly, if the opening sentences of our intended text consider human life as a whole in three parts and if these can be in a good or bad state but it is clear that we want to live a good life not neutral or bad one. But there are some challenges to this way of thinking that make speaking about these items difficult and the compiler should write them in a specific way. It can mean we should desire and try to think, speak and act rightly and correctly. Interestingly, although in this text religion has an essential worthwhile position and function but it is in interplays with this complexity and contributes to it. In one of the usual triad at the beginning of and through the text is the hierarchical arrangement of character, wisdom and religion, in which religion subsists in both character and wisdom and not vice versa:" character / xēm is not in the wisdom/ xrad, but wisdom is in character; and religion/ dēn is in both wisdom and character (Shaked 1979, 6. And 3,4,5,11).

Ethics / Morality: Both or One or Neither?

One of the customary dichotomies which can be used in order to classify this text is ethics and morality.

Etymologically, the Greek term for ethics is *ēthos* and means something like character or character traits and can have relation with *ethos* as habit and custom; and the Latin word for morality is *mores* and means habits and customs.

With regard to this philological difference we can speculate about four possible relations between them: two distinct spheres; equation; whole and part; and one the object of the other. Although this scheme is useful but it is insufficient and we suggest that with regard to the context / text it would be better we speak about the application of ethics and/or morality in order to classify our intended text Denkart VI.

According to Yarshater, "although the Denkard is based on pre-Islamic material and drawn on Sassanian sources, its actual redaction took place in the ninth century- a time of particular significance in the history of Zoroastrian literature" (Shaked 1979, ix). Without going into details, it means that there are many unfavorable social, religious and cultural developments that necessitate Zoroastrian scholar-priests to reconstitute and compile such a book as Denkard VI in the form it is. Accordingly, it is formed in reaction to the "other' and it is not something autonomous that comes out from its own internal requirements and demands. This historical "other" has results for the form and content of our intended text and we can say it has been complied in a prudential manner. This text is constituted of gnomic sayings that are short, pedagogical, economic, practical; relay their message fast and easy; the meanings are not so explicit but implicit and covered; and the like.

According to the interplays between the text and context, it is more appropriate to consider Denkard VI as an ethical text although morality is not absent in a thin form. For the basic concern of scholar-priests of such a minority is preserving their own community that as a minority is disconnected from the majority at large and at the same time promotes and increases its own intended good life. Accordingly, the other parts of the picture will be arranged and become meaningful. As such the scope of these gnomic sayings is limited and is not conclusive but exclusive. Besides, the sayings are not abstract and subjective materials but are collected according to the requirements and conditions of a specific community and context. If the compiler of our intended text with sensitivity to his context wants to preserve the interests, life, goals, concerns, and excellences of a specific endangered community it is compiled in an esoteric way.

The Spirit of Traditional Ethics in Aristotle and Emetan

Now it is suitable to explore the spirit of traditional ethics apart from the particular minutes and details according to the accounts of Aristotle and Emetan.

Let us begin our discussion with the "origins" of traditional ethics in Aristotle and Emetan. If we take this Socratic question, what kind of life is worth living? (Devettere 2002, 13) as the beginning question of ethics, we can suggest "the desire of good living according to nature [Phusis]" is the nutshell answer of Aristotle to it. If so, now we analyze its constituents. Ethics primary arche is desire or *orexis* that as verbal noun means an internal domestic moving power that aims to move human being from one status to another one in order to do something therefore it is not a static wishful external thing. Accordingly, living a good life in distinction of mere living can be both biological and psychological that is exclusively for us as men with a unique bio-psychological constitution and as a result does not cover animals. These desires are not confined by Aristotle only to rational ones but we have nonrational desires too that he consider them as feelings and are wider and more than rational ones which he considers as [rational] willing or *boulesis* (Devettere 2002, 17).

More importantly, it should be noted that this desire is rooted in "physis" as Aristotle understand it and in him it is equal with our existence, goodness, telos and function as human beings. Thus when in our mentioned answer from the tongue of Aristotle we consider this desire [natural] with distancing ourselves from the modern biases and categories, he can means that the end, goodness and function of human beings as they exist. In the other words, human beings as they exist in their both individuality and commonality reach their end as far as they function well. After mentioning the second ingredient of our answer and in relation to the last sentence it is proper to consider the term "good": [ontological] desire towards good living.

We expect that when Aristotle speaks of good or valuable he has a true and authentic not apparent and pseudo one in his mind:"Everything we make and every inquiry, likewise every action and decision, seem to aim at some good: hence it has been well said that all these things aim at the good "(NE 1094a1-3). But in continuation of his argument it seems that he introduces the notion of overriding good as a whole in order to cover all true and authentic goods. In him this overriding value has two characteristic that is, it is both "final" and "autono-

mous" (Devettere 2002, 34). By finality he means that good is complete and is sought for its own sake and not incomplete in order to be sought for something complete. And by autonomous he means that this value is independent and includes all necessary things from the beginning for living a throughout good life.

Analogically, we refer to Emetan account about the beginning and principle of ancient ethics. In the beginning or introduction of Denkard VI, he mentions to the three parts of human life as a whole: thought, speech and deed. And immediately he introduces desire or *kamag* "in, within" human beings that has relations with the mentioned triad. But more importantly desires are of two kinds or can take two courses and according to them there can be actualized a good triad or bad one. If so, we as human beings should follow the right desire in order to realize a good living in its totality. In other words, there is not two but one genuine desire for good living as a consistent integrated whole.

It seems that in Emetan desire is a kind of inclination and will that is not homogeneous and monolithic but has antagonistic dualistic nature that one pole should have the upper hand:" in the mind there is recollection, …In the recollection there is desire, Sros [Obedience] holds throne [in it], Xesm [Wrath] holds up the way "(Denkard VI, 1b). Accordingly, living well originated of an "inward inclination" that should have a "good orientation" although with its background in Zoroastrian theology.

The mentioned orientation is toward an ordered integrated triad that in our daily life we pursue them. According to Emetan (Denkard VI 1979, 1a) this idea is the belief of the first poryotkesan [ancient religious sages] and his reception of it give it this status that functions as a sovereign principle / arche for it is the beginning and founding stone of ethics: living well is a consistent whole.

This whole is composed of and begins by thought which is situated in men's mind or ox as the basic container which is outside the dualistic division, then in thought is situated speech and lastly in speech is placed deed. But Emetan account is not crude as ours for the antagonistic duality of desire has presence in each one of these three parts of human life and as a result can form good or bad one. Accordingly, the whole should be divided into its pertinent interconnected parts and it means that, "the poryotkesan [ancient religious sages] held thus: In men's mind, there is thought, sometimes a god holds a throne in it, sometimes demon holds up the way" (Denkard VI, 1a).

Thus the driving desire of humans in order to be ethical or good is good living. But what may be the origin and source of this derive? With regard to our reading of the initial sentences the answer to this question has clear and basic relation with a specific religion although the spirit of the 1a and 1b in text has this quality too. As mentioned to the text layers we should have methodic prudence in order to avoid of making general and conclusive inferences, suggestions and results. Accordingly, at the opening section the dominant role is with religion and religious categories such as Ohrmazd, Mazda, orthodoxy, law and the like. As a result, here desire of "good living" is based on a specific religion and theology and therefore unlike Aristotle's it is not "philosophical ethics".

After exploring the "origin" of ethics through the "desire of good living", according to our framework we consider the overriding good for apart from apparent and true goods in *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Denkard VI* there is an explicit account about this topics as the symbol and exemplar of traditional ethics. In other words, though there are differences but in both texts two moments can be distinguished: an universal integrated good in singular and at the same time particular consistent goods in plural.

Through reading Aristotle, we can say that as a philosopher he engages with popular, philosophical and sophistic versions and accounts of ethics and in his constructive reading and criticism corrects notions such as happiness is good conduct with virtue; pleasure; wealth, self-sufficiency; and honor (Devettere 2002, 41, 44-45). For in ancient Greek thinking about "eudaimonia" is not limited to the philosophers. If so, they can suggest notions that are worthwhile though should be passed through the philosophical reasoning and mind.

The result of Aristotle engagements about "eudaimonia" is introduction of "formal" criteria as security, completeness and self-sufficiency plus major "defining characteristics" of it. By "security" he means that happiness depends far more on how we think and on what we choose to do than on luck and fortune. By "completeness" that happiness is what we need through our entire life. And by "self-sufficiency" that happiness as such includes all we need and needs nothing outside itself (Devettere 2002, 50,50). Thereby our intended philosophical ethicist mentions to the formal criteria that any conception of happiness should have to meet. Accordingly in the next step he gives only its defining characteristics: free choice; practical reasoning, and moral character. The first defining characteristic of "philosophical happiness" is negation of the blind fate and

chance and instead affirming choice. It consists of distancing from fate and approaching to free choice. This criterion makes happiness something accessible to all human beings and not as something in the hands of fate and restricted to a few. Now that happiness is accessible then as rational human beings we can think, know, and actualize it through our rational human capacities although can never completely forget the role and position of fate. As a result, for happiness we need practical reasoning or phronesis.

The last defining characteristic of "philosophical happiness" is moral character in its two aspects: good moral training and education and actual decision-making in live experiences. As a result, for happiness we need character virtues.

Thereby the last two indices lead us to two kinds of intellectual and ethical virtues that form the Books Three to Five on one hand and Six on the other hand in *Nicomachean Ethics.* It means that intellectual virtue of phronesis guides our decision making and creates character virtues; at the same time man with good characters can make a good decision and act according to it. But for Aristotle it is not all and they are not enough for being happy we need pleasure, wealth, health, and honor too.

Analogically, Emetan mentions and enumerates the goodness and goods for "human beings" from different angles and wordings. Accordingly, he considers good both through its extensions which are multiple and different and thereby do not reduce goods into a monolithic unity and at the same time he speaks of goodness that is, *wehīh ī wehan* (E45l) in a very few instances at the end of his treatise without definition or succinct explanatory analytical discussion about it. Therefore Emetan dominant orientation is towards introducing goods through its concrete examples and it seems that in Aristotle the quantity of the particular goods is more than the universal one.

But the crucial point is the differentiation of contexts in which these concrete extensions are introduced and this fact can somehow justify the difference among the goods. It means that in the fields of myth-theology, symbolism, and religion there are different goods in organic interrelations with each other that one of them may be the best but we cannot automatically and easily extend this fact to the other spheres. In other words, there are different spheres that each one has its own pertinent goods and on this ground they should be considered, understood and interpreted.

One of the spheres which goods are mentioned is the myth-theological sphere (114; and E45h). Here Emetan introduces each one of seven goods in specific relation to each one of the seven gods and although words he uses for goods can be analogous or similar to the words of the other spheres other than this specific one but we should be very careful in their meanings and understanding. Interestingly, in both sayings it is mentioned that the law of Amurdad is consultation and "keeping the measure *paymānīgīh* is a basic word in virtue ethics and analogically in Aristotle too. As a result how we should understand this homonymous word in this context? On the whole it is methodically imperative to understand each set of goods according their related sphere and not on a universal level.

Another sphere is dominantly religious and its pertinent goods form an organic religious whole. For example in 110 and 181 Emetan narrates in a normal way of goods such as patience, shame, discernment and being a disciple and with considering the last one as the best among all these implicitly he speaks out his intention of putting all these goods under the umbrella of one of them. As a result we are not permitted to read these goods as we usually read them in everyday and routine human sphere and in this relation we can consider 115 and E38a in the same way.

In comparison, there are other spheres which we read a combination of religious and customary goods. In 113, Emetan enumerates seven goods: nobility as giving presents to the good and worthy men; lordship as restraining from sin; authority as the preservation of the good and uprooting of the wicked; health as separation of the soul and body from the aliens; rightness, good fame and satisfaction as the reverence to spiritual goods for good things. Accordingly, in this combined sphere we observe a combination of religious and conventional goods – we can consider 127 the same way plus this extra characteristic that in each one of the ten mentioned goods there is one sovereign good among them.

In another sphere is a metaphorical description of the explicitly conventional worldly goods. For example in 132, he writes of four human goods in this order: bread, word, work and wife and then give us short metaphorical descriptions of each one. By bread he means shares of a person; by word he means the function of soul an intercessor; by work he means fighting with owns demons; and by wife he means sharing desires in every righteous thing. Accordingly, here we have apparently very conventional goods but we cannot take them as

face value but should consider them in light of Emetan spiritualized metaphorical descriptions.

But among these spheres there are 115 and E38a with the same wordings and content and seem more appropriate to our intended points in comparison with Aristotle virtue ethics. According to both of them there are five good for human beings: religion; character; wisdom; virtue; and fortune. At the stage Emetan speaks of the "multiplicity" of goods that are pertinent to "people" and literally they are "human good" and not metaphysical. For reaching to these human goods we should know and equipped with specific pertinent instruments. The instrument of religion / dēn is faith; the character / xēm is righteous habit, association with good people, learning from every person and not learning evil from any person; wisdom / xrad is maintaining good people and being respectful to them; virtue / hunar is doing ones duty and diligence; and fortune / xwarr is truth and keeping ones word . This is the order of goods in 115 but E38a which includes the same goods begins with character and ends with religion with the same descriptions. With regard to the presence of both fortune and religion in an interrelated way in these two sayings, it seems that human goods are not something monolithic and of a homologous kind and there is room for different kinds of human goods. If we put religion and fortune in the same set (as 74,187) we have another set includes triad of character, wisdom and virtue respectively. And this can be a good starting point for our next discussion about virtues.

Virtues and Practical Logic

Aristotle according to his usual way of thinking and class teaching begins with the prevailing common notions about virtues and then challenges and eventually modifies and appropriates them in relation to the principles of his own philosophy. Therefore alongside Socrates and Plato notions he surveys of the common famous salient beliefs which belong mostly to prephilosophical popular ethics. But here we want to present the general philosophical perception of Aristotle of virtue in order to trace its possible analogical manifestations in Denkard VI.

Accordingly, we consider Aristotle perception of virtue as what can typically called a classical Greek philosophical conception of virtue that maybe summarized in five integrated characteristics (for more see Devettere thesis in 2002, PP. 63-65). For him, virtue as an ethical category is an admirable and

praiseworthy choice that is rooted in human soul/psyche as a unity and as a result is essentially dispositions, habits and states of human soul that is dependent on practical reasoning. It means that soul of human being consciously chooses those admirable psychological states that through practicing them form some good human life for him or her. Virtues are internal native dispositions of human soul that make our humanity.

Within this framework Aristotle makes his own specific explicit contributions on these two levels: in an analytical classificatory way he introduces distinction between good things from authentic virtues; distinction between character (more suitable in place of ethical) virtues and intellectual virtues; and distinction between natural virtues and authentic virtues too (Devettere 2002, 66-71). He tries to give a picture of them in *Nicomachean Ethics* although now we have not such a thing as mentioned in Book II, vii and he develop them in Books III vi- end; and VI. At the first place we read:" let us then take the particular virtues from the diagram / diagrafhV "(NE 1975, II,vii, 1107b). This initial table contains 11 character virtues in a particular order that begins with courage and ends with justice, although the order in which Aristotle subsequently takes up the virtues and vices differs somewhat (R.C. Bartlett & Susan D. Collins 2011, 303). Besides, his important contribution is the distinction of "goods" and "virtues" that at first sight may seem very marginal and small but when we explore more deeply we can see the necessity of this distinction. For there are many good things such as health, wealth, pleasure and the like that can be considered virtues or not. And at the same time there are many virtues that though they are necessary but are insufficient; or there are virtues which can be distorted and misused and thereby become anti good.

On the other hand, Aristotle collects the unit of character virtues under the guidance of phronesis. It means that in Aristotle philosophical virtue ethics, though nature, training and education have roles but the essential role is or more precisely should be by orthos logos in order to shape authentic virtues in distinction of natural, instinctive, educational virtues. And thereby he makes distance from popular ethics and philosophical ethics of both Socrates in *Apology* in which "virtue is wisdom" and Plato's *Republic* in which justice has the pivot role and position.

On this basis, it seems that Aristotle distinctive contribution to virtue ethics includes his distinctions; table of virtues; and the role and function he gives to phronesis in unifying and managing the character virtues as a whole.

But in Emetan human goods are considered from different numbers and angels that are somehow in a close relation with each other and for our purpose we have chosen this set: religion, character, wisdom, virtue and fortune (115, E38a). And prior to sayings about human goods there is no mentioning to any kind of virtue and it is after them that we have them. Apart from marginal issues the crucial point is the distance between good and virtue that they are two things and not one.

Besides, crucial point is the existence of the three short and manifest but rich content-paragraphs which intervene between the unit of human goods and virtues and function as preface to the introduction of virtues. According to B13 as the capstone:" A man who knows how to contemplate with each one of the two wisdoms knows well everything that was and will be" . I suggest that Emetan speaks as an obvious and evident fact the existence of two kinds of wisdom / xrad that he names explicitly as innate /āsn and acquired / gōšorūd wisdoms that are distinctive but work in complementary and interconnective ways with each other. But these two kinds of wisdom are not abstract or textual and as human beings should know how to work and use these two kinds of wisdom and this makes the role and intervention of human beings or specific strata of people crucial and essential. The effect of becoming wise through being equipped with innate and acquired wisdoms is gaining knowledge about "the time of doing good deeds and preventing of bad deeds" (B11, B133). As a result, for Emetan introducing virtues needs a preface about "wisdom" and its two kinds and in this context "doing in time" without mentioning to place has a salient and prevalent meaning.

It is a preface to the virtues too: "Unless one knows what goodness is and what is its adversary, one does not know how to do away with sin" (B14). Once again Emetan refers to "knowledge" and its priority in the field of virtues or virtue ethics. Equipping with this knowledge can lead to a specific action and practice for the latter is dependent on the former and not visa- versa. Moreover, this knowledge has two aspects of goodness and badness and knowing one of them is not sufficient though is necessary. Thereby, once again we see the emphasis and salient role of knowledge which leads to practice in the sphere of ethics.

Then Emetan introduces the table of virtues and vices in his own specific order and rationale. Although suggesting such a table is not something unprecedented (Menasce 1958,52) but with exploring it an outline of some parts of Book II of Aristotelian *Nicomachean Ethics* comes to mind. Initially the number of virtues and vicious in Aristotle are about 35 included 11 virtues beside 24 vices (excess and defect) that are mentioned in chapter seven of Book II. In comparison with *Denkart VI* there is a clear cut formulaic economic table of only 32 virtues and vices respectively that about five titles are essentially "religious ones" but all the rest are "character virtues". For figuring out Emetan table we should be acquainted with his rationale and logic. Formally, the table is composed of short sentences that each one of them is composed of two elements: one specific virtue plus its specific opposite. Besides, though they are independent and distinct sentences but we should read them in together. And as a result of these meaningful units about 26 character virtues take shape.

Accordingly, Emetan begins the table of virtues and vices with "generosity" - although Aristotle begins his so-called table in the seventh chapter of Book II with "courage": "generosity is goodness / wehīh, and squandering is its adversary/ petyārag" (B 14, 1). Accordingly, generosity as thesis is good and squandering as its antithesis is bad. This sentence is acceptable within the virtue ethics that is based essentially on two poles one good and the other bad. But it is not all for after it we come to this sentence:" Thrift is goodness, and avarice is its adversary" (B 14,9). This latter sentence should be read as the pair of the former for badness can bisected into excess and defect that appear in the latter sentence after the former. Therefore sentences one and nine form a meaningful pair although they have distance but should be read in interconnection with each other. What is the justifying logic of such a writing and arrangement? We suggest that in the context of virtue ethics there is a polarity between A as a positive thesis and B as a negative antithesis. At the same time one pole of this polarity which is goodness is the virtue or mean and the other pole that is badness or vice is composed of two subsections. In this relation in a precise and concise form Emetan narrates: "They held this too: the main thing in transgression/ wināh is excess / frēbūd and deficiency/ abēbūd. The main thing in a virtuous work / kirbag is the right measure/ paymān" (Denkard VI, 38. And 40, 42 and 43 too) .

Besides, though both excess and defect are opposites with each other but one of them is closer to the virtue or mean and in comparison with its counterpart can be considered better. Therefore "generosity" and "squandering" are virtue and vices respectively at the same time, squandering is composed of "thrift" as defect and "avarice" as excess. But for Emetan thrift is closer to generosity and he considers it better than avarice.

The above outline reminds to the comparativist mind chap. 7 about the table of virtues and vices; chap. 8 about three kinds of dispositions; and chap. 9 on the practical rules in order to hit the mean as a difficult and relative task in the second Book of *Nicomachean Ethics*. Notwithstanding all these appropriations and analogies, why thrift as defect is considered as virtue in contrast with avarice, for at this stage Aristotle suggests avarice instead (NE Book II, viii, lines 31-34)? It seems that the issue returns to the possible and diverse relations that in each "situation" can be mapped between defect and excess with the mean or middle. For example, in some cases extremes show a certain likeness to the mean; and in some other cases the defect, in others the excess is more opposed to the mean. Accordingly, we can say that here Emetan as a prudent man considers that thrift other than avarice has more affinity with generosity as mean and as such is good. And this is not in opposition with the substance and spirit of Aristotle suggestion that is summarized at the end of Book two, chap. Ix 1109b 20-25:" … but that one should lean sometimes to the side of excess and sometimes to that of deficiency, since this is the easiest way of hitting the mean and the right course".

The same structure and rationale can be suggested and applied about the other 26 sentences that are about character virtues: first there is opposition of thesis as virtue or mean with antithesis as vice; then antithesis is bisected to excess and defect; and at last one of the defects has more inclination to virtue and as a result is preferable.

Meanwhile, on the ground of this rationale and Emetan wordings there are some traces of the four core common character virtues that are characteristics of classical Greek virtue ethics and Aristotle too. The second virtue and vice in Emetan table is about one subject that should be put on a wider context that is managing our different feelings such as joy, sympathy, kindness, spiritedness, anger, grief and so forth. For example, in relation to

spiritedness there are two sentences which are apart but interrelated with each other. According to the general polarity and in the first sentence "confidence" is good and "hesitation" [Menasce translation is more appropriate than Shaked] is bad (B14, 2). Then in the sentence 13 "hesitation" as vice is divided into timidity as excess and bashful ass defect. At the same time, bashfulness is nearer to the mean and it is only and merely in comparison with timidity it is considered good. Apart from his only sentence about "temperance" in eating/drinking (B14,32) in the category of "physical virtues", in regard to temperance in sex we can found out the same mentioned structure and logic. In this regard, cleanness of body is considered a virtue and in opposition fastidiousness as a vice (B14,19) and this fastidiousness has two subdivisions that is love for ones wife and intercourse with a whore that the first one is preferable and better than the other vice (B14,20). And in relation to the third core character virtue that is justice as our relations with the other people and building fair communities and institutions, there are relatively more sentences. According to the 28th sentence justice is virtue and its opposite is vengeance. At the same time with regard to the social nature of this kind of virtue and vice Emetan introduces a typology of different groups of the people such as good-doers [B14,5], evil-doers and enemies [B14, 30], professionals [B14,29] and then narrates the pertinent injustice in regard to each one of these groups. For example, in relation to enemies and evil-doers the defect is smiting and the excess is irascibility which both are subdivisions of vice but the former is closer to justice. Across these three core virtues and specially justice among them we observe that sentences related to friendship as a distinctly Aristotelian virtue that occupies two Books of *Nicomachean Ethics* has a prominent position too. Here friendship and its suggested equivalents in relation to virtues and vices are introduced. For example, he writes:" Friendship/ dōstīh is goodness, and sensuality is its adversity" (Denkard VI, B14, 11). Then he considers sympathy / dil-dardīh as another comparable virtue with friendship that is in opposition with antipathy as its vice [B14, 12.]. Moreover, love/ mihr, possession of warm heart and compassion are good and complaint and lamentation are their adversary [B14,17]. Accordingly, character virtue of friendship in its short and economic format on the one hand is distinguished of justice as a social virtue we have with the people as other individuals and on the other hand, it is differentiated from its close character equivalents such as sympathy and

love which we have with familiar individuals. They have meaningful connotations for the readers of this text in its specific social and historical milieu and as a result they are not abstract and metaphysical but are concrete and contextual.

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The Power of Practice and Dispassion

Aristotle's Ethics as an Overlooked Resource for Understanding Patanjali's Yoga Sutras

Anne-Marie Schultz

Abstract

In *The Shape of Ancient Thought*, Thomas McEvilley explores the ongoing exchange of ideas between cultures of the Indian subcontinent and the Ancient Greek world. Scholars often discuss similarities between classic Indian thought and the philosophical framework that undergirds Plato's dialogues. As fruitful as the Platonic comparison is for understanding the texts that provide the philosophical underpinnings for contemporary hatha yoga practice, I argue that Aristotle is an overlooked resource for understanding the complexities of these texts and the yogic practices that they outline. To my knowledge, these affinities between Aristotle and the yogic tradition more broadly and Patanjali in particular, are almost completely unrecognized by the scholarly community. I begin with the opening lines of Patanjali's *Yoga Sutras,* which describes the aim of yoga. In part two, I address the importance of practice and detachment (or dispassion) in achieving those ends. In the third section, I explore Patanjali's articulation of the eightfold path as a way of illustrating the ethical underpinnings of yoga practice. Next, I turn to Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. I discuss the role of habituation in virtue cultivation. I then explore the numerous references that Aristotle makes to pleasure and pain in this discussion. I conclude with an assessment of the overall similarities between Patanjali and Aristotle with respect to the role that habituation and renunciation play in the cultivation of the good life.

Keywords

Aristotle, Ethics, Hatha Yoga, Patanjali, Practice, Habituation, Dispassion, Pleasure and Pain.

"Whatever we learn to do, we learn by actually doing it; men come to be builders, for instance, by building, and harp players by playing the harp. In the same way, by doing just acts we come to be just; by doing self-controlled acts, we come to be self-controlled; and by doing brave acts, we become brave."

Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* (II, 1, 1103b)

"Practice becomes firmly established when it has been cultivated uninterruptedly and with devotion over a prolonged period of time."

Patanjali, Yoga Sutras (1.14)

"In everything, we should be on our guard especially against the pleasant — pleasure that is — because we are not impartial judges of it."

Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* (II, 9, 1109b)

"Attachment stems from [experiences] of happiness."

Patanjali, Yoga Sutras (2.7)

In *The Shape of Ancient Thought*, Thomas McEvilley explores the ongoing exchange of ideas between cultures of the Indian subcontinent and the Ancient Greek world.[1] Scholars often discuss similarities between classic Indian thought and the philosophical framework that undergirds Plato's dialogues.[2] As fruitful as the Platonic comparison is for understanding the texts that provide the philosophical underpinnings for contemporary hatha yoga practice, I argue that Aristotle is an overlooked resource for understanding the complexities of these texts and the yogic practices that they outline. To my knowledge, these affinities between Aristotle and the yogic tradition more broadly and Patanjali in particular, are almost completely unrecognized by the scholarly community.[3]

I begin with the opening lines of Patanjali's *Yoga Sutras,* which describes the aim of yoga. In part two, I address the importance of practice and detachment (or dispassion) in achieving those ends. In the third section, I explore Patanjali's articulation of the eightfold path as a way of illustrating the ethical underpinnings of yoga practice. Next, I turn to Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. I discuss the role of habituation in virtue cultivation. I then explore the numerous references that Aristotle makes to pleasure and pain in this discussion.[4] I conclude with an assessment of the overall similarities between Patanjali and Aristotle with respect to the role that habituation and renunciation play in the cultivation of the good life.

