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Why Mediation Attempts in the Nagorno – Karabakh region  
failed (1991 - 2016)

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To my outstanding *parents* for their patience. To *Allah* for giving me patience.

This work is dedicated to soldiers, who died for their flag, country and territory that was occupied many years. This work is dedicated to peace in Nagorno – Karabakh and to peaceful coexistence of two nations in the region.

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## **Abstract:**

The territorial conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia in Nagorno – Karabakh was considered as the frozen one until the end of 2020, when it was finally resolved. Unfortunately, not the effective mediation, but warfare helped to end this dispute.

This dissertation is an analysis of failed mediation attempts in the Nagorno – Karabakh region from the beginning of the conflict (1987-88) until 2016.

Chapter one focuses on the theory of Old and New Wars, giving the reader clear image about disputes that have become more complicated. The significant number of unresolved conflicts in former Soviet Union republics is the best evidence of it.

Chapter two gives the reader brief theoretical framework about conflict stages and mediation process. I also presented opinions of both Azerbaijan and Armenia as well as causes and stages of the dispute in Nagorno – Karabakh.

Finally, in the third chapter you can see deep analysis of failed mediation attempts by various political agents: states, organizations or individuals. In order to understand measures that had been taken in order to resolve the conflict, I use theoretical typology of dispute prevention. Moreover, I try to investigate if religion or location of the particular actors have an impact on opinion towards the dispute.

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## Introduction

New tendencies in geopolitics, as well as technologies, reshaped methods of waging war. Conflicts did not disappear, they were just reshaped and have become more complicated to understand. The conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia in Nagorno – Karabakh was territorial and political in the beginning. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and independence of both countries did not help the peace establishment and had not resolved the dispute. These two dimensions made the conflict even more complicated. Many political actors finally managed to have an access to the mediation process after 1991, but all attempts were unsuccessful and only large – scale warfare in 2020 resolved the territorial conflict between two former Soviet Republics, at least for now. Even such legal acts as the UNSC Resolutions did not mediate the dispute between two states, despite they called Armenia to withdraw military forces from the region and stated the fact that Nagorno – Karabakh is the territory of Azerbaijan.

I have used official governmental websites<sup>1</sup> of Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as various papers of political scientist from both countries to be more objective. The book *Azerbaijan's Geopolitical Landscape. Contemporary Issues, 1991 – 2018* by Farid Shafiyev influenced me the most while writing this dissertation, because Dr. Shafiyev presents in his work origins of the conflict that had not been identified before. It motivated me to analyse views of all political actors and to check if there is any correlation between religion, location and opinion of particular agent in Nagorno – Karabakh dispute.

It was also significant to read and analyse papers by scholars that support particular side of the conflict instead of presenting both views. For instance, *Ethnic conflict in the Transcaucasus: The Case of Nagorno - Karabakh* by A. Yamskov that supports Armenia in

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<sup>1</sup> Mentioned in webography

the dispute. This work helped me in creating classification of conflict's stages. Articles of A. Valiyev helped me to have a clear image about Azerbaijani relations with other countries that were actively involved in the dispute after 1991.

The book of M. Kaldor, *Old and New Wars: Organized Violence in a Global era*, inspired me to identify features of New Wars in the Nagorno – Karabakh conflict. Moreover, while writing articles based on this dissertation, I have found clear dimension of modern conflicts presented by Kaldor in the warfare of 2020.

The motivation of this dissertation is to analyse why mediation attempts of various political actors were unsuccessful and present main reasons of the dispute in Nagorno – Karabakh, taking into account both Armenian and Azerbaijani views on territorial conflict.

Main focus of the dissertation is on the Nagorno – Karabakh region because of some important reasons:

1) The dispute was active since 1988 and was the cause of many deaths. There is still no diplomatic relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia, mediation attempts to resolve the conflict were unsuccessful, only war actions in the zone led to the conflict resolution. This is why it is important to analyse the Nagorno - Karabakh conflict from 1991 to 2016.

2) There are many various articles and books about Nagorno - Karabakh, political actors of the conflict and territorial disputes. But there is no particular work with a detailed explanation why all mediation attempts in the region failed from the year of winning the independence until 2016, when the Four – day War occurred in the region.

3) The conflict in the Nagorno - Karabakh was not only territorial, but also ethnic and political one. I am interested in the territorial side of this dispute and its political and ethnical dimensions.

4) It was also interesting to work with the extreme type of case, when it clearly demonstrates phenomenon's manifestation that is not usual. Taking into account that

independence of Nagorno - Karabakh was not accepted by international organizations and most of countries admitted that it is territory of Azerbaijan occupied by Armenia and that there were a lot of mediation attempts, but conflict was still active. And Nagorno - Karabakh region was under control of Armenia during many years and Azerbaijan did not have any access to its former land.

5) 2020 increased tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan and has demonstrated that it is still difficult to imagine peaceful coexistence of two nations despite the resolved territorial conflict. However, our analysis will focus mainly on 1991-2016 because of documental support.

After the analysis of all mediation attempts by various political actors, there will be four questions to answer:

*1) Is there any correlation between **the location** of the political actors in dispute and their opinion regarding the conflict?*

*2) Is there any correlation between **the religion** of the political actors and their views on the dispute in Nagorno – Karabakh?*

*3) Why did warfare resolve the conflict in Nagorno – Karabakh, but not mediation attempts?*

*4) Why did mediation attempts in Nagorno – Karabakh region fail?*

According to these perceptions and motivations, I structured my dissertation in the following way:

Chapter one is titled *Conflicts in the framework of New World Order*. The objective of this part is to present theory of Old and New Wars, to show new tendencies in waging the war and to demonstrate the complexity while identifying main political actors of dispute. I

found the cases of frozen conflicts in the post – Soviet space the most accurate for presenting the Mary Kaldor’s theory about New War. The dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia is the unique case, because it is the first conflict in the former USSR space that was frozen one and was finally resolved. But it is important to mention that only the territorial conflict was solved in 2020, but not all tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Chapter two is titled *The Nagorno – Karabakh conflict: the history and political cartography of the conflict*. It was important for me to present both Azerbaijani and Armenian opinion towards the origins and causes of the dispute in Nagorno – Karabakh. After, I analysed both views from the point of Levinger’s conflict analysis theory. In order to be objective while making conclusions for this chapter, I used for analysis international legal acts adopted in order to establish the peace in Nagorno – Karabakh. I also presented main stages of the conflict and described cases of ceasefire violations (1987/88 - 2016).

Chapter three is titled *Political actors and failed attempts of the conflict’s mediation (1991 - 2016)*. I have chosen former Soviet Union Republics, Turkey, Russia, Iran, the EU and its countries, the USA, the states of the Baltic Assembly and some international organizations as political actors of the dispute for my analysis. I found it also important to analyze all agents from the point of their locations and predominant religion. It helped me to understand if there is any correlation between these two dimensions and agents’ opinion. It was quite difficult to create this classification and to establish groups for some agents. The main reason is the globalization that let countries be the part of any organization or union even if they are located far from other member states.

## Chapter I

### Conflicts in the framework of New World Order

“Peace at home, Peace in the World”

(Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, 1931)<sup>2</sup>.

World order has experienced a continuous evolution and has not been established yet. 1989 is marked in the world history as the year of re – ordering different spheres of influence. Re – ordering of alliances, revolutions and other dramatic changes completely transformed the state system in Europe. These dimensions are not so obvious or dramatic as the fall of the Berlin Wall or the lifting of the Iron Curtain that happened at the end of the Cold War, but they are also not less important. The truth is that a new world order emerged gradually from this moment, but it is certain that the old order ceased to exist as it was before, the new world order is still not clear or defined. We are still witnessing continuous changes and developments and if a definitive shape is not in sight, there are new signs worthwhile analysing because they will help us to understand world politics today. Methods of waging wars has changed as well because of new tendencies and technological progress. Let me explain this in a more detailed way.

#### 1.1 – In search of new world order. Positive and negative results.

Nowadays we can witness not the re-arranged system, but a new mechanism of how world order works, as it is suggested by Robert Cooper in *The post – modern state and the world order* (Cooper, 1996:7). States obtained new forms of statehood or behave in a completely different way from their past. Various alliances that survive in war and peace are able to interfere in domestic affairs and jurisdiction acceptance of international courts. It

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<sup>2</sup> Retrieved from M. Gönübol, 1992. Yurtta Barış, Cihanda Barış. *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, V. 9(25). P. 9.

means less absolute character of independence and sovereignty for many states. Michael Walzer mentions in his seminal work *Just and Unjust Wars* that «collective security depends on collective recognition» (Walzer, 2006:16). The position of the country is discussed when the role of individual grows in the international arena. It also influences the process of waging and observing new wars.

