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Estudos de
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Intellectual Topographies and the Making of Citizenship

Helena Gonçalves da Silva

Maria Laura Bettencourt Pires

Inês Espada Vieira



Universidade Católica Editora



Intellectual Topographies
and the Making of Citizenship

Catálogo recomendada

INTELLECTUAL TOPOGRAPHIES AND THE MAKING OF CITIZENSHIP

Intellectual topographies and the making of citizenship / coord. [de] Helena Gonçalves da Silva, Maria Laura Bettencourt Pires, Inês Espada Vieira. – Lisboa: Universidade Católica Editora, 2011. – 344 p. ; 23 cm (Estudos de comunicação e cultura. Cultura e conflito)

ISBN XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

I – SILVA, Helena Gonçalves da, coord. II – PIRES, Maria Laura Bettencourt, coord. III – VIEIRA, Inês Espada, coord.

CDU 316.48
316.42:321.6
316.72

© Universidade Católica Editora | Lisboa 2011

Edição: Universidade Católica Editora, Unipessoal

Composição Gráfica: Europress, Lda.

Impressão e acabamentos: Europress, Lda.

Depósito Legal:

ISBN:

Universidade Católica Editora
Palma de Cima – 1649-023 Lisboa
tel. (351) 217 214 020 | fax. (351) 217 214 029
www.uceditora.ucp.pt | uce@uceditora.ucp.pt

Este trabalho é financiado por Fundos Nacionais através da FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia no âmbito do projecto PTDC/ELT/64834/2006

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We are grateful to the Research Centre for Communication and Culture (CECC), the Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT) and the School for Human Sciences (FCH) of Universidade Católica Portuguesa for their logistic and financial support in organizing this volume. Our sincere thanks to all who offered their ideas to and support for this project, including Ana Fabíola Maurício, Scientific Assistant to the CECC.

Introduction

This book gathers together writings on the transformation of the intellectual and the challenges posed by citizenship against the backdrop of dismantling the Modernity project, the decline of Marxist ideology and the contradictory and competing value-systems of our times; it also includes several studies regarding the Portuguese and Spanish intelligentsia, particularly in the context of dictatorial regimes and as an inherited framework for more recent intellectual topographies. The analysis they provide draws relevant implications for our understanding of the changes in the conditionings, nature and meaning of the intellectual's function.

The 20th century, characterized by omnipresent change and serious conflict, ended with the disintegration of one of the most powerful universal utopias. The new millennium began with the violence of September 11 and all its subsequent political and social implications amidst financial deregulation and economic turmoil. Meanwhile, growing globalizing pressures, the vertiginous transformation of the worldwide cultural situation, and the reliance of modern structures on science and technology governing the entire knowledge industry and informational system suggest that the technocratic or professionalized intellectual will increasingly occupy a dominant position not only in the production apparatus but in most areas of public life.

We may refuse to endorse Adorno and Horkheimer's views about the neutralization of critical thinking by a system of total domination, Virilio's detection of lethal risks in technological development and Baudrillard's remarks on the implosion of meaning. Nevertheless, we cannot fail to note the many restraints on intellectual autonomy in the form of technology, the commodification of social life and bureaucracy. Nor can we escape the impression that it is inevitable for today's intellectuals to be progressively and organically integrated in institutionalized power relations where they are entrusted with providing expertise and decisions; mobilizing public opinion; or becoming just another voice in the global Babel of noises that definitely discards any possibility for promoting the sort of ideal speech envisaged by Jürgen Habermas.

In his article *A Plea for Intellectuals* (1966), Sartre, for whom the intellectual should be “someone who meddles in what is not his business”, points out a basic contradiction in the intellectual’s situation, caught between a call for questioning and inquiry along the lines of the classic intellectual, and the particularistic requirements of employability. This contradiction between the universal and the particular is also pointed out by others such as Alain Touraine, for whom, in an advanced industrial society, there is a perpetual conflict between the imperatives of organizational control and the struggle for personal autonomy. Alternatively, Edward Saïd and Noam Chomsky have no doubts about their obligations as public intellectuals. Although lamenting the decline of the public intellectual, they make a clear distinction between the critical intellectual, who emerged during the Dreyfus Affair, and the technocratic intelligentsia, heir to the rationalizing intellectuals espousing Enlightenment values which, according to Max Weber, gave rise to the paradigm of technological rationality that would redefine education, culture, social life and politics, while also forming the basis of Antonio Gramsci’s “organic intellectual”. In *the Representations of the Intellectual: the 1993 Reith Lectures*, Saïd conveys an image of today’s critical intellectual as an outsider and a nonconformist, in line with Chomsky, for whom the values of truth and objectivity remain a priority. Among other things, the intellectual’s role is, in Saïd’s words, “to raise embarrassing questions, to confront orthodoxy and dogma (rather than produce them)”, acting “on the basis of universal values”. They are good examples of the direct connection between the intellectual as someone who systematically attempts to make a serious contribution to improve social life and the issue of citizenship. It is stimulating to see that, in Saïd and Chomsky’s public commitment, they are not discouraged by difficulties. Quite the opposite: they both consider themselves as belonging to a privileged minority that enjoys favourable conditions for carrying out their activities, such as training, access to qualified information, relative freedom of speech and publics for their views. We could say that, together with Sartre and Marcuse among others, they fall into the categories of nonconformists and iconoclasts that, as such and in certain circumstances, are very often marginalized.

Meanwhile, Bloom’s ideal of a recoiled community of scholars, as presented in his *Closing of the American Mind* (1987), nowadays seems to be a relic from the past, though we cannot help admiring many of those elitist intellectuals, apologists of ‘high culture’, for their vigour, autonomy of mind

and faith in the redeeming power of a legacy of humanistic values and ideals that philosophically addressed the meaning of life and explored the questions of history, politics, religion and aesthetics, so perfectly expressed in George Steiner's *Errata: An examined life* (1997). Some of these older scholars are still very much active, reminding us of the imperative to expand the intellectual dialogue across generations in search of continuities and connections that may provide answers for today's epistemological and historical deadlocks.

The last few decades have seen the rise of an intelligentsia that is flourishing in the form of influential figures, mostly associated with academic projects, institutes and foundations, with newspapers, TV, and in cyberspace, as well as with party politics, social movements and grassroots campaigns. Their practices are conditioned or bound by pressures produced by multiple interdependences and polarizations coming out of diversity, various positioning, and fractured identities (in the domains of class, gender, ethnicity, age, religion, sexuality, and so on).

Their predicament also reflects the endorsement by post-modern theory involving social complexity and radical pluralism that has been deconstructing binary oppositions and other notions such as origins, causes, structure, and sovereignty. The axiological shift from Modernity enables value re-assessment, options and discourses which are more independent of *doxa* and normativity as an open-ended process of intellectual engagement – a process that builds up new ways of understanding social interaction, disembedding phenomena and more subtle dislocations. The impossibility of contriving any single or unified vision has stimulated more localized and fragmented discourses, the increase of critical sub-cultures and a technocratic or professionalized intelligentsia; in addition, it has brought forward the figure of the more localized specific intellectual, as well as competing or hostile public spheres and subaltern counter publics.

Moreover, if the immense broadening of the public sphere by the Web's trans-local and transnational networks has brought compensations, conferring more visibility and choice on the intellectuals, it has also meant a higher degree of dispersal, volatility and disarray. This fact, combined with the rapid deterioration ever since the 1960s of the historic linkage between universal belief-systems and political action, seems to have thwarted the formation of any sustainable intellectual front or concurrence that might have led to major cultural change. Even the traditional Left, according to Terry Eagleton, has lost its initially radical impulse as the purpose of transforming has given way to a

desire to subvert mainstream society. In challenging the process of Modernity, with its facile equation of power, knowledge and universal social progress, environmentalists seemed to have gathered strength over the years to promise enough cohesion to configure an intellectual movement, but with time they too came to display signs of having been caught up in the vortex of conflicting pressures and interests.

Does this mean that we are confronted with a culture that has failed to establish an effective connection between intellectual work and the politics of local and transnational citizenship? Will abstract thinking, the discursive and ‘high culture’ give way to the tabloidization of culture and “the civilization of spectacle” as prophesized by Mario Vargas Llosa in 2008? Are today’s intellectuals simply a repository of technocratic ideology? Does this all mean that their problematic and debilitated situation makes them less needed or even irrelevant?

If they are no longer capable of being legislators or ideologists, and if most of them do not fit into the radical category defended by Saïd and Chomsky, the majority, whatever their relative or deadlocked positions amidst the disruptive factors and conflicting rationalities of our societies, will, however, continue to have a genuine interest in critical dialogue, human rights and democracy as Sartre had already observed. Such interest derives fundamentally from the basic recurrent historical demonstration that mankind’s salvation lies precisely in the possibility to amend error and evil and make things better. Hence, it is reasonable to expect that as regards the crisis of and the implementation of an ethics of global governance, at a time when the utopia of the ends (“Real Socialism”) and the utopia of the means (Capitalism) reached their limits, the answer must be cultural and this requires permanent responsible commitment – a commitment that goes beyond the refusal of official optimism, which in wolf lepenies view characterized the “active melancholic” or the european intellectual of the socialist regimes. Against the more pessimistic out looks, it is sensible to expect that today’s and future intellectuals will continue to act as a transforming force within the mounting interplay of local and larger social forces and the relativism that distinguish our post-industrial, informational societies. As Zygmunt Bauman explains in his theory of post-modernity, because relativism has become a common feature in the world, intellectual work should be understood in metaphorical terms, as interpretation, i.e. as cultural translation, a strategy devised for greater hermeneutic transparency and better communication.

Therefore, regardless of the conflicting intellectual topographies, the quandaries and uncertainties that erode the social impact of the intellectuals' output and public messages, the need for their function is probably greater than ever before, whether as scholars, activists and creative writers, as guiding figures at particular moments, as interpreters or mediators, as creators of consensus or as innovators. Indeed, they are being called upon to deconstruct harmful stereotypes and "discursive formations" that, in Foucault's view, structure society and often shape their own intellectual practices; to think, verbalize and show the world from the multidimensional perspective of its diversity and ever more boundlessness; to critically assess the new forms of citizenship and intervene in the budding multi-level public space shaped through digital engagements – the space of interpersonal and intercultural communication which we create and discover everyday in our ordinary adventures with each other; to read our multiple cultural heritages adequately; help in healing old and more recent wounds; denounce policies and practices that violate human that violate human rights and condemn abusive and spurious conflicts. In other words, they are being summoned to force ethics into politics, be of assistance in averting the ever-increasing systemic risks the world is progressively more exposed to, probe and question practices, conceive alternatives and negotiate values and choices in defence of a more sustainable and democratic global order.

These are some of the issues that this book addresses in its three parts: 1. The Intellectual and the Postmodern World; 2. Intellectual Commitment, Identity and Citizenship; 3. Intellectual Topographies in the Iberian Context.

All the sections offer theoretical and pedagogical approaches, capturing and expanding on some of the trends that the History of Intellectuals, the History of Ideas, Political History, Sociology, Anthropology, African-American Studies and Native-American Studies have been exploring. Seen from this angle, the book also vivifies a debate that has an established tradition, thereby adding to the intellectual narrative itself. The first and second parts display different levels of analyses, involving philosophical, scientific, aesthetic, media and culture studies. The third part stands out for the specificity of the cultural and political contexts in which the topic is inscribed. It focuses on the intellectual circumstances in Portugal and Spain, from the beginning of the 20th century through the dictatorial contexts in which both countries were immersed for decades, and up to the present, debating continuities between past and current forms of intelligentsia and the

re-drawing of traditional intellectual topographies. The issues raised in the three sections are relevant to today's pressing problems and to numerous ongoing public controversies, even when some of the intellectual figures pertain to previous ages, since by deepening our understanding of the possibilities of intellectual response in different historical circumstances, we can envisage today's situation in a wider perspective.

Intellectual Topographies and the Making of Citizenship is neither a comprehensive nor a representative sample of work on the topic. Rather, it is a selection of writings by academics, some of whom are also prestigious public intellectuals who are in the privileged situation of speaking from the double perspective of theory and praxis; a couple of contributions are by students working for their Master's and Ph.D degrees. On the whole, the assortment included in the three sections is the product of seminars and of an international conference held in November 2011, at the Universidade Católica Portuguesa, on the intellectual functions, on citizenship and on how intellectuals and post-modern culture interrelate in a broad sense.

Finally, the idea of this book is also rooted in the apprehension about the ongoing course of our contemporary world and the nature of the modern university, namely the specialization and professionalization of academic life, its tendency to become a market and its growing incapacity to safeguard the necessary autonomy to create knowledge, respond with strong ideas to the present civilizational crisis and recreate the ideal of a universal humanism based on solidarity and intercultural values. No wonder, the university as one of the key factors accountable for the deterioration of the independent public intellectual has been tackled, among others, by Bauman, Bourdieu, Smith and Weber, Posner, Sousa Santos and Freudi. Questioning and reevaluating the issue of the intellectual from within academia is also a positive way of reacting to such apprehension. More so because, being mostly a multi-perspective inquiry into the intellectual's situation, the book avoids establishing overgeneralizations, sustaining gloomy prophecies or a simplistic celebration. Let us hope these writings capture the current state of debate and prompt further productive work on the topic.

Finally, a note on our editing policy: we have kept to both British and American English out of respect for the authors' individual choices.

Helena Gonçalves da Silva

I – The Intellectual and the Postmodern World

The myths of the end or the unperceivable dislocation from saying to showing

JOÃO BARRENTO

So often have I seen a candle flame flicker. But in that instant, I saw it differently. I was not sensitive to colour, but to the glimmering and wavering of the flame; to its hesitant and persistent way of breathing. As it was dark, the flame, rising and falling in intensity, created a larger or smaller pool of light. And in this rare coincidence of fluctuations, I felt the parity between flame, sound and vibration.

(...)

*Nothing fades away, everything passes from heap to heap, hand to hand, listening to itself. As if the reverse of history had reached me folded back, and I had seen it ever so slightly opening up...**

(Maria Gabriela Llansol, *Finita. Diário II*, 1985)

There is no end

The epigraph by Maria Gabriela Llansol, at the centre of which there is a motif – the *flame of a candle* –, that occasionally is the almost-figure of many of her books, seems to be a metaphor that gives visibility to the ways of intervention of those social and cultural agents who today act as an *ersatz* of the dimmed figure of the classical intellectual. I mean dimmed but not extinct in what his functionality was: a *fold* happened once more, yet another of the recurrent folds in the fabric of history. This folding back, in contrast to what happened half a century ago, has opened up a flickering, intermittent, unequal landscape, very often discreet and infinitely more varied. To a pattern dominated by a certain manichaeism of shadow and light, political power and critical voice, there succeeds a situation that in more recent decades has been configured and today openly revealed, and

*All translations into English from the original works as well as from the Portuguese translations of such works are mine (J. B.).

may be represented by an apparently paradoxical image: on the one hand (the “right” side of the civilization fabric) a new configuration of powers, all mighty but opaque and unpredictable; on the other hand (the “reverse” side of this *same* fabric) the fragmentation of small resistance centres, diversely configured, varying in intensity, that try to undermine, sabotage and subvert through the “cunning of the imagination”, the phantasmic machine for moulding and managing minds created by formal democracies. The alternation between the reverse and the right sides of the great tapestry of history is sometimes slow and barely perceptible and, at other times, abrupt and violent. This alternation also seems to apply to the progressive transition from the 20th to our incipient 21st century, undertaken in the forms of social, political and cultural intervention.

I am now providing a summary of what I will attempt to say and show in my analysis concerning the place or non-place of the “intellectual” in the contemporary world, the causes of his mutation – since it is mutation and not the end of the intellectual we are dealing with – and the political, civilizational and cultural conditionings that may explain it.

I start with a basic statement by the philosopher Hans Blumenberg, but it might easily come from various other contemporary thinkers, whom I shall evoke in due course: “In history, there are no beginnings – they are established by someone” (Hans Blumenberg). Just as there are no beginnings there are no ends. The latter are almost always established against the complexity of reality – neither the end of history, nor of the subject, nor of the grand narratives, nor of art, nor obviously of the “intellectual”, if we bear in mind not a secular (and French) model, but rather a *figure* with functions and mutating modes of action adjusted to the prevailing circumstances. The mutation undergone over the last half century may be placed in parallel with that which Foucault conceptualises when proclaiming the “death of the author”, proposing his replacement by the figure of an “author-function”. Whenever *theory* descends from the stars to the level of *praxis*, there is a place for the “intellectual” (who may also be presented as a philosopher or as an artist): ideas are his target, *Lebenswelt* his inexorable destiny. It is then the “non-actuality” of this figure that, under new disguises, renders it still and always contemporary.

What sort of disguises? Those that result from the changes operated in the nature and relative position of the interventional subject *within* society and “life world”. The previously dominant and opposing forms of the “or-

ganic intellectual” (Gramsci) and critical intellectual have been substituted by a *creative an-archy*, not always reflexive, but still and always critical, under its artistic, media, theatrical and visual clothing. The “intellectual” is no longer the singularised figure of the critical thinker of the system or the moral conscience of the nation: therefore (and this being my underlying thesis), he has assumed various other names, he *has become plural*. Some decades ago he underwent an unperceivable process of dislocation that made him act and intervene not necessarily at the level of *saying* (the lost power of the word), but more so at the level of *showing* (the multifaceted power of the spectacle, no longer in Guy Debord’s or Baudrillard’s sense of *simulacrum*, but in a great diversity of forms of *performative intervention* that are less discursive in nature).

What I mentioned earlier as a possible basic statement, taken from *Das Lachen der Thrakerin* [*The Laughter of the Thracian Maid*] by Hans Blumenberg, to which I shall later return, was based on the conviction that, among many others, the *luciole* – the fireflies – remain lighting up the landscape in which we live, following the era of the grand luminaries, as put forward by Georges Didi-Huberman in his most recent book *Survivance des lucioles* (2009). Here, he sets out the plurality and mutability that define the nature of the contemporary historical fabric, in opposition to Pasolini’s apocalyptic theses in his renowned and desperate article “Articolo delle lucciole” (Pasolini 1975), inspired upon the 26th Canto of Dante’s *Inferno*. Here, he denounced the disappearance of the *luciole*: with their intermittent light, they had thus far provided the tenuous illumination of the Summer nights and the heavens of culture, having totally disappeared in the apocalyptic darkness in which industrialized Italy was immersed; or, alternatively, some would say today, on the global stage on which we view the spectacle of the “Shipwreck with Spectators” of a not-at-all divine comedy under the blinding lights of contemporary societies. However, there is also purgatory that awaits us as our destiny and where we have to learn how to live by paying attention to the little lights – candles, fireflies – that are there as visible images or that we ourselves have to light up.

In addition to this, Didi-Huberman’s work also confirmed a commonplace that I had already become aware of in relation to other realities and times: the notion that, more than heralds and epigones, and forerunners and followers, very often there is in the reading of our time and in the vessel on which we are all embarked, a common perception, or a simultane-

ous intuition, of what is in the air, marking our time and affecting us all. In the end, it is a matter of seeing and of the various ways we face up to reality, being sure that reality and the order of immanence and contingency that defines it (still *on this side* of all the “horizons” or “final ends” proclaimed by some others, although with contradictory signs – from Heidegger to Agamben or from Carl Schmitt to Pasolini) “is always right” in a certain way, as already stated by Hegel in the formula “alles, was ist, ist vernünftig” (“everything that is has a rational foundation”). The question is however, contrary to what Hegel conceived when he envisioned a teleological order for history that modernity would confirm, that reason is not universal but contingent, nor is it the reason of the *history of the world* but a certain absurdity inherent to the *course of the world* itself. This is what I think is repeatedly stated in Musil’s self-critical mirror, *The Man Without Qualities*, for example in a conversation between the “intellectual” Arnheim and the sceptical inquirer of meaning Ulrich, when the former affirms in a Hegelian way that “in universal history nothing takes place outside the orbit of reason”. To this the latter responds: “but that is always happening in the world”. In the two centuries that have elapsed since the Hegelian postulate and that of his followers, the course instead seems to have been rather that of un-reason in history. This allows us to conclude – as many others have already done, from Nietzsche to Lukács and from the Frankfurt School to Sloterdijk – that “alles, was war, war unvernünftig” (“everything that *was* was unreasonable”), that the absurd is always happening in the world and the destructive irrationalism (i.e. paradoxically: still a form of reason, but an “instrumental” one), which has progressively replaced the light of practical reason, would necessarily lead to the hallucinating phantasmagoria in which we live.

Today, we have reached a point in which societies and the “life world”, as we know it, have nothing to do with the embryo that was their origin over two centuries ago: the negative dialectics of the *Aufklärung* definitively came to an end and superseded itself. Hence, our perspective of reality has to be different, new and adjusted to something we call “world” and which does not have any defined “form” since it is, instead, to a greater or lesser extent, a sequence of arbitrary “facts” (in the sense inferred in Wittgenstein’s *Treatise*: a “state of things” [*Sachverhalt*], which is dynamic, and not a “thing” [*Ding*], which is static) and of *apparitions* in mutation (*Er-scheinungen*, phenomena – literally: flashes that burst through, “luminous signs that emerge”). And this is how the world asks to be read and apprehended.

With a new perception. New... or possibly the oldest one; the problem is not of today but of all times, ever since Power ceased to be based upon unquestionable consuetudinary truths and became State power, and *Logos* acquired its role as critical thinking that intervenes in *praxis*. Before drawing conclusions or proposing theses as regards the end, the disappearance or the destruction of whatsoever in the contemporary world (in this case, the so-called “intellectual”), it is, therefore, necessary to *diagnose*, to understand the contours of the disease, as well as the healthy signs of our time that also exist. It will have to be a comparative, relative diagnosis, and never an absolute one.

Where are we?

Diagnosing an epoch means, not so much asking *where are we heading*, but rather attempting to understand *where we are*. “It is time to know on which landing we are and what kind of intelligible discourse on the world and on ourselves is possible” (Touraine 2005, 12). Casting light on this question is a feat in itself; and the pretension of wanting to tell where we are heading is dangerous and bears a mark of totalitarianism or, at the least, of political haughtiness. The question “where are we?” results in a vision that, as already stated, does not aim at imposing a form, but rather highlighting a proposition such as Wittgenstein’s at the beginning of his *Treatise*: “The world is everything that is the case”, i.e. an uninterrupted and uncontrollable sequence of events (not an abstraction or a territory to be dominated, whether by the power of force or by the force of ideas). There is no world but worlds in the world. The best available mirror to confirm that *the world is that which happens* (or rather: that which is happening) nowadays is television, Internet and its power, both subtle and simplistic, offering immense diversity, but betraying the eternal return of the same, that is, infinitely diversified and totally standardised. We are in a paradoxical situation today: despite standards being more uniformly global than ever before, the diversity is immense and there has never been such an appeal to difference. However, the vision of the whole, in this phase that is not one of finalism, but of transition, has yet to reencounter an ethics. I am talking of the exploratory phase of a culture that has shifted from the political to the aesthetical in its broad sense – recreational, hedonistic, narcissistic –, after having been through a long period

in which the main references were social and economic. This vision remains complex and opaque – in the sense that, “format” and “invention”, to use concepts by Michel Serres, still seek new forms of equilibrium.

Obviously, this equilibrium is not compatible with catastrophic visions that set out the paradigm of the end based upon deterministic assumptions. The end of something can only be proclaimed if it ever had a beginning, which, in turn, would have been what happened after another end that preceded it and so forth. All beginnings follow an end and all ends generate new beginnings. There are neither beginnings nor ends – only that which is happening, metamorphosis and transitions. As far as we are concerned, we are far from any “end”: the beginning of the end, of the so-called crisis of values, has hardly begun in terms of the historical dimension of our neo-imperial, neoliberal and above all pan-communicational era. Homi Bhabha identifies a tension between “technological connectivity” (in expansion) and “cultural connection” (in decline), concluding that the former would impede or has already radically transformed the possibility for transparent and direct relationships between individuals. He considers the logo of Apple Macintosh, presented to us with the fatal bite of paradise lost, as the symbol of this loss of innocence. However, none of this is obvious when the machine itself has almost become a sort of third nature, a central or an opening to the planet, thus enabling all forms of intervention and creativity – body-less but with its own respiration, bloodless but with countless other forms of nourishment, circulation and energy, skinless but increasingly sensitive and almost erotic to touch, to tactile contamination... The intellectual’s new functional place, or of those who come in his wake, is inevitably implicit in all this.

Let us go back to our attempt to diagnose the present situation. One of the aspects that perhaps best reveals the perplexity and the disorientation of intellectuals, thinkers and the field of symbolic production as a whole is their apparent incapacity nowadays to deal with the crisis in society and values, contrary to what happens in the sectors of added value production or politics where the commonest slogan is crisis management. I believe that this may be explained as a certain intellectual myopia that frequently tends to see only half of the crisis: that which relates to the loss of values (though, looking around us, we have no difficulties in finding them, as we shall see later) or the threat of their ending (intellectuals have always had the magna virtue, or the awful defect, of interpreting threats as

endings); the other half, the critical look at the reality of the crisis, the productive scepticism, seems to have been stifled or to have fallen into decline. Within the current context of great “ethical indetermination” (something the intellectual did not experience before?), in which ambivalence is “the structuring principle of our affective and political existence”, Homi Bhabha proposes a displacement or an investment at the aesthetic level, one which more naturally would allow for what he designates as “interlocution” or the right to narration and to being heard. As a matter of fact, one of the approaches followed by the interventional function in contemporary societies is precisely performative (and no longer discursive). The problem to be solved is the frequency with which this type of “intervention” still falls into the hedonistic or narcissistic pose, into increasingly present and influential forms of media populism, manifest even in the domain of art, in manifestations of a more or less radical counterculture, very often innocuous to the large stomach of decadent Western capitalist culture, without the necessary ethical moment ever coming to the fore. The very post-colonial artistic manifestations, which we encounter ever more, blowing in fresh from places experiencing renewed energies, so often run the risk of being perceived more as examples of “exoticism” than bearers of values and experiences that might in fact prove of use to us. And the question posed by Homi Bhabha – to which I have already responded in an essay on the state of the world (cf. Barrento 2006) – is the following: what is the place of ethics in the aesthetics, in the “dynamic ambivalence of globalisation”, within the scope of the universal mercantilism of this world that has become – in the dual sense of the term – flat and dull (cf. Thomas L. Friedman *The World is Flat* 2005)? My response, based upon what seems to be the most clearly “interventive” literary work in current Portuguese literature, that by Maria Gabriela Llansol, can be summarised in the following terms (returning to the aforementioned idea): what is worth knowing – acting and thinking in conformity – is what present-day world lacks so as to become (more) “humane”. Llansol proposes, in the wake of Spinoza and his pact of kindness and beauty, a hyper-human (or trans-human) vision of the human, open to Being and free of the reductionist avatars of all autistic humanisms and of shackles – whether teleological, moral or of any other schemes of power (including the intellectuals of classical profile, who really did aspire to it: otherwise, how might it be possible to understand the slogans of May 1968, “power to the imagination”, “power is in the street”, etc.?). Such a

philosophical (and practical) conjecture, with a profile of “pondered hope” and an imminently aesthetic vision of the world, may represent the basis of a “sensualethical” – of an “ethiaesthetic” – culture (not to be confused with the classical utopias of the aesthetic State, since, within this situation, which I would rather qualify as having an eudemonistic, anarchistic or, in a soft version, radical foundation, the State has no role). This culture is very different from the forms of liberal society that we know and it supposes a relearning of desire beyond mere name (here, overlapping Bernard Stiegler’s thought) and a perspective on the world that is neither critical nor deferential but simply free as “a story unworthy of regrets”. In following this route, we come to some of the names that I shall refer to later, and which are on the other side of the apocalyptical. However, it is clear that none of these “apocalypticals” are any of Umberto Eco’s in the 1970s, nor are they the “integrated” ones of today, unreservedly backing the new means and the new proposals for reconfiguring the world of life. Everything has diversified far further.

And there are also the positions that I see as *phantasms* of a more or less surpassed recent past, of which I would highlight the following: the remnants of Gramsci’s “organic intellectual”, at a time when neither parties nor organisations need ideologues; the posturing of the “great refusal” (Marcuse’s *große Weigerung*, or Blanchot’s *le grand refus*). However, they still serve as examples of a straightforwardness that contrasts with the “inner emigration” to which intellectuals and many writers recur today. There are cases such as Edward Saïd who I see as hostages of the “*but syndrome*” (proposals to which the current situation of the relationship with power immediately responds with an adversative that annuls them – in this case, proposals that are conditioned by a historical situation that seems to have no end in sight); and, more recently, the place given to a new variant of the masses of the past, dispersed over the immaterial empire of our days, designated as “the multitude” by the ex-radical intellectual Toni Negri in his latest books, inspired on a currently displaced Spinoza; books that are permeated by angelic and unrealistic projections, the wishful thinking of the “interactive singularities” which would form that new *multitudo* – a species of transgenic creation that will have to await, perhaps indefinitely, the passage to its post-philosophical condition.

Homi Bhabha, in turn, and differently from others I shall mention, does not give up, even in his ethical protestations, in taking the “role of repre-

sentation”, in representing the classical type of intellectual and the “best” of his heritage in this new situation. He does so by proposing doubt (*global doubt*) and interpretation, but also negotiation and consensus, which are, as he argues, the marks of the new intellectual language (without the facet of combat, which has been lost). His perspective at long term is one of “vernacular cosmopolitanism”, that is, the half paradoxical utopia of a globalisation of the local (or “glocalisation”, as it has already been termed). This is more a strategy than a frontal position in which what happens is only the expression of dissatisfaction or a global (formal?) doubt without any traces of indignation – after all the strategy of Bhabha himself as paradigm of the post-colonial, mundane intellectual who speaks from the safe heaven of the academic world (American academia, of course!).

Beyond the social

Very different are the points of view – and, in some cases, the diagnoses of the situation – by the sociologist *Alain Touraine*, who is rightly sceptical of the feasibility of the absorption of the local by the global. If we believe in the new tasks he attributes to sociology that, just like the intellectual, has shed its “classical” and golden phase, sociology will have to abdicate from its assumptions, objects and traditional methodologies. Given the new conditions, which are far removed from the decades of the cold war and the various totalitarianisms, when the intellectuals’ role was to warn about abuses of power and the alienation of the masses, Touraine supports new profiles of the “subject” – individual and collective, cultural and bearer of “individual universal rights” – along with new forms of creative individualism. Consequently, the problems have undergone a dislocation: from a political (national, regional or local) to a predominantly cultural and no longer strictly social configuration. “A grand alliance is needed of everything that is not social, given that the social has become almost entirely the zone of power. For this reason, notions such as ‘globalisation’, in as far as they are powerful ideologies, indicate to us the path that we should not take. [...] On the contrary, nothing prevents us from thinking it may be possible to live as in the last century, in a world in which the scope of rights ceaselessly expands and combats power”. The actors in this combat are necessarily different, guided by a new conception of the subject(s) and

subjectivity: “Without this escape beyond the social, we run the risk of being dominated by the world of power” (Touraine 2006, 206).

The implications of such an ethical-cultural shift are enormous, since responsibilities in principle fall to all, and not only to governments, nor to an elite of intellectuals (still perceived by another French sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu, in the context of a “sociology of symbolic forms”, as the central piece in a relatively autonomous “field of forces”). Today’s intellectual is the thinker, the artist, the actor in forms of performative and multiple intervention given that thinking is not only done through the intellect – there are also the body and the effective value of emotions (something that television happens to know very well how to exploit to its advantage).

I will highlight some of the other approaches that have been conceptualized in recent years with particular mention of the theories of the *biopolitics* “of the State” or beyond the State (Foucault-Agamben-Esposito) and of *psychopolitics* (Bernard Stiegler), as well as of the new stances generating readings of our contemporaneity as a moment of *survival of the minor lights* amidst the spotlights of present-day mass and media culture (Didi-Huberman), or the need for a *repoliticization of art* as a “mute manifesto”, an intervening form without deliberate intervention (Jacques Rancière).

Biopolitics beyond the State?

The following readings are almost always a diagnosis rather than a prognosis in that they pay particular attention to the mutations of the very concept of the “political”, which has always been decisive to the configuration of the intellectual’s role. Foucault put forward one of these new concepts in coining the formula “biopolitics of the state”, with roots in Nietzsche and his philosophical “guiding thread of the body”, continued and developed by thinkers such as Roberto Esposito and to a certain extent superseded by Giorgio Agamben. The latter has sought his own way since *Infanzia e storia* (*Infancy and History*, 1977), following a more speculative than analytical approach through a biopolitics beyond the State. He affirms the relative place of the human and the need for a new global ethics that integrates the entire Living Being (*L’Aperto: Uomo e l’animale* [*The Open: Man and Animal*], 2002); in *La comunità che viene* (*The Coming Community*, 1990), he also defends the notion of “any being” (best: *any-will, quod-libet*), i.e. that

which “establishes an original relationship with desire”, a desiring singularity (Agamben 1993, 11). In this speculative vision, we are not far from the illuminated multitudes of Negri. Agamben’s reading of the contemporary world emphasises a trend that is inherent to his thinking since the outset and which Didi-Huberman, in his last book (where Agamben is submitted to rigorous criticism), sums up as follows: “What is the *modus procedendi* of Agamben? He begins by affirming a radical destruction and then builds a transcendence” (Didi-Huberman 2009, 66). Giorgio Agamben’s thought, even in essays of a more analytical nature, such as *Che cos’è il contemporaneo?* (*What is the Contemporary*, 2008), would, in fact, seem overly dependent on messianic, metaphysical and scatological points of view in order to really account for what is taking place in the contemporary world. Some of the doubts advanced by Didi-Huberman thus do make sense. Agamben applied the metaphysics of the “world of ends” to the living movement of immanence in a para-theological and apocalyptic approach. As a result, he makes frequent recourse to the figure of the “horizon” (the promise of the great distant light), rather than taking notice of the near images and lights. Didi-Huberman writes that “the first political operator of protest, crisis, criticism or emancipation has to be designated as *image*, in the sense of that which proves able to *cross the horizon* of totalitarian constructs” (Didi-Huberman 2009, 101). Alternatively, as can be read in one of the paripomena to Walter Benjamin’s theses *On the Concept of History*: “Organising pessimism [that which fundamentally needs to be done today] means discovering the space of the image within the space of political action. This space of the image, nevertheless, is no longer measurable in contemplative terms..., it is the world of full and integral actuality” (Benjamin 2010, 156). The French author sets the belief that there is no absolute destruction in opposition to the affirmations of radical destruction in Agamben (that lead him to transcendentalisation or redemption as an exit route). In this, he is seconded precisely by Walter Benjamin, a thinker both authors hold in esteem. That which survives is there and affirms itself; it does not have any redemptive value, interrelating merely with the immanence of historical time.

Reaffirming the image as the “temporal operator of the survivals” (Didi-Huberman 2009, 102), Didi-Huberman insists that there is no total disappearance of light or the state of things in the world but only decline or “*declination*”, a term which serves far better the present times of expecta-

tion and the mutant forms characterising them. The essential feature of the phases of decline is the “bifurcation”, the small dislocations (which are indeed referred to by Agamben in his *The Coming Community*, chapter “Aureoles”), or the ball of fire (Benjamin) that crosses the horizon and always brings the invention of a new form. Michel Serres formulates the problem in a similar fashion by operating with the concepts of “format” and “invention”. The overlaying of format by invention, which is constantly happening, nowadays corresponds to modes of updating the discrete but present counter-powers in the social and cultural scene. The retreat to those niches of counter-power does not necessarily mean a dismissal but the choice of a place of freedom of movement that allows action – naturally the possible and relative action in a situation in which direct confrontation has become almost impossible and inglorious in the face of the absence of a centre of power or that which we might designate as the *evasive centre* of the post-modern era dominated by the *as if* (the simulacrum, appearance, the pure contingency that opens up to the uncertain but which at the same time allows for every type of intervention).

This new situation is a direct consequence of tough regimes and their intellectuals’ certainties. Today, without any centre or even dominant references, the very notion of transgression, central to a certain vision of the intellectual and the artist in a period predating our time, no longer makes sense. Ten years ago, I made a diagnosis of the cultural situation of our time (I say *situation* and not cultural *condition* as the latter would imply a clear and stable trend that does not exist). My diagnosis, established in a comparative framework within what was the so-called 20th century “modern” phase, highlighted features such as: the dissemination of counterculture poles among a totally open and permissive cultural humus; cultural media populism; the discrediting of any form of intellectual “authority” (which previously could be intolerably moralising); the lack of causes when there were only strategies; the expanding radical culture (as against serious ruptures in modern culture); a performative and transgenic culture, both hybrid and permeable (in response to a critical, rigorous and tragic era); the passage from a culture of the word to a culture of happening and spectacle... (Barrento 2001, 40-42 and 47 onwards).

From biopolitics to psychopolitics

The change that occurred and led to what Foucault, Agamben and Esposito designate as “biopolitics”, a practice guided by the recognition of the individual as a body to care for, with the consequential weakening of the traditional political categories of sovereignty, representation, State authority, may also be seen as a factor of change in the very status of the intellectual. The question is ascertaining to what extent biopolitics, which perceives individuals as living beings, contributed towards the “extinction” of the classical type of intellectual, far more concerned about individuals as social and “moral” beings. There would in fact seem to be a direct relationship between both factors. The forms of intervention in the *polis* change (despite not dying) because the forms of politics change. Roberto Esposito, one of the philosophers espousing biopolitics and who openly continues and develops Foucault’s thesis, speaks of a relationship between what he terms the “non-political” and biopolitics: it would prove to be non-political as it applies to a situation – our own – in which the means of political functioning are radically altered. Therefore, it may be stated then that, just as the body of the individual has increasingly become transformed into a factor, an object and a subject of a State biopolitics, that same body – those who act in the political scenario, under new forms of organisation and creation – has substituted the intervening, “authorised” *voice* of the intellectual (the voice, as we know, has always been, ever since Genesis, something sacral and oracular – and neither aspect is taken into account nowadays). The weight of the voice – the original one, that is origin and authority, and which was also the intellectual’s in the wake of Zola and Sartre – has given way to multiple *ways of speaking* in the Babel of the contemporary *polis*.

Bernard Stiegler is one of the contemporary thinkers who has come closest to a diagnosis that does not look sideways, upwards or backwards but, rather, frontwards towards that which our contemporaneity has brought us, lying visible at the surface. He seeks to articulate the condition of being in the world (the old and the eternal condition of being) with today’s technology against all resistance to the so-called alienating actions of capitalism. Stiegler proposes as a possible route “creating desire with technics”, revaluing the libido and life through this alliance that, for more conservative mentalities, is a decidedly impossible marriage. The promethean, exclusivist, intransigent and tragic pose of the hard intellectual is put aside

and replaced with an alliance between Prometheus and Epimetheus. More recently, in being attentive to what is happening and based on concrete statistics, Stiegler realizes that the cultural state of the supposedly civilised world is one of “*disattention*”, generated by the dependence on the audio-visual (especially television) and the programme industries that nourish it. While before there was talk of a biopolitics with the State controlling the bodies and some thinkers wanting to save them by a return to forms of “bare life”, we now have to face up to the reality of a “psychopolitics” and “psychopower”, “as soon as technics emerge that enable ever more efficient means of controlling the mental activities of individuals” (Stiegler 2007, 157). Capitalism itself absorbs the great mass of cultural production and assumes the role of the intellectuals, which the new “society of control” (Deleuze) is able to dispense perfectly. In a situation in which symbolic misery reigns throughout the whole territory of “culture”, in which the deceiving information saturation de-socialises its consumers, and the destruction of attention (that “natural prayer of the soul” as Montesquieu put it) de-forms minds with hallucinating audiovisual technologies, the great question of our time involves, according to Stiegler, finding exit routes from this way of life and inventing new modes of human existence *within* totally technologised societies.

The fireflies still fly or the re-politicisation of art

Contemporary thinkers, such as *Georges Didi-Huberman* and *Jacques Rancière*, follow the same proposed “endogenous” routes, which are not external to the social arena where everything happens (nowadays, even that which is, or seeks to be outside it).

In his latest book – *Survivance des lucioles*, published in late 2009 –, which is a direct response to the famous aforementioned article by Pasolini on the supposed fading out of the last final luminous points (in Pasolini’s words: *lucciole*, or fireflies) of resistance to the “culture industry” in the 1970s, Didi-Huberman refuses the idea that we have fallen into such a purgatory of semi-dead fireflies to never more escape from it, after the era of the great luminaries, in which the intellectual shone (as did the power under whose spotlight he stood). The “disappearance” of the *lucciole* announced by Pasolini has instead given way to their reappearance, thereby

contradicting the theses of their end. Today's clusters of resistance continue to have (or have again) something of an innocence about them (although without the illusions of the 1970s), when compared to the prevailing cynicism in politics, advertising and media in all the world life of advanced and wild capitalism with its neo-cryptic forms of cultural fascism – witnessed in the imposed “taste”, the loathing of thought, the subalternization of the book and reading and in its aesthetic conservatism. All of this is naturally accompanied by a liberalisation characteristic of the formal democracies that precisely allows for the dispersed proliferation of those luminous points of counterculture. The problem is – indeed, as in all periods – the impact and the repercussions of such clusters, although we know that the place of thought and creativity has always been that of small resistant reserves and not of the masses that today are fed by a media-based cultural populism that demands nothing of them while giving them everything – the price still having to be ascertained.

In this *era of the image* that, however, is *not a time for seeing*, the world itself is still there, now and for ever, waiting to be... not interpreted (its meaning always escapes us), neither transformed nor revolutionised but simply looked at with eyes that see it along with that which shines within – in its multiple and permanent *apparitions* (images) and not in the excessive *exposure* given by the great lights, the levellers of all experience. This is probably the great paradox of a so-called civilisation “of the image”: a large number of people have become *incapable of image* (of imagining and creating or animating, i.e. giving life and soul to the images that surround us or are conveyed to us). What is more, they are also incapable of seeing those other-images that within this society of great lights continue to be produced – intermittently, multiply destabilising the larger brilliance. This seems to be the destiny, the fatality – but not the destination – of the society of the spectacle, information and globalisation at its advanced (and already decadent?) stage.

It is illusionary to affirm that the destination (the *telos* towards which something tends) of this civilisation of the image, though image blind, might finally be to open its eyes to the “apparitions” on its margins. However, it is not illusionary to affirm, contrary to pessimistic proclamations of the end, that there is place and space in our societies for those apparitions that have come to replace the strong intellectual luminary. Never has the stomach of capitalism been so large, never have permissiveness and plural-

ity been so real and at the same time so fictitious. The insatiable voracity of this ultraliberal system is both capable of tolerating all the *luciole* shining within as it is capable of assimilating and placing them at its service (in this, the advertising industry has reached an unsurpassable point).

What then survives in this intolerable and overly tolerant purgatory into which history has plunged us? Didi-Huberman replies (against the apocalyptic and seconded by his reading of Walter Benjamin, that “Marxist Rabi” – in the end not at all messianic?): the minor lights, the unstable but persistent will-o’-the-whisps that act today across various levels, generating desire in an era that is poorly or not at all receptive to major ideologies. Desire is, or might be, a driving force raising awareness and transformation (Bernard Stiegler grounds his way of reading the present in this fact, as we have seen). Furthermore, the receptiveness to images, the capacity to be attentive to the small lights that animate the night of our days may take on a highly *political* role. Didi-Huberman reminds us – along with Foucault, and returning to Benjamin’s notion of the “dialectic image” – that “imagination is political” and, together with Aby Warburg, of the political function of the survival of images, tradition and memory (D.-Huberman 2009, 51-52). What is most profoundly contemporaneous, and should not be confused with any surface actuality, has somehow to do with this (but with different assumptions and arguments than those put forward by Agamben in *What is the Contemporary?*).

However, is it not precisely this surface *actuality* – that which happens and is perceived in the domain of thought and creativity at the crux of the *polis* itself – that is most appropriate to our contemporariness?

The mute manifesto: meta-politics of art and thinking

This, in fact, seems to be the main and most productive idea of an author with a plural perspective like *Jacques Rancière*. His way of understanding the relationship between art (or thought) and current politics, emerges when he proposes the removal of art and thought from the straight and simplistic quadrant of the present situation, from an *opposition* of distinct fields. What happens today is that art and politics take up the same unique space that, according to Rancière, “is configured as a spatial-temporal *sensorium* determining ways of being together or separated, outside or within” (Rancière

2005). That is the space of aesthetics and of the *polis*, of aesthetics and the thought of the *polis* within the *polis*. The 18th century theorised and conceived a politics of aesthetics, just as the place and the limits of thinking within the *polis* had been defined since Socrates. Since the Enlightenment and Marxism the intellectual assumed the function of denouncing the “aesthetic illusion”, generating an irreconcilable and apparently natural opposition in bourgeois society between society/politics and art (the bourgeois novel reflects this theme to exhaustion). This situation endured through to the second half of the 20th century with peak moments in Romanticism and Modernism. Everything seems to have changed in recent decades, in a phase that we may designate as post-bourgeois – but not, Rancière states, thanks to “post-modernism”, rather because art and thought have always been an intrinsic part of politics. Today, this has become evident in a dual sense: politics has never been more ludic and theatrical (artistic and staged); never have so many art forms been confused with the actual social humus and the political material wherein they prosper. And sometimes, the more autonomous and “indifferent” art and thought seem to be, the more they become instruments for political intervention: not from outside inwards, but within the political and social theatre itself. They thereby become a form of *meta-politics* (the term is also used by Pierre Bourdieu) which intervene directly in life, acting above legislative and managerial politics. In their loneliness, the work/thought promise emancipation, *show* what is happening, gaining the *strength of presence*. Classical oppositions no longer make sense, such as between the autonomy and heteronomy of art, pure and engaged art, art and the culture industry (which in the 1970s, still informed the aesthetic theories of Adorno as well as of Marcuse in his final phase, that of *The Aesthetic Dimension*). As Rancière counterposes, this is because art and active thinking create not works but life forms that are “indifferent” (as they renounce the function of denouncement and the explicit message), attaining a new critical potential (this is almost a (neo)Dadaist program). In the open, multiple space of the social and virtual, where everything takes place today, the shock of the opposites and the discursive debate have transformed themselves into a unique game where “experience is reconfigured” (generating new forms of being aware of the real) – with the danger, certainly, of the chaotic profusion of information confusing all and affecting the critical spirit. However, one could also say: the *spirit*, perhaps, but not critical *action*. This is present everywhere, in the street, in

cultural life in general, on the Internet, even in the museum – effervescent, diverse and alive. What happened was not the end of the intellectual and other cultural actors but, as I have been stressing, the dislocation, various and imperceptible on occasion, of the traditional functions towards diverse alternative areas of intervention. The great change – the new paradigm of the intervening figure? – is advanced by Rancière in the following terms: “*The demystifying machine begins to operate alone*”. This means: it begins to show, rather than to say, to appeal to the recipient’s sensory faculties and not so much to bombard him with discursive messages; without absolute models, and always in relation to precise contexts. The work (photography, installation, film, “action”, text) has become a “mute manifesto”, assuming within its own existence and visibility the function of denouncement. The intellectual has thereby given way, within this process of subtle dislocation, to other participative figures, almost always artistically predominant. The arena is now the installation, the blog or You Tube.

This is then the significant passage that has led into our present, from argumentation to the power of evidence, from discursive denunciation to the exposition of tensions. What happened – I would say, turning to the well-known poem by Kavafis – was the *barbarisation of the intellectual* (his necessary de-sacralisation) in the historical epoch in which we are living, perhaps not yet of open decadence but certainly of decline, or declination. The “barbarians” are among us when the discursive gives way to the performative, rhetoric to action, abstract thinking to forms of living art, *theoria* to life world. An era in decadence, which has annulled any self-critical perceptions and, in total blindness, proceeds along a path heading into the abyss, like those at the end of the Roman Empire or the Western Middle Ages, or during the great crisis of the bourgeois world relentlessly exposed by Musil in *The Man Without Qualities*, the fascist and communist dictatorships, and in a certain sense also the current era. The latter perhaps craves in the depth of its weak awareness, some type of “salvation” that never arrives and, on arriving, can only come from the barbarians who, in Kavafis’ poem, are anxiously awaited at the gateways of the city because the situation has become unsustainable and intolerable. The new barbarians setting up shop inside the city might be the thinkers or the activists, the artists or the press columnists, the writers and the cultural programmers, the historians and the scientists... Kavafis’ poem, reread in the light of our current expectation, is a possible allegory of our times, the current winter

of our discontent, and of the many small lights that briefly flare up before fading away.

From the intellectual to the “intellectual-function”

We have not arrived at the end of an era; but its centre or one of its most audible centres (not actually visible, as of now) – the Voice of the intellectual – has splintered. He, too, (and all those, as well as others, whose names have arisen during the course of this reflection) remains as a truncated but real presence. What has changed then have been the intellectual’s relative positions in society and the world of life in general, as well as his pretensions of transformative intervention. The intellectual (the “intellectual-function” distributed among many actors) is found in today’s thinker and agitator, visionary and protester, resistance group and NGO, creative artist and *performer*, writer (still and always) and humorist. The results of all these atomised forms of intervention are different, more unpredictable, more plural, in general “lighter”, and perhaps more quantifiable in our informational society. The great profound alteration is probably of a qualitative order: interventions in the “social” fabric are not as clearly and explicitly political, but this is due to the fact that politics itself is no longer what it once was. It no longer needs ideas; it is no longer an “art” – that of the possible – to increasingly transform itself into a show always on the eve of elections, a sophistic discourse at the level of advertising, an illusory game of sovereignty (almost only economic and not even that), and the ignoble and tiresome endeavour to escape from the web that is being woven by the global financial empire. Time itself and its scope of action, more prolonged and incisive in some figures that provided substance to the classical intellectual type, have changed: the new forms of intervention, with emotions very often loudly on display, probably no longer impact onto our consciences in a lasting way; they are more ephemeral and superficial, lacking the power of penetration and duration in the mutant and frothy humus from which they stem. However, it is possible that many of them are destined, like so many “outdated” figures from the past, to join the list of the “posthumous”. But even in such a condition, they would not have reached the “end”. They would transverse this period of expectation, this *interim*, prior to the return of new gods. For the meanwhile, we still do not

know which. But I suspect that we shall still remain under the reign of the gods of images (the visual, the gestural, the performative) for some time yet, more than of those of the committed word, in an (unequal) “*partage du sensible*” as *gesture and the act of showing* will prevail over *discourse and the saying*. Unless the latter are what allow man, a being of time, differently to the gods that simply *are*, to gain an over-life: that which the word brings them through *efabulation*, the *imagination* in all its variants (as suggested in Cesare Pavese’s fabulous *Dialogues with Leucó*). Because – wrote Ernst Jünger at the end of the last century in a book that reflects upon this disturbing side of all transitions – “in the moment in which the images fall, they have to be replaced by images: otherwise we fall under the threat of loss” (Jünger 1990, 7).

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DECONSTRUCTING EXPECTATIONS: ON THE WIRE BETWEEN IVORY TOWERS AND NUTSHELLS

TERESA CADETE

Outlining the problem

Man wird nie betrogen, man betrügt sich selbst, one is never betrayed, one betrays himself (or herself), wrote Goethe in his *Maximen und Reflexionen* (Goethe 1982, 12, 522) against too high expectations of any kind. But this should not be a declaration of defeatism or cynicism. In an interview in the Portuguese newspaper *O Público* (October 19, 2010), about the changes within European religious geography, the Italian sociologist Enzo Pace asserted that “people have no intellectual instruments for handling multiculturalism”. But who are “people”? May “people” be the German chancellor Angela Merkel when she echoed, not long ago, a verdict by the former Berlin senator Thilo Sarrazin about the failure of the multicultural model? And yet it would be a rather satisfactory experience to sit side by side with such defeatists watching the wonderful movie *Crash* by Paul Haggis, a film where all clichés find themselves confirmed, just in order to be afterwards deconstructed. And deconstructed by what? Deconstructed by moments of recognition, of common feeling, of astonishment.

Such moments are also said, since the Greeks, to be the beginning of all philosophy. In the present case, they may be felt like a rupture. But if viewed retrospectively under an analytic eye, such moments of astonishment cannot historically exist, i.e. be understood without all previous discussions on multiculturalism. To those discussions surely also belong the statements about failure or incapacity to understand. And each accusation of failure concerns us all.

But this was just an example. Let us therefore not betray ourselves about the role of intellectuals in the 21st century. Times have changed and places too. We must descend to the level of microanalyses. But as far as we may generalize for our latitudes, the sense for uniqueness tends to replace the sense for universality on the scale of the mental dispositions of audiences

in discussing such important issues like multiculturalism and the so-called clashes of civilizations, like the environment and sustainability, value crises and alternatives for getting out of these crises. And this happens because “in the culture we inhabit, recognition has to be fairly instantaneous or it will evoke loss of confidence in the attachment on both sides” (Raz 2001, 24, note 11). It seems that the former *sense* of History, which was able to push the will to discuss so many problems in specific time-space contexts, has crumbled into a lot of *senses*. It seems that our capacity of judging is moving from *market places* to *marked spaces*: market places in the meaning of H. Arendt’s public discussion of issues that concern the interests of people assuming their citizenship (in the Kantian tradition), marked spaces in the meaning of the values that each one of us attaches to the matters discussed in the media, that seem to have become the main public space.

As a possible result of this, discussions still continue but they seem to have lost the passionate quality that they showed in their golden age between the forties and the seventies, at least in the countries with freedom of expression. One is tempted to push forward the hypothesis that the audiovisual media could have contributed, precisely because of the presence of the image, to cause a certain skepticism or even distance towards all problems, as a possible reaction to the illusion of immediacy. This is not as paradoxical as it seems, if we recall the passion with which my generation still reads books and newspapers, possibly compensating through the faculty of imagining the distance from the immediate events – the same distance which can nowadays be deceived through the simultaneity of a satellite report. But I would not like to oppose the depth of the reading-writing dynamics to the superficiality of the use of the information made possible by new technologies. They are complementary, therefore promoting complementary competences, since they also stimulate different parts of the brain. The medium is not always the message: it often even hides the message under the struggle about the means, without reaching the ends, that is, the discussion about the conditions of possibility for producing leading ideas.

It seems clear today that we can no longer claim the role of a Voltaire or a Zola, writing or speaking to a constant and predictable audience as in the 18th and the 19th centuries, succeeding in carrying along huge amounts of people behind the causes of innocents like Jean Calas or Alfred Dreyfus. At least not in the same way these writers did. Audiences, like majorities of any sort, have become either diffuse and indistinct, or specific and differ-

entiated. The nostalgia of becoming a sort of leading conscience may also go along with an unconscious desire of getting support from a mass basis, or at least from a broad audience. The consequence is clear: paradigms *have* changed, because they *had to* change.

In our days, we have to depart from a position of weakness. It is no more a gender issue, as it still was in 1964, when Hannah Arendt answered Günter Gaus, in a TV interview, that for her the task of thinking and publishing was not to “want terribly to produce effects (*furchtbar gerne wirken*)”, as men were supposed to do, but simply to “understand (*verstehen*)” (Arendt 1996, 46). Such an assertion may contain much more than a passive observatory position. It is surely also something more than a gender dispute. It can disclose a sort of intermediary platform for that necessary paradigm change, not only from the multitude orator to the differentiated analyzer. The change is deeper, must be deeper because it has a lot of implications which we are able to follow in a second degree observation, as self-observation.

The platform I mean is made up of time and space: it is the *place* from which we observe the world, speak and act, recognize our own perspectives, our own memories, our own evolution, and our own relativity. And also the sum of the critical voices that have been making us acquainted with the *pluralité des mondes*. Therefore, we can amplify our vocabulary according to a wide semantic field that includes irregularities, exceptions, tensions, misunderstandings, disagreements. The capacity of translating and relativizing differences tends to make such differences more porous, letting contrasts become varieties. But the process of such translations, which are inherent to the process of reading any study object, is everything but linear. Since there is no translation without treason, no *traduttore* without being *tradittore*, because each message transfigures itself while it runs through the transmission channel, we cannot but constantly find understanding nodes and barriers in our way.

Precisely here begins our task, following Hannah Arendt’s wish to understand while communicating. For instance, by asking whether it is our fate to give credit to the voices that are only able to make copy-paste with the reasons of a so-called loss of values on a plurality of fronts: morally, economically, politically, existentially. Crises are, as we know, made of threats and chances, as well as of marked and unmarked spaces. A collective reading of any crisis is therefore as suspect as the problematic of collective iden-

tity: both tend to blur any differentiated analysis. Setting unknown paths, leaving behind the reproductive character of all normative or predictable registers, all this requires a sense of opportunity and risk. But even this risk is necessarily minimized, if we see the world as an integrated, multilinked system, where communication channels appeal to our expectations and to our capacity of marking changes onto our maps of marked and unmarked spaces. It is the time to question a possible dialectical relationship between the speed of communication and the redundancy of the amount of information. The answer to such a question often goes through sheer silence.

After that silence we may realize that public opinion, an opinion that was still intrinsically needed by such voices like Voltaire or Zola, is perhaps no more the culturally reasoning audience from former times of struggles for liberty of expression. But we should avoid moving between extremes and in this case also avoid mourning the directly deliberative space of the ancient polis in order to accuse a contemporary gloomy, vicious space, where, according to some apostles of authenticity, we are irremediably bound to lose our own authenticity. This *topos*, although often deconstructed, seems to retain certain attractiveness, incidentally due to the persistence of the romantic heritage in its diffuse impetus to show a permanent aversion to all patient, daily civic duties.

Today, civic duties, among which we may count intellectual intervention, may have moved, as said above, from market places to marked spaces. This means making a detour from the former, taken symbolically as opinion making channels, over historical memories that help us in seeing the factors of contingency and predictability better, as well as the meanings of universality and particularity throughout the last decades. In this sense, we may discover, taking the former example, that multiculturalism might be a mask for conglomerated forms or particular tribalism. The latter does not need to be deconstructed in its evidence. It just needs to be surpassed by individual dialogues, singular analyses, unique narratives, which are always able to get superposed so as to form new common senses. This also shows the limitations of sociological laws and all kind of rules within human sciences.

We should further ask ourselves whether any adopted models do not produce more triviality while pretending to oppose trivialization. The multicultural example is still expressive in itself. But the cultural analyst, a dimension that must be inherent to each intellectual, has only to reset and

to readjust his or her optical lens, in order to attain a finer grain, in order to differentiate and individualize. We may also ask with Judith Butler whether humanities get disintegrated through relativism or whether this job was done by opponents to relativism and criticism (Butler 2004, 129).

But such questions have once more the function of proving the superfluous character of any answer that we might be tempted to give. No one is entitled either to making definitive conclusions or to erasing anything, but just to complete it. In this sense, any analysis object may come under a new light. In this sense, the most pertinent question could be: Why reproduced objects and ideas, that do not surprise us but rather throw us back to a status of believing in regular laws, or even in any kind of fate, still find an audience? On the opposite side, the simple life, as *praxis*, as well as any nature pattern, never repeats itself (Abram 2007, 65). Both invite us, life and nature, to become aware of the infinite forms of analogy, as varieties.

Here, I would like to stress that my point is by no means to set any opposition between natural and artificial realms, since such opposition is itself artificial and ignores the complexity and the entanglement of both. We just need for the moment to keep in mind the differences between, on the one hand, the dialectics of means and ends, which determine the functional perspective, and, on the other hand, the open problematic of purposelessness, of self-fulfilled situations, as the open paths of sheer life.

Where does the sense of further researching lie? We could turn this question upside down and give an answer like “precisely in the illegibility of the world”. Let us mistrust not only all recipes, but also all generalizing opinions, that come inevitably from the voices that seem to take pleasure in remaining seated on crisis scenarios, and not even stand up in order to try to discern a wider horizon. But even the apparent a-historicity of such methods discloses a lot of “micro-histories” if we take any scenario under our lens; in a certain way, it would be the remaking of Hegel’s pointing at the modern subjectivity, which had been able to tear down the normative veil of historical symbolic dreams (Hegel 1802/1986, 2, 290). But that subjectivity, formerly new as a manifestation of modernity, has nowadays to be corrected. It cannot be free from the suspicion of trying to compensate for the narrowness of a single view through reproductive formulas. In any case, this could be a way to understand why so many scientific premises are never questioned. Is such an uncritical attitude not rather the *search* for a kind of excuse for giving up on any effort to *research* further, to question established positions?

We have to deal with all this, and always from that perspective of weakness as mentioned above. Whether we see ourselves as belonging to post-modernity or late modernity, such a question at the end becomes irrelevant. We have to face the enormous challenge represented by the claim of reconstructing frames of reference, and this repeatedly, even if seeming to be a Sisyphean task. But we are neither Sisyphus nor Penelope. We do not need to undo neither former schemata, nor the schemata that we build, but instead of that we have to learn from both in order to be able to work independently from any historical normativity. Historical knowledge is essential to open our horizons and to deepen our views, not to bestow us with any kind of specific competence. The ivory tower, in which intellectuals have been seen for so many centuries, has become uncomfortable in its narrowness. It was also, we realize it now, a metaphor from the semantic field dictated by the illusion of stability or by the need of shelter. The sea metaphor, so familiar to our culture, seems to fit better to our present contingent world. And in it, the intellectual has to manage his or her boat, as tiny as a nutshell, as Schiller used to say in the 18th century when he took conscience of his historicity, also as a form of contingency.

The most difficult, but perhaps also the most attractive challenge, seems to be the search for a source of energy that could be able to function as a replacement for any identity illusion. The empty space left by the institutional support given to the exact sciences has caused a sort of complex of exactness with a huge amount of negative consequences, such as an obsessive claim of objectivity by the social sciences that makes these often unable to deal with the principle of contingency and uncertainty. Even such theories like the theory of chaos or of catastrophe do not abdicate to claim forms of regularity and predictability. Another negative consequence is the reservation status given to literature and art: they have become *tout le reste*, in spite of their prophetic character, which often gives them the honor of being quoted at the beginning or at the end of scientific papers. But what would be necessary is a real dialogue between these codes. It is no question of abolishing the limits, but of crossing them. Neither is the question of giving up the claim of objectivity, but to overrule a narrow, positivistic view of objectivity. We lived for centuries with the belief in a separation between a so-called real world and a so-called apparent world. After metaphysics has been replaced by the hegemony of science, this same science gives us the instruments to understand not only the laws of causality, but also the

implications of their consequences. All forms of objectivity imply moments that are not visible, but no less real.

We live in a schizophrenic world, among several forms of fundamentalism. They often remain unnoticed; and when noticed, they may be neither named nor analyzed. Religious fundamentalism is just one sort of it. In our latitudes today, we have to put under the lens the consequences of scientific and economic forms of fundamentalism, rather than the religious. If we are aware of the mental predisposition of many citizens (in Western countries) to question religious issues but not to question scientific or economic expert positions, we have to go a step further. To go a step further means to get involved in the atmosphere, the mental disposition that seems to paralyze so many of us in order to make us accept apparently unquestionable measures or decisions, not asking for the conditions of possibility of acting differently. And this is not only a question of freedom, but also of availability to the adventure of thinking and judging and not to leave one satisfied with ready-made formulas. This is, then, a possible way on the path of intellectual citizenship. Let us not be afraid of asking our own questions, and let us not be afraid of saying that only the development of an interactive discussion may lead us to a possible answer. Let us not be afraid to hold the rudder of our nutshell.

Hannah Arendt and the zero degree of politics: a case study

“All the words like Peace and Love / All the same affirmative speech / Had been soiled, profaned, debased / To a horrid mechanical screech”. W. H. Auden, whose words are here quoted by H. Arendt, at the beginning of her work *Responsibility and Judgement*, out of the volume *Nones*, published in the fifties, testimonies a full archeology of devastations throughout the twentieth century. Auden and Arendt are contemporaries – both were born in the first decade of the same century and both know what they are talking about. The process of desertification, both of culture and public spaces, showed several dimensions: existential, linguistic, urban, dialogical, political, economical, biological, and many others. Some decades before the two world war machines produced the well known ravages, the ideological milling of stable values had already caused a radical erosion,

denounced for instance by Nietzsche in his essay about truth and lying in the extra-moral sense.

The image of desertification is recurrent in the sense of any form of devastation and not just the consequences of both world wars. In *The Promise of Politics*, H. Arendt mentions the space in-between, which had been seriously damaged as a space of living, building, communicating, interacting. This action had already been carried out and in a much higher degree by totalitarian systems, as the author had pointed out in her work under the same title. But the implicit question in all the works that followed seems to be of another kind. After 1945, we had the chance, as citizens, to rebuild the world and to implement democratic structures by communicating and reflecting about the conditions of possibility for acting together.

Why did this not happen, at least in a satisfactory way, on a widespread basis? In fact, such “world alienation” (Arendt 1958, 248) has deeper roots than the totalitarian regimes. It means the result of a long historical process (as the author demonstrated in the last chapter of *The Human Condition*), which has also led to a loss of capacity to contextualize reference themes in time and space. In this sense, it could be a form of amnesia and inability to differentiate, letting the individuals become potential objects of all kinds of manipulation, or even worse, pieces of machinery that they cannot overview any more. Such a loss of availability to face worldly issues would come not only out of solipsistic individuation or adverse socialization processes, but most of all out of an atrophy of judging and self-reflective capacities. The individuals are seen as being responsible for the consequences of such a process, precisely due to their lack of responsibility. This is the paradox which we all have to deal with.