I Patanjali's Definition of Yoga

Patanjali's *Yoga Sutras* were probably first written down sometime between 250 BCE and 250 CE.[5] The book has four chapters (padas). Each contains a set of logically structured aphorisms that explore aspects of yoga practice.[6] At root, this book is a meditation manual. It tells the practitioner how to control

the mind in order to see the true nature of reality. The first chapter, "Samadhi Pada," sets out the aims and goals of yoga practice. It begins with the following three aphorisms:

> Now, the teachings of yoga [are presented] (*YS*, 1.1).[7]
>
> Yoga is the stilling of the changing states of the mind (*YS*, 1.2).
>
> When that is accomplished, the seer abides in its own true nature (*YS*, 1.3).

Yoga is the practice of stilling the aspects of our consciousness that prevent us from seeing our inner divine nature.[8] Patanjali explains what happens to our minds when we do not abide in our own true nature: "At other times, the seer identifies with the fluctuations of the mind" (*YS*, 1.4).

These fluctuations are called *vrttis*. *Vrtti*, in Sanskrit, literally means a revolving or a turning. A mental *vrtti* occurs when the mind turns from one thought to another. Patanjali lists five basic *vrttis*: right knowledge, error, imagination, sleep and memory. Given Patanjali's definition of yoga as "stilling the fluctuations of the mind," one might think that the aim of yoga practice is to still all mental fluctuations. However, this is not the case. Any of the five vrttis can either help or hinder our practice (1.5). Each *vrtti* can be painful (*klista*) or non-painful (*aklista*) vrttis (1.5). Differently put, each can help or hinder our ability to see reality. Take just one of these vrttis, memory, as an example. Memory can help us see our true nature when we remember past experiences and practices that provided us with glimpses of our higher spiritual states. Memory can be a hindrance when we keep focusing on the past rather than on the present moment. Patanjali explains more precisely what he means by each of these mental fluctuations in the next five sutras (1.6–1.11). He describes the primary ways to still the fluctuations. Practice and dispassion come into the picture at this point.

II Practice and Dispassion as the Two Wings of Yoga

BKS Iyengar, the foremost practitioner of modern hatha yoga, and author of his own translation and commentary of Patanjali's *Yoga Sutras*, along with numerous other books on yoga, describes practice and detachment as the "two wings of yoga practice."[9] Patanjali sees them as integrally linked as well. He lists them together as the two main ways of stilling the fluctuations; "The vrtti states

of mind are stilled by practice (*abhyasa*) and dispassion (*vairagya*)" (1.12). What does Patanjali mean by practice and detachment? He tells us in the next four sutras. First, he turns to practice, "practice is the effort to be fixed in concentrating the mind."[10] We practice whenever we focus our effort to still the fluctuations of our mental activity. Practice has a cumulative effect when done over time. Patanjali continues, "Practice becomes firmly established when it has been cultivated uninterruptedly and with devotion over a prolonged period of time" (1.13). This sutra tells us three things. One, we must work without interruption. Two, we must work with a sense of devotion.[11] Three, we must work for a long time.[12] Without interruption and for a long time are relatively straightforward terms. Devotion means having an awareness of the divine as the ultimate aim of our endeavors. In the yoga context, there is a strong affinity if not absolute identity, with the individual soul and God.

Simply put, practice is any continuous, long-term activity that we do with devotion that stills the fluctuations of the mind. This somewhat vague description begs the question, what exactly does practice involve? Patanjali outlines several specific practices later in this chapter.[13] The first one is devotion to God (1.23).[14] He then suggests meditating on God and chanting Om, which represents God, as reliable means of stilling the mental fluctuations (1.29). He offers more secular options as well. One can fix the mind on one object (1.32). One can "cultivate an attitude of friendship toward those who are happy, compassion toward those in distress,[15] joy toward those who are virtuous, and equanimity toward those who are non-virtuous" (1.33). Other practices include exhaling and retaining the breath (1.34), focusing on a sense object (1.35), cultivating a pain free and luminous state (1.36), and contemplating those that are free from desire (1.37). We can also reflect on knowledge attained from dreams and dreamless sleep (1.38). Patanjali ends this list of techniques with the rather Aristotelian observation, "practice can be anything that works to still the fluctuations (1.39). While I find the specific techniques fascinating in their own right, here I am more interested in emphasizing Patanjali's broader understanding that these techniques are examples of what he calls "practice," that which we do without interruption, with devotion, over a long period of time. Any of these techniques, properly practiced, will still our mental fluctuations. We do not have to practice all of them. We must search for the particular practice or practices that work for us and do those for a long time, repeatedly, without interruption, with devotion. One final observation about devotion. If we practice with devotion, and devotion is an awareness of the

divine, and there are strong affinities between the divine and the soul, then could one argue that at least part of what is meant by devotion is care for the self, a care that is aimed at true knowledge of the self.

After discussing what he means by practice, Patanjali defines dispassion:

> Dispassion is the controlled consciousness of one who is without craving for sense objects, whether these are actually perceived, or described [in scripture] (*YS*, 1.15).
>
> Higher than renunciation is indifference to the *gunas* [themselves]. This stems from perception of the *purusa*, soul (*YS*, 1.16).

Dispassion means controlling our desire, not only for sensory experience, but for the objects we crave.[16] We must control even our desire for the thought of pleasurable experience. Ultimately, we must become indifferent to nature itself. The gunas are the qualities inherent in all nature. We must cultivate our ability to remain unaffected by the constant flux of the natural world.[17]

III Practice and Dispassion in the Context of the Eightfold Path

Direct comments about ethical action do not immediately arise in the text. Nonetheless, Patanjali places the practice of yoga, the practicing of stilling the fluctuations of the mind, within a broad comprehensive ethical framework: the eight limbs of yoga.[18]

The eight limbs are abstentions (*yamas*), observances (*niyamas*), posture (*asana*), breath control (*pranayama*), disengagement of the senses (*pratyahara*), concentration (*dharana*), meditation (*dhyana*), and absorption (*samadhi*) (*YS*, 2.29).

The *yamas* are universal ethical principles. Patanjali explains, "they are considered the great vow. They are not exempted by one's class, place, time or circumstance. They are universal" (2.29). These ethical principles apply to everyone regardless of circumstance. These yamas are "nonviolence, truthfulness, refrainment from stealing, celibacy, and renunciation of [unnecessary] possessions" (2.30). These *yamas* govern our interactions with other people. The *niyamas* outline standards for personal comportment. Patanjali defines those as cleanliness, contentment, austerity, study [of scripture], and devotion to God" (2.32). They are universal as well.

When Patanjali describes each of the *yamas* and *niyamas*, he uses a particular phrasing that is helpful for the comparison with Aristotle. He defines the virtue and then describes what happens when one is "established in" the virtue (*pratisthayam*). For example, consider the first and most important of the ethical yamas, nonviolence (*ahimsa*). Patanjali writes, "In the presence of one who is established in nonviolence, enmity is abandoned. (2.35). Similarly, "when one is established in refrainment from stealing, all jewels manifest" (2.37). Simply put, Patanjali regards virtue cultivation as something that requires long uninterrupted practice. When we become established in the virtue, good effects manifest.[19]

Dispassion runs through the *yamas* and *niyamas* as well. The last three of the *yamas* involve detaching from desire: refrainment from stealing, celibacy, and renunciation of [unnecessary] possessions (2.30). *Saucha*, one of the *niyamas*, "leads to disinterest in contact with others for personal gratification" (2.40). Dispassion is part of the fifth limb of yoga, *pratyahara*. *Pratyahara* involves drawing the senses inward toward their source. To do this, we must loosen our attachment to the external world. Patanjali also mentions cultivating indifference to pleasure and pain (1.33) as a means of stilling the fluctuations of the mind, and in 2.15 cautions about remaining detached from the play of the gunas. Iyengar's translation draws this aspect out nicely: "The wise man knows that owing to fluctuations, the qualities of nature, and subliminal impressions, even pleasant experiences are tinged with sorrow, and he keeps aloof from them" (2.15). Cultivating detachment helps us avoid future suffering (2.16).[20] Dispassion, taken together with habituation, enables us to still the fluctuations of our mind and see our own true nature.

IV Practice in Aristotle

In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle distinguishes between moral and intellectual virtues. Though both have relevance for a comparison with Patanjali, I will only consider moral virtue here. Moral virtues are character traits like courage, temperance, justice, piety, and generosity. Aristotle emphatically states the role that habituation plays in acquiring virtues of character; "Virtue of character is a result of habituation (*ethos*). From this, it is clear that none of the virtues of character arises in us by nature. For nothing natural can be made

to behave differently by habituation" (II, 1, 1103a). He reemphasizes the point a little later, "So virtues arise in us neither by nature nor contrary to nature, but nature gives us the capacity to acquire them, and completion comes through habituation" (II, 1, 1103a).

For Aristotle, habituation involves repeatedly doing the ethical action; "For by acting as we do in our dealings with other men, some of us become just, others unjust; and by acting as we do in the face of danger, and by becoming habituated to feeling fear or confidence, some of us become courageous, others cowardly" (II, 1, 1103b). Just like any other craft or technical practice, "We become builders by building, and lyre-players by playing the lyre. So too we become just by doing just actions, temperate by temperate actions, and courageous by courageous actions" (II, 1, 1103b). Aristotle does not say much about how long this process takes, but, no doubt, it is similar to what Patanjali describes as being done "without interruption" and "over a long period of time" (2.13).

Patanjali's sense of being established in a virtue is present here. Aristotle explains, "For when we are talking about a person's character, we do not say that he is wise or has judgement, but that he is even-tempered or temperate. Yet we do praise the wise person for his state, and the states worthy of praise we call virtues" (I, 13, 1103a). Aristotle remarks, "The same goes for cases of appetites and anger; by conducting themselves in one way or the other in such circumstances, some become temperate and even-tempered, others intemperate and bad tempered. In a word, then, like states arise for like activities" (II, 1, 1103b). The mind of the virtuous person does not easily fluctuate. Yet Aristotle acknowledges that one should sometimes experience fluctuation when the situation demands. For example, anger is an appropriate response to a true slight; fear is an appropriate response to a real threat to one's life. Both thinkers emphasize controlling mental fluctuations, but allow room for the right kinds of mental fluctuations in our ongoing activities. Patanjali's notion of being established in a virtue also appears in the primary distinction Aristotle makes between various parts of the soul: feelings, capacities and states (II, 5, 1105b). For Aristotle, virtue cannot be a feeling because we are not "called good or bad because of feelings" (II, 5, 1105b). Virtue is not in us by nature because we cannot act contrary to nature. Aristotle concludes, "Virtue then, is a state involving rational choice, consisting in a mean relative to us and determined by reason"

(II, 5, 1107a).

Patanjali also stresses that virtuous acts must be done "with devotion." On the face of it, Aristotle says very little about the role of devotion in habituation. However, when one considers devotion as commitment to the good and self-cultivation, similarities emerge. For instance, Aristotle acknowledges that our mental attitude with respect to action matters: "*the agent must also be in the right state when he does them*" (II, 4, 1105a). The virtuous agent chooses to perform the action: "The virtue of a human being too will be the state that makes a human being good and makes him perform his characteristic activity well" (II, 6, 1106a). The virtuous person is committed to the good and chooses the virtuous action for the sake of the good. Thus Aristotelian virtue cultivation requires devotion to moral ideals.

V. Pleasure and Detachment in Aristotle's *Ethics*

Aristotle links the attainment of virtuous states with pleasure and pain.[21] Some virtues themselves involve the regulation of pleasure. Consider temperance and courage: "By abstaining from pleasures we become temperate, and having become so we are most able to abstain from them. Similarly with courage; by becoming habituated to make light of what is fearful and to face up to it, we become courageous, and when we are, we shall be most able to face up to it" (II, 2, 1104b). Aristotle also regards the experience of pleasure in a virtue as a sign that the virtue has been acquired: "We must take as an indication of a person's states the pleasure or pain consequent on what he does, because the person who abstains from bodily pleasures and finds his enjoyment in doing just this is temperate, while the person who finds doing it oppressive intemperate" (II, 3, 1104b). The opposite is also the case: "In the same way, the person who enjoys every pleasure and never restrains himself becomes intemperate, while he who avoids all pleasures-as boors do-becomes, as it were, insensible" (II, 2, 1104a).[22]

Because of the important role pleasure plays in our lives, we cannot judge it appropriately. Aristotle explains:

> Pleasure has grown up with all of us since infancy and is consequently a feeling difficult to eradicate, ingrained as it is in our lives. And, to a greater or less-

> er extent, we regulate our actions by pleasure and pain. Our whole inquiry, then must be concerned with them, because whether we feel enjoyment and pain in a good or bad way has great influence on our actions. (II, 2, 1105a)

However, it is worth noting that pleasure is most closely associated with intellectual activity for Aristotle, which is the highest activity, and this intellectual activity actualizes the divine element in a person (X, 8, 1178b). Intellectual activity is also the most sustainable form of life that brings happiness. Thus pleasure for Aristotle might well be better understood as the satisfaction that comes from a life devoted to actualizing the divine.

While Aristotle regards the whole of this ethical inquiry as engaged with pleasure and pain, Patanjali regards both pleasure and pain as afflictions (*kleshas*). Yoga aims at weakening them. Patanjali explains, "the *yoga* of action is for bringing about *samadhi* and for weakening the afflictions" (*YS*, 2.2). Nonetheless, Patanjali and Aristotle share a basic understanding of the potential disruptions that pleasure presents us with in our attempts to become good.

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Endnotes

1. Thomas McEvilley, *The Shape of Ancient Thought: Comparative Studies in Greek and Indian Philosophies* (New York: Allworth Press, 2002).

2. They are numerous and quite obvious to see: a strong relational affinity between the individual Soul and Universal truth, a fundamental distrust of the body, and a belief that the soul is somehow trapped in the body and must be freed through philosophical activity. Plato, drawing from the Pythagoreans, advanced a view of reincarnation based on actions in previous lives. There are less often noted similarities as well. The idea of an asana pose and a Platonic form, Elenchus and the process of demonstration and correction in yoga practice, the interplay between an oral and a written tradition, and the understanding of philosophy as a way of life. He appeared to advocate vegetarianism, gymnastic practices, and modes of chanting along with other musical experiences as a means of focusing the mind. All of these practices have clear

counterparts in classic Indian texts like *The Bhagavad Gita* and Patanjali's *Yoga Sutras*. See Jeffrey Gold, "Plato in the Light of Yoga," *Philosophy of East and West* 46, no. 1 (1996): 17–32; Vassiliki Panayotaki-Papathanassopoulou, *Human Potential in the Philosophies of Socrates, Plato, Confucius and Yoga* (Hong Kong: Union Institute, 1997); Judy D. Saltzman, "Wisdom and Method: Yoga in the Platonic Dialogues," in *Theory and Practice of Yoga: Essays in Honour of Gerald James Larson*, vol. 110, Studies in the Histories of Religion (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 110–63; Swami Paramananda, *Plato and Vedic Idealism* (Whitefish: Kessinger, 2006); S. Lupaşcu, "The Chariot of the Soul. A Commentary on Plato, *Phaedrus*, 246a–54b and *Kath-Upanishad* I, 3.3–3.9," *ARCHÆVS. Studies in the History of Religions* XI–XII (2007): 337–50.

3. L. Duffy, "Balance in Yoga and Aristotle," in *Yoga - Philosophy for Everyone: Bending Mind and Body*, ed. L. S. Swan (Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 129–38; D. Prithipaul, "Anthropological Persuasions in Patanjali and in Aristotle," *The Visva-Bharati Journal of Philosophy* 21, no. 1 (1984): 33–46; J. Wiesner, "Taming the Wild Elephant: Yoga, Cognition and Emotion," *Man in India* 90, no. 1–2 (2010): 329–42.

4. Aspects of the *Yoga Sutras* illuminate our traditional understanding of Aristotle and as time allows I will point those out. The importance of friendship and the priority of the contemplative life help us understand Patanjali's comprehensive ethical system. Exploring those parallels are beyond the scope of this paper.

5. For a discussion of the various dates associated with Patanjali, see Georg Feuerstein, *The Yoga Tradition: Its History, Literature, Philosophy, and Practice* (Prescott, AZ: Hohm Press, 1998). See also Edwin Bryant, *The Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali: A New Edition, Translation, and Commentary with Insights from the Traditional Commentators* (New York: North Point Press, 2009), xxv–xxxiv.

6. On their own, the sutras can seem quite opaque, rather like trying to figure out a Heraclitean aphorism. However, the sutras are not aphorism, but rather discrete parts of a unified whole. They resemble the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein in this way. Furthermore, there is a long commentary tradition associated with their written transmission. Originally, the sutras were transmitted in an oral context, where the teacher and student would discuss them together. This dialogical dimension of the Sutras remains. Imagine an implicit question before each of the sutras. Implicit question: "What are we doing now?" Answer: "Now we are doing yoga." Implicit question: "What is yoga?" Answer: "Yoga is the stilling of the fluctuations of the mind." Implicit question: "Why would we want to do that?" Answer: "When we do that, we dwell in our own true splendor." Implicit question: "Okay, what happens when we are not doing that?" Answer: "At other times, we identify with the fluctuations of consciousness." Many thanks to Edwin Bryant to calling my attention to the implicit conversation imbedded in the sutra structure.

7. I use Edwin Bryant's translation of the sutras throughout. *Yoga Sūtras*, 2009. At times, I draw upon Bellur Krishnamachar Sundaraja Iyengar's translation of the sutras. *Light on the Yoga Sutras of Patanjali* (New York: Harper Collins, 2012).

8. Aristotle describes the immortal as "the highest element within us" (X, 7, 1177b). All references to the *Nicomachean Ethics* are from Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. Roger Crisp (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.)

9. Iyengar, *Light on the Yoga Sutras*, 65.

10. Iyengar's translation reads, "practice is the steadfast effort to still these fluctuations" (1.13). *Light on the Yoga Sutras*, 63.

11. Prashant Iyengar gives some clues about what this might mean on a more basic level when he remarks, "practicing is not merely a mechanical effort. It is a very difficult endeavor wherein there is a replication of effort in a region in terms of quale (quality) and quanta (quantity)." Prashant then remarks, "Here the golden rule is to do neither more nor less, nor 'more or less'." *The Alpha and Omega of Trikonasana* (Mumbai: YOG Publishing, 2004): 15.

12. See Aristotle's arguments about the steadiness of contemplation in *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book X. Of course, Aristotle sees self-sufficiency as inherent to its value.

13. "[But] for others, [the state where only subconscious impressions remain] is preceded by faith, vigor, memory, samadhi absorption, and discernment (1.20). Bryant, *Yoga Sutras*, 77.

14. He helpfully defines what he means by god in the next four sutras (1.23–1.27). Bryant, *Yoga Sutras*, 81–109.
15. This has a direct correlation with the definition of pity in the *Rhetoric*: Aristotle defines pity as "[p]ain at an appearing evil, destructive or painful, belonging to one who does not deserve to have it happen—the sort of evil that one might expect oneself to suffer, or some member of one's family" (II, 8, 1385b). Aristotle, *On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civil Discourse*, trans. George A. Kennedy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).
16. Translations of this word vary from "detachment" to "dispassion." See Byrant's commentary for a discussion. *Yoga Sūtras*, 52–60.
17. Dispassion also arises in the list of specific techniques mentioned in the previous paragraphs. One of the ways that we can still the fluctuations of mind is to contemplate those that are free from desire (1.37). Thinking about the desireless state helps us attain that state within ourselves.
18. The first mention of easily recognizable ethical action occurs at 1.33. Patanjali writes, "By cultivating an attitude of friendship toward those who are happy, compassion toward those in distress, joy toward those who are virtuous, and equanimity toward those who are non-virtuous, lucidity arises in the mind." Bryant, *Yoga Sutras*, 128. Feuerstein notes, "The foundation of Yoga, as of all authentic spirituality, is a universal ethics." *Yoga Tradition*, 245.
19. Consider the rest of the yamas in this regard: "When one is established in truthfulness, one ensures the fruition of actions. When one is established in non-stealing, all jewels come to you. Upon the establishment of celibacy, power is attained. When refrainment from covetousness becomes firmly established, knowledge of the whys and wherefores of births manifests" Bryant, *Yoga Sutras*, 2.35–2.39.
20. "Suffering that has yet to manifest is to be avoided" Bryant, *Yoga Sutras*, 2.15.
21. Dorethea Frede, "Pleasure and Pain in Aristotle's *Ethics*," in *The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle's* Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Richard Kraut (John Wiley & Sons, 2008), 255–75. and David Bostock, "Pleasure and Activity in Aristotle's *Ethics*," *Phronesis* 33 (1988): 251–72.
22. Though pleasure is clearly associated with some virtues, Aristotle disregards the common notion that happiness as such has anything to do with pleasure. He explains, "The masses, the coarsest people, see it as pleasure, and so they like the life of enjoyment." *Ethics*, I, 5, 1095b. At the same time, the contemplative life is, in fact, the most pleasant life. He writes of such people who seek the life of contemplation, "Their life therefore has no need of pleasure as some kind of lucky ornament, but contains its pleasure in itself." *Ethics,* I, 8, 1099a. Also, Aristotle appears to have a more positive view of some pleasures, particularly intellectual ones, than to recommend detachment from them.

Conscience, Contemplation and the Eternal Law
Aristotle and Aquinas on the Soul

Ann Ward

Abstract

This paper explores the relationship between Aristotelian ethical philosophy and the Christian theology of St. Thomas Aquinas. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle argues that all moral actions are voluntary actions. Included in such actions that are voluntary are those that require knowledge of general or universal principles. Ignorance or claims of ignorance of such universal moral principles, Aristotle argues, can be considered voluntary and hence blameworthy. Yet, in assuming that knowledge of universal moral principles should be present in everyone, Aristotle, I argue, points to Aquinas's concept of conscience. Aquinas argues that knowledge of the first practical principles of right and wrong has been endowed in us by nature and cannot be abolished from the human heart. Conscience, applying these first practical principles, witnesses, incites, and judges of all our actions. Aristotle also discusses intellectual virtue, the highest of which is contemplation, in both the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Metaphysics*. In contemplation, Aristotle argues, human beings may grasp the final cause of the cosmos which Aristotle characterizes as the unmoved first mover, or the divine reason that sustains the universe and all within it. I argue that Aristotle's suggestion that human reason can connect with a divine reason that is at once the cause and the principle of cosmic intelligibility, relates closely to Aquinas's concept of natural law articulated in the *Summa*. Natural law, according to Aquinas, is humanity's rational knowledge of and participation in God's eternal law, through which He governs the universe.

Keywords

Aristotle, Aquinas, Voluntary, Conscience, Contemplation, Natural Law.

Introduction

This paper explores the relationship between Aristotelian ethical philosophy and the Christian theology of St. Thomas Aquinas. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle argues that all moral actions that require knowledge of universal principles are voluntary actions. Ignorance of such universal moral principles, Aristotle argues, can be considered voluntary and hence blameworthy. Aristotle also discusses the intellectual virtue of contemplation in both the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Metaphysics*. In contemplation human beings may grasp the final cause of the cosmos which Aristotle characterizes as the unmoved first mover, or

the divine reason that sustains the universe and all within it. Aristotle's assumption that knowledge of universal moral principles should be present in everyone, I argue, points to Aquinas's concept of conscience articulated in his *Summa Theologiae*. Moreover, Aristotle's suggestion that human reason in contemplation can connect with a divine reason that is at once the cause and the principle of cosmic intelligibility, relates closely to Aquinas's understanding of natural law. Natural law, according to Aquinas in the *Summa*, is humanity's rational knowledge of and participation in God's eternal law through which He governs the universe.

Aristotle and the Voluntary

Aristotle begins the *Nicomachean Ethics* by embracing the claim that all human activity aims at the good (*NE* 1094a1-2).[1] The highest human good for which we are searching is an end in itself, chosen for its own sake and not as a means to any other end, and toward which all of our actions aim (*NE* 1094a18-22). Aristotle identifies this highest human good as happiness (*eudaimonia*) (*NE* 1097b1-2). The argument that happiness is the highest human good, Aristotle concedes, may initially seem a little trite. To address the concern that the condition of happiness may lack the seriousness required for a complete and self-sufficient human life, Aristotle grounds his definition of happiness in the proper "work" or "function" of the human being (*NE* 1097b25-35). This proper life, or work, of the human being, is "an activity of soul in accord with reason" (*NE* 1098a1-8) Moreover, Aristotle adds that it is an activity of soul in accord with the reason a "serious person," who serves as the standard for the proper life's work. Since the serious person aims to live virtuously, the definition of happiness is thus further refined to become, "an activity of soul in accord with virtue" (*NE* 1098a16). The life of virtue, therefore, is identified as that which makes us happy and hence as the best way of life for a human being.

Defining happiness as an activity of soul in accord with reason, and more particularly in accord with virtue, is not unproblematic, however, because virtue is divided by Aristotle into two different types: moral virtue and intellectual virtue. Which of these virtues for Aristotle constitutes happiness is one of the most contested debates in the contemporary literature on the *Nicomachean Ethics.* Scholars such as David Bostock and J.L. Ackrill hold that Aristotle has an "inclusive" view of happiness, requiring the practice of both the moral and intellectual virtues.[2]

On the other hand, scholars such as C.D.C. Reeve and Thomas Nagel believe that Aristotle has an "exclusive" view of happiness grounded in the intellectual virtue of contemplation.[3]

While not providing a definitive answer to whether Aristotle has an "inclusive" or "exclusive" view of happiness, I will focus below on the relationship of both types of virtue to Thomistic theology.

Aristotle defines moral virtue as an activity of the soul in accordance with reason, a reason that determines the mean between excess and deficiency (*NE* 1106b35-1107a1). Virtue is an internal motion of the soul that culminates in an action that is external, and actions, internal and external, that "hit" the mean, as it were, are virtues, excesses and deficiencies are vices.[4] For instance, Aristotle presents the virtue of courage understood as a mean in the following way. In an external circumstance of danger, the passion of fear is aroused in the soul (*NE* 115a25-30). If the soul is disposed to give in to this feeling of fear, it suffers from an excess of fear, which leads to the vice of cowardice (*NE* 1107b4). On the other hand, if the soul is disposed to suppress or ignore these feelings of fear, it suffers from a deficiency of fear, which leads to the vice of recklessness (*NE* 1107b3; 1116b34-1117a1). If the soul, guided by reason to the mean, is disposed to feel not too much fear nor too little fear but rather the median amount, this leads to the virtue of courage. Reason determines the mean and then guides the passions to it, which is then followed by an external action of the body (*NE* 1138b21-25).