One of the main outcomes of the new world order is the phenomenon that when something goes on inside a state, it can not be considered as the concern of only that one state anymore. And in this sense, the new system is not just about rights of sovereign governments, but also their obligations to other states. That is why fast and updated operating system is strictly necessary for new established world order. And this points out that the sovereignty of the country is also its responsibility. Obligations include respect for frontiers and are also opposition to their being transformed through force or coercion. Such legal acts as the Genocide Convention<sup>3</sup> or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights<sup>4</sup> are one of the new order's basements, despite the fact both of them were created long before the establishment of the new international security system. Legal acts like these are important for protection of human rights. Also, such kind of legal acts are able to ensure the safety of people that do not participate in war actions. For example, medical personnel, journalists, religious workers. Humanitarian law is supposed to protect civilians as well, but there are many examples of violation of legal acts<sup>5</sup> and civilians represent the biggest share of victims.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. [https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocities-crimes/Doc.1\\_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf](https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocities-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf) [Last accessed on 15/03/2021]

<sup>4</sup> UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights> [Last accessed on 15/03/2021]

<sup>5</sup> N. J. Wheeler, 2002. Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society.

<sup>6</sup> Advisory Service on International Humanitarian Law. What is International Humanitarian Law? [https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/what\\_is\\_ihl.pdf](https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf) [Last accessed on 15/03/2021]

It was more natural that with the old global system that is gone, politicians should be motivated to hail the establishment of a completely new world order. But the geopolitical situation in the world and, particularly, the large number of unsolved territorial conflicts clearly demonstrate that actual state of affairs is different from this description.

Conflicts have not disappeared, they were just reshaped. In her work *Old and New Wars: Organized violence in a Global Era* Kaldor admits that:

... [the] term «low - intensity conflict» was coined during the Cold War period by the US military to describe guerrilla, warfare or terrorism. Although it is possible to trace the evolution of the new wars from the so-called low-intensity conflicts of the Cold War period, they have distinctive characteristics which are masked by what is in effect a catch - all term. (Kaldor, 2012:2).

Fortunately, there are also some positive changes in the international security trends from the post – Cold War time. For instance, such instruments as capabilities and doctrines, reforms to military systems became irreplaceable in the new world order. Talking about new world order and modern conflicts, it is also important to talk about the influence of previously mentioned International Humanitarian Law.

The act of war was totally free from any kind of limitations and there was a big preoccupation with boundaries of war actions. UN Charter's Article 2 and Article 51 limit states in their right to war for individual and collective self – defence. If the motivation to wage a war is outside of the self – defence principle, this war should be controlled as well as mediated by the UN Security Council. That fact reflects a positive shift to controlled boundaries of conflict.

In her study on *Unilateral Humanitarian Interventions and the Legitimate Use of Force Under American Interpretations*, Carina Gouveia outlined not only development of international humanitarian law, but also emergence of specific debates about legitimacy for other governments or non – state agents to break states' sovereignty for humanitarian

intervention goals. The issues about the right to stage humanitarian intervention and to implement humanitarian intervention have been raised as well.

There were new objectives – a new shape of «forward defence» came into being instead of territorial defence. It had a goal to meet all threats to world stability at source through high, medium or low intensity operations of crisis-management. When experts argue about positive shifts in international security, they also mention the fact that various forms of institutional character for defence policy as prioritisation of NATO or EU and national strategic autonomy won its significance. It is important to admit that NATO, marking its 75<sup>th</sup> anniversary in 2019, managed to achieve such goals as managing Cold - War tensions, possibility not to return to previous confrontation between several countries and taking part in establishing new world order.

It is also important to mention that 1990 was marked as an important year not only for the US and the Soviet Union, but also for the whole world. Two governments «defined *strategic stability* as the absence of incentives for any country to launch a first nuclear strike» (Trenin, 2019:1). Since these times technological, psychological and geopolitical landscape that helped to avoid wars between various nuclear powers has dramatically changed. Both instruments and conditions of strategic stability has also experienced modifications. As Kaldor suggests:

Indeed, the wars epitomize a new kind of global/local divide between those members of a global class who can speak English, have access to the Internet and satellite television, who use dollars or euros or credit cards, and who can travel freely, and those who are excluded from global processes, who live off what they can sell or barter or what they receive in humanitarian aid, whose movement is restricted by roadblocks, visas and the cost of travel, and who are prey to sieges, forced displacement, famines, landmines, etc. (Kaldor, 2012:5).

To sum up, it is rather difficult to give a positive or negative evaluation to the modern state of geopolitics. Such unresolved conflicts that do not have the attention of world, more

sophisticated structure of disputes and modern technologies implemented in new types of war conflicts make it difficult to understand modern geopolitics. But new system based on respect to territorial sovereignty and existence of alliances as well as that of legal acts give us a possibility to evaluate modern geopolitics positively. Maybe new forms of international consolidation would give us more positive results in the future. And we will make a big progress towards peace establishment in the whole world. That is why it is very important to define and to guarantee national security beyond national frontiers.

## **1.2 – The difference between Old and New Wars.**

The world still follows defence policies and tendencies shaped in the Post - Cold War time in the space of world order created after the end of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The goal of this part is to represent concepts of Old and New Wars and to show differences between them. In order to do it, we should refer to some scholar's works. The theoretical part behind warfare has always been a great subject for discussion among academics. But if there was a more general understanding on the meaning of "classical warfare", contemporary academics have some difficulties while defining «New Wars» because they need to take into account all modern dimensions that have become an essential part of the conflict. *On War* by Carl von Clausewitz<sup>7</sup> (1997) [1832] was written after the Napoleonic wars and was published only after the death of the scholar. This book gives an important overview of war studies and, as it was mentioned by Colin S. Gray in his *War, Peace and International Relations* (2007), Clausewitz describes and explains the nature of war, rather than how to guide for it. There are many experts that support ideas described in Clausewitz's book. But there are also scholars that criticized his work, considering it obsolete.

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<sup>7</sup> It is not the goal of this dissertation to analyse Clausewitz theories or criticism regarding his work, I only introduce his ideas here in order to explain Mary Kaldor's new war's argument in a more comprehensive sense.

For instance, Mary Kaldor, views all new war conflicts in a «post - Clausewitzean» light. Another great expert, theorist and military historian, Van Creveld, had the same opinion. Military historian, John Keegan, in his *A History of Warfare* (1993) expresses opinion about limited person experience and cultural environment of Clausewitz that resulted in limited work. Keegan's criticism is extreme, because he compared Clausewitz with Marx, attributing him responsibility of ideological character for the World War I outbreak. It is quite difficult to agree with Keegan, because *On War* gives to the reader insight into war studies. Especially it helps to understand European warfare.

There are two aspects described in Clausewitz's book: *the nature of war* (objective aspect) and *the character of war* (subjective aspect). Colin S. Gray uses this division and admits that "*There are no old wars or new wars, at least not with respect to their nature. But assuredly the character of warfare periodically is transformed by socio-cultural, political and technological change*" (Gray, 2007:227).

A quite controversial war trinity is also presented in Gray's book. It is: «enmity and passion, chance and opportunity, and reason; the climate of war, comprising 'danger, exertion, uncertainty, and, chance; and friction...» (Gray, 2007:24). It is controversial because it creates association of passion with the people, the reason of war with the government, while the creativity and chance is associated with the army of the state. It is significant to give some extra explanation for the trinity. When Clausewitz mentions friction, he wants to underline the difference between «war on paper» (Clausewitz, 1997:67) and the real war. It is extremely relevant for all war and peace studies because of relating practice with theory. This definition was created by the Prussian general as a result of limits between the political goal and the practical constraints of unexpected obstacles. Reality can be totally different from the theoretical framework as well as the theory might not reflect the reality. Therefore, the shift to the restoration of order is the most significant part of New Wars. The book of Clausewitz

is still relevant tool for conducting analysis of wars. But, of course, we should also take into account new realities and modern conflict dynamic.

But it is also important to mention other essential features of the war described by Clausewitz. Romanticism of German Enlightenment influenced the Prussian general and that is why he aimed at humanizing and rationalizing the war. He has a romantic view on warfare, considering it to be national, rational and instrumental tool, because political power belongs to sovereign government power.