Upon each step of her expositions, H. Arendt develops her reflections, dialoguing silently and implicitly not only with her readers, but also with other authors of the history of ideas. Although she partly agrees with Nietzsche’s denunciation of the world as a desert, she still refuses the belief that the same desert would dwell inside us, thus refusing what she considers to be a form of fatalism, a yielding towards an inner conviction of the impossibility of living, thinking, judging, dialoging and creating even under adverse conditions.

In spite of such refutation, such desert around the human beings could become a reality, beyond the well-known tragic historical situation of the concentration camps. The real danger of our times would be the feeling

that the desert is a sort of homeland, a place where life has been submitted to mere reproductive categories and schemata, as a result of the victory of the *animal laborans* upon the *homo faber* and the *homo politicus*. The individuals who feel at ease in such a world would be living examples of the incapacity and unavailability to think and judge under democratic conditions, but at the same time submitted to the cyclic mechanisms of production and consumption. The burned-out environment would therefore be the result of a refusal to think within space-time contexts, a denial of the courage to assume defense of one's own judgments. This might be, but must not be a consequence of a "Madison Avenue function" (Arendt 2007b, 237), of an entertainment society where nobody conceals the purpose of helping to sell commodities. We would like to stress that such assertions were formulated in the year of her death, 1975, when she regrets the American intervention in Vietnam overshadowing the glory of a two century democracy.

Although pointing out the barbarian and ruinous consequences of the entertainment society, yet she does not stick to a complaining negative dialectics like Adorno and Horkheimer. The denunciation both of consumption priorities and the uses of culture as a function, as a means to reach forms of social prestige is but a station in Arendt's thinking path, which sees in a general lack of sense (incidentally caused by both attitudes mentioned before) an effect of the absence of a critical and self-critical praxis by the individuals. At the end, it could be seen as a result of not questioning how it would be possible to make things become better, under the given circumstances.

Developing such capacities is a process that requires the exercise of re-activating historical memories. It may begin with a question: Can we learn from unspeakable horror, from the confrontation with facts that should never have happened, with situations from which no human being could be expected to exit with energy to look at the world in its eyes, to dialogue, to smile, to create? And yet: If in such situations human beings interact and testify mutually to their presence, it is in such an in-between space, on such a *tabula rasa* or zero degree of politics, that may arise the most amazing occurrences, worth to be told as lessons for posterity. Such is the meaning of the quotation *Victrix causa deis placuit, sed victa Catoni* at the beginning of *Men in Dark Times*, upon the example of individuals who had given such proof of crossing existential deserts, and not only under totalitarian regimes. Therefore, the ability for action with a political dimension has to

do with forms of interaction in the in-between space, creating profiles of singular humanization which can be retraced later on.

Thus, we see that a differentiation between totalitarian and democratic systems does not hinder the author from discerning some analogies among them and pointing out how the latter are undermined by economic imperatives and the subsequent reduction of culture objects and works to spectacular, trivial commodities. In other words: The paradigm of resistance has changed since most of such dark times, but neither has it disappeared nor has it become superfluous in times of peace and liberty of expression. The struggle of former decades has given way to deliberate steps and attitudes against the *doxa*, the mainstream of trivialized opinions.

Beyond the well known distinctions between the absence of independent jurisdiction in a totalitarian state and the warranty of basic rights of individuals in a democratic state, the similitude between both can be analyzed under the spotlight of the threat of extinction of the separation between public and private realms. Let us go back to the image of the desert, in order to understand better what is at stake. It can be used as a comparison, in neutral terms, to domains that are strange to us, ruled by laws that we ignore and in which people speak languages that we do not understand, without the possibility of any help from a *lingua franca*. In such spaces, we do not know how to find any kind of orientation. But such a desert – as H. Arendt points out in the last pages of *The Promise of Politics* – harbors in itself a bigger risk, that of sand storms that threaten, like totalitarian regimes, the human faculties of passion and action (Arendt 2007a, 168). In this context, H. Arendt stresses the importance of the oasis, as fountains of affective regeneration, like a private realm to which individuals may accede but where they should not remain confined. Such a realm should be considered just as a necessary station to regain forces that may empower the same individuals in order to interact again on the public arena.

We should hereby notice the full positivity of Arendt's vision of the public realm in *The Human Condition*, contrasting with the admitted possibility of the existence of a desert-like dimension, in the same realm, in the last years of her life. As a matter of fact, the oases should not be places of amusement, but life fountains that would allow us to live in the desert in spite of the eventual impossibility of our reconciliation with it. No details are given to us about what such a desert might contain or imply. The author does not capitulate before any destructive reality, not worthy of figur-

ing in world history. Instead of this, she draws our attention towards the inexhaustible potentials of human capacities even if submerged in cultural trash.

The loss of stable criteria or the question of traditional values is therefore a mere process that is inherent to modernity. We should learn how to handle it. Such a loss can be solved neither by old time's nostalgia nor by the arbitrary adoption of new criteria. In this context, the author draws our attention towards the risks of ignoring the historical dimension or of subsuming it under social or psychological sciences. This means that she pledges to bestow us with all the instruments to cross the desert, either in the dark times of totalitarian regimes, or in the times of confusing lights and noises of the post-war.

The blank platform of what we may call the zero degree of politics can also be seen *ex negativo*. The banality of evil circulates as a marked expression ever since the Eichmann report as the configuration of any insignificant administrative worker, as a depersonalized function of a bureaucratic state. We should yet go further than the problematic of state machinery, totalitarian or democratic, and question the crumbling of all presuppositions of civility, of culture. This leads us to the mentioned desertification of the world in-between. Such a desertification, with its subsequent sand storms, becomes possible when the human being gives up the claim of stopping in order to think, to unfold him- or herself into perspectives corresponding to points of view which are strange to him or her, to engage him- or herself in conceptual operations which should have as an object a reality basis. The transition from the invisible realm, where the problems are formulated in full awareness about the limitations of one's own perspectives, to the space of appearance where in each moment the interactive possibilities are played out, such a transition has to do, in our way of reading H. Arendt's thought, with the non linear paths of achieving liberty.

These paths can only be fulfilled out of a reserve fund of reflection and memory, of a conscientious exercise in thinking and willing as a critical, so to say, "proto-communicative" attitude. In the afterword of the first volume of *Life of the Mind (Thinking)*, the author admits the intention of putting together in a next volume analysis of the will and the faculty of judging. One comes to judgments, as she wrote in the notes that she left for that volume, neither by deduction nor by induction, but by a process in search of a kind of "silent sense" analogue to the aesthetic conscientiousness and as a result

of a “peculiar talent” (Arendt 1999, 237) that could only be practiced, not taught – as a path than only can be made by walking. Judgment, as she asserts, deals with particularities and forces the thinking self to return to the world of appearances and to develop a special endowment to deal with it, using History in its etymologic sense, which means researching in order to tell how it has been.

We are now able to understand why what we call the “zero degree of politics” may never be found in the lack of reflection that leads to a blind obedience by a functionary, or confines an *animal laborans* to a cyclical, conditioned existence. While lack of reflection obliterates any political potentialities, such a zero degree dwells, as a form of latent interaction, in each individual who should not only be able to communicate his or her judgment about a problem that he or she might face, but also to act according to the circumstances. In other words, while the *faculty* of judging would be a common endowment to all human beings, the *possibility* of acting would have to be repeatedly formulated from the start, taking account of the virtualities of adaptation of judgments to a constantly changing reality.

The criteria of judgment are based upon experience. Such experience is reported by the five senses, by action in the in-between space and by the exchange of memories. Latest is made possible by reading, writing and correspondence. It is not by chance that the *Denktagebuch*, published in 2002, shows us the author’s practice of a silent dialogue of the individual with him- or herself and with authors of the philosophical and literary tradition, so to say in a movement of a rocking chair, used by Arendt to speculate and think, but interrupted by the movement of getting up from the chair and sitting at the table in order to write a letter or an essay. She always typed her texts directly on the machine, without using a previous, manual written version.

Besides the hundreds of pages with notes of the *Denktagebuch*, Arendt left us a huge amount of letters to the persons around her: Martin Heidegger, Karl Jaspers, Heinrich Blücher, Mary McCarthy, Hermann Broch and Kurt Blumenfeld. All notes and letters can also be seen as an in-between space, where one can measure and judge what is revealed and what is concealed. The recognition of such space and the achievement of practices of interaction and dialogue presuppose an in-between time, which does not care about the immediacy of modern life but shows itself as being indispensable in order to articulate thinking, willing and judging with worldly action.

Articulating means mediation between the instances of thinking and acting, in the simultaneous conscience of their contingency. In this sense, Arendt's understanding (against masculine producing effects, as mentioned above) is a kind of "reconciliation in action", as she writes in the *Denktagebuch* (Arendt 2002, 315). Reconciliation means therefore opening oneself to the world, because there is no other world besides this one. In this sense, we could reformulate the Pascalian question about the use of having faith, for our times, as W.H. Auden put it – and H. Arendt quotes it at the beginning of her volume about thinking: "Does God ever judge us by appearances? I suspect that he does".

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INTELLECTUALS AND THE MEDIA

RITA FIGUEIRAS

In the beginning of 2010, soon after releasing a book called *Axolotl Roadkill*,¹ the 17-year-old German author Helene Hegemann was accused of plagiarizing from a blogger's book,² but instead of causing embarrassment the author was surprised. In an interview with the German newspaper *Der Spiegel*³ she said "I can't understand what all the fuss is all about" and in her defence regarding accusations of plagiarism she claimed: "there is no such thing as originality anyway, there's only authenticity".

According to the net-generation mentality, epitomized in this young author, if everything has already been said, originality is a fallacy and legitimacy resides in authenticity.⁴ According to this perspective, an author's

¹Helene Hegemann's *Axolotl Roadkill* was published in the beginning of 2010 by Ullstein publishing house, one of the largest publishers in Germany. Two weeks after the novel was released, the publishing house had already printed 100,000 copies. In February, in the major critical moment of this literary scandal, the book was second place on the German bestsellers lists and it was also short-listed in the best fiction category of the Leipzig Book Fair. Sources: "Helene Hegemann, the art of cut and paste" by Dirk Pilz, <http://goo.gl/3OL1Z> (accessed October 2, 2010); "Did the New Star of German Literature Steal from a Blogger?" by Tobias Rapp, <http://goo.gl/TKDPq> (accessed October 2, 2010); "Author, 17, Says It's 'Mixing', Not Plagiarism" by Nicholas Kulish, <http://goo.gl/MztNN> (accessed October 2, 2010); "The Free-Appropriation Writer" by Randy Kennedy, <http://goo.gl/vGv48> (accessed October 2, 2010).

²Helene Hegemann plagiarized mainly from *Strobo*, a novel by Airen published in 2009 by Sukultur, a small publishing house in Berlin. "Helene Hegemann, the art of cut and paste" by Dirk Pilz, <http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/article/188711-helene-hegemann-art-cut-and-paste> (accessed October 2, 2010); "Did the New Star of German Literature Steal from a Blogger?" by Tobias Rapp, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/zeitgeist/0,1518,678165,00.html> (accessed October 2, 2010); "Author, 17, Says It's 'Mixing', Not Plagiarism" by Nicholas Kulish, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/12/world/europe/12germany.html> (accessed October 2, 2010); "The Free-Appropriation Writer" by Randy Kennedy, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/28/weekinreview/28kennedy.html?_r=1&ref=europe (accessed October 2, 2010).

³Tobias Rapp, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/zeitgeist/0,1518,678165,00.html> (accessed October 2, 2010).

⁴Excluding the legal debate and dimension of copyrighting, for a long time now, in different perspectives and theoretical backgrounds, there is a vast literature addressing the

creativity is revealed through authenticity. Creativity is expressed in the way one approaches an existing text, in the way the text is reorganized. From a different order in a distinct context, a “new” text is born. Profoundly shaped by one’s subjectivity, reconfiguration is always unique and that is each author’s distinguished signature.

This “remix culture” emerging out of the new generations has nevertheless been legitimized by several traditional cultural instances, whose reputation and business have always been based on the economy of creativity, on the principle of originality and on a different definition of authorship. The publishing house, a reputable one, did not remove the book from the market after the scandal; the book was nominated for a literary book prize, in the category of best fictional writing at Leipzig’s book fair, and through this process the book became a bestseller.

In this era of users producing content and sharing – two of the main seductive and widely promoted characteristics of social networks – this episode illustrates this new trend well and adds to the debate surrounding *blogs*, *Wikipedia* and *YouTube* contents created by individuals without the credentials and intellectual background to validate what they produce. Within this discussion, a set of questions on the cultural consequences of these new practices, especially concerning the authority of knowledge, has been raised. If anyone, regardless of his or her knowledge, can collaborate with these social networks, what place is reserved for the specialist and intellectual knowledge?

In this paper, entitled *Intellectuals and the Media*, the social and culture-wide reconfiguration that has been taking place in contemporary society is debated. These changes have been framing the loss of relevance of intellectuals as well as their disappearance from the media. The paper proceeds as follows: in the first section, I wish to analyze the concept of the intel-

interconnections among the concepts of authenticity, originality, individuality, identity and authorship, such as: Schwarz, Hillel. 1998. *The Culture of the Copy*; Coombe, Rosemary. 1998. *The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties: Authorship, Appropriation, and the Law*; Randall, Marilyn. 2001. *Pragmatic plagiarism: Authorship, Profit, and Power*; Macfarlane, Robert. 2007. *Plagiarism and originality in nineteenth-century literature*; Vicinus, Martha and Caroline Eisner. 2008. *Originality, Imitation, and Plagiarism: Teaching Writing in the Digital Age*; Blum, Susan. 2009. *My Word!: Plagiarism and College Culture*; Boon, Marcus. 2010. *In Praise of Copying*; Perloff, Marjorie. 2010. *Unoriginal Genius: Poetry by Other Means in the New Century*.

lectual and its changes throughout time, and in the second, the media demotic rendered through the growing presence of the *vox populi* in the public sphere, and the increasing invisibility of intellectuals as a consequence, is addressed. I end by debating how the invisibility of traditional intellectuals in present-day Western society may be seen as a consequence of the “melting powers” of modernity (Bauman 2000, 6).

Melting power

Intellectuals: from legislators to interpreters and facilitators

According to Bauman (2000), modernity has instituted its own model by substituting traditional society’s structure, while the contemporary era of modernity has been characterized by dismantling the modern project without replacing it with any other. Within this context modern institutions such as the church, the family, the nation-state, the political parties, and the education system are collapsing and may be seen as “zombie categories”, as Ulrich Beck calls some dimensions of modernity, dead and yet still alive in contemporary society (in Bauman 2000, 6).

Relevant works on intellectuals in present-day Western society are a good example of Beck’s expression: *The last intellectuals* by Russell Jacoby; *Public Intellectuals: a history of decline* by Richard Posner and *Where have all the intellectuals gone?* by Frank Furedi. Bridging decline, disappearance, and extinction, these titles illustrate well the non-optimistic tone of the debate surrounding the topic.

The epithet “intellectual” was initially created to offend men of letters heading a press campaign against the French state over the “Dreyfus Affair” (1898). Since then, the term has been associated with controversial individuals imbued with a spirit of public culture and critical participation in society. By publishing his famous article *J’Accuse*, in the newspaper *L’Aurore*, Émile Zola is one of the first examples of the relationship between the figure of the intellectual – characterized by independence, knowledge and critical spirit – and public intervention through the media (Debray 1979; Carey 1992; Jacoby 2000; Posner 2004).

Throughout times, these attributes have given visibility, prestige, credibility, and respectability to intellectuals, leading authors such as Gramsci

(in the early 1930s), Mannheim (1936) or Foucault (1980) to an informed discussion as to the relevant role of intellectuals in disseminating ideas and the formation of knowledge. However, society nowadays is very different from the years when each respective author wrote about intellectuals and it is even further set apart from those times when the reputation of the public thinkers was conquered.

The invisibility of intellectuals in the media and in public life is also the corollary of other social changes, such as the growth of relativism and specialization, as well as of the professionalization of academic life (Baumann 1987; Gagon 1988; Bourdieu 1989; Giroux 1995; Smith and Weber 1997; Posner 2004; Furedi 2005). Specialization, which is detectable in an ever more fragmented and narrower knowledge, and the professionalization of intellectual life by academy expansion also led academic intellectuals to centre themselves increasingly on their careers, and keep busy with multiple bureaucratic tasks.

In this process, the already mentioned traditional intellectual attributes of independence, autonomy, public intervention and universality of thought were compromised and led, according to Bauman (1987), to the loss of their role as cultural “legislators” to assume a more modest role as “interpreters” of culture. Invested in their role as legislators, intellectuals used to make authoritative statements. On several occasions, they were not appreciated, either because they were considered subversive, dangerous or naysayers, but they were always respected and asked to participate in public debate. Some of these intellectuals tended to have a difficult relationship with the *status quo*, even while some represented the dominant power(s) – the ideologists and apologists –, whom Gramsci (1983) called “organic intellectuals”.

The transformation of knowledge into “knowledges” also compromised the status of intellectuals, and their erudition started to be seen as a point of view without any given relevance to society. Simultaneously, the increase in specialization started to discourage a wider perspective on subjects and to privilege the particular and the concrete. In the role of post-modern interpreters, intellectuals have become communication “facilitators”, some of whom have been converted into media celebrities.

For many authors (Debray 1979; Baumann 1987; Bourdieu 1989; Said 1994; Louw 2001; Posner 2004; Furedi 2005; Chaplin 2007; Fleck et al.

2009; McKee 2002), changes do not lead just to a variation in scale regarding being an intellectual, but to a structural redefinition of the concept. According to Eric Louw (2001, 13) and Alan McKee (2002, 221), nowadays there are new kinds of “intellectuals” deriving from communication and popular culture, such as television producers, screenplay writers or publicists. These authors view themselves as intellectuals by highlighting the growing power of these media professions and emphasizing their role in defining, producing and disseminating public knowledge. This perspective, besides reflecting un-sacred knowledge trends, emphasizes the media’s relevance and social influence in contemporary societies, just as intellectuals did in the past.

The transformation happening in the cultural sphere, built both on the growing relevance of the media and the devaluation of knowledge and of those who know, the intellectuals and experts, is also reflected in government education policies enacted in several Anglo-American countries, in Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, France⁵ or Portugal.

Education oriented to personal and intellectual growth has been substituted by an education policy in which the tension between the “old” and “new” “knowledges” is expressed. The political project to guarantee wider access and success in school can be seen as representing a continuous decrease in the levels of demand and quality and by increasingly despising cultural heritage and over-rating “reality” (Furedi 2005 and 2009; Vieira 2009 and 2010).

An episode that occurred in Portugal in 2003 illustrates well the polemic surrounding the education reform ideology in which the favouring of materials related to everyday life elbows aside the reading of the classics and erudite knowledge (Vieira 2009 and 2010). The reality TV show *Big Brother’s* regulations were included in one of the schoolbooks from one of the most reputed Portuguese publishing house in the field. In the textbook, students were asked to comment in class on the television show according to what they knew about the program, and then to write a “technical opinion” about *Big Brother’s* rules and regulations. This exercise raised

⁵“Entre les murs” (Class) directed by Laurent Cantet and “La journée de la jupe” (The day of the skirt), directed by Jean-Paul Lilienfeld, are French movies, released in 2008, that had huge visibility. Both addressed real events regarding teacher authority in terms of both knowledge and discipline in French high schools.

such public indignation from teachers to experts that the publishing house removed that specific exercise from the textbook.⁶

According to Furedi (2009, xi), in a time where education is the flagship of all governments and lifetime learning is valued – presented as the land of new opportunities –, this translates into one of the biggest paradoxes of the contemporary era: the more society values education, the less schools and universities demand of their students.

Icing Power

The media: from the cult of the expert to the cult of the *vox populi*

For commercial reasons, television has suffered a significant social transformation from a rational and civic enlightening sphere to an entertaining and demotic space, leading to “the increasing visibility of the ordinary person” (Turner 2009, 2).⁷ Umberto Eco’s (1985) concepts of “Paleo-TV” and “Neo-TV” help understand this change from television as a civic cultivation space to a space of affective sociability. Television started out conceived as a debating space for public issues, structured on a formal relationship, hierarchized and built into distance between specialists and the audience. Two different kinds of examples, from Portugal and France, convey this role well.

“If I remember well” (1969-1975), led by Vitorino Nemésio, and “Images of European Poetry” (1969-1974), presented by David Mourão-Ferreira

⁶LUSA, “PCP pede explicações ao ministro da Educação sobre manuais escolares do 10.º ano”, *Público*, December 3, 2003. http://www.publico.pt/Educação/pcp-pede-explicacoes-ao-ministro-da-educacao-sobre-manuais-escolares-do-10o-ano_1177583?all=1 (accessed October 2, 2010); “Big Brother retirado do manual escolar”, *Correio da Manhã*, December, 6. <http://www.cmjornal.xl.pt/detalhe/noticias/nacional/portugal/big-brother-retirado-do-manual-escolar> (accessed October 2, 2010).

⁷In Turner’s view, the turn towards the media demotic is systematically demonstrated by the reality TV programmes, such as *Big Brother* or *Idols*; however, nowadays ordinary people have turned themselves into media content through diversified content and media. “From the *vox pops* in news bulletins to the celebrity that comes with participation in reality TV, from calling up your local talk radio host to competing for stardom in *Idol*, from posting your favorite images on Facebook to becoming one of the notorious Web “cam-girls” – the possibilities of media visibility seem endless (Turner 2009, 1).

ra, were two weekly programs broadcast on the Portuguese state television channel, RTP. The authors were both Portuguese intellectuals (poet, author, professors in the Faculty of Arts at the University of Lisboa and members of the Academy of Sciences of Lisboa), and in both programs several topics related to erudite culture were discussed for an audience addressed directly, as if delivering a lecture.

The second example comes from France. *Les Télé-clubs* were created in 1952 by the French state broadcasting television channel, TF1, and were produced for schoolchildren, but also adults, and targeted mainly rural areas. The success of the show extended its concept to other countries, including Great Britain, Italy, Japan (Chaplin 2007, 19), and Portugal.

All these programs were conceived as civic debate promoters both for educating and working. However, for commercial reasons television was converted into an emotional “proximity place” (Mehl 2002) by transferring itself to a living room, a garden bench, a doctor’s office and its waiting room. Television started to centre itself on ordinary citizens, valuing him/her and legitimizing his/her ways of expression and interests, creating an open cultural arena, accessible and intelligible to all. Throughout this process, the privatization of the public sphere and the private sphere’s increased publicizing was verified.

“Neo-TV” started to devalue experts and value the instant popularity of ordinary people to the detriment of artistic talent or intellectual work. This is what talent shows, such as *Idols*,⁸ are telling society by giving viewers the power to choose the winners without needing to know anything about what is being judged, and therefore overriding the panel of experts.

Hence, the mainstream media, one of the most relevant institutions sponsoring the emergence and social affirmation of intellectuals in the past, seem now an accomplice in the disappearance of this knowledge elite. They are ever more distant from expressions of high culture and complexity of thought, and increasingly centred on superficial debate and on *vox populi*. Anchored in emotion, spectacle, speed, shallowness, (Gitlin 2007;

⁸The entertainment show “*Idols*” is one of the most popular transnational television formats in 21st century television history. It started in Britain as “*Pop Idol*” in 2001, but soon after its format was exported to Australia, Malaysia, the US, Brazil, Belgium, Canada, Norway, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Pan-Arabia, Portugal and Spain.

Patterson 2010), these attributes “grew, however, from this kind of specific application to the point where the label of tabloidization was expanded to cover a broad-based cultural movement, that was not only evident in media forms but also in the wider culture” (Turner 2009, 28).

In this social context, throughout this ascendant trajectory of media-pop culture in several Western countries, it is easy to find examples that illustrate this trend: the intellectualization of football, television personalities becoming university teachers (and some raised to the status of authors), and the promotion of Twitter and Facebook to official sources for quality media, such as *New York Times*, CNN or BBC newscasts.

At the same time, the *tabloidization* of cultural institutions also represents a growing trend. Academics popularize their work in order to reach an uninterested audience; schools decrease their levels of demand and quality so as not to compromise universal education; newspapers popularize themselves in order to guarantee audience share and financial survival; publishing houses invest in hyped themes and authors, compromising book quality and the status of erudition and authorship.

According to Andrew Keen (2007), the Internet is amplifying this phenomenon, as already illustrated by the example from Helene Hegemann. For this author, the Internet is one of the main factors responsible for the loss of relevance of erudite culture, knowledge, and as well as for the eminent ruin of its modes of expression, like books or newspapers. For Keen, the positive aspects of the Internet do not prevent technology from destroying culture and its business models.

Further to this point, French philosopher and sociologist Gilles Lipovetsky in *World Culture* states that “going to the web to obviate lack of knowledge and by being too occupied in living in the present time to cultivate a not immediate culture, human beings from hyper-modernity tend to lose the notion of perspective, but also the shared base of shared knowledge, which is culture” (Lipovetsky 2009, 98). And the author continues: “the absence of structuring cultural pillars and the existence of easy-to-find abundant knowledge is reflected in a lack of ability to hierarchize information”.⁹

⁹Unless otherwise noted, all translations in this article are the author’s own.

Conclusion

I have tried to highlight the wider cultural reconfiguration that is happening in contemporary society. It argues that the institutions that endorsed the emergence and prestige of intellectuals are those that are currently contributing most to the decline, disappearance, and, who knows, potential extinction of intellectuals. Through a logic of cultural and social liquidity, modern institutions are collapsing – melting in Bauman’s words (2000, 6) – and authorities of knowledge, such as intellectuals and their type of thought, may no longer be adequate to the emerging liquid institutions.

As I have shown, education, governments and the media, dealing with their own liquidity, are redefining themselves, changing their values and practices and simultaneously valuing kinds of knowledge and thought, namely the *vox populi*, different from that offered by intellectuals. Everyday citizen living experiences posed as a certain kind of expertise are increasingly being valued by society’s main institutions.

This tendency can be explained by exploring one of the most esteemed values of the cultural rhetoric of Western societies: the abstract equality between individuals (Wolton 1999) that is taken to its extreme by promoting *vox populi* and by attributing it the same level as the “voice” of experts. Having said that, this cultural turn is also contributing to the *intellectual malaise* (Furedi 2005, 102) that characterizes contemporary societies. Using Bauman’s metaphors, this may be seen as the infiltrations corroding some of the foundations of Western culture, such as erudite knowledge, reflection, intellectual and specialist status, authorship, knowledge hierarchies, and the levels of demand and quality that society demands of itself.

If between “equality” and “distinction” (Bourdieu 1989) the latter is renounced by society in the name of one of the most esteemed values regarding Western societies’ cultural rhetoric and all voices are valued equally, there is, at least, one question that must be raised: when everybody is speaking, who is listening?

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FROM A CULTURE OF SEPARATION TO A SEPARATION OF CULTURES: AND NOW?

JOÃO CARAÇA

The intellectual strength of modernity springs from the surprising capacity and robustness of “separation” as a method of analysis of natural phenomena. Starting with the invention of linear perspective (which clearly separates the object from the observer, the subject) and the development of new critical cultural and experimental trends, a new worldview took form. This worldview, “geometrical” in character, stemmed from the search for symmetries in nature which, in themselves, conceal principles of invariance that in turn lead to the formulation of laws for the natural world. The use of instruments, namely the “camera obscura” – which enabled the separation of light from vision, and the deployment of the printing press – against the general background of growing trade and business activities related to oceangoing navigation, led to the separation of a private sphere within what until then was considered the public domain – that of (agrarian) society. The Reformation initiated the separation of the state from the church and “matter” naturally followed this path, becoming separated from “mind” during the following century. The 19th and the 20th centuries saw further drivers of separation – economy and society; home and work; science and technoscience; i.e. the separation impetus has promoted a “macedoine” of cultures with no clear cut future direction: and with a loss of purpose for human endeavour.

In fact, the triumph of modernity, which was based on the introduction of a symbolic language (mathematics) to represent nature (enabling the separation of beings from rules, objects from models, ontology from epistemology) has turned into a cognitive crisis where the sense of anguish, short-termism, oppression and insecurity are rampant. The fade-out in daily language and concerns of concepts like nature, science, universals and sovereignty, and the pre-eminence of new notions (yet to be fully understood) like environment, knowledge (as with the knowledge-economy), global and governance, as their substitutes, unveiled a world filled with uncertainty and complexity to astonished westerners.

If uncertainty is clearly not a new subject, requiring responses that create redundancies (which mean more expenditure), thinking about the future and defining a strategy (which may appear as a waste of resources to common sense), a complex world brings about a complete confrontation in terms of values and perceptions with that hitherto perceived as reality. This is because what complexity really means is the impossibility of separating the system from its context, the object from the measuring instrument, the living being from its environment. Either we invent a new mathematics to deal with complexity or we are severely hampered in our capacity of understanding that going on. Thus, a crisis has developed.

This crisis merged with the intrinsic crises of the modern world-system (based on the operation of markets, in particular financial) and amplified them in our corner of the world, by tying them to the systematic mechanisms of structural change in the world economy which will occur in this century (on the 2030 horizon).

Many disruptive factors are clearly discernible among Western societies: (i) a major weakening of existing institutions; (ii) a major, wide reaching and long lasting war for resources; (iii) a possible fading-out of higher-education systems due to fiercely competitive mechanisms; (iv) a possible new techno-economic paradigm implemented (for the first time in history) by a non-Western country; (v) the emergence of a new set of unchecked values: no longer “transform nature” but “live together”, especially challenging if deployed under non-democratic principles.

The answer to the crisis must therefore be cultural: from the ashes of the culture of modernity and its geometrical worldview we have to be able to (re)create a culture that embraces both the ethics and aesthetics of “interrogation” (of self, of society and of the universe) leading to a socially and environmentally accountable cooperative economy, supported by rules for the common good and new institutions at world level. Only with a planetary culture based on the “recognition” of the values of diversity and identity will this century become brighter again. We must let new ontologies flower. And cherish the new mathematics that will replenish the holes left by greed and hubris, opening up new avenues onto the future.

THE LAST PARADIGM? DELIBERATE VISIONS ON A SUSTAINABLE WORLD

GASTON MESKENS

Introduction – Sustainably clearing up conceptual fog

What is the purport of global politics around global challenges within the framework of sustainable development today? It does not need thorough and in-depth research to conclude that global negotiations on how to tackle serious issues such as climate change, poverty, environmental degradation and unsustainable production and commodity consumption have made little to no progress during the last decades. The first reason for this might indeed be called “situational”, as it is obviously very difficult to “turn the tide” of the dynamics of a set of interlinked processes that function according to their own rationalities. Global politics recognises that the world has become more complex, and that the challenges mentioned, multifaceted in themselves, are essentially emergences of the complexity of the dynamics and inter-linkages of these global socio-economic processes. Taking into account declarations such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Agenda 21,¹ one can say that our society has made progress in developing and formulating *ideas* about what needs to be done. These ideas are ethically grounded as they typically (and rightly) refer to fundamental values such as human equity and the value of nature, but also in the way they refer to more modern “organisational” values such as transparency and fair play in politics and the market economy. Guided by these ethics, while faced with the observed or expected malaises, one could wonder why deliberations on what would be the right thing to do remain deadlocked over conflicting rationalities or, in the best case scenario, in

¹Agenda 21 is a comprehensive plan of action to be taken globally, nationally and locally by organizations of the United Nations system, governments, and major groups in every area in which human beings impact on the environment. See <http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/agenda21/>.

vague (re)formulations of non-binding commitments. Is it only political self-interest to blame or is there more at stake?

The adagio goes that interest groups (nation states, private sectors, cultural communities, etc.) would need to “show political will” by putting the higher interest first and then seek to maintain their integrity consistent with (or despite) the policies and measures that would serve this higher interest. Everybody would agree that this is an extremely difficult exercise. In contemporary arenas, however, the complexity of the challenges faced is *only* perceived as that of a thorny political exercise of negotiating trade-offs between conflicting interests in the social-economic-ecological playing field. In this arena, politics only focuses on negotiating socioeconomic incentives and disincentives at the level of the practices under investigation, but deny the fact that the reference knowledge used to motivate argumentations in these negotiations tends to be ill-considered or strategically mediated already in itself. In deliberating what to do, actors seek to protect their integrity and their search for evidence to stimulate what to do is troubled by the search for evidence to motivate the maintenance of their own integrity. The reference knowledge used to motivate both argumentations is thereby typically mediated into “thin rationalisations” that undermine the quality of the debate. One can observe that, in the face of cognitive and axiological complexity, political actors strategically “talk next to each other”, as they avoid jointly scrutinising references for consent and dissent and refrain from critically assessing proclaimed mutual understandings of each other’s interests. Open debate about realities is to a large extent semantic and conceptual discourse aiming only at maintaining actor integrities instead of clarifying uncertainties and ambiguities. The result is that trust, in essence the prime quality criterion of political deliberation, in itself also needs to be negotiated. And, beyond semantics, this seems to be a lost cause in any case.

I state this tendency as a second reason why deliberations do not result in significant practical progress. It would be a mistake to think that conflicting values unambiguously relate to conflicting interests. Before a socio-political society can see *how interests really conflict*, it should be prepared to “clear up conceptual fog at the knowledge-policy interface”. It can do this by also engaging in “negotiations of meaning” and in reflections on what we can and *cannot* know and should and *should not need* to know with respect to a particular issue.

With the previous consideration in mind, my intention is to present a reflection on the need for a new politics of and for sustainable development, and shall do this in a rationale that develops in two sections. The first takes a critical look at how sustainable development is understood and tackled today, and focuses on issues that, each in their own way, represent specific challenges to understanding, using and instrumentalising the principle of sustainable development. While taking into account their rather “philosophical” nature, the relevance of these issues is recognised as such in academic and informed civil society circles, one can also observe that they do not feature prominently on the political agenda. A second section makes some key considerations on what I understand as these new politics.² They can best be described as “advanced deliberate approaches” to policy supportive of knowledge generation and subsequent decision making in face of the socioeconomic and ecological challenges nowadays tackled under the rationale of sustainable development. While this description may seem too vague and too general, it becomes more specific with the basic premise that underpins this view, namely that the quality of governance essentially depends on the quality of the working of the knowledge-policy interface.

In the general context of agreeing on what development should be in order for it to be called “sustainable”, the global political community would in principle need to make a fundamental choice: it could continue the debate by “bargaining over conflicting evidences”, or engage in more deliberate approaches to knowledge generation in order to “better” deal with cognitive factors (uncertainty, ambiguity, complexity) and axiological factors (values, identities, abstract “ideological” references) in political decision making. In practice, this would mean that, within the context of a specific theme or issue, the arenas of negotiations that face these cognitive and axiological factors would be prepared to engage in deliberate generations of (what I call) “critical consensus knowledge”, and this as an intermediate phase preceding traditional negotiations on policy options. Critical consensus knowledge does not converge on “truths”, but integrates scientific facts and ideas, observations, discourse and reference with the outcome of joint

²The views presented in this paper are based on the research programme performed by the author under the title “The Reflexive Knowledge Society” (v. <http://www.theacademia.org>).

reflections on the *usability* of those facts, ideas, observations, discourses and references and on the *motivation* of actors to bring these “knowledges” into the debate.

I state that, in the absence of a rational link between “normative ethics and pragmatic architectures” in the context of designing fair and effective sustainable development governance policies, building trust in negotiating the way forward can only be done through these deliberate and advanced approaches, as they constitute in themselves “the possibility to generate trust”. I call a socio-political society that makes these approaches work a “reflexive knowledge society”. The conditions for a reflexive knowledge society to “happen” are twofold and simple in principle: they are set “in the academy” and need to be enabled in the Agora around the governance negotiation arena. Today, there is no excuse for the academy not organising applied research and reflection in transdisciplinary inclusive settings for the sake of global governance of/for sustainable development. Neither is there any excuse for political delegations and civil society not to enable and stimulate “dialogues” – in the sense of concrete reflexive and transparent knowledge generation settings – in global negotiation processes. These settings by themselves would not generate pragmatic architectures, but at least “liberate” actors from the pressure of choosing between references to ethics on the one hand and proposals for pragmatic architectures on the other hand. This kind of “capacity building” for reflexive and transparent knowledge generation is, in a way, the most important responsibility of all actors involved, and is also the only one key responsibility that is shared without differentiation.

A critical assessment of sustainable development – thinking

1. Sustainable development appropriations

The concept of sustainable development is, as a policy principle, some 40 years old. While its main understanding was still connected to “environmental protection” at the time of the first World Summit on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the second World Summit saw a shift towards a more humanitarian approach, with poverty eradication and

equity at the centre of concerns. At the same time, sustainability gained a last, new connotation. Instead of denoting *a limiting factor on* development, it came to be understood as *a positive quality of* development. The basis of this positive vision was the understanding that the organisation of economy, ecology or social systems cannot be tackled in isolation. The famous “three-pillar” approach to sustainable development persists in supporting sustainable development policies through to today. Henceforth, it was only a small step to starting to use “sustainability” as a quality touchstone for (or the necessary condition of) policies that had the ambition to tackle socio-economic challenges taking into account their context and interconnection. The concept of “sustainability assessment” was born (see for example (Gibson 2005)). As expected, together with this ambition came the obvious question of how sustainability can and should be understood, and how it can be used as a guiding principle and be translated into concrete policies that, in turn, are amenable to “testing” in terms of their effectiveness after implementation.

Today, the adjective “sustainable” is used to characterise a “wanted” quality for virtually every possible, imaginable human activity, from the original policy context related to energy, environment, and production & consumption to tourism, cities, families, cars, livelihoods, health care, design, leadership, sports, buildings, value chains and dance clubs. This trend is no sign of a democratisation or effective instrumentalisation of the concept. The proliferation of appropriations of the concept, and the tendency to stretch the characteristic from the narrowest to the broadest all-embracing areas of human activity make “sustainability” a paradigm that can remain forever, but this tendency makes it at the same time hollow and essentially meaningless. Furthermore, the observation that in most of these popular-cultural appropriations, no attempt is made to rationalise the link between the sustainability of the activity on the one hand and the overall paradigm of sustainable development on the other hand, one could also note the absence of a usable set of criteria and indicators to “test” the sustainability of these specific practices bottom-up.

2. Questioning growth

The least one can say is that, thus far, sustainability has an ambivalent meaning, as it denotes both “stability” or “continuity”, as well as the idea of “progress”. One could say that the meaning of what needs to be “con-

tinued” under the banner of sustainability has shifted throughout modern history. The scheme in Figure 1 aims to suggest this by identifying four “periods” marked by a specific vision on the economic and related political challenges to tackle in the interest of preserving the environment and humanity as such.




Figure 1 – Four phases of understanding sustainability

Reading the scheme from the top downwards, the second phase came with industrialisation and the third with economic globalisation. While the original meaning of continuity (denoting stability in the sense of protecting the integrity of local communities) was typical for pre-industrialised cultures, it was the very modern development through industrialisation and economisation that, based on the raised awareness for the “limits to growth”, resulted in another understanding of the meaning of continuity. The rising awareness of the human impact on the ecosystem made scientists, analysts and policy makers connect the notions of stability and continuity to the societal “collective well-being”, taking into account the limits of our planet, both in terms of resources and capacity of recovery from environmental impact. That stance inspired a rethinking of the relationship between man and nature, but the approach was essentially pragmatic, as environmental impact assessment was about anticipating and avoiding the higher costs of restoring the negative impact of practices; the first conceptions of

sustainable development spoke of anticipating and avoiding development that would lead to the complete exhaustion of “resources” (including the earth’s recovery capacity).

The third phase describes the world today, in its continuing economic globalisation. The focus is on development, or more precisely, on the need to continue development. Based on the classical view of seeing economic growth as a measure for the “well-being” of a socioeconomic society, development is thereby understood in the sense of “progress” and, more concretely still, in the sense of “growth”. In the vision of, for example, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), sustainability is a means to the end of economic growth. In the introduction of (OECD 2001), it is noted that “... without sustainable practices, economic growth can also lead to excessive degradation of natural and social resources. Governments face the complex challenge of finding the right balance between the competing demands on natural and social resources, without sacrificing economic progress (...)”. According to this rationale, the responsibility of our socioeconomic society is thus to make sure that specific sub-practices are sustainable in order to ensure “proper” economic growth. Although the previous language suggests that national political authorities have prime responsibility here, the logic is extended by suggesting that the capacity to ensure the sustainability of practices can in principle be created within the economy itself: “As levels of material welfare have increased, so have opportunities for addressing a range of unmet social and environmental concerns and the abilities of societies to adapt to adverse impacts (...)” (*ibid.*).

Obviously not everyone believes in growth. It is known that the above described paradigm that connects sustainable development to economic development (in a “means-ends” rationale, with the first as a condition to ensure the second) has been questioned throughout modern history. The Club of Rome report “The Limits to Growth” proclaimed the idea of “zero growth” and can be considered the first international systematic and scientifically underpinned study that links economic growth with environmental degradation. The more stringent vision is that of “de-growth”. De-growth-advocates claim that the story of global wealth creation through economic growth is misleading and justify this by questioning the logic of growth as such. The argument is that one does not need meta-ethics to understand that in a closed system (“the finite world”), “winners need los-

ers". In this view, the real problem is productivist capitalism that stimulates overproduction and overconsumption. It is worthwhile noting that many de-growth rationales however reject the idea of sustainable development instead of appropriating it in order to link it to their own view on socio-economic organisation. Ideas on equity and distributive justice (as such essential to de-growth rationales) can, in a conceptual meaning, be connected to a vision on *social* development, but there is apparently no clear view on what the meaning of the adjective "sustainable" would need to be in that case. Up till now, the de-growth rationale has generated little impact on national and global policy discourses and deliberations in the context of sustainable development.

On a global scale in this third phase, throughout the last two decades, the combination of the positive vision on sustainable development (sustainability as a quality of development) on the one hand and the urgent context of enduring poverty and unsustainable production and consumption patterns on the other hand has not really generated the necessary political commitment. The Johannesburg Plan of Implementation³ is generally considered as containing less stringent commitments compared to the original Agenda 21 Document. Only in the pressing atmosphere of the recent climate change debates, one could observe political momentum, as the Stern Report (Stern 2006) restored the old pragmatic motivation for environmental protection with the simple statement (and calculation) that it would be more expensive to restore damage due to climate change than to prevent it. But this pragmatic stance was apparently insufficient to tackle the challenge of "historically shared but differentiated responsibilities" between the developed and the developing world. The failure of the Copenhagen climate change conference in 2009 is said to be due to "too high expectations", and many observers (and politicians) saw this "global policy crisis" as a chance to "rethink the way forward" and find solace in the idea of a "green economy".

The vision for the future (indicated as the "fourth phase" in the scheme above), as for instance presented by the United Nations (UN) in its preparation of the third World Summit on Sustainable Development ("Rio+20"), is that of a fully global socio-economic system working through a green

³V. http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_PD/English/POIToc.htm

economy and with an accelerated poverty eradication policy “to also take the poorest on board”. When it comes to taking care of the environment, the focus would be on “restoration” and especially “adaptation”. Obviously prevention is still a “first principle”, but it would need to be taken up under a new conception of restoration. Many current visions on climate change and biodiversity claim that “we went too far already”, and that we would try to keep what we have now and “adapt”. What would need to be restored is thus not the original natural habitat as such, but the relationship between the human being and his/her natural environment. It is however clear that not everybody finds this an optimistic outlook.

The most important observation however is that in a green economy, the idea of growth seems to persist. In the context of preparing the Rio+20 Summit, the UN stresses on “the centrality of growth”, claiming that “No country, howsoever rich, knows how to live without growth. The modern economic and financial system seems to require growth to maintain full employment and decent social services. Growth is the only sure recipe we have discovered for overcoming global inequality” (Banun 2010). The growth would however need to be different from current patterns of growth and could follow three strategic paths: “MDGplus (accelerate development and focus on the most vulnerable)”, “internalise externalities” and “invest in an alternative growth strategy”. The last strategy is thereby only concretised as a “renewable energy revolution”.

The final question of this reflection on the basis of the scheme above is thus whether a combined policy of a green economy together with an extra effort to take the poorest on board would comply with “sustainable development”. There are reasons to believe that this policy would anyway struggle with those ethical aspects of sustainable development that would necessarily fall outside any reasonable market-regulating framework. This consideration will be taken up again further on in the text.

3. Getting straight on risk-inherent technology

Is governance of technological risk compatible with sustainable development? In contemporary policy discourses related to energy technologies, food production, mobile phones and health care, the notion of “acceptable risk” plays a central role. One can however observe that views differ on *who*

should define and assess what would be the right “level” and character of acceptability of a specific technological risk, and on *how* this justification exercise should be undertaken. The picture becomes even more complex if one tries to relate the rationale on acceptable risk with that of sustainable development. To put it simply, in terms of designing assessment and decision making criteria related to specific risk-inherent technological applications, it is not clear how accepting a specific risk would (needs to) relate to “meeting our needs” and to “not compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs”. Is it sufficient to democratically (“fairly, deliberate and effectively”) justify a technological risk (in light of expected benefits) to rationalise and defend the contribution of the specific technological application to sustainable development, or will long term uncertainties related to potential harm ensure the concepts of risk and sustainability always remain part of a trade-off? Or are they simply incommensurable in both their conceptual meanings and practical hands-on policies?

The issue of technological risk that dominates the actual global political agenda is clearly that of climate change, and the most important strategic framing that undermines the quality of climate change negotiations today is that around the issue of nuclear energy. A simple observation of the history of the negotiations tells us that, since the UN climate change conference in Kyoto in 1997, nuclear energy has never been subject to official discussion in open negotiation sessions. The reason is not the inherent complexity of its risk assessment, but because parties don’t want to discuss it, as there are other state-related interests at play (being the economic (in search of a market position or energy-autonomy) and the military). Apparently, the industry and also its opponents find benefit in sticking to their polarised positions in the Agora’s around climate change negotiations (Meskens 2008). Policy documents such as those generated within the scope of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development processes emphasise the freedom of nation states to consider the use of nuclear and speak of its “conditional acceptance” (safe operation, safe waste management, protection from malevolent use), without going deeper into the complexity of its (democratic) justification. At one point in time, in the UNFCCC process, the concept of “advanced low-carbon technologies” was introduced in the negotiating texts to please both advocates and opponents of nuclear, as anyone could

perceive and use the meaning of the concept in accordance with their own stance on the issue.

The technological risks of fossil fuels and of nuclear technology are essentially incomparable, and therefore the proclaimed contribution of nuclear to combat climate change is as such contested. Even its objective benefit (being a low-carbon energy technology) is subject to controversy, as opponents claim they are seriously underestimated. The real problem is that it is impossible to calculate the total CO₂ emissions generated from the nuclear fuel cycle, which makes it in principle impossible to undertake an impact analysis with the aim of comparing this burden with that of alternative energy technology options. For nuclear energy, CO₂ emissions result from different process stages over the entire fuel cycle. A life-cycle assessment offers the possibility to properly calculate these emissions. However, it shows that estimates of the total CO₂ emissions of the nuclear fuel cycle depend very much on the choices made by scientists when it comes to taking into account technical, practical, social and political factors in the assessment of these process stages (Beerten 2009).

The reason nuclear energy should be openly and formally discussed at climate change negotiations is not to make it accepted or rejected once and forever, but because it exists. Today the nuclear sector benefits from a renaissance that is driven by economic incentives and is apparently “backed” up by growing public support, in spite of the latest disasters in the Japanese nuclear plants. Two critical thoughts can be made here. Given the remaining uncertainties around the real costs of dismantling and waste management, the budgeting of provisions therefore, and consequentially the proclaimed economic incentives, are open for interpretation and narrow framing, which means that, in the end, surplus costs risk “leaking back” from the private to the public sector. Secondly, if public support really exists, then there are reasons to believe that this does not build on a sudden belief in the technology as such, but on a fear of climate change. The justification of risk-inherent technologies such as nuclear faces a cognitive and axiological complexity that brings about a need for specific normative conditions for the working of the science-policy interface. For various reasons, the necessity to engage in reflections on these required conditions is not always acknowledged by the intellectuals and, particularly, by the scientific, industrial and political world. Especially in the nuclear case, deliberate research and policy making is hindered by too many strategically demarcated

non-overlapping comfort zones. After decades of public and political debate, a serious reflection on the contextual justification of nuclear technology is still hijacked in a polarised (and polarising) discourse, characterised by positionism on the basis of (all but not strategically inspired) “simple” narrow pro/contra framing in the broad public and political sphere. In the concrete case of the climate change negotiations, this serious reflection is needed more than ever, and only the UN can organise it and call on parties and civil society to participate.

4. Rationalising the theme-driven governance approach

The most difficult challenge for designing policies under the banner of sustainable development seems to be: how to link the meaning of sustainable development as a meta-working method (holism, integration) and a meta justice principle (equity, solidarity) to a responsible governance approach, or thus to designing, deliberating and implementing specific multi-level thematic and sectorial policies, taking into account their “cross-cutting issues”. It looks as if framing sustainable development into a theme-driven approach (energy, water, food, health, ...) (see Figure 2) is a way out, as it provides a conceptual method to design policy processes that can lead to practical outcomes. This does not mean that meta-reflections would be irrelevant in these cases. Only through “framing”, the connection with meta-levels (such as “the planet” or “overall well-being”) and the connection with other frames (through so-called cross-cutting issues) will become “workable”. Nevertheless, our society still struggles with defining “the right themes”. To give only one example: while “energy” and “biodiversity” have no essential practical issues in common, they both meaningfully overlap with the theme of “sustainable production and consumption of commodities”. In addition, of those three, biodiversity, although an essential concern, seems to be the most unworkable in terms of setting clear goals that can be translated into unambiguous policies and measures. A practical solution would be to drop biodiversity as a theme as such, and “ensure” it within the policies and measures to guide “sustainable production and consumption”. But that, in turn, would overly emphasise the impression that our natural environment is only there at the service of global trade.

For sure, it is worthwhile striving to define the right themes in order to negotiate clear “vertical” (top-down/bottom-up) policies that can be connected to socioeconomic sector responsibilities and that would unveil unambiguous cross-cutting issues to be connected with transversal cross-sectorial policy responsibilities. But even then, it would look as if the social of sustainable development (poverty eradication, education, labour rights) would, as cross-cutting issues, only need to be taken care of to serve the other pillars of sustainable development, being economic development and environmental protection. Which brings us again to the essential question: what does it mean to pragmatically organise a theme-driven approach to sustainable development while ensuring an equal treatment of its three pillars of social development, economic development and environmental protection?




Figure 2 – Framing sustainable development into a theme-driven approach

5. Voluntary committing beyond (or in absence of) the law

The reality of the endless sputtering and wandering political negotiations shows that, as reaching consensus on the *idea* of what would be the

right thing to do under the banner of sustainable development is already utterly difficult, pouring this consensus into binding global law seems to be almost impossible. Nations unite to tackle global problems – caused by specific transnational sectorial activities – to design transnational thematic and sectorial solutions, to be consolidated by international and multilateral binding agreements that would enforce translation into national law. While this sounds like a logic that is “closed” to reasoning, reality is clearly different. Agenda 21 was still ambitious in designing and promoting the advancement of international law with respect to the environment, trade and social aspects, but the character of the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, as with the outcome of the second World Summit, showed clear stagnation in the development of international law in the field of sustainable development (Pallemaerts 2003). The only clear progress made seems to be international trade law. During the negotiations in Johannesburg, an attempt to add to the final text a specification that the principle of “mutual supportiveness” of trade and environment “should be consistent with WTO Principles” was foiled in the last phase. A specification of this kind would in principle have meant nothing less than a subordination of multilateral environmental agreements to international trade law (*ibid.* 210).

While early industrialisation and the expansion of economic activities (“the root of the problems”) happened in the absence of national protection or competition (everybody had the right to “jump on the development train”), global governance now needs to be negotiated and organised by nations that try to protect their national integrity and maximise their competitive position. This “situational complexity” comes on top of the fact that, due to cognitive complexity and essential value-based pluralism, there exist different visions on solutions “within” specific sectorial contexts that are state-independent. The difficulty of designing and implementing international environmental law has not so much to do with issues of protection and competition in principle, but with the fact that the negotiating actors distinctly differ on criteria that have nothing to do with the nature of the problems as such. Thereby, the fact that economic development has been mainly a North/West story is a historic evolution that was not driven by a global strategic plan (although post-colonial critical theorists would put a relevant side note here). Therefore, shared but differentiated responsibilities among developed and developing nations imply a global moral problem, but not a case of guilt.

Still today, opinions differ over whether nation states, as policy actors, are the solution to global problems, or rather represent an additional fundamental methodological problem. While this reflection may be called essential, the issue as such is a topic of discussion in academic and civil society contexts, but obviously not in political debate in the context of the global negotiations. Is there, in relation to the meaning of sustainable development, and taking into account the historic evolution of the political world as a group of nation states, still a rationality to formulate in defence of having the nation states as leading actors of global governance? If not, what would be a realistic alternative in the long term?

The making of citizenship for sustainable development

Today, sustainable development is seen by many policy makers as *the* rational “meta-criterion” to motivate or test specific policies for global problems. Others think the criterion can only *inspire* discussions on governance (and government), taking into account its vague and ambiguous meaning. Last but not least, there are many sceptics who consider the concept flawed as such, as, according to them, it provides a way for autocrats, technocrats and corporate powers to disguise their old habits with a sense of socio-political responsibility. Whatever the view on the concept of sustainable development is, as set out in the introduction, and as hopefully underpinned in the previous part, I state the situational complexity of balancing conflicting interest is not the only reason for the staggering global negotiations under the framework of sustainable development, and claim that, before a socio-political society can see how interests really conflict, it should be prepared to engage in an advanced politics with the aim of “clearing up conceptual fog at the knowledge-policy interface”. As will become clear in the rest of the text, the advancement would need to be found in “new human attitudes” in the way we deal with knowledge (referential, factual and discursive) in socio-political interaction, and the idea of the reflexive knowledge society will be sketched in this sense. However, in the interest of an advanced dealing with sustainable development, two essential focus shifts are needed to enable this reflexive knowledge society “to get to work”: we should rethink the nature of our bare necessities and accept that we have no choice but to “think” anthropocentric.

1. Struggling out of the anthropocentric view

The original Brundtland definition of sustainable development may be said to be driven by a sense of protection and justice (“Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”). Although during the last decades, this definition has inspired many thoughts on the value of our natural habitat, in its essential meaning, the formulation is purely anthropocentric. The value of nature comes in only indirectly, as a mean to preserve the possibility to meet *human* needs. Since then, socio-political discourses have struggled with using the value of nature as a reference in reflections on human responsibility. Is this responsibility to be defined in the spirit of a higher meta-ethics (the value of nature, and the necessary humble position of humans in the order of things) or can it only be “among ourselves”, out of a stance of “deliberate responsible anthropocentrism”?




Figure 3 – Possible references in discourses on the protection of the natural habitat

Thinking in terms of the “acceptable occupation” of nature is reasonable, but it is impossible to force this stance into an eco-centric perspective. Nature has a value as such, but it cannot be regarded as “absolute”,

as we do not know what this would mean, and therefore we cannot use this absolute character as point of reference. The alternative cannot be more than “responsible anthropocentrism” stretched into a perspective of engaged aesthetics beyond ethics (see Figure 3).

2. Rethinking the bare necessities

The bare necessities of early human beings were the same as those of animals: food (including water) and shelter. The early development of living standards was made possible by means of socially organised settlement, agriculture and the use of energy (fire and mechanically generated power). With the progression of “organised living”, energy became the third bare necessity of a civilised society, joining food and shelter (the last now called “housing”). Today, in a society that relies on a complex system of interdependent production processes of goods and services, human bare necessities are no longer food, energy and housing, but the *logistics* to provide food, energy and housing. This counts for developed as well for underdeveloped societies. To push the reasoning further, today “organising logistics” apparently puts a burden on the ecosystem and does not ensure distributive justice in a straightforward way. With the specific unavoidable cognitive uncertainties and the high degree of complexity that characterise current challenges, it appears that different rational views on solutions exist, based on references to different value frameworks. From out of a pragmatic ethics (or ethical pragmatism), one could thus conclude that human bare necessities are not the logistics to provide food, energy and housing, but a *collective interactive intelligence to organise these logistics, and an effective and fair decision making system to produce this intelligence and to implement its findings*. But out of these various value frameworks, not everyone would agree with the last claim.

3. Finding ground in between normative ethics and pragmatic architectures.

In a world wherein the proper designing of socially, economically and ecologically fair and effective policies is complicated by inherent cognitive

uncertainties and value-related pluralisms, politically negotiating the way forward to a large extent comes down to “negotiating meaning”; that is: the meaning of concepts, knowledge and values behind or “in front of” these uncertainties and pluralisms, and in the face of various “contexts of urgency”. Negotiating “meaning” instead of “direct action” can sound unintelligent and irresponsible, given the fact that some of these contexts of urgency, such as poverty and the deterioration of the natural habitat, are, in their harsh reality, clearly visible and for many of us directly tangible. Furthermore, in the case of global problems that become ever more apparent (such as climate change), the needed precautionary action can in principle be easily translated into practical policies “in the real world” (such as emission cuts). Despite these phenomena that require direct action rather than semantic and philosophical reflection, the global political world (supported by science and society) chose to tackle them “all together”, and to make this endeavour guided by the concept of sustainable development. The reason to handle all global problems together is not philosophical but rational, as there is the clear insight that they are all interlinked in various ways. The reason to put them under one guiding reference may also seem rationally driven by a concern with respect to the evolution of the global state of affairs of humanity on the globe, and inspired by a stance of inter-generational justice. The Brundtland report said indeed that “sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. But one does not need to be a historian or a policy analyst to observe that, since then, uncountable views have emerged on what that would mean in practice.

Since the beginning of negotiations over designing policies for sustainable development (such as those under the auspices of the UN Commission on Sustainable Development,⁴) deliberations have been morally grounded by making reference to two general ethical principles that are said to have a fundamental character (in the sense that “nobody can be against”). These principles are human equity and fair play. The general principle of human

⁴The United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) was established by the UN General Assembly in December 1992 to ensure effective follow-up of United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), also known as the Earth Summit. See http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/csd/csd_aboutcsd.shtml.

equity informs in its turn the “derived principles” of (1) inclusion of the (potentially) affected in decision making, (2) intra-generational solidarity as an account towards the weak (the underdeveloped / the poor) and (3) intergenerational solidarity as an account towards future generations. The principle of fair play, on the other hand, traditionally supports a generally acknowledged need for transparency and accountability of authorities and the private sector, based on an understanding that political authorities and markets can (and should never try to) shape their own ethics, but that they have the moral right and duty to take part in the intellectual socio-political debate about them.

In recent decades, numerous useful mechanisms, instruments and architectures in the interest of sustainable development have been suggested by policy makers, academics and consultants, and in their pragmatic approach, most of them seem so “logical” that one could wonder why the global political community does not accept, instrumentalise and implement them right away. A way to understand why some rational-pragmatic architectures (such as a CO₂ cap-and-trade system; (see, for example, Aldy and Stavins 2009) do apparently not inspire and stimulate political consensus on the way forward would be to question how these architectures rationally relate to the normative-ethical framework sketched above. The answer would be: they do not, at least not in a direct unambiguous way. This does not mean that it would be useless to think in terms of ethical principles and frameworks in the interest of sustainable development on the one hand, or, pragmatically (“bottom-up”), to design workable architectures on the other hand. The important insight is that *it would not be necessary* for designers and policy makers to prove that architectures rationally “connect” to the normative-ethical framework sketched above. The simple argument for this claim is that it is impossible to unambiguously “extract” these architectures out of this fundamental ethical framework and that, vice-versa, it is impossible to “stretch” them in order to prove that they comply with that fundamental ethical framework. The reason for this impossibility is that in most thematic contexts (energy, biodiversity, health, sustainable production & consumption, among other issues) a number of issues exist “in between the normative ethics and the pragmatic architectures of which their rationalisation (in terms of role and impact) is hindered by typical cognitive factors (unknowables, unknowns, uncertainties and ambiguities) and axiological factors (“pluralism”), which makes these issues in principle

not subject to rational resolution within that “imperative” context. The problem is now that, driven by value-related or simple protective interests, these unknowables, unknowns, uncertainties and ambiguities provide room for mediation of these issues into “thin rationalisations” (either by denying them or by strategically mediating or framing them) that tend to “erode” the quality of the knowledge-policy interface in the context of the sustainable development debate. A typical example is the polarised “nuclear is (not) sustainable” issue. A second example is the approach to product life cycle assessment that typically assesses aspects *within* the lifecycle of the product but forgets to assess the justification of the very existence of the product itself.

4. Better living, in false atmospheres of trust

What are these issues that exist “in between the normative ethics and the pragmatic architectures” and of which their rationalisation (in terms of role and impact) is hindered by typical cognitive and axiological factors, which makes them susceptible to mediation into “thin rationalisations”? They are certainly not global concerns such as poverty, aids or terrorism. Although solutions to these matters cannot also be rationally extracted out of the normative framework sketched above, there is the simple understanding that nobody would want to try to rationalise them as an unavoidable consequence of the complexity of our contemporary society. The issues of which their rationalisations need to be scrutinised are concepts that, although unwanted in the way they manifest, have a “neutral” character, as society accepts them as inevitable consequences of current socio-political, socio-cultural, technical and economic interaction. The concepts are identifiable and recognisable in the way the adjective “acceptable” can be meaningfully connected to it, and a few key examples are set out in the following table.

“unwanted but neutral” organisational concept		
Ecology (natural environment):	/ acceptable ...	occupation
Technology:	/ acceptable ...	risk
Socio-economy:	/ acceptable...	exclusion
Organisational systems:	/ acceptable ...	functionality
Politics:	/ acceptable ...	authority
Politics:	/ acceptable ...	delegation
Media:	/ acceptable ...	mediation
Consumerism (market economy):	/ acceptable ...	dependency
Socio-cultural environment:	/ acceptable ...	formation
(all adding up to...)		
Welfare:	/ acceptable ...	inequity

Table 1 – *Examples of concepts susceptible to misuse in false atmospheres of trust*

What do I mean by “thin rationalisations”? At various manifestations of the knowledge-policy interface, these unwanted but neutral organisational concepts become susceptible to misuse in strategically created or mediated “false atmospheres of trust”. In this view, the fact that an atmosphere of trust is “false” is not a problem, but the fact that it can be strategically created or mediated is. Living in false atmospheres of trust is a human thing. Since emerging as sensible creatures, through reflective interaction, human beings have constantly tried to make sense of themselves and of the world around them, facing unknowables, uncertainties and ambiguities of which many still persist today. The notion of “false” denotes an atmosphere of mutual trust built on what one “believes but cannot prove” and should thus initially not be understood in a negative way. The awareness for possible misuse comes with the conclusion that, due to the existence of specific unknowables, there is no rational evidence available to determine *in consensus* what would be an *acceptable*

occupation, risk, exclusion, functionality, authority, delegation, mediation, dependency, formation or inequity.

If a socio-political society (the political arena and its Agora's) would want to create "transparency" in the interest of arriving at consensus on the available and needed knowledge to be able to judge what would, for instance, be an acceptable technological risk, an acceptable environmental occupation or an acceptable socio-economic exclusion, it would need to engage into a kind of "epistemic mediation". Epistemic mediation starts from a set of questions meaningful in the context of a challenging societal setting (what is at stake? / what do we need to know? / what is possible in terms of knowledge generation and use?) in order to motivate a "collective stance" beyond the need for individual self-justification and protection of integrity. This stance can be described as a joint awareness for and recognition of "(in)capacities" in interactive discursive knowledge generation. Therefore, "better" living in false atmospheres of trust requires recognition of and awareness of the consequences of the limits to our knowledge producing capacities, being:

- limits to the capacity to show reasonable concern, denoting a "lay" perplexity
("what you fear but cannot account")
- limits to the capacity to deliver social warranty, denoting a "discursive" perplexity
("what you hope but cannot guarantee")
- limits to the capacity to show factual evidence, denoting a "scientific" perplexity
("what you believe but cannot prove")

As a next step, the "act of epistemic mediation" would facilitate a collective inquiry into the usability of a specific knowledge brought into a discourse setting, and into the relevance of the actor's motivation to introduce it, in order to come to a "justified critical consensus knowledge" with regard to a specific issue at stake. Critical consensus knowledge does not converge on "truths", but integrates scientific facts and ideas, observations, discourse and reference with the outcome of joint reflections on the *usability* of those facts, ideas, observations, discourses and references and on the *motivation* of actors to bring these "knowledges" into

debate. Important to note is that these. In this sense, epistemic mediation would essentially inform a discourse deliberate acts of critical consensus knowledge generation are negotiating acts in themselves, as they essentially aim to negotiate “meaning” and to reflect on what we can and cannot know and should and should not need to know with respect to a particular ethical issue that “better” relativises truth by way of creating a “hermeneutic transparency” around the usability and motivation of a specific proposition. This better relativization would enable in its turn an “advanced” understanding of notions of authenticity and legitimacy (connected to the proposition), and of their functioning in the interest of “trust building”.