In the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle argues that all moral virtues and their corresponding vices are voluntary actions. Aristotle's distinction between the voluntary and the involuntary provides a vivid illustration, I believe, of the connection between Aristotelian moral theory and Aquinas's concept of conscience.

Voluntary actions, according to Aristotle, are either praised or blamed. Involuntary actions are pardoned or pitied. One kind of activity that illustrate the distinction between the voluntary and involuntary are actions done out of ignorance. Aristotle makes a sharp distinction, however, between actions done *on account of* ignorance, which are sometimes involuntary, and actions done *in ignorance*, which are considered voluntary (*NE* 110b25). Actions done on account of ignorance, according to Aristotle, are of two types: actions for which the agent feels regret afterwards, which can be considered involuntary, and those for which the agent feels no remorse, which, like actions done *in* ignorance, are considered

voluntary (*NE* 1110b18-24). Aristotle's meaning can be illuminated by the following example. Two prisoners awaiting execution were involved in a bank robbery in which a teller was shot and killed. One prisoner expresses remorse and apologizes to the family of the victim, claiming that they didn't believe anyone was going to get hurt. The other prisoner, in contrast, expresses no remorse and insults the victim's family.

Aristotle suggests that the actions of the remorseful prisoner should be considered involuntary and forgiven, whereas the actions of the prisoner without remorse should be considered voluntary and punished accordingly. How can Aristotle account for this difference after the fact? Aristotle suggests that the remorseful prisoner has knowledge of the general principle that murder is wrong. Yet, they were ignorant of the "various particulars," such as this teller was going to be shot in the botched progress of this particular robbery. Aristotle implies that this ignorance of particulars is beyond the agent's complete control and therefore involuntary and worthy of forgiveness if requested.[5] The remorseless prisoner, on the other hand, is ignorant, or claims to be ignorant, of the general moral principle that murder is wrong (*NE* 1110b33). However, one should not be ignorant of this general principle, Aristotle argues, and hence this ignorance can be considered voluntary and rightly blamed. Yet, where does knowledge of this and other universal moral principles come from? Aristotle is not explicit about the source of such moral knowledge, but in assuming that it should be present in every person, Aristotle, I believe, points to the Christian concept of conscience.

Conscience

In the *Summa Theologiae* Aquinas argues that nature has bestowed on human beings "first practical principles" which "incite to good and murmur against evil" (Question 79, p. 2).[6] Aquinas calls this natural knowledge of right and wrong, which inclines or habituates the person toward good and away from evil, *synderesis* (Question 79, p. 2). From *synderesis* flows conscience. Aquinas describes conscience as an "act" of reason that applies our natural moral knowledge in three senses or situations (Question 79, p. 3). First, conscience is said to witness, recognizing when we have done or not done something. Thus, for example, we may deny to others that we have lied, but our conscience knows that we did. Second, conscience incites or binds, judging that something should or should not

be done; for instance we should be generous to the poor or we should not steal. Third, conscience judges whether what we have done is right or wrong and either excuses, accuses or torments. Thus, the remorseful prisoner in the example above feels guilt for having done what they know is wrong, and asks for forgiveness (Question 79, p. 3).

Aquinas thus claims in his discussion of conscience that there are moral truths, for instance that murder is wrong, that every human being can naturally be expected to know. Moreover, moral truths can be held with the same certainty as scientific truths such as three angles of a triangle equal two right angles. Like Aristotle, who argues that ignorance of certain universal principles should be considered voluntary and thus blameworthy, Aquinas argues that knowledge of the first practical principles of right and wrong have been endowed by nature and cannot be abolished from the human heart (Question 79, p. 2).

Contemplation

Returning to the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle argues that intellectual virtue, and not simply moral virtue, contributes to the happy life. The highest of the intellectual virtues, arising out of the rational part of the soul when unmixed with passion, appears to be what Aristotle calls "contemplation" (*theoretike*). At the close of the *Ethics*, Aristotle claims that contemplation, grounded in theoretical reason, "would constitute the complete happiness of a human being [...] but [...] not insofar as he is a human being [...] but insofar as there is something divine present in him" (*NE* 1177a18-19; 1177b26-28). Human beings, therefore, share the activity of contemplation with the divine, and in the act of contemplation human reason, it seems, in some way connects with the divine reason. This naturally begs the question: Contemplation of what? To begin our search for a preliminary answer to this question, we can turn briefly to Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.

In the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle suggests that wisdom involves knowledge of the first causes spoken of in four senses: material cause, formal cause, efficient cause, and final cause (*Met.* 981b25-30; 983a24-25).[7] The material cause is the "matter" or basic "stuff" of the universe, so to speak, out of which things are made. The formal cause is the shape or embedded purpose of a particular thing in the universe. The efficient cause is the "proximate mover" or triggering event that sets a thing in motion or initiates change, and the final cause is the ultimate purpose or good

for which a thing exists, or its final end. For Aristotle, all entities in the cosmos, including the cosmos itself, can be understood in terms of these four causes.[8] Thus, taking a house as an example, complete knowledge or wisdom of what it is involves understanding it in terms of these four causes. Its material cause would be bricks and mortar, its formal cause would be the shape or design of the house, its efficient cause would be the builder or artist who, in Aristotelian terms, brings the design of the house to be in the bricks and mortar, and the final cause—the purpose or the "why"—for which the house exists, is to provide shelter for persons and property.

Knowledge of the four causes also allows for knowledge of what Aristotle calls substance (*ousia*) (*Met.* 1003b15-20). Substance is "being, qua being," or in other words what it means to be a thing or an entity in the cosmos (*Met.* 1005a13-16). Substance, Aristotle argues, is essence, or what a thing is in virtue of itself; it is the unchanging core that makes something what it is, as opposed to accidental qualities that come and go (*Met.* 1029b11-15; 1030a1-7). Moreover, the only things that have essences are species, or more specifically individuals within species that possess species characteristics (*Met.* 1030a11-17). Thus, for example, particular colours and occupations are accidental qualities of a particular person within the species known as human. A person therefore can be black or white without ceasing to be human, and likewise can switch from being a tailor to a shipbuilder and still maintain their human characteristics. A person, however, who lost their soul, would no longer be human. The soul is an essential or core characteristic of what it means to be human, colour and occupation are not.

Aristotle defines substance, or essence, as the inseparable combination of matter and form, material cause and formal cause (*Met.* 1032b30-1033a5; 1033b4-10, 20-21). Known as his theory of "hylomorphism," Aristotle understands substance or essence as "formed matter;" "form" is like a structure, and "matter" is that which admits of being structured.[9] All individual things, or substances, are a combination of the two. Thus, for example, taking a house again, its substance or essence is the combination of bricks and mortar—its matter—and the design of the house—its form. Taken together they make an individual house which is part of the species of house or building. The efficient cause is the builder and the final cause is shelter.

Applying this methodology to a human being, s/he should be understood not as a mere collection of physical particles, but rather as a collection of physical

particles—her/his matter—with a certain organization or structure—his/her form—which Aristotle understands to be soul. This structure or form, the soul, is, for Aristotle, responsible for you and I being human as opposed to other entities such as horses or trees.[10] Taken together, body and soul make an individual person that is part of the species human.

The efficient cause of the person is a little more difficult to identify. Whereas Aristotle identifies the builder or artist as the efficient cause of man-made or artificial things, he suggests that the seed is the efficient cause of natural things (*Met.* 1034d30-1034b1). If the efficient cause of the human person, or natural organisms, is somewhat difficult to identity, their final cause or embedded purpose may be even harder. I would suggest that for Aristotle, the final cause or purpose of the human being is to think or contemplate the cosmos. In doing so, human beings may contemplate or grasp the final cause or purpose of the cosmos as a whole, which Aristotle characterizes as the unmoved first mover, or the divine reason that sustains the universe and all within it (*Met.* 1072a24-30; 1072b1-10).

At the close of the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle explores what he understands to be the final cause of the cosmos as a whole, containing all of the substances or species within it. Aristotle begins by observing that species are in eternal motion (*Met.* 1071b1-10). This does not mean that Aristotle suggests Darwin's theory of species evolution by means of natural selection. Rather, Aristotle indicates that while species are eternal, individuals within species are continually coming to be and passing away. For example, a tree dies and its matter seeps into the earth. The seed acting as an efficient cause ensures that this matter will grow into a new tree; matter will be joined with the formal or species characteristics of a tree to bring a new tree into being. But, what is causing this continual joining of matter with form to bring new individuals within species into being, thereby ensuring that species, and hence the world as we know it, continues to exist? What is it that ensures that there are seeds that give rise to stable species that we can know, and why does it do this? Aristotle attributes this cause and this purpose to the final cause of the universe, the unmoved first mover (*Met.* 1034a15-22).

The unmoved first mover, according to Aristotle, is a living, immaterial substance. As immaterial it is a unique substance which, though the cause of motion, is itself unmoving, eternal, and one or single in nature. It is the cause of substance, or the unity of matter and form within species, thus being responsible for and sustaining the cosmos and its manifold parts. Finally, the unmoved mover is

the goal toward which all things in the cosmos are drawn, thereby causing motion or the coming together of matter and form within species, by drawing things toward itself (*Met.* 1072a24-30). It is like the beloved object of a lover or, as Aristotle, prefers, the object of thought. More specifically, the unmoved first mover is, famously, thought thinking itself (*Met.* 1072b19-25). Aristotle concludes the *Metaphysics* with the claim that, "throughout eternity is thought which has itself for its object" (*Met.* 1075a9-10).

What does Aristotle mean by thought thinking itself, such condition of contemplation itself Aristotle now calls God (*Met.* 1072b23-30)? Or what does it mean that for eternity thought has thought as its object? Aristotle, I would suggest, evokes an image of a divine reason that reflects on the conditions necessary for thinking in the cosmos to take place. As suggested in the *Metaphysics*, the existence of thought requires distinctions in the universe; that there are particular substances with species characteristics distinct from other particular substances with other species characteristics. A chaotic, swirling soup of unformed matter cannot be thought. The final cause, or the unmoved mover, therefore, seeking to make the cosmos intelligible, ensures the continuous joining together of matter with form to bring substances or individual entities within species which can be thought into being. It therefore grounds an intelligible cosmos which can be thought, and which is thus benign to human beings as it allows for the achievement of their highest natural end in the act of contemplation. In contemplating, or thinking an intelligent cosmos, human reason connects with a divine reason that also thinks, and therefore sustains, an intelligible world.

Law, Eternal and Natural

Aristotle's suggestion that human reason, in the act of contemplating an ordered universe, connects with a divine reason that is at once the cause and principle of cosmic intelligibility, relates closely to Aquinas's concept of natural law articulated in the *Summa*. The discussion of natural law, which Aquinas says is very similar to the phenomena of *synderesis* and conscience, occurs within the context of the four types of law Aquinas identifies: eternal law, natural law, human law, and divine law. To conclude we will briefly consider the first two kinds of law.

Eternal law, according to Aquinas, is God's direct governance of the "whole community of the universe," through His divine reason (Question 91, p. 18). All biological processes and living beings are therefore subject to this law. Moreover,

Aquinas argues that the eternal law is written in the "Book of Life," and is thus promulgated or made known to us by reflection on the order and design of the universe (Question 91, p. 18). We can know that there is a Divine Being behind the natural world who orders it for our good, by observing or contemplating that natural world.

Natural law, which pertains uniquely to the human part of the cosmos, is humanity's rational knowledge of and participation in God's eternal law. Thus, Aquinas argues that, "the light of natural reason, whereby we divine what is good and what is evil, which pertains to the natural law, is nothing else but an imprint on us of the divine light. It is therefore evident that the natural law is nothing else than the rational creature's participation of the eternal law" (Question 91, p. 20). This passage suggests, for Aquinas as for Aristotle, that human reason contemplating the natural world shares in an imperfect form of God's reason.

Human beings, as a result of natural law, have a greater freedom of action than other parts of the cosmos. For instance, dogs and cats do what nature intends them to do without knowledge, but rather only by instinct. Human beings, on the other hand, through natural reason have knowledge of what they are to do and not do; for instance, honour thy parents and do not steal. Such knowledge, however, allows human beings to engage in vice in a way that dogs and cats cannot; dogs cannot choose to "meow" and cats cannot choose to "bark," but human beings can choose to dishonour parents or harm others. Knowledge of the eternal law, in other words, gives us the choice to do bad, but this means that we also have the choice to do good; we do it freely or consent to God's law. Freedom, therefore, from the perspective of natural law, is not doing whatever we want, but, much like Aristotle's concept of the voluntary, consenting to do what reason tells us we should do; it is the freedom to do good.

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Endnotes

1. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 2011. All subsequent citations will be taken from this edition.
2. See David Bostock, *Aristotle's Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 13-14, 20, and J. L. Ackrill, "Aristotle on *Eudaimonia*," in *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics*, ed. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 17-29.
3. See C.D.C. Reeve, *Practices of Reason: Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 120, 128-37, and Thomas Nagel, "Aristotle on *Eudaimonia*," in *Essays on Aristotle's Ethic,* ed. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 9-11.
4. But see Rosalind Hursthouse, "The Central Doctrine of the Mean," in *The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*, ed. Richard Kraut (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006),101-08.
5. But see Bostock, *Aristotle's Ethics,* 112.
6. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, in *On Law, Morality and Politics*, eds. William P. Baumgarth and Richard J. Regan (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing), 1988. All subsequent citations will be taken from this edition.
7. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, in *The Longman Standard History of Ancient Philosophy*, eds. Daniel Kolak and Garrett Thomson (New York: Pearson: Longman), 2006. All subsequent citations will be taken from this edition.
8. For this discussion of the four causes see John Chaffee, *The Philosopher's Way: Thinking Critically About Profound Ideas* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, 2009), 253-55.
9. See Chaffee, *The Philosopher's Way*, 251.
10. See Chaffee, *The Philosopher's Way*, 251.

Shakespeare's Julius Caesar and the Greatest Human Virtue

Paul Ulrich

Abstract

Julius Caesar is one of the few men in history who could plausibly be said to be an example of the kind of man Aristotle mentions, who is so virtuous that he deserves to rule permanently as king while the rest are gladly ruled by him. But when Shakespeare wrote his version of Caesar's story—which has become the most familiar version to many of us—he made it primarily the story of much lesser men than Caesar. In this paper I discuss some of the ways in which these men, Brutus and Cassius, are interesting enough, in Shakespeare's presentation of them, to be the main characters of this play, named for the greatest and most important historical figure in Shakespeare's works. I think, in fact, that the question of the play is: what kind of men are these two who so determinedly deny the obvious, the surpassing virtue of Caesar? My answer is that Brutus seeks a perfect, self-contained, spiritual existence and cannot bear to be disturbed by the evidence that he is not the best of all men. Cassius, quite differently, cannot abide the implicit claim Caesar makes to be a god because he sees that as a claim to have attained complete virtue. Each wants to kill Caesar not in order to restore or improve Rome's political condition but because of each one's peculiar inner life and each one's peculiar disposition towards the symbolism of the position Caesar has attained.

Keywords

Aristotle, Shakespeare, Soul, Virtue.

The most obvious way to tell the story of Julius Caesar is to focus on his astounding achievements and on the qualities that enabled for him to become pre-eminent in Rome. Caesar is one of the few men in history who could plausibly be said to be an example of the kind of man Aristotle mentions, who is so virtuous that he deserves to rule permanently as king while the rest are gladly ruled by him.[1] But when Shakespeare wrote his version of Caesar's story—which has become the most familiar version to many of us—he made it primarily the story of much lesser men than Caesar. Of course, they became historically important because they killed Caesar, but by itself this does not make them worthy of being the protagonists in a play called *Julius Caesar*. In this paper I will discuss some of the ways in which these men, Brutus and Cassius, are interesting enough, in Shakespeare's presentation of them, to be the main characters of this play, named for the greatest and most important histori-

cal figure in Shakespeare's works. I think, in fact, that the question of the play is: what kind of men are these two who so determinedly deny the obvious, the surpassing virtue of Caesar?

This would not be the question of the play of Caesar were clearly a tyrant. In that case the play would be about the kind of men who fight for freedom in a fairly simple way, and we could easily call them heroes. But there is wide scholarly agreement that Shakespeare intentionally presented Caesar ambiguously, so that we cannot say Brutus and Cassius are shown to be tyrannicides in the play. What is more, Shakespeare presents several characters who see Caesar as no worse than laughable, as well as one great man who thrives as Caesar's subordinate. These men show us that by no means is this the choice: either kill Caesar or suffer under him.

The most straightforward example is Antony. When we first see him he does not speak except in response to Caesar, and at times in the play he seems to be merely Caesar's message boy (I.ii.5-11; II.ii.52-56).[2] When he comes upon Caesar's corpse he is ready to be killed then and there, showing his sincere belief that Caesar was so great that nothing could be more glorious for him than to be killed next after Caesar, right beside him and by the same hands (III.i.151-163). Yet Antony is an extraordinarily virtuous man in his own right. After Caesar's death we see that he is a clear and quick thinker, an effective orator, and a more skilled general than everyone in Rome except Caesar. As virtuous as he is, he is not debased or wretched, nor are any of his qualities diminished for living so much as Caesar's subordinate. To the contrary, no one in the play could be said to be happier than Antony, at least before Caesar's death.

Men not as great as Antony have a different take on Caesar. Caska, who serves Caesar closely (I.ii.1), finds the prospect of Caesar being crowned king to be "mere foolery" (I.ii.235). Caska's is the only account in the play of Antony's offering a crown to Caesar, and it is such a mockery of the scene that Brutus is bewildered by it. Caska was not alone in his judgment. He recounts that some men around Cicero laughed outright at the scene (I.ii.281-282). Caska did not go so far as to actually laugh, but he kept himself from doing so for the absurdly comical reason, he says, that he feared that if he laughed he would smell the hideous breath of the crowd (I.ii.247-249). Finally, Decius Brutus, the man who, on the day of the assassination persuades Caesar to go to the Senate when he is reluctant, speaks of Caesar with something very close to contempt. Decius

claims that he is a master of flattering Caesar and that he can control him with stories suitable for children (II.i.201-208). In the event, he does indeed persuade Caesar by using flattery, though not the kind he claims to have used in the past (II.ii.83-90). The attitudes Caska and Decius have might or might not sustain them in the long term, but there is good reason to think that they need not worry about the long term since Caesar's health appears so shaky (I.ii.247-252). Brutus and Cassius want Caesar gone as soon as possible and they want to be the ones who send him on his way. They cannot have Caska's attitude since they are so lacking in humor. Cassius comes close to sharing Decius' view when he compares Caesar to a little girl who cries out pitifully when he is sick (I.ii.128). But a flatterer—even a very good one like Decius—can perhaps induce his target to pursue only what he already wants. Cassius and Brutus do not want Caesar to pursue what he wants.

That Brutus and Cassius will not recognize Caesar's virtue as Antony does is the subject of most of this paper, but before getting to that let me very briefly note that neither Cassius nor Brutus is thinking of something bigger than themselves, such as the Roman people, or something above themselves, such as the Roman gods. As to the gods, most telling may be this: when Cassius is outraged that Caesar has "become a god," (I.ii.116) he is not thinking that Caesar may have offended the real gods. Why he <u>is</u> outraged, I will discuss near the end of this paper. Cassius asks Brutus to think of his great ancestor Brutus (I.ii.157-160), the fabled founder of the republic, but that makes it all the more striking that neither speaks of restoring or re-founding the republic. The word "republic" does not appear in the play. And while each of the two separately voices a fear about what the people might do at particular times (I.ii.79; III.i.234-235), neither ever speaks of what he wants or hopes for the people.

So on what grounds do Cassius and Brutus decide to kill Caesar? In Act IV, Brutus tells Cassius that they did so because Caesar "supported robbers," (IV. iii.19-23) but neither mentions anything remotely like that before the murder. When he thinks out loud before the murder about how to justify his certainty that "It must be by his death" (II.i.10), Brutus says plainly that he knows of nothing Caesar has done to deserve to be murdered. It is worth pausing to consider that. Brutus must mean that as long as Julius Caesar has been back in Rome and in charge he has done nothing tyrannical. But Caesar certainly has done things that indicate he will do anything he thinks he needs to do to get

the power he wants. We learn from the play's opening scene that he went to war with a fellow Roman and led an extraordinary triumph through the city after his victory. This is on the mind of some of Caesar's opponents but it is not on Brutus' mind. In vague ways Cassius tells Brutus to think of Rome as a whole, yet neither mentions Caesar's role in the war against Pompey.

For that matter, when Cassius makes his initial case to Brutus, he mentions nothing Caesar has done. He says he must pay symbolic deference to Caesar, and that is the sole reason he gives for finding Caesar's rule intolerable. Yet the text gives no reason to think that Cassius in particular—or anyone, really—"must bend his body/If Caesar carelessly but nod on him" (I.ii.115-118). We see no one other than Antony paying deference to Caesar until the conspirators pretend to be doing so, and Caesar is baffled and repulsed by what they do (III.i.33-75). Cassius is angry at Caesar's status *per se*, and not at anything oppressive or violent Caesar has done.

But Cassius does not immediately tell Brutus what makes him angry about Caesar's status. When Cassius begins to try to win Brutus over, he tells him he is going to tell Brutus about himself and that honor will be his subject (I.ii.66-70 and 92). At that point we might expect Cassius to remind Brutus of some of his accomplishments or traits that are evidence that he is at least as virtuous as Caesar. But Cassius does no such thing. That may well be reasonable, since Brutus' record would look like nothing compared to Caesar's. And it may be that because Brutus can make no claim to be comparable to Caesar in his deeds that neither he nor Cassius ever mentions any of those deeds. From the play, we know of nothing that Brutus has ever done. Again, it is reasonable for Cassius to avoid comparing Brutus' record to Caesar's, but if he also refrains from enumerating Caesar's specific offenses, how can he win Brutus over?

The answer is to be found starting with the word Cassius uses to describe how he approached Brutus when he reviews their conversation to himself. He says that he "seduced" Brutus (I.ii.311). No doubt there are numerous ways to successfully seduce someone, and different approaches will work with different kinds of people. Brutus is susceptible to a specific kind of seduction because of his particular kind of inwardness. He shows that inwardness almost as soon as we first see him, when he tells Cassius that he is avoiding a public festival because of a personal inclination or taste, and that he has neglected his friends because of his indulgence in his inner life (I.ii.25-28). Even more telling is that

he thinks his neglect of country and friends is justified because that neglect is due to his indulgence in his inner life. Brutus is so involved in the world within the confines of his thoughts that he says—to himself—that the most interesting thing about a plot like the one he joins, to kill the most powerful man in the world, is what goes on in the mind of the plotter (II.i.63-69).

The most effective seduction of a man like Brutus will not involve direct praise but rather will put into words his most private thoughts. The seducer will put into words especially the seduced one's private thoughts about his distinctiveness and even uniqueness. At that point, not only is the seduced one intrigued by the seducer because he has knowledge of—and even shares—those inner-most thoughts, but the seduced one sees that he is as fascinating to another as he seems to himself, and that he is fascinating to an especially insightful and discerning other. And as the seducer says out loud what the seduced one had thought but not spoken, he finds that his tempting vision of himself is plausible and at last seems more like reality than like a daydream. The seducer of a Brutus first of all makes the seduced one truly believe that he is loveable, that he deserves love, and thus leads him to love himself more. The seducer ultimately succeeds by showing himself to be the necessary means by which the seduced can find reason upon reason to think as highly of himself as he had wanted to but barely dared to. The seducer of course seems to be a great benefactor, and so Brutus' first words to Cassius when the latter is done with the seduction are: "That you do love me, I am nothing jealous" (I.ii.161).

In this very early scene we see only the beginning of the seduction of Brutus. Even as a mere beginning, though, we must wonder how Cassius' words can be any seduction at all. He does not speak of honor and of Brutus, as he said he would. Instead, he paints little scenes from Caesar's life. Cassius tells Brutus that Caesar once had difficulty swimming and that another time he had the flu, or something (I.ii.98-128). On each occasion Caesar cried out to someone for assistance. These examples seem to demonstrate nothing of importance about Caesar as a man or as a ruler. But it is precisely because the anecdotes Cassius tells about Caesar are so little revealing that we can see that Brutus must be in a most peculiar state of mind to not dismiss Cassius outright when he hears them.

Cassius' words can be the beginning of a seduction only if Brutus is craving a way to find flaws in Caesar—as a man, not as a ruler—that could serve as the makings of a case that Caesar is not Brutus' superior. Cassius understands

that Brutus is in a self-described war with himself (I.ii.46) because he wants to think that he is at least Caesar's equal, but he knows that all the evidence indicates that he is not. We do not know whether Brutus was a perfect swimmer in all conditions or whether he ever was sickly, but we do know that he has been building a solitary home entirely within his own mind and that he has been doing so while neglecting to eat and sleep (II.i.61-62 and 251). Within his self-contained, self-sufficient spiritual dwelling he can come to believe he is the superior of Caesar when he ponders the fact that Caesar despairs and is needy when his body fails him. Brutus does need to think that his accomplishments are greater than Caesar's or that he surpasses Caesar in some newly discovered virtue. He needs only to be convinced that his life and Caesar's are not comparable, that he is free from the mode of life that Caesar cannot leave.

Now to Cassius. The plot to murder Caesar could not come to completion without Brutus, but it could not have started without Cassius. Shakespeare does not give us as many opportunities to grasp the character of Cassius as he does Brutus. Cassius does not have an extended soliloquy and he does not speak about himself with his friends and family. But Shakespeare makes up for leaving such things out by making one of the most intriguing speeches in the play about Cassius, and putting that speech into the mouth of Caesar. Caesar's characterization of Cassius goes far beyond the short phrase that Plutarch records Caesar saying about Cassius, that he is "pale and lean," a phrase that Caesar applied to Brutus too, in Plutarch's account.[3] Shakespeare took the trouble to richly imagine a Cassius with an intricate inner life:

"Let me have men about me that are fat,/ Sleek-headed men, and such as sleep a-nights./ Yond Cassius has a lean and hungry look:/ He thinks too much: such men are dangerous./…./Would he were fatter! But I fear him not:/ Yet if my name were liable to fear/ I do not know the man I should avoid/ So soon as that spare Cassius. He reads much,/ He is a great observer, and he looks/ Quite through the deeds of men. He loves no plays/ As thou dost, Antony; he hears no music./ Seldom he smiles, and smiles in such a sort/ As if he mocked himself and scorned his spirit/ That he could be moved to smile at anything./ Such men are never at heart's ease/ Whiles they behold a greater than themselves,/ And therefore are they are very dangerous" (I.ii. 191-209).

Caesar is correct that Cassius is dangerous, and we must assume that Shakespeare wants us to think he is correct about the rest. But how does it all fit together? Cassius is a thinker and a reader. But he is not a cloistered monk since he needs to be among active men in order to observe them. As he observes them he looks to intentions, motives, and whatever else is in the souls of men, especially those whose deeds lead them to some distinction. He is critical of those men, but his aim is not to tear down others but to examine souls, including his own. We can see that that is the case because he is harsher with himself than he is with others, perhaps because he can see more of his own soul, looking at it from first hand. He is capable of some laughter, and so it looks as though his avoidance of all pleasures is not due to the kind of a natural disinclination Brutus has for ordinary enjoyments (I.ii.28-29). Cassius' avoidance of pleasures comes from his attempt to be better than those who enjoy them, all of which seem to be low because they are bodily.