According to the theory of Clausewitz, there is a clear distinction between moral and physical aspect of the warfare. But the factor to be successful in waging the war is compulsory in both aspects. Moreover, the commander must obtain skills of manoeuvre and attrition in order to win in the battle. It is important to mention that while manoeuvre is to take the enemy by anticipation and surprise (strategy of defence), attrition is to win by wearing down the rival (strategy of offense). As Mary Kaldor mentions the Clausewitz's view on the warfare in her *Old and New Wars*:

(...) War tends towards extremes. War is a social activity that brings together different tendencies or emotions – reason, chance and strategy, and passion that can be linked, respectively, to the state or the political leaders, the army of the generals, and the level of people. From this trinitarian depiction of war, Clausewitz derived his concept of absolute war (Kaldor, 2012:23).

But it is significant to remember that warfare aspects discussed by Clausewitz mainly belong to the types of decisive and direct battles, mostly among different states. Hence, the theory of Clausewitz can be classified as modern state's interstate war in the time of consolidation. However, in respect to conflicts of lower intensity, the scholar mentions few of them. As we can clearly see from the Graph 1, presented in part 1.3, the number of low – intensity conflicts and small wars is high. That is why we can conclude that contemporary

type of warfare consists predominantly (by number) of non – direct battles and of disputes of low – intensity conflicts.

There are also other interesting interpretations and opinions regarding the Old Wars conception. According to Kaldor, Old Wars can be related to the evolution of modern government and they are usually a European phenomenon (Kaldor, 2012). Another expert, British politician Michael Howard, characterises the Medieval Europe as the territory of various warrior societies in his *Invention of Peace (2000)*. He thinks that military technologies and increased war financial costs stimulated the development of these societies and the establishment of the social order. These dimensions influenced the growth of Europe, so we can consider social order and war as phenomenon that can influence and interact each other. Howard also describes the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 as the moment of changes in World Order, talking about particular state's opinion and state as an owner of domestic order. The idea about the government that is a «legitimiser of external war» (Howard, 2000:16) is also expressed because of absolute sovereignty in this era. Probably, it was a first attempt of the state to rationalize warfare as the way to preserve its power. According to Kaldor, there was an important shift from mercenary armies to the standing ones, because modern governments monopolized violence for their evolution.

### **1.3 – Limits, time and influence areas as significant dimensions of New Wars.**

It is quite interesting that New Wars are no longer related to specific state borders or to particular time frames. The dramatic change is in the fact that dispute acquire regional and global dimensions. The big increase of interstate conflicts (Graph 1)<sup>8</sup> shown by the 2016 Conflict Barometer report (92 disputes) demonstrates regional and international conflicts of various intensity.

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<sup>8</sup> Statistic Maps by Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, 2016. <https://hiik.de/data-and-maps/static-maps/?lang=en> [Last accessed on 15/03/2021]



(Graph 1) Interstate Conflicts in 2016.

Münkler admits that:

(...) the boundaries drawn by the states no longer play a role... It is characterized by a constant switching of friends and foes and by a breakdown of the institutional authorities (such as the military and the police) responsible for ordering and having recourse to the use of force. (Münkler, 2003:21)

It shows us that the term «civil war» cannot reflect all features of New Wars. Hence, present state of dispute seems to be related to the government monopoly of war's disintegration. When the state had the force monopoly, there was an enemy that was easy to identify and clear goal. And fighting on the battle field as completely concentrated. World War I and World War II are ideal examples of it because wars between governments in both

cases were centralised. But modern conflicts are totally opposite, because they are marked by forces' dispersion, where it is really difficult to understand a «time or place where all threads converge and decisive results is sought» (Münkler, 2005:12).

For instance, such resolved conflict as one in Nagorno – Karabakh still attract attention of political scientists, because some of its mediators were often suspected in escalation of the conflict. It is very important to mention that in New Wars the weakest actors are agents having a lack of military or technological capability. Monjardino admits that the usage of sensors, smart ammunition and drones was the advantage of Azerbaijani side in the 2020 Karabakh War against Armenia.<sup>9</sup>

It is quite easy to prolong a dispute intermittently into so – called «long war of endurance» (Münkler, 2003:9). by adopting special defensive strategy. There would be no particular beginning or end of the conflict and Münkler thinks that in many cases war as physical confrontation is not even present. The new step of the dispute can start again immediately with even more intensive violence. It is more challenging do adopt any peace resolution of the conflict, because «where there is no state executive powerful enough to impose the will of the majority, the ones who decide on war or peace are those most prepared to resort to violence. They hold the initiative and impose their will on everyone else» (Münkler, 2005:13). But Duffield has completely different opinion, thinking that it is difficult separate legal acts of actors from illegal ones as well as to identify acts of war or peace.

Talking about location issues, we need to mention an opinion of Kaldor that New Wars has surpassed geographical borders. The author of theory about Old and New Wars even compared it with a virus (Johnson, 2007:18). It is challenging to identify the geography and to contain these conflicts. For example, the case of the Karabakh War of 2020 clearly

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<sup>9</sup> M. Monjardino. Lições da guerra no Cáucaso. [https://expresso.pt/opiniaoblogues/opiniao\\_e\\_blogues\\_opiniao\\_autarquicas/2020-12-04-Licoes-da-guerra-no-Caucaso](https://expresso.pt/opiniaoblogues/opiniao_e_blogues_opiniao_autarquicas/2020-12-04-Licoes-da-guerra-no-Caucaso) [Last accessed on 05/03/2021]

demonstrates it. Armenian troops attacked territories that are located not in the conflicting zone. Hoffman and Wise think that «...new wars are fought locally (in neighborhoods, villages, and other subnational units), even if modern technologies make external connections easy» (Hoffman, Weiss, 2006:60). Globalization has had negative effects as criminal networks, population displacement and flows of refugees. Hence, the conflict can continue its development even beyond borders of fight. Even institutions and organisations that supposed to be legitimate and created for peaceful goals, can start implementing illegal actions against human rights. For instance, Golubenkian Foundation that was created as a charity organisation that has a goal to improve lives of people through science, art and music, made «a 100,000 USD contribution to the Hayastan All Armenian Fund».<sup>10</sup> This fact was presented as humanitarian relief, but, in reality, it is a clear assistance to Hayastan Foundation that supports the idea about independence of Nagorno – Karabakh. According to the Resolutions 822, 853, 874, 884 of UN Security Council, Nagorno – Karabakh region belongs to Azerbaijan and cannot be recognized as independent state. As it was mentioned by Hoffman and Weiss, «the major problem of the contemporary society of states is no longer aggression, conquest and the obliteration of states. It is, rather, the collapse of states, humanitarian emergencies, state terror against segments of local populations, civil wars of various types, and international terrorist organizations» (Hoffman, Weiss, 2006:64).

There was a dramatic change for such dimensions as area of influence, time and location with a transformation into New Wars. Now it is more difficult to identify particular time when any conflict can start, continue or end. The reason of changes can be less serious than it is expected. It is also challenging to make any conclusion about location of the conflict: sometimes the place of future war actions can be located far from «official» war zone.

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<sup>10</sup> Ajuda humanitária a arménios de Nagorno-Karabah. <https://gulbenkian.pt/noticias/ajuda-humanitaria-a-armenios-de-nagorno-karabah/> [Last accessed on 05/03/2021]

Moreover, area of influence of political actors of different levels (countries, individuals and organizations) can become more significant and less legitimate than it was expected.

#### **1.4 – The role of actors in reshaped conflicts.**

Some states experienced dissolution of their monopoly of force that is filled by various new actors. These agents impose security implications that are extremely daunting. It is resulted in the fact that now the war conflict is a totally opened field for such private actors as guerrilla groups, local warlords, organized crime players or mercenaries. Their power is autonomous and can diverge interests that are serviced by sustaining the dispute. Weiss and Hoffman express two ways in which their importance has changed:

(...) first, some are in a more prominent position to wage war in an international order principally based on states, certainly since its consolidation as a system in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Second, some are predominant in responding to war, especially IGOs and NGOs (Hoffman, Weiss, 2006:57).

The power of Non – State Agents has increased, and these have become strong local players with a help of supplying various local social services to citizens, sometimes usurping the government role. Stedman and Tanner described this phenomenon of New Wars, using the «pseudo - states» term, «to denote crafty belligerents that manipulate the presence of refugees to attract and exploit humanitarian resources for their political agendas» (Hoffman, Weiss, 2006:65).

According to their classification, there are three categories of Non – State Agents' groups:

1) Armed belligerents. They have autonomous political and military power and privatize the force. This kind of power is not subordinate to the government and these actors use fear, division and persistent insecurity as the grant of political power. Their real goal is to provide

protection for economic gains and political payoffs or for security, reflecting criminal personality.

2) Agents blending economic and military agendas. For instance, private military companies that are classified by Hoffman and Weiss, while they are careful about highlighting the difference between them and mercenaries. Example of mercenary is former French military Bob Denard or former soldier from Britain, «Mad Mike» Hoare. The company Executive Outcomes participated in military operations in Angola is an example of private military company.