As these happenings would be conceived of as formal materialisations of the knowledge-policy interface in which various formal and informal knowledge generation processes on a particular issue would converge, this deliberation of knowledge essentially needs to be fully inclusive. Last but not least, it would require actors to move (and be stretched) beyond the traditional attitudes of those principal mediators of knowledge typically active at the knowledge-policy interface, being “the politician”, “the scientist”, “the stakeholder” and “the activist”. However, in a governance arena, before transparency can be stretched, it needs to be “unlocked” in a culture of reflexivity. While transparency can be “organised”, reflexivity needs to be “fostered” in the academy, the research institutes and in general public discourse about the issues at stake. This will be taken up in the next and last part of this text.

5. The idea of the reflexive knowledge society

However “logical” specific architectures, instruments and mechanisms for sustainable development policies may be perceived, the considerations above illustrate the argument that the soundness of their science, the rationality of their economics and the pragmatism of their politics will always have to be based on “opinions that cannot be turned into facts”. This means that, in the context of the issues touched upon above, but also in the general context of agreeing on what development should be in order for it to be called “sustainable”, the global political community would in principle need to make a fundamental choice: it could continue the debate by “bargaining over conflicting evidences” (as is still too often the case today),

or engage in more deliberate approaches to knowledge generation in order to “better” deal with cognitive factors (uncertainty, ambiguity, complexity) and axiological factors (values, identities, abstract “ideological” references) in political decision making, as was sketched before.

So where can these epistemic mediations and conceptual demystifications happen in reality? Although the idea of “governance” generally refers to concepts related to culture and politics, or more specifically to a process relying on laws, regulations and conventions, it cannot be seen as something driven and steered by an autonomous “system” that would keep on running in the absence of people. Governance can only be done where people come together and interact. It is in these places that global civil society “materialises”, and where a global reflexive knowledge society can come to exist in reality in a concrete political setting. This reflexive knowledge society has the intra-generational moral responsibility of inclusion. The reflexive knowledge society, understood as an *interaction between people*, includes the categories of indigenous, lay-person and expert knowledge (and all variations in between). In this sense, it is important to see the knowledge society as an organised deliberate transversal knowledge exchange in the public sphere, connecting the citizenry, the private sector, informed civil society, the academies and the political world. As a general definition in this sense, participation can be understood as the involvement of non-mandatory concerned and (potentially) affected individuals and groups in a mandatory organised knowledge exchange. This applies as much for the political context as for the context of policy-supportive (but “non-committal”) research, discourse and opinion making. Taking into account the reasoning of the previous paragraphs, reflexivity should be understood as an individual attitude of awareness of an agent (involved in a discursive “knowledge exchanging” interaction) of (1) the (im)possibilities of “making a claim”, (2) the way his/her knowledge has been shaped and formed and (3) the character of his/her knowledge (multiplicity, variety, integration, coherence). In this sense, reflexivity does not necessarily denote “knowledge about the contextual character of own knowledge” (which specific philosophers would call an impossibility anyway) but a normative responsible individual *intention*.

Taking all this together, the knowledge society cannot be but a discourse society. While this sounds like a downgrade in the concept (is that all we have?), its perspective is actually of a higher intelligence than the one that would strive for unambiguous clarity and evidence “at the science-society-

policy interface”. The knowledge society is the “population” of a holistic, trans-disciplinary, inclusive and practice-oriented science-society-policy interface. Holism, trans-disciplinarity, inclusiveness and practicability are thereby no fixed unambiguous qualities of its knowledge generation, but *intentions that inspire the practices* of knowledge generation. Last but not least, the knowledge society is self-reflexive in the way it maintains processes of generating, capturing, disseminating, assessing, applying and evaluating ideas. The reflexive knowledge society is an unselfish knowledge society, and therefore the only possible knowledge society for the sake of the general interest.

The conditions for this society to emerge, happen and work are twofold and simple in principle: they are set “in the academy” and need to be enabled in the Agora around the governance negotiation arena. Today, there is no excuse for the academy not to organise applied research and reflection in trans-disciplinary inclusive settings for the sake of global (environmental) governance. Neither is there an excuse for political delegations and civil society not to enable and stimulate “dialogues” in the sense of concrete reflexive and transparent knowledge generation settings in global negotiation processes. These settings by themselves would not generate pragmatic architectures, but at least they “liberate” actors from the pressure of choosing between references to ethics on the one hand and proposals for pragmatic architectures on the other hand. This kind of “capacity building” for reflexive and transparent knowledge generation is in a way the most important responsibility of all actors involved, and is also the only one key responsibility that is shared without being differentiated.

Sustainable development is social development

For a large part of the political world, it is clear today what sustainable development can and needs to be: the implementation of a “green economy”. The previous reasoning has hopefully showed that the concept of economic growth is conceptually flawed and therefore dangerous, and also that a “green economy” will not ensure in itself socio-economic well-being. It does not ensure “by design” the fundamental ethical principles of equity and fair play mentioned above. While it may in some respect guarantee a form of pragmatic intergenerational solidarity (in accounting for the next

generations) by way of restoring the old idea behind environmental assessment, there is no reason to assume that it would ensure the principle of inclusion of the (potentially) affected in decision-making and the intra-generational solidarity accounting for the underdeveloped (the weak and the poor).

A green economy may be the (future) motor of the “logistics” of the socio-economic society, from a global ethics point of view, the social capacity that needs to be built in the interest of sustainable development comprises much more. In terms of the idea of solidarity, a global ethics for sustainable development would in essence imply the possibility of an “intellectual-discursive” globalisation and give a new meaning to the conception of the global citizen. Its foundation would be the human right to enjoy individual intellectual development that stimulates curiosity and critical-contextual thinking and that would strengthen and motivate every citizen to follow transversal trajectories between self-maintaining cultural, social and political territories, and to enter or create joint interactive and solitary reflection spaces. In face of the global challenges envisaged, this potentiality would need to be supported bottom-up by multilevel (sub-national and regional) social policies to rethink and reform education and research. But this approach would require a specific relativism with regard to cultural, social and national identity and integrity. Looking back on decades of global negotiations among cultures, nations and sectors, and on the way they remain hiding behind their protective curtains of conceptual fog, this might be the most difficult challenge to tackle.

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STRATEGIC INTELLECTUAL COMMITMENT FOR THE GLOBAL SYSTEM

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The need for consistent commitment: a question of coordination and a global perspective

A more effective intellectual commitment is being demanded by the present imperative to create a more balanced and sustainable world. In a context where the intrinsic crises of the modern world-system are merging with the systemic effects of globalization, intellectuals should try to share more consistent and visible responsibility by appointing themselves, in spite of the difficulties, as public mediators in matters of fundamental concern. Should we wish to avert the likelihood of the process of globalization becoming primarily a hegemonic financial and neoliberal trading system and 1989 and 1991 (the demise of the USSR) the prelude to the decline of democracies, we have to realize that the process of deep social change the world is undergoing entails a problem of cultural coordination, i.e. the need to deal with wide-reaching crucial matters in a concerted way and from a global perspective.

Building intellectual consensus and compromises within a context of growing structural, axiological, social and cognitive complexity involves joint responsibility and systematic interaction among intellectual actors with different identities, functions, outlooks and meaning systems. On such aptitude rests the possibility of conceiving common strategies for creating a framework for epistemic mediation and public intervention on focal matters. Furthermore, given the mounting fragmentation, the value-related pluralisms, the cross-cutting nature of all issues and, on the whole, the overlapping, contradictory tendencies towards increasing interconnectedness, concerted intellectual activity would have to be supported by an inclusive, multi-perspective perception of our present world as well as a transdisciplinary approach. Pluralism and plasticity would then be major prerequisites in the formation of a cosmopolitan intellectual allegiance that has a potential for informing political praxis by means of continuously

assessing requirements, conditions and possibilities. I am not, therefore, defending any perfectionist notion of a single philosophy (precisely what we have now if we consider the hegemony of financial and economic discourse) that is produced by a sort of ‘government’ of wise men, but rather a truly committed culture of permanent reflexivity and strong intervention.

In order to function as concerted intellectual voices, as advocates of a pluralist reflexive culture, intellectuals need greater visibility. Hence, they should cultivate adequate recourse to the media (in spite of the risks involved) as a fruitful means of critically addressing large audiences, especially the mainstream television networks, from where single controversial intellectuals – I am thinking of Bertrand Russell, Jean-Paul Sartre and more recently Noam Chomsky among many others – have so often been excluded. The media opens up opportunities for increasing their agency, that is to say, for developing a more responsible transnational public sphere and, with it, the democratization of the rising structures of a new global order.

Difficulties on the way to concerted commitment

The strategic engagement I am postulating is not impossible, given the fact that the majority of intellectuals are already implicitly committed, but it is difficult and problematic. For one, critical thought and discourse have become more of a dilemma and contrary to stabilized notions, unifying visions and consensus. Essentialist and binary representations (including that of social antagonism), for example, have been historically eroded and rendered obsolete, mainly because the solidity and order they offered, mostly attached to notions of identity – ethnic or ideological –, are incompatible with the demands of a progressively unbounded, multi-centred, and culturally permeable world, i.e. simultaneously de-differentiated and hyper-differentiated; just as interpretations and alternatives sustained by overarching teleological narratives, like those that erected the foundations of previous historical theory, were deconstructed; what is more, critical thinking, the very essence of culture theory, today poses the major problem of how to operate with certain concepts rooted, for instance, in quantum theory, fractal physics, mathematics and biology, and transfuse them into the core of the

real world, where they are everywhere and simultaneously active.

Scientific knowledge itself has been immersed into a foundational crisis manifest in Karl Popper's notion of methodology (*The Logic of Scientific Truth*¹). Since neither empirical verification nor logical reasoning is sufficient to establish a secure foundation for knowledge, the crisis of scientific and philosophical knowledge has converged into an ontological crisis of the Real. Radical reflexivity has thus become a departure point for approaching all sorts of subjects, including the sweeping ongoing drastic transformations that are "liquefying" our "modernity" (Bauman 2006). Furthermore, the combination of uncertainty with complexity in the rapidly mutating macro-cultural situation means that, whatever major consistent conceptualizing and sustainable key-answers a concerted intellectual engagement might produce, they would have to be subject to constant evaluation and revision. Consequently, and in spite of the fact that the conditions in which intellectuals may function as legislators and ideologists have gone, the emerging historical milieu, which configures the change of paradigm dramatically demands their vigorous involvement, not just at individual level but in a convergent effort towards assisting local policy-makers, global governance, entities and civil society confronted with a host of interlocking challenges of which the most important are the issues of distributive justice and (ethically) sustainable development.

Consensus through cosmopolitan imagination

A cooperative intellectual endeavour of the kind I am suggesting – an endeavour aiming at articulating local realities with global structures and flows and intervening in world matters of social and ethical concern – would draw legitimacy from being cosmopolitan in configuration, scale and vision. On the other hand, in being an indispensable quality and tool, a cosmopolitan imagination should never jeopardize the strategic agendas

¹Karl Popper's notion of methodology implies that no number of experiments can ever prove a theory, whereas a theory can be contradicted by a single experiment. This was expounded in *Logik der Forschung* (1934) and reformulated by the author himself in English as *The Logic of Scientific Truth* (1959).

and the levels of action organized with the purpose of establishing a common ground on which to build consensual knowledge and take initiatives involving vital universal issues. However suspicious or frail the building of consensus may seem, even when be, even when established on a reflexive, democratic and pluralistic basis, we cannot ignore that compromises and agreements cannot be reached without first overcoming differing or even incompatible views on priority matters. From a pragmatic standpoint, such incapacity would mean a greater exposure of the new world order to unsuitable gratuitous standards and policies that would thereby increase its growing potential for inequality and disaster.

Being cosmopolitan means that a combined intellectual commitment could not be just ‘Western’, despite the fact that most political theory tends to assert that the ‘West’ is synonymous with liberal democracy as the only legitimate political model to ensure the universalism of human rights (Rowls 2005, Habermas 2008); this notion has been reinforced since 1945 by the spread of Western democracy throughout the world, from Asia to Africa. The Western democratic spiral had its moment of triumph twenty years ago, according to Fukuyama’s essay “The End of History” (1989), which was published in the conservative quarterly *National Interest* and hailed from the start by leading conservative intellectuals. What brought the essay immediate world-wide notoriety was not Fukuyama’s reworking of Hegelian theory but his overconfident assertion that “something very fundamental has happened in world history”. By that he was not referring to historical finalisms but to the collapse of the last rival to liberal democracy – Marxism-Leninism as an international mobilizing ideology. Since then, and judging from the present uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East, the desire for Western liberal democracy has continued to grow.

Despite such evidence, theoreticians like Chantal Mouffe and Boaventura de Sousa Santos question the notion that Western democracy is the only possible political model. The former argues in favour of a “pluralist” conception that would consent to “good political regimes” (Mouffe 2011, 103). The pluralism Chantal Mouffe has in mind would require the recognition of regimes other than Western democracy, as being legitimate forms of political association. In his view, only a shift from the universalistic approach, used for so long to validate the hegemony of the ‘West’, could safeguard the dimension of “the political” (*ibid.* 108-110) and the future of a more democratic world order. Sousa Santos (2005) proposes the

“universal reach” (Rorty 1999)² of human rights as a form of globalization “from below” or “cosmopolitan globalization”, since only the intercultural conceptualising of human rights would convert them into an instrument of progressive politics. In the early 1990s, Anthony Giddens’ theory about the reformism of late social-democracy also recognised the need for considering the multifarious ways in which individuals and groups imagine, experience and enact alternative realities within the dimensions of “negotiated power” and “dialogic democracy” (Giddens 1994, 100-1). Tackling this issue from a post-colonial viewpoint, Homi Bhabha suggests that it is necessary to “de-realize” democracy by de-familiarizing its history and political project (in the sense of critical distance and also in the surrealist sense of withdrawing an object from its normative reference) in order to perceive its fragility – not its failure – and cope with the trials of the century (Bhabha 2003).

Whatever the different outlooks, the basic conviction in democracy provides a common ground for rethinking its functioning from a global and multicultural perspective. Such a move would represent a further step in the historical process of emancipatory politics that had its roots in Ancient history, later to be taken up by the Renaissance legislators and the philosophers of the French Enlightenment (regardless of their connivance with absolutist power), and that could be continued in our time with a more interactive and open-minded approach, despite some very negative interpretations made by contemporary thought where the most debated is, perhaps, Giorgio Agamben’s. In his critique of human rights – distinct from the more historical approaches of Karl Marx, Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault – and his messianic appeal to a radically new form of politics, Agamben’s “state of exception” appears as an *aporia* that characterizes Western politics, since contemporary sovereignty produces biopolitics and the logic and rationalities of biopower with its inherent genocidal potential (Agamben 1998).

Furthermore, the intellectuals involved in a cosmopolitan coalition should be able to rise above partisan, radical or corporative politics, in-

²Neither Habermas nor Rorty question the superiority of liberal democracy, although they argue differently: Habermas believes in the “ideal speech situation”, i.e. the universalization of liberal democracy through rational argumentation (Habermas 1984), whereas Rorty makes a distinction between “universal validity” and “universal reach”, favouring the second mode, i.e. persuasion and economic progress.

dependently of their individual embedding, whether in political parties, organizations, movements, firms or universities in the sense pointed out by Bauman: “(...) the intentional meaning of being an intellectual is to rise above the partial preoccupation of one’s own profession or artistic genre and engage with the global issues of truth, judgment and taste of the time” (Bauman 1987, 2). Only the enhancement of disinterested and pluralist outlooks are apt to potentiate new possibilities for agency and place them in an eligible position to generate a transnational synergy of brainpower and connivance capable of redirecting the social and the political towards a more inclusive and fairer democratic world culture. A fundamental aspect of such re-direction was discussed, for instance, by Anthony Giddens’ in *Beyond Left and Right* (1994) and *The “Third Way”* (1998). His approach to dual structures relies on the themes of reflexivity and system integration, and acknowledges the need to update the political concepts of “left” and “right” in the context of the great changes sweeping through the world. But neither the occlusion of thinking capitalist exploitation, nor the denial of politics is excluded from his discourse on the “third way” that is intrinsic to the “beyond left and right” paradigm.

Regaining legitimacy

Thus far, intellectual “Left” and the collapsedisunion and dispersal, as well as inconsistencies, ambiguity and omission prevail in matters as relevant as human rights, multicultural politics, forms of control and domination, military intervention, environmental policies and questions of value. A feeling of disempowerment that came with the destructive impact of modernization, the errors and misjudgements of the intellectual left and the collapse of major ideological currents caused both the disintegration and proliferation of centres of resistance (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, Castells 1984). Moreover, while on the one hand, the fragmentary, ambiguous and provisional postmodern milieu has been opening up a new space for critical discourse and local movements (Carl Boggs 2000, 307), on the other, one of the major changes in recent times has been the persistent call for universities to go beyond their traditional role and turn towards more utilitarian or even lucrative scientific programmes and goals. In addition, most intellectual functions have been increasingly appropriated by the university,

mass media and governments, where they are integrated into think-tanks, newspapers and TV channels, institutions, and movements that have a localised influence for the most part. Nevertheless, even though intellectual identities have become less consistent and outstanding, a divide is still discernible between an oppositional intelligentsia – now less influential and affirmative than in the past – and the technocrats who enjoy dominant positions in the high-tech global economy and information revolution.

If the 20th century saw the decline of the more classical humanistic intellectual, as well as the Gramscian “organic” type with strong roots in ideology and the community, and their replacement mostly by political experts, opinion-makers, cultural, artistic and sociological actors, the 21st century may well come to represent the divorce or antagonism between critical consciousness and politics. The reverse was once true: from the First World War and going beyond the Russian Revolution, the most numerous and the best European intellectuals supported so-called “left”. Intellectual allegiances to the fascist movements during the twenties and thirties were also a reality. But as the century moved on, after the Second World War, a tendency towards accommodism became evident along with a shift in their ideological filiations. Without an anchor in the class struggle, the “New Left” of the 1960s and 70s merely sought to be a short-cut to social change through various movements (women’s and gay liberation, pacifism and environmentalism). It was, according to David McKnight’s analysis, “the last gasp of an older left” (McKnight 2010). In the last two decades of the century, as their stances became identical with party and economic interests, the distinction between the “left” and the “right” became less clear, configuring a development that has been interpreted as the “the story of a disappointed determinism” (Wood 1995, 9).³

Ultimately, the decline of deep commitment evident in many intellectuals’ fear or avoidance of politics, and witnessed in the semantic substitution of the left’s analytical normative vocabulary, as well as their tendency to lean in the direction of theories on empathy, can also be understood as the outcome of a crisis in authority and legitimacy, nourished to a great extent

³The full quotation is: “The intellectual history of the (stunningly rapid) transition from the structuralist Marxism of the sixties and seventies, through the brief moment of ‘post-Marxism’, to the current fashions of ‘post-modernism’ has in large part been the story of a disappointed determinism” (Wood 1995, 9).

by their discomfit at having to explain how the destructiveness and terror related to the ideals they supposedly pursued, and why they lived with and concealed what was intolerable.⁴ The embarrassment, bewilderment and shame, and also the objective failure of Communism played upon their ability to speak out against all sorts of more recent or impending terrors – ideological, individual, group or state terrorism.⁵ It also wore away their eligibility to be listened to. In this respect, according to the categories established by Umberto Eco, intellectuals became “integrated” (something unacceptable, however, to some well-known exceptions like Chomsky or Edward Said⁶), or “apocalyptic”⁷ as he designates those who convey the vision of an irretrievable decline of culture. In their dispersal, conformism or scepticism (genuine or cynical), they seem to be content with merely commenting upon and more often, showing what is going on in the “global village” mostly within the framework of “the politically correct”. By so doing, they chronically defuse their aptitude for exerting influence, for that reason bearing the main responsibility for the lack of more consistent far-reaching engagement precisely at a moment when the need for an accountable global public sphere and coordinated intellectual commitment seems most urgent. But what is even worse is that politics itself today appears to give signs of being indifferent to their withdrawal from public life.

⁴Naturally there were many who suffered and died for their convictions. Ironically, many of them very often had to bear the suspicion, attacks and lies by the official “left intellectuals”, who for the sake of privilege and in the name of orthodoxy became their fiercest enemies, accusing them of being fascists, pro-Nazis or CIA agents. The dishonesty and betrayal extended from Stalinism and Maoism to Cuba and the military regimes of Latin America. It also explains, as Tony Judt tells us, the difficulties Primo Levi faced in Italy with the “Left”. His first testimonies about the Holocaust only became the object of attention twenty years after having been written (Judt 2008).

⁵The concept of terror was applied to politics during the French Revolution during 1793-94; since then it has been regarded by many intellectuals, like Camus and Walter Benjamin, as correlate to history.

⁶In *Representations of the Intellectual: The 1993 Reith Lectures*, Edward Said clearly states that the intellectual cannot submit to the goals of a government, a large corporation or even to an association of professionals.

⁷In *Apocalypse Postponed* (1994), originally published in 1964 as *Apocalittici e integrati* and revised in 1977, Eco offers a commentary on cultural life, from the mid-1960s to the late 1980s primarily in Italy, when intellectuals were especially alarmed by the emergence of a mass or pop culture. He dedicated the book to the “apocalyptic”, i.e. cultural elites who feared the destruction of their world by mass communication and popular entertainment.

Consequently, the second difficulty the intellectuals face (together with the former lack of coordination), is how to re-gain authority or legitimacy. This could be surpassed through their willingness to engage as a collective in a continuous strategic effort that would offer stronger guidance to the problems and deadlocks of our civilizational crisis. The fact that our time is going through sweeping transition, where the modern references and ways of interpreting the world and history have vanished or been rendered unstable, political, social, ethical and aesthetic concerns of a more complex kind than those posed by modernity, constitute ample motivation for re-engagement in the global *res publica*. However, despite the audible claims that our planet requires a new comprehensive perception or world consciousness, as well as a different paradigm of development, codes and regulatory principles, there is little evidence to suggest that a committed intellectual synergy of the kind I have been suggesting might be in the process of materializing. For the time being, amidst a multitude of conflicting views and interests and growing complexity and insecurity, we are experiencing a new world order being processed by a marriage between technology and the market or, more precisely, by the planetary reach of neoliberalism and the speed of its linkages and repercussions in real time; we are also speculating apprehensively about ineffectual political leaderships, the destabilization of democratic mechanisms, the vacuousness of public morals and all sorts of asymmetries, imbalances and hazards. It is inevitable that, in this scenario, the ineffectiveness of the intellectuals appears to be a considerable part of our world's problems.

Despite the limitations I have pointed out, by no means do I wish to underestimate the enormity of their present relevance. Nor do I wish to ignore their accomplishments individually, and across the "global sub-cultures" (Beck 1996, 121), forums, social movements, inter-personal societies and organizations that, in acting as transversal networking mechanisms, bear an important responsibility for global ideologies. Precisely because I value them, I can also envisage their greater potential in working towards a concerted intellectual strategy so as to respond to matters of universal concern despite all difficulties. My point, then, is that only as a consortium will intellectuals be able to provide the far-reaching insights, fruitful dialogical approaches and indispensable agreements on fundamental key-concepts, criteria and proposals our world requires. In other words, the enormity of the challenges involved in the processes of globalization calls for a type of

intellectual power that only a cosmopolitan convergence is able to provide. Ideally, this means that a good number of intellectuals need to surmount the “coordination problem”, the lack of a world-wide perspective and the deficit of authority, as well as all kinds of other limitations that affect their commitment to such vital issues as the sustainability of culture and life in general. In support of my thesis I shall now briefly focus on just a few problematic aspects of our contemporary world.

Some instances where intellectual concerted commitment is needed

1. Economic and financial globalization

The process of *economic and financial globalization* and the spread of neoliberalism, particularly after the 1990s, when the geo-economics of the post-Cold War asserted itself over geopolitics, brought to the foreground with renewed vigour, questions related with financial and business monopoly, deregulation, wealth redistribution and labour policies. Stock market capitalism, disconnected from productive economy and social responsibility, new became a source of uncertainty, inequality and displacement. It has torn down the fabric of many societies, threatening the very concepts of Western democracy, while crushing the most vulnerable strata of the capitalist system. Most national states see their GDP being surpassed by the incomes of the biggest multinational corporations, while directives from the top are valuing risk-taking as a better stimulus to economic growth as against social and economic rationality. Thus, the main contradiction is no longer between capital and labour but between two kinds of economies, the productive and the financial; just as the tension is no longer between the market and the state but between the social market economy and the global finance market. Consequently, neoliberalism and financial deregulation – not politics – have become the radical force throughout the world. And although the industrialization of the so-called “emergent nations” (in some of which, like China and the former-URSS, there is still strong state control over finance and the economy) is accelerating, thereby diminishing poverty with many millions of people climbing up the food chain, it is also

incrementing world imbalances, anomalies and all sorts of risks. The latter are mostly associated with technology, climate change, and the scarcity of natural resources. From arable soil to water and all kinds of commodities, the shortage of resources, aggravated by fierce market speculation, is rapidly augmenting famine throughout the world, producing successive energy crises, and leading to violent confrontations at a time when the proliferation of weapons and terrorism are common phenomena.

Meanwhile, in the enduring edifice of Western civilization, the fissures, which have long been identified with its decline, are now more conspicuous as the gap between affluence and poverty widens in the USA and the EU. After the Second World War and despite the loss of their colonies and empires, most Western countries reached a situation of relative self-achievement through political stability, social welfare, extensive protection of basic rights and a wide-ranging popular culture. Many of these accomplishments are being threatened by the aggressive demands, imbalances and systemic effects resulting from the speeding up of the globalization process and the harsh neoliberal measures that most countries are adopting to try and meet economic competitiveness. The magnitude of the financial crisis that emerged in the USA at the end of 2007, mainly because of reckless banking and predatory urbanism, and ecological devastation, can hardly be considered just another cyclical crisis similar to those happening during the last few decades.⁸ Its devastating economic and social consequences, as many countries face massive unemployment, huge debts and bankruptcy which are also due to large-scale taxpayer-financed bailouts and unhampered international rating agencies, seem to provide evidence of major global turbulence. Its gravity is patent in the hasty attempts to build regional and global oversight structures in the fields of banking, insurance securities and fiscal policies to enforce measures that time and again seem inconsistent and counterproductive. The damage has extended to the political sphere, affecting the Euro Zone in particular. The European Union, which was the most promising project to come out of the Second World War and seemed even stronger after the end of the Cold War, is suffering severely from a

⁸The mid-eighties and the 1987 “Black Monday” crash, for instance, generated a lot of market mistrust. But despite the high-profile criminal cases involved, the Bull Market of the 1990s saw a return to financial investment and to a culture of credibility around the markets as a means of generating easy money.

deficit of political perception and commitment. Its failure to develop as a federation and enforce measures that build upon integration is hampering its capacity to survive moments of large-scale systemic crisis.

Thus, after the “real socialism” of the East, after the turn to a flow-based economy operating in timeless time, nourished by the fantasy that the self-regulatory mechanism of the market is the true guarantor of stability, we once again realize that questions thought to be primarily economic and financial cannot, after all, be dissociated from ethics, freedom of choice and human dignity – in a word, from politics. Precisely because the systemic volatility of the global market will not generate national and cross-border economic solidarity and social stability, strong intellectual commitment to political renewal, along with intense public debate have become an imperative.

2. Democracy and sovereignty

An issue I would like to focus on briefly is the *democratic national state and the question of sovereignty*. In many ways, the former is going through a critical stage chiefly due to the growing inconsistencies between macro and local politics or because “those responsible for shaping global and transnational public policies are not always accountable to those affected by them” (Tinnevelt and De Schutter 2010, 1). With “territoriality as the organizing principle of the world polity (...) everywhere in retreat” (Axford 2000, 241-2), the classic nation state, organized around a clearly demarcated territory and recognised by other states as having juridical-political sovereignty, is undergoing a process of metamorphosis characterized by de-nationalisation as a consequence of the internationalised and flexible production systems; a de-statisation of politics due to more decentralized forms of governance; and an internationalisation of policy regimes (Tinnevelt and De Schutter 2010, 79-80).

Consequently, the progression of globalization is also propelling the re-invention of *world governance*. This concept has gained attention in the two last decades in a range of key-disciplines and in connection with certain issues, such as the rules for collective decision-making that transcend the powers of the national states. However, this field still poses a great number of problems that need to be clarified, regarding, for instance, roles and

responsibilities and the new mechanisms of accountability (Chhotray and Stoker 2009, 221-25). Some intellectuals are particularly sensitive to the growingly mutual interdependence of all nations: Ulrich Beck advances the notion that national sovereignty can only survive as post-national by means of “cosmopolitan political realism” (Beck 2009, 3), while Noam Chomsky points out that the de-nationalisation of statehood is being countered by an increasing role for stronger national states, or the imposition of a “single standard” (Chomsky 2007).⁹ Meanwhile, in Western and Westernized democracies there are mounting fears that social transformation and liability may no longer be within the reach of their common political culture, and chaotic situations are likely to arise.

On a different level and differently from world governance, *transnational civil society* is also trying to cope with the shortcomings and vulnerabilities produced by the expanding process of globalization. An awareness of the disempowerment of national states, of forms of disorganization and polycentric control that are replacing the centralized organization characteristic of modernity and of the feebleness of local or regional political leaderships, explains, among other issues, the phenomenon of international civic mobilization in critical moments. This type of mobilization seems to favour more inclusive rather than merely national solidarity. Nevertheless, as Bob Jessop explains, civil society is a problematic notion: it remains a “contested space for representatives of very different types of interests, norms and values (...) a target for strategies to secure the dominance of the particular institutional orders (...) a reservoir of antagonistic ‘instincts’ (...) and a social resource for resistance” (Jessop 2011, 81). Even if it is heterogeneous and formless, its democratic potential nevertheless seems to be undeniable as Jürgen Habermas recognizes (Habermas 2008). Besides, the feasibility of a transnational civil society has been greatly enhanced by the technologies that work at the speed of light (Internet, mobile phones and other gadgets) in a space that is the space-world. “Time and space compression”, to use David Harvey’s expression (Harvey 1990), is redefining all sorts of borders, as well as the consciousness that is becoming increasingly cosmopolitan, with the result that indignation and political disappointment are fuelling spontaneous expressions of citizenship across the planet.

⁹This expression is used by Noam Chomsky in connection with American foreign policy.

On the opposite side of mobilized civil society, there is the more common phenomenon of *depoliticized citizenship*. The number of people who do not fulfil even their most basic role as electors has been rising in Western democratic countries, despite the expansion of the culture and information societies of recent decades. One of the reasons for this attitude lies in the generalized scepticism about the political system itself coupled with a self-perception of being politically insignificant. World governance may also be adding to this attitude, in as much as it dislodges or restricts some of the functions of the national state, harming the basis for the individual's identification with national party-politics. But there are multiple causes for citizens' indifference, including: the dissolution of ideologies and traditional forms of class identity, the contradictory perspectives offered by our shifting and malleable postmodernity, consumerism and mind formatting by the dominant media, notably the liberal media, including international news agencies and powerful networks, such as the CNN, CNBC, BBC and Aljazeera.

In a number of essays on the culture industry in the 1940s, Adorno and Horkheimer argued – and did so even more controversially in their critique of the Enlightenment known as *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1947) – that far from encouraging critical reflection, the culture industry had deteriorated into a mere commodity, impressing “the same stamp on everything” and making up a totalitarian system that was “uniform as a whole and in every part” (Adorno 1991, 120).¹⁰ In *One Dimensional Man* (1964), Herbert Marcuse also explained how consumerism in an advanced industrial society, that is a capitalist society, became a commodity-producing society, integrating individuals via the mass media into the existing system of production and consumption, or what he called the “one-dimensional” universe of thought, behaviour, and technology – the latter both as a contrivance used in the production of goods and as a social process which facilitates control and domination.¹¹ Whatever the causes and explanations – scepticism, an ingrained feeling of impotence, auto-reification or

¹⁰I am referring to the negative critique of culture that Adorno and Horkheimer made as regards the mid-1940s in the context of late capitalism under the impact of German National Socialism and American modern culture – a critique that Adorno reaffirmed in a radio talk in 1963.

¹¹For Marcuse a humanizing liberation from this system of domination could only come through a “Great Refusal” co-ordinated by those outside the system and within a loosely constituted “New Left”.

one-dimensionality – citizen indifference or apathy weigh negatively on the quality of our present-day democracies (Arteta 2010) and, consequently, on the political quality of the new world order that is being shaped. Today’s cybercitizens are “tourists” (Bauman 1997, 89) pleasurably immersed in the images and symbols of millions of others, yielding to the instant gratification provided by consuming the virtual: places, communities, relationships and “pornotopia” (Steven Marcus) free from the traditional taboos about human behaviour, or distracted by Dysneyesque shopping malls and tourism channelled through architectural look-alike airports or Marc Augé’s “non-places” (1995).

Viewing citizenship from this angle leads us to the rather pessimistic conclusion that advanced technology and affluence may have removed from society the possibility for social and political change that existed in early industrial societies. According to Baudrillard, this loss came with the shifts away from modernity, when the production of consumers rather than goods became central, the distinction between the “mass” and the “media” blurred, and rationalization dissolved (Lyon 2000, 229). Moving away from the political economy of the Frankfurt School theory toward a semiological theory of the sign, Baudrillard’s work, especially *For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign* (1981), clarifies the emergence of post-modern culture from consumer societies. Political alienation or conformism is thus a feature that, to a large extent, characterizes the citizens of our increasingly globalized world. While citizenship is distracted from its duties, contemporary democracies tend to become autistic, distant from the real social problems, more prone to uncountable direct corruption and irrational political decision-making. A more intelligible public sphere, i.e. less fragmented, contradictory and esoteric, enlightened by a cosmopolitan intellectual synergy might stimulate the revival of democratic engagement, both at individual and collective levels, along with the development of a more integral awareness of the world.

3. Science, technology and public surveillance

Many more issues and areas require intellectual convergence. The direction of change in *science and technology*, for example, is of the utmost relevance, especially the issue of how to democratize decisions and open up priorities in order to found a wider public debate and thus avoid depoliti-

cization as well as the implicit endorsement of organized non-liability. Ever since the work of the late T.S. Kuhn in the early 1960s, sociologists have been studying the ways in which processes within the scientific community can affect the content and direction of scientific innovation. Their analysis points to the key question of how to detach research from its current embeddedness within the institutional nexus of capital and the state. We have received sufficient confirmation that it is a grave mistake to minimize the structures of power which have accompanied the latest scientific revolution and the unprecedented monopolies that have arisen. Man-made risks and disasters, such as the increase in epidemics in the early 1980s with the new strain of Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease (bovine spongiform encephalopathy, commonly known as mad-cow disease), the oil spillage in the Mexican Gulf (2010) and the succession of accidents in the nuclear power stations on Three Mile Island (1979), in Chernobyl (1986) and in Fukushima (2011), are becoming more frequent and dangerous. Following on from what I have said, Ulrich Beck’s advice seems to be judicious when he reminds us that the more cosmopolitan and interconnected our clarification of the problems is, the more chances we have of diminishing the serious risks happening in our contemporary world. In his view, the relatively certain capacity to predict catastrophes must be understood and acknowledged within a cosmopolitan realism that is capable of establishing a network of alliances and mutual transnational dependencies (Beck 2011, 23). For that to happen, science and technology must be surveyed by the public eye, while the chronic insufficiency of public debate and the culture of non-liability should be remedied. This is a complex area in need of reliable sound orientation. Without it, I do not see how we are able to restrict global ambitions in the fields of capitalist accumulation, control over labour processes, product innovation and state strategies in relation to military priorities and surveillance.

4. Dialoguing and dissuasion against terror and violence

Another problem we face is the need to reinvent *the politics of dissuasion*, since “time and space compression” also redefines the issue of war and peace; technology and the acceleration of history favour accidents at a time when the world disposes a “third system of armaments” that may be lethal to mankind (Virilio 1993). With the increase of terrorism, our communica-

tion and perception have become the new weapons of dissuasion, but there seems to be a quandary here: global surveillance or the whole logistics of the global panoptic systems is leaving us with less freedom without guaranteeing our safety, because dissuasion in the context of terrorist warfare and the proliferation of weapons seem to be an impossible task. Surveillance must then be complemented by the economic development of poor regions and continuous political negotiation at local and regional levels. That is why the offensive launched against Islamism following the attack of September 11, 2001, was a gross and dangerous misjudgement as the ongoing popular uprisings in Northern Africa and the Middle East spearheaded by ordinary people in their twenties and thirties seem now to confirm. The offensive unleashed a revival of monolithic thinking and xenophobia alien to the complexities of cultural diversity, regional alliances, tribal loyalties and counter-global activity, as well as endorsing the recourse to “enhanced interrogation techniques”, “extraordinary renditions”, prisons such as Abu Ghraib and a concentration camp like Guantánamo, where a multicultural, multinational and multi-aged population (living a “bare life” existence) continues to be detained whereby its abandonment has been sanctioned by the law within a “state of exception”.¹²

These practices have damaged international efforts to enforce a whole new policy for the Middle East through a culture of fair negotiation. Furthermore, they have once again foregrounded the Western contradiction between real politics and its humanistic values or human rights – a contradiction that shapes a culture of violence and terror with an established tradition. Within the limits of modernity, barbarity has always been inherent to the civilization, going back not only to Robespierre, Saint-Just and Lenin but also to the colonial policies that prepared the twentieth century’s genocides and mass murders. Or it entails the paradox pointed out by Agamben, when he claims that “(...) in every modern state, a point exists which defines the moment when the decision of life is transformed

¹²For Agamben, whose concepts I have just used, the camp is “the hidden matrix of modernity” (Agamben 2000, 48), the concrete physical location for biopolitical exception. With its invention, “the state of exception, which was essentially a temporary suspension of the rule of law on the basis of a factual state of danger, is now given a permanent spatial arrangement which nevertheless remains outside the normal order” (Agamben 1998, 84).

into the decision on death, when biopolitics is thus inverted and becomes thanatopolitics” (Agamben 1998, 188).

But there is another side to civilization, that is also grounded in tradition, and which has been solidly built by the intelligentsia over the centuries and needs to be reinforced in the present global context. For has not emancipatory reason always had to fight for its right to exist within Western culture itself? Has it not most recently been locked in a life and death struggle against totalitarianism? And is this struggle, mostly against instrumental reason, not one which has to be fought anew and on a daily basis? This better tradition is the culture that still nourishes the options that involve intellectual commitment to inscribe human rights within the modern state, deconstruct prejudice and hatred, condemn exclusion, oppression and all forms of sovereign violation, as well as forge a conciliatory and lawful outlook on external political affairs instead of arbitrary decisions and actions. To this cultural tradition belong, among so many others, Bertrand Russell, Herbert Camus and Edward Said: the Russell Tribunal (also known as the International War Crimes Tribunal), was established following the 1966 publication of the philosopher’s book *War Crimes in Vietnam* which investigated American foreign policy and its military intervention in Vietnam; Camus and Said tried to find key-answers to the acutest problems of their time in the domain of sociability. Camus argued for solidarity and negotiation during the Algerian War, and Said urged an understanding between Palestinians and Israelis so that a one-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict might emerge. They both endured fierce criticism for their views. The repeated failure to carry on this better tradition explains why the silence of many American intellectuals or their belatedness in condemning the political offensive that followed September 11 was so disconcerting; it also revealed why it is imperative that we have a coordinated world intelligentsia, composed of democratic open-minded intellectuals with the authority to help shape public opinion and exercise an influence on international politics and organisms in decisive situations such as those involving military intervention.

Conclusion

A unique feature of the present situation is that all countries – developed and developing – are subject to the same global marketplace pres-

tures and culture industries in varying degrees and different aspects, as well as to the new possibilities opened up by the communication and information technologies. Constructing a democratic cosmopolitan culture that meets fundamental challenges posed by the globalization process requires changes in our awareness of the world we live in and the emergence of a political culture which captures and responds to the difficulties faced by societies today. Decisive world issues, such as those pointed out and including many others (the convergence of ethics with the political, peace among the states, ethnic conflict and genocide, unbiased international law, multicultural policies and the sustainability of life on earth), means tackling them from a global and multicultural perspective and taking advantage of the new opportunities for agency that spring from the immense access to information and knowledge. Because of their scale and complexity, these issues can only be met through major structured intellectual effort, strategic vision, and dialogic and pluralist approaches. All this implies, in my view, the formation of intellectual public consensuses that moves away from an obscure, diffuse and to a great extent, inept postmodern intellectual culture towards a more overt, consistent and vigorous commitment to the renewal of politics and ethics – to a more intelligent, inclusive and green world. Ultimately, such effort would involve a new type of cosmopolitan imagination that might well mean “(...) a *re-enchantment* of the world that modernity tried hard to *dis-enchant* (Bauman 1992: x).

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II - Intellectual Commitment, Identity and Citizenship

THE ORDEAL OF CITIZENSHIP IN THE ERA OF DIGITALIZATION

MOLEFI KETE ASANTE

My task is to elucidate a complex set of discourses around the post-modern warping of citizenship by giving special attention to immigrant and native narratives in various contemporary societies. Transnational boundaries and transgenerational communication are cornerstones of the new era of a digitized world. Understanding and maintaining a common state of citizenship in a world where it is easy to own bank accounts, pay taxes, and live anywhere has allowed the contemporary scholar of culture and communication to explore the human being in the world as a challenge. Therefore, I want to pose as many questions as I answer, but certainly to answer the ones that are most pressing in an analysis of contemporary citizenship.

Furthermore, I seek to explore the increasingly intrusive nature of the digital revolution on the question of being, not simply autonomous ontology, but being aware of others, being-in-company, but being in company. I shall show, as Abdul Jan Mohammed has claimed, that the love of difference has emerged in our discourse with an undue exuberance (JanMohamed 1983, 2-9). I am not suggesting that difference or *differance* is without value, only that the suppression of identity, to the degree that it has been suppressed, might be unwarranted in many cases (Derrida 1978). Indeed, the suppression of identity might lead to further oppression of certain groups. The valorization of difference, a sort of hetero-philia, has warped the way we see relationships. It is true that I am different from you and yet at the same time my alterity carries its own identity and it is not simple, the other. In either case, whether in love of difference or love of identity, we are bundles of affections and cognitions that are evident in our actions.

My thesis is that most racial and ethnic discourses related to questions of citizenship are ultimately false and nothing more than fear reactions based on the idea that we will lose something that we really do not possess and can never possess exclusively. We cannot possess perfection in human relationships, even though the endeavor itself is worthy of humanity. Racial discourses are about our petty imperfections as well as the valorization of difference. Identity figures in this equation only to the extent that the

Sartrean racist seeks to take his identity for granted and for meaning while simultaneously denying an identity-with-substance to others (Sartre 1948). In other words, a hollow symbol, an empty shell, a shadow, an unsubstantial sign, or a stereotype laden with the potential to create fear suffices for the racist imagination.

Yet in modern European and American societies it is this fear, not so much of difference but of identity that sits at the very entrance to our own freedom (Asante 2007, 23-56). We are stunted in our imagination, deformed by our anxieties, and hemmed in by our desire to escape from genuine humanism that recognizes identity as well as difference. Nothing less than the upheaval of our established fears can allow for the re-awakening of a human society based on the duality of difference and identity.

We have not yet abandoned the European Renaissance or the Enlightenment in social views and there are perhaps many aspects of those movements that we should not abandon, but we must continue to advance from the structured cocoon created by those who sought to control every aspect of the world. This was a control that was not simply one concerned with gold, oil, rubber, diamond, silver, or uranium, but the control of people, and people's thoughts and behaviors. Sometimes living in the United States of America through political campaigns, where the various voices of the past are brought to the present, I imagine a 17th century *déjà vu* experience. The 21st century is not very far from the 17th.

The United States of America was born with two serious birth defects that have truly challenged the citizenship idea. The first was the dispossession of the Native Americans and the second was the enslavement of Africans. In the process of its growth and evolution, the American nation, with bravado, also managed to conquer Mexican territories. How these events are remembered and how they are passed on to students in American Studies are important matters of memory. Nevertheless, we are confronted by desires of dominance in the Althusserian sense where people are willing to exercise violence to maintain dominance over others. But as Fanon understood, violence often creates more violence (Fanon 1965, 34-79).

Yet the manner in which our collective memories organize national identities and allegiances to given political platforms is of especial concern. If we know anything, we know that intellectual topographies, digital literacies, embedded mythologies, reified symbols and new histories encourage the construction of boundaries as much as they eliminate them. In our

present moment in human history, two intellectual traditions converge at the level of *reading* and *locating* (Derrida 1978; Mazama 2003, 12-14; Ferreira 2010). Derrida's reading of difference and *differance* and the Afro-centrist's locating of agency and passivity, or center and margins, are deep constructions of thought meant to breakdown, to deconstruct, in order to reintegrate human thinking. I do not believe that we should dispense with either of these ideas.

Drawing on a mixture of discourses rooted in my understanding of historical themes, articulated human conflicts, and our debates over interstitial territories, I champion an alternative set of discourses based on an ancient African system of *maat* as articulated in the writings of Maulana Karenga (Karenga 2006).

The ancient Africans who lived along the Nile Valley created the idea of holding back chaos and made that idea the central fact of their concepts of the ethical, physical, intellectual, and eternal life. *Maat*, according to Maulana Karenga, is normally referred to in modern European languages as truth, justice, propriety, harmony, balance, reciprocity, and order. But while *Maat* is common in our contemporary language it is exceedingly rare in national behaviors. In fact it is easy to understand why it is difficult to achieve when Karenga says that "Maat means rightness in the spiritual and moral sense in three realms: the Divine, the natural and the social" (Karenga 2010). In effect, as Seba Khun-Anup says, "Speak Maat, do Maat, for Maat is mighty, it is great, it endures (...) Wrongdoing does not achieve its goal, but one who is righteous reaches dry land" (Karenga 1984 34:VIII). Our task, as communicators and cultural thinkers, is to pose Maat in the making of citizens where the digital era has broken the boundaries of territories and place. Our dealings with each other, no longer local, but global and digital, must rise to the level of Maat.

Examples

Recently, I read in the *New York Times* that the Israeli government was planning to send 400 children, born in Israel, to the original home of their parents because the parents were undocumented aliens when the children were born (*Haaretz.com*). Israel is not alone in this tendency to seek external causes for economic and social turbulence. Squeezed, because jobs are

scarce during a recession, many Israelis blame the lack of job opportunities on the presence of the once much-needed foreign laborers.

In the United States, the immigration issue has taken on some of the vilest expressions of racism we have seen for quite some years. The motivation for anti-immigration activities in the United States is the Mexican immigrant, most often undocumented. There may be twelve million undocumented aliens, principally Mexicans but also some Eastern Europeans, in the United States according to the authorities. Believing the Mexican government to be broken and that the growing migration of undocumented Mexicans to the United States cannot be completely stopped, the State of Arizona, in the American southWest, a state that borders Mexico, wrote a law requiring police to arrest anyone who might be considered *illegal*. The problem is that the only people they were targeting with this law were Mexicans. Fortunately, a federal court prevented this negative law from going into effect. There will be more debate and legal actions by the State of Arizona and the United States federal government. It appears from some news reports that there might also have been some capitalist interests in pushing this law since a few corporations that specialize in housing aliens stand to win millions of dollars worth of contracts with the State of Arizona. The plan was to have law enforcement officers arrest the aliens and since there was not enough space in the local jails, the capitalist prison developers would meet the need by producing their own holding cells. They would stand to make millions of dollars on such a scheme.

As important as these suspicions, the protections of traditional dominance patterns are at the core of these irrational actions. There are fears here, not simply fears of Mexicans taking jobs from Anglos, but a profound ontological fear. Mexicans will further Mexicanize the culture, the food, the language, the philosophy of beauty, and the history of the region. The question for the whites is: "How to maintain Anglo-Saxon control and dominance in a region that is becoming increasingly Mexican?" People know certain things or they think they know certain things because this is the way it has been done in the past or this is what their parents told them about a situation. What we have known before, that is, what we knew during the analog age, we knew viscerally with our affective as well as cognitive dimensions. Sometimes we have brought past attitudes too far into the 21st century much like children growing up in their parents' religion and then in adulthood genuinely believe that they made an independent choice

to be a member of a certain religion. In such a case, one has no choice but to choose our parents' choice. There is a wave of imposition, a tide of coercion, that exists in our social interactions around what we think are our independent choices.

Our language and our ability to decipher appear to succumb to no particular hegemonic system. We know now, however, that it is respect for others that must govern all true intellectual quests regardless of hegemony. This is the basis of all listening to others even when we hear others say: "I do not care what you say. I do not want to listen." Actually they are listening at that very moment and they do care even though they may not act upon what they have heard or may be angry about it.

I have heard some of my contemporaries say: "I am comfortable with the way of the world as it is, as I see it, do not disturb my world. Do not bring new ideas". These are the dinosaurs of thought. Do you remember what happened to Leonardo Fibonacci when he brought to Europe the African-Arab numerals that replaced the bulky Roman Numerals that had been introduced by the Roman Empire? (Bernal 1984) Many people ridiculed Leonardo Fibonacci, called him a witch, an evil man filled with mysterious ideas about how the world should or could work more efficiently, and then threw him into jail. What audacity he had to bring innovations in the way Europe wrote numerals? Today, six hundred years later the world is grateful that he insisted on the portability and practicality of the new numerals.

During the early part of the last century in the American South, a place laced with a history of charm and cruelty, and in more recent times in South Africa under the white minority regime there was *signage racism*, personal racism emerging in the *signage* throughout the country. Signs pointed people to either "white" or "black" places to eat, sleep, or drink. We knew this in the United States for a hundred years after the end of the enslavement in 1865. In the 19th century, there had been a brief twelve years of Reconstruction when it looked like the old structure of enslavement would give way to a world of interracial freedom and collective responsibility toward government (Foner 2002). Blacks were elected to Congress, served as senators, and briefly as governor of one state. But by 1877 the reaction was so severe that the response of right wing racist political operatives caused an abrupt halt to what could have been a regime of good relations. The era degenerated into the establishment of the Ku Klux Klan, a terrorist orga-

nization, with the purpose of bringing back the old regime in which blacks “knew” their places and their places were not alongside whites.

In the present day, it is hard to imagine black and white racial signs separating people but it was not so long ago that there were those times in Africa, in America. What could possibly have gone through the minds of the perpetrators of these divisive structures in America and in South Africa? Who could devise such laws? What would a white person do in a toilet that a black woman would not or could not? How could a black man use a urinal differently than a white man? What contamination would I cause to a white person by eating my food in the same room? How is it that our societies have advanced beyond this static kill of the spirit of humanity? Who is responsible for the death of reason? These are telling questions because once we answer them we are right back at the heart of the matter. Humans are responsible for all conventions by which we live regardless of our societies. If I do not want for you what I want for myself then I am reducing you to something other than human. In effect, to be human, as I am human or think I am, I have certain expectations but if I am able to separate you from me and to define you as outside of those expectations, then I have reduced you, thrown you into a pile of trash, or to the human wayside. This is the core meaning of all forms of human discrimination. The racist says, “You are not me and you do not deserve the rights or expectations that I have.” All societies have dark corners of these antique beliefs in their closets because all societies have individuals who believe they are better than others. Chattel slavery in the past was the epitome of the idea of otherness, the enslaved were those who were really not considered human at all, but property, to be owned, managed, and disposed of at will.

Portugal has its own closet of questions, so does Spain, and France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. There are no gods that have devised racist regulations and restrictions or anti-feminist attitudes; all these actions belong to humans. The makers of social terror that lead to destruction of trust and deep self-rejection are all humans. They look like our neighbours, in fact, they look like us. However, all violence against human beings has the capacity to ignite the fires of hatred (Fanon 1965).

I must add, however, that I would not ask the majority to decide on the rightness of these anti-human actions nor would I put these issues to some human majority in an effort pursue some form of Foucault’s popular justice because majorities can be very wrong (Foucault, 1989). If we think *popular*

in the sense of majority or mass public opinion we know that such popular opinions have often been responsible for killing decent people.

I do not need to remind you that a few months ago we had a horrendous debate in the United States over whether or not the Islamic community in New York should build a community center on land that they own close to the site where the World Trade Towers were attacked? There were many irrational arguments in this debate. In the United States, the Constitution, almost a sacred document, protects “freedom of religion” and “freedom of speech”. But the masses of Americans, according to pollsters at the time, wanted to deny those freedoms to Muslims. “They must not build their community center which included a mosque so close to Ground Zero,” the masses Saïd. Popular justice is sometimes based on mass justice and mass justice has its limitations when it comes to ethics.

I am a descendant of people who have lived with a majority that has over the years believed in slavery, racial segregation, Ku Klux Klan violence, the lynching of Africans. The southern majorities in America condoned attacks on little school children because they were black, and now we are often confronted in many societies with violent homophobia, anti-Jewishness, anti-Africanness, and discrimination against women. If you had taken a poll of the masses during the heat of many of these debates rational people would have wondered if we did not live in a mad society, so vitriolic and violent were the arguments and actions against others. Too often, freedom is interpreted as something that we could have but not others. This thinking, of course, is the beginning of terror.

Terror, the political term of the era, has two forms, *petty* and *grave*. They form a merry-go-round, you see them here and then you see them there. They are parts of the same process of negation of self and others. Perhaps the petty terror is different from the grave terror in some respects, as I will show, but they are pretty much of the same game. They play on the same football pitch, though in different positions at different times. They are consistent in their ability to strike from any position on the field. This is our dilemma. Petty terror operates in our societies, as it has in previous societies, as violent attacks and assaults against people and institutions with which the terrorists have differences. Terror, in such cases, is a message sent with the most awful consequences to individuals, families, homes, and institutions.

But even in the most vile assaults on property and individuals this petty terror is never so overwhelming or so consequential as the grave terror

that demonstrates its awesome power in the devastation of a people's will to live, in their desire to achieve, in their ability to maintain culture, and in their absolute economic degradation on a daily basis. Grave terror is created when a society is able to produce an extensive, indeed, in some instances a comprehensive malaise and immobility in thinking, in action, and in behaviour. It reigns supreme in the avenues of our brain like massive trucks consuming all of the space on the road. You know the experience of driving around the side of a mountain and meeting a huge truck that takes up all of the road and you are squeezed into the smallest possible area to avoid a disaster. Well, this is grave terror. Like petty terror it is based on successfully peddling the idea of mortal fear. Of course, no where else in the world has terror been de-historicized as in the United States. The 9-11 attack on the United States brought a new awareness of terror, but Africans, Native Americans had lived with terror for several hundred years. Lynching of blacks became a recreational past time in the 20th century. General Sherman sent soldiers to kill millions of buffalo on the American plains in an effort to force the Native Americans into reservation camps.

One thing we have learned in the modern world is that fear is contagious. It sends fundamentalists, of whatever religious banner, into action with a vengeance. The terrorists are fearful themselves and they use their own fear to scare the hell out of others. They blow up this and that or they tell this lie or that lie, but ultimately the malaise brought on by fear multiplies so that there is a headlong rush of masses of people seeking to hold back the collapse of structure.

They have to be against love. They have to be against Mexicans. They have to be against Africans. They have to be against Christians. They have to be against Muslims. They have to be against Catholics. They have to be against Communists. They have clear prejudices against everyone and every culture, gender, creed, or ethnic group. They are miserably locked into a world of madness. It is this madness that screams at them and creates racism, colorism, religious prejudice, women haters, and so forth.

And now we see that this suspected *hetero-philia*, love of difference, is somewhat a mirage, a phantom, because what matters to the hater, the denier, is his own identity, something he would like to prevent the other from ever possessing.

There are white Americans, for example, who insist even now that President Barack Obama is not an American despite the fact that the au-

thorities in his home state of Hawaii have produced copies of his birth certificate. We call these doubters, *birthers*, meaning that they question his nationality. “How could he be an American,” they say, “since he thinks like a European or an African?” In their minds they believe that his emphasis on social justice, religious freedom, environmental protection, health care for all, is an anti-American position. Some even ask, “How could Obama be an American since he was born in Hawaii”? Not knowing that Hawaii is a state of the United States of America these birthers betray reason and show their ignorance of their own history. Others ask: “How could he be an American since his step-father was an Indonesian and he was raised in Jakarta?” “How could he be an American since his Kansan mother married a Kenyan, and Kenya is in Africa?”

What the racists among this cohort are saying is, “How can a black man lead the American nation? How did he gain control over the political apparatus of the United States? So, one of their campaign pledges in the last election, held a few days ago, was “Let’s take our country back!” The double meaning inherent in this political declaration was probably unintentional but the clarity of going backwards is crystal clear. The implication for many conservative Americans is that Barack Obama is not an American. The fact that the right wing won one of the houses of Congress in 2010 attests to the strength of this identity politics. Although Obama’s intellectual and academic records are impeccable and the fact that he achieved the highest political office by sheer brilliance, eloquence, and the ability to sell his ideas to the majority of the people, those who closed their eyes to reality still see him as an interloper, occupying a white person’s position. I am setting a stage for you to see how the collapse of structure, however ancient in the mind, can cause more fear.

We must never forget that the fear generated in the unconscious masses is dangerous because they believe that there is some threat to them because others are also free. It is the unconscious masses’ unfreedom that produces their fear. They cannot allow others to be free because their unfreedom would unravel.

In many cases, the so-call birthers in the United States were born in Portugal, England, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Sweden, Greece, and other European nations. They came to a country of immigrants and sought to impose the strictest structures on others. One Hungarian immigrant Saïd that he was against the Mexicans coming to the United States to have

children just so they could gain American citizenship but in his case, he explained, it was different. I guess the difference was that he migrated to the United States because of political reasons, the oppressive Soviet Union's pressure on freedom in Hungary, but the Mexicans seem to be coming for economic reasons. In the end, none of this matters because the Hungarian American is just demonstrating his ignorance of history and prejudice against Mexicans, who were among the first as well as the latest group to arrive. One-third of the United States once belonged to Mexico and it is still an unsettled question in the minds of millions of Mexicans whose land was appropriated nearly one hundred and seventy years ago.

So the issue is the sovereignty of nation states in some circles. Those who claim priority of citizenship often devalue the experiences of those who arrived within the jurisdiction of the state without documents. If we cannot discriminate on the basis of ethnicity or race, then we can claim that the person is undocumented. If the person is documented, then we claim that we cannot employ them because of their accents. This is a common situation in Western Canada, in the Vancouver area, where African immigrants to the area have the highest educational credentials of any immigrant group yet often find it difficult to secure the best jobs because of their English accents. Of course, Vancouver is English-speaking and there is no trouble with the English accent of Australian or British people in the area. To further complicate this problem of linguistic accents, the largest group of immigrants to the Vancouver region are Chinese and they are the ones discriminating against the Africans because the Africans do not speak English like the Chinese immigrants. So you understand now, it is not racism, they claim, but accentism that produces the need not to hire or promote the African person. All of this is complicated by the fact that the sovereign government is Canada and yet the operational realities on the ground are counter to the realities one would find in Toronto or Montreal.

Sovereignty has two dimensions as a practical idea or as a popular idea. As a practical idea sovereignty is related to how governments control the domestic actions within its jurisdiction. As a popular idea, one gaining in use, sovereignty is earned by nations on the basis of protecting those within their jurisdiction. However, nothing about it is sacred and it could be transferred from one government entity to another.

The dominance of neoliberalism, after the fall of the Soviet Union, has brought mistrust in governments, not that this is a new idea, but it is new

in the sense that we had thought that there were some governments that were truly untrustworthy. Now, we are faced with the uncomfortable fact that governments appear to be inherently untrustworthy, regardless of the honesty of the people in the government. The nature of the bureaucracy invites, as Kafka knew, dangers to the public (Kafka 1995). There is a tendency to devalue the personal experiences of the citizen. We are victimized by our own optimism. This was the experience of many leftists during the first couple of years of the Barack Obama government in the United States. Is it ever possible for government to fulfil all of its promises and to what degree are we willing to admit that our favorite politicians have lied to us? They are neither gods nor angels, but like us, they are human. However, unlike us, they make their living selling us the idea that they are really capable of delivering us from evil. In every society, repeatedly, we believe them. Such is the nature of human mistrust of government.

We soon forget the past unless we are constantly reminded and that is why societies create rituals of remembrances, festivals, religious observances, and shrines. Sometimes children either do not remember or do not know the debt they owe to their parents for their own livelihoods.

Africans must take notice that the world is no longer after Africans in a physical sense, but after Africa itself. It is the richest continent, the cake that has not yet been fully eaten; the treasure that has not yet been completely stolen; and the intellectual and philosophical well that remains too deep from which to drink. In the West, we assume that Africa is very different, even the word exotic used by the French to identify Josephine Baker was too mild for what some would call African ideas. Terms like primitive, savage, jungle roll off of the lips of Westerners in reference to Africa more than to any other place. As an African, I am re-assured by my friends that I am not the African they are thinking about. But this reassurance does not allay my fears or calm my anxieties. There are very real reasons why I am not at ease with verbal exclusions. I know that I am one with the African world, with the African that is condemned, held in contempt, and that has history torn from its roots. I can be profiled as they say in the United States. It is one of the more onerous state crimes in America, this racial profiling, which allows the police to look at a person and to declare that person dangerous, unfit for the society, or suspicious. While it is now considered unethical and is increasingly prohibited, some highway police often have an unwritten law that certain drivers, particularly young black and Latino

males, should be routinely pulled over and checked for drugs, seatbelt violations, or any other transgression that could result in the person being imprisoned. Such deliberate targeting of those who are socially or physically “not like the rest of us”, has been adjudged a violation of a driver’s rights. It is now considered criminal in some states for police to profile individuals for harassment. But the passion for profiling stems from the prediction of dangerousness, not necessarily in physical terms, but in terms of our comfort with our own prejudices.

A recent report by the CCR.Justice.org in New York is most revealing. Jeffrey Fagan, a Professor of Law and Public Health at Columbia University, has supported a class action lawsuit of the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) that challenges New York Police Department (NYPD) stops-and-frisks because these stops were racist. Nearly 150,000 stops over the last six years lack any legal justification. Another 544,252 stops may be unconstitutional but were not sufficiently documented to analyze. Here are the facts: most police stops occur in Black and Latino neighborhoods, and even after adjustments for other factors including crime rates, social conditions and allocation of police resources in those neighborhoods, race is the main factor determining NYPD stops. Black and Latino residents are more likely to be stopped than Whites even in areas with low crime rates where populations are mixed or mostly White. Nearly half of all stops are justified by citing the vague category “furtive movements”, as opposed to only 15 percent citing “fits relevant description”. In more than half of all stops, the officers cite “high crime area” as an “additional circumstance” even in precincts with lower than average crime rates. The Supreme Court has specifically found that it is unconstitutional to stop and frisk a person simply because they are in a so-called “high-crime” neighborhood. Black and Latino suspects are treated more harshly in instances in which police officers make the determination that a crime has occurred. Black and Latino suspects are more likely to be arrested rather than issued a summons when compared to White suspects who are accused of the same crimes. Black and Latino suspects are more likely to have force used against them; and the rate of gun seizures is nearly zero – 0.15 out of a hundred stops – a disturbingly low return for a law enforcement tactic the NYPD claims is designed specifically to remove illegal guns from the streets.

The idea is that the immigrant or ethnic other in a cognitive way, that is, in the mind of the Native, could be punished not for what the immigrant

had done, or would do, but for what the Native believe he or she may do in the future. Often the Native believes that he will be harmed by the immigrant's lifestyle, behaviour, food preparations or physical dangerousness. The Native refuses to bear any risk in regard to the immigrant and in fact seeks to project the dangerousness of the immigrant as a reason for violating the immigrant's status.

What are we to make of President Sarkozy's rounding up of thousands of Roma in France and shipping them to Romania and Bulgaria? What can actually be the justification for South Africans assaulting Zimbabweans who seek work in South Africa, especially since South Africans received financial, military, and moral support from the Zimbabweans during the days of apartheid? Indeed, should there not be the quid pro quo that humans should be treated with decency simply because they treated others with decency? Why should any human be treated in a fashion less than human? The answer to this question is obvious for those of us who seek to foster new spaces for effective human interactions. No one should have to deny their identity, conceal their names, or hide their background in order to be a full citizen. It was widely reported on September 25, 2010 that two former Polish neo-Nazis who had become violent skinheads in Warsaw during their teenage years learned in 2009 that they were actually Jewish. The report said that their ancestors had hid their Jewish identities in order to protect them from the Nazis. Ola, the woman, and Pawel, the man, now in their thirties said that they believed when they were teenagers that "it was all about white power (...) that Jews were the biggest plague and the worst evil of this world" (*New York Times*, February 28, 2010). Now that they have embraced their Jewish identity and history they are actively trying to overcome the regrets of the past. Of course, they no longer believed the accusations against Jews now that they have understood their own humanity as Jews. Literally, they have awakened to become the bodies and the minds they hated without reason. The claiming of identity is a form of census taking. It allows us to know who we are and who the other is only for the purpose of enriching our lives, not destroying theirs or preventing theirs, but seeing clearly how much, even with difference, we are to each other.