Most crucially, Cassius scorns himself ruthlessly, for a quite minor imperfection—for smiling—and this may be the key to understanding his discontent with seeing anyone above him. That is, he is so harsh with himself that he cannot believe he deserves to be in the superior place (and he never suggests that he should lead the conspiracy, to say nothing of leading Rome), and he has no specific accusations that Caesar has committed real harm. He does claim that he must bow down to Caesar, but nothing in the play supports his claim. The most he can charge Caesar with are extraordinarily minor, ordinary, occasional shortcomings. But that is to say that he finds fault with Caesar in the way that he finds fault with himself, not for having large, harmful flaws but rather for being not quite perfect. As Cassius looks beyond deeds, he reasons about something that cannot be seen, the soul, and he seeks a degree of virtue that no evidence suggests actually exists. Those above him infuriate him because the higher they rise, the greater the implicit claim to virtue he thinks they are making, and they necessarily fall short in his eyes, no matter how small the actual shortcoming. To Cassius (though only to him), Caesar has "become a god." Cassius thinks that Caesar must be claiming perfect virtue, given how high he has risen, and he finds Caesar unbearable since his claim to perfect virtue is false.

Brutus wants to be able to love himself untroubled by evidence that he might not be the best of all Romans. Cassius will never love himself; he does not even

want to try to. Brutus wants his mind to be at peace, and Cassius thinks a mind at peace would be the greatest intellectual failing. Cassius' problem with Caesar is that his standing in Rome comes with a claim that the greatest virtue has been attained and thus there can be no more search for virtue. With Caesar in this new position, there can be only the kind of awe that is the absence of thinking. Cassius does not oppose Caesar to improve the earthly political situation—he is unconcerned with any of Caesar's deeds, not even his war with Pompey. Cassius opposes Caesar to remedy a problem in the realm of the intellect. Shakespeare shows Brutus entirely concerned with his personal inner world which he wants to be serene and polished, while Cassius wants neither himself nor Rome to settle for a mistaken, imperfect notion of virtue.

Brutus and Cassius are both inward men, and each is in some way associated with a school of philosophy (IV.iii.143-144; V.i.76-77; and V.i.100-102). As we have seen, for all of their contemplation neither is characterized by reasonableness. More broadly, neither can be said to be philosophic, especially if we consider the test case for philosophers to be their handling of death. Brutus is not embarrassed to say in front of adult men that he wishes they could kill Caesar's spirit without attacking his body (II.i.166-170). And he is not embarrassed to fake indifference to his wife's death in front of Cassius, who knows he is faking (IV.iii.179-193). When he and Cassius have reason to think that death could be coming soon for them, neither is able to retain the belief about it that was part of the philosophic teaching to which he had adhered (V.i.77-94 and V.i.100-112). Caesar, on the other hand, who knows the hideousness of death very well, truly is able to accept that it will come when it will come (II.ii.26-37). And despite becoming superstitious (II.i.194), he will not interpret any sign as indicating that he should fear death (I.ii.22-24; II.ii.41-43 and 74-91). Antony too, as mentioned earlier, is ready to die when he thinks that his time has come, right after Caesar's death. To be sure, his drawn-out, raucous death scene in *Antony and Cleopatra* does not show him dying "philosophically," if one must die as Socrates did to die philosophically.[4] But far less does the scene show Antony abandoning the kinds of thoughts that have guided his life up to this point, as Brutus and Cassius did. As he is dying, Antony is neither pathetic nor bombastic. He tries to counsel Cleopatra sensibly and specifically about how to live, and until his very end he remains drawn to her sensually. We are sorry Antony dies and we think as highly of him as he dies as we did while he lived.

Neither Caesar nor Antony faces death with perfectly placid equanimity. But each comes closer than Cassius or Brutus to facing death like a philosopher. Shakespeare does not give us enough evidence to say that Caesar is of such surpassing virtue that he deserved to rule permanently as king. We can say, rather, that showing the comparison between the men trying to live perfectly freely as non-bodily souls and even demanding a perfect state of soul—that's Cassius and Brutus—and the men relishing their earthly existence while facing the truth about it, Shakespeare points us to the path Caesar and Antony are on as the path to the greatest human virtue.

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2. All references to Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar* are to the Arden edition, third series, edited by David Daniell (London: Bloomsbury, 1998).
3. Plutarch, *Life of Julius Caesar*, LXII.
4. See *Antony and Cleopatra* IV.xv.14-59.

Jan Patočka's Asubjective Phenomenology of Europe

'Care for Soul' as Aristotelian *Phronēsis*

Ruhtan Yalçıner

Abstract

Jan Patočka's negative Platonism has often been regarded as the central theme of his asubjective phenomenology. The concept 'care for soul' has also implied a critical continuum of Patočka's negative Platonism. Through the corpus of *care*, Patočka reconciles horizons of an Aristotelian *phronēsis* and Socratic *responsibility*. Patočka's notion of Europe unconceals this implicit connection through the corpus of practical philosophy. Patočka's notion of *care*, herein, substitutes eidetic idea of Europe with a new corpus of responsibility to come.

Keywords

Patočka, Europe, *Phronēsis*, Asubjective Phenomenology, Care for Soul.

Introduction

In his article titled "Helpless Europe", states Robert Musil: "[there is] an abiding miscommunication between the intellect and the soul. We do not have too much intellect and too little soul, but too little intellect in matters of the soul".[1] Czech phenomenologist Jan Patočka's proposition on "*care for soul*"–not only for the *self*, but also for Europe–might be read in the same direction. In Marc Crépon's words "the war was the manifestation, or the blunt translation, of what Patočka, reading Husserl and Heidegger, describes…as a new world age, a new era–the technical era–that had dawned the world".[2]

Having been strongly influenced by Tomáš Masaryk, Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, Patočka's concern on the matters of the soul was guided by the ontological chiasm of the progressive mind, and the question of the *Gestell*. Patočka's own problematic regarding the epochal *krisis* was the lost sense of care and responsibility. A second emphasis of Patočka's problematic was posited on European *eidos*, which might be read as a critical component of the question of belonging.

Patočka's answer to the *krisis*, therefore, was closely tied by the condition of being. Patočka's critique of the metaphysics of presence, regarding this condition, was based on a presupposition on negative Platonism, or asubjective phenomenology. The critical corpus of Patočka's critique might be interpreted through the framework of Aristotelian *phronēsis*.

For Aristotle, unlike the corpus of "theoretical wisdom" (*sophía*); phronēsis denotes "*practical wisdom*". According to Aristotle, phronēsis (φρόνησις), or practical wisdom might be defined as "a reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regard to human goods".[3] As a virtue of the deliberative and calculative part of the soul, *phronēsis*, denotes *eupraxia*, which is the excellent praxis of a deliberate choice. *Phronēsis* and its *eupraxia*, accordingly, underpins a composition of "deliberation (*bouleusis*)" and "deliberate choice (*prohairesis*)".[4] Thus, "*eupraxia* is the same as *eudaimonia*".[5] Phronēsis denotes a critical leitmotif of hermeneutics for both Martin Heidegger[6] and Hans-Georg Gadamer.[7]

Aristotle's *phronēsis* was defined by Heidegger as "conscience".[8] For Gadamer, on the other hand, phronēsis implies a key marker of hermeneutics as practical philosophy. Whereas for Heidegger phronēsis implies a critical question of Dasein's authenticity; for Gadamer, it connotes an ethico-political marker. The role of phronēsis for hermeneutic phenomenology, herein, might be read through the critique of metaphysics of presence. Patočka also shares this corpus of critique.

By following a more Socratic line of phronetic critique, Patočka introduced theoretical and practical framework of an asubjective phenomenology and negative Platonism through the question of care. Patočka's care might denote a phronetic nexus of responsibility, or the "care for soul".

The *Krisis*

The question of the *krisis* and its epochal and ontological framework implies a critical marker of Patočka's *problematic*. Patočka follows the hermeneutic phenomenological line of criticism, with an exception of including Socratic and theological arguments. According to Patočka, "the great turning point in the life of western Europe appears to be the sixteenth century. From that time on another motif comes to the fore, opposing the motif of the care of the soul and coming to dominate one area after another, politics, economics, faith, and science, transforming them in a new style".[9] Epochal conditions of Patočka's *krisis*,

in this regard, disclose a new and irreducible milieu of criticism regarding the *human nature* and *the idea of progress*.

A key marker of Patočka's critique could be defined through protentional aspects of subjectivity. In Patočka's words, throughout modernization, "not a care for the soul, the care to be, but rather the care to have, care for external world and its conquest, becomes the dominant concern".[10] According to Patočka, then, "modern mechanism was, of course, no mere scientific theory: its tenor was really metaphysical".[11]

Patočka's critique of *presence* and *presencing* was primarily derived from Edmund Husserl's interpretation of the *krisis* of positivism.[12] Patočka's reading of the *krisis* was also influenced by Tomáš Masaryk, who was indebted to the philosophy of Comenius.[13] The outcome of Husserl and Masaryk's influence on Patočka might be seen qua critique of positivism. For Husserl the gist of this crisis is a phenomenological and epistemological problem of hyper-rationalism; for Masaryk, it is theological. Patočka gathered Husserl and Masaryk's accounts within the corpus of a Socratic framework. According to Patočka, "being at a loss as to what to do with the modern discovery of the subject is, for Husserl and Masaryk alike, the fundamental premise of spiritual crisis which is then in fact born of a bad subjectivism, such as Hume's–a subjectivism with a naturalistic foundation which is the starting point of positivism".[14]

Drawing upon critical reading of Husserl's transcendental reductionism and Masaryk's nostalgia for religiosity, Patočka stipulated a framework of asubjective phenomenology. The key disposition of this asubjective proposition was the critique of any metaphysical account of *presence* and *presencing*. For Patočka, "an asubjective phenomenology thus becomes a dialectical phenomenology of modes of becoming, not a static one of structures of being".[15]

Patočka's manifold critique of foundationalism also disclosed a critical assessment of European humanity. Regarding the question of European humanity, Patočka reconciled Husserl's phenomenological and Masaryk's theological accounts through the question of the *krisis*.[16] According to Patočka, "for Masaryk, the disruption of life is the symptom of the crisis, and the diagnostic tool is an analysis of moral statistics; Husserl sees the crisis in a lack of clarity at the foundation of the sciences, and his critique is already an attempt at its systematic reconstruction".[17]

Patočka brought forth the question of European *krisis* not merely as a critical demand for particularity, but rather as a new possibility of regenerating an alternate meaning for universality. Patočka defined Husserl's endeavor as "fundamental attempt at uncovering a new common level from which we can look over the totality of beings in a way different that that of the modern rationalistic objectivism".[18] Patočka, hence, inferred Heideggerian question of unconcealment. In his later writings, similar to how medieval philosophers had called Aristotle, Patočka mentioned Heidegger as "Philosopher".[19] Heidegger and his Aristotelian roots provided Patočka with an alternative nexus of interpretation, which bounds not only immanence and transcendence, but also, being and becoming.

Patočka's negative Platonism unveiled a critical continuum of not only epistemological but also ethico-political dualism of *res cogitans* vs. *res extensa*. Patočka developed an asubjective phenomenology by following Eugen Fink and Gerhard Funke.[20] The very idea of this asubjective phenomenology was based on the immediacy of overcoming metaphysics of presence through the own task of the philosopher. Negative Platonism, in this regard, inaugurated a Socratic contexture of meaning. Negative Platonism disclosed the problem of seizing the Idea in its negativity. According to Kohák; this implied a new corpus of interpretation based on "understanding its significance rather than positing it as an entity, seeing the Idea of the just, the true, the beautiful, the holy, as the meaning which animates and renders particular instances meaningful. It is the quest for the 'natural' world–though again, negatively, not as a second level object reality but rather as meaning itself".[21]

A critical asset of Patočka's asubjective phenomenology is his emphasis placed on the relation between truth and technology. Patočka reads this relation through not only Husserl but also Heidegger.[22] Patočka regarded Husserlian *krisis* within the vein of the loss of meaning via technicization. This point was also bound by Heidegger's portrayal of "*enframing*" (*Ge-stell*).[23]

Patočka's reading of ontotechnicality, both as *crisis* of technicization or as essence of technology, was based on an appeal to posit the task of philosophy. Heideggerian *Gestell*, therefore, denoted a critical locus of Patočka's critique of the *technē*. Patočka avoided marking a universal truth for the subject qua ontotechnicality. For Patočka, "technology in its relation to that in man which is capable of truth represents a danger that needs to be blocked–technology itself need not be opposed, limited, or eliminated".[24]

Patočka construed not only epistemological but also ethico-political corpus of phronēsis qua Socratic question of the soul. Through phronetic corpus of care and responsibility, Patočka follows Heidegger's critique of metaphysics of presence.[25] Patočka conveyed a critical interrelationality based on "the alternation between a revealing and a concealing that determined that the world of beings is to be taken to be now Nature now Subject, now Spirit".[26] Patočka, hence, followed a temporal connection between "phenomenon", "concealment" and "manifestation". The question of concealment and unconcealment denoted an existential necessity of manifestation. Hence, "every manifestation can be understood only as an un-concealment".[27] Patočka underpinned the actuality of the life-world by reference to a particular context of being, as "*manifestation*". For Patočka "our life-world has no other function than to make itself transparent to the things and persons whom it reveals and manifests".[28]

For Patočka, Socratic vision of the practicality of philosophy denotes a potentia of "processing a knowledge of a special kind".[29] The gist of Socratic philosophy, for Patočka, was based on "the fact of purposiveness, on the model of technē, on the relation between means and ends with which ordinary, routinely human life operates".[30] However, this practicality also maintained a sense of aporetics through which freedom is unconcealed. Unlike any kind of presencing, the very idea of this freedom for Patočka could be defined as "active experience".[31] Patočka also brought forth the question of the *eidos*. In Patočka's words, "reflection on essence, on pure *eidos*, appears to be the most suitable example of showing transcendence in immanence itself".[32] Patočka underpins this notion of immanence as a critical asset of Husserlian idea of constitution, which "means essentially that *a transcendence of self-givenness is consistent with a real immanence of the essence of lived experience*".[33]

According to Kohák: "the radical subject –Husserl's 'functioning I'– is not reducible to a static schema. It is possible and intelligible only as 'called to the world', as transcending its immediate givenness in acts of interaction, of retention and recollection on the one hand, of protention and anticipation on the other".[34] Kohák, herein, mentions Husserlian notion of the epochē, as a critical disposition of becoming in Patočka. According to Kohák, "*epochē* thus does not uncover a static, absolute I but rather the freedom of the I from the immediacy of the given".[35]

Europe qua *Phronēsis*

According to Patočka, "the basis of Europe's uniqueness is the quest for the eternal in time".[36] Patočka designated the role of *soul* as the critical leitmotif of this temporal appeal. In this sense, "the soul stands out as the intersection of eternity and time, its care as the discovery of the eternal in the temporal. In the cosmos, the eternal, the ideal forms, are mathematical –Patočka's old objective conception of nature reasserting itself– while in the polis they are virtues".[37]

For Patočka, in Kohák's words, "what is distinctive about Europe and basic to Western culture is its conception of human life, both individual and social, as a vertical movement, aimed not merely at future gratification of present needs but toward ideal motives, not for the sake of their utility but as the meaning of being human, for truth, justice, goodness, beauty".[38]

Patočka revealed the ethico-political question of disaffection as a critical sign of the *krisis*. Patočka followed Heideggerian reading of the *Gestell* at this point. The system of care, which has long been associated with the vertical eidetic context of Europe, has been destructed by the routinization of a horizontal movement. According to Patočka, "it is this driving force of Europe, the vision of an ideal, which stands in danger of being lost as Europe's heirs take over –and Europe herself retains– no more of its heritage than the technical proficiency at satisfying the demands of the horizontal movement".[39]

Patočka notion of "*the care for soul*" not merely reflect the nostalgic continuum of particularity. At the same time, the care for soul denoted an ethico-political corpus for politics of responsibility. It reconciled *vita activa* and *vita contemplativa*. Following *Nicomachean Ethics*, Patočka merged "*bios politikos*" and "*bios filosofikos*", through politics of an active life.[40]

Patočka introduces a transformed notion of Aristotelian movement, *dunamis*. By pointing the progressive context of movement as "vital drive" in terms of Occam's *vis impressa* and its reinterpretation in Nicholas Cussa as "mechanical motion", Patočka interplayed the relation between purposiveness and *phusis*.[41] Through Aristotelian ontological conception of *dynamis*, Patočka revealed the ethicopolitical markers of modern existence.[42]

Patočka reckoned Aristotelian *dynamis* as "a protentional futural one".[43] While providing critique of the Aristotelian question of hylomorphism,

Patočka also unveiled a protentional preposition on care and responsibility. Patočka's care, accordingly, is a responsibility to come. Patočka's negative Platonism and asubjective phenomenology is based on a thorough reconsideration of this responsibility, which is marked as "*the care for the soul*'".

The question of *care*, for Patočka, underpinned an internal dispositif of being as becoming. Patočka followed existential question of in/authenticity via the disposition of care in Heidegger.[44] Yet, for Patočka, *care* denoted a course of actuality, unconcealing practicality of philosophy in a sense of *phronēsis*, as immanent experience of practical wisdom. Yet, at the centre, of this practical capacity Patočka marked an interpenetrative rule. Patočka defined *phronēsis* as "understanding".[45] According to Patočka, "we understand practically: that is, we are able to, we are familiar with, we know how to deal with. That is the original meaning of 'to understand'. That is how we first understand ourselves and things".[46]

Patočka's care denotes hermeneutic employment of Aristotelian *dunamis* vis-à-vis internalization of reversed Platonic *eidos*. The "*care for the soul*", in this sense, denotes not only the potentiality of truth but also the actuality of the problem of justice. In Findlay's words "although the injunction to 'care for the soul' comes directly from the Platonic dialogues, it is read negatively, that is, under the influence of the Heideggerian critique of metaphysics".[47] By reference to the locus of Heideggerian emphasis on care, Patočka defined the care for the soul as on-going task of understanding and unconcealment. In this regard, "*given certain circumstances, man could make at least the human world a world of truth and justice*. How this can be achieved is the very subject of the care of the soul".[48] In Patočka's words, "care for the soul means that truth is something not given once and for all, nor merely a matter of observing and acknowledging the observed, but rather a lifelong inquiry, a self-controlling, self-unifying intellectual and vital practice".[49]

Patočka's care is a phronetic disposal of modern subject's presencing. It is derived from a combination of "the Platonic meaning of 'learning to die', *melete thanatou* from the *Phaedo*, and Heidegger's *Sorge*".[50] The basis of *care as practical wisdom*, for Patočka, discloses the continuum of *bios politikos*, through which the critical responsibility of the philosopher must also prosper. The very idea of Patočka's phronetic reading reflects a practical emphasis on the centrality of interpenetrating practical philosophy and politics. Jacques

Derrida defines Patočka's reading of *care* by reference to the context of "the secret of responsibility" which is always to be unconcealed.[51] Patočka's protentional proposition on the care for soul echoes Derridean notion of the appeal *to come*.

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28. Jan Patočka, "Edmund Husserl's Philosophy of the Crisis of the Sciences and His Conception of a Phenomenology of the 'Life-World'", in *Jan Patočka: Philosophy and Selected Writings*, ed. Erazim Kohák, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 237.
29. Jan Patočka, "Negative Platonism: Reflections Concerning the Rise, the Scope, and the Demise of Metaphysics-and Whether Philosophy Can Survive It", in *Jan Patočka: Philosophy and Selected Writings*, ed. Erazim Kohak, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 181.
30. Ibid., 180.
31. Ibid., 200.
32. Jan Patočka, "Husserl's Transcendental Turn: The Phenomenological Reduction in *The Idea of Phenomenology* and in *Ideas* I", in *Jan Patočka: Philosophy and Selected Writings*, ed. Erazim Kohák, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 211.
33. Ibid., 214.
34. Kohák, "Jan Patočka", 93.
35. Ibid.
36. Kohák, "Jan Patočka", 118.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., 119.
39. Ibid.
40. Patočka, *Heretical Essays*, 40.
41. Ibid., 64.
42. Jan Patočka, *Body, Community, Language*, *World*, (Chicago: Open Court, 1998), 154-155.
43. Ibid., 154.
44. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1962).
45. Patočka, *Heretical Essays,* 42.
46. Patočka, *Body, Community, Language*, *World*, 96.
47. Edward F. Findlay, *Caring for the Soul in a Postmodern Age: Politics and Phenomeonology in the Thought of Jan Patočka*, (New York: State University of New York Press, 2002), 62.
48. Jan Patočka, *Plato and Europe*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 36.
49. Patočka, *Heretical Essays,* 82.
50. Findlay, *Caring for the Soul,* 62.
51. Jacques Derrida, *The Gift of Death*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 20.

The Role of Judgment in the Deliverance of Justice in International Law

A Return to Ethics

Negris Canefe

Abstract

This paper ventures into three seemingly distinct areas of study: international law, international relations, and, political philosophy. Its aim is to chart a pathway for linking these areas within the context of Aristotle's virtue ethics. The venue chosen to this end is humanitarian and human rights law and in particular, crimes against humanity jurisprudence. Particular attention is paid to the possibility of relating common sense philosophy to virtue ethics in order to develop a normative understanding of *erga omnes* crimes in international law.

Keywords

Humanity, Crimes Against, Human Rights, International, Erga Omnes, Aristotle, Prudence, Virtue Ethics.

Introduction

The question of judgment is a worthy problem in social, political and ethical thought and its explorations have very important ramifications for legal theory. This is despite the fact that international law scholarship does not have a very close affinity with political philosophy, not the least ethics.[1] When it has to relate to normativity, it often assumes one of the two prescribed modes of engagement: the monist or the dualist perspective.[2] Here I take issue with the common frameworks habitually prescribed by international law scholarship. My vantage point is a specialized debate on the role of ethics in producing critical and path-breaking judgments in international criminal law. In a brief reiteration, the dualist perspective claims international law to be alien to domestic law. It characterizes international law as imposing and undemocratic--only appropriations of it through internal processes such as parliamentary deliberation or legislative approval are deemed acceptable. This approach to international law is paramount in American and German jurisprudential thought, among others.[3] The

monist perspective, on the other hand, is more of a darling of public criminal law scholarship as it provides for an unapologetic advocacy of 'universal principles' applicable to all contexts. This is due to the claimed normative superiority of constructs such as *erga omnes*.[4] A case in point is the International Criminal Court's absolutist embrace of crimes against humanity and genocide legislation. According to the monist perspective, in the application of such jurisprudence, there is no caveat to be used. In other words, the standards set by institutions such as the ICC for pursuant trials are to be accepted as non-negotiable. Exceptions are made only due to retrospective judgment issues (i.e. prior to the endorsement of the Rome Statute) or insurmountable political limitations (such as the US being exempt from being tried for the crime of genocide in courts other than its own).

In this context, I inquire about the possibility of a third perspective possible, perhaps akin to the Ricoeurian sense of arbitration, and one that is based on a more dynamic and historically contextualized understanding of international law.[5] If adjudication of international law adjudication is attended to for more than its legal/structural and institutional aspects, then it may be possible to achieve such an understanding. The paper thus pursues two methodological investigations. The first one relates to specific debates on ethics in relation to production of legal judgments. To this end, a comparison between virtue ethics and common sense school of philosophy is undertaken. This results in the singling out of the notion of *phnoresis* as a cornerstone for developing a new understanding of the alignment between international and domestic law.[6] The second methodological investigation is a concerted attempt to turn one's face towards the Arendtian notion of political judgment as opposed to a procedure oriented one in an effort to formulate how conflicting moral stances could be reconciled without excessive dependency to an overarching institutional framework.[7] In Arendt's case, what we are presented with is a unique mixture of the Aristotelian notion of politics as engagement that is associated with political judgment and the Kantian notion of reflectiveness that is associated with moral responsibility.[8] This is despite the fact that in Kant's analysis, judgment was largely limited to the realm of aesthetics. In Arendt's treatment of it, no doubt this is not the case.[9]

The paper incorporates the concerns and findings emerging in the sections on methodological investigations into the larger debate on international law via

the identification of problems of incongruity among the spheres of domestic and international law. It also uses these findings to formulate the interaction and fluidity between these two. In this regard, first and foremost emerges the issue that within the domestic sphere, one can indeed privilege pluralistic, liberal democratic norms due to their effectiveness and long-term rewards in terms of social and political peace. However, when one shifts the frame to international law, the obvious historical reality pertaining to the filed is that it does not have a history of equal participation, or, transparent and regulated relations. Second, there appears to be a problem concerning the unaddressed nature of the rather unique divide between international humanitarian and human rights law, and, other spheres of international law in terms of whether one can put a caveat on value pluralism. In other words, the question of whether one can legitimately relativize the criminality of genocide for instance—as one negotiates about trade or labor laws—remains largely unattended. Thus, the first observation is that there may have to be certain absolutes in these select areas which cannot be based on democratic deliberation in an open ended manner, i.e. allowing for future reversals or tempering of the unacceptability of genocide or crimes against humanity.

These finding, however, lead to another problem. Arendtian notion of political judgment allows for engagement, deliberation, active involvement and thus has a cognitive core and political promise. It is a politics of persuasion and open debate. As such, it would not allow for absolutes. In cases such as crimes against humanity, however, one is obliged to consider absolutes and thresholds of admissibility. The only way that is possible to resolve this dilemma is to claim that taking an absolute stance against such crimes is 'common sense': given the right kind of considerations and normative understanding, everyone would, on the very basis of their humanity, potentially agree that such acts constitute crimes. This is perhaps similar to the identification of murder—other than in proven instances of self-defense—universally as a crime in domestic jurisdiction. However, there then emerges the difficulty of pointing out the difference between common-sense based political judgments and the monist persistence on universal jurisdiction. This is the point at which the debate is temporarily suspended. My conclusion points out possible directions that could be taken from that point of suspension onwards.

The main practical concern that is fueling this inquiry is the following. One cannot force legal decrees of international organizations such as international courts upon societies that commit acts such as crimes against humanity without forceful action, unless there is value convergence in place. If one is to go for a more enlightened notion of law and legality that is not founded upon use of crude force or intricate theories pertaining to the formalistic universality of law, and if one is to embrace a complex reading of Hobbes regarding cooperation in politics otherwise known as his second iteration, then the issue becomes how to find a normative common ground upon which domestic courts would willingly incorporate international legislation such as the ICC's Rome Statute into constitutions, as well as handing in criminals to venues like ICC for trial if they are unable to pursue the case themselves. In particular, this paper asks the question of how far 'common sense' could go in terms of justifying aligned international and domestic adjudication in cases such as crimes against humanity.