3) Actors, whose economic interests are filled by violence. This kind of agents are advocates of the dispute's maintenance and active engaged in acts from which they can have profits.

It is also important to mention that motivation of various political actors is totally different. Some of them are motivated for economic goals and profits, while others have a motivation of ethnic-cultural character or religious one.

Non – State Agents do not answer international norms or liberal values, for instance, human rights agreements. Own motivations are the most significant values in this case.

When the government loses its capacity for control, hidden actors see a great opportunity to take an advantage from globalized playing field that creates the capacity to establish their own rules.

### **1.5 – The nature of territorial dispute.**

Despite the unprecedented technological progress and achievements, there are still many ongoing or new conflicts between different political actors. As it was mentioned in the previous part of this chapter, disputes have not disappeared, they were just reshaped and

various new methods are used to wage the war. There is a big number of territorial conflicts around the world: they have not disappeared as well, even with the establishment of the new world order.

Statistics and surveys illustrate that territorial disputes are considered to be the most common reason of interstate war, despite the fact that colonial competition is over as well as the Cold War. Hence, disputes because of territory should be the most important topic in war and conflict studies (Choi, 2009:36). Taking into account the existence of various conflict types, it is important to understand the nature of «*territorial dispute*». Very often, fighting over natural resources located in conflict territory or where the zone itself is located strategically makes dispute over particular territory unsurprising. The theory created by Hassner tells that there are three processes in intractable territorial conflict. The first one is period when conquered zone undergoes material resources entrenchment, and communication and transportation lines connect territory with the core of state. The second, functional process, of making borders of state less negotiable and ambiguous (mapping process). Finally, the third one is when with the passage of time there is a creation of different symbolic attachments: constructing myth or legends in order to legitimate claims for territory (Goddard, Pressman, Hassner, 2008:191-201).

Many influential political scientists like Hensel, Holsti, Vasquez and others admit that one of the key factors that can lead governments to war is a conflict over the territory. For instance, Paul Hensel analyses interstate wars<sup>11</sup> and finds «that over 50% of wars included issues of disputed territory. Additionally, regardless of whether two states have a contiguous border, disputes with a territorial dimension are much more likely to lead to conflicts with fatalities than disputes with no territorial dimension» (Carter, 2010:970). J. Vasquez finds that around 79% of all wars were because of territorial issues (Vasquez, 1995:284). But the

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<sup>11</sup> From 1816 to 1992

main problem is in the gap in literature about territorial dispute and about explaining the war itself. Usually the approach of political scientists is in the demonstration and analysis of particular cases to give an image of territorial problem. But each conflict is specific and usually belongs not only to one type of dispute.

Previously mentioned globalization has managed to transform territory from the static dimension into dynamic one. Despite the fact that it is expected to have borderless and deterritorialized world after the globalization.

It is also important to mention that there was a shift to analysis of any territory in a geographic framework (before it was in a framework of the political power) (Newman, 2006:2). Now the study of borders and territory constitutes a focus of multi – disciplinary research, drawing in legal experts, anthropologists, sociologists and political scientists, as they want to understand the territory's role in a modern world. «The special role of territory is also reflected in the norms that regulate the relations and borders between states. Consider the principle of sovereignty, which affords legitimate control over a given space. Without territory, there would be no sovereign states» (Johnson, Toft, 2013/2014:16).

Despite the powerful evidence of empirical character that territorial conflicts are central reason in the outbreak of international disputes, no study is able to explore how characteristics of territorial conflict affect governments' incentives or abilities to consolidate their position in military sphere. Consequently, the way we understand an impact of military capabilities on consolidation as well as character of military conflict and the outbreak is very limited.

Region remains contested where national and ethnic groups fight for power, where they demonstrate spatial segregation, territorial homogeneity and regional concentration on a high level, where they want to implement self – government and where they feel danger from other national groups.

The symbolic dimension of the particular territory should be also taken into account. For sides of the conflict all territorial claims can be rooted in deep perceptions of homelands, filled with locations, myths, sites that are included in their national identity formation.

Understanding the world we live in is significant, because of the enormous cost of intellectual errors in international space. Many wars fought by people's mistakes and clarity of thoughts is the most important contribution to peace. But it is also important to understand why the particular piece of land can lead to the serious territorial conflict. Reasons can be different and sometimes very specific for each side of the conflict.

### 1.6 – The impact of post – Cold War Era on territorial conflicts in the former Soviet Union Republics.



(Map 1) Conflicts in Post – Soviet Union World.<sup>12</sup>

Heavy geopolitical trends, disintegration or integration forces in governments and the new world order established after the Cold War make the global contexts less easy for

<sup>12</sup> Post – Soviet world: what you need to know about the 15 states. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/09/-sp-profiles-post-soviet-states> [Last accessed on 15/03/2021]

understanding. Sometimes it is even difficult to identify all the political actors in a conflict, because not only conflicting sides are actively involved in the dispute. Countries that are interested in selling military facilities, defence systems or weapon also became important political actors.

The post – Cold War time and new world order also caused new conflicts in former Soviet Union Republics and the Dissolution of the USSR made them even worse.

One of the reasons is modern technologies that became an essential attribute of our life, making much easier some processes that before was taking a lot of time, efforts and human resources. Military and Governmental Security spheres are not an exception, because Artificial Intelligence significantly changed them. Among all systems and spheres, autonomous systems implemented in governmental security can be a threat, that is why this demands meriting greater analysis and attention. For instance, while creating different propaganda content, experts use various algorithms. The process of creation is very sophisticated and challenging. So – called «algorithm», step – by – step process for resolving an issue or accomplishing it, is able to perform different groups of tasks presented below (Fry, 2018:12 – 14):

- *prioritization* (possibility to make an organized list);
- *classification* (possibility to pick a category we need);
- *association* (possibility to find links);
- *filtering* (possibility to outline what is important).

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine because of territorial claims for Crimea transformed into a real information war where both sides has been using modern technologies and various propaganda instruments for changing people’s mind. As the result – two nation’s hate to each other has been increasing last years.

Another reason caused new conflicts in post – Soviet space and made much more complicated already existing disputes is globalization. As it was mentioned before, some countries realized the obligation to care not only about domestic politics, but also about international community. Unfortunately, very often under the mask of mediators different political actors follow just only their interests and consider the conflict as a chance to achieve particular goals – selling military facilities to any side of the conflict or to obtain more control over territory. The Nagorno – Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan that is a central case of this MA dissertation, started in 1988 and was resolved in 2020 by war actions, but not by measures taken by significant political actors. Nagorno - Karabakh is a region located in Caucasus and surrounded by Azerbaijan and Armenia, countries that fought for this territory over 30 years. And the Russian Federation was a critical actor in the conflict, because this country is responsible for peace mission now, but also the state that was «for having tipped the balance in favour of Armenian forces during the Karabakh war» (Uzer, 2012:246). Kaldor mentions this case as the «long – standing example of both economic and political burdens» (Kaldor, 2012:115).

It was also mentioned that it is quite difficult to identify the type of the conflict after the Cold War. One of the best examples of sophisticated dispute is Georgian – Ossetian conflict that started in 1989. Georgian leaders did not manage to solve problems connected with various Georgia's ethnic minorities (that making up 30% of the Georgian population), what resulted in conflict between Georgians and South Ossetians, who were always more loyal to the Soviet system. In 2008 the conflict that was not solved resulted in the war between Russia and Georgia, because ethnic minorities decided to rely on Russia as a mediator in on-going conflict. And now it is difficult to admit that this conflict is only ethnical because it is also a territorial one. Kaldor also mentions Abkhaz inhabitants, saying that they «accounted for only 17 per cent of the population. In order to control the territory,

the secessionist forces had to expel most of the remaining population, mainly Georgian. Even after the expulsion of the Georgians, the Abkhaz remain a minority. A typical tactic is to instill fear through grisly and well-publicized executions or atrocities» (Kaldor, 2012:105).

Moreover, the new world order and disorganized actions of local authorities that did not managed to adapt to Globalization and life out of Soviet Union caused some civil conflicts in former Soviet Union Republics. Tajikistani Civil and Transnistria Wars are clear evidences of inability of two different governments to cope with independence, influence of other countries and some people's desire to see their country in the process of active democratization.

There are many conflicts in post – Soviet Republics that still affects modern geopolitics and that happened after the Cold War. But the dispute in Nagorno – Karabakh is a case that should be analysed properly for improving mediation processes in the future not only in Caucasus region, but also in other parts of the world. In the next chapter I want to describe the history of the conflict from its beginning until 2016. Only after presenting reasons and main stages of the dispute, it would be possible to analyse why mediation attempts in the Nagorno – Karabakh region were failed.