I think we can pose another issue of complexity given the new emphasis on non-geographical social networks such as Internet blogs, online communities, virtual classrooms, and various other non-geographical spaces. We can spread our identities, opinions, and ideas throughout the world in

near lightning speed and without an editor. An entire field of intercultural and international communication developed in the 1970s around the notion that human beings from various cultures were interacting more regularly because of air travel. This meant that a business person, student, or professor who lived in one cultural setting could easily within a day be situated in another geographical area with someone of a different culture. Now all of this has become far more complicated because our spaces have become arenas of thought, multi-level discourse sites, and even interactive ideologies that are created through digital engagements. In effect, spaces of interpersonal communication and intercultural communication are discovered everyday in our ordinary adventures with each other. They are the spaces where we meet other cultures and interact with them in the context of a common humanity.

Our own identities are created and re-created during these remarkable meetings and it is our emphasis on human relations that re-shapes our spaces so that they are safe. Maulana Karenga, Antonio Gramsci, Stuart Hall, and Ana Monteiro Ferreira, among others, have added the dimensions of class, power, identity, and centeredness to intercultural spaces. I have tried to link Afrocentricity, that is, the idea of agency and subject perspective of African culture, to the best aspects of post-modernity. In an anti-structural sense, a core idea in post-modernity, Afrocentricity has sought to address immigration, diasporas, and representative identities in ways that align with the best thinking of Ama Mazama, bell hooks, Paul du Gay, Stuart Hall, Ien Ang, and even Zizek.

They all suggest that you cannot hear your own opinion and be sane. You have to listen to others, integrate ideas, attach symbols, understand and appreciate diversity, in order to retain a semblance of humanity. But to listen to others is essential communication. President Amadinejad has some of the same issues that President Bush had, he hears his own voice, he sees only his perspective, and he concedes only his history. Yet as the poet Saïd, none of us is an island.

Maat exists sometimes when we have exhausted the means to harm each other. Armies have run out of weapons, distances have proven too great to launch missiles, money has dried up and the people are weary of supporting warfare, and children have been born who have no memory of the reasons for hatreds, animosities, and enmities between people. We must have a new standard of citizenship, based on acceptance of diversity,

freedom, and respect for humanity and reason, then we will be able to declare that humanity has met and conquered the ordeal of citizenship in the digital age.

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WITHSTANDING THE RIGHT-WING STORM: THE CURRENT AMERICAN (ANTI-) INTELLECTUAL LANDSCAPE AND THE INTELLECTUAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF NATIVE AMERICAN STUDIES

TOM HOLM

It is unfortunate indeed to have to report that cultural hostilities, anti-intellectualism, xenophobia, rage, anti-government sentiment, and racial polarization in the U.S. are once again on the march. What this current American celebration of ignorance, fear, and bigotry seems to be aimed at is the extinction of any and all intellectual development. It really appears as if the Arizona state legislature wants to stop knowledge dead in its tracks. The current appeal is to aggrandize the so-called American way of individualism, capitalist entrepreneurship, Christian fundamentalist thought, and professed American exceptionalism to the detriment of any critical thought, scientific method, and especially of the post-World War II hypotheses about human socio-political behavior. Anything that remotely criticizes American colonialism, racist policies, modernization theory and the perceived liberties of erroneous and vitriolic free speech, bearing arms, and the insertion of Christian fundamentalist ideologies into the making of national policy is seen as un-American and even criminal. This paper amounts to a special plea for the continuance of ethnic studies as legitimate academic disciplines in the face of these ideological trends.

Arizona, the state in which I reside, has led the charge into the politics of fear. The newly elected president of the Arizona state senate, Russell Pearce, is the chief supporter of various laws that are aimed directly at oppressing the Mexican-American population in the state, including an "English-only" law, a statute that permits racial profiling to check the papers of so called "illegal immigrants," a regulation that would allow school boards to fire teachers who have heavy "foreign" accents, and finally a law that would ban any kind of ethnic studies program in schools, colleges, and universities based on the unfounded supposition that these programs advocate the overthrow of the American government and promote ethnic

solidarity instead of American individualism. Pearce even wants to change the fourteenth amendment of the U.S. Constitution to deny citizenship to so-called “anchor babies”, those born on American soil to undocumented immigrant mothers. An ironic twist to Pearce’s stance on the fourteenth amendment is the fact that the young man, who staunchly held the blood from Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords’ gunshot wound she suffered in an assassination attempt and propped her up so that she did not choke on her own blood all the while dodging bullets, was in fact an “anchor” baby – exactly the person Pearce would have deported immediately and without even the briefest of hearings. Daniel Hernandez Jr., the twenty-year-old man who heroically helped save Representative Giffords’ life, was a congressional intern who also sat on the city of Tucson’s Board of Gay, Lesbian, Bi-sexual, and Transgender Affairs.

If Pearce and others had their way, the U.S. would be moved back to the mentality and socio-political structure of the 1950s. Civil rights for minority groups would be non-existent; Christian fundamentalist beliefs would be enshrined in school curriculums instead of scientific reasoning and critical thought; unbridled capitalism would create an even greater disparity in wealth between the upper and lower classes; there would be nothing left of the social and economic safety nets that were created under the New Deal of the 1930s; and new knowledge, particularly about ethnicity, race and colonialism, would have been filtered strictly through the models, theoretical constructs, and ideologies of Western European intellectual traditions. What follows is a short and basic history of the intellectual development generated by information gathered just within the framework of Native American Studies – a framework that will not exist if current American anti-intellectual sentiment has its way. The storm of right-wing criticism is rapidly gaining strength. On the other hand, many students of the discipline of American Indian studies have published the results of their research. So I am hopeful that American Indian studies will survive the tempest of invective launched against its content and the attempt to excise it completely from all levels of public education. I might mention also that this threat exists against all of these kinds of programs and their own internally created theories and the new knowledge they have produced.

The notion that Native American – and for that matter, African-American and Mexican-American – studies is a simple by-blow of 1960s activism has become almost axiomatic. I have heard several of my non-Native col-

leagues in various disciplines argue that ethnic studies programs in general were established in order to mollify minority protests on college campuses rather than to move any kind of academic discourse forward. These colleagues have more or less adhered to the proposition that Western science, logic, and philosophy have already developed the conceptual frameworks, theories, paradigms, and core assumptions that fully explain the political, social, and economic behaviors of minority peoples, including those living as colonized groups. Thus, Native American studies is considered a kind of tributary – a stepchild – of the mainstream disciplines like history, political science, sociology, and anthropology. Worse still is that American Indian studies has been accused of providing sinecures for Native American political activists rather than hiring “real” (read “traditional”) scholars in order to place barbed thorns in the sides of university administrators.

During this period of time, however, a number of Native American scholars and activists were conducting research and proposing ideas that moved American Indian studies beyond Western intellectual constructs. I will add too that scholars of African-American and Mexican-American studies were doing the very same. In the case of Native American studies, the first wave of American Indian scholars understood, in the light of post-modern discourse, that deconstructing stereotypes of Native peoples was a step toward completely disavowing harmful, abusive, and even genocidal policies.

In 1968, N. Scott Momaday was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for his novel *House Made of Dawn*. Most critics praised the book for its portrait of an Indian man, the main character Abel, caught between two worlds. Many academic observers have posited that Momaday was working from a post-modernist standpoint and was thus disparaging the colonial oppression that had led to the decline of his culture and his own marginalization. In the final act of the novel, however, Abel returns to his native land and finds solace in his own culture. In short, Momaday was not really the cynical post-modern writer that his reviewers would have him. What he did, in my opinion, was introduce his readers to the spiritual healing of place. Abel’s culture was rooted in his home land, which was also a holy land. Indigenoussness was actually Abel’s salvation. And since Momaday’s work, the meaning of place to human beings has been one of the focal points of Native American studies. He certainly solidified the idea of a living connection between human beings and place in his book *The Way to Rainy*

Mountain (Momaday, 1976 and 1999). I was fortunate to have worked with Momaday and with Vine Deloria, Jr., whose readership was easily as great as Momaday's. Deloria recruited Momaday to the University of Arizona, along with Leslie Marmon Silko, Robert K. Thomas, and my humble self. Looking back, I would have to argue that Deloria was perhaps the most significant force behind the development of American Indian studies as an autonomous discipline within the academy. Although often labelled as an activist (and polemicist), Deloria was a fierce logician who attempted to deconstruct false and harmful stereotypes of Native Americans. Deloria's diverse academic background included study at the Colorado School of Mines, general science at Iowa State University, theology at the Lutheran School of Theology, and law at the University of Colorado. He also served as the Executive Director of the National Congress of American Indians. Perhaps in consequence of his liberal education, Deloria approached every topic on which he wrote from a multi-disciplinary standpoint.

Although not one to formulate theory or construct paradigms, Deloria took up the critics' role of dissecting each and every academic assumption about Native Americans as well as putting Western science and philosophy under his intense logical scrutiny. He literally put Western academia on trial and generally found them all inadequate to explain the Native American relationship with place, the persistence of Native cultures, the pervasiveness of Native spirituality, and Native American behaviors. Deloria made several indictments in his first book, *Custer Died for your Sins*, but none so scathing as his critique of the traditional academic discipline of anthropology. "Indians", he wrote, "have been cursed above all other people in history. Indians have anthropologists" (Deloria 1988, 78). His overall criticism against the discipline primarily rested on the fact that anthropologists frequently built careers on observing Indians, but, at the same time, learned nothing about Indians. Just as frequently, in both the pure and the applied research, anthropologists developed jargon and a set of definitions that not only perpetuated stereotypes but also fixed certain incorrect notions in the minds of non-Indians. In looking into the matter of anthropology and Indians further, I have become convinced that Deloria had it right all along.

I will attempt, in a very Native way, to illustrate Deloria's contention about anthropology by retelling one of my experiences with an anthropologist colleague and explaining my own war on certain anthropological terms and concepts. The experience with my anthropologist colleague occurred

just a few years ago. I sit on a commission for my own Native nation in Oklahoma. I am an enrolled citizen of the Cherokee Nation. One of my good friends is our tribal NAGPRA (Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act) officer. NAGPRA essentially was established to return human remains and grave goods to Native nations for proper re-interment according to tribal customs. My friend asked a group of Cherokee elders what they would like to see returned to the Cherokee people then located in various museums around the country. They unanimously replied that they wanted to have the “giants’ arrowheads” given back. According to tradition, the giants’ arrowheads are very powerful, protective medicine that secured both the health and prosperity of the Cherokee people.

I told my anthropologist colleague about the revelation from our tribal elders, to which she replied, “Oh, they must mean Clovis points!” My remark to her was probably not put as well as it should have been put. I said that it did not make much difference if they were Clovis or Mousterian or Saturn’s fingernails, the giants’ arrowheads were powerful objects and not museum pieces to be classified for public view. My colleague bristled, narrowed her eyes and said, “You people simply don’t understand the importance of the Clovis point!” It is exactly this kind of cross-purpose discussion with racial overtones that makes Indians question the supposed benefits of Western science.

Anthropological classification and definition has led me into several more fierce discussions over terminology. I am currently doing battle with the term “tribe”. I use it frequently as do my Native American brothers and sisters. But in recent years, journalists and scholars have used the term to explain violence and genocide in the Middle East, Africa, and Eastern Europe. This incredible level of hatred and violence in Afghanistan, Rwanda, and Kosovo was the result of a kind of “us-them” mentality of kin-based, exclusive, tribal societies. This notion is the direct result of an undisputed anthropological definition. In the nineteenth century, the father of American anthropology Lewis Henry Morgan began to use “tribe” and “clan” almost interchangeably. Since then “tribe” is used for a group of people that bases its social structure and political system on kinship. Kinship, in Western political discourse, does not a state make. What that means in the long run is that they do not have the international status as do other nation-states. Some of my political science colleagues have actually argued that because Indian tribes do not rise to the level of the bureaucratic state,


the treaties they made with the United States are not necessarily valid. In short, this rationale could be used to lessen the importance of our treaty rights.

Deloria's scholarship went beyond his critique of anthropology (and, with it, the rest of the social sciences). He added an important, but often overlooked, evaluation of the Bering Straight theory of how Indians came to the New World and offered a strong rebuttal to the idea that somehow Indians were to blame for the extinction of American mega fauna around 10,000 BCE. These arguments, presented in his *Red Earth, White Lies*, first published in 1995, are perhaps the most thought-provoking reassessments of so-called scientific theory that have added to the spurious stereotyping of Native Americans as immigrants to the Americas and rapacious hunters willing to exterminate any and all creatures in their path (Deloria 1995, 81-127).

But Deloria's most significant intellectual gift was his deep understanding of the Native American sense of place. Through various writings, but especially in his *God is Red*, he outlined the basic tenant that human beings have a regard for their place over and above that which values land for its resources or its worth as a piece of property. Native knowledge, according to Deloria, was the understanding that the human-place relationship was organic by nature. Deloria also pointed out that place was sacred at several different levels (Deloria 2003, 276-278).

Deloria's ideas about the Native American-territory/land/place nexus fit closely with those of Robert K. Thomas. Deloria recruited Thomas, a Cherokee anthropologist, to the University of Arizona in 1981 to serve as director of the newly founded American Indian studies graduate program. Most important in terms of theoretical development in American Indian studies were Thomas' hypothesis of "internal" or "domestic" colonialism and his concept of "peoplehood" (Thomas 1966-1967a & b; Thomas 1981; Thomas 1986; Fink 1998). Thomas was convinced that Native American peoples had a sense of group identity focused on their individual tribes' own language, territory, religion, and sacred history. Without those four elements the "people" would not constitute an identifiable human group—in short "peoplehood." Thomas built this theoretical base for Native societies on Edward Spicer's and George Castile's and Gilbert Kushner's models of "enduring" or "persistent" peoples. Spicer, Castile, and Kushner, however, did not include a very important aspect, that of "sacred history" in their respective models (Spicer 1962; Castile and Kushner 1981).

Several years after Thomas' death, Diane Pearson, Ben Chavis, and I took up the notion of peoplehood and saw its potential as a defining model for American Indian studies. Let me illustrate with a Native American symbol what we have come to call the "People Matrix" (Holm 2000; Holm, Pearson, and Chavis 2003; Holm 2005, xiv-xv).



This figure was carved on a rock surface and was an artifact of the Mississippian mound builder culture. It cannot be dated with pinpoint accuracy. In any case, it depicts the intertwined bodies of four horned snakes – called in Cherokee *uktena*. The four bodies are intertwined so as to be inseparable and they cannot be distinguished as being attached to a particular head. I am convinced that they were depicted in this manner to demonstrate the idea that they are all related one to another. It is, therefore, a representation of the complexity of culture – a metaphor if you like – that combines place, spirituality, and history in a holistic milieu. It is then the gist of both Deloria's and Thomas' understanding of Native knowledge: that the world is a living being that does not function mechanically.

As Pearson, Chavis and I modified the matrix, each snake represents the four basic elements of peoplehood: language, sacred history, ceremonial cycle (a change from Thomas' "religion"), and place. As Keith Basso has argued in his *Wisdoms Sits in Places*, language and storytelling essentially relate to landscape and demonstrates a kind of living kinship between environment and identity (Basso 1996). I know of numerous elders who can simply walk across a meadow in Northeastern Oklahoma and tell you not only place names but also the stories about how and why they were given those names. But the connection between all four elements of peoplehood

exists in the same way. Sacred history (origin and creation stories as well as trickster and hero stories) tells not only of the requirements for ceremonies but how, when and why they are to be performed. Ceremonies always relate to place in that they are usually conducted according to seasonal, faunal, floral, stellar, solar, or lunar change. Healing ceremonies are done to cure the body, mind, and spirit of the individual. They seek to heal the surrounding environment as well so that the physical and spiritual worlds commingle and establish balance and harmony. Priests and shamans always utilize sacred objects from the environment, whether gourd rattles, particular stones, animal hides, bird feathers, and/or plant parts. Sage, sweet grass, and cedar are but three types of plants burned to cleanse the environment in which ceremonies take place. Finally, language is used both colloquially and in a liturgical sense to tell the stories, sing the healing and ceremonial songs, relate to others, establish kinship, and ultimately to seek political consensus through persuasion. There are three very important derivatives of peoplehood: political sovereignty, personal identity or nationality, and individual well-being in terms of mental and physical health.

Momaday, Deloria, and Thomas set American Indian studies on a course that should lead to its being recognized as a free-standing academic discipline. American Indian studies has theory, definitions, and even methodologies that set it apart. It has students, refereed journals, and academic conferences where the latest in research is presented every year. It can no longer be considered a tributary of one or more of the traditional Western disciplines. It has, along with African-American and Mexican-American studies programs, become a legitimate, autonomous area of inquiry and research.

But given today's political climate, these great strides in the evolution of this particular area of study can be wiped out with a single law or a steep decrease in funding. Already we have seen in our universities an increase in hiring adjunct instructors and a decline in appointing professors on tenure tracks. Additionally, new instructors are hired with degrees in the traditional disciplines to teach American Indian studies. Even though there are ethnic studies programs in the United States that grant doctoral degrees, universities nevertheless hire instructors whose first loyalty must be in a "home" department. The home department, of course, is in a traditional discipline. It all seems apparent that the trend in American education is to throw out programs and focus on the "traditional" for two reasons, both implemented to mollify the current right-wing cries for budgetary austerity

(while giving away vast sums to corporations) and base education on so-called traditional American values.

This ostensible return to American values in education is shorthand for teaching the old doctrine of American exceptionalism. The “exceptionalist” notion is a political tool used to stir up patriotism among voters, especially those of European decent. In essence, American exceptionalism asserts that Americans, because of the Constitution and the frontier experience, are freer, more productive, more democratic, more diligent, more innovative, more plainspoken, and more assertive than their European ancestors and contemporaries. It is, in fact, a clear expression of a supposedly new identity based on the rejection of its European roots. It also rests on the false assumption that the founding of the republic, subsequent turmoil of civil war, and the expansion of the United States from ocean to ocean was a great blood sacrifice. Exceptionalism, then, is a kind of religious experience. The upshot of this form of American piety is an illogical assault on all things deemed “un-American”. Interestingly, the two-word phrase “special interest” has come to be used among certain groups as a synonym for the terminology. “Ethnics” are considered special interests within this ideological framework. The Arizona law calling for a ban on ethnic studies programs essentially encapsulates this trend in American right-wing philosophy. Another point about this American creed is that its true believers do not believe it carries racist overtones. Anyone of any color, so they say, can accept the creed and become a “true” American. The trouble is that there is no room for critical thought or diversity. The logical trend is to de-legitimize ethnic studies, whether American Indian, African-American, and Mexican-American, except when these programs emphasize the assimilation of these groups into mainstream American society. If that is truly the case, then the collective works of scholars like Momaday, Deloria, and Thomas will be, once again, shelved and treated as aberrations in the American academy.

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PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS FOR A MORE HUMAN HUMANITY: THE AFROCENTRIC IDEA

ANA MONTEIRO-FERREIRA

Introduction

This essay reflects my concern with the annihilating effects of the contemporary globalization and technologization of science and society and draws on Jean-François Lyotard's (2007) double concept of *inhuman*¹ and Molefi Kete Asante's (2009) *fundamental critique of the Western discourse*.² It is a critical reading of the Western constructions of knowledge both in its origins and dehumanizing consequences.

Many thinkers who understand the Western rationalistic project as well as the collapse of modern capitalist societies have long predicted the failure of an unending faith in the progress of humanity during the twentieth century. Anchored in the hegemonic and totalizing views of the Western individual as superior and of the Western thought as universal, new theories have surfaced, one after the other, as Western intellectuals and thinkers have tried to answer the anxieties of the Western individual mind and close the breach on the Western paradigm caused by the atomization and itemization of people in society.

The possibility that African cultures and values bring renewed ethical and social significance to a sustained project of human agency, liberation, and equality is explored here as a critique of the Western discourse and construction of knowledge understood and discussed in the context of Afrocentricity, a revolutionary philosophical paradigm and an epistemological theory of social change.

¹Published in France in 1988 *L'inhuman: Causeries sur le temps* discusses the need to question the ideological mechanisms through which humans become individuals, i.e., acquire a 'second' nature which makes them fit into the established social and cultural institutions.

²In "Resisting Westernity and Refusing Development" published in 2009 Asante declares that "(T)here can be no privileged discourses that protect the status quo where the status quo is anti-human".

Concepts like individualism, domination, colonialism, race and ethnicity, universalism, progress and supremacy that Molefi Kete Asante, the creator of the Afrocentric theory, calls the infrastructures of dominance and privilege are reviewed against the backdrop of agency, community, commonality, cultural centeredness, and *maat* to highlight the inadequacy of Westernity in overcoming the various forms of oppression.

The discussion that will follow between Westernity and Afrocentricity can be summarized as a dialogue between, respectively, the primacy of rational individualistic values and the holistic values towards life and the world, community and nature.

Conceptualization

Like every other theory, Afrocentricity has a history. The publication of Asante's *Afrocentricity: The Theory of Social Change* (1980) is the philosophical and methodological corollary of five hundred years of works and struggles of many of this author's African and African-American predecessors, scholars, writers, scholar-activists, poets, preachers – public intellectuals – like W.E.B. Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, Cheikh Anta Diop, Langston Hughes, Harold Cruse, Malcolm X, Ida B. Wells Barnett, George James, Paul Lawrence Dunbar, Carter G. Woodson, Anna Julia Cooper, John Henrik Clarke and many more, in the best tradition of the modern American public intellectual. Unlike the modern American “think tanks” popular in media and in television appearances, whose goal is to shape general public opinion on important political and ideological matters that keep the American *status quo* intact, the Black Public Intellectual, active in the community, in an academic or preaching format, writing magazine articles or books, less frequently on television, has worked in a distinct direction: to improve the social conditions inherited from the American dehumanizing system of white-on-black oppression. In the American cultural, social, and intellectual panorama, in fact the epitome of racial oppression and historical falsifications, the work of African centered scholars like the great Pan-African Marcus Garvey and W.E.B. Dubois as well as John Henrik Clarke's, Yosef Ben-Jochannan's, Ivan Van Sertima's, and especially Cheikh Anta Diop's seminal works, irrefutably detail African contributions to society in a way that demises the Eurocentric myth that white people are the fathers and

mothers of civilization, technology, religion, philosophy and education, to the detriment of peoples of African descent labeled as uncivilized, barbaric, with neither history nor contribution to the civilized world.

African American preachers, on the other hand, also have a strong tradition of keeping active roles in politics, running for office or sustaining their congregation to support and serve its best interests, struggling for social uplift and the human dignity of the African community: Absalom Jones, M.L. King, Jr., Jessie Jackson Sr., Richard Allen, Al Sharpton, Jeremiah Wright, Malcolm X, Elijah Muhammad, to name the most charismatic.

In the academy, or in the community, their work has been systematically suppressed pretty much by and in every mainstream white dominated institution in America. Some of these intellectuals, predecessors of Asante's theory and forced into an *artificial or recent memory*, have become trapped in a kind of *cul-de-sac* resulting from an appreciation of oppression through the ideological lens with which the oppressor determines his rule. They have almost invariably choked in the obfuscating nets of Westernity, which shifts responsibility away from the oppressor and the institution of *officialized* race discrimination by providing a selective cultural amnesia to hide the facts and support the motives of geo-political-socio-economic domination and white supremacy. When trying to elevate the status of Africans and attain the common goals of cultural reconstruction and liberation of African people these scholars, activists, and public intellectuals face the paramount challenge of confronting the cultural and religious hegemony that "makes sense" of the pivotal doorway into the relevance of humankind's past painted white; one such clear example being eventually Martin Luther King, Jr.'s Christian framework.

With Afrocentricity, Asante brings to the fore the parameters of the African sense of the world, and reclaims this culturally rooted African worldview and the power of rememory (Morrison 1987) to confront and resist white racism, to regain African cultural and historical centeredness, to critically build a metatheory based on the study of the three fundamental themes in the African and by extension African American discourse (1) human relations; (2) human's relations to the supernatural; and (3) humans' relationship to their own being (*ibid.* 168), in an African rhetoric condition.

While it poses a severe criticism of the preponderant Eurocentric myths of universalism and challenges the colonizing concepts and racist theo-

ries that preside over the triumph of the Western thought, Afrocentricity also offers the possibility of a non-hegemonic alternative perspective in the understanding of human expressions in our diverse multicultural society. Afrocentricity materialized as a theory of knowledge in 1980 under Molefi Kete Asante's philosophical thinking whilst a systematic challenge to Western epistemology. It emerged in the African-American cultural panorama as a set of premises that would account for the understanding of an African sense of totality and wholeness in a network of multiple and particular manifestations of different fields of knowledge to address the life and experience of people of African descent in America, in the African continent, and in other diasporas.

Theoretically rooted in the pursuit of human knowledge from a culturally and historically located perspective of the subject, it questions moral, political, and intellectual justifications of taken-for-universal values in clear epistemological rupture against what in this work is addressed as Westernity. By agencing the African subject in the voicing of his/her own history and culture contrary to being the object of study or the mere subject matter in the framework of Eurocentric disciplines (Asante 1988), Afrocentric theory informs a clear epistemological rupture with the Eurocentric paradigm.

This epistemological rupture with Westernity may be better understood if we reverse our present day status of ideological subjects to find out the epistemological moment where our Western perception of the world, as we conceive it today, has gained its shape – Modernity.

Modern Western philosophy and cultural paradigms are based on individualism and on the autonomous individual as center of the universe. They have been shaped by the systematic attempt to control the natural order in a *quasi* supra-natural understanding, and ultimately, as the replication of an almost *divine* power, as the secular human being became the locus and center of rationality with the reasonable doubt of René Descartes (1596-1650) and the power of the reasoning mind of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), maybe the two most influential philosophers of the Modern epoch.

However, over five hundred years of building a project that presumed to revolve around human rationality and for that matter emancipation, progress, and civilization the credibility of modern ideals of social wellbeing and equanimity is being profoundly questioned *au fur et à mesure* that individualism and collective greed, secular and religious powers alike, have

plunged Europe and the world into consecutive humanitarian disasters since European modernity has emerged.

Afrocentricity questions the European project of Modernity both in its universalistic and hegemonic stances. Afrocentric perspective on knowledge requires “location”: African “location” as the methodological approach to African traditions and cultures while refusing the subaltern place that has always been conferred to black expressions, artistic and cultural, by Eurocentric scholars. As a theory of location and agency, Afrocentricity is committed to the reconstruction of ancient African classical civilizations as the place for interpreting and understanding the history of African peoples, narratives, myths, spirituality and cosmogonies.

Similar to the notion that can be found in Cultural Studies that “everything is culture” (Pires 2004, 35) in an Afrocentric sense culture is also holistic, systemic, symbolic, and relativist. It is the lifelong process of individual and collective apprehension of the meaning of the world, of human relationships, of the relationship of humanity with the world and its manifestations.

In the Afrocentric paradigm, culture entails the historical experience of a people, their systems of knowledge, spiritual dimensions, ethical and social values organized in some aesthetic support that reflects their particular cosmological standpoint. Culture is therefore history in its broadest sense.

Major Findings

The consciousness of difference, the ontological problem of self-definition, the dramatic reversal of meaning and purpose of life entered African cosmogony with Portuguese and Spanish colonization, the European Slave Trade, and the “civilizational” mission supported by the Catholic Church. Concerns with the meaning of existence and identity have been, for the past 500 plus years, at the core of every African person’s existential quest impaired by colonial theft of self-definition and sense of humanity. In fact, the foundational ideas of the Western European concept of the world and its civilizational expansion have led instead to the objectification of human beings, reducing them to the role of *commodifiables* of powerful Western international corporations.

As a result of the analysis conducted on both paradigms three major propositions must be highlighted in order to critically discuss the founda-

tional ideas of the Western European concept of the world and its oppressive nature on the one hand, and the liberating nature of the Afrocentric theory of knowledge on the other.

The first proposition is the idea that the project of European Modernity, purportedly aiming at propelling liberation and the development of humanity through progress and civilization, has paradoxically become one of the most oppressive, annihilating, and destructive ventures for human beings. The second proposition is the fact that there are two grounding philosophies of political, economic, and social organization as well as two modes of perceiving human relationships: one is an ethics of sustainability the other an ethics of deprecation (Galeano 1971). They represent respectively (1) the respect for the good of the community organized in systems of freedom and equality, a simple reflection of one's respectful orientation towards human beings and nature, and (2) the individualistic profit motive organized under oppression and exploitation that has been crystallized by the Western dichotomic organization of thought in political concepts of right and left, capitalism and socialism. The third proposition regards the fact that Afrocentricity represents a philosophical paradigmatic rupture with the extreme case of hegemonic Western ideological framework, which is Eurocentrism, offering a philosophical structure and a liberating theory of knowledge with the potential to bring a renewed ethics for a more human humanity.

Discussion of the central propositions

Three pillars sustain Westernity. The first is Christianity and Enlightenment that became the building blocks of European Modernity. They constitute, in Lyotard's sense, the two grand narratives of the Western thought, myths of freedom and progress validated by anthropocentric philosophical theories hand in hand with political and religious powers, which are what we can call the birth of a Eurocentric ideology: one that became simultaneously the place of material and symbolic exploitation, oppression, and exclusion of the rest of the world, exactly as Chinweizu called his 1975 work *The West and the Rest of Us*. The second is the Western philosophical architecture of European Modernity which heir to Greek and Roman classical philosophy and law, produced a comprehensive superstructure around

the following foundational and distinctive traces: (1) the modern man, separated from the Divine by his inherent ability to reason, became the center of the material and immaterial world that he would subdue, transform, and use for the betterment of his living conditions, and technological and economic development; (2) this journey from a theocentric into an anthropocentric orientation of the world could only be achieved by the separation of the material from the immaterial, the body from the soul, that crystallized into the perception of a dichotomous world created by relationships of inclusion and exclusion: I versus the other, center versus periphery/margin; (3) in a world defined by binary oppositions, progress / civilization can only be achieved by means of conflict; (4) progress is evolutionary – a journey to the future in a linear conceptualization of time: past is disconnected from future; (5) individualism, i.e. the prerogative of the individual person to overlook an ethics of common and shared responsibility with the community and the world, has been conferred to the modern European man by Christianity as the belief in a Supreme omnipotent entity ultimately the only one endowed with the power to punish, reward or redeem human actions.

The third pillar of Westernity evolved out of the European Modernity's thrust for material/economic and ideological/religious expansionism that produced a new Global Order: Western or Modern Capitalism at the expense of the human degradation of the rest of the world by colonial and imperial oppression and the exploitation of the human and natural resources of Africa, Asia, and the Americas, sustained by a new conceptual tool of oppression and domination: racism.

Afrocentricity also has three, yet absolutely distinct foundational mainstays. One is the fact that the first major human civilization whose origins date back to at least the 4th millennium B.C.E.³ is African. The second is what in Afrocentric terms we call communalities, i.e. the fact that Classical African or Kemetic cosmological orientation can be found all over the African continent as part of an African conceptualization of the world that Islamic and European colonization could not destroy. The third is the existence of an African comprehensive superstructure, characterized by a *Maa-tian* or Ancient Kemetic sense of the world, organized around the following values: (1) the Kemetic sense of the world or the African superstructure

³In Afrocentric theory B.C.E. stands for Before the Common Era.

is holistic. It does not conceive the world in separate but in contiguous and integrated forms where the spirit world and the material world, life and death, nature and human beings, ancestors, living and those yet to be born, are all part of the cosmological order; (2) harmony, not conflict, is the generating force in the world. Indeed one first moment of balance and harmony of the cosmological forces created the world. A first occasion / Tep Sepi / or the Big Bang if we want to translate it into modern scientific language / or a First Creator in a spiritual sense /or the old, old, old ancestor created the world and passed it on to the human beings to take care of it; (3) in the African spiritual sense a supreme being is not an all-governing, all-presiding entity over the destiny of the world. On the contrary, it is the human being's responsibility to actively and permanently seek the sacred in life and heal the world *serujta*, and restore the supreme moments of balance and harmony; (4) endowed with the ability to reason it is human beings' responsibility to keep balance and harmony in the world: searching for MAAT is the ultimate condition and meaning of existence for the African; (5) the rhythms of life are cyclical and the notion of time is circular: past is contiguous to future and past actions determine the path to harmony or chaos. Therefore it is the world, and the future that render human beings accountable for their moral conduct. Human responsibility is not deferred to the Creator /the first ancestor; (6) ancestors, not an almighty omnipresent God, are venerated as the symbols and keepers of wisdom and ethical teachings.

Conclusion

The critical analysis on both paradigms revealed that with colonial and imperial practices of racism, oppression, and exploitation, the individualistically – and hegemonically – oriented performance of the European man of reason erected a rotten edifice of dehumanization that reclaimed liberation from economic exploitation (Marxism) and physical and psychological survival (Existentialism), eventually the complete overturn of the European Grand-narratives (Post-Modernism). All of them grounded in the basic tenets of the Western *Weltanschauung*, they could barely provide partial shifts in the perception and functional orientation of the Western superstructure (ideology), post-modernism included.

Only a paradigmatic rupture – a philosophical framework structured around a totally different cosmological orientation – would provide the liberation of thought towards an epistemological and functional liberation of humanity from inhumanity. This is the role of the Afrocentric philosophical paradigm constructed over *Maat*, *Hisia ya Dunia*, (African sense of the world in Kiswahili), *Ubuntu*, *Muntu* and other African philosophies based on the cultural and historical centeredness of Africa and African agency, within an ethics of respect and equality, shared values of community and environmental sustainability.

While the Western thought, condensed in the Eurocentric paradigm, has failed in solving the crucial stances of humanity in a modern world, where the male white individual had to confront the collapse of his civilizational project and was left adrift in the void created by his impossible transcendence, the Afrocentric paradigm seized the floor of Western hermeneutics and transcending any parochial or essentialist assumption becomes a new place of human consciousness, a non-hegemonic and non-hierarchical location from where to assess the world, and the possibility of a perspective on data that definitely demises European hegemony (Asante 2007a).

Afrocentricity provides a critique to Western distortions of history and to its diffusionist proclivities (Blaut 1993). It stands as a revolutionary theory of knowledge, a philosophical paradigm that answers many of the subject's anxieties that contemporary Western discourses have been unable to overcome when we want to understand, and overturn, the deep structure of oppressive power relations that have almost erased colonized peoples' agency out of the world landscape.

Unlike the universal character reclaimed by Eurocentric ideologies, Afrocentricity unapologetically honors historical and cultural contingency. This sense of contingency and respect is precisely that which generates the whole encompassing scope of the theory that can be appropriated by anyone anywhere because the parameters of the theory remain equally valid if applied to locate any people as agents in the center of their own culture and history, which testifies to the fact that Afrocentricity is not a reversed Eurocentrism. The theory stands as an orientation to knowledge that rejects essentialism. It is a liberating theory and a paradigm that provides the epistemological tools to scientifically address issues of oppression, distortion and dislocation, in order to restore human beings to their self-identities and dignity.

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VARGAS LLOSA. TWO CULTURES, TWO DISCOURSES: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE WESTERN INTELLECTUAL AND EL HABLADOR (The Storyteller) IN MACHIGUENGA SOCIETY

KLEMENS DETERING

Mario Vargas Llosa was born in Arequipa, Peru in 1936. He was a member of an important group of Latin American intellectuals beginning in the 1950's and rising in influence throughout the 1960's. Vargas is well-known, not only for his notable novels including *Los jefes* [The Time of the Hero] (1959 /1963), *La ciudad y los perros* [The City and the Dogs] (1962/1966), *La Casa Verde* [The Green House] (1966), and *Conversaciones en la Catedral* [Conversation in the Cathedral] (1969) but also for his civic activism, debating again and again themes like the relationship between diverse cultural identities, their coexistence or cultural hybridism. Peruvian, a naturalized Spanish citizen and citizen of the world residing in London, he was elected President of PEN Club International in 1977. His most high profile political activities include running, in 1990, for the presidency of Peru, when he lost to the agricultural engineer Alberto Fujimori. During the 1950's, Vargas Llosa openly sympathized with communism. Later, he moved closer to Liberalism and Neo-liberalism, making his support for these tendencies publicly known. He has recently offered a strong critique of the populist regime of Hugo Chaves for the increasing limitations he has placed on the freedom of speech of the press. During the recent Chilean elections, Vargas Llosa supported the current President Sebastián Piñera, appearing with him at several campaign events. Then, in October 2010, the career of this great freethinker reached a peak on winning the Nobel Prize for Literature.

Almost anyone who grows up in Peru lives in a world marked by miscegenation and encounters with people of varied cultures. Vargas Llosa proves no exception. As a young man he 'drank in' different cultural climates not only within Peru but in other countries, such as those of Bolivia and Spain. In Madrid, he was a frequent visitor to the National Library as he prepared his doctoral dissertation on Rubén Darío. He continued his studies in Paris where he wrote his famous essay on *Madame Bovary*.

He soon turned his attention to the Andean world through the works of *indigenistas* such as Ciro Alegria or José Maria Arguedas. The latter portrayed the Andean world in *Los Ríos Profundos*, whilst his unfinished short novel, *El zorro de arriba y el zorro de abajo*, argued that the Indians' world would one day be crucified by the “*zorro de abajo*” (“the fox down below”), white society and Westernization. In *The Storyteller*, Vargas Llosa depicts the world of the indigenous peoples of the Peruvian jungle, namely the Machiguenga tribes that inhabit the region called “*ceja de selva*” and “*selva*” in Cuzco and Madre de Diós, between the rivers Misahua, Manú and Madre de Diós to the east and the rivers Koribeni and Yanatile to the South and those of Tambo, Perené and Ene, and, to the West, the River Urubamba.

This short novel portrays the confrontation of the intellectual narrator, in this case Vargas Llosa himself, with his country at the very moment in which he is distancing himself from home by travelling to Italy. It is exactly as he finds himself far from home, upon arriving in Florence at an exhibition of an Italian photographer (deceased in the meantime), that he is faced with images of Peru, specifically photographs of Machiguenga, an Amazonian Indian tribe. He feels particularly drawn to the picture of a *storyteller*, a storyteller who appears in the middle of a group of Indians. The photo reminds him of his student days at the *Universidad Nacional de San Marcos de Lima* and a trip that he had taken to Eastern Peru. On this voyage, he had met an old missionary who had spoken about a *storyteller*. Now this well-known and cosmopolitan intellectual, Vargas Llosa – the apparent opposite of a “primitive” Machiguenga Indian – is prompted to discover more about these people and to write a short novel about them. With the help of the Schneils family, linguists with the American Summer Institute for Linguistics, he manages to enter into contact with the tribe, but they, unlike the Schneil couple, deny the existence of any *storyteller*.

As the writer searches out the *storyteller*, the reader witnesses the process of literary creation and the previous attempt of the writer to approach a world foreign to his own. It reminds him of his days as a law student in Lima, when he used to discuss the Amazonian Indian question with his colleague Saúl Zurata, the son of a Jewish immigrant and a Creole woman who, due to an enormous birthmark on his face, was called “Mascarita” (“The Masked One”). This made Saúl an outsider, although he took on that role of his own free will, since he felt no sense of identity with his law

studies or with Lima society. Instead, he sought to know more about the way of life of the people and he moved closer towards ethnological studies. This interest is revealed when Vargas Llosa is involved in an incident with some drunken men and Saúl gives him a talisman so that he might overcome the anger that this provokes in him. The men insult Saúl and Llosa defends him vehemently. Thus, Saúl reveals the deeply Indian cultural attitude with which he identifies. This same identification leads him to turn down a postgraduate scholarship to study ethnology at a European university, the dream of many Latin American academics. Saúl justifies his decision by invoking the need to take care of his father. In fact, however, he shares the concerns of the great Swedish ethnologist Nils Erland Herbert Nordenskiöld (1908/1909) who, as is well-known, regretted bringing the existence of a previously unknown Indian tribe on the border of Brazil and Bolivia to the attention of the Western world. The tribe ended up disappearing due to the massive intervention of white society. Saúl recognised that the Indian tribes had no chance of survival unless the paradigm of white society changed. The white man should learn to nurture nature, a fact which has recently been accepted by the President of the European Parliament Jerzy Buzek (15/06/2010). In his disillusionment with Western society, Mascaritas turns his back on Lima and disappears into the jungle without a trace, where he learns the Machiguenga language by living with its people. He then becomes a nomadic storyteller, a *storyteller*. One day his picture is taken by an Italian photographer.

It is not known whether Saúl Zuratás is a real person or a literary creation. However, he functions as a mirror, allowing the author to challenge the weaknesses of his own preconceptions about the Indians and serving, equally, to introduce Western readers to the Machiguenga world, or a world which is represented as such in Vargas Llosa's writing.

Upon returning to Peru, Vargas Llosa once again enters into contact with the Schneils and finds out that the current *storyteller* is an albino who travels amongst the villages in the Machiguenga territories always accompanied by a parrot, just as his schoolmate Mascarita had done in Lima. When the writer hears that the *storyteller* tells stories to the Tasurinchi-Gregorio and to the Tasurinchi-Jéhova Indians, he has no doubt that the *storyteller* is his old classmate from San Marcos. Saúl had always enjoyed commenting about *Die Verwandlung*, in other words Kafka's *Metamorphosis*, as well as the permanently nomadic destiny of "his" Jewish people.

This story coincides only tangentially with the Machiguenga lifestyle as the tribe is not considered nomadic, despite the fact that their groups displace themselves, moving within the same region every three years so as not to damage the environment, but to protect and preserve it. Vargas Llosa, however, finds a link between the move of the Machiguenga and mythology. There is a myth according to which the world used to live in perfect harmony until one day when the God of Evil, Kientibakori, tried to bring down the sun, although unsuccessfully since Tasurinchi, the God of Good, left his place to support the sun, constantly moving from one place to another. In his wanderings, Tasurinchi is accompanied by the Machiguenga people who thereby protect themselves from places threatened by chaos, illness and wars that the God of Evil Kientibakori tries to cast over them. Following Tasurinchi, the Machiguenga people find other Tasurinchi in all places, rivers, plants and animals, which allow the people to live anywhere, supported by the Tasurinchi. The myth is constantly retold and reinvented by the *storyteller* with new words but always with the same truth. Thus, the storyteller ensures the continued existence of the people because the myth of Tasurinchi expresses the deep philosophy, knowledge and customs of the Machiguenga, so that all the stories told by the *storyteller* appear as stories told by Machiguenga to other Machiguenga, interconnected by Tasurinchi(es).

Thus, the *storyteller* ensures the continued existence of the Machiguenga because he constantly narrates the myth between the communities and the Machiguenga villages, sustaining and strengthening their identity. This role of the *storyteller* is different to that of the Western writer Vargas Llosa, whose influence upon our society is much more tenuous. However, the narrator allows a doubt to linger about the *storyteller* when he comments “Eso es, al menos, lo que yo he sabido” (“This is, at least, what I have learnt”) (Llosa 1987, 242). This phrase reveals the vast difference between the Western intellectual Vargas Llosa and our way of looking at the other, about whom we try to obtain the maximum information possible, without ever managing to completely understand the animist culture of the Machiguenga, which is centered on itself. While observing the culture of other peoples, Vargas Llosa has to recognize that his role as a writer and intellectual in our culture is much more limited than that of the *storyteller* in the Machiguenga culture. His reflections about himself, as well as those about the world of the other, do not engender greater respect on our part

for the Machiguenga, nor have they found a way to ensure the preservation of that culture.

Meanwhile, Marcaritas, with his archaic vision, failed to preserve the myth of the Tasurinchi. Nevertheless, he did preserve the cyclical, spiraled history of this Amazonian people. On final analysis, neither Mascaritas nor Vargas Llosa's "*The Storyteller*" were able to contribute to the protection of this people, since our civilisation did not accord them sufficient importance.

However, Vargas Llosa highlights a conflict which has existed in multi-ethnic and multi-cultural Peru since the arrival of the Spanish. In the past, more specifically, the pre-Incan past, the Machiguenga people managed to live peacefully with their neighbours on the high plains and even offered sacrifices to Pachacamac, the Oracle, on the Peruvian coast, near Lima. These offerings were explained by the fact that the tribe had successfully defended itself against the "new diseases" of the Incas, who had caught them with the Spanish colonisation and with the arrival of the first missionaries. The threats that once began to decimate the Machiguenga and other jungle peoples continue today. Their universe is disappearing day by day, whether because of the gold miners who poison their rivers and surrounding life with mercury, the danger of the white indigenous peoples from the Peruvian coast, or even because of the Western and Eastern indigenous peoples who are willing to kill Indians in search of natural gas or oil, declaring them to be "second-class citizens" (see Youtube), as did the President "of all Peruvians", Alán García, in June 2009. His words followed the massacre of Ashuainca Indians by a police force in Bágua after native lands were illegally invaded by a company prospecting for gas.

Current events such as those in Bágua, in the Ashuaninca territory and in the district of Madre de Dios (see Glüsing 2010) must stop! It would be wonderful if our society afforded to the Nobel Prize winner Vargas Llosa the same importance that Machiguenga society gives the *storyteller*. I doubt this will happen, amongst other reasons, because of the events in Bágua and the gold mining in a region that once contained 86% of the world's biodiversity and which is now in danger of disappearing.

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CAREY MCWILLIAMS, THE PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL: REFLECTIONS ON CITIZENSHIP AND CULTURE

MARIA JOSÉ CANELO

In a lecture to college students delivered at Cooper Union, in New York, in 1976, Carey McWilliams elaborated on what he called “the power of ideas” in terms that I find fitting to identify the brand of intellectual and political activity he espoused throughout his career as a lawyer and a social and cultural critic. They highlight the strains of dialogism and activism that inform his whole criticism. McWilliams was more than a traditional intellectual and more than a traditional lawyer as well; more than an intellectual because he became fairly active in the public sphere, whereas he was more than a lawyer because his reinvention of legal concepts and legal practices derived from his insightful research on cultural matters. In effect, the most original aspect of his work lies in his combination of a critique of culture with a critique of the law and how this anticipated current debates, namely on legal activism. While presenting a broad overview of his criticism of culture, I shall attempt a closer look into his engagement with the law and the development of his ‘legal imagination’ as a crucial component of McWilliams’s activity as a public intellectual.

Ideas have an inherent interest. (. . .) There is a symmetry about them that opinions lack. And they are creative in the sense that they can combine with other ideas, or modify them, or lead to still more novel ideas. Ideas keep an intellectual tradition alive, viable, and relevant; they are the yeast of a culture (. . .). The intellectual awakening of an individual usually dates from the moment he or she discovers that ideas are more than words on a page but are real and that the life-of-ideas is a timeless reality in human experience.¹

¹“The Importance of Ideas”, lecture given at Cooper Union, New York, Feb. 2, 1976, p.2. Carey McWilliams Papers (Collection 1319), Department of Special Collections, University Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. Box 67, Folder ‘The Importance of Ideas’ Mss. Notes.

Although the words of McWilliams to the students first appear as a call to their imagination and creativity, they were also an appeal to their political awareness. They imply that idealism *per se* does not contribute so much to the individual's intellectual development as the application of ideas to practice. Ideas are intended to create and recreate the world.

McWilliams's own coming into politics had happened quite early in his life; after a privileged childhood and adolescence, he was somehow forced into the real world when the family's fortune suddenly vanished. Born in Colorado, in 1905, in a conservative family of Scotch-Irish and German-French descent, his father a powerful man in the cattle industry and a state senator, McWilliams could not locate in his family history, nor in the pastoral education he received until moving to California, the roots of the social concerns that were to inform his adult life. Shortly after the First World War, the crash of the cattle market on which the family business relied caused the loss of his family's fortune, and forced them to leave the ranch. Moving to Los Angeles, they became migrants of a sort, but the urban milieu was to provide McWilliams with a very different life experience than his earlier pastoral education.

Soon after his graduation in Law and a short period of practice at a lawyer's firm, McWilliams started practicing labor law, which was determinant to his future involvement in social issues. With the Great Depression and the Popular Front as background, McWilliams, as many intellectuals of the time, was soon engulfed by politics. Once the Wagner Act was passed in 1934, the practice of labor law was allowed and McWilliams was frequently asked to give advice on worker rights and how to exercise those rights under the new law. In time, his interests moved on from labor to civil rights, an essential turn whose reach in U.S. ethnic history and its struggles for freedom were hard to foresee at the time.

Also of great importance to understanding McWilliams's activism was the particular historical context of the Great Depression and the New Deal. Indeed, the New Deal provided intellectuals and artists with the chance to be what Antonio Gramsci has termed "organic intellectuals", mediators for the people before state institutions or the apparatuses of power. Even though McWilliams was to refuse the connection of the intellectual with power for need of a critical distance, he became engaged with the state apparatus during this period, being appointed Chief of the Commission for Immigration and Housing in California, a post he carried out between 1938

and 1942, under Popular Front Governor Culbert Olson. In line with his previous work on labor law, this post allowed him a greater proximity with farm labor and a way of resolving the workers' problems, as McWilliams became the official responsible for the welfare of migrants. It also deepened his interest in problems of migrant and immigrant integration, of which an extensive critical and cultural work gives evidence, much of which was certainly ahead of its time. In connection with this position, McWilliams was also chosen as a member of the Senate LaFollette Committee, in 1939 and the House Tolan Committee, in 1941, which held public hearings in California on labor conditions in state farms, interstate migration and the Japanese evacuation from the West coast. For McWilliams, his position as Commissioner was the experience that took him beyond liberalism and toward the path he defined as his own brand of activism: native American radicalism (McWilliams 1978, 85).

This position gave him the chance to design and carry out policies aimed at solving questions of social justice and reducing social conflict, although it is difficult to see him as a politician proper. McWilliams used the position also as a tribune: to denounce the oligarchies of California, namely what he termed the feudalistic land-barons who exploited migrant work. His outspokenness regarding the suppression of labor and civil rights, voiced in the numerous public hearings he convened and the reports he subscribed to and publicized, threatened the profits of the most powerful agricultural lobbies, such as the Associated Farmers of California. Pressures from this organization led to McWilliams's discharge by the next Governor, Republican Earl Warren, in 1942. His dismissal was actually the 'popular' order with which Warren boasted of having inaugurated his term of office, after the Farmer's Union had elected McWilliams "Agricultural Pest No.1 worse than pear blight and boll weevil" (*ibid.*, 77). In the meanwhile, McWilliams authored some of the still most referenced pieces of historical, social and cultural analysis of California and the West on the ethnic history of the region. As an active member of the Sleepy Lagoon Defense Committee, he drafted the Appeal that eventually won the release of the Mexican American youngsters arrested in the Sleepy Lagoon case and gave testimony to the Los Angeles County Grand Jury on discrimination matters in California, warning against what came to be known as "the Zoot Suit Riots". He was one of the first personalities to publicly denounce the internment of the Japanese-American community, after the Pearl Harbor

attack and, as a lawyer; he was also involved in the defense of the “Hollywood Ten”, later in the 1950s.

Arenas of intervention – the Law

McWilliams understood writing as a way of pushing aside the official histories and examining facts anew, a continuous rereading and supplementation of history (1939, 9). Thus, writing and the law combined in his work throughout his life, developing a legal imagination that was particularly fruitful in terms of envisioning legal tools to empower subaltern groups such as immigrants and ethnic communities experiencing discrimination. McWilliams sought a new understanding of both the law and its practice and it is in this combination that I find one of the most solid and also most productive features of his activism in terms of criticism of the role of the intellectual.

At the time McWilliams was writing, many legal cases brought to the fore the issue of discrimination against ethnic groups, namely Mexican Americans, which evinced how the law formulated, justified and corroborated racial inequality and its institutionalized practices of segregation. One of McWilliams’s early and most vocal engagements in public terms was his drafting of the Appeal to release the Mexican American youngsters arrested in the Sleepy Lagoon case, after the first mass trial in California and what became one of the most infamously racist manoeuvres of the legal system. McWilliams spoke out against the involvement of the law in segregation, stressing how race was a social construct serving particular interests, a critique that clearly forestalls claims resumed by critical race theorists, from the 1960s onwards.

McWilliams became interested in legislative reform, or how to make of the law an ally against institutional racism and the vehicle for his most outstanding theoretical and political project: how to make of U.S. society what he called an “ethnic democracy”. In a seminal article published in 1945 and titled “Race Discrimination and the Law”, McWilliams unearthed the roots of racial discrimination in U.S. society and their articulation with legislation. To his mind, instead of a solution, segregation was actually a social danger that threatened the public interest, for it subtly promoted prejudice and conflicting difference, especially when it continuously generated unequal competitive power (1945, 21-22). He saw discrimination as “a policy

of systematic exclusion” that involved adherence and resulted in concrete forms of policy (“segregation” proper) and was materially applied to various areas of social life, before dividing it into two different types: passive segregation (based on custom and tradition), and “active” segregation, which had the legal sanction of the law. The legal signature made the inferiority of the segregated group official, allowing for it to be approached elsewhere as an essence. Deliberation based on precedence in turn reproduced the erroneous representations he noted being upheld by legal discourse and fostered what McWilliams called the “legal myths” governing the law. This aspect was aggravated by the generalist and abstract character of the law, which tended to overlook the historical contexts witnessing and assisting the productions of identities – and exclusions.

This evidence that the law effectively gave tacit consent to the perpetuation of a particular social order and hierarchy showed that it sustained, or was ineffective against, inequality. Therefore, if the law could discriminate negatively, McWilliams reasoned, so should it be able to discriminate positively as well and this was one of his most important and prescient contributions to the legal debates of both his times and those to come. He envisioned new legal mechanisms for the accommodation of difference (e.g., ethnicity and culture) into the law, aiming at an idea of *equality* that could acknowledge and incorporate difference.

McWilliams found in citizenship the terrain where the fight for equality had to take place. By defending the concept of what he termed “functional equality”, he fought for the need to accept differentiated rights to answer differentiated needs, in the cases of communities with histories of institutional dispossession and discrimination of sorts. What he found missing in the new legislation (considering that the 1940s were indeed a decade of profuse legislation on equal opportunities and equal rights laws) were the effective substantial differences still pending in terms of access to opportunities. His concept of equality was not, in this particular scheme, a levelling of sameness, that is, the application of the same rule or benefit to everyone, but a concept to be adapted to the conditions and needs of each of its objects instead. He defended that social justice could only be achieved if equality, as also a fundamental pillar of the law itself, was conceived as *differential* – what he termed “functional”; hence equality as a function implied assuming equality to be also a practical, utilitarian value, and thus *specifically* applicable to co-respond to particular needs.

In line with this, he developed the idea of “special” or “group” rights for ethnic communities, a project quite close to what we now call cultural citizenship. And showing that his approach to the issue was not just a social but also a political matter, he backed political action regarding race that was not traditionally sanctioned by the law (McWilliams 1947). This was the case of what he termed the “positive obligation” of the federal government to intervene in the enforcement of civil rights, which I suggest can also be situated within any genealogy of “affirmative action”.

Even as a law expert, McWilliams did not however remain an abstract thinker. His activism concerning legal reform and the strategies he defended correspond in many ways to what is currently identified as legal activism and alternative or subaltern legalities (Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito 2005, 4-6; Santos 2007). As a lawyer, he defended more *causes* than cases; his concern for social justice was very much informed by his perception that the dispossessed were also deprived of the legal means to improve their situation or accordingly make demands on the instruments of access to justice that were totally improper to them and so continuously reproduced their subalternization (Santos 2008, 55). In that sense, he promoted the creation of grassroots associations and the formation of groups according to ethnic constitutions, especially in the case of Mexican Americans. His activism in this field certainly calls to mind that of “popular lawyers”, in their upholding of values and principles, an ethics of the oppressed, as it were, as the basis for their practice of the law. Like popular lawyers do, McWilliams went to the workplace to meet his defendants and to hear their stories, which he defended as valuable testimony, in the sense of alternative forms of knowledge that had to be taken into account in the construction of the legal case, as the workers’ perspective of the workplace as well as the activities taking place there constituted an essential part of the context. These narratives would work as ‘counterstories’, as critical race theorists would also have them, personal testimonies that supplemented the understanding of a situation by providing the viewpoint of the victims. McWilliams defended these practices as emancipatory for these groups, for in the long run they would allow them to defend themselves better and so break their dependency on the state legal instruments that had not ultimately been shaped according to their particular interests and needs. In other words, it was not only a question of attaining visibility but of finding their own voices in order to attain self-representation as one more faithful to their needs.

Arenas of intervention – public dissemination

Public discussion and advocacy regarding specific situations and experiences were strategies that McWilliams often used as he prepared numerous official public reports and participated in public hearings. For instance, he was in charge of the first hearings to be held in California for salary rises for workers in the cotton fields, at Madera, early in 1939. He believed that public hearings were a powerful pedagogical tool to develop an informed public opinion, their powerfulness resting in their dramatization of events thereby bringing events to the attention of a wider audience. As such, dramatization informed both the people and the state, and an informed public was well on its way to dismissing prejudice (McWilliams 1942, 636, 648). McWilliams believed that “[i]f people can be made conscious of social processes, if they can be made aware of the weight and influence of the past on the present, this creates, although it may not seem so, a lasting impression or influence on their outlook and experience” (Navarro 1971, 15).

The press was therefore a follow-up to what he started in the courts and in the hearings. I believe he used it as if a platform to publicize and extend debates, since he also believed that an informed public would demand the necessary legislative action required for changing what was wrong. Besides his book-length studies, McWilliams published widely in newspapers and magazines, a career that culminated in his editorship of the New York leftist magazine *The Nation*, a position he held for about twenty years (1952-1975). Besides the abundant contribution to newspapers, brochures and magazines, he wrote several books that remain works of reference today, such as *Factories in the Field, A Story of Migratory Farm Labor in California* (1939) and *Ill Fares the Land* (1942), which were largely based on the dramatic farm-labor strikes he witnessed during the 1930s. His closer contact with the people who led the events he depicted in his studies in turn led to his books on ethnic matters and race relations: *Brothers Under the Skin* (1943), *Prejudice: Japanese-Americans: Symbol of Racial Intolerance* (1944), *North from Mexico: The Spanish-Speaking People of the United States* (1949), and *A Mask for Privilege: Anti-Semitism in America* (1948). Some of these studies were precursors in ethnic studies, most notably *North from Mexico*, which for many years prevailed as the only general history of the Mexican people in the U.S. (Navarro 1971, 2). These books, McWilliams explained, should be seen as part of his activism; they were part of the racial revolu-

tion of the 1940s, or, as he put it, “[they] have been part of the action. They’ve grown out of what was actually happening at the time” (McWilliams 1982, 185). Several of these studies were republished after 1951 by the Civil Rights Movement (*ibid*, 6).

I take his intervention in the press as a distinguishing mark to his activities as a public intellectual. The magazines and newspapers were springboards for his ideas and *forae* for debate, especially as they introduced ideas that were more often than not innovative and disruptive of the *status quo*. Indeed, the main goal of the magazines, McWilliams argued, was to break taboos and introduce new subjects: “to provide a home for new ideas and young writers. To prepare, so to speak, an agenda of items requiring national attention and discussion. To flush out new points of view. To support unpopular causes and issues. To focus a consistent and intelligent criticism on prevailing attitudes, policies, and dogmas.”² And so he himself used them profusely, having written for *Antioch Review*, *The New Republic*, *Common Ground* and *Survey Graphic*, besides *The Nation*, and to mention but a few. His editorship of *The Nation*, while not preventing him from publishing, provided him with a different stage of action; he would pick subjects (McCarthyism was one of his favorite targets; the construction of the military-industrial complex another; the fabrication of fear the umbrella for all of them, a keen topic for him since the war period) and giving clues to young journalists or contributors to the magazine, such as the young historian Howard Zinn, and encouraging them to pursue the story (Richardson 2005, 211). It is interesting to see that McWilliams ‘forged’ a genealogy for his activism that included some of the most outstanding critics of U.S. culture – most of whom wrote for newspapers. Pressed to explain his activism, he placed himself amongst figures such as Edgar Allan Poe, Ambrose Bierce, Mark Twain, H. L. Mencken, and Louis Adamic; they were for him an ancestry rather of choice and affinity. These figures were also all part of a tradition of dissent in American letters, what he called an “indigenous American rebel democratic tradition” with which he identified his own quests and concerns (McWilliams 1978, 51). In the context of the Depression, as later during the Cold War – a period in which he was

²“The Small Magazines” 4. Carey McWilliams Papers (Collection 1319), Department of Special Collections, University Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. Box 17, Folder “Small Magazines.”

particularly active in denouncing the culture of fear and protesting against the military-industrial complex –, H. L. Mencken’s irony and wit, combined with Bierce’s bitterness, appeared to McWilliams as more helpful and more fitting critical modes to approach the times, while also protecting him from adhering to the consensual reading of the “American experience” that was the vogue then. Moreover, Bierce’s example as an unattached intellectual may have provided McWilliams with the freedom he needed to make original and relevant new contributions in the theoretical and practical fields of social activism (*ibid*, 232). He singled out not just Bierce’s rejection of the society of his times, but how he created an idiom, as a critique, to speak that rejection.

This need to invent his own critical genealogy gives evidence of an interesting aspect of McWilliams’s criticism, one that still puzzles many critics: the motivation for his activism, even though there are no reasons to doubt that he was a public intellectual. Especially in the context of identity politics in the U.S., McWilliams’s commitment to the causes of communities to which he did not ‘belong’ or with which he did not share a personal affinity is challenging. Why write on Jews and prejudice, if he was not of Jewish ancestry? Whence his interest in Mexican Americans (he is acknowledged as one of the founders of the Chicano movement for the publication of his studies *Brothers Under the Skin* and *North From Mexico*), if, again, he was not of Mexican ancestry? Why defend workers if he was middle-class? Whence his inflamed denunciation of the Japanese internment program, and so on and so forth. What mostly troubles scholars who come across his experience as a public intellectual is the fact that he never explained his activism as a predetermined path, a calculated mission, or even a personal vengeance. And it sometimes looks like, by that omission, he somehow failed to convey his commitment as a comprehensive, hence more powerful, example to the American people.

Indeed, if we turn to a much referenced study taking the intellectual as its object, Edward Saïd’s *Representations of the Intellectual*, and follow Saïd’s remarks that “[t]here is always the personal inflection and the private sensibility, and those give meaning to what is being said or written”, locating the personal motivation for activism in the intellectual’s own experience (1996, 12), we understand the struggle to explain McWilliams’s intervention. Reading McWilliams’s autobiography, written in the late 1970s, one perceives how he was challenged to explain his motivations as a public in-

tellectual and how he always resisted in making particularistic or personal claims: he very much felt like a cultural ‘maverick’ or an outsider, also in social and political terms, in relation to his ancestors. McWilliams was the first to point out how his education could hardly have foreseen his interest in social reform: “Anyone with a background as mixed as mine”, he writes, “might be expected to feel a bit of an outcast in today’s America, in which ethnic backgrounds and ‘roots’ have acquired a new significance. But I (. . .) can not see that tribal loyalties or immediate family influences had anything to do with shaping my political convictions” (McWilliams 1978, 26). He considered his childhood on a Colorado ranch a much more important experience, for it had taught him the values that would lead his life: “For quite logically it is on frontiers (. . .) where the tags and identifications have been discarded or never recognized, that a sense of justice and equality often emerges”, he reflects, quoting Lionel Trilling (*id. ibid.*).

To the disappointment of many, I suppose, he did not claim any ethnic battle in particular to justify his interest in social matters, but advanced arguments that may be taken as very candid in the context of identity politics: his path to activism, he said, was boredom and curiosity (*ibid.*, 66). More than that, and regarding his motivations, McWilliam stresses a responsibility for justice and equality that is timeless and universal, which brings us close to the ethical ideal of the traditional intellectual definition. He always stated that experience had taught him that radicalism resided first and foremost in a concern with values, not with doctrines, traditions or specific man-made and historically bound ideologies: “If they [radicals] could achieve substantial agreement on the kinds of values society should encourage, it might then be possible to proceed experimentally, tentatively, to invent new forms and institutional arrangements which would best safeguard and extend those values. Values, in a word, should take precedence over programs” (McWilliams 1979, n.p.) Yet, he realized that reinventing a whole system and its institutions was a task for a Goliath; he argued that for the critic it would be enough to go on commenting on reality, fulfilling his or her rebellious and destabilizing role as a critic of established ideas and of power; in a word, a dissenter.

McWilliams’s endeavors to remain a rebel without a doctrine were a constant in his life. Political affiliation and activism were different takes on reality, but only the latter could make a difference. He denied association both with liberalism, which he saw as too feeble to unleash his interest, as

mentioned in a letter of 1931 to Mary Austin (Pearce 1979, 247) and also because he considered his native American radicalism to be well beyond liberalism; as for Marxism, he admired it but only as part of the ferment of his times (McWilliams 1982, 84-85). He justified his activism in accordance with certain ideologies in pragmatic and contingent terms: he admired the Left (e.g., the trade union movement) because it brought to the fore issues that deserved attention and concern, but he declined commitment to a particular doctrine. McWilliams even considered himself a socialist, but noted that he could not reconcile his sentiment with a party or a movement; yet he admitted being a socialist in his critique of capitalism, because socialism provided him with an analytical scheme and a language fit to identify and explain the dangers of corporate power to democracy: its exclusive concerns for profit and expansion (McWilliams 1979, n.p.).