One example commonly used in the literature in order to compare domestic and international spheres of jurisprudence is that of freedom of speech and limits imposed on it in liberal systems. Though not an entirely accurate comparison in terms of the scale of criminality involved, it may be possible to suggest that crimes against humanity is akin to the hate speech of domestic jurisprudence in terms of its exceptional status and the necessity to draw the line somewhere. And yet, curtailment of freedom of speech does not take place based on a common sense understanding of the appropriate limits of hate and propaganda. These limitations have particular historical references—select individuals but more so communities who either already suffered injustices in the society at large, or, who may suffer injustices based on a logic of fair comparison. Here, the common sense approach would have dictated that what is not to be done to you should not be done to others. Thus, it would purport the assumption of the normative superiority of the claim of equal access to good life and no allowance for its curtailment. This is indeed how hate speech is defined in legal terms in instances such as the Canadian Charter. However, it is not easy or even possible to extrapolate from hate speech as a recognized domestic crime to genocide and crimes against humanity, as in the latter case it is not the potential threat that is of concern, but the purposive ending of life through organized political violence and its hiding or justification by the very political bodies responsible for protecting the individual and the community. Thus, the question remains: how could one move from the Arendtian notion of the involved, negotiation-

based, persuasive strategy/act of producing political judgments to the adjudication of justice in cases of crimes against humanity? A further caveat relates to the superiority of the 'common sense' approach to that of virtue ethics. Although common sense goes along well with virtue ethics in terms of some of their common premises, it appears to stand alone better than virtue ethics in its promise for legal conduct due to its overtly un-moralistic stance. Common sense is meant to be more dynamic, more open to change though also more innate or intuition-based. However, unless one is equipped with the virtue ethics perspective of human beings having a nurtured set of virtues as opposed to natural ones, and thus, unless one is open to institutional and pedagogical interventions in terms of building up of normative commitments, upon what grounds one could judge the validity of common sense, or worse, how common sense is to provide a common language in jurisprudence are questions that would remain unanswerable.

Methodological Investigations
Virtue Ethics versus Common Sense Philosophy for International Law

As already stated, this work is an introductory attempt in achieving an informed interpolation between ethics as exemplified in the area of political philosophy, and, ethics as an entry point to legal scholarship on international law in the specific instance of crimes against humanity. Its underlining preoccupation is that common sense philosophy, combined with an Arendtian understanding of political judgment, would be more conducive to an in depth debate on the normative underpinnings and substantive qualities of international humanitarian and human rights law than would be the case with virtue ethics. In this spirit, below is a brief investigation of where the difference lies between these two approaches and how they would each affect the field of legal ethics in the particular instance of crimes against humanity.

Although the lay meaning of the term *common sense* refers to what 'people in common' would agree as a matter of their common and furthermore natural understanding of the world, the ethical counterpart of it is built upon a somewhat different plane. In this latter context, common sense does not necessarily refer to the beliefs and dispositions common to all humanity that would then lead to the experience of commonality in terms of determining the

most prudent or sound judgment without referring to a body of esoteric and specialized knowledge such as law or religion. Insetad, the identification of particular forms of knowledge and judgment with 'common sense' is related to the Aristotelian concept of *endoxa*. Accordingly, common sense ideas tend to be related to events that mark human experience, and thus have an identifiable historical content.

With an interesting twist, the meaning proposed by John Locke in his *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* is often identified as the beginning of the modern philosophical discussions on common sense. Locke's interpretation of common sense is based upon it being a phenomenological experience that yields long-lasting impressions. The resultant definition refers to the sense of things in common between disparate experiences. Locke therefore positions common sense almost in opposition to judgment, which signifies in this case the ability to divide things into separate groups. The Lockean understanding of common sense was then challenged with a categorically different meaning attributed to it by Thomas Reid and G. E. Moore. According to this latter take, common sense constitutes the true foundation for philosophical inquiry. In particular, Reid--who was the founder of the Scottish School of Common Sense—was very influential in developing a theory of common sense as exemplified in his *Inquiry* and the *Intellectual Powers*.[10] His list of principles of common sense includes the suggestion that their denial would lead to logical contradictions. With a similar take, G. E. Moore penned a programmatic essay titled "A Defence of Common Sense" at the turn of the last century. This essay is widely considered to have had a profound effect on the methodological debates shaping twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophy.[11]

In this tradition, philosophical appeals to common sense have become characteristic of a more general epistemological orientation favoring both particularism and historicism. In contradiction to a methodist or idealist approaches exercised by Berkeley, Hume and Descartes among others, advocates of common sense philosophy have been much less susceptible to skepticism.[12] The current legacy of common sense philosophy takes into account the common pitfalls that are associated with such a self-assured stance. Consequently, the pivotal question for contemporary embraces of common sense is somewhat reduced to the identification of areas of inquiry where reliance on the dictates of common sense is legitimate and would not constitute an obstruction to neces-

sary change, normative or otherwise. Similarly, caution is exercised so that common sense is not equated with what is off-limits for philosophical inquiry. One particular difficulty that arises in this changed context is the understanding of the relation between common sense and intuition.

Here, returning to Aristotle may again prove useful. One of the most relevant endowments of Scholastic philosophy for our times is the term *sensus communis*. This is different from the ability to make judgments based on a finite sum of key principles supposedly found in all sane minds as expressed by the idiom *recta ratio* [the good sense]. Resolving the problems in the 'external world' through ethical ideas no doubt owes some of its pedigree to the Platonic world view as opposed to the Aristotelian engagement with what is here and now. It is in this latter framework that Thomas Reid went as far as vindicating common sense as 'natural judgment'.[13] It is even possible to argue that common sense philosophy shares a basic understanding with phenomenology since both schools of thought prioritize sensation and intended perception of reality over ideas. The idea of the mind as merely a receptacle for ideas is rejected both by phenomenologists and common sense philosophers. According to both schools of thought, it is from the consciousness of will power that humans derive the notion of causation. One marked difference between these two schools, however, is of crucial importance for the current work. Conscience, understood as moral sense, is taken to be an original faculty by the classical representatives of the Common Sense School, independent of the influence of social and historical experiences as dictated upon the human will.

The closest ally to the Common Sense tradition in the realm of ethics is Virtue Ethics. In this work, however, virtue ethics is allotted to a secondary position. Below is an attempt to explain why such a choice has been made. Contrary to its common perception, the distinguishing feature of virtue ethics is not its exclusive emphasis on virtues, or moral character, of the individual either regardless of the utilities to be accrued from a particular act, or, at the expense of the duties or rules that provide structure and rhythm to social and political life of human communities. This is a rather reductionist understanding.[14] A more expansive understanding would require some degree of engagement with the history of the field. Virtue ethics was the dominant approach in Western moral philosophy until the Enlightenment and thus there is a certain degree of indebtedness to it by all succeeding schools. Although it did suffer from a

notable eclipse during the nineteenth century, it re-emerged with vengeance in the late 1950's within the Anglo-American scene of philosophy. Its rebirth was heralded by British analytical philosopher Gertrude Anscombe's article "Modern Moral Philosophy," spelling out increasing dissatisfaction both with deontology and utilitarianism.[15] Virtue ethics tradition wanted to prioritize aspects of human life that somehow fell from grace with the advent of modernity, such as virtues, motives and moral character, the moral education of the individual, moral wisdom and discernment, friendship, a deep concept of happiness and flourishment, and, the role played by emotions and intuition in our moral life.

This re-emergence had an overall invigorating effect in moral philosophy. One related consequence has been the rekindling of interest in Kant's long neglected *Doctrine of Virtue* as well as a devoted returning back to both Plato and Aristotle.[16] Although not all proponents of modern virtue ethics assume a neo-Aristotelian stance, they all make direct references to three key concepts endemic to the Scholastic tradition of ancient Greek philosophy: *arête* [virtue], *phronesis* [prudence], and, *eudaimonia* [flourisment]. Of these three, phronesis has the closest proximity to the tenets of the Common Sense school of philosophy. The other two are more limited in their potential for application outside the virtue ethics discourse. Virtue, for instance, is a disposition which is well entrenched in its possessor rather than something that can be learned via training or a habit. It is concerned with emotions, choices, values, desires, perceptions, attitudes, interests, expectations and sensibilities rather than just virtuous acts. In addition, virtue can be possessed in degrees rather than being an ideal to be realized.

Meanwhile, even about the notion of *phronesis*, there are differences and discrepancies to be observed in each school's embrace of the concept. According to the virtue ethics tradition of thought, reliance on motivation by inclination or good intentions alone is only a proto-version of *phronesis*. In other words, *phronesis* is not something that one can be born with, or exercise as a child. This is due to the fact that the knowledge of what is beneficial or harmful could only be attained through education and experience, and it is not innate. In turn, *eudaimonia* is a direct extension of the notion of *phronesis*: those who understand what is truly worthwhile, truly important, and thereby truly beneficial in life, are those who know how to live well. Meanwhile, although virtue is necessary, it is not sufficient for the attainment of *eudaimonia*, and thus the value placed

upon the concept of 'luck' by virtue ethics. In this larger framework, proponents of virtue ethics attempt to distance themselves from the pre-ordained task of ethical theory in terms of coming up with universal rules or principles for 'good life'.

As a revolt against proceduralist attempts to determine the definition of right actions, or, rules with universal applicability, virtue ethicists maintain that controversial moral issues cannot be resolved on a rules-based platform. Rather, what is needed is moral sensitivity, combined with moral education that would trigger the required faculties of perception, imagination, empathy and ultimately judgment both to determine the necessary rules specific to cases and to arrive at larger principles. If so, one could argue that the main distinguishing feature between Common Sense and Virtue Ethics schools is that the former relies upon the passage of traditions of experience and learning in the form of the molding of the conscientious individual and the active citizen, while the latter has a much less doctrinaire take on what constitutes a legitimate and fair ground for resolving conflicts while addressing the issues of moral choice and the related notion of the good.[17] Although both approaches are weary of a rights-based discourse in terms of attainment of peace and human welfare, one could claim that Virtue Ethics has more in common with deontological approaches to societal conflict due to its acceptance of the importance of the development of normative understanding in general, and, civic education in particular. By the same token, it is possible to deduce that while the common sense school is more prone to be 'action oriented', the virtue ethics school is bent on understanding and dealing with the agent that is to undertake the expected, opposed, or deliberated act. As such, cultural relativity can constitute more of a problem for the virtue ethicist due to the differential nature of virtue defined according to the matrixes of each society, as opposed to the common sense approach assuming that certain things are unacceptable in all human societies.

Conclusion

For these alluded reasons, if one is to pursue an alternative route of analysis in the field of ethics above and beyond deontological, rights or rules-based, proceduralist, utilitarian or consequentalist approaches, virtue ethics appear to cover only some of the ground. Combined with the Common Sense school,

however, the concept of *phronesis* does prove extremely useful for future openings in the area of political judgment as it pertains to adjudication of international law. Finally, in relation to the common problem of justification of one's moral beliefs and choices that effect all areas of ethics [thus considered a meta-ethical concern], virtue ethicists' naturalism appears weaker than the Common Sense School's turn to politics. The possibility of providing an 'external foundation' for ethics with reference to normativity is more true to the original understanding of the Aristotelian notion of *polis* as the fountain-bed of politics.

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Endnotes

1. For a critical debate on the subject, see Baier, Annette C. "The need for more than justice." *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* (1987) 17.1: 41-56, and Higgins, Rosalyn. "Ethics and International Law." *Leiden Journal of International Law* (2010) 23.2: 277-298.
2. The canonical text on these two perspectives is Starke, Joseph Gabriel. "Monism and Dualism in the Theory of International Law." *Brit. YB Int'l L.* (1936) 17: 66. A more nuanced and more recent example is Hathaway, Oona A. "Between power and principle: An integrated theory of international law." *The University of Chicago Law Review* (2005) 72.2: 469-536.
3. For a very insightful analysis on this issue and yet in a somewhat unusual format, see Schlag, Pierre. "The aesthetics of American law." *Harvard Law Review* (2002): 1047-1118, 2002.
4. *Erga omnes* is a Latin phrase commonly used in international law indicating rights and obligations are owed *toward all*. An *erga omnes* right, otherwise known as a statutory right, is distinguished from a right based on contracts and unenforceable except against the contracting parties. In particular, erga omnes norms signify obligations owed by states towards the community of states as a whole. An *erga omnes* obligation exists because of the universal and undeniable interest in the perpetuation of a special set of rights and the prevention of their breach. These include piracy, genocide, slavery and torture.
5. The first essay in his *The Conflict of Interpretations* is titled "*Existence and Hermeneutics*." This particular work lays out Ricoeur's overall plan for human understanding. Specifically, he wishes to establish a hermeneutic philosophy as the mode of understanding and arbitrating the claims of all human endeavors. For further debate, see the entire collection which brings together twenty-two essays by Paul Ricoeur under the topics of structuralism, psychoanalysis, hermeneutics, and religion: *The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics*, ed. Don Ihde, trans. Willis Domingo *et al*. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974).
6. See Statman, Daniel, ed. *Virtue ethics*. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997). *Phronesis* is the ancient Greek word for a type of wisdom in Aristotelian ethics. In Nicomachean Ethics, it is distinguished from episteme and techne corresponding respectively to knowledge and intelligence. It is often translated as prudence or 'practical wisdom' as opposed to an absolute or impartial wisdom.

7. There are several problems identified in this context. First and foremost, Arendt's work on political judgment was left unfinished since that was the last piece she was working on at the time of her death. Although there are enough clues to build a theory there based on her prior work, there are also gaps and unaddressed issues, such as whether there should be normative limits to reflection. Here, the distinction to be made is between the validity of all possible moral persuasions and the instinct to protect the overall democratic framework open to pluralistic participation based on regulated and transparent procedures of negotiation. That is to say, norms allowing participation may be identified as trumping all other moral references. This is precisely the core of Seyla Benhabib's readings as well as other leading commentaries of both Arendtian and Habermasian scholarship. See Benhabib, Seyla. *The reluctant modernism of Hannah Arendt* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003).

8. Hannah Arendt's decisive contribution to this debate includes two distinctive perspectives on judgment that is derived from the corpus of her writings. Her relation to Aristotelian and Kantian sources, as well as key thinkers such as Benjamin and Heidegger, I would argue that Arendt's work pinpoints the key antinomy within political judgment itself, that between the viewpoints of the political actor and the political spectator. For further debate on Arendt's work in political judgment, see Arendt, Hannah. *Lectures on Kant's political philosophy* (University of Chicago Press, 1989), Arendt, Hannah. *Responsibility and judgment* (Random House LLC, 2003) and Arendt, Hannah. *The promise of politics* (Random House LLC, 2009). For an interpretation of Arendt's work on the subject, see Benhabib, Seyla. "Judgment and the moral foundations of politics in Arendt's thought." *Political Theory* (1988): 29-51, Biskowski, Lawrence J. "Practical foundations for political judgment: Arendt on action and world." *The Journal of Politics* (1993) 55.4: 867-887 and Yar, Majid. "From actor to spectator Hannah Arendt's 'two theories' of political judgment." *Philosophy & Social Criticism* (2000) 26.2: 1-27.

9. Kant's theory of judgment could be identified by three characteristics: (1) He takes the innate capacity for judgment to be *the central cognitive faculty of the rational human mind*, (2) He insists on the semantic, logical, psychological, epistemic, and practical *priority of the propositional content of a judgment*, and (3) He attempts to systematically embed judgment within *the metaphysics of transcendental idealism*. The primary text referred to in this regard is Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of judgement* (Oxford University Press, 2007). Also see Hanna, Robert. *Kant and the foundations of analytic philosophy*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001).

10. See Reid, Thomas. *Inquiry into the Human Mind: On the Principles of Common Sense*. Vol. 2. (Edinburgh University Press, 2000). The original version appeared in Reid, Thomas, and William Hamilton. *The works of thomas reid*. Vol. 1. (James Thin, 1895).

11. See Moore, George Edward. *A defence of common sense* (Allen & Unwin, 1925).

12. See Stocker, Michael. "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories" *Journal of Philosophy* (1983) 14: 453-66.

13. Latter additions to common philosophy such as the work of Dugald Stewart (1753-1828) and Thomas Brook (1778-1820), then added the component of experience to the final equation of what constitutes common sense. Other variations of the common sense doctrine include James Oswald's (1727-1793) use of it in support of religious belief, and, James Beattie (1735-1803) defense of it in the name of the existence of a moral faculty in human kind. For further debate, see Baron, Marcia W., Philip Pettit and Michael Slote *Three Methods of Ethics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

14. See Galston, William, *Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues and Diversity in the Liberal State* (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1991).

15. Anscombe, G.E.M., "Modern Moral Philosophy", *Philosophy* (1958) 33:1-19.

16.For further debate, see Swanton, Christine. *Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Driver, Julia. *Uneasy Virtue* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Foot, Philippa *Virtues and Vices* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978) as well as her (2001) *Natural Goodness*, Oxford, Clarendon Press; Hurka, Thomas. *Virtue, Vice, and Value* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Hursthouse, Rosa-

lind. *On Virtue Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); and Oakley, J. "Varieties of Virtue Ethics", *Ratio* (1996) 9: 128-52, among others.
17. See Slote, Michael. *Morals from Motives (*Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Carr, David and Jan Steutel, eds., *Virtue Ethics and Moral Education* (New York: Routledge, 1999) and, MacIntyre, Alasdair. *After Virtue* (London, Duckworth, 1985).

Deliberative Democracy and Aristotle's Legacy in Contemporary Canadian Political Thought

Lee Ward

Abstract

This paper reconsiders the contemporary efforts to inspire discussion of, and reflection upon, the possibilities for and limitations of democratic political community in Canada by reframing the work of James Tully, Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka in light of Aristotle's legacy in political and ethical theory. I will argue that these contemporary thinkers present a version of discursive democracy that draws upon the Aristotelian tradition of locating the faculty of reasoned speech or logos at the center of political life. For Tully, Taylor and Kymlicka, politics is as much about discussing the "just and unjust, and the advantageous and disadvantageous" (Aristotle *Politics* 1253a12) as it was famously for Aristotle. Indeed, I will argue that these contemporary Canadian democrats follow Aristotle's path toward a vision of democracy moderated by an inclusive conception of the common good.

I will also try to show, however, the limits of an authentically Aristotelian conception of virtue as applied to modern times, particularly with regard to how these contemporary Canadian theorists try to avoid the inegalitarian tendencies in Aristotle's political and ethical theory by rejecting 'perfectionist' assumptions about virtue and human nature. Thus, while indebted to Aristotle in important ways, Tully, Taylor and Kymlicka remain committed to the modern moral premises of liberal democracy.

Keywords

Canada, Deliberative Democracy, Aristotle, Charles Taylor, James Tully, Will Kymlicka.

I Aristotle's Political Theory

Before we consider contemporary Canadian political theory, it may be good to briefly return to Aristotle's seminal political teaching as it bears on the work of Taylor, Tully and Kymlicka. There are three aspects of Aristotle's political thought that have helped shape contemporary theories of deliberative democracy. These are Aristotle's substantive principle of the good, his argument for the human being as a political animal, and finally his qualified defense of democracy as a form of government.

For Aristotle, the science of politics (*politike*) is the architectonic study because the political community encompasses, but also points beyond, all other

forms of association including the family, business partnerships and smaller communities such as the village. The goodness of politics derives from its capacity to reflect the variety of goods to which every association aims: "all associations aim at some good, and the particular association which is the most sovereign of all, and includes all the rest, will pursue this aim most, and will thus be directed to the most sovereign of all goods" (Pol 1252a4-6). The political community or *polis* is the most sovereign association not only because it includes the other associations, but also because the good to which it aims is the most complete, or highest, good. The means that Aristotle uses to describe this good is the accumulated actions and acquired virtues characterizing the "good life" (1252b30). In contrast to modern notions of the good life as a product of individual choice relative to particular tastes and preferences, Aristotle's idea of the good life is a substantive concept which he derives from what he takes to be the permanent features of human nature.

There are two aspects of Aristotle's teaching on human nature that provide the substance or content to the good human life. The first is his idea of natural sociability. As is well known, Aristotle famously remarked that "man is a political animal" (Pol 1253a7). By this, Aristotle not only meant that human beings are gregarious creatures drawn into society with each other. He also meant to highlight the unique human capacity for reasoned speech (*logos*), which provides the intellectual grounds for human sociability. Alone among the creatures, human beings have language that "serves to declare what is advantageous and what is the reverse...of the just and unjust, and other similar qualities" (Pol 1253a15-17). The deliberative activities central to political participation are, in Aristotle's view, essential ingredients of the good or full human life. The significance of language for Aristotle is that it demonstrates the ontological priority of the polis over the individual or family: "The city is prior in the order of nature to the family and the individual," because the "whole is necessarily prior to the part" (Pol 1253a18). Both the wholeness of the political community, and the partiality of the individual or familial unit, derive from the fact that human flourishing at its highest level is only possible, according to Aristotle, in the *polis* that allows for the citizen to engage in debate and deliberation with fellow citizens. Simply put, for Aristotle, any life that does not involve active citizenship is less than fully human. The second aspect of human nature that Aristotle believes supports his idea of the good is his teaching on virtue. The human being when "perfected" by moral education "is the best of animals" be-

cause we are furnished by nature with the intellectual capacities and cognitive resources to "serve the purposes of wisdom and goodness" (Pol 1253a25-30). The purpose of the political community is "to make the citizens good and just" (Pol 1280b11), by which Aristotle means that civic life has a primarily educative function. Moral virtue is not, however, relative to the regime charged with training its citizens. Indeed, the morally serous individual aspires to a standard of moral action that is in crucial respects independent of the perspective of the polis. The measure for the exercise of the moral virtues such as courage, moderation, generosity, and magnanimity is what is noble or the quality that renders good the thing itself by which an action or characteristic is excellent. The political, community is the only forum, according to Aristotle, in which human beings can reliably be expected to strive "for the sake of actions valuable in themselves" (Pol 1281a2). The substantive content of Aristotle's idea of the "good life" is, then, supplied by both the deliberations of rational speech in a civic context and by the standards of noble or virtuous action that, at least in part, transcend the regime.

How does Aristotle's account of the good life in the political community relate to his teaching about democracy, the form of government to which contemporary Canadian political theorists are by and large committed? Famously, democracy is not Aristotle's idea of the best regime, but he offers a qualified defense for certain aspects of democracy. For Aristotle, every regime type is determined in part by the "organization" of offices into rule by one, few or many. Democracy is rule by the many so that "the people (*demos*) are sovereign" (Pol 1278b10). The other determining factor for regimes is whether the ruling group "considers the common interests," or only the "personal interest" of the rulers (Pol 1279a17-19). Each type of rule by one, few or many has a good and a defective form contrasting monarchy with tyranny, aristocracy with oligarchy, and what Aristotle calls polity or constitutional government with democracy. That is to say, Aristotle identifies democracy as a defective regime because it is "directed to the interest of the poor," who Aristotle assumes will always comprise the majority (Pol 1279b10).

However, Aristotle will say on behalf of democracy that rule of the many is not only not necessarily unwise or immoral, but also that democratic elements in a regime can help the many develop their rational and moral capacities in order to become citizens of the political community rather than its opponents.

In other words, Aristotle indicates that any form of regime can be improved, or made more secure, by incorporating democratic features that allow the many to enhance their rational capacities through deliberation about issues of public concern. The goal of defining citizenship in participatory and inclusive terms is shared by Canada's premier political theorists.

II Contemporary Canadian Political Theory

Charles Taylor is arguably the doyen of Canadian political philosophers. A native-born Quebecer and life-long resident of the province, Taylor's work has engaged with the philosophical and legal dimensions of the division between Quebec and the rest of Canada since the 1960's. For Taylor, the Quiet Revolution in Quebec and the rise of the independence movement produced profound social and political change that the Canadian constitution has proven unable to address. The problem of Canada is a problem of democracy. Or to put it differently, Canada's constitution is a problem with a democratic solution insofar as the "deep diversity" (Taylor 1993: 200) in Canada produced by division rooted in language, culture, and history make the formation of a single political community difficult, even as the principle of democracy extends the promise of accommodating diversity.[2]

The relation of culture and politics in Canada suggests to Taylor that a certain kind of democracy with strong deliberative and discursive elements can remedy our constitutional troubles. At its deepest level, the problem is not really political at all, but rather philosophical or even existential. Taylor insists that modernity's self-generating self, an intellectual and moral monad set adrift in an ocean of being and left to create any meaningful relation in terms of the limited introspective cognitive resources available to it, is not a true reflection of human nature or experience. According to Taylor, the ontological priority of community over the individual means that my identity depends crucially upon "my dialogical relation with others."[3] On the political or constitutional level, this dialogical character of identity formation presents a specific challenge for Canada, which unlike other historic democratic republics such as France or the US, is not bound together by a common culture and language. Rather Canada is "a natural locus for the experiment in the dialogue society (Taylor 1993: 27). The difficulties in perfecting this social and political balance through dialogue have only increased,

in Taylor's view, since the introduction of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982. Since that time, "Two conceptions of rights-liberalism have confronted each other," the one dominant in English Canada stressing individual rights and proceduralism, on one hand, and the other view of group rights and substantive protections prevailing in Quebec, on the other (Taylor 1994: 52, 56). The "tragic" events relating to the failure of the Meech Lake Accord (Taylor 1993: 190), which promised distinct constitutional status for Quebec, derived from the incapacity of Canada's dominant cultural and linguistic groups to recognize the claims of the other group.

According to Taylor, democracy is both a causal factor of, and potential solution for, the problem of recognition. It causes difficulty in the sense that distinct groups form their own "dialogical community" through democratic deliberation, and thus produce coincident diversity (or more pessimistically lack of unity). But democratic principles are also, of course, a source of unity insofar as dialogical exchange can produce "collective decision" and bind people together in a "common fate" (Taylor 1993: 197). Common deliberation presupposes recognition of the moral worth of the parties to the cultural dialogue. Thus, Taylor believes that the result of dialogical exchange in Canada can be a country in which the "common understanding" of citizenship rests precisely upon recognition of difference (Taylor 1993: 199). While the primary focus of the dialogue surrounding Meech Lake may have been ensuring the survival of a "community of people here [in Quebec] in the future that will avail itself of the opportunity to use the French language (Taylor 1994: 58), Taylor's treatment of the value of democratic dialogue clearly extends, at least in principle, to constitutional recognition of the claims of aboriginal peoples and Canadian regions (e.g., the West) as well.