## Chapter II

### The Nagorno – Karabakh conflict: the history and political cartography of the conflict.

“Human nature has a propensity for conflict as well as need for peace.”

(Mónica Dias, 2016)<sup>13</sup>

The Nagorno – Karabakh territorial conflict was one of the unresolved disputes in the Caucasian region more than 30 years and involved two sovereign states – Azerbaijan and Armenia. Both of them were parts of the former Soviet Union as the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan (*The Azerbaijan SSR*) and the Soviet Socialist Republic of Armenia (*the Armenian SSR*). The independence of both governments was established only on 18 October 1991 and 21 September 1991 as the consequence of the dissolution of the USSR. But this change did not stop the dispute and territorial conflict between two newly established governments. The territory of Nagorno -Karabakh is a national cause for Azerbaijan and Armenia. Thomas de Waal in his *Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War* tries to express his view why Nagorno – Karabakh is so important for both states:

(...) The cultural and symbolic meaning of Nagorny Karabakh for both peoples cannot be overstated. For Armenians, Karabakh is the last out - post of their Christian civilization and a historic haven of Armenian princes and bishops before the eastern Turkic world begins. Azerbaijanis talk of it as a cradle, nursery, or conservatoire, the birthplace of their musicians and poets. Historically, Armenia is diminished without this enclave and its monasteries and its mountain lords; geographically and economically, Azerbaijan is not fully viable without Nagorny Karabakh. (de Waal, 2003:3)

It is clear that the author wants to demonstrate support to Armenians, talking about historical belonging of Karabakh to Armenians (but without giving particular proofs) as well as opinion that Azerbaijan is not economically stable state without Nagorno – Karabakh. To

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<sup>13</sup> Retrieved from M. Dias, 2016. *A Letter to Osama bin Laden. On Healing and Conciliation in Sharon Maguire's Incendiary*. Mediations of Disruption in Post – Conflict Cinema. P. 123.

understand the origin and causes of the conflict, we need to present both sides' opinions and their claims in this chapter.

The territorial dispute was finally resolved in 2020 not because of effective mediation process by political actors involved in the conflict, but as the result of warfare between two conflicting sides. Only the military warfare between two states made it possible to resolve the territorial problem in the Nagorno – Karabakh region. The armed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2020 was totally different, because it was a first time when Azerbaijani regions located far away from the dispute zone were attacked by Armenia. For instance, Ganja City became a target of missile attacks several times and government of self – proclaimed Republic of Artsakh<sup>14</sup> even admitted its responsibility for committing these violent crimes against people of Azerbaijan.<sup>15</sup>

Currently Azerbaijan is focused on such tasks as development and restoration of Nagorno - Karabakh territory, fixing issues of Armenian environmental terrorism and cultural vandalism, developing sector of economic activity.

Peaceful coexistence of Azerbaijani and Armenian people in the region after the war is also a priority of Azerbaijani government. That is why one of the key tasks of the state is to raise global awareness about the history of resolved territorial conflict in the Nagorno - Karabakh. According to the bulletin of the Azerbaijani Center of Analysis of International Relations published in 2020:

(...) From the first day of the flare – up, Azerbaijan has faced organized disinformation and coordinated social – media manipulation campaigns. Armenia has increasingly leveraged social media platforms to spread propaganda and fake news during the critical moments. (Center of Analysis of International Relations, 2020:4)<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> This is how Armenia calls the territory of Nagorno - Karabakh.

<sup>15</sup> Artsakh President: The strike on Ganja was a warning. <https://mediamax.am/en/news/karabakh/39851/> [Last accessed on 15/03/2021]

<sup>16</sup> Bulletin. Highlight of the Foreign Policy of Republic of Azerbaijan. September 2020. <https://aircenter.az/uploads/files/Bulletin%20september.pdf> [Last accessed on 15/03/2021]

So, it is very significant to give objective framework of the territorial dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia that is already resolved, but there are still many challenges on a way to peaceful coexistence between two nations. There might be an understanding on territory, but the conflict between the people of two countries goes on.

Today new approaches implemented in post – war realities would help to reintegrate Armenian people living in Nagorno – Karabakh into its social, economic and political environment. Granting the same rights for Azerbaijani and Armenian people would demonstrate the equality as citizen. The president of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, has already guaranteed these opportunities for Armenian people from Nagorno - Karabakh.<sup>17</sup>

The aim of this chapter is to present main stages of the conflict from 1987 until 2016 as well as reasons of the dispute in the Nagorno – Karabakh region. I took requirements of continuous assessment and mention only 29 years of the conflict (since 1987, when conflict was just on linguistic, economic and national – culture level until 2016, when the so – called *April War* or *Four – Day War* occurred).

## **2.1 – Origin and Causes of the Conflict.**

“The true soldier fights not because he hates what is in front of him, but because he loves what is behind him”  
(G. Chesterton, 1911)<sup>18</sup>

To understand the roots of territorial conflict we must explain what the different viewpoints and causes are regarding a territory. According to Matthew Levinger (2013), there are many layers for conflict and it is very difficult to see them clearly. In order to demonstrate

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<sup>17</sup> Ilham Aliyev received in a video format co – chair of Nizami Ganjavi International Center.  
<https://en.president.az/articles/50718> [Last accessed on 15/03/2021]

<sup>18</sup> G.K. Chesterton. Quotes. <https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/94304-the-true-soldier-fights-not-because-he-hates-what-is> [Last accessed on 15/03/2021]

how disputes begin and end, the author created diagram that can help in organizing all terms used in conflict management.

<b>Intensity of the conflict</b>	<b>Mediation process</b>	<b>The level of complexity (increasing)</b>	<b>The level of complexity (decreasing)</b>
<b>WAR</b>	Crisis management	Full – scale violence	
<b>VIOLENT CONFLICT</b>	Crisis management	Overt crisis	Ceasefire
<b>INSTABILITY</b>	Prevention	Increasing tension	Decreasing tension
<b>PEACE</b>	Peacebuilding	-----	

(Table 1) The state of the conflict according to Levinger’s theory.<sup>19</sup>

Levinger thinks that the course of each conflict is traced to two dimensions: the vertical axis (intensity of the conflict) and the horizontal axis (the duration of the dispute). It is clear that the line that shapes an arc across the diagram from left to right demonstrates the course of the dispute. Moreover, this line rises and falls over time in intensity:

(...) The escalation from peace to instability, and ultimately to violent conflict and war, is never inevitable. Without a spark, or triggering event, an unstable situation may persist without erupting into violence – just as dry and hot conditions in a forest do not always result in a forest fire (Levinger, 2013:33).

There are many examples<sup>20</sup> of so – called intractable conflicts that can oscillate between violent dispute and instability for decades. Such type of the conflicts usually resists all resolution attempts, because typically it includes various problems as domination issues,

<sup>19</sup> Retrieved from the graph of M. Levinger, 2013. Conflict Analysis: Understanding causes, unlocking solutions. P. 30.

<sup>20</sup> For instance, Israel – Palestine, Cyprus, the Mindanao region.

high – stakes issues of distribution, human needs or fundamental disagreements regarding values.

Usually while describing international disputes, scholars have a tendency to divide them into two groups – intrastate (= civil wars) or interstate ones. But, according to the *World Development Report 2011* by World Bank, it is challenging to separate 21<sup>st</sup> century disputes by particular categories as «criminal violence», «peace» or «war»:

(...) First, conflicts often are not one-off events, but are ongoing and repeated: 90 percent of the last decade's civil wars occurred in countries that had already had a civil war in the last 30 years. Second, new forms of conflict and violence threaten development: many countries that have successfully negotiated political and peace agreements after violent political conflicts, such as El Salvador, Guatemala, and South Africa, now face high levels of violent crime, constraining their development. Third, different forms of violence are linked to each other. Political movements can obtain financing from criminal activities, as in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Northern Ireland. Criminal gangs can support political violence during electoral periods, as in Jamaica and Kenya. International ideological movements make common cause with local grievances, as in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Thus, the large majority of countries currently facing violence face it in multiple forms. Fourth, grievances can escalate into acute demands for change—and the risks of violent conflict—in countries where political, social, or economic change lags behind expectations, as in the Middle East and North Africa (World Bank, 2011: 2 - 5).