Marginality was therefore a condition of the radical rebel; he had to stay outside the domain of power in order to constantly check the exercise of power. McWilliams agreed with Hannah Arendt that “[t]he radical is the perpetual outsider, the odd man (or woman) out, constantly critical of the power structure and of things as they are” (*id.*, *ibid.*) He could not criticize from within, for the proximity of power was, as he put it, “a terrible temptation” (McWilliams 1982, 18). So, “radical”, as he further argues, “suggests critical thought operating outside the consensus or by way of challenging the consensus.”³ Another fundamental aspect in this tradition of dissent that McWilliams also identified with radicalism was its pragmatism and its preoccupation with social justice and equality: “the American radical tradition has been pragmatic (. . .) The tradition has always been concerned with justice, with equal opportunity, suspicious of large aggregates of power and antagonistic to them.”⁴

The option for being politically active without the constraints of dogma may in the end explain the peculiar and productive dynamism of McWil-

³Letter to Joseph P. Navarro, Dec. 19th, 1972. Carey McWilliams Papers (Collection 1319), Department of Special Collections, University Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. Box 7, Folder “1920’s.”

⁴Letter to Joseph P. Navarro, Dec. 19th, 1972 (underlined in original). Carey McWilliams Papers (Collection 1319), Department of Special Collections, University Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. Box 7, Folder “1920’s.”

liams's thought and criticism, not altogether common in times of political ferment (and political persecution) such as his. The Popular Front was a very wide umbrella of the Left; its ranks included many independent leftists who refused identification with the Communist Party. Of course this ambition of McWilliams's to be truly objective, pure and universalist could be challenged; as editor of *The Nation* magazine he faced serious criticism in the 1950s for insufficient criticism of the rise of totalitarianism in the Soviet Union (Richardson 2005, 181); McWilliams argued that the troubles at home, namely McCarthyism, were more urgent to address because they were closer, the same argument he used when publicly denouncing the deportation of U.S. citizens of Mexican and Filipino origin, or the internment of U.S. citizens of Japanese descent, in the 1940s, while the nation was so busy combating Nazism abroad. His activism was therefore moved by both universalist and particularistic causes and it involved negotiations with politics and power that leave the ideological question open, certainly. Whatever the case, however, McWilliams's contribution to debates on citizenship rights deserves deeper research, all the more since he was not an idealist – to return to my first quotation on the power of ideas –, for he did struggle to turn his ideas into reality, or else planted the seeds for them to bloom just a couple of decades later.

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PATHWAYS OF RUSSIAN INTELLECTUALS: RUSSIA AND THE WEST

VANDA AMARO DIAS

The Russian Revolution turned out to be a distortion of the *intelligentsia's* goals.¹ The new regime brought massive oppression to the country. Besides executions and prisons, repression involved cold, hunger, hard labour and disdainful abuses (*apud* Kochetkova 2010, 21). Despite the *intelligentsia's* structure continuing to survive during the 1920's, under Stalin's rule the cut with the revolutionary *intelligentsia* reached its climax,² with censorship and the Purge of the 1930's almost physically destroying it (Bergman 1992, 17; Davies 1989, 11-27; Walker 2000, 346).

As the old *intelligentsia* vanished, crushed by the state apparatus, a new class of "engineers of the human soul" was born, with a very distinct notion of what should be their social function. They were created by the state that desired a new intellectual class, which could break with the oppositional character of the nineteenth century *intelligentsia* and put national interests above everything else³ (Boobyear 2009, 113-114). Therefore, a modern Soviet intellectual class was born, a privileged social stratum organized into

¹After the Russian Revolution in 1905, two distinct camps emerged within the *intelligentsia*. One was an atheist group oriented toward the West, following a Westernizing tradition. The other was a mighty circle of influential religious philosophers, like Berdyaev and Bulgakov that accused the Russian *intelligentsia* of atheism, nihilism and sectarianism, which led to the defeat of the 1905 revolution. They advocated philosophical atheism to be the most reliable foundation for all future reforms. They published the anthology *Vekhi* in 1909 reflecting their opinions of the failure of Russian Revolution, which would be disliked by Soviet leaders like Lenin (Gessen 1997, 7-8; Volkov 2009, 38-39).

²Before him, Lenin had already restricted the *intelligentsia's* freedom and initiated the expulsion abroad of the greatest cultural figures of Russian society, including the *crème de la crème* of Russian philosophy, revealing the anti-intellectual position of Soviet power (Volkov 2009, 73-74).

³Among them were some members of the Russian avant-garde, who decided to collaborate openly with the regime, since it gave them the opportunity to be in charge. Bolsheviks accepted this arrangement out of purely pragmatic considerations, thereby starting a convenient alliance (Volkov 2009, 58).

professional syndicates. The Soviet Writers Union, founded in 1932, is the oldest of them. Expulsion from this institution composed of successful writers meant the impossibility of publication and, thus, the loss of public visibility. Nevertheless, its congresses were not only opportunities for declaring dedication to the regime but also for authors to lobby for improvements or changes. In fact, it was an important instrument through which it was possible to exert political influence, even if it was also used to materialize the regime's revenge on some writers – those who did not follow the rules could face with severe consequences, from loss of social standing to prison and death (Churchward 1973, 75-76; Gessen 1997, 10).

Assuming itself as an alternative model of modernity, the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) wished to replace the critical intellectual by the intellectual who unreservedly supports the regime (Sakwa 2006; Reis 2005, 8). As the Party strictly controlled intellectual activity, there were few opportunities to exert individual criticism (Churchward 1973, 97). Their function was to organize and develop productive processes, culture and social experiences, as well as systems of maintenance and adaptation. Intellectuals were to be the architects of a *homo sovieticus*, while they were expected to give away their autonomy and criticism and prove their loyalty to the regime (Leymarie and Sirinelli 2003, 366-367; Volkov 2009, 89).

Nevertheless, the limited influence of conformist intellectuals allowed them to remake Marxism by developing a theoretical analysis of national and international politics beyond the limits of official ideology. Also, they were successful in their defence of liberal opposition and resistance to conservative pressures through joint or individual letters sent to superior Party organizations and statements of faith published by recognized intellectuals. Political divisions inside the Party allowed them to find allies to defend their causes without danger of being persecuted (Churchward 1973, 127).

However, the line between being considered a “friendly” intellectual or a threat was very thin. In fact, some intellectuals with anti-Soviet ideas were not only not arrested but given some of the highest Soviet awards simply because the leaders liked their speeches or texts. This was the case of Tikhonov who, despite his anti-regime activities, enjoyed a good shield of protection because Stalin had once heard a speech in which he spoke of and greatly praised Pushkin (Volkov 2009, 85-86). But those who were

definitely perceived as a threat to the power were severely punished. This resulted not only from anti-Soviet intellectual activities, but also from all contacts with the West. The Iron Curtain had fallen not only upon political Europe, but also on its culture (ibid, 120-121).

At some point, the regime took a keen interest in the Eurasianist movement that first emerged in the nineteenth century and was revisited in the 1920's. Accordingly, Russia, as the great state on the border of Europe and Asia, shaped its own role in global geopolitics. This group was divided in the early 1930's into right and left wings: the right tending towards Christian Orthodoxy and the left drifting to the side of the Soviet Union, which the Eurasianists considered the true heir of the Russian Empire. Therefore, the Kremlin gradually brought in leftwing Eurasianists under the control of the secret services, turning them into conformist intellectuals that supported the regime (ibid, 144). Conformist intellectuals believed they only had one life and were not willing to throw it away. Hence, they believed their mission was to achieve as much as possible within the limits of the system given them. These were Party members who did not rebel, openly protest, get involved in underground activities, sign protest letters or take part in demonstrations (Kochetkova 2010, 135-172).

After Stalin's death, the dissident movement was born, formed by intellectual critics of the regime which fought against violations of human rights and individual freedoms. The emergence of this generation, during Khrushchev's rule, proved that the various attempts to erase the critical spirit of Russian intellectuals had failed (Tolstaya 1996, 317-318). By that time, many young intellectuals occupied the place that once belonged to the *intelligentsia*. As a consequence, they embraced the mission to reconstruct their predecessors' intellectual and spiritual exaltation (Walker 2000, 347). In fact, there are some similarities between them. Both criticized the political order from a moral perspective, recognized the value of individuality and the absolute inviolability of individual conscience. They seemed to emerge from similar circumstances as both were the offspring of a paternalistic state that limited the autonomy of the Russian educated elite (Bergman 1992, 16).

In the 1960's, those young intellectuals remained silent because they believed that only silence could translate an independent conscience. Nevertheless, that attitude became unbearable and it was replaced by a major mobilization of intellectual circles, which was made possible by the relative

opening of the USSR under Khrushchev. One main feature of this era was the mobilization of intellectuals in order to defend their rights, especially freedom of speech. They wanted to preserve some kind of detachment to prevent them from turning into technocrats or experts. Ultimately, to be free was to be independent from power holders (Kochetkova 2010, 13).

The intellectuals accepted Khrushchev's ideas with enthusiasm as they were ready for change and eager for active participation. They believed they had an opportunity to become involved in Russian politics and, thus, they gave him their support and energy. But it did not take long for Khrushchev to take several steps backward, which came as a blow to their hopes for a better and freer future. Khrushchev's main goal was the USSR's de-Stalinization and not the opening up of the regime. Only that can explain why authors like Pasternak and Alexander Ginsburg were constantly attacked while the publication of Solzhenitsyn's first novel, *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovitch*, was personally approved by Khrushchev. The Soviet leader appraised the book for being written in the spirit of the XXII Party Congress, meaning that it would upset his enemies. At first, it seemed that Khrushchev had sympathy for the intellectuals because he needed allies and legitimacy in his tightrope walk of de-Stalinization but, once the process could no longer be stopped, he turned suddenly violent on them (Applebaum 2009, 582; Kochetkova 2010, 53-57; Volkov 2009, 185-204).

Later, with Brezhnev and the regression in the relative openness experienced under his precursor, many intellectuals were charged with being anti-Soviet and sentenced to the work camps and prisons of the gulag system.⁴ The reactions were almost immediate. Letters and protest petitions spread and, while some intellectuals involved in these events turned out to be integrated non conformists, others affirmed their dissident charac-

⁴Brezhnev, unlike Khrushchev's lack of interest in culture, was an intelligent and interested leader who sympathized with the idea of expanding cultural freedom in USSR. He was particularly shocked by the ruthless treatment writers experienced under his predecessor. However, despite his personal benevolence, culture came under increasing pressure during his rule as cultural issues fell mostly under the supervision of *apparatchiks*. Consequently, he rarely interfered in cultural affairs (Volkov 2009, 213-216).

ter, defending with serenity their right to free expression and individual dignity, as well as the fulfilment of human rights. From 1968 onwards, after the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the USSR,⁵ the dissident movement definitively assumed fighting the regime openly and fearlessly as its mission (Kochetkova 2010, 95).

Another significant event in the formation of the Russian dissident movement was the trial of Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel. This was a decision made by the *apparatchiks*⁶ who felt that the intellectuals were getting out of hand and needed to be brought to heel. It was a strategic move and therefore planned with extra caution that attained initial success. However, within this framework, they decided the trial was to be open, thus enabling the establishment of closer contacts between Soviet dissidents and the Western media. Furthermore, it unleashed sentiments of anger and disappointment in relation to the Russian political and cultural system in the West, representing a historical breakthrough (Volkov 2009, 217). Massive trials and arrests followed, signalling the end of the Thaw – a magical era that ended as quickly as it had begun but not without having shaped the dissident movement, giving birth to *samizdat*⁷ and bolstering the free word (Gessen 1997, 12).

In fact, dissidents were the tip of the iceberg, with the large mass of intellectuals opting for more reserved non-conformist attitudes that ensured they could stay within the system and preserve their careers. They were foremost technological and scientific experts that sought refuge in non-

⁵The demonstration in Red Square in protest at the invasion of Czechoslovakia was one of the most dramatic milestones of the dissident movement. On 25th August 1968, eight people met in Red Square to criticize the Soviet invasion four days earlier. As a result, they were beaten up by KGB agents and transferred to a police station. Then, they went on trial and were sentenced to prisons and labour camps, with the effects felt for many years after in terms of ostracism, marginalization and even exile (Gessen 1997, 3).

⁶*Apparatchiks* were professional bureaucrats of the Communist Party or the Soviet government.

⁷At the end of the 1950's, this instrument is developed to diffuse censored works, allowing ideas and critical opinions to circulate. This practice consisted of typewriting a work distributed among some persons close to the author, contributing to the emergence and development of a space for reflection and debate independent of political power. *Samizdat* allowed repressed authors to perform a broader social function and to assume themselves as committed intellectuals (Leymarie and Sirinelli 2003, 372).

political activities. Furthermore, dissidents, whose undisputed leaders were Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Andrei Sakharov,⁸ wrote texts, signed petitions, organized demonstrations and created *samizdat* magazines, which worked as forums of information and debate, with the aim of undermining the state's authority (Kochetkova 2010, 25; Leymarie and Sirinelli 2003, 373-377).

In practice, there was no proper movement of which one can speak about. For instance, Shafarevich, a mathematician and political philosopher, saw the dissident group not as a movement but as something born of a desperate scream against the clamping down on thought that followed the Thaw. This non-movement had no unifying ideology, program nor any particular goal beyond struggling against the ongoing violation of human rights. Even if later on these shortcomings will be seen as the root of post-Soviet Russia's political and ideological problems, at that point they were the key to the dissidents' existence: there were too few people willing to risk their social status and freedom to draw ideological distinctions among them (Gessen 1997, 40). Kovaliov, a human rights activist and dissident, perceived dissidence as a loose concept as there were no profound divergences from the regime – it was more impulsive than that. It was not a conscious resistance but rather a moral incompatibility with what was going on (*ibid*, 154).

Often dissidents had more than the average person's familiarity with the regime. Many Soviet intellectuals, including dissidents at some point in their lives, established contacts with Party structures, allowing them to develop a particular understanding of its nature and functioning. They had to know it in order to criticize it; besides membership of the Soviet elite or state institutions added unparalleled moral authority to their critique (Churchward 1973, 127-133; Gessen 1997, 154-155).

Even though it is easier to identify Soviet dissidents with the committed intellectual model,⁹ paradoxically Western intellectuals acknowledged

⁸Both were exact scientists – Solzhenitsyn was a mathematician and Sakharov a physicist. In fact, it has been claimed that exact scientists played a major role in the dissident movement. According to Andrei Amalrik in 1968, 45 percent of those who signed protest letters by then were exact scientists (*apud* Gessen 1997, 38).

⁹The term “commitment” was related to intellectuals for the first time in the 1930's to indicate their political involvement (Mackinnon 2009, 515). Sartre represents the intellectual *totale* because he has an opinion about everything in society. The committed intellectual should be actively involved in political and social events, acting as a

Russian intellectual commitment in those (the conformists) closest to them. This idea results from the fact that these Russian intellectuals wrote and published papers, took up public positions and shared some of their so called progressive stances on foreign policy – anti-Americanism, campaigning for peace, denouncing the Korean and Vietnam wars, supporting the Palestinians against Israel and backing national liberation movements (Leymarie and Sirinelli 2003, 367). But what was free choice for Western intellectuals was a constraint for conformist authors, as they were strongly limited by socialist realism and the psychological pressure that came from the threat of expulsion from the Soviet Writers Union – conditions that led many of them to embrace the official ideology. Those who really used their intellectual abilities to report political flaws were sent to work camps and prisons. They could neither speak nor publish publicly, they wrote in secrecy and hid their works to protect themselves from harassment and, therefore, had less visibility in the West (ibid, 368-371). And yet these were the opposition to the regime, bearers of truth and defenders of the weak, inheritors of the *intelligentsia* and those actually closest to the committed Western intellectual. In fact, they were what Bon and Burnier (1995) defined as intellectuals: individuals making a critical judgement of society, a permanent contestation, in order to achieve social and political change and improvement. But, exposed to the regime's censorship, they often ended up in exile, where they developed their ideas without ever denying their bonds to Mother Russia.

But the link between Russian and Western intellectuals cannot be limited to a fixed classification. There was a game at play between them as Russian intellectuals 'used' Western intellectuals to exert influence and claim visibility for their causes. Recurrently, dissidents would identify a problem, find a way to communicate it to the West and often see their demands introduced in high-level negotiations (Gessen 1997, 31).

By the 1980's, the dissident movement was in disarray and weakened by the arrest, imprisonment, emigration, exile and psychiatric incarceration of many of its members. Under Gorbachev, the regime attempted to change its relationship with dissidents in such a way that it would make the movement obsolete. Glasnost brought their works into the media, albeit with certain limitations. The only condition was that the dissidents stop

counter-power (Leymarie and Sirinelli 2003, 247; Winock 2000, 410-415).

being dissidents. In 1987 and 1988, when the majority of political prisoners were released, the state sought to pre-empt their future activities, constraining them to sign a statement promising not to engage in “anti-State activities”. This controversy was the beginning of a set of debates through which dissidents attempted to define a new relationship with the government. Sakharov was the leader in shaping the cautious new cooperation. By 1989, as the Soviet Union prepared its first democratic elections, he was straddling the dividing line between dissidents and the ruling elite (Gessen 1997, 155-156; Volkov 2009, 72).

Embodying the *intelligentsia*'s classical tradition, they defended socialism “with a human face”, authored Perestroika, and were demonized when the reforms failed. Worse, when the Soviet regime fell, arts and culture were left without funding. Many artists and writers moved to the West hoping to find better conditions. After the fall of communism, many anticipated the flowering of culture. However, almost the opposite occurred (Kochetkova 2010; Volkov 2009, 278).

Post-Soviet intellectuals: the ultimate convergence with the West

After communism collapsed, intellectuals were ideally placed to act as mediators and encourage dialogue between civil society and political power (Kochetkova 2010, 38). Confronted with the mirage of freedom they had wished for all their lives, intellectuals believed and supported the promises of politicians. Gorbachev's reforms had taken hold and the free press and elections were flourishing in Russia. But all of a sudden, Gorbachev was backtracking while democrats kept pushing for more. The Democratic movement, a popular front that could draw hundreds of thousands of people to the streets, was backing Yeltsin as a candidate in the first Russian presidential elections. Frightened by the loosening of his grip on the country, Gorbachev banned public demonstrations in Moscow having the counter-effect of causing possibly the largest independent demonstration in Russian history just a few days later (Gessen 1997, 115).

The sympathies of intellectuals were divided between those who wanted the reforms to continue and the reactionaries that inspired the conservative Parliament. Both sides thought their opponents to be driving Russia

into an abyss and both needed an ideological cover that could only be supplied by intellectuals (Volkov 2008, 278-279).

Many dissidents were getting inside power institutions. After years of opposition, they were led to believe they were playing a key role in toppling the post-Soviet regime. Most supported Yeltsin in October 1993 when his troops shelled the Russian Supreme Soviet building with rebellious members inside. This reflected the belief that the regime was so bad that it must be destroyed by every means

But disillusionment soon afflicted the intellectuals. The military attack on Grozny, the Chechen capital, in January 1995 represented the failure of the intellectuals' quest for a free Russia. Instead, they helped raise a regime responsible for Russia's economic collapse and unjust military interventions. People lost hope in the regime and intellectuals not only felt responsible for Russia's economic, political and identity crisis but found themselves alone, tormented between the corrupt and inefficient government and the indifferent people. They lost oppositional power and their word was now meaningless to the people. Simultaneously, they missed the sense of homogeneity that opposition to the established power endowed them with (Gessen 1997, 17-18). The changes were not as transformative as predicted by the somewhat naïve intellectuals.

Facing a new reality, intellectuals spread through all social strata and professions. Now they are philosophers, political scientists, economists, lawyers and all sorts of professionals, but that does not mean their death or silence (*ibid*, 28).

They were experiencing the transformation Western intellectuals suffered with the passage from modernity to post-modernity and their evolution from legislators to interpreters. This represents a final phase of convergence between Russian and Western intellectuals. Now they found themselves on the same stage, facing the same problems and dilemmas. Even if in some domains they defend different positions, these cannot be seen as a structural difference but rather as intellectual heterogeneity – one of the consensual features in today's intellectuals, whether in Russia or the West (*ibid*, 31).

Nevertheless, some dissidents were able to maintain their intellectual role, despite post-Soviet transformations. For example, Shafarevich, who was not optimistic about the future, believed Russia to be at a divide – between good and evil. For him, Lenin and Gorbachev were expressions of

Russia's destruction. If the Revolution had isolated Russia from the world and weakened it, Perestroika exposed Russia to the outside and weakened it. A rejection of modernity spread through intellectuals who thought and believed, like Shafarevich, that the Western world was suffering from a mental crisis with roots in modern evolution (*ibid*, 46-81).

Furthermore, there was a transformation in the intellectual-media relations with intellectuals integrated into television program formats (by the mid 1990's, the feminist Arbatova and Solzhenitsyn had their own shows). But having a place to set out their thoughts was not the problem. The worrying question is: who listens to them? An economic crisis, social Westernization, evolution in the media, information overload and new technologies ended up deviating people's interest from the quest for truth (*ibid*, 87-94).

Apart from resistant dissidents, the new intellectuals are "techies", technological experts that produce a steady stream of trends and fashions that dominate intellectual thinking and behaviour. If they were the centre of non-conformist movements in the 1960's, 1970's and 1980's, representing many of the intellectuals who sought refuge in non-political activities, in the 1990's they turned to business. Former scientists, physicists and mathematicians controlled banks, investments, firms and television channels. The educated people of society are now businessmen (in the same way they were in the nineteenth century *intelligentsia*), but they inherited the dissident quest. The difference is that instead of fighting the regime's repression, they combat corruption, nepotism and political inertia. Simultaneously, money gives them the power to influence the government. "Techies" have also had major importance in the Westernization of the country, importing its culture and liberal thinking while assuming a vigilant posture towards the State. In this respect, whether out of old habits or new exigencies, they embraced the role of the nineteenth century *intelligentsia* and Soviet dissidents for the new times (*ibid*, 104-110). The *intellectuals* who chose political life hoped to enlighten the government and play a significant role in Russian development. However, while they perceived enlightenment as a changing process, the State simply regarded them as an informative source. Furthermore, they soon realized that government was not meant for intellectuals, as it left no time for thinking. Other intellectuals found refuge in research institutes thereby trying to contribute towards a better society (*ibid*, 125-128).

But intellectual apathy and consent did not last as long as the government might have expected. Reactionary performances emerged through

former dissidents like Kovaliov, whose appeals caused avalanches of denunciations from the Parliament, the government and the media. By denouncing, for instance, the Russian troop invasion of Chechnya, he tried to define a proper relationship between intellectuals and the State, but he soon realised the difficulty of that task. Not only did his confrontation not influence political decisions, as the State made clear that neither law nor speech would check its intent, as it seemed that in post-Soviet Russia everything had changed but the State. Nevertheless, Kovaliov represents those who still believe the intellectual to be an individualist who must always be in opposition to the regime – if only because in the absence of opposition any regime becomes inhumane (*ibid*, 153-163).

This new situation led, as one saw before, to the emergence of several anti-modernity positions among intellectuals. But it was also responsible for the revival of Eurasianism that projects the idea of Russia as a unique and anti-Western civilization. Many intellectuals affiliated with this understanding, some exerting its influence in the Kremlin (Delanty 2006, 46). It implies rejection of the West and criticism as to its decline and barbarianism. Nevertheless, Eurasianism represents only a part of Russian society that condemns the West, particularly the USA, for its fake, mechanical, individual and material nature.¹⁰ Even if Glasnost opened a door for Russian-Western relations, the legacy of the Soviet Union resulted in relatively few Russians having contact with the West. Therefore, there was no room for a major transformation in the country's narrative and the West remained the other, the stranger that helps the nation to define its identity. This ambiguity facing the West also expresses Russia's multiple colliding and complementary identities – imperial, byzantine, European and Eurasian – or its belonging to a broader European civilization (Feklyunina 2008, 608; Rose and Munro 2008, 54; Sakwa 2006, 215).

Perestroika was intended to maintain the Soviet system's distinctiveness, while improving its effectiveness. But this goal was somehow lost in the middle of the treble transformation of Russia's political regime, economy and State. Gorbachev's and Yeltsin's policies had been inspired by Western political and economic theories. However, in Russia's imagined history,

¹⁰As the enquiry realized by Rose and Muro (2008, 53) shows, by a majority of almost two to one, Russians see the country's future linked with other states of the post-soviet space, rather than with Western Europe.

the West was a constant opponent and the antithesis of imagined Russia. It represented technological progress, unlimited consumerism and spiritual barbarism. Nevertheless, aspects of this imagined West have been realized in post-Soviet Russia. Additionally, as the country lacked the mitigating factors that have allowed Western liberal democracies to work, these have since become the 'nightmare vision' of the West that has inspired conservative Russian thinkers since the eighteenth century: an atomized and nakedly aggressive society marked by individualism, corruption, consumption and cruelty (Slater 1998, 79-81). This fed Eurasian rhetoric and allowed it to gain strength among Russian intellectuals and politicians.

With Putin, the quest for preserving Russia's uniqueness was again on the table yet the President never truly embraced rejection of the West as he was aware of its importance to achieving Russian national interests (Rose and Muro 2008, 51-52). His goal was to make Russia an independent and strong international actor, by strengthening the State and maintaining a realistic world order (Mankoff 2007, 127).

Most post-Soviet intellectuals have been very negative, as they have lost critical power and visibility, which affected their ability to change events. Today, Russian thought ranges from national democracy to Eurasianism and imperialism;¹¹ most still believe that Russia is simultaneously a unique civilization and a major power in international relations. Russia has a mission in the world that collides with her ambition of independence from the West, a problem whose solution has yet to be found. Analysis of discussions among intellectuals finds that the set of ideas underlying Russian foreign policy has remained fairly constant since the early 1990's (Mankoff 2007, 126).

When in 1991 Russia initiated its political approach towards the West, their differences became clear as the two sides were at different evolution-

¹¹ Despite some liberal politicians and scholars believing that Russia should abandon any imperial hopes, there has been a striking combination of liberal and imperial views presented within the concept of liberal empire. Anatoly Chubais suggests that Russia should build a liberal empire in the post-Soviet era. The core elements of the country's relationship with the near abroad should be: promoting Russian culture; defending the rights of Russian speakers; expanding Russian business and supporting democratic rights and freedoms. At the same time, Russia should respect the sovereignty of those countries and its actions should always comply with international law. Therefore, Russia would become an empire not through political coercion, but through its increasing economic attractiveness (Feklyunina 2008, 619).

ary stages. While the West, particularly the European Union, has been evolving towards a new cosmopolitan identity,¹² Russian narratives remain linear. Instead of embracing the cosmopolitan features of its identity that would allow for developing relations with Europe and Asia, intellectuals tend to suppress them and right at the moment when cosmopolitanism is emerging in international relations as a new phase in post-Western development (Rose and Muro 2008; Sakwa 2006, 220-226).

The place of Russia in the world remains a political issue but its validity lies in Russian narratives and it is up to intellectuals to change them and to embrace their critical role in post-Soviet society. They should at least act as interpreters, identifying what links Russia to the major European constellation and devaluing rejections of the West. Interpretation and mediation could indeed promote a more fruitful relationship between Russia and the West, while validating the inherent cosmopolitan features of Russian heritage. Intellectuals should move beyond political constraints and try to recover their mission as power-people mediators. In post-Soviet Russia, individuals often found themselves lost. With the complex transformations of the 1990's, people lost their identity and security in the name of democracy and freedom that to their eyes brought only social dysfunctionality (Ohan 2008, 64-65). Therefore, now more than ever, there must be a sense of accountability that creates a bridge between political power and civil society. However, this is not merely a quest for Russian intellectuals but for all post-modern intellectuals that have to rethink their role in the conception of a better and fairer world.

Solzhenitsyn: beyond the East/West dichotomy

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn is perhaps the most emblematic Russian intellectual of the twentieth century. The story of his divergence from the Soviet regime was pretty uncommon. After attending an officer's school in 1941, he fought on the Western front in 1943. Criticism of Stalin in a letter sent to a friend cost his imprisonment in 1945. While thus far he had been a convinced communist, the cruelty of the events turned him into a critic of the political status quo (Applebaum 2009, 580; Rappaport 1999).

¹²On European cosmopolitanism, see Grande and Beck, 2008.

He had a central role in the defeat of communism by exposing its ideological lies. The *Gulag Archipelago*, one of the century's masterpieces, undermined its moral legitimacy and showed Solzhenitsyn's remarkable courage in de-legitimizing the regime.

Solzhenitsyn's legend was created simultaneously by various sides: the author; the authorities; the growing circle of his supporters and admirers; and the Western media. His reputation led the KGB to bring up the idea of expelling him from the Soviet Union. In a letter to the Soviet leaders in 1973, he proposed an ambitious program to save the country from what he saw as looming catastrophes: war with China and a global economic crisis due to a depletion of natural resources and overproduction. To avoid this scenario, Solzhenitsyn recommended discarding Marxist ideology and the policy of excessive industrialization and returning to traditional values. But while the letter was ignored by Soviet leaders, it caused plenty of criticism from Western intellectuals who accused him of promoting the USSR's isolationism (Solzhenitsyn 1980, 66-67). The persecution by the KGB became hysterical and Solzhenitsyn ended up arrested in 1974. Surprisingly, he was released the next day, stripped of his Soviet citizenship and placed on a charter flight to Frankfurt. From there, he went to Zurich and then onto the United States, starting a twenty-year exile abroad. After him, the authorities got rid of a plethora of intellectual figures that "disturbed the peace" (Volkov 2009, 220-228). The real reason for his expulsion from the USSR was the publication of *The Gulag Archipelago* in the West. Its effect among Western intellectuals was huge. It was not only a literary masterpiece as it was the real testimony of a victim of the Soviet system and, at the same time, an analysis of its corrupt nature. The debate that followed its publication in the West divided intellectuals: there were those who thought of Solzhenitsyn as a traitor and those who saw his book as the ultimate denunciation of what was really going on – the prisons and work camps, the machinery of oppression and the mechanisms of extermination (Bergman 1992, 31; Winock 2000, 618-624).

Actually, Solzhenitsyn did not say anything new. Criticism of the Soviet regime started early in the West and, after World War II, the French-based radical libertarian socialist group "Socialisme ou Barbarie" had already made a rigorous systemic analysis of the subject. Nevertheless, the USSR achieved a status after the defeat of the Nazis that was, in part, responsible for the devaluation of what was happening inside the USSR by internation-

al leaders and even some Western intellectuals. However, what Solzhenitsyn did, with the help of many others dissident works that became known all over Europe, was to revive the debate on the subject. Henceforth, no one could ignore repression or human rights violations; the results reached further as they transformed European Leftists into anti-Soviet intellectuals. He was helped by felicitous timing since, in the 1970's, the Western intellectual community was becoming disillusioned with the Communist experiment that rendered it hard to distinguish cause from effect (Applebaum 2009, 18; Volkov 2009, 229; Winock 2000, 627-630). While high culture declined and the influence of intellectuals decreased, Solzhenitsyn was the only writer still named regularly as a moral authority and cultural leader, even though the number of his followers shrank drastically (Volkov 2008, 296). Solzhenitsyn is the example of a Russian intellectual inspired by Western ideas, while being sufficiently independent from them to criticize what he thought wrong in the West. This ambiguity proves the inadequacy of the East/West division of intellectuals and the closed categories into which intellectual activism is very often confined.

Solzhenitsyn knew that "moral impulses among statesman had always been weaker than political ones" (Solzhenitsyn 1993, 688) – something that, in his view, explained Western decrepitude. He also believed that Russia held immunity to this decline because Christian Orthodoxy retained moral and political activity tightly linked. However, with the advent of the Soviet Union and the Russian federation, the moral axes had fallen into greater disuse than in the West (*ibid*, 698-699). He had the perception that progress was the main factor responsible for the decline in morality both in the West and in Russia. Progress based on economic development led to the optimistic idea that history will bring justice without God's help. Whereas, in fact, progress proved to have too many flaws: it was a limited process dependent on scarce natural resources; it made men forget about their soul and integrity; it allowed the spread of consumerism and oppression; it impoverished culture and humanity through superficial, massive and easy flows of information; it institutionalized a new form of slavery that led to human's loss of purpose – "what are we living for?" (*ibid*, 690-691). Despite the collapse of Soviet communism, Solzhenitsyn recognized that modern life problems had not vanished, but were aggravated. Post-Cold War complexity intensified the former spiritual and cultural crisis, leaving mankind's major question unsolved: "what is our destination?" (*ibid*, 694).

As a political moderate and strong opponent of conservative constitutionalism, he consistently advocated the rule of law and economic development fuelled by human scale technology. He was usually dismissed as a romantic, monarchist, theocrat and even anti-Semite. Solzhenitsyn was what Donald Treadgold called a “syncretistic thinker”, combining Western and indigenous ideas (apud Mahoney 2003, 67). He was inspired by Russian Christian liberal thinkers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, such as Solokiev and Bulgakov, from whom he inherited the intellectual resources of the wider Western tradition and the rejection of scientism and atheism. Nevertheless, he was victim of widespread hostility in the West because many of the so called Left refused to forgive him for his pivotal role in the defeat of communism and for being a conservative-minded thinker who brought together a measured critique of philosophical modernity (Mahoney 2003, 67-68).

Solzhenitsyn’s speech at Harvard University in June 1975 is a fine example of his Western influences and critiques but also of how an intellectual causes similar reactions both in the East and the West, proving that the intellectuals’ quest knows no boundaries. He assumed that the West had become materialistic and had forgotten the ideas that first generated its growth and excellence. Freedom has become indifference, democracy cannot control the media’s abuses and intellectuals have a confused function in such a scenario. Furthermore, he argued that communism and democracy came from the same roots: secular enlightenment. Assuming a critical and controversial role, Solzhenitsyn announced that the World was at a crossroads faced with the urgent choice between sinking into materialism and pursuing freedom grounded in spiritual values (Berman 1980, x). According to his perspective, Western thinking had become conservative, defending the perpetration of the established order and fighting all eventual changes. For him, this was the clearest symptom of a society that had ceased to develop (Solzhenitsyn 1980, 8-16). To transcend that situation, he underlined the need to return to Christian moral patterns. Solzhenitsyn’s references to Christianity and his Manichean vision of the world were not as much about religion as about a higher sense of morality. As with almost everything in Solzhenitsyn, his speech was massively criticized. Many people accused him of believing himself to ‘own’ the truth and criticizing those who had welcomed him. But more than criticizing the West he was criticizing modernity both in Russia and in the West.

Due to his criticism, in Russia he was seen as a Westernizer while in the West his critiques cost him the label of being an anti-modern Russian. However, Solzhenitsyn's thinking about the nature of man and politics are broadly congruent with the ideas of Cicero, Plato, Aristotle, as well as with those of Aquinas, Augustine, Richard Hooker, Pascal, Thomas More, Burke, Hegel, among others (Berman 1980, 34). He was an anti-modern in the sense that he had fundamental and comprehensive doubts about the modern enterprise, of which communism and liberalism were products, and he wanted to explore the possibility of a way out of modernity. For that purpose, he proposed, for instance, voluntary self-restraint and the revival of European classical thought. Consequently, he was not an opponent of the West. On the contrary, he was one of the twentieth century's greatest representatives of the West, an "avatar" of the most ancient and honorable Western principles that defended a return to the almost forgotten alternative to modernity: classical and early Christian political philosophy (Kesler 1980, 49-57). Furthermore, Solzhenitsyn's attitude towards the West cannot be regarded as being exclusively Russian as it embraced concerns from all writers aware that modern societies entail severe flaws that are too risky for mankind.

Certainly, Solzhenitsyn had many links to Russian Slavophiles. In fact, the central postulate of his thesis regarding human nature and politics is axiomatic for all Russian conservatives. But to identify Solzhenitsyn only with this current is to dismiss his participating in the Western tradition, since he is critical of the West and also apologist of those values that have made Western civilization what it is (Berman 1980, 75-84). He did not call for the West's collapse or a no-democratic system but rather for a better democratic West. Ultimately, he proposed the rise to a new stage of development that transcended the mistakes of modernity.

Following his return to Russia in 1994, Solzhenitsyn hosted a weekly television show for about a year where he spoke of the end of Russia. However, he sounded like a stranger to Russians (Gessen 1997, 25). However, he did become the first to call post-communist Russia an oligarchy (in his speech to the Duma in 1994). Even if liberals, both in Russia and the West, gave him little credit, today, it is all too common to adopt his analysis of the oligarchic character of the Russian Federation. Contrary to common opinion, he understood himself to be first and foremost an optimist. Even in *Russia in Collapse* (published in Russia in 1998) his undeniably bleak

description of contemporary Russia acknowledges those souls who refuse to accommodate themselves to post-communism corruption or to succumb to a pernicious nostalgia for the communist past. It was his belief that Russia still has its fair share of patriotic citizens, public-spirited entrepreneurs and morally upright people of faith. Solzhenitsyn refused to despair because he knew that the future is open and evil can never triumph once and for all (Mahoney 2003, 70-71). This explains why Solzhenitsyn, in opposition to the idea that post-modern intellectuals vanished after communism's collapse, produced a variegated body of work that included poems, short stories, memoirs and political writings. All display the same moral and intellectual seriousness that informs his best known anti-totalitarian writings (Mahoney 2003, 69). His death in 2008 meant a major loss to Russian society and the entire intellectual world that perceived him as a symbol of 20th century intellectual dissidence.

Conclusion

Despite the Great Schism of 1054, Russia shares a common civilization and evolutionary path with the West. The European theoretical background that inspired the nineteenth century *intelligentsia*, as well as the character of Soviet intellectuals, whether conformists, non-conformists or dissidents, and the contacts they established with Western intellectuals, seem to prove exactly that. Therefore, Russian and Western intellectuals cannot be truly distinguished from each other. Both assume the role of speaking the truth to power and to act as the moral conscience of their nations. They share beliefs, theoretical grounds and political positions. Like some in the West, Russian intellectuals express harsh critiques of hegemonic Western modernity. In that sense, the East/West division of intellectuals seems to be rather artificial and makes no real sense in the current world order. If this division was at some point useful because it indicated the actions and behaviors of intellectuals on either side of the Iron Curtain, the collapse of the Soviet Union made its utility irrelevant. Not only are there no physical barriers separating intellectuals but also their function and position in the world show no significant divergences. In this respect, my conclusion confirms the notion that contemporary intellectuals can be better understood as links and bonds between all cultures and civilizations.

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THE MAKING OF CITIZENSHIP, THE DIGITAL AGE, AND THE INFORMATION HIGHWAY

ANTÓNIO SIMÕES

Introduction

My thesis is simple, but yet, complex. It has three assumptions. They are:

1. The idea of citizenship and intellectual topography has various social and political components. Each notion has its own deep culture that does not rapidly change. It is an evolutionary process that may take generations to transform into different value orientations (Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck 1961).
2. The new technological age has a significant impact on information sharing and responsibilities that are beyond our control. This impact may have changed some of our views on collective intellectual responsibilities where the idea of citizenship may have political or cultural borders (Mirza 2010).
3. Each generation may have a different focus on citizenship and the self in relationship to society-at-large (Underwood 2008).

There are no simple answers or even simple questions that one can put some closure to the idea of citizenship, intellectual topography and cultural interaction. The old and still valid question is: “Who am I and how do I belong in society?” The way I participate in my social and political environment, individually and collectively, still brings some validity to our passage of life and one’s relationship to the self, to society, to the nation and now, to the globe. In other words, is Martin Buber’s original definition of I-Thou or I-It now changed to an It-It relationship in this new world of technology and information age (Buber 1970)? In the I-Thou relationship, human beings do not perceive each other as consisting of specific isolated quantities. They engage in a dialogue involving each other as a whole being. In the I-It relationship, human beings are perceived as separate beings and consist of things (Angelfire 2010; Buber 1970). My addition to Buber’s original

writings, an It-It relationship, brings us a step further to a disengagement of human interaction. On both sides of this relationship, going in two equal directions, there is disrespect for each other. Each other side is treated as an object that can be disregarded at ease.

The idea of the I-Thou is also flexible depending on where one lives, what cultural orientations one has, one's age, gender, geographical location, and skin color (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck 1961; Paul 1997).

Due to these and other important variables, I will have to limit my focus to postmodern Europe and North America. My analysis will use a macro approach. It is assumed that those who participate in my paradigm of inquiry are those who are the "informed" in the day-to-day participation of the post-modern and technological era. Excluded are those who still live in environments where electricity is minimal, farming is the way of life or those who still live in cultural communities that have not changed in the last century.

The Years from 1946 to the Present – What are some of the Variables that Affected Citizenship and Intellectual Topography?

I will begin with the boomer years, or those born from 1946 to 1963. Underwood (2008) developed a model to attempt to understand generations born in the 20th century. I will use this model to look at some of the issues on citizenship and intellectual topography.

It is important to note, that Underwood suggests that each generation has similar developmental stages. The first stage is called the formative years. This stage is critical because one moulds the core values of one's parents. Hence, we can assume that each generation presented new problems and issues. But did these 'new' issues really change into a new social paradigm? The next stages are extremely important. In these stages, the Boomers, Generation X, people born from 1964 to 1981, and the Millennials, people born from 1982 to the present, have more of a 30-year life expectancy than that of past generations. Due to this reality, they can experience the values of five generations. Hence, each generation may have a different view of citizenship.

Under Underwood's definition of generational values, I could be classified as part of the "silent generation". This is because I was born in 1940. This generation is perceived as hard working. The great depression and the Second World War also brought a trauma and a consciousness to the

political arena. I was taught to obey the rule of law. Citizenship was as a virtue, a responsibility to my nation and to God. My duty was to follow what was 'right' and 'correct'. At this time, Europe was going through a critical transformation.

It is interesting to note that many film makers and writers that influenced the boomers were born during the silent generation. In the movie industry, films such as *Rebel without a Cause*, *Blackboard Jungle*, *La Dolce Vita*, *La Chat*, among many others, are but a few that ring testimony that something was in the air. What to obey was now put in question. In the music industry, most of the rock n'roll artists were also of the silent generation. In the art world we had post modernism that was mostly followed by the intellectual elite.

Writers such as Kuhn (1970) were writing about paradigm shifts. Dali and Picasso were the fad of the day. In the field of education, writers such as Freire (1970) or Illich (1971) were read to discuss how oppressive schooling was, especially in the United States and in capitalist societies. The appearance of change was going on in North America, Europe and some other parts of the globe. The past was seen as the "old world" which represented oppression, colonialism, fascism and so on. Citizenship, for some, was now transformed into a critical phase of one's relationship to the State. In my field of education, it was called critical thinking (Hooks 2009).

Let us begin to look at some of the possible changes in our digital world to understand if the idea of citizenship has changed within the concept of intellectual topography. For our discussion, intellectual topography is not land surface but a collection of individuals without borders.

The Boomer Years

The boomer years are when the postmodern era became influential in our beliefs and politics. The boomer generation questioned the past, rejected some of the fundamental beliefs of racism, sexism, national origin, monolingual societies and sexual orientation. This generation began a new conversation on the I-Thou relationship from the citizen to the State and from the State to the citizen. However, the means of communication and dialogue were still from the past. People relied on radio, limited television coverage, writing letters, and the use of the outdated telegraph, now re-

placed by e-mail.

According to Underwood, the next generation after the boomers was called Generation X. It is a generation that is very individualistic. Career building was its primary objective. It was the first generation that had no moral ties to a particular company. Looking back at my own experiences as a teenager, and since coming from a traditionally European home, I did not experience a psychological and sociological split from one generation to another. Until I entered higher education, the silent and the boomer phenomena were one continuing life experience

The next generation, the millennial generation, is interesting. They have more support from parents than from the previous generation and have affection towards the silents and the boomers. It is a generation, however, that is totally different from other generations. Now, the millennials fully participate in the electronic age. They text message, use Facebook as a social network, have blogs, Google for information and use Twitter to share information on a daily basis.

The Idea of Citizenship – Topography – Language and Culture

I have one basic question: is citizenship in one place in time and space or does it depend on economic and socio-political shifts during one's lifetime? My own drastic shift in a place and time was in my intellectual training in the late 1960's and early 1970's. I encountered a new time warp and a contradiction of my past. I began to view citizenship from the so-called "new left". But even at that time, one issue remained unresolved. That was, I also had the fortunate experience to know another language and understand another culture. I was embedded with traditional values and understood two cultures (Simões 1983). Part of my early childhood was in Lisboa, Portugal. Both my parents were Portuguese. My father was dominant in the Portuguese language and culture. My mother was dominant in the English language and the American culture. In other words, I grew up in a balanced bilingual home where both cultures had a deep effect of my state-of-being and my deep culture (Freeman and Freeman 2001; Simões 2001). Still, I was a product of the past. My roots from the silent generation did not fundamentally change. On some levels I was a "citizen" of two States. As a young adult and living in New

York City and being part of a movement of political reconstruction of society, I noted that my views of the world, or my social construction of reality, had two different perspectives (Berger and Luckmann 1967).

Although my general view of citizenship was to see an end to fascism and to develop a new path to personal freedom, I understood that the political issues in the United States were somewhat different than Portugal. It is true that I had a general feeling that both countries and cultures had a past in colonialism, oppression and the loss of personal freedom. Yet, my I-Thou relationship to both cultures had a very different perspective on ethical and moral responses to what I thought was morally correct (Simões 1991). This may have been due to my bilingual and bicultural view of the world. By possessing bilingual interpersonal communicative skills (BICS) and cognitive academic level proficiency (CALP), (Cummins 1979, 1982; Simões 1992; Simões and Correia 1992), I had the luxury to “view”, “see”, “feel”, “know”, and “understand” the world from two different perspectives (Whorf 1956). That is, my linguistic relativity was coded or encoded into different categories. Hence, to be embedded in a special social construction of knowledge, was to perceive and react to my specific linguistic and cultural codes to citizenship (Fishman 1973, 1989). Due to this reality, I possessed two semantic systems that identified my ideas of citizenship from various perspectives. Depending on my cultural response, did my place and time affect my response to my social and personal environment?

In short, my "persona" and the view of the world had different perspectives depending on several and complex social factors. Space and time were critical to the formation of my view(s) on citizenship.

This line of logic is highly important to my main thesis that the idea of citizenship and intellectual topography is simple to define, but highly complex to analyze. That is, *each individual* responds to particular environments which are loaded with social cues that form one's state of being. These social cues reflect the social construction of one's reality.¹

¹The literature in bilingualism and biculturalism usually defines the individual of having experiences in two cultures. Due to intellectual topography, it is true that in many instances one culture may become more dominant than the other. For example, in a master's thesis written on my book *Moments in Culture* (1996), the author Ms Duarte defended the idea that I was "truly" bicultural. She proposed that I was Portuguese and American and *not* Portuguese-American.

The ideas of cultural hegemony and citizenship also come into play (Gramsci 1992, 2010; Giroux 1981, 1992). That is, I could also use a different line of thought that “what is real” is “real”. I will leave this type of analysis to my colleagues in sociology and philosophy.

Now let’s us review some of the literature of the postmodern era so I can create a working paradigm for further reflection and discussion.

The Postmodern Era and how it Has Evolved

To attempt to capture some images of what was then and what is now, I will begin with a time frame of post World War II. It is assumed that those who participated or are included in my paradigm are those who are the “informed” in the day-to-day participation of the post-modern era. Still, as Giroux suggests (1992), to invoke the term “modernism” is to immediately place oneself in the precarious position of suggesting a definition that in itself opens an Enormous debate and little agreement.

Also, some will argue that the post-modern era is dead (Kirby 2010). I will not dwell on these concerns. Any intellectual, social, cultural movement does not ‘die’ in a year or two. It takes time to eventually transform cultural environments across the globe. I do accept the label of “postmodernism”, but I accept this label as a limited category where only the intellectual elite participated in its doing. I have not seen any data that identify the working class as a full participant in this domain. For example, the invention of the information highway took place over several years. At the beginning of this technological era, the intellectual elite used it as an information tool. Now in the year 2010, it is used by most who are technologically literate, which include children to senior citizens of all social classes.

I can suggest, however, that political or social paradigm shifts can rapidly take place (Kuhn 1996). With the invasion of Poland by Germany in 1939 or the attack of the World Trade Center in New York City, on September 11, 2001, the world changed on how we view specific ideologies, Still is this “paradigm shift” drastic enough to change a how we view specific ideologies, still is this “paradigm shift” drastic enough to change a total worldview on citizenship and intellectual topography? I do not think so.

Taking some specific events in our history that may have affected our political responses, I still ask: Has there been a drastic paradigm shift in

cultural 2010 is different than let's say, 1939 or 2001? This depends on how one interprets a paradigm shift in the I-Thou, I-It and the It-It relationships. In other words, are "face to face" encounters (Burger and Luckmann 1967) present in all domains? I will use these categories to continue our conversation on intellectual topography and citizenship. They are useful to capture some images when we share information on these matters. But it must again be emphasized that these categories are *not* fixed notions frozen in time where one era is abruptly changed into another way of thinking.

My assumption is that the postmodern era did not stand alone from 1945 to the present. I believe there was a parallel movement or shall we say knowledge input from another source that affected our daily lives. It was called technology. My knowledge source toward citizenship gradually changed in 50 years from print knowledge to media knowledge and now to Internet and global knowledge.

What is knowledge today in the year 2010? Are we in a different "space and time" where technology now controls our knowledge system and possibly our citizenship that crosses over political borders?

Twitter, Space Book, Google, Blogs the Millenniums and Social Networks: Is this a New Form of Intellectual Topography and Citizenship?

It seems logic that all generations have one common thread. It is that citizenship is still bound by geographical and cultural borders. Is technology and literacy the "new" form for social and economic benefits? Is this new form of communication going to create a new class of "have and have nots" (Simões 1984)?

May I suggest that we may now have a new phenomenon regarding this inquiry? Citizenship and intellectual topography may have two existing notions. I will call them the local and the global notion.

On the local side and positive side, it is the notion of citizenship to one's country, flag, language, music, sports, food and other encumbrances that defines who is "French, German, Portuguese, Australian, or Brazilian". There are very emotional ties to one's inner core values. One may cite the soccer world cup matches and understand that "beingness" and the I-Thou relationship is still strong when it comes to nations and sports. When one sees a grown man such as a Japanese soccer player cry after defeat, it relays the message that the homeland has still a very deep emotional bond to the

flag, to country, and maybe to God. Also, when one celebrates the 4th of July in the United States or the Day of Portugal, it brings some notion that citizenship and nation is still alive and well. Even on immigration issues, I am always fascinated to go to some of the local ethnic festivities in the United States. St Anthony's feast for the Italians and the Puerto Rican Day for the Puerto Rican are always events that are full of ethnic pride celebrating a specific culture of the globe. These events testify that there are still strong emotional bonds to the homeland. These examples, among many others, show that local citizenship is still a strong expression of one's individual roots.

On the negative side, in the Bosnian silver-mining town of Srebrenica in July 1995, one of the most modern acts of genocide took place. Many dictatorships exist across the globe where the free press and the freedom of speech are banned. In the year 2010, in some countries one can go to jail for life and even be executed for speaking one's beliefs.

In short, I believe that local citizenship is still strong and is embedded in its own cultural traditions. Still, there seems to be a change coming in the future. It is possibly a global view of citizenship. We now have the information highway, twitter, chat rooms, face book that bring us to one another as "citizens" of the world. It is called social networking. I have met teenagers in Portugal who knew more about basketball in the United States than most of the population of that country. What is amazing is that they never left Portugal. When there is a social or political crisis several thousand miles away, I can see the events unfold in real time. Using the World Cup again as an example, most of the football fans participated together as "one" cohort. My last example is the recent event in the San Jose mines in Chile. With access to the media and after 69 days buried in a mine underground, most of the world watched while the miners were rescued. It was a live event that in many ways brought us a global connection that did not have any borders.

Hence, may I suggest that citizenship and cultural topography may be slowly changing from a local view to a global view? On some levels the global view is a view without borders and citizenship.

Further Research

I believe that our mission in this chapter is to identify some common threads across disciplines to collect data and examine current ideas. May I suggest some ways to examine these exciting and very important issues? On a scientific level, one way to collect data is to create a survey model that looks at citizenship across the globe. As we know, research gives us a “window” to look at social constructions and to develop paradigms for further discussion and analysis.

One way is to borrow Underwood’s model of generations. I would begin with the silent generation and develop a series of questions that could cross the academic disciplines. A survey questionnaire could be developed to collect data that speaks to a generational time line. We could look at 4 generations. Here are some *preliminary* questions for survey research:

IP = Intellectual Topography

C = Citizenship

DD = Demographic Data

1. What is your sex, male or female? (DD)
2. How old are you? (DD)
3. What is your yearly income? (DD)
4. Where do you live? (DD, IP)
5. How many times have you moved in your lifetime? (DD)
6. Do you trust your politicians? (C)
7. Do you support your present political system? (C)
8. How many countries do you possess citizenship? (C)
9. Are you a user of technology such as the Internet? (IP)
10. When applying technology, what language do you use? (C, IP)

These data points are *but a few* possible questions that could be used in survey research. I am sure that with a team of experts from cross disciplines, at least 100 questions could be developed to understand differences on a cross generational basis that looks at intellectual topography and citizenship. It is true that such a survey will be expensive and time consuming. In the long run it could give the research community some data to understand the ‘new’ world we now live in.

The second suggestion would be research in the humanities. Here, particularly in the arts, theology and philosophy, we could look at issues in ethics, social attitudes in the arts, philosophical themes of the past and present that are now in play in the year 2010.

What are my conclusions to this very exciting topic? I believe it is a challenge for the academic, business and intellectual communities to continue a discussion that deals specifically with the issues on citizenship and intellectual topography. At the university level, we could develop cross disciplines in academic departments. Academic disciplines could evaluate not only social and cultural trends across the globe, but it could also assist the business community to make sound judgments based on the data that is related to citizenship and cultural topography. In short, I believe that we can create a new way to look at our world of today and of the future. We can begin a new intellectual discourse of our global participation in the economic and the intellectual spheres.

Do we really now have local and global citizens? Is citizenship and intellectual topography now a legitimate academic field that deserves an academic department at institutions of higher education? Would such an academic department be multidisciplinary?

I believe these ideas and challenges are exciting.

We cannot afford to pass them by.

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MATTHEW JAMES BELLAMY: AN EXAMPLE OF A NEW INTELLECTUAL?

NELSON NUNES

When examining the critical bibliography on the post-Sartrean intellectual landscape, it becomes clear that frustration and pessimism (Posner 2004; Furedi 2004; Jacoby 1987; Small 2002, 110-128, 207) are the predominant notes sounded for the public intellectual. Stefan Collini, Frank Furedi and Russell Jacoby, among others, clearly admit that the intellectual has disappeared or is at least in decline. However, there are also authors, such as Steve Fuller and Richard Posner, who claim that the intellectual has not actually vanished (Fuller 2005; Posner 2004) but rather being dispersed throughout different fields such as science, politics, literature and art.

However, should we also consider the list of one hundred intellectuals put forward by Richard Posner (2004), and that is most commonly cited by the media, we realize that the majority of public intellectuals appearing in the public sphere between 1995 and 2000 remained academics (41) and writers (34). In addition, the list includes ten journalists, eight political pundits, seven law experts before then being completed by a sprinkling of philosophers, activists, politicians and the poet Ezra Pound for his participation in different musical projects.

According to most scholars, an intellectual is someone who thinks about current affairs (Small 2002, 114), strictly and independently, while remaining committed to truth, social responsibility and innovative ideas (Furedi 2004, 36). As such, he/she influences public opinion and policies in a direct way (Small 2002, 5). Beginning with the idea that the traditional intellectual (mainly the writer and academic) is in decline, I shall proceed with a proposal that may seem, to some, rather unorthodox. Hence, I would like to ask, at this early point, for some open-mindedness about what I am going to say on the well-known young musician Matthew James Bellamy.

Who is Matthew James Bellamy?

Mark Beaumont, journalist and Bellamy's biographer, gives one of the most accurate and elucidative ideas of Bellamy's *persona*:

What Matt constantly strives to do is thrust forth an alternative viewpoint on politics and humanity, to make his listeners question the information they're being spoon fed daily and to research and reason out their own form of The Truth. Matt Bellamy humanises the frustration, paranoia and anger of the ordinary man who refuses to be a pawn in a global game with no rules. If marching about Iraq and rioting about banking crisis make no difference, at least Muse are voicing our concerns, as brightly and loudly as they humanly can.¹

Matthew James Bellamy was born in 1978 in Cambridge, England. From an early age, he revealed a *sui generis* passion for music. Aged three, he started playing the piano and, when he became twelve, he was already playing long classical music pieces at school events.² Later, he also became a member of his school's theatre group.³ Nevertheless, nothing could predict, at that early stage in his life, the future idealistic, profound and erudite artist. Today, still a young man, he is the lead singer, guitarist, pianist and composer of the British rock band *Muse* and has produced some significant pieces of work that, in my view, qualify him as an intellectual, i.e. as someone who is capable of thinking in depth about current affairs and, perhaps more importantly, creating his own cultural material through complex and informed analysis. No wonder, in the last decade, Bellamy has created five pieces that have received unanimous critical acclaim: *Showbiz* (1999), *Origin of Symmetry* (2001), *Absolution* (2003), *Black Holes and Revelations* (2006) and *The Resistance* (2009). Throughout these years of inspired creation, a significant literary culture stimulated Bellamy's artistic vision of the world, his interpretations of current events, as well as his socio-political critique and alternative views, and which we find in *Confessions of an Eco-*

¹NME Icons, May 2010: 8-9

²http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_99w1GYza1c, <accessed November 26, 2010>.

³NME Icons, May 2010: 42

nomic Hitman,⁴ *Limits to Growth*,⁵ *Crossing the Rubicon*,⁶ *Nineteen Eighty-Four*,⁷ *The Grand Chessboard*,⁸ among others. The vast majority of this bibliography is about politics or think-tank style thinking.

From a very early age music was definitely a decisive facet in the formation of this curious artistic character, as mentioned above. Matthew Bellamy has revealed that several musicians were important sources in his musical development, influencing him throughout the years. Artists such as Tom Morello (guitarist of Rage Against the Machine), Sergei Rachmaninov, Tom Waits, Hector Berlioz (Beaumont 2008, 14), Jimi Hendrix, Nirvana, Smashing Pumpkins (*ibid.* 15), Andres Segovia or Villa-Lobos (*ibid.* 14) are constant inspirational presences in his work. Bellamy himself was awarded an *Honoris Causa* Doctorate by the University of Plymouth in recognition of all the artistic advances he has given music.⁹

His interest in political issues also began long before he became the composer and exclusive lyrics writer for *Muse* at the early age of 15. Apparently, the soon-to-be musician finished college with grades that were somewhat a “mix of A’s B’s and C’s” (Myers 2007, 42). What is interesting is that he soon grasped the great potential of the media for a successful socio-political commitment. As he explained: “(...) I got an ‘A’ in Media Studies and I believe that it made me feel interested by the amount of power that the media have”.¹⁰

Can musicians be deemed intellectuals?

How can a rock musician and composer be deemed an intellectual? Careful analysis of Bellamy’s complex artistic output is required before gi-

⁴<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=42mesIUG3kI>, <accessed November 26, 2010>.

⁵NME Icons, May 2010: 24

⁶NME Icons, May 2010: 25

⁷Q, October 2009

⁸*Ibid.*

⁹<http://www.nme.com/photos/50-supermassive-muse-facts/173103/1/1>, <accessed November 26, 2010>.

¹⁰*State*, March 4, 2008

ving a credible answer to this question as, while not new, approaching a mainstream artist as a possible intellectual is not very common.

There is no such thing as an accurate definition of what is an intellectual. There are, however, characteristics that may help us define one. Taking an unbiased look at some of the specific attributes with which critics tend to assess the intellectual's functions, I have no doubt about the feasibility of a musician like Bellamy being considered an intellectual not just because of his ability to sing or play a musical instrument but also because of the relevance and reach of the message he conveys. According to McKee, for instance, the intellectual is someone who takes as his or hers "subject matters of public concern and has the public's attention" (McKee 2002, 221). Bellamy focuses upon the abuses of power and political oppression inciting his audience to combat them: in the song *Uprising*¹¹ – an excellent example of such concerns – the musician tells us that "*they will not force us, they will stop degrading us, they will not control us, we will be victorious*".

Relevant to any classification as an intellectual is the central position of the media in contemporary society. In fact, it seems that "the traditional Western image of an intellectual as a cloistered ivory-tower academic or a member of the clergy is no longer valid for the bulk of intellectual roles" (Louw 2001, 13). Furthermore, there are theoreticians who "insist that performance artists, novelists and filmmakers should also be public intellectuals", since "the attention of a wider public is vital to the definition [of an intellectual]" (McKee 2002, 221). Correspondingly, a successful musician like Matthew Bellamy, who is capable of deploying the media as a communication vehicle (especially to reach younger generations), has a great impact on his audience and, by this criterion, may also be considered a public intellectual.

The intellectual in Bellamy

Jeremy Jennings defines the intellectual as someone "who thinks about current affairs",¹² adding that he also possesses the ability to analyze, criti-

¹¹"Uprising", *The Resistance* 2009

¹²SMALL, 2002: 114

cize and explain the reality to his public, decoding procedures and situations with critical independence and without the interference of personal and professional interests that might influence his view on the issues.¹³ On September 2009, *Muse* put out a song named *United States of Eurasia*,¹⁴ in which Bellamy uses the ideas Zbigniew Brzezinski (state advisor to the former American President Jimmy Carter) expounded in *The Grand Chessboard*; it also incorporates elements of *Nineteen Eighty-Four* by George Orwell¹⁵ and a piece of *Nocturna in E Flat Major, Op. 9, No. 2* by Frédéric Chopin. Bellamy advances the idea, developed and explained by Orwell, that the State fostered the feeling that Eurasia was constantly at war with other continents, based on the ruling party's idea that "War is Peace, Freedom is Slavery, Ignorance is Strength" (Orwell 1984, 30). Bellamy's song states that "*these wars they can't be won*", asking his listeners: "Do you want them [the wars] to go on and on and on? (...) Does anyone know or care how they begun?"

The bibliographic references are present throughout the song. As referred, another source that inspired him was Brzezinski's *The Grand Chessboard*. This work expands on an international scheme for North American foreign policies based on the idea that the United States needs to control Eurasia both since that area holds a great amount of cultural, military and economic potential given its gross national product is 420% greater than the American, and because that continent is a "cauldron of ethnic conflicts and great-power rivalry" (Brzezinski 1997, 33 and 195). The author puts across the idea that the United States as a superpower, based on military strength, technology and cultural and political influence (*ibid.* 24), must control Eurasia in order to avoid future threats to its political system.

What Bellamy seeks to convey is essentially what someone, commonly known as "intellectual", does when he/she paraphrases and recycles the ideas of several authors in order to advance a personal point of view or a particular thesis: for instance, why not unite the whole of Eurasia in order to have enough power to respond against the dominance of the United States of America? The initial statement "you and me are the same" – which

¹³SMALL, 2002: 117

¹⁴"United States of Eurasia", *The Resistance* 2009.

¹⁵*Nineteen Eighty-Four* has been referenced by *Muse* as an inspiration for the whole album *The Resistance*.

seeks to approach Eastern and Western cultures and dissolve the West/East dichotomy –, the glorifying shouts of continental union “Eurasia!” and the fusion of oriental melodies with Chopin are clear indicators of the elucidative inter-textual intricacy of Bellamy’s composition. Along with profound thoughts about current affairs and proposals for viewing the world’s geopolitics differently, Bellamy is also exempt from bias in his statements as he has no contractual obligations that might restrict him from saying whatever he wants— except, of course, his record label contract. Certainly, this might pose an obstacle to a musician’s independence, however, when he is in a band that already has a large fan base, the problem dissipates.

As a musician, he has no other professional obligations than playing or signing sessions; therefore, he has a lot of free time for examining reality and elaborating on what he considers to be relevant issues. Bellamy himself acknowledges that he “possibly” thinks too much, since “you’ve got a lot of time on your hands when you are in a band travelling all the time”.¹⁶ This bohemian side was also common to the lifestyles of many 19th century intellectuals. Additionally, Bellamy also believes that a great amount of critical thought about what the media broadcasts is needed in spite of admitting to being afraid of eventual retaliations. Fear does not prevent him from intervening publically: “[If] I feel strongly about it (...) I’ve got to say it”, he says. And when asked whether he is afraid of being identified by the FBI as a dangerous threat to the system, he simply retorts that “with the world we live in, I think the books I’ve ordered on Amazon I’ll already be on [their] lists”.¹⁷

Frank Furedi states that the intellectual is the “defender of cultural standards” and “the conscience of society” (Furedi 2004, 35), committed to the chase of new ideas and the ‘truth’ (*ibid.* 36). As I have pointed out, these are also characteristics of Bellamy’s activism, who says explicitly that he is interested in “alternative ways of thinking”.¹⁸ Besides defending cultural standards (as we shall see further ahead in this paper), Bellamy also aspires to be society’s conscience, even on matters of a quasi-philosophical

¹⁶Kerrang, November 10, 2006.