What in Taylor's estimation are the prospects for the development of democratic political community in Canada based upon recognition of cultural difference? Clearly, the failure of Meech Lake and the Charlottetown Accord reflected a basic lack of recognition. Going forward, Taylor suggests that English Canada needs to recognize that from the perspective of French Quebec, "it is necessary to create anew...the country has to be remade from top to toe" (Taylor 1993: 145). Whether English Canadians are willing to accept the need for radical reorganization of the constitutional order today seems unlikely, and there is uncertainty as to whether Quebecers even desire radical constitutional change nowadays. Regardless, Taylor is unequivocal in his assessment that the 1982 constitution is

inadequate for the purpose of national renewal in Canada. In fact, he dismissed the work of 1982 as part and parcel of the "1867 Constitution" which "died morally in Quebec" with the failure of Meech (Taylor 1993: 145). The amendment process outlined in Part V, ostensibly the mechanism for future change, is, according to Taylor, part of the problem: "We must avoid becoming embroiled in the maze of amendment procedures that currently exist. The problem with these procedures is that they leave us with the status quo by default. They put the burden of proof on those who want change" (Taylor 1993: 154). Thus, Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982 exposes, and indeed exacerbates, the profound tension in Canada between an aspirational democratic political community and a constitutionalism that is unable to reflect the diversity of the country that it purports to represent.

Will Kymlicka's work on multiculturalism has been some of the most important contributions to Canadian political theory in the post-Meech era. For Kymlicka, Canada is a model for both the successes and challenges facing multicultural policies in advanced liberal democracies. In contrast to the "Westphalian state" characterized by uniformity in law, culture, language, and national symbols, Kymlicka finds the multicultural state in an idealized version of Canada (or perhaps Canada's promise) in which diversity is recognized and valued with respect to indigenous peoples, sub-state national groups and immigrant communities.[4] The multicultural state presupposes a distinctive form of democratic deliberation by which the traditional idea of territorial and legal sovereignty is replaced with a new civic discourse about "emerging principles of targeted, group differentiated" rights for indigenous and minority national groups (Kymlicka 2007: 148). Kymlicka identifies both successes and limits to Canadian federalism. First, there is the constant threat of secession from groups with "substantial levels of popular support."[5] While Canada went some way in the post-1995 Quebec referendum period to deal with the legal aspects of secession with the 1998 Supreme Court reference and Clarity Act of 2000, Kymlicka suggests that the root cause of secession remains in Canada's diversity. The second and related challenge confronting federal states like Canada is the need to entrench constitutional or legislative affirmation of the distinct status of minority groups (Kymlicka 2007: 67). The failure to constitutionalize "distinct society" regarding Quebec or to establish aboriginal self-government in Canada indicates just how great a challenge collective agreement upon this formal affirmation can pose.

In Kymlicka's view, deliberative democracy is the mechanism suited to accommodate diversity and instantiate the new civic discourse required to re-conceive the idea of the sovereign state. In this light, "democracy is not just a formula for aggregating votes: it is a system of collective deliberation and legitimation that allows all citizens to use their reason in political deliberation" (Kymlicka 2001: 226). Only by means of deliberative democracy can one say that political decisions are "legitimated on the grounds that they reflect the considered will and common good of the people as a whole, not just the self-interest and arbitrary whims of the majority" (Kymlicka 2001: 226). There are two conditions required for deliberative democracy to flourish. First, Kymlicka points to the need for a high level of trust that one's views will be heard and that defeat will not be permanent (Kymlicka 2001: 226). Second, political deliberation is only feasible if participants understand one another, and this seems, in Kymlicka's view, to require a common language (Kymlicka 2001: 227). As he memorably puts it: "Democratic politics is politics in the vernacular" (Kymlicka 2001: 213).

What does this insistence on the value of shared linguistic meaning signify for a multilingual or bilingual state like Canada? Kymlicka argues that deliberative democracy does not require a common religion, political ideology, or racial/ethnic descent because genuinely participatory democratic fora cut across racial, ideological and religious cleavages (Kymlicka 2001: 212). With language, however, the issue is more complex because in the increasingly democratic modern age language is ever more important in defining the boundaries of political communities in Belgium, Spain, Switzerland and Canada. The increasing importance of the linguistic base of political community is tied to democracy. Linguistic communities are the "primary forms of democratic participation in the modern world" because the average citizen is only comfortable debating political issues in his or her native tongue. For Kymlicka, the problem for creating democratic political community in Canada is only secondarily a constitutional affair. Rather more fundamentally, the problem is that while there are public spaces and forms of civil society that cut across language lines in Canada, it is nonetheless hard to generate a single "mass public opinion" in any multilingual country (Kymlicka 2001: 214). Thus, in Kymlicka's estimation even as multicultural policies open up public space for a civic discourse among diverse groups in a polity, the challenge of language makes achievement of agreement on flexible constitutional forms that can accommodate this diversity difficult.

The last of our troika of prominent Canadian political theorists is James Tully, whose most recent work presents a new "public philosophy" for democratic societies confronting the legacy of imperialism and the challenges of globalization.[6] Tully's philosophical reflections are inspired by Canadian political experience, especially his knowledge of aboriginal peoples acquired as a member of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples from 1991-96. The primary theoretical foundation of Tully's new public philosophy is deliberative democracy, which he argues has the potential to liberate modern societies from imperial and hegemonic power structures. "Democratic communicative action" is the term Tully uses to describe the form of healthy civic participation involved when interest groups mobilize to defend basic rights (Tully 2008 v. 2: 169). In this regard, Tully has praise for some aspects of the 1982 Constitution, especially the Charter of Rights and Freedoms which he associates with Pierre Trudeau's vision of "a toolbox that citizens should use to engage in practices of civic freedom against the unequal distribution of power in Canada and the world" (Tully 2008 v.2: 167). While 1982 failed to resolve the legitimate claims of Quebecois or to entrench aboriginal self-government, Tully finds some solace in the new more agonistic approach to civic engagement that it introduced into Canada. For Tully, "diverse citizenship" is inherently deliberative because it depends less on formal, legal status than a form of activity "situated" in local practice, or the "grass-roots democratic or civic activities of the governed" (Tully 2008 v.2: 247). Put succinctly, in Aristotelian terms "one becomes a citizen through participation" (Tully 2008 v.2: 248).

One of Tully's most important philosophical insights is his critique of the modern conception of constituent power, which in the Canadian context takes the form of his in-depth analysis of the political practices of indigenous peoples. For Tully, the western idea of constituent power, with its reliance on a reified notion of consent and a fixed, temporal moment of expression for popular sovereignty, has simply been imposed upon aboriginal peoples. He exposes its fundamentally imperialistic character by contrasting western enlightenment ideas about constitution-making with the traditional practices and customary law of indigenous peoples in Canada (Tully 2008 v.2: 202-06). The indigenous political tradition contains "practices of freedom" developed in dialogical communities that were originally independent and self-sustaining. The key organizing principle of these indigenous practices is negotiation as the basis of an ongoing, futural relation based upon mutual respect and sharing of land and resources

(Tully 2008 v.1: 287-88). Rather than a definitive 'founding moment' in the past central to western ideas of the state, Tully offers the indigenous practice of future-looking, institutionalized discourse among diverse parties. What does this mean for Canada, a democratic state putatively "founded" in 1867 by agreement of colonial and British authorities, and then "re-founded" in 1982 by agreement of the national government and nine of the ten provinces?

Tully calls upon Canadians to re-conceive of their state in terms of a discursive community built upon democratic principles. In one sense, this new Canada requires a new constitution, or more precisely an "Aboriginal-Canadian Charter that should govern relations between aboriginal and non-aboriginal peoples" (Tully 2008 v.1: 229). This new form of constitutionalism would encourage democratic deliberation and "intercultural dialogue" by emphasizing a "new dialogue of equality" among Canada's diverse peoples (Tully 2008 v.1: 241). However, in a more radical sense Tully's new Canada would reject the western idea of constituent power root and branch. Rather than a single Canadian confederation, Tully envisions "two confederations" of which "the 'first' confederation (or federation) is the treaty confederations of the First Nations with the Crown and later the federal and, to some extent, provincial governments. The second confederation (or federation) is the constitutional federation of the provinces and the federal government" (Tully 2008 v.1: 236-7). This new, multidimensional Canadian state would require not only diverse kinds of institutions and practices, but also diverse forms of citizenship. In the spirit of negotiation that would characterize this Canadian state, there would be a continual process of consultation, discussion, and adjudication among the Canadian national and provincial governments, as well as among First Nations. This new order that Tully terms "Treaty Federalism" would recognize First Nations as a "stateless, self-governing and autonomous people, equal in status, but not in form, to the Canadian state, with a willingness to negotiate shared jurisdiction of land and resources" (Tully 2008, v.1: 280). This new order would also likely include a separate legal system based upon aboriginal customary law.

The great challenge, of course, lies in forging a path that allows aboriginal and non-aboriginal peoples to feel a "shared sense of destiny together" without either assimilation or exploitation (Tully 2008 v.1: 242). For Tully, there is inevitably a constitutional dimension in this project as "the mutual acceptance and affirmation of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples as equal, co-existing

and self-governing" requires "public acknowledgement of this in the Constitution" (Tully 2008 v.1: 230-31). The "just Confederation" to which Tully aspires presupposes radical reorganization of the constitutional order, especially but not exclusively, as it pertains to aboriginal and non-aboriginal relations. While recognizing the difficulty of the formal amendment process established in 1982, Tully suggests that the new spirit of negotiation and deliberation is inseparable from constitution-making albeit a new more fluid conception of constitutional law that he believes will form the basis of an aboriginal charter, aboriginal courts and even an aboriginal parliament (Tully 2008 v.1: 225, 250). In this sense, the connection between deliberative democracy in new structures of negotiation and formal constitutional change is as central to Tully's vision of a future Canada as it is for Taylor or Kymlicka.

III Aristotle's Complex Legacy in Canada

In what respects can we say that Taylor, Kymlicka and Tully are intellectual heirs of Aristotle's political philosophy. There are at least three distinctive Aristotelian teachings that are central to these contemporary political theorists. These are the Aristotelian idea of community, the emphasis on reasoned speech and a shared distrust towards majority-rule. First, with respect to community, we see a profound disquiet about modern individualism among Canadian political theorists. Taylor, Kymlicka and Tully each shared some notion of a collective good that transcends the moral claims of the *individual qua individual*. Whether it be Taylor and Tully's conception of the common good defined by cultural survival for Quebecois and aboriginal peoples, or Kymlicka's argument for a multicultural politics grounded in the individual's loyalty to group identity, we see an ideal of human life for which membership in a group is the most politically relevant fact. There is also an important Aristotelian dimension to the critique of constituent power in Tully (and implicit in Taylor), which claims that western ideas of constituent power in a founding moment of contractual union privileges origins over the more Aristotelian idea of *telos* of proper ends of society and human life.

Second, there is strong evidence of the Aristotelian emphasis on reasoned speech throughout contemporary Canadian political theory. Aristotle's principle of *logos* forms the core concept in Taylor's theory of "dialogical com-

munities," Tully's idea of "communicative action," and Kymlicka's claim that language constitutes the chief boundary among national minority groups today. Aristotle would agree that democracy involves politics in the vernacular, but he would go further to say that politics in any regimes depends upon the citizenry's capacity to communicate effectively among themselves. Kymlicka's warning that the formation of genuine political community becomes more difficult in a multilingual context reflects this fundamentally Aristotelian assumption about political life. Third, many Canadian political theorists share Aristotle's deep distrust of majoritarianism. For Tully, Kymlicka and Taylor, as for Aristotle, democracy's goodness is crucially dependent upon the regime's capacity to promote the common good, not simply reflect majority will. Of course, the common good in a modern liberal democratic state such as Canada is defined in terms of an inclusive principle of justice based upon diversity or multiculturalism whether this diversity reflects distinct national minorities, aboriginal peoples of immigrants. The principle of demonstrating concern for promotion of minority interests as part of the common good is one that Aristotle strongly endorses.

However, despite sharing some important philosophical underpinnings Aristotle and contemporary Canadian political theorists disagree about the moral premises of political life. Most significantly, Canadian political theorists share fundamental liberal commitments about individual rights and natural equality that are simply alien to the Aristotelian tradition. These important differences can be encapsulated in the different understanding of the concept of nature, and in a uniquely modern idea of diversity. For Aristotle, nature is the regulative principle for political life. Nature is also, Aristotle claims, inherently hierarchical: "In all cases where there is a compound constituted of more than one part but forming one common entity, whether the parts be continuous or discrete, a ruling element and a ruled element can always be traced. This characteristic is present in animate beings by virtue of the whole constitution of nature" (Pol 1254a17). For Aristotle, nature sets patterns for rule such as soul over body, and reason over appetites. The political and social implications of this hierarchy form the basis for Aristotle's inegalitarian conception of the family with male rule over females and slaves, as well as a political ideal according to which the best form of city will not make mechanics or labourers citizens (Pol 1287a8). The only notion of equality that has political bearing for Aristotle is the idea of proportional equality linked to his account of distributive justice

the essence of which is reward on the basis of one's contribution to the common good. As Aristotle relates, "justice consists in what tends to promote the common interest' (Pol 1282b14). It would be just, then, to claims honors on the basis of wealth, good birth, or being a good soldier insofar as these contribute to the common good of the polis (Pol 1283a3).

Contemporary Canadian political theorists display an aversion not only to the inegalitarian implications of Aristotle's politics, but also to the very idea of nature as the standard for moral philosophy. Even though Taylor rejects the individualist "naturalism" that he associates with modern liberalism, this does not lead him back to classical natural right. Rather Taylor, as well as Tully and Kymlicka, embrace the modern concept of "culture" which they believe to have more egalitarian political implications because it is tied to subjective ideas of dignity and self-worth, and because given this subjective standard it is difficult (although not impossible) to judge or evaluate ranks among cultures. For Taylor, Tully and Kymlicka culture is the basis for a certain kind of equal rights claim, i.e., a right to self-government for minority groups distinct from majority-rule. The Aristotelian idea of proportional equality is thus alien (or even hostile to) the identity politics central to modern communitarianism. The importance of culture, whether minority national groups or indigenous peoples, does not depend on what supposed contribution a specific group makes to the common good. Rather the common good is defined in terms of the regime's service to distinct cultural groups.

Modern ideas of diversity also show the important differences between Aristotle and contemporary political theorists. Aristotle embraced a certain form of diversity in the sense that he believed that the *polis* requires not only distinct families and private property, but also diverse opinions and interests in order to facilitate meaningful deliberation (Pol 1261a10-1264b24). However, the essence of political community is, according to Aristotle, the sense of having shared things that bind the community together. The shared things are primarily intellectual conceptions of what is good or right. A *polis* is more than common residence or a contractual arrangement for the "sake of preventing mutual injustice and easing exchange" (Pol 1280b29). For example, Megara and Corinth would not make a single political community even if they were surrounded by a "single wall" and had a "common system of law" (Pol 1280b12). Thus, Aristotle highlights the moral, intellectual and affective supports for civic

unity that make a *polis* the perfect community. Is the Canada envisioned by Taylor, Tully and Kymlicka capable of the kind of substantive shared conception of the good life promoted by Aristotle? Does any serious contemporary Canadian political theorist believe that it would be a desirable goal to encourage this degree of unity?

Peter Russell famously argued that Canadians are not yet a fully sovereign people because among other things, there is "no evidence that either the Quebecois or aboriginal peoples accept" the vision of the country promoted by the majority group (Russell 2004: 6). Given this political reality, it is probably no surprise that the concept of "diverse citizenship," that is different forms of citizenship for aboriginal and non-aboriginal peoples or between Quebec and the rest of Canada, describes the relations central to theorizing about contemporary Canadian politics. Diverse citizenship presupposes that different conceptions of the good life can support a single, albeit diverse, political community. The authentic Aristotelian teaching rejects this possibility on the grounds that the intense interpersonal cultural connection among sub-state groups will seriously weaken civic attachment at the state-level, so that strong cultural communities must produce a thin conception of the good at the state or most authoritative level. In contrast to Aristotle's functional diversity, modern Canadian democrats tend toward the liberal idea of a political community built upon the fundamental idea of difference. That is to say, we are united in our commitment to difference. Needless to say, this classical liberal principle born out of the sectarian conflicts of the early modern period would have appeared highly problematic to Aristotle.

One way to explain the difference between Aristotle's and modern ideas of political community is to reflect upon the importance of friendship as a political force in Aristotle. Friendship, for Aristotle, is both a factor in personal development and a kind of relation with profound political relevance. In fact, for Aristotle, friendship is present anytime "to the extent that men share something in common."[7] A shared conception of justice is the basis for political friendship. While friendship between individuals deepens moral education by mutually promoting moral and possibly intellectual virtue, Aristotle identifies concord as the form of friendship proper to the state, or "friendship among fellow citizens" (Ethics 1167a22). Concord is the form of friendship that plays a similar role for Aristotle that consent plays for modern liberals, namely, concord

legitimizes collective actions. As Aristotle argues, concord is evident "when the citizens have the same judgment about their common interest, when they choose the same things, and when they execute what they decided in common" (Ethics 1167a26-28). Out of all of the regimes types, Aristotle sees friendship as being most important in democracy "since where the citizens are equal, they have many things in common" (Ethics 1161b10).

Friendship is much more problematic for modern theorists because individual rights typically assume moral priority over communal concord. Even among contemporary theorists such as Taylor, Tully and Kymlicka, who dissent from key aspects of liberalism, there would likely be concern that Canada cannot (or perhaps should not) sustain the kind of intracommunal friendship and concord that Aristotle prescribes because it would require cultural assimilation and homogeneity. For contemporary Canadian political theorists diversity is the cardinal principle compared to which concord and friendship is a lower order good. More precisely, Canadian political theorists who have been shaped by the demands of Quebec nationalism and claims for aboriginal self-government are committed to preserving some idea of an affective bond or friendship within the discrete elements of the polity, but not a deep friendship across the whole polity. Is diluted patriotism and civic identity the price, as it were, of maintaining a truly diverse political community? The great challenge for twenty-first century followers of Aristotle in Canada would then be how to conceive of diversity as not only a source of political or constitutional consensus, but also as an idea around which concord and friendship can grow.

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Endnotes

1. Aristotle, *Politics* 1253a12. All quotations from Aristotle's *Politics* are from Aristotle, *Politics*, Ernest Barker, trans. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
2. Charles Taylor, *Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism.* Guy Laforest, ed. (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993), 200.
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5. Will Kymlicka, *Politics in the Vernacular*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 93.
6. James Tully, *Public Philosophy in a New Key: Two Volumes*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
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Aristotelian Types of Persuasion
Understanding the Rob Ford Phenomenon

Naomi Couto

Abstract

Toronto Mayor Rob Ford has achieved a level of notoriety unique amongst Canadian politicians for his admissions of drug and alcohol use, and subsequent attempts to deflect media attention and public scrutiny away from his public and private life. Conventional wisdom would suggest that Ford should not have survived such politically charged revelations. In past decades, any politician so publicly shamed would have resigned as a mark of honour. Ford, however, continued to cling to office. This modern political mood, and the lack of loss of legitimacy, is read through the classical lens of Aristotle's notions of *ethos*, *logos* and *pathos*.

Keywords

Rob Ford, Aristotle, Persuasion, Politics.

> I know what I did was wrong. And admitting it was the most difficult and embarrassing thing I have ever had to do. Folks, I have nothing left to hide. I would do anything – absolutely anything – to change the past. But the past is the past and we must move forward… I was elected to do a job, and that's exactly what I'm going to continue doing.[1]

Introduction

The Canadian political system is based upon the United Kingdom's Westminster Parliamentary System and Whitehall governance model. Inherent within these models are the notions of individual 'integrity' and 'responsibility'. It is expected that members will conduct themselves responsibly and with honour. Members that are found to have breached implicit codes of conduct, both publicly and privately, are expected to do the 'honourable' thing and resign. Although this 'principle' has been advocated over time for a series of offenses, compliance is more a function of moral suasion or individual accountability.

Hence, individual member accountability and responsibility remains couched within 18th century notions of duty, honour, and responsibility. Simi-

larly, much of our governing legislation is predicated upon such notions, and consequently are silent regarding situations where members disavow their responsibility. These notions in turn find their roots within Greek models of democracy. To an extent, more recent legislation and amendments have sought to specify explicit repercussions in the case of member defiance. Nevertheless, compliance under the *spirit* of the law has deferred to compliance in accordance with the letter of the law.

The Issue

> Yes, I have smoked crack cocaine. But am I an addict?
> No. Have I tried it? Probably, in one of my drunken stupors.[2]

This admission by the Mayor launched a series of events that further called into question his 'competence' for the position. In the wake of this admission, further revelations came forth, including another drunken stupor episode on St. Patrick's Day of 2012. The Mayor had reportedly been drinking and smoking in his office at City Hall with other guests, then went out to the Biermarkt, where his party was served in a private room. According to one of the servers, the Mayor and his female friend appeared to be snorting cocaine (one of his staffers told the server that 'he had seen nothing'). The Mayor then returned to City Hall, where he had an exchange with security. Rob Ford was reportedly carrying a half empty bottle of brandy, and asked where his car was. He also reportedly made some sexually suggestive comments. This final point led to yet another infamous comment from Rob Ford to reporters:

> Oh, and the last thing was Olivia Gondek, that I wanted to eat her p***y. I've never said that in my life to her. I would never do that. I'm happily married. I've got more than enough to eat at home.[3]

Following these remarks, Council members began the formal process of seeking to remove the Mayor's discretionary powers as part of seeking to encourage him to take a leave of absence to address his issues.

> But apologies are not enough, according to Deputy Mayor Norm Kelly, who says Ford has lost the "moral authority" to lead. "It's not enough because it doesn't address the major issues in his life and the life of this council," Kelly said Thursday morning on CBC's Metro Morning. "He must take a leave of absence in order to rehabilitate himself."[4]

Although others believed that Rob Ford had lost the moral authority to lead, Ford has consistently reiterated both his refusal to step down and his desire to continue to serve as mayor. The incidents leading to Council's removal of the Mayor's additional powers (powers granted by Council that are not automatically attributed to the position) supported the Deputy Mayor's remarks, but have also traditionally been sufficient as to result in voluntary resignation (or leave of absence) by other political figures. One of the factors complicating this situation has been the shift in discourse promoted by the Fords. Both Rob and Doug Ford have put forth a series of arguments suggesting that there is no justification for Rob to step down.

First, they note that from a legal perspective, Rob has done nothing warranting his resignation or removal. Ford has not been convicted of a criminal offense, either in relation to his actions as Mayor, or as a private citizen. Second, Rob Ford was elected Mayor with an "overwhelming majority" in the words of Doug Ford, and that any actions to remove him would constitute an attack upon democracy. Although Rob Ford may be ultimately responsible to the electorate through the election process, this clearly neglects the notion of elected representatives taking action as warranted under the circumstances. Third is the argument that the actions for which Rob is being 'punished', occurred as part of his private life, and did not impact upon the performance of his duties. This is notwithstanding that some of the documented incidents occurred during normal work hours (meetings with Lisi, his coaching activities, the Taste of the Danforth), and reported incidents of drinking in his office (though after normal office hours). Finally, they continue to note Rob Ford's persistent base of support according to the polls, that this is just an attack by the Toronto Star and downtown elites against regular guy Rob. Notwithstanding all of his foibles, between 25-30% continue to state that they believe he is doing a good job, and will vote for him on October 27, 2014 (a number that the Ford brothers believe would sustain itself even as Doug Ford became the mayoral candidate after Rob Ford was diagnosed with cancer in September 2014).

Theoretical Background

— *Rob Ford as Tragic Comedy*

Mayor Rob Ford's story reads akin to a tragic comedy. The hope is that all of his 'tragic actions' on behalf of the taxpayer (tax cuts, budget efficiencies, subways) will somehow result in a brighter future for Toronto and its citizens. Unfortunately, for all of Rob Ford's potential as an anti-politician, everyman hero railing against the perceived enemy of 'downtown latte-sipping elites', his now well-publicized tragic hero flaws threaten to undermine his message. Moreover, as in *Troilus and Cressida,* [5] we appear to be witnessing the 'demise of civil society', through the abdication of traditional notions of duty, honour, responsibility and respect.

Thus, we turn to a more classical account of 'honour' and 'responsibility' and how to interpret their use/abuse in our modern day world. In brief, we ask, what is honour today? Here the Rob Ford story is but one representation of a larger social and political dilemma; namely, the end of honour in political life. Such notions form part of the democratic model that finds its roots in ancient Greece. Although different from the democracy we know today, the idea of the polity entrusted to the 'many' as a form of government was predicated on the social (society) being placed ahead of individuals' (the one) needs and wants.[6] Accordingly, we turn to a classical, specifically Aristotelian, understanding of honour, morality, and ethics, as these ideas have come to inform our Western modern sensibilities. Our aim is to consider Aristotelian ideas as a way to theoretically frame the *present mood* around the seemingly endless narrative that is Rob Ford.

— *Aristotle on Persuasion and Moral Authority*

For Aristotle, honour can sometimes be found in the "hero" with the following qualities. First is the quality of "time"; that is, a character whose reputation for excellence stands the test of time. Second is the quality of "fame"; meaning to go down in memory or history. The hero is not forgotten by time because they strive to be a "good" person, doing what they do as *intrinsic* acts that are done for their own efficacy. All these good deeds move towards fulfilling one's "end" as action that is self-sufficient and final (not in the service of *instrumental* ends). Such truly ethical men though, as defined by Aristotle's concepts of *Ethos, Logos,* and *Pathos*, [are] difficult to find (even in ancient Greece).[7]

Ethos for Aristotle speaks to the ethical appeal of the rhetor or speaker. The speaker or author's character brings value to their arguments, their speech. This in turn offers support for those arguments, as the audience trusts the speaker. Aristotle speaks of two types of *ethos*: the *invented* and the *situated*. The *invented* type is seen in the tone or attitude taken by the speaker towards their audience. The *situated* type involves what the audience thinks of the speaker even before they begin to speak. Typically this involves the heroic figures typically portrayed in tragic comedies (Julius Caesar, Oedipus Rex).[8] From a traditional political perspective, this is characterized by highly educated, politically sophisticated, and/or well-off candidates (reflective of the Protestant work ethic). The alternative is the "everyman", who is deemed "trustworthy" as they come across to their audience as genuine.

Logos means the "word" or "reason" in addition to "action". Aristotle argued that *personal character* and *ethical character* are two different things. In most cases, they are merged as the person builds their reputation. What is important is the narrative delivered (whether the numbers and ideas are factual or not), and staying "true" to one's promises. *Ethos,* the spirit or character of a nation, is always tied into time and place. In 2010, the ethos of Toronto suburbs was one interested in punishing those whom they felt had abused the good of society: the moneyed elite. Over time, an ethos of distrust of smooth sounding politicians had developed due to a failure to deliver. Increasingly, the public wanted the opportunity to attain the honour and status Western society (steeped in the ethos of individualism) defines as *the good*. To those holding these values, what is important is whether what is said and promised sounds rationale and indeed, *good*.

Lastly, *pathos* helps us understand the tragic hero's *emotional* appeal. Emotions for Aristotle are just as valid for moving people into action as that of logic or method. Emotions involve a passionate way of knowing – different from, but not inferior to – the rationality of the philosopher or the precise observation of the scientist. Here, Aristotle is referring to the Arts and their ability to move people to think and act. As Aristotle points out, we do not automatically act the right way. Morality has to do with developing habits, the habits of right thinking, right choice, and right behaviour. Whereas the passion and emotion of tragic heroes is important, they also need to be balanced against personal and ethical character.