The curve of the dispute described in the Graph 1 can be used while talking about main stages of the conflict in Nagorno – Karabakh. Political scientist Yamskov in his *Ethnic conflict in the Transcaucasus: The Case of Nagorno Karabakh* suggests three phases of the dispute before the independence of Azerbaijan and Armenia (Yamskov, 1991: 638 - 639). We can analyse all these stages through the Levinger's theory:

1) **Winter 1987 – 1988**. Linguistic, economic and national-culture dispute (according to the Levinger's theory: the shift from peace to instability);

2) **Spring – summer 1988**. The dispute over territorial status of the Nagorno - Karabakh region (according to the Levinger's theory: instability);

3) **Fall 1988 - 1991.** Ethnic clashes and open confrontation (according to the Levinger's theory: the shift from violent conflict to the war).

In this dissertation we are interested in first 29 years of the conflict, so it is also important to outline stages of the conflict until 2016:

4) **1991 – 1994.** Full – scale war between two states that was stopped by Bishkek ceasefire agreement (according to the Levinger's theory: the shift from war to peace using tools of crisis – management and peacebuilding);

5) **1994 - April, 2016.** Violations of ceasefire agreement by Armenia (according to the Levinger's theory: instability);

6) **01.04.2016 – 05.04.2016.** April War between Armenia and Azerbaijan (according to the Levinger's theory: the shift from war to peace using tools of crisis – management and peacebuilding).

In the Chapter 1 of this dissertation, talking about New Wars, I mentioned that with the passage of time the conflict can become more complicated. In many cases dispute can obtain new reasons. The conflict in Nagorno – Karabakh is not an exception. Different sides has different views on the reasons of the dispute as well as totally opposite opinion regarding territorial status of the Nagorno – Karabakh region.

Levinger thinks that there are 5 types of factors that can prevent or motivate violence. Each one may be considered as dimension of peace and dispute (Levinger, 2013: 33 - 34):

- ***political dimension*** relates to the political institutions' performance and competition for power at the subnational and national level.

The Nagorno - Karabakh conflict was an after effect of political mismanagement and economic hardships of that times resulted in many problems for both sides of conflicts. The

tragic dispute started not from warfare, but from provocations against Azerbaijan that resulted in a military aggression.

One of the reasons of the Nagorno - Karabakh dispute also is in failing central governmental institutions and breakdown of Soviet governmental structures that were not able to provide legitimization of USSR existence based on ideology of communism. State erosion is the reason of the conflict not only in Nagorno – Karabakh, but also in other former Soviet Republics.<sup>21</sup>

- *strategic dimension* involves issues of power and security at the international level. Historiographers, academics from Armenia had been creating hate narrative texts during Soviet Union Times, proving who was «the first» in the Nagorno - Karabakh territory. It shaped local nationalism and domestic discourses and policies towards national identity in Armenia itself (Zurcher, 2007: 155). Azerbaijan, despite having serious proofs as particular historical books or maps with references, chose international legal acts as basement while negotiations.

- *socioeconomic dimension* concerns the role of economic competition and various social institutions in provoking dispute. Armenian people from Karabakh had a chance to rely on and use governmental institutions of NKAO<sup>22</sup>: public, regional Soviet administration, local media. It was quite similar to other USSR autonomous regions that were results of Soviet contested state formations (such as Adjara and Abkhazia in the Georgian SSR, Transnistria and Gagausia in Moldovan SSR) (De Waal, 2003: 141 - 142).

- *psychological dimension* can reflect rival group's mutual perceptions and in which way they form intergroup relations.

- *cultural dimension* involves religious and ideological dimensions of the dispute (+ gender roles, traditional hierarchies).

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<sup>21</sup> For instance, conflicts in the former Georgian and Moldovan SSR.

<sup>22</sup> Nagorno – Karabakh Autonomous Region.

There is another mediation theory that we will use for analysis of mediation attempts in the Nagorno – Karabakh dispute. Igarapé Institute suggests typology of conflict prevention that includes three kinds of elimination: *operational*, *structural* and *transnational* (Igarapé Institute, 2018: 22-26). It would be much easier to analyze all political actors and their efforts using this theory. Each kind of prevention has its own objectives, measures and time – horizon:

- ***Operational prevention.*** This kind of elimination has objective to manage crisis immediately in order to avoid conflict’s escalation and recurrence. In terms of duration – operational prevention can be short – term or mid – term. Mobilized when dispute relapse, escalation or occurrence is imminent.

CATEGORIES	SUBCATEGORIES	CODE
OPERATIONAL PREVENTION	Early Warning Systems & Early Response	EWS
	Mediation & Facilitation	MAF
	Use of Force: Peacekeeping	UFP
	Use of Force: Ad Hoc Response	UFA
	Political Mission	PMS
	Special Envoy	SPE
	Electoral Support	ELE
	National Reconciliation & Dialogue	NRD
	Migration and Refuge Response	MRR

(Table 2) Measures of operational prevention.<sup>23</sup>

- ***Structural prevention.*** It is focused on root causes of the dispute to guarantee that crises are not possible in the future. This is the long - term prevention that is mobilized when dispute drivers are identified.

<sup>23</sup> Retrieved from Igarapé Institute, 2018. The Handbook of Conflict Prevention. P. 24.

CATEGORIES	SUBCATEGORIES	CODE
STRUCTURAL PREVENTION	Private Sector Development	PSD
	Inclusive Growth & Poverty Reduction	ING
	Sustainable Development	SUD
	Natural Resource Management	NRM
	Rule of Law, Justice, and Citizen Security	RUL
	Strengthening Civil Society	SCO
	Good Governance & Strong Institutions	GOG
	Education Policy	EPO
	Health Policy	HPO
	Food Security & Agriculture	FSA
	Gender Equality	GEQ
	Rural Development	RDE
	Urban Development	UDE
	Social Safety Nets	SSN
	Youth Programs	YOP
	Social Security Reform	SSR
	Disarmament Demobilization & Reintegration	DDR
	Preventing Violent Extremism	PVE
	Infrastructure Development: Communications	IDC
	Infrastructure Development: Transportation	IDT
	Infrastructure Development: Energy	IDE
Disaster Preparedness and Resilience	DPR	
Cultural Heritage Protection	CHP	

(Table 3) Measures of structural prevention.<sup>24</sup>

- ***Transnational prevention.*** This type can guarantee prevention of transitional processes and flows that are able to contribute towards disputes and to design transnational processes of cooperation. It is important to mention that this kind of prevention can be short, mid – term and long – term. Transitional measures’ time span may vary widely.

<sup>24</sup> Retrieved from Igarapé Institute, 2018. The Handbook of Conflict Prevention. P. 25.

CATEGORIES	SUBCATEGORIES	CODE
TRANSNATIONAL PREVENTION	Cooperation Against Illicit Drug Trade	CID
	Cooperation Against Corruption & Money Laundering	CML
	Cooperation Against Illicit Arms Trade	COI
	Cooperation Against Piracy	COP
	Cooperation Against Extremist Violence & Terrorism	COE
	Combatting Organized Crime: People Trafficking	COT
	Strengthening Regional/Subregional Mechanisms	REG
	Migration Cooperation and Coordination	MCC
	Climate Change Cooperation & Coordination	CCP
	Disaster Resilience Cooperation	DRC
	Cultural and Educational Exchanges	CEE
	Science, Technology and Innovation Cooperation	STC
	South-South Cooperation	SSC
	Cooperation Against Illicit Drug Trade	CID
	Cooperation Against Corruption & Money Laundering	CML
	Cooperation Against Illicit Arms Trade	COI
	Cooperation Against Piracy	COP
	Cooperation Against Extremist Violence & Terrorism	COE
	Combatting Organized Crime: People Trafficking	COT
	Strengthening Regional/Subregional Mechanisms	REG

(Table 4) Measures of transitional prevention.<sup>25</sup>

As it was already mentioned, both sides of the conflict insist on the fact that Nagorno – Karabakh belongs to their country. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan present different reasons why the region should be considered as the part of their territory.

For instance, Azerbaijani side gives a brief historical framework for the main toponym as one of proofs. The name of the territory «Nagorno - Karabakh» is translated from Russian as «mountainous Karabakh». And «Karabakh» is a «black garden» in Azerbaijani language. Azerbaijani Karabakh khanate’s vizier, Mirza Jamal Javanshir Garabaghli in *The History of Karabakh* (1994), originally published in 1847 (that describes the location and

<sup>25</sup> Retrieved from Igarapé Institute, 2018. *The Handbook of Conflict Prevention*. P. 26.

areas of coverage by Azerbaijan for this territory). That is why the status of the Karabakh region is historically proved even by scholars of XIX century.

Armenian side also presents different historical maps and data, but without references<sup>26</sup> proving that their statement is an evidence of the fact that Karabakh is Armenia. But the main focus of this chapter and my dissertation is not on ancient Karabakh history or maps, but on failed mediation attempts and origins of the conflict. So, it is important to mention legal acts that demonstrate the opinion of international organisations towards the Nagorno – Karabakh dispute.