¹⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁸<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QQF8QBWwuW4>, <accessed November 26, 2010>.

nature. In “Thoughts of a Dying Atheist”,¹⁹ for example, he exposes the ambiguity of thought that can assail the mind of an atheist on his deathbed. The search for ‘truth’ is also present in Bellamy’s body of work as is evident in “Unnatural Selection”,²⁰ in which the musician gives voice to “I want the truth”. And as Steve Fuller explains, ‘truth’ can be transformed by the intellectual himself so that he can present it to the public in a more appealing fashion, for instance, by simplifying it (Fuller 2005, 61-67). In fact, Bellamy recognizes that simplification is required should he wish to be understood by the public in general.

Fuller also sets out the metaphor of “the eternal irritant” to give expression to the intellectual’s function (*ibid.* 163). Bellamy may not (yet) be considered a serious menace to the establishment but there are some individuals who have already felt uncomfortable with his presence in the public sphere. On November 18, 2006, the music magazine *NME* stated that the “powers-that-be” had referred to Bellamy as a “crackpot little fella”.²¹

Edward Saïd, in turn, defines three grand goals that should guide the intellectual: to protect culture and tradition from the sweeping transformation societies are undergoing; fight against the excessive simplification of history by endowing historical narratives with different and detailed contextual perspectives, as well as avoiding manipulating facts and fostering ideological “battlefields”. Finally, the intellectual should protect his work from being minimized by the elites residing in small academic industries (Small 2002, 37). The latter is also what Bellamy does.

David Wallace enhances humanism as an important characteristic of the intellectual (*ibid.* 62-79). Bellamy once again complies with this requirement, judging, for example, from the 12-minute symphonic composition “Exogenesis”.²² Here, he exhorts politicians to assume that, for survival reasons, we may have to leave this planet in the future for another point of the galaxy, restarting life in society in a more responsible way. This may sound like naive science fiction to some but the idea has already been proposed by well-known and respected scientists such as Paul C. W.

¹⁹“Thoughts of a Dying Atheist”, *Absolution* 2003.

²⁰“Unnatural Selection”, *The Resistance* 2009.

²¹*NME*, November 18, 2006

²²“Exogenesis”: Part 1” (Overture), “Exogenesis”: Part 2 (Cross-Pollination) and “Exogenesis”: Part 3 (Redemption), *The Resistance* 2009.

Davies (Brockman 2009, 188-190), Rodney Brooks (*ibid.* 192-95), Carl Sagan (2003) and even Stephen Hawking (2008). Furthermore, there is the message of “Map of the Problematique”²³ – a protest held against what the “Club of Rome” think tank has defended in *Limits to Growth* (Meadows *et al.* 2004) – advocating the need for a population control policy in the face of the scarcity of the planet’s resources.

Nevertheless, the strongest statements of the musician derive from his ability to legitimate (or discredit) certain conspiracy theories. For those considering whether or not an intellectual should believe in conspiracy theories, the answer would seem to be yes according to some authors. Correspondingly, Steve Fuller states that the intellectual should be somehow paranoid about all the issues he is concerned with. He even states that conspiracy theoreticians are paranoid intellectuals who end up building social-scientific theories (Fuller 2005, 19). Bellamy has always been known for believing in some conspiracy theories although he has publicly admitted that some of them are just “sheer madness”.²⁴ Inspiration triggered by this theme is undeniable in his work: the entire *Black Holes and Revelations* album of 2006, for instance, is filled with conspiracy theories rooted in the book *Crossing the Rubicon* (Ruppert 2004), which was his main source of information during the writing process. In the album booklet, we also find references to “High Frequency Active Auroral Research” – the project that studies basic natural processes that occur in the ionosphere,²⁵ documents unravelling the time when the CIA investigated mind control, a project named “MK Ultra” and several pictures of the Auroral project, which developed secret airplanes that reached 20,000 kilometres per hour. But there is more: the song “Ruled by Secrecy”²⁶ is based on the similarly entitled book (Marrs 2001), and “MK Ultra”²⁷ is a song that recalls a conspiracy theory that ended up being confirmed (Boese 2007, 75-80; Klein 2009, 37-51). These are just a few of many more examples.

²³ *Black Holes and Revelations* 2006.

²⁴ Q, July 2010: 57.

²⁵ The Project was used to name the 2007 *Muse* live album, *H.A.A.R.P.*

²⁶ *Absolution* 2003.

²⁷ *The Resistance* 2009.

The Intellectual-Musician – acting in a new situation

The present intellectual context – referred to by Stefan Collini as the 3D Reality: Dead, Deceased and Disappeared (*apud* Small 2002, 207) – leads us to consider that intellectuals are probably no longer only academics, writers and philosophers as was once the case. Granted this possibility, we should then open our horizons and search for them in new emerging areas that possess public relevance. It is certain, as stated by Frank Furedi (Furedi 2004) and Russell Jacoby (Jacoby 1987), that the intellectual has been absorbed by academic institutions and has, therefore, lost the neutrality and independence of the ideas exposed in the public sphere. The public sphere itself has been profoundly changed. In the prodigal period of intellectual activity, between the mid-19th century and the end of the Second World War, the public debate spaces were mostly *cafés* or *salons*, as explained by Habermas (1992), where papers – the most common media at the time – were read. Today, electronic media are the mediator.

There are, in fact, several indicators that suggest a musician actually can function as an intellectual, not only because of his ease in reaching wide audiences through the media, but also because he possesses certain non-verbal codes and symbols that facilitate the understanding of the message in a musical text. Jane Fulcher wrote a book in which she specifies the way French composers, between 1914 and 1940, engaged in intellectual debate through such codes: “The choice for musicians, unlike artists and writers, therefore, was not that of clear conformity or dissent through words or images; rather, through style they could equivocate more subtly. Words were subject to censorship, but symbols and style could be manipulated with latitude, providing a mode of criticism or indirect resistance to complete absorption by the nationalist myth” (Fulcher 2005, 47). Along with words, Bellamy uses these codes in very different ways, from martial rhythms²⁸ to the simulation of sirens whether with guitars²⁹ or with his own voice.³⁰ One of the most interesting and original examples of this type of intellectual communication is *Megalomania* in which Bellamy criticizes the way the Church deals with some issues and denounces the perverted form

²⁸ “Uprising”, *The Resistance* 2009; “Invincible”, *Black Holes and Revelations* 2006.

²⁹ “Plug in Baby”, *H.A.A.R.P.* 2007.

³⁰ “Apocalypse Please”, *Absolution* 2003.

that belief in a God can assume. The artist got permission from a priest to use a Church organ to illustrate his critique. This attitude could certainly be mistaken by childish mockery of religious power or belief, but religion as an oppressive organization has long been a target for intellectual critique. Zygmunt Bauman, for instance, recalls that intellectuals emerged during their war against Church power (Bauman 1987, 34-35). Isaiah Berlin refers to the Russian intellectual Belinsky, for whom “religion was (...) a detestable insult to reason; theologians were charlatans, the Church a conspiracy” (Berlin 2001, 83).

Reaching the public’s awareness

There are some issues that are central to the public’s reception of the intellectual’s ideas. According to Furedi, the contemporary public is philistine meaning that it has no kind of cultural taste and its interests are purely common sense and materialistic (Furedi 2004, 1). This author shows that most people are not proactive in the search for knowledge but take it for granted and comprehend only that which comes through the media – regardless of the sources (*ibid.* 50-72). Philistines also believe that they have “proper knowledge” that comes from their own experience and relevant knowledge than that conveyed by specialized, educational institutions. The omnipresent philistinism of contemporary Western societies is responsible for the increasing scepticism and disinterest in public matters and for turning individuals into possessors of an “inverted snobbery” (Furedi 2004, 145). Bellamy criticizes such attitude in “Futurism”,³¹ saying that: “Ignorance pulls, apostasy and apathy still rules”.

There is also the question of adult authority over children and adolescents. Furedi also writes about this matter when referring to the decadence of education and to the prevailing ideas for coping with this problem: either it is the parents’ or the teachers’ fault with the latter accusation favoured by parents. At the same time, schools strive to satisfy student needs, levelling down education (Furedi 2009, 4). The problem, according to Furedi, resides in the general lack of adult authority when dealing with young people. Without it, they have little influence

³¹“Futurism”, b-side of *Origin of Symmetry* 2001.

and intellectual ascendancy over them (ibid. 87). In such a situation, it is inevitable that young people transfer their attention to those they admire – people like Bellamy and others who, as musicians, attract greater attention than academics or writers. Thus, musicians, in their roles of new intellectuals, are closer to younger generations. What this means is that intellectual-artists enjoy favourable conditions for being makers of citizenship. This is precisely what Bellamy has been concerned about – creating a feeling of social responsibility in his audiences whether by means of statements in the media or the songs he creates. “Assassin”,³² for example, is based on melodies (heard on Islamic radio stations) with the purpose of alerting people to cultural differences and by transposing Middle Eastern realities onto the Western context. In this song, Bellamy states that “the time has come for you to shoot your leaders down, join forces underground”. This may actually be a perfect metaphor for the turnout in elections and the symbolic “death” of the current governing class. The name given to the song – but not chosen for its final version – represented what Bellamy struggles against: demonocracy.

The Intellectual as the gatekeeper of cultural standards

I now arrive at another unavoidable dimension to my analysis: cultural standardization. Linda Kauffman (Small 2002, 131-57) states that the intellectual functions as a certain gatekeeper, that is, he/she informs the public about which are (or are not) good pieces of culture. Accordingly, artists and intellectuals have the “vital function” of studying and explaining the origins and evolutions of aesthetic movements and canons (and the devaluing of popular culture), in order to foster new creative processes and new cultural products.

Bellamy does this in a perfect and delightful way. It takes only a slight glimpse of his influences and we understand that popular and elite cultural references are in constant fusion: while simultaneously turning popular culture more sophisticated, he also delivers elite culture to the masses, rendering it less difficult. There are many examples of this artistic (and

³² “Assassin”, *Black Holes and Revelations* 2006.

inter-textual) process in Bellamy's work from which I point out just a few: "The Small Print"³³ is based on Goethe's myth of Faust, "Micro Cuts"³⁴ was inspired on the style of Johann Sebastian Bach; in "Butterflies and Hurricanes"³⁵ there is a part belonging to a Rachmaninov piece; "Space Dementia"³⁶ is also based on Rachmaninov's work; "Hoodoo"³⁷ contains some Tchaikovsky; "I Belong to You"³⁸ has an opera aria from *Samson and Delilah* by Camille Saint-Saëns, sung in French by Bellamy himself; "Citizen Erased"³⁹ is based on Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. Such merging of popular and erudite music reveals Bellamy's great artistry and also insight into the public's taste.

In 2003, the artist composed a song named "Sing for Absolution",⁴⁰ in which he conveys the belief that music had taken on a new function in people's lives, substituting religion. Seven years later, the researcher Clive Marsh published a paper in which he reached the same conclusion by saying that music is attracting the public's devotion and therefore substituting religion,⁴¹ while transferring the musician's way of thinking to the audiences. And Bellamy admits: "I care about communicating with the younger generation".⁴²

Muse fans: a large public

Let me just point out that *Muse* reaches a very large diversity of publics. As Bellamy refers, the kids attending the gigs are so diverse, from metal to pop-indie fans.⁴³ Besides, on every long tour of the band, the

³³ "The Small Print", *Absolution* 2003.

³⁴ "Micro Cuts", *Origin of Symmetry* 2001.

³⁵ "Butterflies and Hurricanes", *Absolution* 2003.

³⁶ "Space Dementia", *Origin of Symmetry* 2001.

³⁷ "Hoodoo", *Black Holes and Revelations* 2006.

³⁸ "I Belong to You" (Mon Coeur S'Ouvre à Ta Voix), *The Resistance* 2009.

³⁹ "Citizen Erased", *Origin of Symmetry* 2001.

⁴⁰ "Sing for Absolution", *Absolution* 2003.

⁴¹ <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/music/music-news/7511834/Music-is-replacing-religion-says-academic.html>, <accessed November 26, 2010>.

⁴² *National Post*. June 10, 2009: <http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/theampersand/archive/2009/10/06/q-amp-a-matt-bellamy-from-muse-talks-politics-arena-rock-and-the-resistance.aspx>, <accessed November 26, 2010>.

⁴³ *NME*. March 9, 2009.

vast majority of shows are sold out. The last *Muse* concert in Portugal, which took place in Pavilhão Atlântico in November 29, 2009, had already sold out before the end of August. This has been happening over the five continents and throughout the ten years *Muse* has been playing together. But besides the shows themselves, the band also counts on huge record sales successes, especially in North America, Europe and East Asia. Speaking again about the Portuguese case, it is important to mention that one of the group's songs remained high on the playlist of a national radio station (Rádio Comercial) between October 2009 and July 2010. It is also important to mention that several *Muse* songs receive frequent airplay.⁴⁴

In the light of what I said, I believe I can assume that a musician like Bellamy can be considered a new type of “intellectual” – one that has a huge impact on the generations he reaches out to and who will probably play a significant role in the future of societies. The features that Pierre Bourdieu ascribes to the intellectual – capacity for people's mobilization, “freedom with respect to those in power, the critique of received ideas, the demolition of simplistic either-ors and respect for the complexity of problems” (Bourdieu 1998, 65 and 92) – can be found in Bellamy's *persona*. The great resistance to the emerging of this new type of intellectual may lie in the fact that he/she is broadly considered a mere figure of entertainment. However, once the media and the establishment discard the prejudice by assuming the existence of intellectuals like Bellamy, these will become a presence in the public space, where they will discuss public matters in ways that prove easier and more palatable to public understanding and thereby influencing public policies. The time is ripening for this to happen, particularly because the media is now more permissive and there is questioning over intellectuals having to follow traditional and moral values (Johnson 1988, 1).

⁴⁴“Time is Running Out”, “Starlight”, “Supermassive Black Hole”, “Uprising”, “I Belong to You”, “Resistance”, “Neutron Star Collision” (Love is Forever).

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III – Intellectual Topographies in the Iberian Context

PUBLIC INTELLECTUALISM AND THE DEMISE OF THE PORTUGUESE MONARCHY: THE IDEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF THE REPUBLICAN VICTORY OF 1910

JOSÉ MIGUEL SARDICA

In the nineteenth century, even the most conservative section of the intelligentsia was critical of the prevailing cultural climate, and every brand of the intellectuals sought to alter, improve, transform and even overthrow the world that confronted them. The contrast between this tradition of intellectual ferment and the complacent attitudes displayed today highlights the distant features of intellectual life in the early twenty first century.

(Furedi 2006, 48)

The demolishers of liberalism [...] encountered an anaemic and decrepit society, succumbed to a certain senile dementia, mouthing various deliria of liberty as if recalling a passion of youth and in fact abandoned to the disgrace of a great fall and much ineptitude within which one atrophies and is dishonoured. It had become urgent to reanimate society, raise it up through a new baptism, purify it and begin there new kingdoms, free of its multiple vices, recasting it with new politics, new art, new hygiene, new religion, new customs, new happiness and new standards of dignity.

(Lima 1916, 1103)

The lost power: writers and intellectuals in liberal Modernity

It remains today difficult to locate in time the exact historical moment when intellectuals lost their central role in cultural, social and political life. It was only *a posteriori* that this loss was noted, eliciting embittered nostalgias regretting the decadence and the end of the public intellectual and his/her relevance within what is termed post-Modernity. As Frank Furedi recently pointed out with irony: “the very fact that today many monographs

ask “what is a public intellectual?” suggests that what they are describing corresponds to an endangered species” (Furedi 2006, 31).¹ In contrast, and historically as from the Enlightenment through to our post-ideological era, the centrality and relevance of intellectuals was taken for granted along with their unquestionable social and political recognition. At a time when ideas displayed real power in creating and changing “worlds” (in the expectation that this was for the better), their producers, interpreters and promoters enjoyed an almost oracle-like status in public life. As Michel Winock summarised, intellectuals stood out for their strong spirit of civic mission, for their ambition to “conceive and represent the universal” and for their inherently critical vocation that consisted in “recording the universal values” to their co-citizens (Winock 2000, 634, 645). As a class, modernity period intellectuals were a learned and liberal intelligentsia that not only spoke out on behalf of all citizens but also ideally to all citizens, thereby creating, interpreting and motivating wills, leading public spheres of debate, integrating civic society and advising on the construction and improvement of structures of power and political systems. Hence, intellectuals lived *from* and *for* ideas – not ephemeral *slogans* or party convictions but broad questions relating to civic awareness, public morality and global progress (Furedi 2006, 32)² – self-appointing themselves as holders of a social responsibility that drove them to take public and political positions.

Over the course of the temporal span of contemporary times, the final decades of the 19th century and the early decades of the 20th century represented a high water mark in the history of intellectuals and their profile and authority (Charles 1996).³ The figure of the intellectual clearly pre-

¹ See also Posner 2002, and Pires 2009.

² Isaiah Berlin draws attention to this, highlighting how “sheer protest, whether justified or unjustified, does not qualify one to be a member of the intelligentsia as such. What does so is a combination of belief in reason and progress with a profound moral concern for society” (Berlin 2001, 108).

³ In this book, Christophe Charles portrays “the birth of the intellectuals” in the short two decade period from 1880-1900. Like Michel Winock in the first part of his work, Charles’ object of study is the France of the 3rd Republic while the same chronology is equally applicable to other countries – Portugal included. Isaiah Berlin also places the emergence of the intelligentsia in Tsarist Russia (the word *intelligentsia* is indeed of Russian origin) between the years 1860-1870 (Berlin 2001, 103).

dates this period and stretches back, at least in more industrialised societies, to the Enlightenment and the moment when for the first time the most symbolic cultural work of the “Lights” took form – the French *Encyclopédie*. The liberal revolutions politicised intellectuals while the post-revolutionary Romanticism of the first half of the 19th century consecrated their status in glorifying the *génie littéraire* and the *poète-penseur* and assisting in establishing an important inter-linkage between literature, art, journalism, oratory and politics.⁴ It was particularly towards the end of the 19th century, when a realist aesthetic and scientific positivism endowed literature and other fields of learning with a heightened level of concern and socio-political incidence, that the word “intellectual” replaced the previously existing notions of a “man of letters”, “learned” or “public writer”, taking on a new meaning as a noun and not merely as an adjective (Ramos 2004, 108-109, and Andrade 1999, 28).⁵

The “golden age” of the Portuguese intelligentsia

The late 19th and early years of the 20th century, with the transition from a Monarchy to a Republic, represented a “golden age” for intellectuals in Portugal. The word was perhaps not as commonly attributed as in France but it was the same search for ethical-political points of reference, the same discursive energy in their defence and the same commitment towards the civic awareness that motivated writers, journalists and intellectual leaders. It was this image as the “voice of the collective conscience, speaking out to all and perceiving a correction and improvement in the shortcomings of the community” (Ramos 2001, 47-48) that these men of thought – reformist supporters of power and iconoclastic voices of the opposition – attributed themselves as a specific social and cultural category.

⁴ On the history of the French intellectual between Enlightenment and Orleanism (c. 1750-1850), see Sirinelli 1996. On the Portuguese situation in the first half of the 19th century, see Santos 1988.

⁵This qualitative evolution resulted above all from the echoes issuing out of France to all of Europe by the notorious “affaire Dreyfus”. It was on this subject that Georges Clemenceau wrote his *Manifeste des Intellectuels* in 1898, deemed one of the founding texts on the new role and image of the intellectual in the public space.

The importance gained by all those contemplating national problems and intervening in public debate in defence of their position is inseparable from the set of transformations that Portuguese society underwent in the last quarter of the 19th century and the first decades of the 20th century. The *Fontist* period (c. 1851-1890) saw literacy spread more widely, the breaking with ancestral isolation and the creation of larger cities where new middle class social strata boosted civil society and led to the emergence of a radical and noisy *masspolitik*, whose dynamism contributed towards eroding the old institutional and cultural conventions of the oligarchic based monarchy (Bonifácio 2010, 81-82 and 113-114). In a country aware of social protest, political radicalism and the latest trends in thinking and in the arts, the opinion making centres expanded beyond the restricted environs of the Palace, the Parliament, the parties of the notables, members only clubs, elite academies and the university to enter into the main mass channels of communication – the *fin de siècle* style newspapers (cheap, generalist, written in simple language and dotted with political-ideological slogans), books, pamphlets, essays, mass market cultural collections, rallies, conferences, exhibitions and the activism of commemorations and civic processions (Sardica 2010, 109-110, and Matos 2002, 108). It was within such an environment and the sociologically and geographically expanded public opinion domain that the “new” men of letters, the “new” writers took up their stance as militant intellectuals able to bring together the wisdom and perception of the old thinkers and rhetoricians and the sharpness of insight of opinion makers capable of stirring up the urban masses. We were arriving a period when the intellectuals would represent “the critical conscience of a nation”, and where “the arts in general were no longer the pretext for the frivolous pleasure of the bourgeois but became transformed into a source of the national conscience” (Bonifácio 2010, 92), as well as serving as a means for social and political climbing, establishing their mark on the collective imaginary.

The greatest Portuguese writer of the late 19th century – Eça de Queirós – encapsulates the promotion of the intellectual in general and the way in which these intellectuals revolutionised the self-perception of their endeavours and their mission. Since his journalistic debut in 1866-1867, through to the last of his novels in 1900, Eça de Queirós always maintained that the arts were of public utility and that writers of his generation had an enormous influence and recognition among an ever growing public. Writing in 1886, he set out a crucial difference between eras:

The writer, a century ago, particularly addressed a person of knowledge and good taste, who would occupy his leisure time reading and who would be called ‘the Reader’; today, he addresses a bustling and crudely educated crowd that he names the ‘public’. (Queirós undated [1886], 96)

He then went on: “the idea of reading, today, suggests only an accelerated turning of the pages under pressure, in the rumour of the public square”. The changes derived from “democracy”, “gas lighting”, “instruction” and the “*Marinoni* machines”, with the “individual” disappearing and intellectuals now facing before them “the crowds, governed by an instinct, by an interest or by an enthusiasm” (Queirós undated [1886], 96-97). Thus, influencing and leading the crowds was the very purpose of these writers.

What Eça de Queirós and so many other men of letters and journalists of this time conveyed was a dual militancy, ethical and aesthetic, in defence of a new, more self-aware society, a new system of mass education, and a new political and democratic civil order. These were the active intellectuals of the new generations that dominated the Portuguese cultural panorama between the “Coimbrã Question” and the advent of the Republic – and not the simple romantic literati or the stodgy academic of earlier times – and due to serve in the vanguard of the evolution of public life and in the construction of a new and broadened “culture”, which required daily “conquest” and “conversion” of the spirits (Ramos 2004, 114, 129). Contrary to what takes place today, nobody then talked about the irrelevance or the decadence of intellectuals, because ideas, their formulation and promotion *really* did matter and *really* did influence the thinking members of the nation who set the tone for the period. Furthermore, as new ideas spread easily from intellectuals to the streets, through the *masspolitik* channels of communication, iconoclastic and radical intellectual positions reflect core realities needing to be taken into consideration in any understanding of the process that led to the political crisis in the constitutional monarchy and the eventual triumph of the republican alternative.

In October 1910, Portugal underwent one of the most important political changes in its contemporary history in turning its back on the monarchical system, ongoing since the founding of the nation in the 12th century, and declaring itself a Republic. Any historiographic inquiry into the causes of this change would have to take into account the political, institutional,

social and economic factors, all of which predate the “beginning of the end” normally established for this narrative, i.e., the British Ultimatum of 1890. Such factors certainly do all hold importance. However, the scope of analysis perhaps should be broadened so as to incorporate the large front of public intellectuals – both the critical reformists within the monarchy and the radical republicans beyond it – which opened up a cultural war against the throne in the final decades of its constitutional existence (and not merely as from 1890). In this way, the short history of the republican victory in Portugal proves inseparable – and in reality a product of – from the far longer history of criticism and cultural and intellectual dissidence. Through books, pamphlets and newspapers, this current of thinking condemned the monarchical system to ideological bankruptcy and undermined its capacity to govern a problematic country or to resist the military coup of 1910.

The ideological erosion of the Constitutional Monarchy

In a period of such accelerated change as that of the end of the monarchy, in which the uncertainties and difficulties of progress simultaneously engendered feelings of decadence and future utopias, the general objective of national intellectual output was the “reform of Portugal by means of critical public discourse” (Leone 2005, 37). This was the minimum common denominator of all those who, in accordance with their written content, wished to “awake” the country “with screams”,⁶ yanking away the constitutional routines of the 19th century and launching it on course for the modernity of democracy, urbanisation, industrialisation, massification and for conscious civic participation.

Indeed, in the transition from the 19th century to the 20th century, this all seemed impossible within the framework of the old guard of the constitutional monarchy. The criticism made of it from various quarters –

⁶“Wake up all that with screams” was the way chosen by Eça de Queirós and Ramalho Ortigão to justify the publication of their *O Mistério da Estrada de Sintra* as a novel-pamphlet in *Diário de Notícias*, in 1870. “That” was the Portugal of Regeneration, and the sentence authored by the two writers became a program for their generation.

ever since the 1870s Generation to the “vanquished in life”, moving onto a “new monarchical life” and the propagandists of the idea of republican revolution – put forward a dark legend according to which monarchic constitutionalism ran against the grain of political-philosophical good sense and was reduced to a time of ideological foreignness, corruptive materialism and fraudulent nepotistic inbreeding. It was at the intellectual level, therefore, that the sea of repudiation first built up by ideologically demolishing the charter based constitutional monarchy. Furthermore, it was this “betrayal by intellectuals” of the political and cultural system in which they had been educated that drove the ideological victory of republicanism in 1910.

Many began to see the future triumph of the Republic as a demiurgic moment in which, with the advent of true liberalism and democracy, the country would burst out of its apathy and decadence and spring towards progress and citizenship. Without ever playing down the economic crisis, the social tensions, institutional stalemates and the rivalries that wrought the political system apart, which in the long run helped bury the monarchy and open the way to a republic, it was the intelligentsia’s production of a mental and cultural climate capable of eroding and undermining the monarchy through an accusatory public process that served to fuel the confrontation and protest that the republicans were the main beneficiaries of. Hence, we need to begin by looking at what the constitutional monarchy was and just what it was accused of by late 19th century intellectuals.

The first historical and political evaluation of 19th century liberalism took place among the generation founding the constitutional monarchy, interested in justifying the righteousness of their cause and the importance of the break made with the preceding regime.⁷ In 1830, for example, writing against King D. Miguel (absolutist), Almeida Garrett made an intransigent defence of constitutional liberalism as the banner to struggle for and praised the “law of 1826” (the Constitutional Charter). “Proposed by the king and accepted by the people”, Garrett believed it to be the wisest and most “legitimate” of all the constitutions that the kingdom had ever had, “due to its loyal conservation of absolute principles of natural and social law, to its prudent restoration of longstanding bases of Portuguese public

⁷See Pina 2003, 151.

law and finally by the appropriate combination of these principles” (Garrett undated [1830], 209-210).

In the years subsequent to the liberal victory in the Civil War (1834), Alexandre Herculano would step up to the mark as the great advocate of the purity and perfection of constitutional charterism. According to Herculano, beyond the justification of “good reason” and of “profound affections” (having been the “polar star” of all the liberal struggles against the absolutists), the Charter and constitutionalism would prove able to simultaneously free Portugal “from the despotism of an individual and the still more tremendous despotism of the mob”. This provided its “immense moral strength”, guaranteeing the “victory of sensible progress”, the hallmark of respect for historical legitimacy and the sovereignty of law and reason without which the country would lose its liberty and be plunged into the “slavery” of absolutism or the “slavery” of the “adventurers” of “anarchy”.⁸

The Herculano elegy to constitutional monarchism as the best of all political and social worlds for governing the Portuguese rested upon the idea of the “middle-ground” – the *juste milieu* of French Orleanism political doctrine. Repudiating absolutism, that had been defeated through revolution and of which only Catholicism and the monarchic form of the state had been saved, classic liberalism also did not wish to be tarnished with the heritage of proto-republican Jacobinism. Loyal to a principle of equidistance between the two extremes on the political spectrum, charterists did not believe that the denial of divine royal sovereignty would inevitably entail handing it over to the revolutionary sovereignty of the masses. Its justification was evolution within continuity. The separation of powers was an imperative, alongside the consecration of rights and guarantees of citizens, laws set down in writing, parliamentary representation and meritocracy; but all of these factors did not mean that the natural progress of society required revolution or that civil equality represented a synonym for political equality or that all the indicators inevitably pointed to a “democratic” and “republican” future. Herculano was openly pro-oligarchy and elitist. He distinguished between the “legal country” and the “real country”, perceiving the former as a set of adult, educated and independent citizens, who came into politics so as to serve the common good. The cultural and economic progress of the “legal country” that he claimed to be

⁸Herculano 1983, 38-42, 121-122, 165 and 119 (texts from 1838, 1851 and 1867).

working towards consisted of broadening the scope of citizenship to an ever increasing number of co-citizens within a democratisation process undertaken through top-down reformist measures, without any concessions being granted to the revolutionary fervour of the masses (Bonifácio 2010, 15-17). At the heart of this understanding, as its most fundamental law, was the Constitutional Charter and at the pinnacle of the regime, as the arbiter who reigned without governing, was the king wielding the “power of moderation”. The secret to the success of the Constitutional Monarchy lay exactly in guaranteeing this tiresome balance between progress and order – a state of liberties immune to any destabilising threat, in the sway of a throne on which an enlightened and progressive monarch-citizen sat.

Ironically, it would prove to be the same Alexandre Herculano, the romantic theoretician of charterism, who authored one of the first accusatory pieces against Portuguese liberalism. It was his 1856 booklet, written originally in French and entitled *Mouzinho da Silveira ou la Révolution Portugaise*. Within it, Herculano did not attack the foundations of monarchic liberalism. What he stated was that Mouzinho da Silveira (the great liberal legislator of the Civil War) had been the last (and perhaps the only) giant figure of the regime. In his wake, and especially since the Regeneration, inaugurated in 1851, when materialist utilitarianism became the prevailing philosophy for governance, there had only been “*liliputiens politiques*” (Pires 1992, 197-198). This was not the first time the regime had been criticised, and far less so the royalty: *Vintistas* and *Setembristas* had already made such attacks within their leftwing discourse. However, the criticism coming from Herculano, deriving from *within* the system, carried more authority and opened the way to a succession of waves of oppositional intellectual discourse that would end up bringing down the entire ideological construct of monarchic liberalism.

Just a few years after Herculano had set out these ideas, this strand of thought began to mature and reach out to a new generation of public readers. Their distance in relation to the “founding fathers” of liberalism did not only reflect an age gap; it actually amounted to a profound ideological and cultural rupture, heralding the triumph of realism over romanticism in aesthetics and of socialism and republicanism over liberalism in politics (Pires 1992, 35). This was the generation of the “Coimbrã Question”, the *Cenáculo* and the Casino Conferences – the generation of the 1870s. This was the age group that embarked on a fashion for denigrating the Charter

monarchy and all the institutional, cultural and social conventions resting upon it, thus inscribing onto the Portuguese intellectual agenda a slogan of struggle and militancy that may be summarised as “the myth of the unfinished revolution” (Ramos 2004, 127). The first liberalism conceived of the liberal state as a type of super-structure, hierarchical and vote-limited, which ruled over a depoliticised society (Ramos 2004, 128).⁹ To this younger generation, in contrast, there was a need to break with this sleeping state and advance the civic domain as foreseen in 1820 by broadening the public sphere, triply understood as debate, participation and citizenship awareness. Suddenly, what the liberal monarchists had always seen as the *virtuous* nature of the Charter system – that Herculano had always insisted was a philosophy, or at least a theory (political and social), and not only a form of government¹⁰ – began to seem, from the perspective of many, as a *defect*. As from the moment when the constitutional monarchy was judged to be flawed, its credibility and public acceptability were breached. Henceforth, a discourse took shape that would be, with nuances in political colours, that of all intellectual demolishers. In sum, what the 1870s Generation did was to establish the role of the professional iconoclast, the intellectual ‘in opposition’ – not because he/she was subject to political persecution, silenced by censorship (which was non-existent), or marginalised by any excessive traditionalism (which also did not exist) by the parties or the Catholic church, but out of a desire for another liberty, different to that given or promised by the utilitarian windfall of “material improvements” (Ramos 2004, 126).¹¹

The writings of Joaquim Pedro Oliveira Martins, in particular *Portugal Contemporâneo* (1881), built up the most complete “historical process of Portuguese liberalism” (Valente 1990, 70) and still today remain the main

⁹In another formulation by this author, “radicals stressed the ‘unfinished’ character of the liberal state. Liberals had destroyed the old society while neglecting to build a new one in its place” (Ramos 2000, 66). This explains the reason the ideas of the 1870s Generation could appear as “the culmination, the pinnacle of liberalism”, as a means of “mobilising the people for a new life”, breaking with the prevailing anomie and rehearsing a regime more able to “organise the life of individuals in a total manner” (Ramos 2004, 128).

¹⁰ See Saraiva 1977, 97-114.

¹¹ Alternatively expressed, as from the 1870s, intellectuals “dreamed of writing books to provide liberty with the ideas and strong beliefs without which it would be mere permissiveness and egoism” (Ramos 2000, 54).

source for the critical image on the 19th century.¹² It was Oliveira Martins, within the scope of the 1870s Generation, who did most to systematically dismantle the structure of chartist liberalism, beginning to expose the constitutional monarchy to public exhaustion steadily until 1910. Oliveira Martins believed that the Charter monarchy had emerged out of an imposition on the nation due to war and dictatorship, and was an exotic and foreign ideological product.¹³ Victorious as from 1834, over the course of time it had created only “emptiness” and a “grand illusion” in pretending to represent a point of equilibrium between the “historical patriotism” of an old Catholic Portugal, even if genuinely Portuguese, and the “Jacobin democracy” of a possible republic.¹⁴ Mixing tradition with revolution, seeking to modernise in some instances and procrastinate in others, the monarchy ended up being little more than “a tyranny of abstract formulas”, a “doctrinal chimera” seeking to “reconcile the irreconcilable” (Martins 1986 [1881], I, 26, 76, 343). Hence, in the shadow of the Charter and the liberal throne, enlightened citizenship and sustained progress had never been able to thrive and prosper. On the contrary, what there had been most of was “anarchic debate among all the individualities”, within a general ambience of “sentences” and “shots” through to 1851 and, since then, a “clammy” and “soft” peace of “practical materialism” and “idolatry of utility” (Martins 1986 [1881], I, 18, 372, and II, 233-234). “Paying off”, “buying” and

¹²For a summary of the critique of constitutional monarchy by Martins, see Ramos 2000, and Pina 2003, 37-44. For his biography and works (historical, literary and political), see Martins 1999.

¹³In 1879, Teófilo Braga had already publishing *Soluções Positivas da Política Portuguesa*, a work inspired by Comte’s positivism and by the Hegelian concept of revolution as the dialectic march of History. In the vision of this republican thinker, the constitutional monarchy in effect was a lesser state of cultural obscurantism and political impotency, which one day Science and Humanity would be capable of eliminating (see Braga 1879).

¹⁴Martins 1986 [1881], I, 12, 80, 366-367, and 1957 [1870], 91, 95-96. As Rui Ramos detailed, Martins came to conceive the constitutional monarchy in the same way that Pierre Proudhon viewed the July Monarchy in France – as “a stopgap between the *ancien régime* and democracy” (Ramos 2000, 56). Martins would himself better express this in affirming that the liberalism of the Charter elaborated “a new Portugal with the former completely and utterly destroyed. Tradition was broken with and the new building, standing on revolutions throughout years, did not find its axis apart from in political scepticism and economic industrialism” (Martins 1957 [1892], II, 312).

“corrupting”, the constitutional monarchy would forever stumble through an unstable life, digging the “financial ruin of the country” and the “moral ruin of society” by seeking to linger on when the regime could no longer be anything more than a fragile “smooth transition” en route to a different future – a future of greater socio-political equality, with mass education and civic awareness (Martins 1986 [1881], II, 233, and 1957 [1870], 97-98, 101-103).

Such an extreme criticism was designed as much to demolish as to build. Oliveira Martins believed that constitutionalism, given its failure to produce a new national energy or synthesis, was only worsening the separation between the government and the people “to the discredit of the former and to the impoverishment of the latter” (Martins 1986 [1881], II, 322). Indeed, genuine reform would only prove possible if and when this gap was filled by a new civic culture, a new collective ideal, which would drag the most inward parts of the country out of their inveterate torpor and resignation. This would lead to, for example, a stand being taken against *Sebastianism*, which he approached as a collective form of alienation, incompatible with civic participation, entirely against the image of a dynamic and self-aware organism that he, despite his final sceptical cloak of “defeatedness”, never gave up aspiring to (Ramos 2000, 68, 78).

It was also Oliveira Martins, closely followed by José de Arriaga (an openly declared republican), who triggered the insulting tone used in references to the intellectual capacities of the Braganças, the royal family. If the system was in itself inherently corrupt, the sitting monarchs leading and reflecting it could only also be subject to severe accusation. In his 1879 *História de Portugal*, he portrayed all the 19th century monarchs “as degenerate representatives of a decadent society cast adrift” (Matos 2002, 103). And rereading *Portugal Contemporâneo*, or *Oitenta Anos de Constitucionalismo Outorgado* (a radical pamphlet by Arriaga published in 1905), it is hard not to be shocked by the abundance of negative adjectives deployed. Among many other such terms, and in keeping with the chronological order of the century’s monarchs, D. João VI was “grotesque” and “imbecile”, D. Pedro IV “adventurer” and “vain”, D. Miguel “hallucinating” and “fanatical”, D. Maria “despotic” and “viperous”, D. Pedro V “misanthropic” and “naive”, D. Luís “extravagant” and “frivolous”, and D. Carlos “unconscious” and “licentious”.¹⁵

¹⁵ See Sardica 2009, 273.

Between Oliveira Martins, the first in a line of major critics of the monarchy, with his complex profile of a “disappointed radical” (Ramos 2000, 82), and Alexandre Herculano, the last of its defenders, not many years stood distant. However, they were separated by a highly significant ideological break: “Herculano recognised that the country was distant and had strayed far from its natural course, but while he perceived the liberal project as a response to the problem, Martins perceived it as another step forward into collective decadence.” (Pina 2003, 38)¹⁶

This rupture proved lasting and became a distinctive factor identifying all men of ideas, letters and cultures participating in the Portuguese public sphere in the last quarter of the 19th century. And while Martins accused the Charter monarchy of being an impossibility, given its roots led to the false assumptions of classical liberalism, the republicans would later declare that liberalism was, in effect and within the scope of the royal throne, both incomplete and imperfect and only susceptible to improvement on the day there were no more kings, with Portugal then undergoing transformation with a new aurora of genuine democracy. In this way, even with their different purposes and positioning, the destructive effects of criticism of the monarchy attained the same ends.¹⁷

The analysis by Oliveira Martins of monarchic liberalism became orthodoxy for the left by the end of the century and its popularisation was the glue bonding all campaigns against the royalty. In 1899, Augusto Fuschini referred to the intrinsic equivocation of the system itself, “considering the different and antonymous sovereignty of the two sovereigns whose harmony it was sought to establish by contract [in the Charter]” (Fuschini 1899, 133). Given it was a “transaction formula”, the Fuschini prognosis was that the existing monarchy, liberal in form but undemocratic in con-

¹⁶As the author explains, “Oliveira Martins completely destroyed the liberal vision of which Herculano had been the main exponent (...) The liberalism that, for the generation of Herculano, provided the victory of good against evil, to Martins proved negative from the national point of view” (Pina 2003, 37-38).

¹⁷See Pina 2003, 152: “Martins, on the one hand, and the republicans, on the other, performed the role of true iconoclasts, overturning, without any reservations, Herculano’s vision. The liberal regime consisted, to Martins, of a political and economic system to be overcome. To the republicans, the monarchy should be abolished and the parliamentary regime and all of society broadly democratised. As from this moment, the debate took on a completely new dynamism”.

tent, could only ever lose for the simple reason that “when the majority of citizens preferred a Republic, the rights of the monarchy would disappear due to this fact”, causing the inevitable dilution of the half-way monarchy in the face of full popular sovereignty (Fuschini 1899, 134, 421-422). This was also the position taken by José de Arriaga in 1905 amidst a varied range of insults about the evils of the Braganças, whose reign symbolised “a continued and uninterrupted acquiescence before the enemies of liberty”, and inflammatory demands that the natural future could not remain “inside the monarchy” (Arriaga 1905, 7, 11, 34). In 1906, it would be the turn of Alfredo Pimenta to declare that in the time of “positive science”, to which progress had opened the door, only due to “mental impotence” could the people “tolerate kings”. The simple existence of the liberal monarchy rested upon a “contradiction-ability” (*sic*): the kings could only be absolutist figures; to be liberal they had to “come from the people” and out of the people could never come a monarchy (Pimenta 1906, 7, 38, 58, 62). In 1911, already after 5th October 1910 (the date of the declaration of the Republic in Portugal), Arriaga would return to the cause in reaching his conclusion on the 19th century: “The proclamation of the Republic was the last word in the persistent struggle throughout almost a century of monarchy, or government by the kings, against democracy, or government of the nation by the nation. This struggle encapsulates[ed] the entire history of Portuguese constitutionalism.” For Arriaga, the conflict between the two principles, and above all the undermining of the throne in its later years before a nation that “was advancing to the future, desiring a new life”, was that which explained the “democratic revolution” of October 5, “fatally” carried out “under the republican flag” (Arriaga 1911, 11-12, 238).

In its longest extent, amassing decades, it was this dismantling of the constitutional monarchy, embarked on as from the 1870s (if not before), which nurtured the mental foundations of the Portuguese intelligentsia, hindering and stifling the capacity of the regime to defend itself in the daily agitation, crisis and political struggle that afflicted the years running up to 1910.

“Vanquished in Life”: pessimism, apocalypse and neurosis

Against this background of intellectual dissidence, the final years of the monarchy were confused and difficult times. From the relative prosperity of

the Regeneration era, the country entered into a period of economic crisis, social instability and political fragmentation. In an increasingly competitive world, with radical and accelerated international change, with the arrival of the second industrial revolution and the phenomena of urbanisation, tertiarisation and the massification of societies that heralded the 20th century, it became clear that the 19th century level of Portuguese development and progress would not overcome the extent of backwardness and poverty. At the turn of the century, Portugal remained overwhelmingly poor, rural and illiterate, with this latter condition experienced by 74.5% of the Portuguese population in 1900.¹⁸ Due to the vicious circle that bounded cultural and educational backwardness to social backwardness in turn driving a poor economic performance, it had not proven easy to counter the country's peripheral location and underdevelopment that led to its lowly position (already by this stage) in the European hierarchical rankings. Governing the country proved a similarly difficult task. Even on a smaller scale than the European average, the rural exodus, urban growth, industrialisation and the proletarianization of commerce and services generated new dynamics that was reflected in a general climate of agitation and instability. Pressure from below, wielded audibly by labour and the petty bourgeoisie making up the urban plebe, combined with pressure from above, with the political and social elites also talking of crisis and renewal to the extent that they experienced the decline in the aristocratic and bourgeois *status quo* forged in the shadow of *Fontism* and the peaceful years during the reign of D. Luís.

All the macroeconomic indicators identifying Portuguese backwardness in relation to a Europe experiencing significant progress in conjunction with all the social restrictions that impacted on the daily life of the era had an important relationship with the prevailing mentality and intellectual ambience. In just a few years after the biennial combining both the British Ultimatum and national bankruptcy, 1890-1892, the country slumped into one huge community of "vanquished in life", cultivating decadence as a type of cultural *spleen* and doubting the possibility of finding identities and directions able to supply the energy needed for the challenges to be faced. Hence, the era was replete with theories of crisis and decadence across

¹⁸ As the intellectuals would regret, the country had "four million of illiterate citizens out of five million inhabitants", or "in the cities 75, and in the villages 90 per cent of illiterate people" (Ortigão 1916, 20, and Almeida 1912, 12).

both material and moral dimensions. Cursing the nation and “bemoaning” the Portuguese became common threads in intellectual discourse, eliciting and strengthening feelings of scepticism and doubt that crowded across the pages of literature, essays, pamphlets and journalism. As a consequence of these crises, these diagnoses took a generalised hold of public opinion perceptions, creating a mental framework highly favourable to the 5th October 1910 declaration of a republic.

As an expression of *fin de siècle* Portuguese decadency, the term “vanquished” was very much a symptom of the awareness intellectuals held of the difficult world around them. Social Darwinism, industrial competition, the struggle for empires in Africa – everything convinced them, and made them declare publicly, that Portugal was surrounded by threats and was shorn of resources, solutions or the collective will that might be able to serve as a suitable antidote. More specifically, “vanquished” was the aesthetic and cultural expression of the 1890s Generation,¹⁹ which joined people from two intellectual backgrounds. Firstly, there was a new wave of young persons stemming from an “intellectual proletariat” (Ramos 2001, 263) produced by the expansion in the numbers attending university that first emerged out of the anger expressed at the patriotic public meetings called in the wake of the British Ultimatum. Humiliation by Britain stirred their ideas in the same way that twenty years earlier the 1870s Generation had awoken to the sounds of revolution in Spain or the Commune in Paris. Hence, the 1890s Generation was also the continuation and the fruit of its predecessor.²⁰ At a distance of two decades, those who had begun by believing that a cultural and mental revolution was possible were now cursing their failure, strengthening the conviction that the problems fac-

¹⁹ On the 1890s Generation, see Real 2001.

²⁰ The Portuguese “vanquished in life” took their inspiration from a Parisian social movement out of which they indeed drew their name: “*battus de la vie*”. Throughout a year between the summer of 1888 and May 1889, they were a “dining” group with its official members: Eça de Queirós, Oliveira Martins, Ramalho Ortigão, Guerra Junqueiro, António Cândido, the Count of Sabugosa, Bernardo Arnos, Carlos Mayer, Luís de Soveral and Carlos Lobo d’Ávila. At the beginning, they were far from giving over to defeatism and aspired to political careers with a great deal of hope placed on the ascension of D. Carlos to the throne (in 1889). However, they ended up not achieving their aims and dispersed in disillusionment, thereby spreading the expression – “vanquished in life” – that took root as a means of designating the general pessimism that swept Portugal in the following years (see Mónica 2010, 175-190).

ing the country were profound and that the constitutional system – with all the plans in the 1880s for a “new monarchical life” having failed – was definitively obsolete and unable to provide solutions.

The “vanquished” had by self-definition to be pessimistic, prone to perceiving catastrophe and suffering. Indeed, pessimism, apocalypse and neurosis were the mental coordinates for the intelligentsia from 1890 to 1910. Just a few weeks before committing suicide,²¹ Antero de Quental confided to Alberto Osório de Castro: “Portugal is a eunuch country, which only lives an inferior life out of the vileness of material interests and out of the coward intrigue that serves to process these interests” (Viçoso 2002, 126). This was in 1890, at the beginning of the reign of D. Carlos, in the hang-over of shame following the British Ultimatum and shortly before the first attempted republican revolution that would break out in Oporto in January 1891. This was the year of *Finis Patriae*, by Guerra Junqueiro, a doleful satire on the “mediocrity” of the monarchy – “without soul, with mud in its stead: an inversion of two letters, a slight lapse” that the Republic would one day amend (Pires 1992, 20).²² 1891 was also the year when Oliveira Martins praised the virtues of pessimism:

With this label one mocks those who dare analyse, judge and state with clarity the inevitable dangers of the future. One terms them bitter persons, with bad livers, bothersome creatures, that come to interrupt the cycle of society. One day, one hears of a doubling of the deceased and it was always the pessimists who had the courage and notably knew how to deal with the crisis (Martins 1957 [1891], II, 237).

²¹ The “vanquished” and the turn of the century displayed a peak in suicides among members of high society which appear to be extreme expressions of boredom and listlessness, of quitting and radical rupture with a society deemed beyond saving. Such cases include Soares dos Reis (1889), Camilo Castelo Branco, Júlio César Machado (1890), Silva Porto (1890), Antero de Quental (1891), Mouzinho de Albuquerque (1902), Trindade Coelho (1908) and, already during the Republic, Manuel Laranjeira (1912), not to mention Mário de Sá-Carneiro and Florbela Espanca of the *Orpheu* Generation. The morbidity of the Portuguese intellectual led the Spaniard Miguel de Unamuno to declare Portugal was “a country of suicides” (see Ramos 2001, 275, and Viçoso 2002, 131).

²² “Soul” is the English translation of the Portuguese Word “*alma*”, as “mud” is the translation of “*lama*”. The “inversion of two letters” Guerra Junqueiro called for was thus destined to replace “*lama*” by “*alma*” (“mud” for “soul”).

Pessimism appeared to intellectuals as a type of reserve of lucidity in a world that was falling apart, as a symptom of intelligence and wisdom even if not endowed with the power to save the monarchy. In 1892, Oliveira Martins posited that were republicanism to win in Spain “it would be a fact in Portugal on the following day”, with the consequent “political unification of the Peninsula” and the dilution of nationality in an Iberian republican federalism (Martins 1957 [1892], II, 318). In 1894 (the year of his death), in the introduction to the 3rd edition of *Portugal Contemporâneo*, the tone became still harsher. The “financial crisis”, “political disorder” and “social anarchy” were the results of a people “abnormally educated for contemporary life” and without “the strength and guile to amend themselves”. Furthermore, without the intellectual, moral and economic resources to foster labour and civic pride and reducing imports and indebtedness, it was doubtful whether Portugal could survive “as autonomous people within strictly Portuguese borders” (Martins 1986 [1894], 9-16).

In the same year, 1894, another author, Teixeira Bastos, became the spokesperson for a catastrophic atmosphere of pessimism and degeneration. “The further we advance towards the 20th century” – he stated – the further “the dark clouds gather over us and threaten to break into a formidable storm bringing fear, disquiet and terror” (Bastos 1894, IX). Outside the country, the world was dealing with the challenges of swift progress, of a new globalised imperialism, of heightened and bellicose competition between the great powers alongside the emergence of mass democracy. Peripheral due to its geographic location and weak given its scale and resources, Portugal witnessed this “era of transition, of effervescence, of social ferment” with concern, presenting in lamentable contrast the “disappointing spectacle” of a nation and a state “convulsing in ruins” (Bastos 1894, XXIV, 472). In 1896, it would be J. A. da Silva Cordeiro, in a long study on “the crisis in its moral aspects”, observing the “stagnation of collective life”, which had plunged the country into a pure “pool of Epicureanism”, with “an inherent dose of apathetic egoism, cold or malevolent” that was “perhaps the gravest symptom of our status” (Cordeiro 1896, 59-60, 142). Portugal had only the “indifferent”, “life-stoppers” and “charlatans” and of this mass one would not be able to extract a future (Cordeiro 1896, 138). In 1899, Augusto Fuschini listed as “our current afflictions” “the intellectual slaughter in science, art and literature, the flagging of labour and production, the lack of confidence in the honest and intelligent action of

the State”, to desperately conclude: “rather we tend to open up onto us an immense abyss into which may disappear the autonomy of a people and, perhaps, the liberty of its citizens” (Fuschini 1899, VIII, 159).

Beyond being deep and quantifiable in economic and social terms, the crisis fundamentally resulted from the destruction of “moral certainties” and the lack of the energy and civil education that might be able to regenerate it (Ramos 2001, 275). Nothing would be resolved without the Portuguese reinventing themselves. However, for such a reinvention to happen, this required new political leaders and a new national identity that the constitutional monarchy had not proven able to supply. In September 1910, just days before the fall of the crown, Raul Brandão summarised the existential drama of his generation: “The old life had roots, perhaps the future will again restore them. Our epoch is horrible – because we no longer believe and we still do not believe. The past has disappeared, of the future not even guidelines exist. And here we are, roofless, among the ruins, awaiting...” (Viçoso 2002, 124).

In the gallery of critics oscillating between the most neurotically dispirited tones and the most sarcastic irony, we may line up many of the intellectual names of the time – from Manuel Laranjeira to António Nobre, from Eça de Queirós to Ramalho Ortigão, from Eugénio de Castro to Fialho de Almeida. In different registers, the entire *fin de siècle* literature contributed towards deepening the shadows that the intellectual cast over the national destiny. Eça de Queirós is one particular example of the decadent satirical literature, revealing sharp political criticism of the vices of the monarchy and 19th century society in many of his romances. The Constitutional Charter is one of the favoured targets of *As Farpas*, and *O Conde de Abranhos* a terrible libel on the “scholastic” education (the notebooks) and the political corruption (the cliques) underlying the machine of constitutionalism.²³ As regards his masterpiece, *Os Maias*, written in 1888, the book can be read as if from Caetano da Maia to Afonso da Maia and from Afonso da Maia to Carlos da Maia, the decadence of a family represented the decadence of the nation under the 1826 Constitutional Charter.²⁴

The 1890s Generation had its very own aesthetics based upon which the poetry and prose produced were “political”,²⁵ in the sense of being mili-

²³ See Pires 1992, 198-199.

²⁴ See Pires 1992, 203-205.

²⁵ On the “political novels” of the late 19th century, see Pires 1992, 217-236.

tantly anti-monarchical and apologetic of new organisational ideas for the national community. These aesthetics, in reality a vision upon the world, incorporated both symbolism and naturalism, two literary fashions imported from Paris that involved the expression of tedium, nihilism, degeneracy and scepticism. Symbolists and naturalists jointly expressed their “disenchantment with the bourgeois world” and the “belief that European society was decadent” (Viçoso 2002, 118, and Ramos 2001, 263), seeking, without ever attaining, “new roots” to overcome “the conscience of national self-flagellation” (Matos 2002, 113).²⁶ It is certainly also true that the “vanquished” and their decadence was not purely nihilistic, since they continued to take as their reference the idea of the 1870s Generation of completing liberalism through extending voting rights to Portuguese citizens and boosting civic awareness, building a society governed by new certainties and where equality, justice, democracy and enlightenment prevailed. Consequently, the 1890s Generation wanted to serve as “re-Portuguesefiers”, hoping that the national investment in patriotic roots would nurture the collective resurrection that they longed for (Viçoso 2002, 127).²⁷ The demands of writers and intellectuals made them enter a love-hate relationship with Portugal that induced a radical rupture with the *status quo* of constitutional monarchy. The Portugal that they had did not serve the task and they would only gain another Portugal by changing – through reform or revolution – the system that governed them.

From the impossible monarchy to the inevitable Republic

The entire iconoclastic and catastrophic tone of those who shaped intellectual opinions in Portugal necessarily impacted and contaminated the policies and achievements of the period. As from the 1870s Generation, when irreverence and radicalism began penetrating Portuguese cultural

²⁶Decadentism gained an enormous boost with the success of António Nobre and his book of poems *Só*, in 1892, which expressed the “existential miserability” of the author, imbibed with a certain “nationalist sense of yearning” (see Viçoso 2002, 128).

²⁷For continuity between the end of the monarchy and the First Republic in the reinvention of the Portuguese nation, see Ramos 2001, 499 and after.

discourse and especially after the two-year period of crisis in 1890-1892, making politics and leading the Portuguese state and nation became an increasingly difficult and uncertain task. The government simply was not in charge of a calm country set in its routines. The rotational balance that turned into a closed circuit among the elites had to confront the critics and opponents that generated noise with the books they published, the newspapers they wrote, the opposition thrown up against the system, whether from within or, and on a steadily rising basis, beyond, in guilds, associations, Masonic lodges and street rallies. Buffeted by the economic downturn, by social instability and by the iconoclastic stance taken by intellectuals, the mechanisms on which the constitutional viability of the Charter rested came to be perceived as restrictive and out of alignment with the demands for reforms, the socioeconomic challenges and the dynamics driving the democratisation and massification of politics coming from many sectors of society.

Hence, over the medium term, the more radical republican alternative was first contemplated and then attributed credibility. In the field, the pessimism that permeated many monarchic sectors of society could not contrast more sharply with the enthusiasm shining out of republican propaganda. The republicans always saw crisis as more of an opportunity for action rather than a cause for paralysing neuroses. Between 1890 and 1910, while some monarchist supporters strove towards finding a “new life” restoring the country to the *status quo* prior to the body blows of the British Ultimatum and bankruptcy between 1890 and 1892, the republicans termed this effort to be lacking and in vain, capitalising on the image that only they would be able to, as could already be read in the lyrics of *A Portuguesa* written in 1890 (the future republican anthem by Henrique Lopes de Mendonça and Alfredo Keil), “again raise the splendour of Portugal”. Consequently, the republicans proved able, from amongst the vast and diversified wave of criticism targeting the monarchy, to most effectively instrumentalize decadentism and crisis and turn events to their own advantage.

The intellectual strand that regretted the decline of Portugal and harked to a new culture that would raise the awareness and the patriotic spirit of the entire nation found in republicanism the ideal response. More than just a simple proposal for regime change, republicanism was a “global view”, a “*demopedia*”, a broad reaching cultural movement that would reverse the national backwardness that afflicted Portugal and the Portuguese

(Catroga 1991, 107, 191, 377, 451). Within the prevailing mental framework of the “vanquished”, republicanism stood out as an optimistic and energetic counterbalance – and this made all the difference in endowing it with a power of attraction that no monarchic discourse, however reformist it might prove, could ever aspire to have. The term “republicanisation” is erroneously but commonly reduced to the new members joining the Portuguese Republican Party (PRP) without any previous political allegiances. In truth, republicanisation was very often a simple sentimental signing up to the optimism that emanated around the republican “idea”. The PRP had few political militants even while republicanism, as an organic way of protesting and hoping, attracted ever larger numbers of sympathisers in broader terms. That is the reason Oliveira Martins once summarised Portuguese republicanism as “completely negative, as the total lack of hope in any better future with the monarchy” (Martins 1957 [1892], II, 314).

For the moderate theoreticians supporting the cause, replacing a hereditary head of state by an elected leader would prove meaningless were the substance of this new regime not extended to include an awoken, educated and mobilised nation. The question for the radical republicans, who ended up in charge of the party in the final years of the monarchy, was that only political victory and the declaration of a new regime would open the doors to re-founding Portugal and re-educating the Portuguese as called for in intellectual thinking. A new culture required political power to be seized, as only in this way could “the state apparatus serve as an instrument and the political community as a framework” (Ramos 2001, 287), with the objective of ordering and rehearsing the global transformations that would see off the crisis and the pessimism and lead Portugal into the 20th century. The 5th October 1910 declaration was simply the materialisation of this rationale.

The date of the republican political victory still lay far in the distance when republicanism began gaining in credibility and attracting loyal support to the “cause”. This was achieved through taking advantage of the fact that general public opinion and the media climate around kings D. Carlos and D. Manuel II were, always marked by an atmosphere and a rhetoric characterised by mistrust and criticism when not outright hostility and insults. As Basílio Teles noted in 1905, “all the microcosm of constitutionalism, artificial, ignorant, verbose, ridiculous” was “exposed to the merciless analysis of all who, in the public space, formed opinions” (Teles 1905, 47). Against the last two kings of Portugal, there was always “a firm intention

of attack”, “a general assault of low prose”, and a tone of “terrible criticism for a people who neither knew how to read nor to discern”, made up of “ironies, sarcasms and bloody *charges*” (Martins 1926, preface, 47-48). This lament by Rocha Martins is corroborated by another monarchist, Eduardo Schwalbach, who would record the end of the regime as a time when the mental fashion was “loaded with demolition, out of line with the idea of reconstruction”, “an irresponsible lack of discipline” and “the vilification of reputation” (Schwalbach 1944, 213-214). What must be noted is that such insulting iconoclastic and rhetorical discourse came not only from republicans but also from monarchists. In the wake of 1890, due to the British Ultimatum crisis, growing divisions between parties and the undermining of institutional credibility meant D. Carlos and D. Manuel II were never afforded shelter. Both lived exposed to constant political criticism. When revolutionary cries took the streets against D. Manuel, in October 1910, the Monarchy simply had no possible means of defence. Whoever was not actually taking a stand against royalty was not prepared to lift a finger in support of it; hence the republican triumph – althroughalmost accidental and highly improvised – was, given the circumstances, inevitable.

In 1909, Tomás de Mello Breyner (Count of Mafra), a confidant of the Palace, reproduced a known regret of D. Carlos in noting how “in Portugal, there were no monarchists” (Breyner 2004, 302). What he meant by this was that the country no longer had monarchists experiencing any real passion for the dynasty. After years and years and page after page of literature, essay and journalistic output attacking the throne and the institutional and cultural conventions surrounding the monarchy, deference towards the throne had disappeared and there were now only a handful prepared and actually able to defend the old system of the Charter in intellectual terms. Therefore, it was at this level that the need and the hopes for change took effect, providing the grounds for the implementation of republicanism within the scope of the political regime inaugurated on 5th October 1910.

The “demolishers of liberalism” and the nostalgia for the power of ideas

In 1916, in an article written for a small artistic, literary and social monthly – the magazine *Atlântica* – Jaime de Magalhães Lima recalled with

nostalgia and admiration a gallery of heroes from the arts and letters, from around the turn of the century, whom he termed the “demolishers of liberalism”. As a group, they had been the

Primordial members of the court that came and judged us and dissolved bourgeois liberalism and its numerous and splendid cortege, generated and formed in the revolutions that we began at the beginning of the second quarter of the 19th century (Lima 1916, 1092).

With “tenacity, method, knowledge of the cause, adding ability and warm public applause” they had overseen “the demolition of the liberal building in which we had taken shelter and which our grandparents had found solid and noble, built for the eternity of times and the happiness of men” (Lima 1916, 1092).

Their labours were to be admired:

It was they who, whether laughing, assaulting or simply analysing and commenting, reduced to dust the ostentatiousness of that architecture of compromises, acquiescence, principled means, excellent intentions, little courage and scarce logic (Lima 1916, 1092).

However, the “demolishers of liberalism”, continued Magalhães Lima, did not see their “irons” and “reactives” only as instruments of dissolution. All such destruction was educational towards the “reconstruction” – a process imagined by them as

A radical purification, the sweeping away of uselessness, breaking free of all the parasitism, amputating or correcting deformity, purging all rotteness (...) [since] whoever destroys does so because they seek something better or different to that which they see (Lima 1916, 1096-1097).

The homage of Jaime de Magalhães Lima to the “demolishers of liberalism” represents the best summary of the originality and importance of the combative agenda that the intelligentsia had self-imposed upon their

discourse. The decades subsequent to the first demonstrations of the 1870s Generation and the political triumph of the republican “idea” make up one of the most fertile eras in Portuguese literary, artistic and cultural life. At its core and leading the way were the intellectuals, then perceived as enlightened citizens, engaged in reading, reflection, discussion, controversy and debate and with a particular vocation for promoting ideas and enlivening the consumption of culture (books, pamphlets, newspapers, performances). They considered they were engaged in a mission of transformative political action but which neither began nor ended in this field. Their world was one of culture, broadly understood as the public sphere, sociable networks and community of discourse. From the lofty position of their mental and rational capacities, the baggage of their learning and their capacity for diagnosing what was wrong in the lives of their fellow citizens, they addressed a large public, writing and debating issues of common interest. This was a cohesive group in the professional sense of the term as it held a strong identity. While gathering a large sweep of ideological diversity within its extent, frequently plunging into redundant and bitter disputes, they were sincerely convinced that they had something to say and were urged to speak out due to Portugal’s lack of direction and the period of crisis. They did not only want to reflect society but to lead and guide its transformation. To this end, they set about systematically dismantling the foundations of constitutional monarchy, opening the way – many remaining unaware, some consciously and directly – to the political changeover that took place in October 1910. Thus, more than discussing the *forms* of regime, intellectuals conceived of *contents*; but it was indeed this discussion as to *content* that so greatly eased the way to the alteration in *form* in 1910.

The Portuguese intellectual circle of this period was a group made up of various schools in their main deriving from within the monarchical political-social system against which they would turn. Certainly, it was massification that enabled men of learning and thinking to emerge from beyond the scope of the monarchy. Nevertheless, the latter, republican (and anarchist) intellectuals, did not represent the entire intellectual scope nor did they begin alone the iconoclastic and radical discourse on ways of living and thinking. The history of republican ideological discourse is therefore not one of a philosophical invention but rather more of a political appropriation of a feeling of dissidence, criticism of an imperfect liberty and the incomplete citizenship that was born within the

monarchy and which was the heritage of many beyond the actual members of the Portuguese Republican Party.

Despite the republican victory in 1910 – or perhaps because of it, if we take into consideration that the political practices of the republican regime were very commonly limited when compared to the reformist generosity of the republican “idea” – they did fail. They neither yanked the country out of its backwardness nor did they radically re-educate national citizens, providing solutions for the civic anomie or firmly establishing full democracy. When the “golden age” of Portuguese intellectuals ended, towards the end of the 1920s, with the censorship of the *Salazarist* regime already on the horizon, António Sérgio, among others, continued to maintain that the Portuguese problem was primarily civic and cultural, and only afterwards, and as a result, social, political and economic.²⁸ After decades spent attempting to bring about a modernising process, the intellectuals continued to face the perspective of a postponed Portugal, “extemporaneous to its history” and marginalised of its European reality (Leone 2005, 486).