Discussion

There's a lot of people who have done what I've done.[9]

— Aristotle, Rob Ford and Honour

As noted previously, honour can be found in "heroes" with a reputation for excellence that strive to be a "good" person (by doing good for its own sake). However, such language and thinking around "the good person" or "virtuous soul" sounds out-dated and at times confusing to our modern sensibilities. Aristotle reasoned that an individual, who is a good doctor, doesn't necessarily have to be a good person. After all, individuals with exceptional excellence (actions and ethics) do not exist in sufficient frequency (Aristotle's rule of the "few"). Do political figures have to act in accordance with some higher moral or ethical code? Can't they be great leaders while simultaneously leading less than ethical or honourable personal lives? Should Mayor Rob Ford be held to a higher moral standard than the rest of us?

We turn then to these questions and consider "why" Rob Ford is still in office and why his approval rating is relatively still high. Clearly, our definition of "honour" is similar to the values held by Aristotle and those of his day and age, but we, like Aristotle, can begin to understand why less than honourable individuals can become political leaders and remain in power. If the "many" (democracy) are responsible for their elected leaders, we can use Aristotle's three types of persuasion to illustrate the popularity of Rob Ford, and his inability to step down from office even in the light of dishonourable activity in his personal world (even Rob Ford seems to understand this at some unconscious level through his never-ending appeal to the 'voters who voted him in and how he will continue as long as they keep "wanting" him in office).

— Ethos, Logos, and Pathos

As described previously, e*thos* speaks to the ethical appeal of the speaker. The character of the speaker creates value for their arguments, and thereby support as the audience trusts the speaker. Ford's appeal to the working class popula-

tions of Toronto rests upon his ability to position himself as the "everyman" or "trustworthy", such that he comes across to his audience as genuine (situated ethos). This rhetoric is supported by his use of simple (and common) language, conveying his desire to do 'good' for the city he loves (invented ethos). The twist is that for Ford, the 'good' speaks to the *sacredness* of capital — "to put an end to the wasteful spending and to watch the taxpayers' money and respect the taxpayers' money."[10] This message also resonated with "many highly educated, politically sophisticated, well-off people [who] voted for Rob Ford in the last Toronto mayoralty election."[11] However nowhere does this speak to respect for society and its citizens.

Ethos as the spirit or character of a nation is always tied into time and place. In 2010, Toronto elected a mayor that represented these values: individualism and fiscal control. Ford exuded the ethos of a community that was interested in punishing those whom they felt had abused the good of society, namely, the moneyed elite. His appearance and way of speaking about money benefited from his prior speeches at Council, and differed from that of the other mayoral candidates in that it was read as respect for his audience; respect for their "hard earned money." It is here that modern notions of individualism play out in the Rob Ford saga. Ford's mythology[12] situated him as the son of a hard-working father who "pulled himself up by the bootstraps." This appealed to notions of opportunity for a society steeped in the ethos of individualism, where hard work would lead to honour and status.

Aristotle reminds us that in a democracy, the people vote leaders in. The people in Rob Ford's Toronto are, as Ken Dryden writes, "mad". Namely, "… mad at all those people who have all the power, or believe they do. People who think they're so smart. Who know everything. Who study and analyze. Who have all the facts. Who sound so smug, so superior. Who make everyone else feel so stupid."[13] Ford reminded them of all their hard work and hard earned pay, which was being wasted by profligate governments.

Having established an ethos of individualism and money as sacred to "me", the *logos* that arises from this can be traced in Rob Ford's speeches and campaign promises. To those holding these values dear, what he said and promised sounded rational and indeed, good. The distrust of smooth sounding politicians and need for costly studies before action could be taken no longer seemed reasonable or of sound logic. Individualism wants action, and it demands it quickly, reflective of our fast

food, fast everything society. Ford's words spoke to voters, and he was able to sell his "words" as ready to be *acted on* as soon as he became mayor. Once mayor, this narrative continued. He insisted that he was staying "true" to his election promises, which resonated stronger with voters than his personal problems. This in turn allows Ford to ask voters to focus upon his 'actions' as mayor, rather than his personal life. His insistence on "saving people money" is the word, or that which was reasonable to believe in.

The challenge more recently for the Fords has been to maintain taxpayers focus upon the word (logos). No matter how much Ford's personal life may look like a major tragedy, he reminds voters that his personal behaviour will not infringe on his ability to keep their money sacred. What is uncertain is whether there is anyone who can question and convince voters of the "unreasonableness" of Ford's words and actions. How does one persuade the audience, the voter, that Ford's personal character is a reflection of his inability to act on their behalf? Aristotle argued that *personal character* and *ethical character* are two different things that are usually merged as a person builds their reputation. Nevertheless, something about Ford's "everyday-ness", his "bumbling fool quality", or his "I'm only human" quality remains endearing and refreshing in contrast to the more polished or arrogant *ethos* of Senator Wallin, Senator Duffy, or Prime Minister Harper. For the Fords to lose in 2014, an opponent has to be able to reformulate "what is reasonable", and merge the *personal* and the *ethical* character of the Mayor and his brother Doug.

Lastly, there is Ford's *emotional* appeal (pathos). Emotions involve a passionate way of knowing – different from, but not inferior to – the rationality of the philosopher. Ford's supporters, and even those who do not support him for mayor, want to see him make the right choices, and ultimately overcome his addictions. It's like rooting for the underdog to win, for the villain to reveal the tragic flaw that made them that way. Some writers have suggested that a story of redemption "along with remarkable powers of forgiveness on the part of the Toronto electorate", may yet result in Ford's re-election. In 2010, his "mad as hell" campaign was very emotionally persuasive. The question in 2014 is whether this emotional appeal will be less appealing in a candidate who cannot control his impulsive behaviours. Where once his passion and emotion came across as caring about taxpayers and their money, voters are now going to have to think about the right balance of his personal and ethical character, and similarly that of his brother Doug who is now running for Mayor (in place of Rob).

If as Aristotle argues, goodness is in humans *potentially*, meaning that there has to be *deliberate choice* in addition to knowledge, then Ford must be viewed by voters as *voluntarily* choosing to continue down a path of unethical behaviour, or *voluntarily* choosing to become a better man. His decision to take time off in May and June from the 2014 campaign could be viewed in a positive light, if he returns looking like a new man. "Image-making is a big part of Ford's mayoral game plan, Wieder said, and shedding pounds could go a surprisingly long way towards convincing taxpayers that a slimmer Ford is a changed man."[14] All of this ties into the *Pathos* or emotional appeal that Ford may or may not return with. What we can say for now is that these types of persuasion have all played a role in the election of Mayor Rob Ford, and his own sense of why he does not have to step down, regardless of the personal demons that afflict him. Nothing but a criminal charge or future changes to legislation will be able to promote vicissitudes in Rob Ford or the like. Even then, there will be those who can and will argue that the crisis is in the system, not in the individual. The possibility of Rob Ford in office again as a City Councillor is real, and one day becoming Mayor again, also remains a very real possibility.

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Love, Identity, and Transcendence in Aristotle and Hollywood

Steve Robinson

Abstract

This paper draws together aspects of Aristotle's ethics and metaphysics with the notion of a 'plot' drawn from his poetics to argue that the modern world is still very much under the sway of Aristotelian thinking on character and ethics – more so than our modern philosophies would typically recognize or allow. By attending to how ancient philosophers use well-known myths and characters to illustrate their theoretical claims, as well as to how those philosophers employ key plot elements (such as erotic love) as elements of their own ethical and metaphysical theories, we can discover that one very common plot type (the romantic comedy) actually presupposes a moral-theoretic point of view: namely, Aristotle's eudaimonism. That plot type is as common today as it has ever been, which leads us to the curious conclusion that our modern mentality still carries within it a deep commitment to an Aristotelian ethical worldview. The clue to this literary-ethical congruence that this paper examines is the ubiquitous presence of a 'narcissistic' aspect in this comic plot-type, which acts as a bridge connecting the philosophies of Aristotle and Plotinus, on the one hand, to ancient and modern versions of romantic comedy on the other. The metaphysical differences between Aristotle and Plotinus then account for the way Plotinus deviates from the standard plot-type, indicating that romantic comedy entails not only Aristotle's eudaimonism, but also his dualistic metaphysics.

Keywords

Plot, Ethics, Narcissism, Narratology, Eros, Eudaimonia, Aristotle, Plotinus, Hollywood, Narcissus.

This paper draws together aspects of Aristotle's ethics and metaphysics with the notion of a 'plot' drawn from his poetics to argue that the modern world is still very much under the sway of Aristotelian thinking on character and ethics – more so than our modern philosophies would typically recognize or allow.

At the outset I would note that with regard to "plot," dominant trends in deconstructionist literary theory have left us in a predicament much the same as that we now face in normative ethics. As is well known in moral philosophy (and is admirably summarized, for instance, by Cristina Traina in her excellent book, *Feminist Ethics and Natural Law*) all aspects of identity can be deconstructed, leaving no point of critical leverage to advocate for a universal and normative conception of human fulfilment, or 'flourishing' – be it naturalistic or otherwise. The course that Traina charts out of this predicament is towards

a new, more tentative critical and prescriptive feminist anthropology in which social constructionism contributes a "continual interrogation of apparently establish claims of [a more naturalistic] anthropology." [1] This anthropology could then supply the theoretical basis for a normative feminist ethics in a more Aristotelean framework. Likewise, N. J. Lowe has demonstrated in his book, *The Classical Plot and the Invention of Western Narrative*, that the concept of 'plot' has now been thoroughly deconstructed by showing its dependency on and reducibility to supposedly independent generic concepts. Consequently, the ambiguous Aristotelean distinctions between 'plot' (*mythos*), 'story' (*logos*), and the telling or narration of the story (*mimesis, mytheuma*), ultimately collapses in the face of the deconstructionist assault leaving us unable to say with any confidence what is nonetheless obvious to us all on another more 'commonsense' level – for example, that two distinct and cliché stories have 'the same plot.'[2] The grounds become unstable, rendering the concept of plot seemingly arbitrary just as in the case of ethical judgements about character, identity, and the 'good life.'

Lowe, not unlike like Traina in ethics, charts a path out of this literary-theoretical impasse by re-evaluating the scope and parameters of narratological concepts as presented by Aristotle. What Aristotle says about plot is famous, but also famously unclear. It can be found in the following single, long, complex sentence in the *Poetics*, full of qualifying conditions:

Since it (tragedy) is a representation (*mimesis*) of an action (*praxis*), and it (the action) is acted out (*prattetai*, cognate with *praxis*) by particular agents (*prattontes*, participle of the same verb), who will necessarily be particular kinds of person in respect of their moral character (*ethos*) and their ideas (*dianoia*) – for it is through these (character and ideas) that we assess people's actions, and it is through their actions that all people succeed or fail – and (since) THE PLOT (*mythos*) IS THE REPRESENTATION (*mimesis* again) OF THE ACTION (*praxis* again) – for BY 'PLOT' HERE I MEAN THE ORGANIZATION (*synthesis*) OF THE EVENTS (*pragmata*, passive cognate of *praxis*: 'things done' as opposed to 'doing'), by 'moral character' that which makes us say that the agents are particular kinds of person, and by 'ideas' passages of dialogue in which they argue something or express an opinion – then there are necessarily six qualitative parts of every tragedy: these are plot, moral character, diction, ideas, spectacle, and music.[3]

Lowe argues that plot, for Aristotle, is not constituted so much by the contrast between *mythos* (plot) and *logos* (story) – which turns out to be a red herring – as by its synthetic function. Plot is the organizing principle of the action in a story through which the success or failure of certain kinds of persons is evidentially connected to their moral characters. To recover a useful conception of plot, Lowe suggests we must work towards a theoretical characterization of the active synthesis that sets one narrative apart, as a 'story,' from another narrative which is a mere news report or a mere record of sequential events (fictional or otherwise).[4]

What I am proposing in this paper is that for a certain very persistent and popular sort of Western narrative the organizing principle has always been, and continues to be, congruent with the metaphysical presuppositions of Aristotle's own conception of *eudaimonia*, or human happiness. The plot I have in mind is what Lowe calls the "classical plot," but I am concerned here only with the comic variety of that plot including its modern version, the 'romantic comedy' that is so familiar to us from Hollywood cinema. As one screen-writer famous put it, this type of plot amounts to putting a character up a tree, throwing rocks at him for awhile, then getting him down again safely.[5] These dramas are populated by persons with recognizable *moral characters*, including 'good guys' (the ones up the tree) and 'bad guys' (the ones throwing the rocks). They always have a romantic or erotic dimension, and typically end with a consummation of the romantic impulse: either a real or symbolic marriage.

A full treatment of this theme would require a careful analysis of several examples to demonstrate the uniformity of this standard narrative form across two millennia or more. It can be found, for instance, in Disney animated feature films just the same as it is in an ancient Gnostic text from the first Century CE, as well as in Homer, Aristophanes and Shakespeare. But because this paper is very brief, my goal will simply be to consider one brief example which can help us in connecting Aristotle's concept of happiness to this standard plot form. The example comes from the ancient philosopher Plotinus, whose metaphysics is distinct from Aristotle's, and whose version of the romantic-comic plot must be resolved somewhat differently as a result. This will allow us to discern a general moral-philosophical commitment lying within the comic plot generally, and to identify the most common present-day, Hollywood version of that plot with Aristotle's ethics.

My claim is that all of these versions of the comic plot share a central 'narcissistic' structure: that is to say, the ancient myth of Narcissus is something of a paradigm case for this plot-type. It was Ovid who gave us the classic version of the Narcissus myth, though it certainly predated his telling of it. Very briefly, Narcissus was a divinely beautiful shepherd boy; everyone who saw him fell in love. But he took his beauty for granted and became arrogant, spurning the many lovers who pursued him. One of these spurned lovers, the nymph Echo, cursed him in response: "May he one day love as we have loved, and likewise fail to achieve the object of his desires." Soon after, Narcissus came across a mountain spring with a perfectly still surface. Peering down at his own reflection, he saw his face for the first time and fell instantly in love – with himself. In a desperate effort to clutch at and possess his beloved, he fell into the water and drowned and then spent an eternity in Hades staring wistfully at his own image reflected in the waters of the River Styx.

At first glance this story is a straightforward moral tale advising us against excessive self-love, and no doubt that is how it started its life as an ancient Greek folk tale. That is also why the term "narcissistic" is used to label negative and pathological personality qualities in modern psychiatry. The moral of the story is clear: if others offer you their love, then accept it gracefully with humility and gratitude; don't be arrogant and don't be conceited or you will deserve to come to a bad end like Narcissus. But it is likely that even Ovid himself was playing with this moral lesson and twisting it to fit the theme of the book for which he composed it: *Metamorphoses*. If the entire world of appearances is merely an ephemeral stage in the development of an underlying fluxual reality, then the fixation of Narcissus' lovers on his visual appearance can be a reminder that we should look beyond the surface to find a deeper truth. This inverts the moral lesson of the tale, making Narcissus into the victim of others' shallow fixations. By sinking down into the water, *beneath the surface with its image of his beautiful face*, he forsakes his fleeting and superficial beauty in pursuit of his own deeper reality. His lovers are the ones who are cursed. Ovid's moral tale changes from a rebuke of self-love, to a rebuke of superficial love.

Plotinus does something different again with Narcissus. He explicitly maps the story onto a very well-known comic plot: Odysseus' struggle to return from the Trojan War to be reunited with his wife Penelope in the land of his father. In his Tractate, "On Beauty," Plotinus has identified true beauty as the percep-

tion of 'oneness,' or integrity, and he directs each of us to seek it first in that unity which is closest to each of us: ourselves. This is no easy task, however, since our persons are typically not unified, our identities diffused into a multitude of conflicting tasks, roles and commitments. The search for our own integrity, our own beauty, can take many years of practise, and towards the end of this 'Tractate' Plotinus turns to the matter of how one should proceed:

> He that has the strength, let him arise and withdraw into himself, foregoing all that is known by the eyes, turning away for ever from the material beauty that once made his joy. When he perceives those shapes of grace that show in body, let him not pursue: he must know them for copies, vestiges, shadows, and hasten away towards That they tell of. For if anyone follow what is like a beautiful shape playing over water - is there not a myth telling in symbol of such a dupe, how he sank into the depths of the current and was swept away to nothingness? So too, one that is held by material beauty and will not break free shall be precipitated, not in body but in Soul, down to the dark depths loathed of the Intellective-Being, where, blind even in the Lower-World, he shall have commerce only with shadows, there as here. "Let us flee then to the beloved Fatherland": this is the soundest counsel. But what is this flight? How are we to gain the open sea? For Odysseus is surely a parable to us when he commands the flight from the sorceries of Circe or Calypso- not content to linger for all the pleasure offered to his eyes and all the delight of sense filling his days.[6]

Here, we see Plotinus rehearsing a version of the original moral tale but dressed up in Ovid's formulation: now again it is Narcissus (the "dupe") who is at fault – not for loving himself but for loving his own face, which is *not himself*. His bodily appearance is, in its own proper physical manifestation, itself just an image "playing over water." To pursue that image is to be "swept away to nothingness." Plotinus then substitutes Odysseus as the model for our pursuit of our true selves, fleeing to the "Fatherland," his home where his true identity awaits him – the place where he belongs and away from which he has been drawn by the Trojan War and all his subsequent adventures.

The most curious thing about Plotinus' substitution of Odysseus for Narcissus here is that Odysseus' story is also a love story. As a comic plot, the *Odyssey* ends as usual with the re-establishment of social norms symbolized by his reaffirmed marriage and its implied "happily ever after." This means that Plotinus is actually promoting self-love using the model of romantic love: he is endorsing Narcissus' genuine love of himself as an ideal version of the erotic love that we commonly celebrate in romantic comedies. For Plotinus, narcissism is a good thing so long as you are loving not your superficial selves that you present to others but your true, inner self: the integrative principle that unifies your various manifestations and makes them all *yours*. Penelope, the wife of Odysseus and the object of his erotic desire, is made into a symbolic substitute for the true, idealized version of Odysseus himself, and his marriage symbolizes his success in *becoming* that better version through the self-knowledge gleaned from his adventures. This allows Plotinus to portray the philosophical project of self-knowledge as an epic life-journey, which is an image that would appeal to most philosophers. But more importantly, this comic interpretation of the Narcissus myth allows Plotinus to describe human life as a journey from a shallow, imperfect self focussed on appearances and worldly concerns to a higher, better self focussed instead on the highest "unity" – also called "the Father," "the One," and equivalent to God – a oneness of which our own personal integrity is but an image. And the link between these two selves is that of erotic or romantic love. Finally, taken as a comic plot, Narcissus' death by drowning is itself given a new and positive interpretation: true success in life, for Plotinus, means shedding the lower identity of selfhood altogether and rising above it to union with God, or "the One."

Plotinus' use of the Narcissus myth thus serves to reveal for us a narcissistic aspect to the comic plot itself – all comic plots. Aristotle does not explicitly describe his ethics in terms of a comic plot, but the similarity of Aristotle's philosophy to that of Plotinus, together with Aristotle's invocation of *eros* as the force by which the forms of organic substances draw individuals towards their perfected completions and his identification of moral character as an essential component of stories (relating to characters' success or failure), allow us to see his ethical concept of *eudaimonia* as the "organizing principle of the action" in comic plots. Beyond this, there is the notorious fact that Aristotle's metaphysics culminates in a supremely narcissistic conception: the highest form of being – and the principle on which all of nature depends – is "thought thinking itself." In Aristotle, as in Plotinus (and
1350 contrary to modern usage), this narcissism is a good thing, not a pathology. If

we add in Aristotle's conception of 'thought' as replicating or carrying the forms of the objects it thinks, then even the mirroring effect of Narcissus' mountain spring is captured. At the end of the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle tells us that the highest end within human life (*eudaimonia*) is to participate intermittently in the life of the gods by thinking thought itself. Like Plotinus, Aristotle's philosopher in pursuit of happiness thinks his way through his own life to his own form (the form of humanity) and beyond that to the good for all humanity, and beyond that (as best he is able) to the highest and best of all principles, the being of god.

Described that way, Aristotle and Plotinus sound quite similar. However, the picture gets more complicated when we recognize the tension in Aristotle between the two varieties of human happiness that he leaves us with in the *Nicomachean Ethics*: the life of moral virtue and action versus the life of contemplation. Plotinus clearly sides with the latter, and his description of how to achieve perfection is to withdraw into oneself. Aristotle, on the other hand, is famously torn between the two varieties of human happiness, one strictly human and one godlike. His description of how to get to happiness involves first the achievement of success in the life of action before the life of contemplation even becomes possible: the pathway is specifically ethical and is therefore always mediated by the love of others. This is the key to Aristotle's more sophisticated treatment of narcissism, which actually combines both of its positive and negative interpretations. The crux of the matter is the passage of the developing philosopher from knowledge of one's own good to knowledge of the good for humanity. How does one cross that divide? As for Plotinus, so too for Aristotle the human soul can only come to know and love itself by overcoming its "love of self;" that is, only by conceiving of a higher, more perfect, more universal version of oneself in contrast to the present, imperfect, lower version of oneself. But for Aristotle the ideal unity of self is not present within the individual *until such time as it develops*. The form is not a substance; it does not, strictly speaking, exist in the imperfect individual. Where then can a human being find access to the "good for humanity" (which is also his or her highest good) except through others? For Plotinus, the lower self is an emanation of the higher self, which is itself an emanation of "the One." The path to the One is via simplification and reduction of multiplicity: the lower self, as a lower image of unity, contains the higher self. Aristotle's developing philosopher must get beyond the unity of self to the multiplicity of others to access and come to know that which is universal.

The comic plot is Aristotelean, not Plotinian, precisely because it preserves and insists upon the romantic/erotic aspect and does not reduce it (as does Plotinus) to a mere symbol of desire for perfection *per se*. Though the philosopher is seeking herself (her own happiness, her highest good, her thought of her own thinking), she must first find that self in another, and love it in another. The negative sense of narcissism that we are so familiar with is the pathological tendency to put one's own individual happiness above that of others – to be willing to sacrifice others' (or others' goods) for one's own sake. The positive sense of narcissism is the opposite: a willingness to sacrifice one's own life (or success in life) for others. To break out of that selfish fixation and truly be transformed into a "good person," one must do more than claim to understand that fact: one must *be that fact*. There is an existential aspect to this account which is captured precisely by the peril into which the "good guys" are cast by the comic plot (i.e., being the target of the rock-throwing while up a tree). The comic plot dramatizes the growth in self-knowledge of heros who find themselves in great danger, and who learn *only thereby* that the life of another is worth more to them than their own life (or success). Having learned this, and having actually acted so as to sacrifice themselves if necessary to save their beloved, the plot then releases them from that necessity, and brings the two together to live "happily ever after." *Only thereby* does the philosopher encounter, in herself, a knowledge of a self that supercedes her own 'selfish' interests. The path to one's own happiness, for Aristotle, is through the happiness of others, and the "happily ever after" of the comic plot is Aristotle's *eudaimonia*.

The root of the difference between Plotinus and Aristotle here is metaphysical. Because Plotinus is a monist, his view of self-knowledge and happiness does not technically require a shared ethical life with others. One always carries within oneself the trace of "the One" and has epistemological access to it. Aristotle remains a dualist: his cosmos is not reducable to one kind of being, and his human beings are individual substances in their own rights (not forms or universals) – substances which must develop into their perfect forms through deliberate action. His human beings do not have epistemological access to their own forms except through others, but even that knowledge from others is not knowledge without activity: the activity of ethical self-sacrifice. It is *eros* that draws each of us towards our own perfection, but it can draw us there only through the genuine love of another. In loving oneself, one loves humanity. In thinking oneself, one thinks of humanity. The apparent conflict between types

of happiness in the *Nicomachean Ethics* might well be resolved thereby. In any case, it is fair to say that the plots we admire so much, perhaps even today more than ever before, contain within them not just some specific moral attitudes and presuppositions, but a moral philosophy in its own right, and that philosophy is Aristotle's.

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Endnotes

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A Case for Virtue

Aristotle's Psychology and Contemporary Accounts of Emotion Regulation

Paul Carron

Abstract

This essay argues that recent evidence in neurobiology and psychology supports Aristotle's foundational psychology and account of self-control and demonstrates that his account of virtue is still relevant for understanding human agency. There is deep correlation between the psychological foundation of virtue that Aristotle describes in *The Nicomachean Ethics* (NE)—namely his distinction between the rational and nonrational parts of the soul, the way that they interact, and their respective roles in self-controlled action—and dual-process models of moral judgment. Furthermore, Aristotle's conception of character traits requires emotion regulation, and there is growing evidence in neurobiology and psychology of this ability. Most importantly, individuals can intentionally influence and control their "emotion-generating" system, and furthermore can generate *lasting* neurological and behavioral changes through deliberate practice. This essay briefly reviews Aristotle's account of the ψυχή (psyche/soul) and moral virtue in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and then reviews contemporary evidence of emotional self-regulation or self-control that correlates with Aristotle's account of virtue, demonstrating the ongoing relevance of Aristotle for understanding human agency.

Keywords

Aristotle, Virtue Theory, Moral Psychology, Emotion Regulation.

The Soul and Virtue Cultivation

Aristotle divides the ψυχή into two parts: "One part of the soul is nonrational, while one has reason" (I.13.9).[1] The word translated as "nonrational" is ἄλογος, which literally means "without reason." Many translators use "irrational," which is inappropriate given the context. Aristotle ascribes to the nonrational part of the soul "appetites and general desires" and states that it "shares in reason in a way" (I.13.18), while the rational part has "reason fully…within itself" (I.13.19).[2] Thus the nonrational part generates mental states generally understood as automatic or passive. Moral virtue arises out of the proper interaction between these two parts. Moral virtue is "a state (ἕξις – Latin *habitus*, related to "hold" or "have") [that] results from [the repetition of] similar activities" (II.1.7), and it produces actions that are in "accord with the correct reason"

(II.1.1). Furthermore "virtues are concerned with actions and feelings" (πρᾶξις and πάθος) (II.3.3). Thus moral virtue is a rationally informed enduring trait that produces actions and regulates emotions.

A character trait (πάθος) permeates the agent's attitude and conduct and therefore regulates emotions and feelings. The English word "emotion" causes confusion since it has no direct cognate in Greek. The Greek πάθος—which is opposed to πρᾶξις or action—literally means suffering. Ostwald notes that πάθος refers to anything that befalls a person or that the person passively experiences.[3] However, Aristotelian emotions are not always passive. Aristotle's account of particular virtues makes this clear. Consider mildness, the virtue associated with the πάθος of anger. Aristotle, states that the person who possesses this trait will sometimes get angry or "irritated whenever reason prescribes…" (IV.5.3). Therefore anger is an emotion—and can be an emotion-virtue—shaped by the agent's rational faculty, i.e. the agent's perceptive and deliberative abilities. Emotions are not non-cognitive or purely automatic on Aristotle's view: emotions are like perceptions and arise out of the interaction between rational and nonrational psychological elements. Emotions involve discrimination or discernment. Nancy Sherman stresses that emotions are "…a sensitivity, a mode of discriminating and registering particulars."[4] Because emotions are ways of construing situations that include beliefs about the situation, moral education can have a role in developing virtue because education can teach us how to discern the particulars of the situation and come to have the right perception of that situation. But as Sherman stresses, discerning the particulars and perceiving the situation rightly cannot happen apart from a critical judgment that informed the affective perception, i.e. the emotion (166-67).