The international legality was always on the side of Azerbaijan, because Nagorno – Karabakh was recognized as the territory of this state according to legal acts. For instance, resolution №822<sup>27</sup>, made by United Nations Security Council recognize the fact that Armenians occupied Nagorno – Karabakh and support territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.<sup>28</sup> Other resolutions, like UNSCR №853<sup>29</sup>, №874<sup>30</sup>, №884<sup>31</sup> reaffirm the resolution №822 and give additional recommendations for establishing the peace in the region. Moreover, UN Security is not only one international organisation that adopted legal act to support the position of Azerbaijan. I will present them in the Chapter 3, talking about efforts of various political actors to establish the peace in Nagorno - Karabakh.

It is important to start my analysis from the times of Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic that existed from 1922 to 1936<sup>32</sup>. Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia were included in Transcaucasia and ceded their powers of nominal character over

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<sup>26</sup> (...) «Artsakh (Karabakh) is an integral part of historic Armenia. During the Urartian era (9 – 6 cc. B. C.) Artsakh was known as Urtekhe - Urtekhini. As a part of Armenia Artsakh is mentioned in the works of Strabo, Pliny the Elder, Claudius Ptolemy, Plutarch, Dio Cassius, and other ancient authors. The evident testimony of it is the remained rich historic - cultural heritage».

(Official website of the President of the Republic of Armenia, Artsakh Republic: History and Current Reality) <https://www.president.am/en/Artsakh-nkr/> [Last accessed on 15/03/2021]

<sup>27</sup> Table 3 in the part 2.3 demonstrates all resolutions and their content.

<sup>28</sup> UN Security Council Resolution №822 <http://unscr.com/files/1993/00822.pdf> [Last accessed on 15/04/2021]

<sup>29</sup> UN Security Council Resolution №853 <http://unscr.com/files/1993/00853.pdf> [Last accessed on 15/04/2021]

<sup>30</sup> UN Security Council Resolution №874 <http://unscr.com/files/1993/00874.pdf> [Last accessed on 15/04/2021]

<sup>31</sup> UN Security Council Resolution №884 <http://unscr.com/files/1993/00884.pdf> [Last accessed on 15/04/2021]

<sup>32</sup> The year of adoption of the 1936 Soviet Union Constitution

finances, transportation, foreign policy, trade and other areas to the TSFSR's artificial authority. One year after establishment, in July 1923, The Nagorno – Karabakh Autonomous Oblast<sup>33</sup> (NKAO) was established under Soviet rule on the Azerbaijan Republic's territory. Already mentioned Constitution of 1936 not only abolished the TSFSR, but also proclaimed three parts as separate Soviet republics.

It is important to mention that Armenia had territorial claims even before the conflict - from the early years of Soviet Union era (Askerov, 2020:57). The claim of 1945 from Armenian side was especially remarkable, because it was reviewed by Kremlin and the opinion of Azerbaijan was taken into account. The leader of Azerbaijan's Communist Party, Mir Jafar Baghirov, was ready to discuss all issues, but in return he asked for three regions of Armenia – Vedi, Azizbekov and Qarabaglar – to join Azerbaijan. This decision was based on Azerbaijani population's overwhelming majority. This counterproposal of Azerbaijan made Armenia refuse from its territorial claims. However, Armenian government implemented policies for gradual expulsion of Azerbaijani people from Armenia. The period from 1948 until 1953 was the main deportation wave supported by Kremlin and Azerbaijanis' mass deportation from Armenia was completed in 1988: (...) Azerbaijan was the first among the former Soviet countries to face population displacement problems. The first flow of refugees (250,000 ethnic - Azerbaijanis) arrived from Armenia during 1988-1992 (Central Asia and Caucasus Disaster Risk Management Initiative, 2009:94).

The conflict around the Nagorno – Karabakh region re-emerged in 1987 because of the statement made by the Armenian Academy of Science. It demanded a transfer of the Nakhichevan and Nagorno – Karabakh territories to Armenia.

Abel Aganbegyan, Soviet – Armenian scientist and also member of Gorbachev's team focused on economic issues, escalated the dispute with her statement made in Paris in

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<sup>33</sup> «region» in Russian.

November 1987. Aganbegyan expressed the opinion about existing socio – economic problems in Nagorno – Karabakh and made a proposal to solve the Karabakh issues on the base of *Glasnost* and *Perestroika* reforms.<sup>34</sup> The Armenian scientist addressed to the Soviet leadership idea about the transfer of Nagorno – Karabakh to Armenia from Azerbaijan. This opinion implied that there were territorial and ethnic problems in the Southern part of Caucasus and only the land reallocation could help in resolving all issues.

The stage of the conflict	The Azerbaijan SSR	The Armenian SSR	Description of the conflict's stage
1987 - 1988	Kamran Baghirov (03.12.1982– 21.05.1988)	Karen Demirchyan (27.11.1974- 21.05.1988)	Linguistic, economic and national-culture dispute
1988 - 1991	Abdurrahman Vazirov (21.05.1988- 18.01.1990)	Suren Arutyunyan (21.05.1988- 05.04.1990)	Spring-summer 1988. The dispute over territorial status of the Nagorno – Karabakh region.
	Ayaz Mutallibov (25.01.1990- 14.09.1991)	Vladimir Movsisyan (05.04.1990- 04.08.1990) Levon Ter – Petrosyan (04.08.1990- 16.10.1991)	Fall 1988-1991. Ethnic clashes and open confrontation.

(Table 5)<sup>35</sup> The first Secretary of Azerbaijan and Armenian SSR (1987-1991). Years in brackets=years in office.

<sup>34</sup> New political and economic reforms of Gorbachev time.

<sup>35</sup> (Table 2) was elaborated in order to demonstrate who was on the position of the First Secretary of the Azerbaijani and Armenian Republics from 1987 until their independence. In the second and third chapters of this dissertation I will mention some of the leaders many times. It will be easier for the reader to have orientation on every stage of the dispute. The position of the First Secretary was considered the most significant in each Republic before 1991, when Azerbaijan and Armenia won their independence. Table 2 is created by me

The Armenian «Karabakh Committee» that was secretive as well as its separatist organization, «Krunck»<sup>36</sup>, were impressed by the statement of Abel Aganbegyan and started to function overtly. It was one of the evidences that the Soviet Union's political system showed first signs of serious cracks (Efegil, Kasimli, 2015). The watershed moment occurred on the 21<sup>th</sup> of February 1988, when Armenian citizens of Nagorno – Karabakh passed a resolution formally asking Moscow for full unification with Armenia. The resolution was independent and illegitimate according to legal acts. Azerbaijani and politicians of other nationalities did not take part in voting, only Armenian members<sup>37</sup> voted for total annexation of NKAO to the Armenian Socialist Soviet Republic. Many Kurds and Azerbaijani people living in Armenia were forced to leave homes and to become refugees. Armenian people also started to attack people of these nations and abuse their rights. All these rights' violations occurred within hours after illegal adoption of the Armenian resolution (as it was not made with nor recognized by the UNO).



(Map 2) Nagorno – Karabakh, region located between Armenia and Azerbaijan.<sup>38</sup>

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using all sources from Bibliography section about the history of Azerbaijan, Armenia, the USSR and the conflict in Nagorno – Karabakh.

<sup>36</sup> Was located in NKAO of Azerbaijan.

<sup>37</sup> Member of NKAO Soviet of People's Deputies.

<sup>38</sup> Nagorno – Karabakh region. Britannica. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Nagorno-Karabakh> [Last accessed on 15/05/2021]

Previously mentioned in this chapter classification of stages made by Yamskov is very accurate categorization, but it is clear that the author supports only Armenian side and does not mention violating of rights of the Azerbaijani people that was living in Nagorno – Karabakh. Talking about a **first stage** of the conflict, Yamskov expresses his opinion that dispute started between local Armenian citizens and authorities of autonomous region because of infringements on local Armenian population’s rights. Only one thing to agree with the political scientist Yamskov is the fact that during this time dispute was restricted only to the Nagorno - Karabakh region. Regarding violating the rights on the first step of the conflict – it is the Azerbaijani side that suffered from the policy implemented by Armenians. «Armenia without Turkish» was realized since the January 1988 in planned form (Mahudov, Shukurov, 2005). The members of Ichmiadzin church, committees of «Krunck» and «Karabakh» participated in the deportation process of Azerbaijanis and bloody actions against them.<sup>39</sup>

The **second stage** of the conflict is represented by Yamskov as exclusive conceptions of Azerbaijani and Armenian ethnic territories. He describes that the conflict called into issue the legitimacy of boundaries and administrative affiliation of Nagorno – Karabakh.