This diagnosis should not however be allowed to obscure one reality. Even if they did not change the country, the intellectuals of the late 19th and early 20th centuries constituted the most active, richest and fertile community of reflection in the entire history of contemporary Portuguese culture and thinking. Inaugurated with the 1870s Generation, this flame was not snuffed out in 1910 but only after 1926. The entire First Republic (1910-1926) was highly rich in putting forward new philosophies, aesthetics, literatures and ideas, as is visible in *Renascença Portuguesa* (Portuguese Renaissance), *Integralismo Lusitano* (Lusitanian Integralism), *Orpheu*, modernism, futurism or the *Seara Nova* magazine. In radical contrast, after 1926 and throughout almost half a century, intellectual life did not disappear but the imposition of censorship bore down with the resulting sentiment – fear, which kills all mental vitality and discourages all debate of ideas (Leone 2005, 16).

What is interesting to note, as a final comment on the continuity between the prevailing mental climate before and after 1910, is that the anti-monarchy iconoclasts represent only the first manifestation of the tense, critical and dissident cultural relationship that public intellectuals (philosophers, academics, writers, journalists, artists, etcetera) have held with the

²⁸ See Leone 2005, 70-71.

political forms and regimes of contemporary Portugal. Whether 19th century liberalism, through to 1910, or republicanism between 1910 and 1926, as well as, for a plethora of reasons, the *Salazarist* authoritarianism of the *Estado Novo*, all have been perceived as imperfect and insufficient political frameworks and deemed lacking by all intellectual outputs demanding new ways of reorganising the collective existence of the Portuguese, based upon a self-aware and broadened citizenship. Perhaps for exactly this reason, we can and should conclude public intellectuals are still necessary in Portugal.

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INTELLECTUALS AND THE SALAZAR ERA WERE THERE INTELLECTUALS UNDER THE ESTADO NOVO?

ANA PAULA RIAS

*In a country as destitute as ours, we have no right to lose
a single artist worthy of the name. Therefore, it is our duty
to protect men of talent, even if they are enemies of the regime!*

(Salazar)

I will begin by sharing some of the doubts and dilemmas that have arisen since I decided to write about intellectuals in the Salazar era. My first step was to research what had already been published on the subject, only to be met with silence, which, paradoxically, turned out to be quite enlightening. To clarify the point, I could not find one single entry, chapter or study on Portuguese intellectuals during the long *Estado Novo* dictatorship in the extant bibliography on the period. Studies that do exist refer us to the field of culture and to the figures of the writer, the playwright and the philosopher, who are not so distant from the intellectual in view of their traditionally interventionist role via their deployment of words.

Franco Nogueira, Salazar's minister and biographer, drew up the following list of those who "are of great importance in Portuguese political and cultural life": Ramada Curto, Júlio Dantas, Augusto de Castro, Alfredo Cortês, Vasco de Mendonça Alves, Hernâni Cidade, Jaime Cortesão, Armando Cortesão, Virgínia Rau and Alfredo Pimenta. He then went on to refer to the rupture in literary circles led by the group *Presença* and linked the *Presencistas* to a defence of "art for art's sake".¹ He then defined the Second World War as the point in time when a new art movement

¹Among the *presencistas* of particular importance were Branquinho da Fonseca, João Gaspar Simões, José Régio, António de Navarro, Edmundo de Bettencourt, Alberto de Serpa, Miguel Torga and Adolfo Casais Monteiro. (See *História de Portugal* 1981, 438)

appeared which he termed social realism or neo-realism² and, by way of a summary, labelled the work of both the *Presencistas* and the neo-realists as “committed literature”. Franco Nogueira alluded to the importance of the numerous magazines published in the 1950s and, regarding this decade, he focused particularly on works by well-known figures such as Vitorino Nemésio, Cardoso Pires, Eugénio de Andrade, António Gedeão, António Couto Viana, Jorge de Sena and Pedro Homem de Melo. Amongst the philosophers he listed Santana Dionísio, António José Saraiva and Delfim Santos. Concluding this brief account, he furthermore referred to the intervention of Ester de Lemos, Maria Lamas, Natália Correia, Agustina and Sofia de Melo Breyner Andresen. Additionally, Urbano Tavares Rodrigues was mentioned as an example of socially-engaged literature.

Noticeably, Franco Nogueira listed a range of figures that, for the most part, were deemed opponents of the regime even while never using the term “intellectual”.

And hence the question remains: how are we to define “intellectual” within the *Estado Novo* context?³ When attempting to answer this question, I ran into two types of methodological obstacles. The following questions arose: What definition should be used and how might one assess the kind and degree of influence that allows one to classify this or that individual as deserving the name of intellectual? How should one measure the relevance of intervention in public life and the level of dissemination of ideas when censorship and repression were ubiquitous? What was the target audience of Portuguese intellectuals? How many people were conquered by the power of the word, image or music?

On the other hand, we have to keep in mind that it must have been very difficult to encourage the debate of ideas in a country with extremely high illiteracy rates. This seems to lead to only one conclusion: debate took place preferably in a closed circuit, with every actor and recipient belonging to rather small national elites. Moreover, these elites were, in turn,

²Most representative of this neo-realist group were Fernando Namora, Carlos de Oliveira, Alves Redol, Manuel da Fonseca, Soeiro Pereira Gomes and Carlos Soromenho (*ibid.* 445-447).

³Throughout this text the expression *Estado Novo* coincides strictly with the Salazar dictatorship and does not cover the later phase of the regime, that is, this analysis does not cover the period when Marcello Caetano headed the regime.

severed from the major international circuits at least until the 1950s.⁴ This also holds true for the full range of other intellectual activities. We may also assess the influence of certain individuals via an analysis of critical texts. We must bear in mind, however, that in a provincial country, which was intentionally closed to the outside world, there are very few opportunities for the existence of qualified critical voices.

The range and number of newspapers and magazines⁵ as well as holding conferences and gallery openings⁶ are other kinds of indicators for assessing levels of cultural dynamism, and these are evidence of the stunted development then prevalent in Portugal. This may be perceived even as early as the regime's first decade, when a clear intention to mobilize people, form groups, gain support and captivate audiences is palpable.

In some ways, I felt as if I were facing a paradox. The intellectual is, by definition, somebody who goes against the grain, someone who instructs against authority, who breaks the rules and whose intervention is a result of the rhythm of the reflections in which s/he is engaged and of the stimulus received from beyond. The intellectual is neither dependent on a plan nor does s/he have to promote an ideology.

Meanwhile, the Salazar regime was, by definition, authoritarian, anti-liberal and anti-democratic. It denied the existence of the citizen and replaced him/her with the concept of the organic subject, who was an integral part of a society structured around family, as a fundamental cell and the cornerstone of an edifice that extended into the political arena and was completed by the parish and the municipality. Therefore, this new society

⁴Consider, for example, Nuno Teotónio Pereira's speech in 1948, during the I Congress of Portuguese Architects, on the much proclaimed influence of Mallet Stevens and Corbusier whose work was, in fact, totally unknown, insofar as not even the journals approaching such trends reached Portugal.

⁵Decree 28 589, of 14.5.1936, drastically limited the appearance of new titles, which were dependent on a test. Authorization was not given "To found newspapers unless heading them" were "people of recognized intellectual and moral standing, and unless the respective company" demonstrated that "it possessed the financial means required". In addition to this interference, another important obstacle was also created by the State as it forbade financing by advertising in publications that the General Directorate of Censorship Services considered of "oppositional ideology".

⁶With regard to this, we may quote the case of António Pedro who attempted to open a gallery in 1933 and was confronted with insurmountable difficulties and thus only tried again in 1952.

required an element able to bind it together and serve both as its armour and as moral cohesion. “We shall not discuss God and virtue; we shall not discuss the Fatherland and its History; we shall not discuss authority and its importance; we shall not discuss family and its morals; we shall not discuss the glory of work and its imperative.”⁷ Such a strict framework, so clearly defined by unquestionable values, where, let us face it, nothing escaped State vigilantism, was hardly conducive to dissonant voices.

The idea of unity was highly cherished by the dictator and everything that affected it or called it into question was promptly rejected. “Dissolvent ideas” – an expression used by the dictator when alluding to “degenerate art” – had no place in the praxis that Oliveira Salazar envisioned. The regime was firmly anchored in and stoutly defended the essential, the permanent, the unchangeable and the past, and deeply feared the future and divergence.

And yet the role of intellectuals necessarily involves “revealing” futures and muddying the waters so that choice is possible.

Meanwhile, as a result of the regime’s nature, emphasis was placed on the creation of the “New Man”. This required the creation of a grid of aesthetic values dependent upon the political model, and in order for this to emerge, to spread and to lay foundations, it was essential to put forward a new type of standardized “intellectual”, both a supporter of and a vehicle for the official doctrine. One staff member who performed this function, despite all the controversy surrounding him, was António Ferro. He was the head of the State Propaganda Office (SPN) and was the first to recognize that his role was that of a *metteur-en-scène*, charged with the mission of instilling the Leader’s message. He did not regard himself as a creator, innovator or *agent provocateur*; on the contrary, the lesson was written and his duty was merely to “go over the syllabus taught”.

Thus, if we assume an intellectual is someone who points out alternative routes, who livens up debate and contributes with ideas which shape the worldview of an era, where was this person in the Salazar period? Or rather, where could this intellectual be?

The intellectual had no place in this society.

⁷Speech by Oliveira Salazar, given in Braga, from the balcony of the barracks of Infantry no. 8, on 26th May 1936, on the occasion of the great parade and festivities held to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the 28th May movement.

Even at the dawn of the regime, when it was essential to seduce the masses and immediately afterwards, during the troubled period of the Spanish Civil War, the official ideologues limited themselves to instilling values rather than to promoting any discussion of them. The leader's speeches were quoted by his fellows in the Crusade, in official ceremonies, but only as simplified slogans, rules of life and behaviours that anyone would be able to understand, even if illiterate designed to be handed down to the people. As we learn from Fernando Rosas, Oliveira Salazar's speeches carried far greater weight in terms of their disciplinary function than their actual content. Extremely well-known expressions such as "Order in the streets and peace in the spirit"; "Orders given by those who can, obeyed by those who must", or the trilogy "God, Fatherland, Family"⁸ are easily internalized and operate as guiding rules in the life of the society.

Interestingly, Franco Nogueira, in another work, questions the role of elites in the history of Portugal, defining intellectuals as those "who influence the thinking of others and are the source of ideas" (Nogueira 1992, 86).⁹ This view may very well coincide with the interests of the *Estado Novo*, and certainly applies to a figure such as António Ferro.

Were we to draw up a list of the names of those we associate with the intellectual during the Salazar era, I believe we would quite easily reach a consensus: individuals like António Quadros, Adolfo Casal Monteiro, António Sérgio, Bento de Jesus Caraça, António José Saraiva, José Régio, Álvaro Cunhal, Jaime Cortesão, Aquilino and Torga, amongst others. These come to mind because we have an archetype for the intellectual, a person who highlights non-conformism, who provokes division, who shakes up the status quo and who manifests ontological and political concerns. And one fact is all too evident: all these men were opponents to Salazar. This con-

⁸It should be noted that the regime's motto was actually composed of five facets: "God, Fatherland, Family, Hierarchy and Authority", but, as the last two are not very appealing, they were swiftly overlooked.

⁹In the same chapter, Franco Nogueira refers to the "lack of personality of the Portuguese elites", which, in the words of Artur Duarte Ribeiro, "constituted a permanent national danger". He reinforces his argument with the following words from António José Saraiva: "It is heartbreaking to see the lack of confidence that Portuguese intellectuals have in their own roots, and the complex that makes them humble themselves before any insignificant exuberance coming from outside." (Quoted by Nogueira 1987, 94)

clusion is all the more striking if we note that the regime did not produce an intelligentsia. We are unable to list cultural figures that arose out of the dictatorship, and this phenomenon is particularly acute from the time of the Portuguese World Exhibition and the end of the Second World War.

At this point, it is important to clarify the concept that has guided this reflection. An intellectual is someone who livens up and stimulates debate, contributing with ideas that shape the worldview of a generation and of an era. This is a current definition, shared by most contemporary historians. We may take Tony Judt as an example:

The 20th century was the century of the intellectual (...) and described men and women in the world of education, literature and the arts, who engaged in debate and in influencing public opinion.” He goes on to state that “the intellectual was, by definition, dedicated – ‘committed’: generally to an ideal, a dogma or a plan.”¹⁰ (Judt, 2010, 23) And he adds, regarding the matter at hand: “In States where public opposition and criticism was (or is) repressed, the intellectual took on, *de facto*, the role of spokesperson of the public interest and of the people, against authority and the State. (*Ibid* 24)

Should we accept this definition, António Ferro, Augusto de Castro or the previously mentioned Franco Nogueira would be excluded from the category of “intellectual”. Therefore this question remains up for discussion.

“Other examples provide us with ample evidence that turning artists and writers into civil servants practically means preventing them from creating. Art is not a book of records. If it becomes an obligation or a duty, it ceases to exist or exists in pretence, that is, cheats.” (Salazar quoted by Garnier 1952, 189) The author of this statement was the person responsible for the creation of the State Propaganda Office (SPN), later renamed the State Information Office (SNI).¹¹

¹⁰He locates the birth of the “first” intellectuals in France with the Dreyfus affair and tells us that they acted in the name of “universal abstractions: ‘truth’, ‘justice’ and ‘rights’ and by opposing the intellectuals who invoked abstractions “of a less universal nature: ‘honor’, ‘nation’, ‘*patrie*’, France.” He goes on to characterize this group emphasizing their role as animators of public discussion when these ethical or political abstractions were dominant in the debate. (See Judt 2010, 23-24).

¹¹Salazar would have meditated on the deep meaning of his words which can only be taken as criticism of the Stalinist model. They are, however, also applicable to the Portuguese case.

Salazar had a negative image of the Portuguese people. They were illiterate, uncritical, apathetic, selfish, not too fond of work, unhealthily sentimental and easily dragged down by the fatalistic and immobilizing rhythm of the national song.¹² In order to counteract this tendency and promote the National Revolution the regime worked hard on initiatives which sought to exalt and enliven a discourse which was divulged widely: from the classroom and workplace to free time occupations, including both employers and employees, as well as the youth, and even such organizations as the organization of mothers for national education (OMEN).

SPN was attributed the task of defining a policy for culture and on the day of its inauguration, 26 October 1933, Salazar pondered on its mission and, in a fascistic discursive manner, began by highlighting what the State Propaganda Office was not. Hence, it was not “a department of praise for the government” or much less “an instrument of the government”, but was rather a government instrument. Despite recognizing similarities with foreign entities, he declared that “ours” was “a more mundane affair” in an obvious attempt to diminish its impact.

To justify the creation of this organ he took advantage of an image deployed throughout his career: “politically nothing exists beyond what the people know exists,” and the people did not know that the government was on a mission. It was necessary to fight disbelief, distrust, discontent, indifference of the soul and the lack of pride in the Fatherland, since national cohesion and vitality would depend on the capacity to overcome this “state of mind”. It was, after all, “a fact of political import”. And Salazar explains his view by expounding on what he calls “the character of the Portuguese people”. One person sees a street badly in need of repair, another catches a delayed train, yet another learns of a child that has been found dead. Soon the average spirit begins to generalize: the roads are impassable, the trains are never on time and there is no assistance for children in the country. In other words, “It is very difficult to look out on the world from the window of our bedroom”.

For the *Estado Novo* ideologue, it was therefore necessary to contrast the individual circumstance with the universal state of affairs and local and

¹²“Salazar does not like these songs [*fado*] which he considers depressing. He often says that *fados* weaken the Portuguese character, draining the soul of its energy and encouraging inactivity. He prefers the lively songs of the North, “viras” from Minho or “chulas” from Beira.” (Garnier 1952, 204)

personal occurrences with the national situation. Men, groups and classes, philosophizing on their doorsteps, assess matters according to their own interests, and therefore, only an “entity has, by duty, to see things in the light of the common interests” (Salazar 1961, 115). Raising the morale of the Portuguese people, showing them what they are worth as an ethnic group, as a means of culture, as a productive and civilizing force, as an independent unit in the concert of nations, shouting out what is, as opposed to what is said to be, represented the challenge and perceived as a genuine crusade.

The State Propaganda Office was charged with the task of immersing the people “within the moral thinking that should direct the Nation” and its activities focused upon two different directions, internally and externally. As António Ferro stated on taking office: “Art, literature and science constitute the grandiose façade of nationality, that which is seen from abroad.” As a corollary to this, the dominant culture had to be defined by the SPN and by those who would be the privileged “instruments” of political action, the artists and the writers who thus become civil servants in the service of a cause: that of the national interest.

It should be remembered that “the national interest” was always defined by Salazar and always according to the circumstances. Used and abused, the concept gained remarkable elasticity. The same applied to the regime’s slogan: All within the (Salazar) State, nothing against the (Salazar) State. This meant that the State rewarded those who served the national cause and those who contributed to creating the ties cementing the Nation around a shared ideal while persecuting those who might call into question the indisputable principle of unity. Viewing the situation as a dichotomy, as was so popular within the ideology of the time, the regime distinguishes between the good, those who unite, i.e. the nationalists, from those who divide, the anti-nationalists.

Salazar’s words were the beacon and the guiding compass and it was quickly made clear that dissonant ideas had no place in the *poetics* designed by the “great leader of souls”. Cultural actors had to take this dogma on board and, consequently, were coerced into following a code and acting in line with the higher interests of the State.

António Ferro was charged with designing cultural policy. This cosmopolitan writer, who had been editor of the *Orpheu* magazine, published a series of articles in *Diário de Notícias* in 1932 in which he speaks of the relevance of intellectuals within the framework of the masses. He was aware of

the need to overcome the absence of a “poet in service” as the Leader “was averse to contacts” and the “serious, sober dictatorship” could not draw in the masses that need to be assembled and to hear the truths insistently repeated and presented in an attractive and engaging packaging. The solution was to find a “metteur-en-scène” who would carry out his function via “theatre, painting and books”, instruments for achieving a “healthy life”. The people needed festivities and rituals: “Parades, festivities, symbols and rituals,” wrote António Ferro, “are necessary so that ideas do not fall into emptiness and do not fall into tedium.” (Ferro 1932) They were a privileged strategy for socializing, within the rules of the *Estado Novo*, and indoctrinating the people.

Ferro, the author of *Viagem à Volta das Ditaduras* (Voyage around Dictatorships), added another advantage. These seductive movements contributed to mitigating the ever so disagreeable censorship, which so often led up to resentment.

Thus was born the so called “politics of the spirit”, nourished by the work of state propaganda, which sought to strengthen the Portuguese people in a way that the spirit would clearly triumph over “crass, animalistic materialism...,” as Ferro put it in 1935, when announcing his plan for “a series of cultural conferences”.

Not long before, on the occasion of the first presentation of literary awards at the headquarters of the State Propaganda Office, Salazar had delivered an important speech in which he argued that “great works” are those that adhere to “truth”, “justice”, “beauty” and “good”. Most importantly, he categorically declared that the regime would reject any “morbid manifestations” of “nostalgic dreamers on decline and decay”. He seized the opportunity to condemn art for art’s sake, in what might be interpreted as a kind of warning against divergence, particularly to the young modernists who had come together under the wing of the SPN and who might harbour illusions to freely express their *poetics*. This behaviour was unacceptable, since the regime was firmly opposed to those who “sought to make literature and art separate, self-sufficient worlds, containing within themselves their own end and reason for existing”, promoting in this way “amorality and art for art’s sake”¹³. The association should be noted.

¹³Speech given by Salazar, at the headquarters of the State Propaganda Office, on 21 February 1935, at the first literary awards ceremony. (See Ferro 1950, 9-13)

In the same ceremony, in his highly mobilizing tone, António Ferro calls for the formation of a “common front” built on “the moral and spiritual principles” bequeathed by Christianity. Furthermore, Ferro outlined an argument, which is particularly relevant to our research, as to who the intellectuals were and their respective sphere of influence. Besides evoking and invoking the “supreme, sacred words” of the “leader of the Nation”, the new head of propaganda reflected on the impossibility of a truly secularized intellectual before and expanding on the politics of the spirit, the institutional support for the Salazar doctrine, deploying a particularly expressive and, in my opinion, intentionally aggressive language. The guidelines for “healthy art” resulted from balance and order as opposed to “dissolvent diabolism”, “amorality and morbidity” which “sully art” by lust or Satanism, thereby producing “ugliness”, “bestiality” and “evil”.

He continued his attack linking the authors of “vicious paintings of vice”, “sadistic literature” and novels “of Freudian excavations” with “untiring and sick pursuers of contradictions” whom he saw as in opposition to the regime. As a corollary to this, the SPN could only “publicly declare war on the despots of free thinking, on the ‘free’ intellectuals (...), on defenders of the Gidean man, of the earthquake-man. Narcisusses of democracy, poisoners of the World!” (Ferro 1950, 18-36)

Ferro was to go further with this line of argument comparing shapeless works to a disease for which their creators ought to be subject to “sanitary measures” (*idem* 44).

António Ferro was the unquestionable protagonist of a work of significant relevance and won several cultural actors for the cause, including painters, writers, filmmakers, musicians, actors, sculptors and journalists. He took pride in selecting and rewarding these according to quality, “with the greatest generosity of spirit”, as he professed to paying no attention to the “political tendencies of the competitors”. Only one criterion was used to reject a given work: that it was “anti-national” or proved to be “combative against the ethics of the regime” (*ibid.* 143).

Without dwelling greatly on the reasons that may explain this adherence, the attractiveness of a scintillating and mobilizing figure such as António Ferro should be mentioned. Furthermore, the cultural brew out of which the Fascist and authoritarian regimes emerged and the cleverly staged “bread-and-circus” policy, which enabled the intervention of a series of artists who would otherwise have been inactive or ostracized, are

also among the aspects to be considered. It should also be remembered that modernism was underdeveloped and embryonic, having failed to create an audience or practitioners in significant numbers. Just by way of an example, it should be recalled that in Nazi Germany there were around 1,000 of Kirchner's paintings in various museums.

The Portuguese World Exhibition of 1940, the “Golden Year”

To shape daily life in accordance with the model conceived by the new regime was a priority issue. For this purpose, the maestro in service wrote a piece of music – the music “of living as usual” –, whose score contained all the expected leitmotifs – God, Fatherland, Family, Hierarchy and Authority – and had all the movements – national education, censorship, repression – referring back to national unity. Unity was further enhanced by reference to a heroic past of a land of sailors, saints and knights. In order to reinforce the *portugalidade* (Portugueseness), culture and the arts were to act as an enlivening force and the aesthetic and ideological values of the new order fed by shows which were political and propagandistic in character. The Portuguese World Exhibition was the single most symbolic example of this.

However, at the same time as “the great documentary of Christian civilization” was being planned for what was heralded as the first “great historical exhibition” of the West (França 1980, 23), to be held in the splendid “imperial space” next to the Jerónimos monastery, António Pedro and Dacosta broke with the “Politics of the Spirit” and paved the way for a new phase in Portuguese art. This was the first shadow to be cast over the “Golden Year”, announcing what would become reality after 1945. The end of the war became a watershed for architects, a group who had assumed great importance to the regime given its ongoing policy of public works and renovation of historical buildings necessarily requiring their cooperation.¹⁴

¹⁴ Iready in 1938, at the time of the preparations for the Portuguese World Exhibition, Salazar had stressed the importance of architects to forthcoming projects.

The I Congress of Architects¹⁵ constitutes clear evidence of the times to come in which so many of the former collaborators of the *Estado Novo* would distance themselves ostensibly from the regime breaking off their side to the agreement. These professionals took care to stress that the agreement had only existed as a project – of the minister of Public Works – with two men, Duarte Pacheco¹⁶ and António Ferro, and never with the regime.

Keil do Amaral lended his voice to the most fervent criticism and would later go on to lead an organic political, and thereafter unremitting, opposition to Salazarism. A new phenomenon emerged, a kind of “generational camaraderie” which brought together architects, artists and writers who expressed their opinions in magazines such as *Vértice*, *Seara Nova*, *Mundo Literário*, *Horizonte* and *Jornal de Artes*, among others. These publications were subject to heavily scrutiny and greatly reducing their discursive and interventionist role.

Indeed, from the 1940s onwards, the struggle against the regime was transferred to the field of culture and its actors became the active opposition to *Estado Novo*.

The end of the Second World War gave rise to a climate of great expectation and it was believed that the regime was on the brink of collapse. Salazar himself fuelled the possibility of Portugal keeping pace with the Allied victory and promised “elections as free as in free England”. The opposition organized itself and the list of leaders of the Movement of Democratic Unity (MUD) in 1946 was as follows (*A Sessão de Trinta de Novembro de 1946 do Movimento de Unidade Democrática 1946*, 3): teachers of different levels of education, particularly university level = 9; writers = 6; publicists = 4; lawyers = 3; members of the military = 3; doctors = 2; students = 1; workers = 1; graphic artists = 1; accountants = 1.

Of 31 leaders, 19 (approximately 61%) were employed in the fields of education, literature and journalism, and were associated with intellectual

¹⁵Keil do Amaral proves most vocal and the architect who was most vehemently demonstrating his opposition to the regime. While Pardal Monteiro shared some of his opinions, Cristino, who was present, did not take any position.

¹⁶About whom Salazar provided a brief description, highlighting that “he was a man of great value and would be a great minister of any department. A problem studied and solved by Duarte Pacheco was solved in full and for many years. Rather leftist, but as he had a great thirst for power, he easily adapted”. (Nogueira 1987, 179)

intervention. This numbers help us find the definition of “intellectual” in the sense of those who fought against the regime and aspired to a democratic society.

Aquilino, Torga, José Régio, Alves Redol, António Sérgio and Ferreira de Castro were just a few of the writers, thinkers and poets who expressed their civic and political disagreement, in the (at least approximately so) public arena.¹⁷

The author of *Selva*, Ferreira de Castro, soon after dared, as a member of the MUD committee of writers, journalists and artists, to confront the regime, accusing it of restricting the activity of writers and, consequently, of being responsible for the fragility of the cultural panorama at the time. Freedom was an overriding value for those engaged in writing and, while representing a minority, they were those who “embodied the progress of majorities”. Ferreira de Castro’s testimony on this issue is of interest:

The fact that freedom is of greater, and apparently exclusive, interest to a small minority of Humanity, such as those who, by means of the written or spoken world, have devoted their lives to culture, to literature, to journalism or to the propagation or illumination of social, political and religious beliefs, in no way diminishes its immense and irreplaceable value”, [for] “this small minority embodies the progress of the majority, their concerns, their aspirations, their creations, their discoveries, and all that represents Man’s progress through collective living.

Thus, he expresses his understanding of what it is to be an intellectual before adding furthering on:

“What indicates the civilization of a people is a range of factors among which the intellectual naturally stands out as the loftiest, most long-lasting and prestigious” so that there could be “no doubt that the country” was “being cheated out of what” could “have been its best: its spirit”. He regrets not having been able to produce the work

¹⁷The regime was not successful in gaining the adherence of writers, and Marcello Caetano himself admitted this in 1956, at the time of commemorations of “Thirty Years of Portuguese Culture” (See *Notícias de Portugal* 1956).

that he had dreamed of and extends that regret to the “progressive writers of Portugal, i.e., to almost all Portuguese writers.” (Message of the writer Ferreira de Castro 1946, 33-35)

This opposition – and this regret – could be extended to vast sections of national life and was particularly relevant in electoral periods when the freedoms of expression and thought were at the top of the list of political demands.

In 1949, the plot thickened and the end of the collusion that had existed between the *Estado Novo* and those linked to culture and the arts became more than obvious. The 1949 campaign for the Presidency of the Republic would be the pretext for many of those who had to an extent under António Ferro’s protection to switch their support to Norton de Matos. Salazar would refuse to forgive this decision. The leading figure in the “Politics of the Spirit” was soon removed. Furthermore, he had now become dispensable. The period of seduction had come to an end and repression was now the order of day. The regime was positioned to go hardcore on dissent having gained the support of Britain and the United States and become a member of NATO. The policy of diversion – and diversion had undoubtedly been the main goal of supporting culture¹⁸ – was no longer necessary.

The head of the SPN resigned his position, regretting the lack of understanding shown by the “opposition” artists and the more conservative groups within the heart of Salazarism, which, from the very outset, had criticized the protection given to modernism. The most paradigmatic action of the SPN, the cycle of “Modern Art Exhibitions”, ended, and represents the clearest indication of change.¹⁹

¹⁸ It is my belief that Salazar not only agreed with but also worked with António Ferro and understood the importance of including the lively youth, but he also viewed it with a great degree of mistrust. From his perspective, the education of the Portuguese should be undertaken jointly by the Church and School, which he saw as the “holy workshop of souls”. The school, even when the school was rather provisional, could reach the most out-of-the-way locations that propaganda could hardly or would never otherwise reach – this despite Ferro’s attempts to create a prize for the most Portuguese village, for example.

¹⁹ António Ferro was replaced by J. M. da Costa, “a person without cultural merit”. In their field, the annual exhibitions were the most obvious demonstration of Ferro’s Politics of the Spirit. “Exposições de Arte Moderna do SPN/SNI”, *A Arte Portuguesa nos Anos Quarenta*, 1, 69.

In that same year, 22 professors were dismissed and a new form of opposition began to take shape, distinct from the old Republican guard, an opposition which left its mark through surrealism, neo-realism and even abstractionism. This was also the generation of the architects who were at odds with the regime and which finds momentum in neo-realism, a movement based on the theories of Marx and Jdanov.²⁰ Art and literature went hand in hand, resulting from the “new humanism” theorized by Álvaro Cunhal in a series of articles published by the newspaper *Diabo*. In these articles, the leader of the Communist Party defended the new art movement, which he saw as the realization of a progressive historic trend, while condemning relentlessly the art for art’s sake. On this point, he was in total agreement with the Salazarist ideology.

It was, therefore, in the agitated environment of the post-war transformations that the National Society of Fine Arts (SNBA) promoted the I Exhibition of Arts²¹ which displayed works by 93 artists, among which were draftsmen, painters, sculptors, architects and graphic artists. The list of participants in the 1946 exhibition is a clear indication of the level of heterogeneity and, by extension, of the distance from and dissatisfaction with the regime.²² Amazingly, the official reaction was positive, and the exhibition was well received, even from the press linked to the regime. The year after (1947), the atmosphere was very different, and *Diário da Manhã*, of 9th May, set the tone for the scandal that was to follow. In a headline on the front page, the newspaper denounced the “Art’s Popular Front or the

²⁰“Socialist realism” had adopted Gorky’s theoretical positions, as presented by Jdanov in 1943 and disseminated in France by J. Fréville and L. Casanova. The designation began to gain currency and became a household name in Portugal via Italian cinema. In artistic and literary terms, the Brazilian production (Portinari, Jorge Amado and Graciliano Ramos), the Mexican (Rivera, Orozco and Siqueiras), and the American output of Dos Passos and Steinbeck constitute the most significant influences on Portuguese intellectuals. The Marxist influence is widely acknowledged, and the young neo-realists assumed an attitude of denunciation and simultaneously of struggle against society, which they perceived as bourgeois and exploitative.

²¹The exhibition was (anonymously) organized by the Sub-Committee of Artists of the Committee of Journalists, Writers and Artists of the Movement of Democratic Unity.

²²A. Manta, A. Salazar, A. Pedro, Conceição Silva, Arlindo Vicente, Cândido Costa Pinto, Falcão Trigo were some of the participant artists. José Augusto França, *Os Anos Quarenta na Arte Portuguesa*, vol. I, p. 83.

Unity around pessimism and disorder”. Six paintings were confiscated²³ in an operation presumably ordered by the Minister of the Interior himself.²⁴ The exhibition of the following year – 1948 – will be subject to preliminary censorship, an unprecedented situation in Portugal. The “Gerais”, as the exhibitions became known, had no jury and gave out no awards. They took, however, an important place in the imagination of the left-wing and stressed the opposition to the regime, as actions by the Portuguese Secret Police (PIDE) well document.

Within the same spectrum of opposition, although stemming from a different ideology and poetics, we may also mention the role of the surrealists and of the notorious, and scandalous, exhibition in 1949.²⁵ Right at the outset, the catalogue cover was an obvious sign of rebellion: “The Surrealist Group of Lisbon asks: after 22 years of fear are we still capable of an act of Freedom? It is absolutely necessary to vote against fascism.”²⁶ This is clear testimony to the alliance between artists, intellectuals and opponents of Salazar, this time led by the surrealists who followed on from what the neo-realists had been doing.

Further in 1949, and once again on the occasion of a political event – the Norton de Matos campaign –, the writer José Régio denounced the regime and its repressive practices. Régio chose to refer to a paralyzing feel-

²³The confiscated paintings were: Júlio Pomar’s “Resistência”, Rui Pimentel-Arco’s “Pintura”; Avelino Cunhal’s “O Menino da Bandeira Branca”; Maria Keil’s “Regresso à Terra”; Manuel Ribeiro Pavia’s “Ansiedade” and “Filho Morto” as well as drawings. Both the theme of the exhibition and the reaction of the regime were discussed at length in the magazine *Horizonte – Jornal das Artes*, 11 and 12 (first fortnight in June).

²⁴The Interior Minister was Augusto Cancela de Abreu. He was appointed on 4th February 1947 and dismissed on 2th August 1950.

²⁵The Surrealist Group was founded in 1947 and brought together António Pedro, Vespeira, Fernando de Azevedo, Moniz Pereira, António Domingues, José Augusto França, Cesariny and António Dacosta, artists whose intervention would change the course of both painting and poetry. To put themselves on the map, they organized a Surrealist Exhibition in January 1949. However, the surrealist movement itself had older roots, dating back to the 1930s with the incursions of António Pedro. In the 1940s, Cândido Costa Pinto was responsible for the contact with André Breton (1947) at a time in which the movement had gained new momentum as a result of the major Surrealist Exhibition held in Paris.

²⁶This cover was to be a poster for the Norton de Matos campaign and its fate could easily have been anticipated: it was crossed out with the blue pencil of censorship.

ing – fear –, which he describes as “wavering, fluctuating, hesitating, vague, weak, permanent (...), supremely demoralizing” (AAVV 1949, 60), which constitutes a powerful impediment to creation.

The regime sought to play down these attacks and accused the artists and intellectuals of using “intellectual action” as a strategy to bring down the established power out of a lack of other more effective means. Moreover, the enemy had been clearly defined, according to a basic dichotomous, and yet very effective, logic: communists were the chosen target, and this label was applied indiscriminately to anyone who opposed the dictatorship, even though many opponents, it might be added, were actually anti-communist.²⁷

Representing a kind of Portuguese-style McCarthyism, Pinheiro Torres was one of the architects of this strategy. It is therefore worth quoting extracts from his speeches to the National Assembly. In the mythical year of 1949, this Member of Parliament described the activities of the Portuguese secret political police, PIDE, in the hunt for “subversives”, i.e., communists, who, under cover of the “dark”, set “revolutionary movements” in motion. Yet even more serious and more dangerous for *Estado Novo* was their proliferation “in broad daylight” “in State departments”, in “the teaching profession”, in the “official bodies”, “in the order of physicians”, among “lawyers, engineers”, for from such positions they could contaminate society as a whole. The influence of the communists in “books”, “conferences”, “magazines” and “newspapers”, where they spread “the venom of their doctrines” (*Diário das Sessões* April 23, 1949: 544-545), was an absolute anathema for this defender of the regime.

This was not an isolated outburst. His theses were supported, for instance, by Silva Dias, who, in 1951, compared these subversive agents to “bacteria”, thriving in philosophical circles, and taking political advantage of the “notoriety they achieved in the scientific world” to “taint all areas of human knowledge according to the methods of dialectic materialism”. He continued his passionate speech by referring to the “essayists of the utterly human” and “above all the novelists of the social”, whose works had outrageously “received awards from some academies” (*Diário das Sessões* April 28, 1951: 956).

²⁷ Interestingly, we have found fewer negative terms referring to the far-right, which also had highly combative members whose attacks on the dictatorship were not soft and, on the contrary, were extremely aggressive.

The regime's perception helps us, therefore, to establish the concept of "intellectual", and coincides with what we have been suggesting: they were philosophers, writers, essayists, journalists, architects, painters and all those who expressed their "dissolvent" ideas by means of the word.

In the 1950s, the estrangement of the artistic and intellectual world from the regime became final and would never heal. "Art interests me because I love beauty, the indispensable nourishment of the spirit. Everything that is beautiful and intelligent pleases me, and I regret that Portugal is currently so poor in the field of the arts" (Garnier 1952, 191). A great summary, indeed, coming from the man most responsible for that status quo.

Some years later, in 1966, in conversation with Franco Nogueira, his favourite confidante, Salazar recognized that "he always had great difficulty in finding collaborators, and that the intellectuals had always escaped him."

Final remarks

While unquestionably authoritarian, repressive and controlling, the Salazar regime was never as strict as the fascist Italian and Nazi or Stalinist regimes. Thus, the intellectual performance in the public space may very well reflect the regime's "half-hearted" action. From the first decade of the regime through to the end of the Second World War, there was even a certain degree of proximity, promoted by the influence of two characters who served the regime in this ambiguous game: António Ferro and Duarte Pacheco. Salazar fully understood that it was advantageous to use them to strengthen the national spirit, gather support and project an image of modernity.

1945 was a borderline year, as it symbolically announced the end of the regime, which would never again achieve the favour and prestige that had made the "golden era" possible, the very period ending with the war. The close ties established between aesthetic and political discourses began to slacken and eventually led to the estrangement of the intellectuals who, obviously, took up a position of opposition. To speak of intellectuals was to speak of opponents, and this dialectics caused the failure of the regime, as it never managed to produce its own intelligentsia or spokespeople for its ideology and its praxis.

Answering my provocative question as to whether or not there were intellectuals in the *Estado Novo*, I have to conclude that they did exist, with many peculiarities, to be sure. These resulted from historical constraints, which, to a great extent, help us explain the routes taken. Indeed, these were confused times, of ephemeral and contradictory ideological loyalties even if considered only from the doctrinal point of view. António Pedro is but one example. An unquestionable opponent of the regime and the voice of the BBC during the Second World War, this artist, who presented his famous exhibition in Rua da Trindade in 1948, came from the national trade union movement, a right-wing movement that became close to the regime. Alternatively, to conclude, we shall briefly look into an extract from a conversation between Franco Nogueira, Hernâni Cidade and Armando Cortezão. During this conversation, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Franco Nogueira, asks Hernâni Cidade to set up a *Society for the Friends of Rhodesia* and asks Armando Cortezão if he will agree to preside over the aforementioned Society. He asks these two well-known opponents of Salazar to take the initiative as “it would not be a good idea if this appeared to be inspired by the government”. He goes on to say that it would be much more effective if the members were “men of opposition, respected for their intellectual prowess and for their integrity” (Nogueira 1987, 165). The regime was not, we can therefore conclude, able to produce “men respected for their intellectual prowess and for their integrity.”

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THE INTELLECTUAL IN EXILE. JORGE DE DE SENA IN PORTUGAL DEMOCRÁTICO

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We might immediately be tempted to encounter affinities between the conception of *intellectual* expressed by Jean-Paul Sartre, in the first edition of *Les Temps Modernes* (October 1945), and that of Jorge de Sena. Both conceptions do include theoretical studies and teaching, critical-reflective thinking on reality and its dissemination, the production of knowledge and creative acts that do not exempt the intellectual from engagement in action vital within the historical context, but rather merge with public debate, civic intervention and political commitment on behalf of ethical values, which are non-relative and instead universalising. And, since the quality of academic thinking and authority endows the intellectual with the resonance of prestige (the attention paid to his words) that, in turn, explains the great demand placed on him for influencing ethically responsible action in the essential questions of life, i.e. his availability and dedication towards assuming a position within the set of human relationships, especially, in power relationships. If, in Sartrean expression, the human being is *condemned to being free*, privileged awareness of autonomy of will imposes, particularly on the writer and the intellectual, the Atlas condition of taking the weight of the world onto one's shoulders.

Sartre, who reflected extensively on the function and purpose of the writer and the intellectual during the occupation of France by German armies, launched the manifesto *Les Temps Modernes* immediately after the end of World War II and the restoration of democratic liberties in his country. However, in Portugal and Spain, the hope that the defeat of European Nazi-fascism would consequently topple the Iberian dictators proved in vain. Oliveira Salazar worked around his admiration for Hitler and Mussolini and proved sufficiently wise to take advantage of the strategic position of Portugal and the strongly anti-communist character of its regime, in order to survive as an ally of the Western powers, standing against the East, as the Cold War unfurled, playing in both the military and economic fields. The democratic oppositions, isolated between Franco's Spain and the ocean, were shorn of any international support and proved unable to summon the concerted body of action necessary to

overthrow the repressive structures of the *Estado Novo* and thereby bring about its end.

Indeed, it was fear of persecution and the imminence of imprisonment following his involvement in a failed coup against Salazar on March 12, 1959 that led Jorge de Sena, on the verge of turning forty, to leave Portugal. Voluntary exile derived jointly from dissatisfaction over his professional career as a civil engineer, which he felt was impacting on his literary vocation as an essayist and writer, and the circumstances of a visit to Brazil as a speaker at the 4th International Colloquium on Luso-Brazilian Studies, in August 1959. He subsequently accepted an invitation to teach literature theory in Assis, in the state of São Paulo, before transferring to the University of Araraquara, in 1961, where he completed his doctoral thesis. With the rise to power of a military dictatorship in Brazil and the worsening political and intellectual situation (after March 1964), Jorge de Sena moved to the United States of America in October 1965. There, he lectured and gained tenure at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, before moving on to the University of California, in Santa Barbara, in 1970, where he remained through to his death in 1978.

While Jorge de Sena arguably experienced his most creative period during his years in Brazil, this was not a liberating exile. The loss of and yearning for his homeland and the dream of the much hoped for representative democracy were never to leave him.¹ Not even in the safe surroundings of Brazil, where he finally attained a position as literature researcher and university lecturer, did the sense of ethical responsibility as a writer and intellectual allow him to lapse into distraction and inertia. On the other side of the Atlantic, he began sharing with other intellectuals the patriotic imperative of engaging in forms of struggle against the Salazar regime and in defence of the liberty and dignity of the Portuguese. In the light of such commitment do we thus justify our initial reference to his affinity to Sartre's intellectual attitude; both for Sena and for Sartre the conscience of liberty never alleviated nor quietened the sense of responsibility. Correspondingly, it was logical that he would participate in publications such as *Portugal Democrático*,² which gave a

¹In the "Preface to the Second Edition" of *Poesia I*, Sena declared: "politically, I am against any type of dictatorship (whether by majorities or minorities) and in favour of representative democracy" (Sena, 1977, 20).

²*Portugal Democrático* was first published on 7 July 1956 by Vítor de Almeida Ramos and Manuel Ferreira de Moura. It was suspended one year later due to the scant

voice to the tasks and objectives of the expatriate political opposition working out of the Portuguese Republican Centre of São Paulo. His main objective, in his rearguard position in the struggle for freedom in Portugal, was to foster actions that might contribute towards undermining the dictatorship, freeing his homeland and launching the process of democratisation, especially by motivating anti-Salazar opinion and pressure movements within both groups of expatriate Portuguese and on the international front.

The first time the name Jorge de Sena emerged in *Portugal Democrático* was in issue no. 29 (October 1959), which carried a transcription of his poem “This shame of living listening” from the book *Evidências* (Evidences) (1955), seized by PIDE (the Portuguese secret police). The poem was subsequently included in a collection by seven authors,³ “A Battle Front Called Poetry”, against the “dehumanization of Portuguese society caused by the effects of the Salazar regime”. His regular contributions began with the following issues, after which, in January 1960, he became a member of the Editorial Council. His first text for *Portugal Democrático* was an unsigned editorial, “A ‘5th October’ of Unity”, in issue no. 30 (November 1959), which referred to the commemorative banquet celebrating the declaration of the Portuguese Republic, a pretext for a meeting of both Portuguese and Brazilian democratic figures in São Paulo, and which resulted in the dispatch of a telegram to Salazar calling for his resignation. The author expressed pride in the stir caused by the message

that through dedicated, persistent and tenacious action, has contributed towards unmasking, in the eyes of the world, and the Portuguese that are either at a distance or poorly understand the interests hiding that symbolic monster that is Salazar, that perfidious, hypocritical and cowardly dictatorship that is his government.

interest shown by the immigrant Portuguese community and the lack of financial and human resources before resuming publication in July 1958 after having established the conditions to setup its first editorial council and board of directors with offices in the headquarters of the Portuguese Republican Centre of São Paulo.

³They are, in addition to Sena: Afonso Duarte, Alexandre O’Neill, Armindo Rodrigues, Carlos Maria de Araújo, Carlos de Oliveira and José Gomes Ferreira.

The text represents a good summary of the newspaper's mission: contradicting Salazarist diplomacy, internationally denouncing the dictatorial regime so as to isolate it and demystify its propaganda, raising the awareness of deceived Portuguese citizens so that they withdraw their support, even that resulting from neutrality and inertia. As regards the actions undertaken by *Portugal Democrático*, we may first set out the following declaration of its principles and methods:

The principles are very simple: no equivocation in relations with these people who at every moment betray the dignity of their nation whose destinies they expropriate, total loyalty to democratic ideals, those uniquely aligned with the present and the future of the world, uniquely capable of saving Portugal from the fearful abyss into which it is being dragged by Salazarist paralysis, absolute dedication to the cause of liberty and justice and those norms of social interaction and human respect stipulated by the Charter of the United Nations and which the group pretending to govern Portugal so grossly flout.

The methods, from which principles derive, are also simple: unshakeable unity, without discrimination against political orientations in the struggle against Salazarism, absolute loyalty and democratic tolerance in mutual relationships taking into consideration the common enemy, and totally shunning any manoeuvres designed to divert the democrats of Portugal (which have their eyes set on those who live beyond the prison that the Nation is) of courage, decision and the spirit of sacrifice with which they have struggled and shall continue to struggle through to final victory.

The responsibilities of intellectuals abroad, within which the newspaper's own mission fell, derived from awareness as to the deprivations of their homeland and which demanded active commitment with the objective of attaining liberty.⁴

⁴In the same edition of *Portugal Democrático*, Sena also published another unsigned note entitled "Hit the road, Rat!", an invective of great violence and insult against Salazar, "symbol of the illegality, arbitrariness, injustice, oppression", that culminated with the challenging libel: "Don't you resign, hit the road!". The text is accompanied by a cartoon by Fernando Lemos, in which the Dictator, depicted with the body of a rat,

Through to October 1962, between editorials, notes and articles, Sena wrote over three dozen pieces with the shared highly pitched tone of *j'accuse* the Dictatorship. They are texts with depth, length and diverse levels of importance. Let us take some examples.

In the article "Elections in Portugal", still published under the pseudonym of Cândido Alves, in issue no. 31 (December 1959), Sena poured ridicule on the electoral farces designed to pretend democratic openness and which served only for Salazar to appoint his lackeys. Again in the text "The rat and the little flags", published in issue no. 46 (March 1961), he mocked the demonstrations organised by the regime, and staged, for example, after the embarrassing hijacking carried out by Henrique Galvão, to honour and salute Salazar, when he "went to Lisbon docks to welcome 'his' *Santa Maria*".

In the first text published under his real name, in issue no. 35 (April 1960), with the headline "A dictatorship of jurists", he slammed the "gigantesque legalistic 'Make-Believe'" produced to control "the people, through censorship and the political police" and arbitrary "security laws" that allow for the "imprisonment, for an undetermined period of time, of any person, despite the lack of any evidence". He also provided a historical overview, with notable pedagogical precision, of the dictatorship in Portugal, beginning with the military coup by Gomes da Costa, the means of take over and Salazar's actions when in power, through to the fraudulent elections 'lost' by Humberto Delgado, in 1958. Lastly, Sena attacked the "policy of sharecropping", in the interests of the economic-financial oligarchy "that serves Salazar and is, in turn, led by him".

Occasional events, such as the commemorations of the 5th October⁵ and 31st January,⁶ are capitalised upon to highlight the unity of the democrats, with the 50th anniversary of the declaration of the Republic⁷ serving as the occasion for writing a historical memory in which, by replacing the concept of the "republic" type regime by the set of democratic values that

having taken off elastic boots is on the rim of a toilet and set to dive in while the bird of freedom is poised to pull the chain.

⁵Text: "Um 5 de Outubro", published in issue no. 30 (November 1959).

⁶Text: "O General Humberto Delgado presidiu às Comemorações do 1º de Janeiro", published in issue no. 33 (February 1960).

⁷Text: "Os cinquenta anos da República", published in issue no. 41 (October 1960).

were then proclaimed, he reduces its true duration down to fifteen and a half years, between 5th October 1910 and 28th May 1926. The commemorations of the 500th anniversary of the death of Prince Henry the Navigator were the pretext for another historical memory demystifying the usage made of this illustrious national figure by the ideology of the regime.⁸ Sena, unable to directly attack the president of Brazil, where he was living, does so intelligently and subtly within the scope of an attack on Salazar, accusing him of inviting Juscelino Kubitschek to participate in the aforementioned commemorations in Lisbon in the capacity of co-host and co-head of the Portuguese state, which thus tainted Brazilian democracy with the Portuguese dictatorship.⁹ He lamented the same legitimising of the dictatorship by General Eisenhower, president of the United States of America, in visiting the Portuguese government in Lisbon.¹⁰

Sena condemns the terror and the arbitrariness of repressive and judicial processes and the “poisoning of consciences” and appeals for amnesties to be granted to exiles and political prisoners, while heaping praise on successful escapes (prisoners from Peniche,¹¹ including Álvaro Cunhal and Agostinho Neto who made it to Britain). He also called for the end of censorship and freedom of expression and expressed solidarity with attacked writers, while also highlighting any international actions or speeches by leading figures or state representatives against the *Estado Novo* or critical of Portuguese colonialism, in addition to stressing any agitation or rebellion in the colonies that would collectively amount to the outbreak of the Colonial War in 1961. Sena was consistent in affirming the rights of the African liberation movements and the right of such countries to self-determination and independence. Above all, Sena strove to demystify the regime’s propaganda.

Having co-signed the homage to Jaime Cortesão, made by the Committee of Portuguese Intellectuals and Artists Pro-Freedom of Expression,

⁸Text: “Valores Portugueses – o Infante D. Henrique” [313], published in issue no. 39 (August 1960).

⁹Text: “O infante D. Henrique, Salazar e o Brasil”, published in issue no. 39 (August 1960).

¹⁰Editorial “Uma visita presidencial”, published in issue no. 38 (July 1960).

¹¹Respectively, notes “Fugas de Portugal”, published in issue no. 33 (February 1960) and “Agostinho Neto”, published in issue no. 63 (August 1962).

on the 50th anniversary of his literary career,¹² Sena published a moving funeral elogy of this writer, historian and high profile democratic, terming him “an example of unity between intellectual labours, moral dignity and civic refinement”.¹³

In no. 33 (February 1960), Sena was behind the unattributed editorial “A Victory for Democracy” on the holding of the first ever South American Pro-Amnesty of Political Prisoners in Spain and Portugal Conference. Participating, in addition to the Portuguese and Spanish delegates, were Brazilian figures alongside delegates from Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. This initiative not only condemned Franco and Salazar but also gave full expression to the sense of indignation built by decades of regimes of “ignominious characteristics, for the free conscience of the world” and demanded an amnesty for the political prisoners and for the two Iberian countries, “transformed into huge open prisons”. The communiqué concluded: “It is purely an imperative for the human conscience: amnesty for Spain and for Portugal!”. The second conference, held in Montevideo, Uruguay, on 27th, 28th and 29th January 1961, and reported in no. 45 (February 1961), gained the explicit support of Jean-Paul Sartre. The first conference was presided over by Álvaro Lins, the former ambassador of Brazil to Portugal, who, in January 1959, accepted the request for political asylum by General Humberto Delgado, confirmed by Itamarati (Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs). However, Salazarist diplomacy proved effective, firstly weakening and then isolating the ambassador, who then lost the support of his president, who deemed the Brazilian representative to have acted erroneously.¹⁴ Driven by his conscience, Lins was angered, protested vehemently and ended up being stripped of his diplomatic post in Lisbon. He broke off with Kubitschek politically and personally on the grounds of what he deemed the latter’s complicity with dictators. Sena was a speaker at the “Homage to Álvaro Lins”, celebrated with a banquet, on 5th May,

¹²Published in issue no. 36 (May 1960).

¹³Text “Jaime Cortesão, o Historiador”, published in issue no. 41 (October 1960 [331]).

¹⁴With the headline “Revelações de Álvaro Lins sobre sua missão em Lisboa”, *Portugal Democrático* issue no. 36 (May 1960), this included a transcription of an important document revealed by the magazine “Mundo Ilustrado”, based on a book in a diary format written by Álvaro Lins, and published under the title “Mission to Portugal”.

in S. Paulo. This event received widespread coverage throughout *Portugal Democrático*, issue no. 37 (June 1960). Column space was also given to reporting how Álvaro Lins had returned the Grã-Cruz da Ordem de Cristo award he had received three years earlier.

As from 1961, with rebellion in Angola and the generalised outbreak of colonial war, this would become a recurrent theme in the texts by Sena in *Portugal Democrático* that defended the right of African peoples to self-determination and independence. International decisions condemning colonialism made at the United Nations General Assembly and at the NATO Council are applauded alongside the minimising of Salazarist diplomatic efforts, with the latter's positions effectively dismissed.¹⁵ Aware of the growing and humiliating international isolation of Portugal, which would never be able to bear the long-term military and financial costs of war on many fronts in the colonies, and indignant about the disaster that colonialism was bringing upon the country, including the danger of annexation projects by Franco's Spain, in an article entitled "Portuguese Foreign Policy", published in no. 48 (May 1961), Sena ordered and developed a series of ideas as to the need to "mobilise a core of Portuguese citizens dispersed around the world" to help in "a Portuguese political reconversion", the urgency of a democratic solution alongside the diplomatic and trade strategies to be implemented and the restoration of public finances.

The most important articles written by the intellectual Jorge de Sena are two complementary works published firstly in issues no. 39 (August 1960) and no. 47 (April 1961), entitled respectively "The Community of Portuguese States" and "The Organisation of Portuguese Democracy". In the former, he sketches and proposes "for the consideration and discussion of the Portuguese people" an intelligent program, meticulously and rigorously planned throughout each one of its 27 principles. He did this out of the duty he felt to conceive and present "concrete proposals about the political, economic, social, etcetera, future of Portugal and the territories which depend on our nation", because it was not lawful for democrats "to excuse themselves, in the name of tactical unity, from the strategic formulation of concrete proposals", in order to establish "a solid constitutional structure" that would ensure the electorate

¹⁵Respectively to articles "Um novo ano" in issue no. 44 (January 1961) and "A Reforma inicial" in issue no. 49 (1961).

the exercise of their liberties and within which all opinions, races and creeds are gentlemen in their dignity and civic representativeness and which, creating a free community, organised so as to maximise liberty, whatever the scale, imposes the maximum responsibility.

In full awareness of his intellectual responsibility for thinking through the salvation of Portugal, Sena structured the extraordinary plan for a democratic organisation of free political exchange, integrating the various Portuguese language speaking nations that would emerge out of the colonial empire. He also recalled the need for “the political reform of Portugal” not just to be a “liberalizing reconversion” that might open up the doors to other forms “of violence and authoritarianism” (seeming to forecast the period known as the “Marcelist Spring”), but rather a reform “from the bottom up”, and covering “the entire socio-political structure of the country, the entire political organisation of the state and its administrative structure”. He put forward the notion of elections “done gradually”, at the grass-roots level, beginning with the consolidation of democracy at the parish council level before moving up to the municipal level and culminating in the Founding Assembly, which would rewrite the Constitution. He wrote: “Democracy is not, and cannot be *conferred*. Democracy is the creation of democrats and a conquest of a people”. Immediately, we are told it is a process that could never be deemed definitively acquired and consolidated but has to be permanently implemented and justified in its historical duty.

At a certain point, the unity of the democratic oppositional forces, with their different opinions but the shared anti-dictatorial cause, began to crack with the rise to prominence and eventual preponderance and control of *Portugal Democrático* by Portuguese Communist Party activists and intellectuals. Their concept of *unity* meant it proved impossible to define a program for the colonial question, for the range of the desired social transformation, and for the forms of resistance both in exile and back in Portugal (as expressed in the lucidity of the article “The Lefts”, published in issue no. 49 (June 1961). Sena wrote his final article for issue no. 65 (October 1962), precisely entitled “Unity”, in which he is disillusioned with the “suspicions” between the opposition groups that proved unable to attain “real unity around political objectives”, an agreement resulting from respect for the diverse currents and the coordination of efforts that the dictator always exploited to his own gain. Sena stated: “There is nothing more than unity.

However, there is nothing more important than this unity not being absurd in form and overtaken by *some* controlling and immobilising *others*.” Out of the same feelings, and in a declaration published in issue no. 70 (April 1963), the whole group of intellectuals that had sat on the Editorial Council resigned. They were Adolfo Casais Monteiro, Fernando Correia da Silva, Fernando Lemos, Jorge de Sena and Paulo de Castro. Thus did Sena bring to a close his period of cooperation with *Portugal Democrático*.

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Sena mistrusted the entire systematic discourse in the determination of what reality is and in prescriptions as to what it should be. As he wrote: “I am not among those who believe in critical systems (...). From my perspective, the idea of *system* is incompatible with the idea of *critical*, given that the system begins where the criticism ends” (Sena 1977, 109). He also did not believe in unequivocal and absolute truths and was not prepared to submit, whether scientifically or politically, to any absolute doctrine of a normative character. He stressed the critical-reflective method in contrast to categorical and non-comparable discourses as each only ever recognised a partial, sectarian capacity to understand and express the human condition in its plenitude of being. Faced by the relativity (but not moral relativism) of the entire system, questioning and constantly re-evaluating criticism is, to Sena, inherent to intellectual creativity and the human desire for freedom.

According to Sena, the future of humanity is the development of a “conscience of freedom”. Therefore, *being free* is not, as Sartre would have it, a “condemnation” to which man is sentenced from the outset: the autonomy of will and its privileged awareness are a process of personal conquest. Sena’s intellectual performance in knowledge and the (literary and political) transformation of the real does not encounter any incompatibility between the practice of civic commitment and theoretical reflection and the production of knowledge as they are dialectically inseparable activities: there is no conscience of freedom without active responsibility for it and vice-versa. Thinking is acting, knowing is already transforming.

While the actions of the intellectual perform an *educational* and *moral* role, given the implied lucidity of being *ethically* attentive to what the world

is, the intellectual's discourse, rather than normalising the audience within standardised schemas (teaching them what they should think), should help them to freely gain autonomy of thought, stimulate the exercise of critical discussion against every type of dogma and determinism about a reality which, once acquired, interpreted, set in perspective, understood, and even anticipated, may aid transformation.

The thinking and the example of Jorge de Sena suggest a final reflection. The faster the processes of communication and the very information itself become, the greater the need for pausing for critical reflection. The greater the differentiation in the ways ideas circulate, the greater the relevance of lucidly thinking about them. The greater the extent of democratisation of education, the greater the demand to level it off at higher and more challenging standards.

The role of the intellectual has essentially not changed, since technological sophistication and scientific evolution, contrary to the dreams of the nineteenth century utopians which the social tragedies of the twentieth century disavowed, do not eliminate the problems of the convivial existence among human beings. Due to the censure and repression of totalitarian regimes or to the futility and sloth of democracy, there has long been a temptation to lower the statute of the intellectual, or, out of the same hostility to culture, adulterate it by inventing flawed substitutes and conferring the statute upon analysts, political commentators, scriptwriters, publicists, journalists and other types of public entertainers. It is down to the intellectuals (and nobody shall do it for them) to take a stand against the social forces that undermine them. This would seem to imply (I do not have the affront to affirm this) the demonstration of a haughty position of power. However, such supposition is hard to defend when we envisage intellectual commitment sustained by a humanist and renaissance *culture* (against the inward funnelling of current trends towards de-cultured specialisation) and by the *authority* of one dedicated to an honest life producing not merely information and opinions (with these, as with good intentions, our hell is brimming over), but studied understanding and profound knowledge.

Intellectual respectability and prestige shall also be sustained by the strength of reception of this discourse, by recognition that one does know what one is talking about, even when calling for criticism and discordance, and by the capacity, in the face of established ideas and the powers-that-be, to drive attention and mobilise consciences. Ultimately, for the intel-

lectual, liberty still implies and shall always imply the responsibility of the citizen and the creative practice of a *poetic* citizenship.

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PORTUGUESE WOMEN AS PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS*

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I am less interested in whether a woman is a feminist or not but rather whether she could be considered a public intellectual.

Elizabeth Fox-Genovese

My purpose in this essay is to focus on the role some Portuguese women played as public intellectuals in the twentieth century and on their achievements as “Disquieting Muses” in their country and abroad. In order to address this topic, I will briefly refer to evolution concepts of the intellectual and of woman before considering how the ten public intellectuals I selected acted across five different cultural areas: the plasticarts, music, science, landscape gardening and cultural management.

Inspired by the emblematic painting *Le Muse Inquietanti* by Giorgio De Chirico, one of the most representative painters of the twentieth century, I have designated these public intellectuals as “Disquieting Muses” also due to the reference to the muses of Greek mythology,¹ the goddesses of all the arts and sciences who bestowed creativity on both artists and scientists. Indeed, the Muses (αἱ μουσᾶι in Greek), besides incorporating the arts, also inspired creative processes with their graces, through songs and theatrical representations, texts, traditional music and dance and were also drawn upon to help in developing one’s abilities.

This represents one of aspects that would seem to coincide with my thesis about the importance of the role and the agency of the aforementioned public intellectuals as I consider that, through their achievements in the different areas in which they have so successfully acted, they con-

* This is an abridged English version of my volume *Intelectuais Públicas Portuguesas – As Musas Inquietantes* (Pires 2010).

¹ The Muses, daughters of Mnemosyne and Zeus, were nine: Calliope (Epic Poetry), Clio (History), Erato (Love Poetry), Euterpe (Music), Melpomene (Tragedy), Polyhymnia (Hymns), Terpsichore (Dance), Thaleia (Comedy) and Urania (Astronomy). Over the course of time, they have been invoked at the beginning of poems and the terms “Museum”, the temple of the muses, and “Music”, the art of the muses, that included poetry, the art of sounds and wisdom, derive from their name.

tribute to give hope and courage to all other women, thus amply justifying the designation of “Muses” I attributed them. Furthermore, I think they are “disquieting” because, in their respective acting spaces, besides having reached prominent positions, in spite of being women, they also left innovative marks on the different fields in which they were involved and that must certainly have “disquieted” many of their more conservative male counterparts.²

Their privileged status suggests that they attained a rank that requires permanent and diligent inquiry and authenticity and, having travelled to less familiar locations in order to succeed professionally in the context of contemporary cultural life, they all have a mark of intellectual affiliation that is frequently designated as “insider-outsider intellectuals”, whose value consists in the simultaneous distance and intimacy, thus being due to their cosmopolitanism both familiar and strangers, well-known and exotic. Additionally, their different intellectual affiliations led me to consider their articulation with Portuguese cultural life embarking from the assumption that they would, simultaneously, be the transmitters of culture and the models that would inspire other Portuguese women. They reached their intellectual maturity in the twentieth century and have either resisted or acted according to institutional imperatives and developed polarized skills of agreement and resistance in accordance with the different pressures they felt for they are isolated figures forced to circulate in highly traditional intellectual *milieus*.

In my opinion, their works and ways of acting were simultaneously marginal and crucial to the development of the cultural life of their country, although they are not interested in reaching positions of power and influence and there have been, occasionally, some tensions in the first moments of public acknowledgement. For all these reasons, they have certainly contributed to the fact that women are no longer perceived as the other, and as a source of fanciful inspiration and begun to be considered as innovative agents. My intention choosing ten names of well-known female intellectuals in Portugal was to demonstrate how women can stop being seen through the eyes of the male privileged elite, still retaining power, and conceive

²The De Chirico painting also inspired Sylvia Plath’s poem entitled *The Disquieting Muses* (1957) but, according to her pessimistic perspective, Plath sees the feminine figures as threatening representations of the negative forces of life (Plath 1981).

themselves as equal subjects with intellectual commitment, thus contributing towards creating a world in which identical achievements are not only possible but also encouraged by social institutions.