Aristotelian emotions are *affective perceptions*. Consider the virtue of bravery. Aristotle states that "whoever stands firm against the right things and fears the right things, for the right end, in the right way, at the right time, and is correspondently confident, is the brave person; *for the brave person's actions and feelings accord with what something is worth*, and follow what reason prescribes" (III.7.5, emp. mine). Aristotle contrasts bravery with spiritedness, as "those who act on spirit also seem to be brave—as beasts seem to be when they attack those who have wounded them—because brave people are also full of spirit… ." But there is an essential difference: brave people "act because of the fine, and *their spirit cooperates with them*," beasts impulsively respond to pain (III.8.10-11). If

a person is attacked and injured by another person, and impulsively responds by attacking that person, she is not brave unless she discerns the particulars and perceives the situation rightly. Perhaps the attacker is a teenager, or clearly inebriated. If the victim is overwhelmed by fear at the attack and boldly defends herself, or if she responds to an unarmed attacker with shots from a handgun, she is clearly not rightly discerning the particulars of the situation and what the situation requires. Her emotion – fear – is unvirtuous, and we can rightly describe it as unvirtuous because that emotion colors and give rise to the mode of discernment, and virtuous action can only take place with proper discernment.[5]

The Aristotelian claim that emotions are affective perceptions also means that like other perceptions, emotions have representational content. Emotions represent the world as being a certain way and that representation depends in part on the agent's beliefs.[6] Nussbaum states "in order to have emotions such as fear and grief (or anger), one must first have beliefs of a certain kind, beliefs that terrible things may befall beyond one's control" (85). The agent perceives the world in the way that she does in part because she holds certain beliefs. The affective perception of anger arises from the interaction of the agent's beliefs and concerns and events taking place in the world. Put simply, Aristotle believes that moral virtue is a characteristic that produces both emotion and action, and in order for an agent to demonstrate that characteristic, she must *perceive* the situation as impinging upon something she cares about, and *believe* that her action is the morally right or καλὸς thing to do.

Contemporary Evidence

Aristotle believes that there are two major psychological powers: the nonrational one generates mostly automatic responses and the rational part generates rationality and deliberation. Furthermore, a person is virtuous only if her deliberate power shapes or directs her automatic responses. Some will argue that this is merely of historical interest unless there are good reasons to believe that this psychology is actually true. Happily, contemporary evidence in neurobiology and psychology demonstrates that Aristotle was largely right. According to a dual process model of the interactions between cognitions and emotions, moral judgments and behavior are the result of two, largely independent but interactive, information processing systems: a rational system and an experiential or

affective system.[7] But it is virtually impossible from a neurobiological standpoint to fully disentangle the role of cognition and affect in moral decision-making.[8] When the systems cooperate, it is often because the agent is engaging in the practice of emotional self-regulation that is very similar to Aristotle's notion of ἐγκρατής or moral strength, the crucial developmental stage that immediately precedes virtue.

It is commonly held in psychology that different—and sometimes competing—systems in the brain *can* and often do generate moral judgment; however, studies focusing on the relationship between the amygdala and the prefrontal cortex (PFC) reveal the role that reasons-responsiveness plays in a normally functioning brain and that an agent can intentionally override their immediate affective reactions when making judgments. One study presented subjects with pleasant and unpleasant odors varying in strength while an fMRI monitored their brain activity. The amygdala responded to any intense odor regardless of its pleasantness, while the different parts of the PFC responded to strong pleasant and unpleasant odors respectively.[9] "The significance of this experiment is that it shows that the amygdala responds only to the strength of a signal, while the prefrontal cortex determines its nature."[10] Finer discrimination requires that the two systems work together.

Other studies reveal the role that cognitive linguistic skills play in perceptions of affect in others. Researchers presented subjects with two tasks, a match task and a label task.[11] In the match task, they were instructed to match pictures of negative facial expressions with shapes. In the label task, they were instructed to name the emotion represented by the negative expression. The match task activated the amygdala and thalamus. The label task activated neither; rather "affect labeling is associated with dampened amygdala activity during an emotional evocative image" correlating with "unique prefrontal cortex activity."[12] The study demonstrates "that affect labeling disrupts the affective responses in the limbic system that would otherwise occur in the presence of negative emotional images" (426). When the subjects were asked to utilize linguistic reasoning skills to name the negative expression, the PFC was activated and the amygdala dampened. However, when linguistic rationality was not utilized, the amygdala and thalamus were active and the PFC was not. These and numerous other stud-

ies indicate that humans can engage in various cognitive and linguistic strategies to shift their perceptions of and reactions to external stimuli from automatic to deliberate.

A number of researchers argue that the cognitive or reasoning system (mainly PFC generated) can override the affective or intuition system (largely amygdala/limbic system driven) allowing for emotional self-regulation. James J. Gross has documented a variety of ways that humans regulate emotion, from suppressing an emerging emotional reaction, to cognitively reappraising a situation in advance to stop the emotional reaction from emerging.[13] Emotion regulation is a basic form of self-control, and is a necessary pre-condition of both self-controlled and virtuous action. To demonstrate the suppression strategy, researchers performed fMRIs on men while watching erotic film clips. In the sexual arousal condition, subjects were told to react normally to these stimuli, not to suppress arousal. In the suppression condition, they were told to "suppress any feelings elicited by the erotic film excerpts" by becoming "a detached observer."[14] Once the emotion starts, the agent uses a cognitive strategy to view the situation from a different perspective and keep the emotion from generating "emotion-expressive behavior."[15] Clear differences emerged between the two conditions. The sexual arousal condition produced activity in the limbic system and amygdala, areas associated with automatic responses. The suppression condition activated cortical areas associated with decision-making and conscious goal-directed activity. The researchers concluded that this difference provides strong evidence for the view that "emotional self-regulation depends on a neural circuit in which the prefrontal cortical areas mediate the cognitive modulation of emotional responses generated at the subcortical level."[16] In other words, self-control is possible and is correlated with brain activity.

Feinberg and colleagues combined a dual-process approach with the regulatory strategy of cognitive appraisal to see if agent's use of cognitive reappraisal in one situation would lead them to make more deliberative judgments in subsequent situations. In the final of three experiments, they had subjects watch a sad film clip while cognitively reappraising to lessen its emotional impact (controls did not reappraise). Those same subjects then moved to a different room where they read and responded to moral dilemmas. The subjects who reappraised were more measured in their responses

to the dilemma with less intense emotional reactions. The researchers concluded that agents who engage is reappraisal strategies tend to make more deliberative judgments in unrelated scenarios, which suggests that cognitive strategies such as reappraisal can have lasting efforts on the agent's deliberative process and their emotional reactions.[17]

Section IV

The preceding evidence has important parallels with Aristotle's foundational psychology and his theory of self-control. Aristotle's understanding of the relationship between the rational and non-rational parts of the soul has close affinities with dual-process theories. On Aristotle's account, the agent will exhibit virtuous emotions when the two "systems" interact properly. Furthermore, the likeness of Aristotelian emotions with perceptions indicates that Aristotle would likely agree that cognitive methods such as reappraisal could result in different emotions. The interaction between the two neurological systems when discerning various smells helps illuminate Aristotle's understanding of the role the interaction of the two parts of the soul plays in regulating emotions. The automatic identification of the strength of the smell originates in a part of the brain that generates automatic responses, but the discrimination between various kinds of smells and whether or not they signal danger stems from the part of the brain that deliberates, plans, and in general reasons. Finer discrimination requires the rational system take the lead, but both systems are necessary. More importantly, fine discrimination can be intentionally cultivated and refined over time. Consider the skill of wine tasting, which is really the skill of wine *smelling*. A person who has never tasted red wine before will probably not be able to smell much other than sour grape juice. The wine will have a bitter taste and not much else. Moreover, if the person simply continues to drink the wine by herself without any help from a more experienced and knowledgeable wine connoisseur, it will be more difficult to make fine or sophisticated distinctions. However, if a friend comes alongside our young wine taster and begins to teach her how to make and articulate finer distinctions, her newly acquired hobby may well blossom into a well-developed skill. Like emotion regulation, there is intertwined work of the amygdala and PFC in making the distinctions necessary for wine tasting. But more

importantly, the rational part (PFC) is essential for making the finer distinctions necessary for both wine tasting and emotion regulation, and practice can refine both abilities.

Consider the following example from Sherman. She describes the role of the parent or moral teacher as someone who is an expert at discerning and affectively responding to moral situations, and helping the child develop that discernment: "The discrimination of ethical relevance will ground affective responses. By tutoring the child's vision of the world, by instructing him to attend to these features rather than those, desires become focused and controlled in specific ways."[18] Just as a wine connoisseur tutors the novice in discerning various smells of the wine, the moral teacher aids the student in learning to discern the different aspects of a situation and form the right judgments. Essential to this education is providing the student with the moral language to make sense of various situations. Much like the subject who had to match shapes with facial expressions, the young child lacks a moral language to adequately describe and thus discern the morally laden situations she encounters. This lack of language partially accounts for the overly emotional responses of the child to morally rich situations. As the teacher provides the student with the language to describe and understand moral situations, her rational capacities will become more engaged in the process of moral discernment. This moral language acquisition is crucial for the development of self-control: emotions are educated in part by altering the beliefs and deliberative processes that partially constitute them. Just as finer distinctions of smell and more sophisticated linguistic descriptions of facial expressions exhibit stronger activity in the PFC that has a feedback-loop effect on the activity in the amygdala, the practice of deliberating about morally laden situations with rich descriptive terms will enable the student to begin to cultivate and shape emotions and develop control over those emotions.

As the student develops her deliberative mechanism, acquires a rich moral language, and practices moral actions, she will be engaging in an *extended regulatory strategy*. The PFC or rational part of the soul alters automatic responses of non-rational part/amygdala. As the student matures she will not be so easily angered at minor injuries; she will be more prone to feel compassion at another's unjust injury; she will have courage in the face of

danger. And as this happens, her brain activity will change. The activity in her prefrontal cortex will increase as the activity in the amygdala decreases. But this does not mean that she will not have emotions or feelings, or even that she will not have automatic responses. The automatic responses will *change*. These rational shaped responses become virtually automatic, and when they are both automatic and consistent, the agent possesses the virtue. Self-control is possible both neurologically and subjectively, giving us good reason to believe that virtue is far from dead and that there's space for Aristotle at the contemporary philosophical and neuroscientific table.

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Closing Conference
My Europe

Ezra Talmor

Europe, for me, was never a matter of geography. It was always an image in the making, which slowly encompassed and defined my whole life and work. My Europe is like a tree; it has deep roots, a strong trunk, and dense branches. It binds together my biography, my ideology, and my philosophy.

This image I have of Europe has its roots in my childhood in Cairo, on the margins of Europe's Empire; its branches spread over the 70 years I have been living in my communal village, Kibbutz Nachshonim. It flowered into *The European Legacy* and ISSEI.

My School Days in Cairo

I was born in Cairo in 1917, when half of Europe was fighting the other half, in what was later called The Great War. It was some years later, of course, in le college Fraincais that I first learned about this war and about Europe's earlier and later wars. Like other boys I was attracted to history, but I soon found that mathematics had a stronger appeal for me.

For my Egyptian baccalaureate I studied French, English and classical Arabic.

I was fascinated by grammar, especially Arabic grammar. My early encounters with literature were with the French novelists, Zola, Balzac and Alexander Dumas. I remember going to get the French classics from the National Egyptian Library.

When I was 17, I was given the chance to take a course for getting a job at a bank. I can still remember solving the four-part question on mortgage loan: equal payments, time of payments, the capital... and interest rate. More importantly, I remember the essay I wrote in the history section. It was on the statement Khedive Ismail Pasha made on the day the Suez Canal was opened in 1869: He stated: "My country is *Not* in *Africa*; we are in *Europe*!" Whether or not it was because I strongly identified with his words, I managed to pass the examination and started working at the Credit Foncier Egyptien, where I worked for the next 10 years.

Cairo in those days was more beautiful than Paris. More vibrant, more cosmopolitan, more multicultural, as we would say today. I remember my disappointment on seeing Paris for the first time in the mid-1950s, it could not compete with Heliopolis, the northern neighborhood where I lived with my grandmothers, my mother, and two older brothers.

In my youth, I had, as they say, a tempestuous temperament. I was driven by a restless ambition to overcome all barriers of thought. I guess this had something to do with the fact that I had no memory of my father, who died of typhus fever, when I was 2 years old, 2 days after my birthday. This restless search has never left me. I never outgrew it. Something of the schoolboy competing in exams at the French lycée has stuck with me to this day.

Joining the IVRI Hatza'ir, the Zionist Youth Movement in Cairo

In 1938 a man named Sascha Koren from one of the first kibbutzim in Palestine, Messilot, arrived in Cairo with the aim of setting up a Zionist Youth Movement. One of the branches of the Movement happened to be on the street where I lived: Ibrahim Street in Heliopolis. Although the youngsters who gathered there were younger than me, I wanted to find out more about this movement. I went to the central offices of the World Zionist Organization downtown, where I discovered a library with the books of all the important Zionist thinkers. After some time, I transferred these books to the Heliopolis branch and this act marked the beginning of my involvement in the Movement. My main interest was to write letters to the organization's (Hehaloutz) headquarters in London, asking them to send us articles and books on labour Zionism.

During the 1940s the first books on Marxism appeared in Cairo's bookshops, along with books on Zionism. In our local branch we started studying Hebrew and discussing the works of the Zionist theorists, Marxist and non-Marxist.

Our primary ideological challenge was to reconcile Marxism with Zionism. That was no easy matter, for the leading Russian ideologues—Trotsky and Lenin — had rejected nationalism in favour of their vision of the perfect socialist society. We soon saw that the only thinker who could reconcile socialism with nationalism was the Russian Jew Ber Borochov.

Soon afterwards another activist arrived from Palestine, Avner Weisel, from Kibbutz Eylon on the Lebanese border, with the aim of convincing a group of Egyptian Jews to emigrate to Palestine. The motto of the movement was *Self Realization*. This, at the time, referred to the realization of one's social conscience as a member of a proactive group of pioneers who would become members of a Kibbutz, the name given to this new form of communal life. Avner Weisel, at all events, convinced me to leave Egypt for Palestine.

Leaving Egypt for Palestine

So at the age of 27, I quit my job at the bank and emigrated to Palestine. In April 1945 I boarded the train to Lebanon, and entered Mandatory Palestine at a border checkpoint.

I was taken to Kibbutz Mishmar Ha'emek, and from there to Kibbutz Ein Hashofet in the Yizrael Valley, where I started to work in the fields. After a year and a half of strenuous physical work, a small group of my Egyptian friends and a few Belgians set out to found our own kibbutz, Kibbutz Nachshonim.

This took a couple of years until the land was allocated to us. In the meantime we lived in a commune in a small town, Ramat Hasharon, working in odd jobs and consolidating our communal life. We were young and idealistic. Apart from the long hours of work in the fields or small factories, we were totally taken up by ideological debates on socialism and Marxism. In 1949 we founded Kibbutz Nachshonim. We were about 120 members, hailing from Egypt, Poland, Palestine, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany... and other countries.

Working the Fields and Studying Philosophy

When I look back over the 70 years of living in my kibbutz, I see that I was constantly trying to justify and reconcile my political, ideological and philosophical beliefs. It was part of that early restless search for answers. Ideologically I was a Marxist, and remained one for most of my life. I was convinced that the kibbutz offered the ideal way of realizing not only direct democracy but the best form of socialism. My main political inspiration was thus the universal ideal of socialism.

When I left Egypt I had no idea what kind of life awaited me in Palestine.

The only thing I took with me were my advanced maths books in English as though I expected to continue my studies at some future point. These old textbooks are probably still in my attic. But in the end I did not pursue mathematics. I switched to philosophy. This was the outcome of my meeting and marrying my future wife and intellectual partner of 60 years: Sascha Starosta from Czernowitz (formerly part of Romania, today part of Ukraine), who introduced me to classical philosophy and English philosophy. Sascha, who had completed the first year at the Hebrew University reading French and Philosophy had come in the summer of 1945 to work in Kibbutz Ein Hashofet. We met in the communal dining hall.

At the end of that summer she did not return to Jerusalem. We got married. We were going to found kibbutz Nachshonim. We were going to have a family. We were going to continue our studies together. And this is what happened. We enrolled for our BA at London University's Correspondence College, and took our exams in 1950, shortly after the birth of the State of Israel.

The first twenty years of our life in the kibbutz were devoted to agriculture, to finding out what kind of things to grow—we planted citrus orchards, banana and later on avocado plantations, we grew cotton, wheat, sugar cane, sweetcorn, melons, peanuts, vineyards. We had a poultry and a dairy branch. We were not very successful, and for many years our kibbutz hardly subsisted, relying on the support of the federation of kibbutzim. Apart from working for 10 or more hours in the fields, we devoted all our energy to perfecting our social experiment of creating perfect socialism, perfect equality, and full participation in all decisions. Yet despite our ideological convictions, it was hard to live up to the ideal of self-realization, and there was a constant flow of new arrivals and exits of members.

So much of our ideology flew in the face of what human beings were assumed to be like. The extended family and the nuclear family vanished, along with personal property and family inheritance. The idea at the time—the great hope of all the experiments in communism and socialism—was to create the New Man, a being whose social conscience overruled any other desire.

Alongside this intensely ideological and physically demanding way of life, Sascha and I continued our studies. In 1956 we went to London for three years where I was to run the Zionist Youth Movement called Hashomer Hatza'ir—'the young guard'—and represent our political party, The United Workers' Party, Mapam. Sascha started her doctoral studies in aesthetics—and wrote her dissertation on I. A. Richards. During the third year of our stay I too managed to complete my MA in philosophy.

In 1959 we returned to Kibbutz Nachshonim. I became general manager of our failing collective farm. Sascha started teaching English in a teachers' training college in Tel Aviv. We continued to plan our studies, and then in 1964, I won a two-year scholarship and again we travelled to England, this time to Oxford. I completed my M.Litt in philosophy, on mind and political concepts, under the supervision of Gilbert Ryle, and some time later my doctorate in the Sorbonne. It was clear that my interest in political philosophy and the philosophy of language grew out of and was shaped by the daily local politics of kibbutz life.

It was a microcosm of the whole world. The heated three-hour weekly debates in the general meeting, held on Saturday evening, in which all members took part—whether on political, ideological, or pragmatic issues—was a living lesson in philosophical argumentation. My direct experience with all the stages of reaching democratic decisions, the challenge of persuading your equals to accept your opinion, the relentless battle of ideas to defend the autonomy of the community and at the same time to uphold the freedom of thought of the individual, thus confirmed the Existentialist maxim that existence precedes essence or consciousness.

In 1968, two years after our return, we became lecturers at the newly founded university of Haifa: Sascha in the English department, and I in the philosophy department. We seemed to have found a way of combining our life as members of a kibbutz with our intellectual work. Throughout those years I continued to be deeply involved in kibbutz life, running committees, acting as secretary or general manager, working in the cotton fields, attending the weekly general meeting. Although kibbutzniks at the time were not supposed to pursue an academic or any kind of professional career, for me there was always a close and necessary connection between intellectual work and physical work. I needed both, in equal measure.

When I look back over my journey in philosophy, I see that I was always drawn to the question of the relationship between words and deeds, thought and action.

The central problem for me has remained Language and how it creates our picture of Reality. On one side stood Russell, Ryle, and Wittgenstein, and before them Descartes, and the British Empiricists, Lock, Hume, Berkeley, while on the other side, stood Marx. Although each of the great philosophers had his own theory of knowledge and his own idea about the true task of philosophy, for me philosophy was necessarily also an 'ideology'. I was a Marxist. I totally identified with Marx's 11th thesis on the aim of philosophy: *not to interpret the world but to change it.* Yet with the dramatic changes that occurred throughout the twentieth century, and with the decline of the socialist way of life of the kibbutz and the kibbutz movement as a whole, in the 1990s, I slowly lost my faith in Marxism, though not in its moral message.

Society is not a scientific experiment. You cannot invent a new society, and perhaps that is why the kibbutz failed: it was too artificial; it discounted the hidden forces that drive our life. So by a process of elimination, I would have to say that I came closest to being a follower of David Hume. And for Hume, the centre of philosophy is ethics. The most fundamental distinction for him is the distinction between language and action.

Since his central argument is that causality is not a matter of logic or of absolute Laws of Nature, and since only the IS, is a matter of fact, not the OUGHT, the only way to truth is through experience and experiment. Habit rules all, he seems to say. To me this suggests that if we want to reduce the inevitable gap between the Is and the Ought, between the matter of fact and the way we desire things to be, we should take this fundamental distinction more seriously than we tend to do....

But enough on the quarrels of philosophers....

In my personal experience, philosophy can only pretend to help people live their life. In the end, what really helps us live our life are our closest relationships with those we love.

So when, you may ask, did our journal and our society, ISSEI, come into existence?

It happened in the late 1970s, at the end of our two-year sabbatical in Oxford. Quite by chance, Sascha and I were introduced to the late Robert and Elizabeth Maxwell, owner of Pergamon Press, whose twin daughters had remained friends with our daughters when, ten years earlier, they had gone to Milham Ford Grammar School for Girls. At the end of our conversation with the Maxwells, I mentioned the need for a new journal on European intellectual history. This is how in 1979 our first journal, *History of European Ideas*, came into being. Fifteen years later, in 1995, after the transfer of Pergamon Press to Elsevier, we had to start all over again, and founded *The European Legacy*, then published by MIT Press, and from 2000 until today by Routledge, of the Taylor & Francis Group.

In 1984, we founded ISSEI in Bellagio, Italy, and from 1988 we have held 14 biennial conferences in universities all over Europe and beyond, beginning in Amsterdam, Leuven, Aalborg, Graz, Utrecht, Haifa, Bergen, Aberystwyth, the university of Navarra in Pamplona, the university of Malta, Helsinki, Cankaya University in Ankara, the University of Cyprus, Nicosia, and now in the Catholic University of Portugal.

I look over the thousands and thousands of printed pages of our journal, *The European Legacy*, and what I see is that although the position of Europe has changed, and it is no longer the only center of the world as it was in 1917, when I was born, the European Tradition lives on. Europe will change, it *is* changing, but its cultural foundations are solid and firm.

Nothing, but *nothing*, of all this could ever have come about without the total dedication of my late wife Sascha Talmor to *The European Legacy* and ISSEI. And *nothing* of this could ever have come about without the active involvement of long-standing contributors, friends and colleagues, who have attended, hosted and helped us organize our conferences or helped us in other ways.

I want to end on a personal note, to return once more to my childhood in colonial Cairo, on the margins of Europe. My life's motto has always been: Hate Evil. I didn't learn this from books on philosophy. It was my mother who taught me to distinguish between Good and Evil: her absolute, unconditional love implanted in me the imperative to fight against any form of injustice. Because the first language we learn is our mother's love, I see Evil as the denial of this love. Language and life are one: language is the expression of our love of life, of our creativity and productive capacities—our turning towards or away from life.

As some of you have probably heard me say on earlier occasions, language is a story-telling activity. It creates the narratives of our life, it is in fact a narrative form of life, because through the stories we internalize and memorize, the stories we hear and repeat, and in repeating recreate, we are reminded of, we recognize and reaffirm our deepest held values, the values which are predicated on the knowledge of good and evil. Thus for me Ethics is not a meta-language of philosophers. It is continuous with all our thoughts and actions. It is embedded in the minutiae of daily life.

As T. S. Eliot wrote in the choruses in "The Rock" (1934):

The world turns and the world changes,
But one thing does not change.
In all of my years, one thing does not change.
However you disguise it, this thing does not change:
The perpetual struggle of Good and Evil.

To conclude: I partly reconciled the conflicting parts of my biography by adopting the principle and constantly reminding myself of it, that Doing is what counts in the end; It is acting in the world that defines human beings. It is action that creates societies and civilizations. And Doing, as Hume says, is often independent of Ideas.

So, do I still see myself as a European?

My answer is Yes, I see myself as a European; but I am a European who is also an Egyptian Jew; an Israeli kibbutznik; an ex-Marxist; an ex-teacher of modern philosophy and editor of an academic journal.

As the theme of this conference in Porto demonstrates, *Images of Europe: Past, Present, Future*, it is my hope that *The European Legacy* and ISSEI's conferences will continue to offer young academics and established scholars alike, contributors and participants, friends and colleagues from different countries, from different disciplines, the opportunity to ask, and to find new answers to the old question: what do we mean when we talk about Europe?

My Europe is like a tree; it has deep roots, a strong trunk, dense branches.

Its myriad flowers have nourished my faith, my optimism, about our ability to fight against injustice, to overcome the evils of the world, to cherish the gift of life and love.

Thank you all and Shalom.

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A presente publicação reúne as Atas da XIV *Conferência da International Society for the Study of European Ideas* (ISSEI), que se realizou de 4 a 8 de Agosto de 2014, no Centro Regional do Porto da Universidade Católica Portuguesa, sob o tema "Images of Europe: Past, Present, Future".

No dealbar do século XXI, a Europa dá mostras de se aproximar de uma transformação que exige repensar a tradição europeia e os valores que a constituíram e a constituem, o modo como a Europa se vê a si própria e como percepciona o resto do mundo, e reciprocamente, e incorporar uma ideia clara de si mesma para além das suas fronteiras geográficas. Discutir os desafios teóricos e práticos propostos, caracterizando a sua extensão, efeitos e implicações para a Europa e para além da Europa foi a missão dos quase 300 participantes nesta Conferência, procedentes de distintos campos académicos e de mais de 36 países e 160 instituições de todo o mundo.

A Conferência contou com o Alto Patrocínio da Presidência da República Portuguesa, e o apoio do Instituto dos Vinhos do Douro e do Porto e da Associação Comercial do Porto.

This publication presents the Proceedings of the XIV Conference of the *International Society for the Study of European Ideas* (ISSEI), held from the 4th to the 8th of August 2014 at the Catholic University of Portugal in Porto, under the theme "Images of Europe: Past, Present, Future ".

At the dawn of the twenty-first century, Europe shows signs of approaching a transformation that requires a rethinking of the European traditions and the values that formed and constitute how Europe sees itself and the rest of the world, and vice versa, and to incorporate a clear idea of itself beyond its geographical boundaries. To discuss the proposed theoretical and practical challenges, featuring their extent, effects and implications for Europe and beyond Europe was the mission of the nearly 300 participants in this conference, coming from different academic fields and more than 36 countries and 160 institutions from all over the world.

The Conference had the High Patronage of the Presidency of the Portuguese Republic, and the support of the Institute of Douro and Porto Wines and the Porto Commercial Association.

Com o alto Patrocínio de Sua Excelência

O Presidente da República

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