Considering the “Disquieting Muses” I have selected, and whose names are Emília Nadal, Joana Vasconcelos (plastic Arts); Maria João Pires, Joana Carneiro (Music); Hanna Damásio, Leonor Parreira (Science); Cristina Castel-Branco, Teresa Andresen (Landscape Gardening) and Simonetta Luz Afonso, Yvette Centeno (Cultural Management), the idea, mentioned by Giorgio Agamben,³ that we should make a work of art of our life immediately comes to mind. This notion had already been previously referred to by Michel Foucault, who was concerned with the relation of subjectivity to power structures, and spoke about the construction of life as “se déprendre de soi-même”.⁴

As regards the movement generally designated as feminism, besides briefly referring to the definition of its key concepts and to its evolution over time, my objective is to draw attention to the importance of intellectual clarification for the political project and to make a critical reflection on the state of the art of our knowledge and on its institutional relationship with patriarchal power in contemporary societies. Mention is also made to what I consider attempts to motivate a social change without ever forgetting that we must include a historical analysis of the basic intellectual issues that the feminist attack on the *status quo* automatically raises.

Regarding the area of music and the achievements of the pianist Maria João Pires and of the maestra Joana Carneiro, I believe we must remember that music does not dwell in any external form – like the score, the tones or even the sensation of the sounds – it is in the universe of cognitive constructions, in a mental world of thoughts related to the tones and their relationships. Music is thus seen as an audio-cognitive activity, that is, as a thought related to the sounds which excludes every reasoning that does not involve them. In the field of the plastic arts and the activities of painters and sculptors, like Emília Nadal and Joana Vasconcelos, I believe that for

³V. Agamben’s message about a world with hope (Ulrich Raulff 2004, 437).

⁴The expression means actively trying to free oneself of the only “true” or “essential” identity, thus submitting subjectivity to a permanent form of self-*bricolage* (Rabinow 1997, xi-xliii). Roland Barthes also spoke about this topic in his lecture entitled “Vivre ensemble”.

the feminist perspectives of aesthetics there have been contributions not only by philosophers but also by art historians, musicologists and theorists of literature, cinema and performing arts, whose researches have practical implications for the analyses of the historical conceptual frameworks that guide aesthetics and the philosophy of art. The philosophical theories of the feminists have also been very influential in the critical interpretation of art and of popular culture and, occasionally, in the development of contemporary artistic practices.

Concerning science, consider the research work of scientists like Hanna Damásio and Leonor Parreira good examples of how feminists have been developing a science project that they designate as “successor” and which proposes a description of the world that is more adequate to a better life and is in a critical and more reflexive relationship with the practices of dominance by the others and with the dissimilar divisions of privileges.

In the area of landscape gardening, when we consider the work of Cristina Castel-Branco and Teresa Andresen we see that the garden, when duly treated, can be transformed into a “text”, a meaningful space and a location of sociability to which a landscape gardener adds her own artistic contribution. It is a unique space in which both the evolution and the signs of time become fundamental for its understanding. In our times, due to the new ways of big city living, we want to have a nature which is converted into humanized landscapes resulting from the action of landscape gardeners and from their collective work which is an essential element of contemporary urbanism.

From the field of cultural management, I have selected Simonetta Luz Afonso and Yvette Centeno, whose exceptional activities in this area provide fine examples of the ideas I defend about the importance of the action of highly qualified intellectuals in the promotion culture and in the diffusion of interest in art. This is achieved through the management of museums, art galleries and other institutions types involved in the production, dissemination and acquisition of art for, as is well-known, every type of exhibition of works of art also represents an historical phenomenon for it, inevitably, implies some of the selection, planning, elaboration of reports and appreciations that correspond to the theoretical texts of art historians.

In my research, I am especially interested in analyzing the status and the role these women played in the formation of the cultural *milieu* as well as the relationship between the intellectual and the artist, or the producer of

knowledge and the creator of cultural products or, more generically, in the connection between intellectuals and aesthetics. In order to carry this out, we have to evaluate their capabilities in the formation or restructuring of national identity and to look into the social conditions of their existence, including in this study, whose chronological background is the twentieth century, references to the management of their symbolic power and to the trajectories and life structures of these producers of culture. We will thus see how the ten selected Portuguese public intellectuals selected contribute – although in different ways and with distinctive intensities – to the production and the development of cultural goods through music, science, painting or sculpture, among others, thus transmitting frameworks for the understanding and enrichment of culture in general and having an impact on the contemporary cultural life of their country.

When we consider this topic, we inevitably think of the emblematic case of Virginia Woolf⁵ – also both a woman and an intellectual – who was really interested in, rather than communicating her opinions and persuasions, actually educating the public so that people could read with greater discernment, developing ideas and judgments of their own accord. This idea makes all the more sense in Portugal where the education of public opinion is essential to the cultural structure. One can, therefore, conclude that although ‘high’ culture includes different skills and forms of knowledge, it can also be defined, synthetically, as the talent to reflect, analyze, criticize and express and refute ideas. And, as Michael Oakeshott so well taught us in his essay “The Role of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind” (Oakeshott 1996), one requires knowledge of intellectual discourses with their comprehensive vocabularies to implement them well enough to be able to intervene in the cultural world as public intellectuals should strive to do.

As is common knowledge, intellectuals are often perceived as those who deploy their mental skills to work, study, ponder or raise and answer questions. They frequently belong to the professional classes of academics and scientists but there are also the so-called “cultural intellectuals” who work in the fields of culture and art, thus acquiring some authority which

⁵Woolf debated her ideas about this issue in several essays she published in *The Times Literary Supplement* and, much later, in the volume entitled *The Common Reader* (see Cuddy-Keane 2003).

is evident when they speak from public platforms. Although the designation “intellectual” as a specific category only came into view in modern times, the scholar or learned man and the producers of knowledge have been historical agents and important social actors since the first Greek philosophers and the production of knowledge, whether religious, scientific or philosophical, has been relevant for social, political, economic and cultural evolution. Consequently, both the intellectuals and the knowledge they produce have been represented in multiple forms that range from a “chosen one”, producing knowledge for the love of wisdom, to the different forms of “king-philosopher”, civil servant or activist, who participates in dissident intellectual movements that are politically connected to change in the social world. Nevertheless, the intellectual has mainly been perceived as a scholar more closely involved in literary activities than in public actions and was therefore frequently designated as “belletrist”⁶ in France. At the end of the eighteenth century, when literacy became more generalized, the designation “man of letters”⁷ started to take on a wider meaning, such as a “specialist” or a person earning a living writing “as an intellectual” about literature, although not actually a creator before encountering designations such as essayist, journalist and critic, among others. According to tradition, it was George Clemenceau who used the term for the first time, in 1898, although the topic had been mentioned since the Enlightenment.⁸ Henceforth, the class of intellectuals has proven its social importance due to its participation in art, politics, media and education, and the universities have been seen as centers of intellectuality in spite of the fact that some intellectuals may be anti-academic. After these references to the concept

⁶This term was applied in France in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to citizens of the so-called *République des Lettres*, which later evolved into the *salons* that were generally organised by women as also happened in Portugal with the *salon* of the famous Marquessa de Alorna.

⁷According to Michel Winock (2001), the idea that men of letters belonged to an elite and had duties towards society is fundamentally aristocratic and has been inherited from philosophers of the Enlightenment.

⁸Julien Benda, in his well-known *La Trahison des Clercs* (1928), used the term “clercs”, which he defined as “those who speak of the world in a transcendental way”, but in the English translation of 1969 the title was *The Treason of the Intellectuals*, thus indicating how there seemed to have occurred an evolution in the word chosen to designate the *intelligentsia*, which passed from the medieval copyists to the designation adopted nowadays.

of intellectual, I now proceed by briefly defining the expression “public intellectual”, which forms part of the title of this essay. We can even, as Toril Moi did in her famous text entitled “What’s a Woman?” (Moi 1999), also try to define the concept of woman about which Simone de Beauvoir (deemed one of the first female public intellectuals), among others, so reflected extensively, mainly in her classic work *Le Deuxième Sexe*. Concerning this topic, as is also well-known, it takes a long time to really change a society and, considering the situation of women, we have only to recall that they were only granted the right to vote in the twentieth century. One has to understand that there is a difference between intellectually believing in something and to feel it in one’s conscience and, consequently, to actually change women’s living conditions would require several generations living in equality. The changes nowadays taking place are related to the fact that there is a great workforce of feminine professionals constituted by brilliant women who are bankers, lawyers, etc. On the other hand, there is still a lack of women in the leading places at the top of political and academic hierarchies. Furthermore, it also still remains difficult for women to be highly qualified cultural commentators unless they are specialists on feminist issues.

The expression “public intellectual” has been added rather recently to the vocabulary of cultural debate and, as both Edward Saïd and Stefan Collini claim, respectively in their works *Representations of the Intellectual* (1994) and *Absent Minds: Intellectuals in Britain* (2007), it is a problematic expression. As a matter of fact, we might consider all intellectuals should be classified as “public” at least because their works have been published or because they speak for major audiences, which, in practice, is not always the case. Jeffrey C. Alexander, in his work *The Civil Sphere* (2006), claims intellectuals play a fundamental role in modern societies. He argues that the first public sphere appeared in Athens with the iconic figure of Socrates. Later, the Jewish-Christian concept of prophetic judgment was added to these secular origins.⁹ According to Alexander, public intellectuals criticize society in the name of solidarity, which is implied in the public sphere, and they must be understood in the accomplishment of their declarations about the power of truth. The political traditions of the revolutionary, the reformer, the conservative and

⁹According to Max Weber (1993), prophets are the religious equivalent to intellectuals for he describes them as charismatic figures who speak personally and with divine authority.

the counter-revolutionary have all contributed to this expressive figure as well as the ‘personage’ of the public psycho-therapist launched by Freud.¹⁰

In contemporary times, the designation “public intellectual” started being used in the United States even though it entered everyday language in Europe only recently, and is, for instance, not greatly mentioned in France. When we refer to public intellectuals, it would seem that we are declaring not only the usefulness of the word “intellectual” but that it applies to those playing a role in public life. Although this debate is more frequent in the United States, it is also discussed in Europe and among the multiple declarations made on the subject there are two which persistently stand out: one holding that public intellectuals are either in decline or even extinct; and the other that, divergently, considers we have reached a stage in which their reappearance is particularly necessary. These two modes of thinking are related to the changes which occurred in the twentieth century and which have affected the way in which we consider the public sphere and, consequently, the type of influence a “public intellectual” can have. These alterations are connected to the growth in media power, the development of new information technologies, the reduction in state financial support for universities and, simultaneously, their being under the influence of business and corporate interests resulting in the fact that there is less legitimacy and reliability on the ever smaller number of writers and academics that wish to be designated “intellectuals”. On the other hand, there are also tensions between the terms “intellectual”, “writer” and “academic”, which are more evident now due to the number of journalists that have recently taken to acting like “public intellectuals”. On the other hand, it is worth mentioning that Dan Drezner argues that those who cry for the death of the public intellectual are wrong for, in his opinion, the intellectual is as important nowadays as the giants of the past, for, with the blogs, an ever larger audience opened up to them.¹¹

¹⁰According to this tradition, which goes back to Freud and Jung and now runs to Erik Erikson and Jacques Lacan, these therapists/prophets, acting as public therapists, tried to save our civilization.

¹¹Dan Drezner (2008) declares that blogs have provided a larger public, that the explosion of *think tanks* in the last thirty years, a sinecure for intellectuals, and that the Internet has been a boon for the divulgation of their opinions.

Regarding female public intellectuals, it is worth mentioning that, in the twentieth century, when explicit discrimination blocked not only the entrance of many women to university but also their applying for financially attractive student scholarships and for educational and editorial functions which were highly considered and would open up the doors of the artistic and literary world to them, there appeared, all over the world, many brilliant female writers and women who participated in the public sphere and – and following the example of Simone de Beauvoir – combined an unbending spirit with the will to get involved in debates about the great political, social and cultural issues, thus reaching out to a public that was not exclusively constituted by academics. We still nowadays read their books and recall their names, as is the case with Virginia Woolf, Gertrude Stein, Simone Weil, Mary McCarthy, Iris Murdoch, Hannah Arendt and Susan Sontag. These public intellectuals presented their ideas to everyone in general and their texts were published in popular journals, magazines and easy reading books and not only in scientific academic periodicals and written in hermetic jargon as is so often the case nowadays.

Feminists have overthrown most of the old patriarchal premises and motivated the search for new formulations about the way gender relationships are approached and they have also altered our perception and duties towards the environment. However, as public intellectuals, they also have relevant social functions, in spite of the fact that what they can do in a society depends on the form that society welcomes their ideas and on their access to governmental elites and that is also evident in the way the public¹² often criticizes them. Female intellectuals have always had to fight to be considered real intellectuals. In England, in the eighteenth century, they were called bluestockings¹³ and compared to dogs that walked on their back paws. In the nineteenth century, they were told

¹²The topic of what the public actually is has been debated since John Dewey published *The Public and its Problems* (1927), in which he tried to answer to Walter Lippman's *The Phantom Public* (1925), where the author questioned if there was a public of democratic citizens or if the public was "a ghost". Dewey took the optimistic point of view that the public had potential and that it would become a coherent group while attacking technology as it constituted a motif for distraction from more important issues.

¹³The designation was due to the fact that, at the time, blue stockings were worn informally while elegantly attired women should wear black silk stockings.

their ovaries would atrophy if they continued to direct their precious vital energies to the brain.

In terms of the relevance of feminine voices in the public sphere, we should mention that while men of letters have traditionally acquired influential positions as public intellectuals, some women started to play that role in the twentieth century, as mentioned above. We may wonder about what induced them to speak out and also about the way they “developed” their voices as well as why they are still less numerous than male intellectuals. One of the justifying theories for the lack of female public intellectuals argues that they approach their work from an openly feminist standpoint and they focus only on matters which concern women, such as their rights or interests. This characteristic removes them even further from the public in general because debating different topics is considered to be the symbol of a public intellectual. The restructuring of the public sphere in order to include feminine voices has become necessary because public life only considers intellectual discourse and attributes status to civic and state matters, thus denying the relevance of concerns with everyday issues and ignoring their connection to activities performed in the private domain. Consequently, the domestic sphere, the world of family, of nature, of love and emotion are considered inferior to the public sphere, where only reason, objectivity and power count. The word “public” used to qualify “intellectual” implies this emphasis on social and civic matters and denies the relevance of the private area in life, thus defining the theme and the topography of its discourse. As a consequence, women have been absent as contributors to public thought and their narratives, knowledge and experience have been marginalized in the leading and prestigious media.

This social role of public intellectuals implies they have the skill to convey ideas to an audience which has been enlarged through the media, the press and the movies and is mainly constituted of an educated elite. This convergence with the public sphere separates academics from public intellectuals and, according to Pierre Bourdieu, it is the general public divulgation of information outside their immediate area of expertise that allows an academic to become one of them. Although Frank Furedi (2004) argues that intellectuals are not defined by their works but by the way they act, by how they see themselves and by the values they defend, they are, however, often defined by the fact that they bring controversial topics into the public debate.

As regards specifically female public intellectuals, an issue that has already been raised by Virginia Woolf in *Three Guineas* (1938), it is related to the way women can keep themselves independent from the institutions responsible for perpetuating male domination and for the group dynamics which is marked by gender in intellectual life. It is irrefutable that, when compared to their male mates, it has been much more difficult for women to be considered public intellectuals and, rather than only saying they are few in number, we should perceive that, for multiple reasons, they are ignored while their masculine counterparts instead obtain the coveted title. Women were absent from this area due to structural issues and it was only recently that they were able to distinguish themselves at universities in order to become recognized as “experts”, which was apparently a pre-requisite for them to become public intellectuals.

In this essay, I refer to the history of a group that emerges from the community and is constituted by contemporary Portuguese female intellectuals, whose lives and activities in the above mentioned cultural areas are a real and inspiring legacy to every woman in their country. Their acting as “Disquieting Muses” who, with a vibrant energy, try to improve the world through their examples and also to “disquiet” it – thus contributing to a generalized awareness about what should be done to change it – constitutes a link in a living and relevant chain. Descriptions of their activities are expected to motivate, inspire, challenge and encourage other women to follow their examples – for each of their narratives contains a specific message – and to live their lives in a positive, committed and stimulating mode and to abandon the allegedly “feminine” topographies of self-criticism, lack of confidence and doubt about their own capacities.

Aware that the concept of culture has changed and that it is no longer studied as an object or as a coherent and restricted field of meaning and that, instead of analyzing an object in the world, we should clearly investigate the mediation processes through which meanings are selected and organized, thus using culture as a mediator for every aspect of human behavior. Consequently, my analysis necessarily had to be cultural and I deploy analytical concepts derived from social feminist movements all the more so because in every representative case that I refer to there are concerns with social justice and with liberation both in the intellectual production

and in the human aspect of scientific or artistic activity, which leads all the “Disquieting Muses” seeking to improve and perfect the world.¹⁴

Concerning the methodology I followed in my research, due to the fact that both the subject and the objects of study are women and also to my interest in “multidimensional” investigations, I selected the theory of intersectionality that reveals and examines the different categories of discrimination that are culturally constructed and interact at several levels, thus contributing to systematic social inequality. According to this theory, classic models of oppression in society, such as those based on race/ethnicity, gender, religion, nationality, sexual orientation, class or disability, do not act independently of each other and are, instead, interrelated, thus creating a system of oppression that reflects the “intersection” of several forms of discrimination. Although this is a relevant paradigm for sociological and cultural studies, it has been difficult to apply its full capacity. The difficulties encountered stem from the multiple complexities involved in generating the “multidimensional conceptualizations” able to explain the way the differentiated categories interact to create a social hierarchy. Intersectionality claims, for instance, that knowing a woman lives in a sexist society is not enough information to describe her way of living and we must also be aware of her race, sexual orientation and class as well as her society’s attitude in view of those distinctive and characterizing traits. This theory also suggests that the forms and expressions of oppression do not determine themselves mutually and, therefore, in order to understand the “racialization”¹⁵ processes of oppressed groups, we have to investigate how that structure, its systems and social representations are also formed by gender, class and sexuality. This theory started as an analysis of the oppression of women in society but, nowadays, sociologists are trying to apply it to everyone and to the many different intersections of group membership.

In terms of the historical context of the theory of intersectionality, a thorough study of its development has yet to be carried out but based on

¹⁴This attitude reminds us of the Hebrew expression *tikkun olam* – meaning to help “to perfect the world”, creating a model society in which we are all responsible for the others – which is used by contemporary activists whether they are Jews or not.

¹⁵The term “racialization” refers to the processes of discursive production of racial identities. It implies the extension of dehumanizing and racist meanings to a relationship, social practice or group that previously was not racially classified. Summing up, a group of individuals is seen as a “race” that previously was not thus considered.

the limited documentation available, we know the concept was important in sociological circles in 1970s together with the multi-racial feminist movement. It emerged as part of the criticism of radical feminism known as “feminist revisionist theory” and challenging the notion that gender was the main factor that determined the fate of a woman. It was defended by women of color who contested the idea that “woman” was a homogeneous category sharing essentially the same life experiences because they thought that white middle class women did not correspond to a correct representation of the whole feminist movement and that the form of oppression they suffered was different from that experienced by black, poor or disabled women. Therefore, they tried to understand how gender, race and class, when intermixed, “shaped the destiny of women”. Leslie McCall, an important intersectionality theorist,¹⁶ claims the introduction of this theory was of vital importance for sociology and declares that, before its launch, there was almost no research specifically devoted to the experiences of people who are submitted to multiple forms of subordination in society.

The expression “Theory of Intersectionality” was created by Kimberlé Crenshaw in 1989 and gained in profile in 1990 when the sociologist Patricia Hill Collins reintroduced the idea as part of her discussion about feminism in the United States thus contributing to increasing the general applicability of her theory – that previously was more appropriate to African-American females – to all other women. Like Crenshaw, Collins defends the idea that the “patterns of oppression” are not only inter-related but are also influenced by every intersectional system in society (Collins 2000, 42). According to Black feminists, and also to some white, the experiences of class, gender and sexuality can only be properly understood when the influences of “racialization” we incorporate arguing that an un-

¹⁶The term is theoretically and historically connected with the concept of “simultaneity” which was presented by the *Combahee River Collective*, a Black feminist organization active in Boston between 1974 and 1980, in what is known as the “Combahee River Collective Statement”, a key document in the history of Black feminism. The women in this group became aware that their lives and modes of resistance to oppression were profoundly marked by the simultaneous influences of their race, class, gender and sexuality and promoted a new understanding of African-American experiences that challenges the analysis emerging from Black male social movements as well as those made by white feminist and heterosexual middle class interest groups of the dominant culture.

Understanding of intersectionality is a crucial factor for achieving political and social equality. Collins in her theory defines intersectionality as “the focal point where two or more exceptionally powerful and dominant systems of oppression come together” and asserts that many people live with a complex set of privileges in some areas and of oppression in others. She refers to the different intersections of social inequality as the “domination matrix” while G. Ritzer designates them as “vectors of oppression and privilege” (Ritzer 2007, 204). These terms show how the differences between people may be used as measures that oppress women and in the end change their life experiences. This analysis concludes that society is too complex to be reduced to finite categories and defends a holistic approach in the understanding of intersectionality. Patricia Collins’s theory is also designated as standpoint theory and it contends to represent the world from a particular socially situated point of view that claims epistemic privilege or authority.¹⁷ The theoretical basis of this approach involves the notion that a perspective is the only vision of the world through which we have knowledge of society from our specific geographical location. On the other hand, knowledge obviously becomes unique and subjective and it varies according to the social conditions in which it was produced.

In my research, I also refer to feminist epistemology and to the philosophy of science that study the ways in which gender exercises – or should exercise – influence on our conceptions of knowledge, on the cognitive subject and on the research practices and their justification. Indeed, these identify the manner in which our approaches and core conceptions and the attribution, acquisition and justification of the practices of knowledge systematically wrong women and other subordinate groups, and therefore they fight in order to be able to reformulate these conceptions and practices so that they may instead serve their interests. Several defenders of feminist epistemology and of the philosophy of science claim that the dominant knowledge practices are disadvantageous to women because they exclude them from research, deny them epistemological authority, defame their cognitive styles, which are considered “feminine”, and their modes

¹⁷A ‘perspectivist’ theory should specify: the social location of the privileged perspective, the scope of the privilege, the *aspect* of the social location that produces higher knowledge, the basis of its privilege, the type of epistemological superiority and other *perspectives* and means of access.

of knowledge. They claim that the theories those practices produce about women represent them as inferior and abnormal or as being important only when serving male interests, elaborating theories about social phenomena that render female activities and pursuits – or the power relations connected to gender – invisible and promoting knowledge (in the field of science and technology) that is not useful to those in subordinate positions, thus reinforcing gender and social hierarchies.

Feminist epistemologists attribute these failures to the imperfect conceptions of knowledge and to the scientific objectivity and methodology and seek to explain how such flaws can be surmounted and the reason why the entrance of female researchers in the different areas, especially in biology and the social sciences, raised new questions, theories and methods and demonstrated how gender has had a role in these transformations while also defending these changes as social and cognitive improvements.

The central concept of feminist epistemology is the notion of a situated knower and, therefore, of “situated knowledge”, that is, knowledge that reflects the specific perspectives of the subject with feminist philosophers interested in the way gender situates the cognitive subjects. They have three main approaches to this issue which are the standpoint theory, feminist post-modernism and feminist empiricism. The different conceptions of the way gender situates the “knowers” also impact on the way feminists approach the principal problems in this area, such as: the setting up of feminist criticism of science and of feminist science, the definition of the right roles of social and political values in research, the evaluation of the ideals of objectivity and rationality and the reformulation of the epistemological authority structures. Feminist epistemology perceives the knower as “situated” especially in relation to what is known and to other experts. It claims that people can understand the same object in different ways that reflects their diverse relationships with it. Due to their different physical locations, the observers who are in front of an object obtain different information from who are those far away and frequently represent it in relationship to their emotions, attitudes and interests and, as they have different styles of research and representation, they form distinct opinions about that same object, so we can conclude that human experience is relative to the point of view from which it is felt. Feminist epistemology seeks to provide a representation of the social world in relation to universal human interests thus defying the perspective of the privileged that represents social phenomena

only in view of the interests of its class and puts forward these benefits as if coinciding with universal interests. It is, indeed, a *critical* theory – *as critical as that presented by the Frankfurt School theoreticians*, from Adorno to Habermas – whose aim is to confer power on the oppressed so they may improve their situation and, therefore, represents the social world in accordance with their interests.

Throughout this essay I have referred to the place of the feminine subject in different areas of action and provided a brief critical analysis of feminist epistemologies and some of their implications, considering the perspective, or standpoint, from which a person, or a selected group, sees the world and its problems at a certain moment in history. I furthermore referenced several female intellectuals who act in different fields of knowledge and put forward their perspectives on specific ways of contributing towards improving the world. Considering their agency, I am reminded of Gilles Deleuze's wise words in his preface to *Mille Plateaux* (1980)¹⁸ when he speaks of the rhizome¹⁹ and of the fact that the study of a theme is enriched when we gather together several points of view about it. Deleuze says that the rhizome is a "stem" and not an "upright root", as we have when we work in the scope of a scientific field. As it is a stem, we do not know how it is going to develop as it shall do so randomly and we also ignore its basic axis of growth as this will diversify, or as Deleuze says: "it will be gesticulating to one side and the other" and those different shafts will intersect and complement one another. We could thus consider that each "Disquieting Muse" that I mentioned, with her own epistemological identity, inherent to a space of scientific or artistic production, corresponds to a shaft of the Deleuzian rhizome and will correspondingly bequeath a unique and special legacy for the cultural development of her country.

¹⁸Antonio Negri, the famous author of *Empire*, classifies this work as "the most important philosophical text of the twentieth century".

¹⁹In botany, a rhizome is a characteristically horizontal stem of a plant that is usually found underground, often sending out roots and shoots from its nodes. Nowadays it is a philosophical concept developed by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in their *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (1972-1980) project. Deleuze calls it an "image of thought", based on the botanical rhizome, which apprehends multiplicities.

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INTELLECTUALS AND THE FORMATION OF CULTURAL MEMORY: NARRATORS OF THE, CONSTRUCTORS OF DENTITY

INÈS ESPADA VIEIRA

In 1998, the Mário Soares and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Foundations jointly organised a highly important conference in Lisbon on the democratic transitional process in Spain. Besides the Portuguese speakers and their historical and juridical reflection on the Transition, the contributions from the “Spanish protagonists”, included, among others, the historical leader of the Spanish Communist Party, Santiago Carrillo,¹ Gregorio Monreal, founder of the Basque Nationalist Party, and the former Secretary General of the UGT, Nicolás Redondo. According to their 1998 speeches, it would seem that the left was genuinely pacified by the negotiated nature of the Transition.²

Over a decade on, we find society and politics no longer experience this climate of forgetfulness that still prevailed in 1998. Regardless of the purposes underpinning the position taken by each of the political actors

¹On the Transition, Santiago Carrillo stated at the time: “(...) what distinguishes this transition from others is that it was the result of a meeting, an agreement, a consensus between what was the democratic opposition and those who were the so-called reformists of the National Movement. I think this meeting is a truly unique moment in the history of our country, a meeting which enables us to go from a dictatorship to a democracy without great upset, and which also enables us to begin to overcome the history of the two Spains. (...) [The transition] was neither the work of the illustrious Francoists nor was it a popular revolution. It was, I repeat, a great national agreement” (Herrero de Miñón 1999, 47).

²Nevertheless, the former Prime Minister Felipe González, also a participant in the aforementioned conference, had already warned against the existence of certain divisive questions: “(...) In Portugal there is a date and a symbol of change. In Spain no-one can say when the transition begins. Yet, with the situation we have now, no-one can say when it will end either. Some widely-read authors with great authority claim that we are in the *second transition*” (Herrero de Miñón 1999, 51).

involved in the transitional process, this conciliatory approach did not definitively hold perhaps because, as Aleida Assman put it in her essay “From Collective Violence to a Common Future: Four Models for Dealing with a Traumatic Past” (Assman 2010), silence may be a remedy but it is not a cure as it does not function in situations where the perpetrator is clearly stronger than the victims.

In this essay, Assman considers the case of the Spanish Civil War as a complex example of the oldest of her four proposals³: *dialogic forgetting*. Forgetting serves as a pragmatic recourse that societies deploy so as to be able to move forward in the aftermath of a traumatic event: “(...) self-imposed dialogic silence is a model for peace designed and agreed upon by two parties that had engaged in violence in order to keep an explosive past at bay” (Assman 2010, 10). According to this author, this strategy of forgetting is very often found in conjunction with an amnesty enabling the burying of past hatreds and the attainment of a new social balance. Nevertheless, Assman maintains that in Spain the “amnesia and amnesty” formula only worked for the Francoist side because of what she calls asymmetrical memory (*ibid.* 11) – a memory that results from the prevalence of the victor’s narrative. The author even considers the Transition’s *pacto del olvido* (pact of silence) a unilateral pact. Furthermore, she adds that Law 52/2007 introduced the republican version of the Civil War, thus bringing an “abrupt” end to this pact. Precisely these aspects have given rise to controversy, because there is a significant section of society that does not take part in what they consider an extemporaneous debate on the past. There is no rigid clash between former Francoists and former Republicans on this matter. Much of the opposition to Francoism was, seven decades on from the end of the war, comfortable with the options taken in 1975-1978. Moreover, drawing the conclusion today that the Transition pacts were imposed unilaterally might also be unfair, particularly bearing in mind the political and moral temperament of the key figures.

³Here, Aleida Assman systematically sets out four models for dealing with traumatic pasts: *dialogic forgetting*, or the pact of silence; *remembering in order to prevent forgetting*; *remembering in order to forget* and *dialogic remembering*.

Whatever explanation we accept for the origin of the current situation, there can be no doubt that the Civil War and Francoism are at the centre of the Spanish public debate in institutions, such as the national parliament, as well as in informal circles, such as the media. In our view, the present discussion has been profoundly radicalised across all levels of reflection.

We would like to suggest that nowadays the memory of the Civil War and of Francoism is a dual and bipartisan memory. Two opposing narratives of this past coexist in society, both of them exercised under the umbrella of “historical memory”: one anchored within it and the other in contrast to it. The very term “historical memory” distinguishes the before from the after, as a means of dealing with the 20th century in Spain. The concept arose out of a demand for the re-evaluation of the past from the standpoint of the Republican victims of the Civil War that had thus far been officially spurned. Symptomatically, the terms “memory” and/or “historical memory” have never once appeared in the parliamentary debates leading up to the enactment of the Amnesty Law in 1977 (see Aguilar 2008).

In this respect we follow Jan Assman (2004, 2007) and maintain that the memory of 20th-century Spain should be approached culturally and not be burdened down with the weight of judgement implicit to “historical memory”. A cultural reading of the subject enables us, like Jan Assman suggests, to reach beyond a communicative and experiential memory, which is bound up with the question of witnessing and necessarily carries an expiry date.

The two versions of historical memory create distinctly different objects and recreate them according to new perspectives. As cultural products, each object – tangible or intangible – represents an individual or a collective text, thereby susceptible to a foundational mythical meaning. However, cultural memory, as set out by Jan Assman, does not posit the question of difference between myth and history as it is interested less in historical facts than in history as it is remembered, i.e., the memories of this past. Accordingly, we believe that, while always presented from a dualistic perspective, the memory of the Civil War is also a cultural memory. Memory moves from the historical events towards remembrance of the preterit moment and, after being thus transformed into myth, it illuminates the present, beginning with its origins (Assman 2007, 52). Such dynamics works for the two dominant contrasting positions: the Civil War as an original myth serves

to understand, identify and justify the present, regardless of which side the individual or the group takes up.

Quite deliberately, we do not refer to two memories but rather to two narratives or a double memory. In our understanding, the cultural memory of the Spanish Civil War is inclusive, and duplicity forms part of its essence. What we cannot anticipate is the way in which the debate shall unfurl or how memory will evolve over the course of time. The relics (Lowenthal 1985), the places of memory (Nora 1984), the “mnestic” marks (Todorov 2002) are contingent and circumstantial and do not enable any prediction of the future. We may, however, question in what way the disappearance of witnesses to the events will influence the understanding of the past when it is no longer viewed as the property of those who lived it and has become the exclusive heritage of individuals biographically separated from those times. This change may not be felt from the point of view of cultural memory, which, as we have seen, privileges not the specific historical events but rather what is remembered of them. As highlighted by Ricoeur (2000), memory defines itself by the presence of the past in the mind and also by the search for that presence. This does not necessarily relate to a past experienced by the subject; it may also relate to a past interpreted by the individual as a member of a specific group and therefore a participant in a collective memory.

Another important aspect of cultural memory is the identification of the individuals responsible for conveying this memory and extending it beyond an exclusively generational transmission, i.e., from parents to children, which Ricoeur associates with the duty of memory (2000). Jan Assman (2007) identifies different bearers of memory (*spezielle Träger*) that may or may not hold a direct relationship with the past they convey. The carrier of a particular cultural memory is no witness to the facts, is independent of institutions holding political and economic significance and, like the subject matter making up this memory, is on a different plane, far from the demands of the daily situation – a plane which is in a way superior to and beyond mundane daily realities.

Members of the clergy, professors, writers, and the learned in general are, according to Jan Assman, the carriers of cultural memory. Based upon this affirmation, we may attempt to define intellectuals and their role as agents of memory. Due to chronology, the men gathered in Burgos, in the

media and propaganda services of Franco, do not correspond to the strict definition of *spezielle Träger* put forward by Jan Assman. Nevertheless, we may perceive their actions as protagonists in history and their importance as narrators of the past and builders of identity, aware that men are witnesses conditioned by their own experiences and by a very particular context in the history of Spain and Europe.

We understand European Modernity as an *aporia*, the constant hesitation and tension between two opposing sides of the same self, i.e. Modernity as a “paradoxical”⁴ reality, within which the illuminating creations of art, technique, progress, reason and humanity (Bohrer 2008) coexist with a dark (Corm 2009) and catastrophic side (Gil 2008a). This paradox achieves its most dramatic expression in the support lent by some intellectuals to totalitarian ideologies. In truth, the aesthetic appeal of Nazism and fascism was immense to those in the intellectual and aesthetic vanguards. Imbued with a search for the new, for purity, rigour and totality, vanguardists found in totalitarianism yet another means for artistic expression, namely the aesthetics of the absolute. The testimony of yet another “betrayal by the clerics” (adopting and de-territorialising the expression from the argument put forward by Benda (1927) sets down, according to Lepenies, the end of two illusions. First, that a higher morality supposedly inherent to the artistic and intellectual fields might work as a protective shield from Nazism, and secondly, that the Third Reich was against Modernity, when in fact it promoted Modernity (see Lepenies 2008, 380). The Nazi and fascist totalitarisms were peculiarly but also quite straightforwardly *modern*: the new, the vertical, the brotherhood, technology were all the rage. Herf (1984) terms the particular case of Nazi Germany “reactionary modernism”, in which

⁴Baudelaire is considered to have invented *Modernity*. According to Jorge Fazenda Lourenço, Modernity is not a victory over the old, it rather derives from the certainty that tradition is a necessary condition for the existence of the new (see Lourenço 2008, 11). In a short but very interesting text opening up the volume on *Baudelaire e as posteridades do moderno*, Fazenda Lourenço characterises Baudelaire’s modernity as “paradoxical”. The same adjective appears in texts by other authors. In the studies on Baudelaire and aesthetic Modernity this interpretation does not imply monotony but rather unavoidable evidence of dissonance as referred to by Isabel Capeloa Gil: “The dissonance of modernism is certainly its most consensual trait.” Correspondingly, Gil declares her conviction that “modernism is in fact a misnomer.” (Gil 2008b, 186) More than modernism, we should rather be talking of modernisms (*ibid.* 186-187).

a *völkisch* tradition combines the signing up to modern technology with a rejection of liberal Modernity. This concept may be used to look afresh at the ambiguity of European Modernity.

The Spanish vanguard was born, alive and strong, in the very heart of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship (1923-1930). Mechthild Albert even terms 1925 as an *annus mirabilis*, in which diverse cultural manifestations “suggest that the Spanish vanguard will include a certain epigonality among its basic traits” (Albert 2002, 22). This same author perceives the Spanish case as exceptional and eclectic, observing how it is less about action and more about aesthetics: “With regard to Spain, a series of disconcerting contradictions, paradoxes and ambivalences are the sign of a problematic Modernity” (*ibid.* 23).

The totalitarian agenda fitted perfectly the spirit of the vanguard and in Spain Ernesto Giménez Caballero (1899-1988) is a paradigmatic example of this. He was director of the *La Gaceta Literaria* — a journal first published on 1 January 1927⁵ which soon became a meeting point for the Spanish vanguard — and was also one of the first fascist ideologues. His example represents the benchmark as far as individual roles within the vanguard of fascism are concerned. The route taken by Giménez Caballero may be read literally from his works and activities both as a cultural figure and an editor. His *Genio de España. Exaltaciones a una resurrección nacional y del mundo* (1932) went on to become an ideological guide to the fascist takeover of Spain⁶ and is still considered by many as the foundational text of Spanish fascism. In this work, fascism is put forward as the ideology that will lead to the desired renewal of the Fatherland – a renewal inspired by the values of Catholicism and Empire based on the conviction of the universal mission of the Spanish race as the oracle of the world (Giménez Caballero 1983, 196 and 203).

⁵The date served to signal the baptism of the Generation of 27. In *Memorias de un dictador* he writes: “*La Gaceta* was the precursor to the Vanguard in Literature, Art and Politics. A policy that for two years was unifying and spiritual and from 1930 divergent, since the youth were becoming more politicized. And those who inspired communism and fascism in Spain arose from *La Gaceta*.” (Giménez Caballero 1981, 66).

⁶In a note in the third edition of 1938, the author has already recognised the success of his work and his exaltations: “(...) in it are the seeds of almost all the *Terminological and conceptual warring material of our Movement*.”

Up to the point where this book has been considered – both within and beyond Spain – as the *spiritual justification of our Cause*.” (Giménez Caballero 1983, 9).

The process of winning over the crowds went down just as well in the masses as it did in the elites. However, contrary to the masses, the elites held a responsibility. As Ortega y Gasset had already asked in 1922: “Are there no men or are there no masses?” (Ortega 1999, 79 *et seq.*). In these early essays on the “invertibration” of Spain, the philosopher placed the onus of the issue very much on the masses (*ibid.* 84-85).

Looking back nowadays, we are drawn to the conclusion that the intellectuals have become diluted in the masses; they have also revealed the fragile nature of their spirit when confronted with the power of ritual and staged scenario. The same discourses, the same marches, the same *volklöre*, the same “teatro de las autopistas” seduced both the masses and the intellectuals. Politics made art was, in Lepenies’ words, when referring to Gottfried Benn, an

art which had transferred all its morals into form, which had justified the world as a pure aesthetic phenomenon, [Benn] allowed himself to be seduced by a power which represented politics as a movement and the State as a work of art which, once again using the words of its promoter Alfred Rosenberg, described the “German will” as an “aesthetic will” (Lepenies 2008, 384).

The fact that erudite minds had been swept along by the current (while we should note that not *all* these minds let themselves be caught up)⁷ is yet another chapter in the history of the “betrayal by the clerics”.⁸

⁷ In an essay entitled “Fiction of the political: the dangerous liaisons of totalitarian(s) and the avant-garde”, Isabel Gil approaches “the permeability of *some* [our italics] vanguardist ethics to politics”, discussing the cases of the involvement of Gottfried Benn with Nazism, Ezra Pound with Fascism and António Ferro with Salazarism; she also reflects on the relationship between political commitment and the aesthetic performance of these authors (Gil 2003, 298). Furthermore, Wolf Lepenies affirms that only circumstances beyond their own will led some intellectuals away from Nazism: “After 1934, many German intellectuals would have gladly remained fascists – if only the Nazis had tolerated it” (Lepenies 2006, 49).

⁸ As we saw above, it was Julien Benda who, in 1927, accused the intellectuals of descending from the heavenly realm of the mind to this profane world of politics. Lepenies (2008) entitles his two lessons dedicated to the “grateful collaboration” of intellectuals with Fascism and Communism in Germany(ies) also as “betrayals by clerics”.

If we look closely, the *tertúlias* (the cafe-bar discussion groups) during the dictatorship of General Miguel Primo de Rivera or during the Second Republic all present the same scenarios even if with different social interactions. Mónica and Pablo Carbajosa (2003) examined closely the “literary court” of José Antonio Primo de Rivera, which operated according to a specifically informal and reciprocal schema. The “court” followed the leader and guide – the *Führer, il capo* – who would point the way to the construction of a fascist state, and, in his turn, the leader – in this case, José Antonio – found legitimacy for his action via the ideological support of “his” intellectuals.

This promiscuity between intellectuals and power, and the consequent lack of independence in creativity and thinking, constrained by a particular political vision and action, might call into question the actual definition of the intellectual.

Although still unnamed, the intellectual existed prior to the designation (Juliá 1998 and Lepenies 2008), and was symbolically born out of the *affaire Dreyfus*, in France, at the end of the 19th century. Right from the outset, the intellectual emerged in connection to newspapers, and the concept acquired thereby some of its definitive characteristics: the sense of mission, of the struggle against injustice, the notion of belonging to a clarified elite and the need/demand for constant public intervention and acting upon society. Inherent to its emergence as a social category or as a leading actor in the public domain, the intellectual role was bound up with an elitist sense of a group apart and exceptional when compared to other individuals. There is a characteristic that remains transversal to both time and authors: the intellectual thinks, and this thinking must be free from all sorts of constraints. The intellectual struggles against injustices, fights for the truth (Juliá 2004a and 2004b), and acts in society by means of a vigilant mind that observes the state of the world. According to Lepenies (2008), the “melancholics” are intellectuals obsessed with reflection, chronically dissatisfied, and suffering from this vision of the world. Said (2004), in turn, resorts to the Arab terms *muthaqqaf* (man of culture) and *mufakir* (man of thinking) in order to stress the taxing dimension of erudition burdening the intellectual. In the wake of these proposals, we have to ask what is it that distinguishes the intellectual from the philosopher. The answer is: action. This action might take place at the theoretical level, with the intellectual presenting his thoughts (solutions) regarding the problems of the society

and the world of which he is part. Simultaneously, his acting is related to the daily reality and the educational and pedagogic action referred to by Winock (1999). In democratic societies, intellectuals have the task of being a counter-power (Winock 1999), or a counter-discourse (Said 2004), surveying and assessing public life.

Within the context of totalitarian regimes, however, the situation differs because of the absence of freedom and the intellectuals' ideological and economic dependence on power, which inescapably conditions their actions. Thinking under Francoism (Marsal 1979) or under any other oppressive regime is an arduous testing of the will and the mind, especially when the intellectual is also a political militant.

The case of the Burgos group, politically led by Dionisio Ridruejo and morally by Pedro Laín Entralgo,⁹ is symptomatic of the adherence of a segment of the intellectual society to the cause of fascism in Spain. In our opinion, their action was not limited to the propagandistic reproduction of political ideas. The men of the Burgos group, forced to take side with the rebellious movement as a result of diverse situations, which were not always voluntary in nature, had a project for Spain doubly anchored in the modern and in the traditional. Together, they imagined a future for the Fatherland, essentially from a cultural point of view, which they projected in an extensive production of essays and art, especially in what is known as the "national press".

Taking into consideration the prevailing aesthetic, political and historical context, we would like to argue that, while on the "dark" side of his-

⁹On 30 January 1938, with the Civil War already at an advanced stage, Franco established the first government of Nationalist Spain in Burgos, with Ramón Serrano Suñer as Minister of the Interior. The young Dionisio Ridruejo had been a rising star in the Spanish Falange since the times of José Antonio; the brilliant rhetoric and the visceral enthusiasm with which he embraced the causes of "the authentic Falange" had bestowed upon him an aura of great respect. Hence, it was no surprise that the new minister and old comrade, who had handed the *Servicio Nacional de Prensa* to José Antonio Giménez Arnau, would now ask him to head the *Servicio Nacional de Propaganda*. With Antonio Tovar in charge of *Radio*, Juan Cabanas of *Plástica*, García Viñolas y Goyanes of *Cinematografía* and Luis Escobar of *Teatro, Ediciones* was entrusted to Pedro Laín Entralgo who began to build what would later be the *Editora Nacional*. Laín was then joined by his "amigos para siempre" Antonio Macipe, Luis Rosales, Luis Felipe Vivanco, Gonzalo Torrente Ballester and, later, Carlos Alonso del Real y Melchor Fernández Almagro." (Juliá 2002, 6) (The quoted extract from Santos Juliá refers to the words of Pedro Laín in his memories *Descargo de Conciencia*, 1976).

tory, the Falangist intellectuals in Spain were just that in every sense of the word: cultured thinkers, social actors, educators of the public domain and “melancholics”. It was precisely the omnipresent and self-demanding ethical dimension, the moral sentiment governing their intellectual commitment and action that enabled them, at the peak of the most orthodox fascist enthusiasm, to gain a certain margin for freedom of thinking. Accordingly, such clear signs of openness would end up taking physical shape, in the aftermath of the war, in *Escorial*, the magazine project founded in 1940. With Ridruejo as its director and Laín the vice-director, the *Escorial* members of staff, a “pure Falangist” group of “José Antonio flavour” (Juliá 2002, 9), “produced a cultural magazine, born with and for the new State, although they aspired to temper the gloomy ignorance of granitic Francoism” (Gracia 2004, 224). While overtly on the side of the winners and evoking a redemptory Falange, the editorial manifesto of the first issue had more inclusive goals. The new magazine was to contribute to the “re-establishing of an intellectual community” and to take form as the “residence and viewpoint of the Spanish intellectuals” (*Escorial* 1940, no. 1: 7-12). These broad-reaching objectives, together with the content of the issues subsequently published, demonstrate that, in the immediate post-war environment and under extremely arid cultural conditions, “Pedro Laín Entralgo and Dionisio Ridruejo undoubtedly fostered the creation of one of the first areas of intellectual communication.” (Marichal 1995, 314)¹⁰ Slowly accessing reality from the perspective of the viability of implementing their national project, they progressively distanced themselves from both Francoism and the Falangist movement. Later on, when faced with the choice between dictatorship and the basic principles of intellectual activity, they would not hesitate in their decision (*ibid.*).

¹⁰In the text by Gonzalo Torrente Ballester (1976), “Escorial en el recuerdo”, in the volume in honour of *Dionisio Ridruejo: de la Falange a la oposición*, the author provides a witness account of the animus behind the *Escorial* magazine project. Torrente states: “*Escorial* was, then, the only possible platform or launch pad for unpublished or still slightly well-known writers, who had started before the war, or during it, or who were starting at the shadowy dawn of the post-war period.” To the names of participants to a greater or lesser extent well known, Torrente adds the recollection of the reality of a *peregrine* Spain: “(...) to whom Ridruejo would willingly have added many of those who were on a “pilgrimage” around the world and from whom those who were in *Escorial* never felt disconnected” (Torrente Ballester 1976, 66-67).

Hence, from our viewpoint, the notion of the intellectual extends beyond any ideological dichotomy between right and left. As stated above, there is an ethical dimension to intellectuality that is supra-ideological. Valuing then the moral approach, as so often did the Falangist intellectuals, was precisely what enabled the men of Burgos to evolve both individually and as a generation towards liberal and humanist positions. Therefore, re-locating the intellectual should not be interpreted as a radical alternative to the classical notion of intellectual but rather as a contribution towards widening our understanding of Modernity as a multiple and paradoxical reality.

We can approach the history of the intellectuality in Spain through newspapers, which are both privileged pulpits for intervention in the public space and a repository of accounts that allow for reconstructings of the past. Whether in cultural magazines or in the more orthodox national media outlets, it was through the press that the official Francoist intellectuals reached out to their audiences in the exercise of their intellectual pursuits (Ayala 1945). The press is a mirror of the collective memory and contributes towards building or destroying this same memory (Cuesta 2008). Returning nowadays to the texts published by intellectuals from the right and the left during the Spanish Civil War as material memories (Zelizer 1998), is to take measure of the past and gain an insight into the ways this past is helping to shape the present.

If we choose to read the articles published in the “national press” as historical data, they will reveal a rhetorical commitment beyond mere circumstance, a dedicated ideological militancy and an endured reflection. However, the texts are not mere historical objects; they are cultural documents pertaining to the immaterial cultural memory of Spain. Nowadays, they are remembered more in the mythical and symbolical sense Jan Assman refers to than factually. They convey a narrative of the past that transcend the mere factuality of the texts and their contexts and participates in a broader model for constructing and representing Spanish identity. As we have seen, this (as all identities) is an identity in process, unstable without ever collapsing, oscillating between the two narrative poles we have identified.

More than seven decades on from the Civil War, thirty-five years after what has been considered a most exemplary democratic transition, the act of looking back is still wrought up in contradictory impulses. On the one hand, the urgency of peace and reconciliation, and on the other the sheer

perplexity resulting from two facts: a dictator died in his bed and over one hundred thousand persons are still missing. The debate about the past is also a debate about its protagonists: whether individuals or collectives, public or anonymous, heroes or victims. Spurning a tendentially Manichaeistic dichotomy, we purpose a reading, without disguise or labelling, of the role of the intellectuals who supported Franco after 1936. Without renouncing our own circumstances or convictions, we consciously adopt the stance of a researcher who must continue to cross borders, seeking to redesign maps of reading and to contribute not only to a renewed understanding of the past but also to the construction of the future.

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THE *DESACATO* CULTURE – THE CULTURE OF DISOBEDIENCE*

JORDI GRACIA

This lecture was thought up quite intentionally as a space of reflection around the attempt to formulate some of the roles that the intellectual has played within the context of contemporary Europe, and quite specifically within the context of Spain as it emerges from its Civil War, on its way to suffer the exile of an absolutely striking percentage of professionals: intellectuals, reporters, writers, poets, film-makers, architects, sculptors. It was genuinely devastating for Spanish internal culture, which had to endure the real circumstance of restarting an intellectual life after the triumph of Franco's regime's and, thus, and without doubt, after a triumph of a fascist nature.

But so many times we tend to – or the left-wing historiography has so many times tended to – equal or associate fascism to the absence of a cultural life. And that is absurd. The Spanish culture of the 1940's, 50's and partly the 60's was dominated by the Francoist – *Franquista* – dictatorship and, as such, in the first ten to fifteen years experienced the development of a fascist culture – which is to say the alliance, transitional in some cases, between fascism, literature and intellectual life. From the onset, post-war Spain was not a cultural desert. It was, on the contrary, the space of intellectual fascist rule. What happens is that our analysis today of that stage tends to underline, in full right, the poverty, the error, the insolvency of that fascist cultural project. But that fascist cultural project was built by intellectuals who were at some point even front-line intellectuals.

I do not know if the name of a character such as Ernesto Giménez Caballero will sound familiar to you or not, a man who was, before the war, one of the key-figures in the Spanish avant-garde in the 1920's and 30's. He was a brilliant essayist, an importer of modern culture from contemporary

* This text is a transcript of a conference delivered in a seminar at Universidade Católica Portuguesa on February 18, 2011.

Europe and the founder of nothing more and nothing less than the *Gaceta Literaria* in 1927, which is to say one of the main organs of the avant-garde in Spain. Paradoxically, he is simultaneously the first Spanish fascist. He is the first who in fact acts in full throttle as an ideologue of what is the triumphant ideology in Italy, Germany and, in some measure, Portugal after the beginning of Salazar's dictatorship.

Is it a paradox? Is it something we cannot explain? Giménez Caballero was a writer deeply committed to Modernity, in aesthetic, creative, imaginative, plastic, textile terms – he was a man who wore blue garage-mechanic overalls and worked in these clothes – and he is the same man who believes that the ideological and political expression of the future is the ideology of fascism and, then, by extension, a totalitarian, dictatorial system. How does this creative potency of Giménez Caballero fit in with his complete disbanding as a creator after 1939, from the moment when his own people have won onwards, from the very moment in which the *Frankuista* dictatorship is established and the war is won? Giménez Caballero is one of the victors, but he disappears off the map: his ability for cultural, intellectual, literary, creative production after the war, with the victory of Franco, is dissolved. Even those who were victors and felt themselves as falangists – *falangistas* – and fascists came to realize the unfeasibility of developing any form of aesthetic Modernity in Franco's Spain.

The processes of institutionalization of a complex regime, as with any other, are slow and sinuous. What role can an intellectual play in the context of a dictatorship that nurtures as one of its central obsessions regulating the trade of Modernity, repressing the presence of European Modernity and pre-war Modernity? How does an intellectual act in such a context? What type of conduct can he develop, whether he is conqueror or conquered?

I am under the impression that the decisive element to understand the role that an intellectual can come to play in this context is related to the ability to dissociate that which is the political system in which he lives in and that which is his intellectual project as an intellectual and as a creator. What is meant by the ability to dissociate is the ability to understand that which motivates him, as a creator, is going to be annulled, overshadowed, or marginalized by the political system in which it exists. Suppressed, marginalized or overshadowed fundamentally because that intellectual's project cannot fit into a system of power that is, in the end, suffocating. Does

this mean that one has to admit the defeat of the intellectual function? Does this mean that one has to renounce going on working as an intellectual? Does this mean one has to give in to the norms, to public criteria, to censorship and renounce, then, to plant some form of a seed of Modernity in the *Franquista* system? I feel that the best examples of creators, of intellectuals with the ability to transform the different areas of post-war Spanish culture were born out of their own ability to resist power. But to resist does not mean to fight it, it means to bear it, it means to resign oneself to go on working, but in silence or secrecy. It means to go on believing that Ortega y Gasset is one of first intellectual figures of contemporary Spain and that Juan Ramón Jiménez is one of the great poets of contemporary Spain; and to go on believing that Luis Cernuda, or Rafael Alberti, or the architect Josep Lluís Sert continue to be the true front figures of contemporary Spain, even though they are all in exile, even if none of them have the authorization to be published in Spain, even if none of their names can be read in the Spanish press. To resist against that, to resist against accepting the new rules of the game was part of the fundamental function of the intellectual life of the decades of the 1940's and the 1950's. But why was it fundamental? Because it was an attitude of resistance which was aware of its failure or that it was never going to win. There would never be a way to make public the confidence with which they, in private, understood that the great Spanish modern culture was in exile and doomed to go underground in post-war Spain. Only with time would that form of resistance eventually generate some logics of continuity with the central streams of Modernity. The perseverance in honor of judgment was what allowed a few Spanish intellectuals within Spain to keep the faith that someday or another it would begin to be possible that the cultural hierarchies returned to the order that we partake in today. This is to say, that once again it could be said that Lorca was a lead poet of 20th century Spain, and so was Juan Ramón Jiménez, that Ortega y Gasset went on being one of the finest Spanish minds. The official culture of 1940's, 50's and 60's Spain disseminated the opposite, but some minority sectors of the intellectual life, individual by individual, went on believing it.

From this viewpoint, the *desacato* culture, the culture of disobedience, would be embodied by those victors, fascists or *falangistas*, who tinge or rebel against the value system of their own power group. Disobedience operates by opposition to the official truth from within the victory itself, because the conformity to official and unanimous versions is impoverishing

and degrading. The culture of disobedience is that of those members of the intellectual, political and cultural community, who from within each of the groups that compose it are able to subvert the order of values and general attitudes of their own group.

One of the model cases of this attitude was Dionisio Ridruejo, the chief ideologue of *falangismo* in wartime Spain, with connections to José Antonio Primo de Rivera, to Agustín de Foxá, with the full group of first season *falangismo* ideologues and who, since 1942, after having taken office in top positions, after having been the new poet of Franco's Spain, after having been the go-to speaker who everyone sought to energize the masses towards *falangismo* and towards victory, who after all this, in the year of 1942 and amidst Franco's full triumphal victory, decides to write a private letter to Franco in which he mostly tells him: "This is not the Spain for which I have fought. We have not waged a war to have Spain go on as a traditionalist form of power, with the oligarchies left intact, where the national-syndicalist revolution has not been put under way, where the authoritarian and normative power of the Catholic Church has taken over all scopes of civilian, cultural, moral and every other type of power... So, I have not waged a war for this. I am a *falangista*, not a *franquista*." It goes without reminding that Franco had people shot for less than nothing. We are in the year 1942, executions are common, but to have Ridruejo shot would have meant a colossal political error, given that it would have amplified the legend of the honored *falangista*, that very same man that could muster the necessary courage to say to the Head of State and *Caudillo* that this Spain he was building did not respond to the ideological and programmatic reasons for which the *Falange* had waged a civil war. He began then to denounce the sectarian and dogmatic pettiness which Victory had imposed as an intellectual and cultural criterion upon the most valuable past. The culture of post-war Spain should not do without Antonio Machado, Miguel de Unamuno, Ortega y Gasset, Juan Ramón Jiménez, Cernuda or, even if he is a communist, Rafael Alberti. This is the attitude that Ridruejo begins to develop from within victory.

Ridruejo did not all of a sudden turn into an *antifranquista* revolutionary, nor a liberal and a democrat. No: he goes on being a fascist, but not an uncultured or myopic fascist. He is a fascist that requires that the exercise of power by Victory be sound, intellectually respectable and

able to oppose to the quality begotten by those in exile the new quality begotten by Victory, precisely because he knew that the best intellectual values could be found outside the country. So much so that another of those early *falangistas*, Torrente Ballester, a much appreciated novelist of contemporary Spain, in the year of 1940, with the war just recently over, writes one of those symbolically fundamental pieces in which he formulates that very same diagnosis: the intelligentsia of contemporary Spain is in exile. And here we are without them. It is obvious that he does so not in order for there to be tolerance towards those in exile, but to reactivate national creation within national space. This is to say that for the people to start accepting from within that it is necessary to get to work and that it will be very difficult to match the level of national culture inside the country to the culture of exile. Because the culture begotten by those in exile is far superior from any point of view to that created in Spain's national space and that they do know from inside the country's borders. But that they know it, Ridruejo, Torrente Ballester and a few others, does not mean that they feel forced to act in favor of liberalizing, watering down or making the culture produced within Spain's borders more permeable to the culture produced by those in exile. They know it but they do not do it.

Well, that is where the role of the intellectual with a will for disobedience to his own group begins. There is where someone like Ridruejo steps in, especially after the 1950's, to consciously lead a political and intellectual group that will say in public what they only dare to write in private. And so meaning that disobedience to social and public norm transcends the scope of what is private. Instead of making jokes about the faults of power in private, to share them in private. The key is in the potential of contagion of that specific intellectual. What are the virtues of Ridruejo? A prose, as essayist, that is clear, direct, flexible, malleable, brilliant and persuasive. By means of reasoned prose he is a man capable of ethically compromising those who have been his basic core of friends. All in all, nothing too subversive. As I have said before: to tend to making somewhat more permeable, more sensible, more depoliticized the cultural policies and conducts of the regime. And that in this way the national Spain, from within its borders, the official *franquista* Spain, can begin to reap the benefits of what should be common heritage because the winning *falangistas* need it too.

Of which group of friends do I speak of? Of a group of young writers and intellectuals who worked with Ridruejo in the office of Press and Propaganda during the Civil War, in Burgos, since the year of 1938. Those we call by whim, because they called it so, the *Grupo de Burgos*, the Burgos Group. In it there are many names and nearly all of them were relevant in post-war culture. One of these I have already mentioned, Gonzalo Torrente Ballester, a great novelist of 20th century Spain; Luis Rosales, Luis Felipe Vivanco, or even after that José María Valverde (another of those great intellectuals, and what is more in this case, a catholic of coherent progression towards communism). In the human surroundings of the group is also Camilo José Cela, Pedro Laín Entralgo (a key historian and intellectual throughout the post-war period); someone like Julián Marías, who was however never a *falangista* and some other names. I will not provide more because the argument does not require it, but these are critical names of the cultural life of 20th century Spain.

Almost all of those I have named, if not every one of them, sooner or later accepted Ridruejo's challenge. They accepted that, they should in fact put forth something of theirs so that they would not go on intellectually humiliated in their own country and under their own regime. To be rid of the shame of going on accepting that one cannot quote Lorca because he was what he was, and that one could not quote Juan Ramón because he was in exile and that one could not quote, nor comment, nor exalt Luis Buñuel, the film-maker, because he was in exile. Or that you could not do the same with so many other names. Lecturers, university professors with columns in the newspapers and access to the best publishers began to rebel against that which had been the common judgment of their own power group. The dynamics that set some of these men under way, in this case Ridruejo, is a movement of exit, of detoxification, an hygienic movement which will no longer be merely cultural, but also political and ideological. So what is at stake is that the ability to contradict, dispute or question the beliefs of their own group is what assures one of the most prolific and renovating labors of the intellectual's function.

The similarity of this profile with that of the engaged intellectual is deceiving. I'd rather say that an intellectual takes on as his own commitment to build a space of values that are those in which he believes in his good conscience that he must make prevail in the public sphere. That is the form of commitment that it represents: it does not depend on a political party

– because that is the basic function of the sartrian notion of commitment, the one where the intellectual becomes nothing more than the one who socially broadcasts the ideology of a given party. The commitment of which I speak is of a fundamentally moral order, in which an intellectual will imagine and will attempt to materialize the strategies, the pathways, the contacts, the people that will be able to be put to use to get a transformation of the very value system under way. And believe that this intervention in the public sphere and its modification are part of his obligations.

From the 1950's onwards, Ridruejo engages in direct and frontal conflict with the regime: he is imprisoned, he founds a social-democratic party and becomes an oppositionist to Franco. He does. But the rest of his friends do not do so or begin to do so at a much slower pace. What he does achieve, nonetheless, is that that group of friends does in fact evermore conquer a certain boldness, a certain ability to not say what should not be said, not do what should not be done, not quote those who should not be quoted, not see those who should not be seen, not compliment books by those who should not be complimented, etc. This is to say that they progressively gain greater shares of conformity with their own conscience that before they did not have. But the one travelling more hastily and further is Ridruejo.

But this is not merely a fascist matter. The life of an historical communist like Jorge Semprún is organized around two fundamental axes. One: he was detained by the Gestapo in 1942 and sent to a concentration camp, the one in Buchenwald; he survived for a year and a half, involved in the protection networks of the French Communist Party from within Buchenwald camp – he was with the Spanish Communist Party (PC). From 1953 to 1963, for ten years, he is the main person responsible for reorganizing the intellectual cell (in this case, in the widest sense: painters, artists, poets, reporters, film-makers) of PC, working underground as is obvious. They never caught him. They caught everyone else, but never Semprún. He was the most handsome, the smartest, the one who spoke the most languages. Movie-like: the photos of those times fade it because they associate an attractive and stunning young man with the very same author who writes the poems to *La Pasionaria*, or to Stalin's death, in 1953... The emotional brazenness of the poems Semprún publishes then under his name is that of a natural born Stalinist, genuine and without reservations. Well, in 1963 the Executive Committee of the Spanish Communist Party, obviously in exile, composed of Dolores Ibarruri, *La Pasionaria* or Santiago Carrillo, decided to

purge Semprún from PC. Why? For motives of revisionism, because Semprún has been in national Spain, within its borders, and he has taken stock of the disparity between the official political voice, of PC, what PC says from exile about what goes on in Spain and what Semprún knows is going on in Spain because he is in contact with very many people and has so realized the amazing discrepancy between what PC believes in and what it says in its publications, including in its projects for subverting order within Spain, and what indeed is taking place within Spain's borders.

What is taking place has nothing to do with what PC says. Semprún has the courage and the commitment to face his own people and, in turn, to practice disobedience and point out the lies in the triumphalist diagnoses and calculations of PCE in what concerns subversive activity within Spain's borders. It is an act of disobedience to the core beliefs and the criteria of the group to which he belongs. What is more is that in this case the purge from PC serves as a trigger to an evolution towards social-democratic leanings, towards positions that are far more respectful towards individual freedoms. He is a socialist humanist who accepts that the faith in which he has been living in submersion, the communist faith, was nonsense and a huge mistake, and a destructive and self-destructive one at that, which is the same thing that happened to Ridruejo. He was also one to discover, though on the fascist side, that what he had been living in was a monstrous error of beliefs, of immaturity, of rashness and one and the other corrected their respective paths.

Well there it is, I wanted to comment on those two examples, Semprún and Ridruejo, as models of an intellectual with the courage to correct themselves, having first disobeyed what was the norm and law of their own group. The ability to question one's own beliefs means to recognize that they might have been good at a specific moment, but not so indefinitely. It also means to maintain a critical and vigilant attitude not only towards one's adversary or historical time, but also towards one's own ideological and social environment, to assess if the reasons that justify one's own value framework are no longer fair and understand then that what is necessary is to transform them.

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The vertiginous transformation of the worldwide cultural situation, the many competing value systems and beliefs, radical pluralism, and the reliance of modern structures on the science and technology governing the entire knowledge industry and informational system all suggest intellectuals now serve as mere “interpreters” or as technocrats, “real-time” opinion-makers with media stars increasingly taking centre-stage in key areas of public life and in the production apparatus.

Does this mean we are confronted with a culture that has failed to establish an effective connection between intellectual work and the politics of local and transnational citizenship? How does the post-modern status of intellectuals differ from that of their forerunners? How can public-intellectual activities be improved?

These are some of the issues the authors of this book address from different standpoints.

By capturing and expanding on some of the trends that the history of intellectuals, the history of ideas, politics, sociology, anthropology, African-American studies and Native-American studies have been exploring, this book will prove of interest to students and professionals in those areas.