The **third** and the last **stage** of the dispute is described by Yamskov as confrontation that resulted in deaths of Armenians and Azerbaijanis, their massive migration to other republics. Yamskov finds it is very important to mention that in the fall 1987 many Armenians were expelled from Azerbaijan and overwhelming majority of Azerbaijani people were expelled from Armenia. But there is a lack of evidence to agree with the author about abuse of Armenians’ rights. While it is easy to find data, statistics, reports made not only by the Azerbaijani government, but also by various NGOs, photojournalists and political


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<sup>39</sup> Genocide and deportation of Azerbaijanis. <https://www.virtualkarabakh.az/en/post-item/30/111/genocide-and-deportation-of-azerbaijanis.html> [Last accessed on 15/03/2021]

scientists that clearly demonstrates that Azerbaijanis living in Karabakh suffered from violent actions of Armenia:

(...) 185 places of the settlement in Armenia were vacated, more that 250 000 Azerbaijanis and 18 000 Kurds were forcefully deported from their houses and 217 Azerbaijanis were murdered by the Armenians in the result of ethnical clearance. 49 of them froze in the mountains when they try to escape, 35 were killed under torture. (Virtual Karabakh, 2005)<sup>40</sup>

It is difficult to present data about Armenian refugees that left Armenia or Nagorno – Karabakh region, because not only the war, but *de facto* blockade by Armenian neighbors<sup>41</sup> that blocked almost all trade routes into the state forced people to leave their place of living. Soviet Union system’s collapse and the fact that «more than 70% of the country's former industries have been shut down»<sup>42</sup> (European Democratic Group, 1995) had an impact on Armenian population as well. One of the results of these dimensions is a big Armenian diaspora in many countries.



(Map 3) the Armenian Diaspora in the world.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>40</sup> Genocide and deportation of Azerbaijanis. <https://www.virtualkarabakh.az/en/post-item/30/111/genocide-and-deportation-of-azerbaijanis.html> [Last accessed on 15/03/2021]

<sup>41</sup> Blockade by Turkey, Azerbaijan. I will describe it in the third chapter.

<sup>42</sup> Report on the Humanitarian situation of the refugees and displaced persons in Armenia and Azerbaijan by the European Democratic Group. <https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewHTML.asp?FileID=6823&lang=en> [Last accessed on 15/04/2021]

<sup>43</sup> World – Armenia: Armenian diaspora. [Last accessed on 15/03/2021] <https://en.populationdata.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Monde-Armenie-diaspora.png>

The analysis of the first 4 years of the conflict presented in the next part of this chapter can help a reader to make conclusions about the dispute's nature before independence of both republics.

## **2.2. – The evolution of the conflict: 1987 – 1991 in the conflict zone.**

On the first stage of the conflict, it is difficult to predict its scenario and results. The dispute in the Nagorno – Karabakh was not the exception and no one could imagine that the conflict on the national - culture, economic and linguistic levels would result in long – going warfare. In the beginning the conflict was restricted only to the territory of Nagorno – Karabakh, but the Armenian diaspora embarked on a serious purposeful campaign abroad in order to seize the NKAO that was established within Azerbaijan. Previously mentioned Aganbegyan's interview in *L'Humanité* newspaper in 1987 influenced the situation and provoked mass rallies in Yerevan, where nationalists of Armenia used raised territorial claims to call for violence against Azerbaijani people in autumn 1987. The forced expulsion of Azerbaijani people that started in the late 1987 was a sign of growing instability not only in the Nagorno – Karabakh region, but also in Armenia. Until 1988 this country had been densely populated by Azerbaijani people. It is important to mention that « ... unlike the Armenians living in the Nagorno – Karabakh region, the areas densely populated by Azerbaijanis were not given an autonomous status by the Soviet leadership withing the Armenian SSR» (The official website of the President of Azerbaijan, 2020).<sup>44</sup>

The resolution that was illegally adopted on February 21, 1988, and NKAO was annexed to Armenian SSR. And the following day, the Armenian nationalists opened fire during the peaceful demonstration organised by Azerbaijanis against the decision made by

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<sup>44</sup> The official website of the President of Azerbaijan. Armenia – Azerbaijan Nagorno – Karabakh conflict. <https://static.president.az/media/W1siZiIsIjIwMjAvMDkvMDIvN29jeG9qNXZial9RYXJhYmFnXzlwMjBfRU5HLnBkZiJdXQ?sha=0bd92c6276c837fa> [Last accessed on 15/03/2021]

the Soviet of People's Deputies of NKAO. Two young Azerbaijanis were killed in this incident occurred near the Asqaran town located on the Khankendi – Aghdam highway.

Previously mentioned resolution was not only one act influenced the dispute. The Supreme Soviet of Armenian SSR decided to adopt a special resolution on NKAO's «inclusion» in the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic on June 14 of the same year. As the response to it, the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan SSR decided to reaffirm the status of NKAO within Azerbaijan SSR.

Finally, on July 18, 1988, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet adopted resolution. It expressed the impossibility to change the territorial and national division of Armenian SSR and Azerbaijan SSR. Adopting this act, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR showed the support to the principle of the territorial integrity, guided by USSR Constitution's relevant provision (Article 78).

Niccolò Machiavelli in his *The Prince* (2019) [1532] suggested that to act at the right moment immorally is more acute than ever. It emphasizes the idea that leaders decisions are not strongly affected by moral values, but the case of the Spitak earthquake that occurred in Armenia on December 7, 1988, is one of the exceptions of the Machiavelli's principles: despite the expulsion of Azerbaijanis from Armenia, Azerbaijan helped the country after the Spitak tragedy, sending units of equipment and tons of fuel, professional builders and even financial assistance like many other Soviet Republics (Central Asia and Caucasus Disaster Risk Management Initiative, 2009). But according to the Armenian official reports and articles, «foreign rescue teams» or «Soviet authorities» took part in providing emergency

help to the country.<sup>45</sup> Moreover, victims of earthquake are still waiting for the help from the government and around 4500 families have to live in makeshift shelters.<sup>46</sup>

Some political scientists are sure that it was the conflict in Nagorno – Karabakh that shook the Soviet Union system first. And it also demonstrated that policies towards Soviet nationalities were «not equally effective throughout the country» (Askerov, 2020:57). Military groups mostly sent from Armenia appeared in Nagorno – Karabakh and began destructive activities in the region. The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet even created the Special Administration Committee under these circumstances on January 12, 1989. But newly established committee was doomed to failure fast (it existed only until November 28, 1989).

Carrying out propaganda abroad, the Armenian diaspora was influencing the dynamics of the Nagorno – Karabakh dispute. For instance, the «human rights movement»<sup>47</sup> was established to defend Armenia’s interests and territorial claims. Some countries adopted several resolutions and expressed a support to Armenia on the base of diaspora’s pressure and propaganda (*Chapter 3*). Of course, in every conflict there are abuses on all sides, however, we should consider international law as the main source for evaluating the dispute

The conflict is already resolved, but the Armenian diaspora expresses the opinion that conflict is still ongoing and carrying propaganda against Azerbaijan.<sup>48</sup> It is important to mention that the number of Armenians living abroad has been increasing not only because of warfare, but mostly because of not developed economy in the country. Representatives of diaspora are «with a graduate, and often post – graduate, degree, and many have special skills

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<sup>45</sup> Earthquake response: 30 years of MSF in Armenia. <https://www.msf.org/earthquake-response-30-years-msf-armenia> [Last accessed on 15/03/2021]

<sup>46</sup> Spitak earthquake victims still waiting for help 25 years on. <https://www.dw.com/en/spitak-earthquake-victims-still-waiting-for-help-25-years-on/a-17272621> [Last accessed on 15/03/2021]

<sup>47</sup> «Memorial» organization.

<sup>48</sup> The official website of the Armenian Diaspora. Overview of the current conflict. <http://diaspora.gov.am/en/pages/126/Artsakh#b1752> [Last accessed on 15/03/2021]


or expertise» (Kasbarian, 2015: 368), but the fact that «about 30% of the population»<sup>49</sup> live outside the country affects even more negatively on the key sectors of economy. Instead of developing agriculture, labour market, education sector and financial services inside country, the Armenian government was focused on developing military sector (Graph 2).

Not only the Armenian diaspora and nationalists escalated the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Many decisions of Armenian SSR's Supreme Soviet revealed dispute's aggressive essence. For instance, the evidence of Nagorno-Karabakh's occupation is the adoption of «On the unification of Armenian SSR and Nagorno - Karabakh» of 1989 as well as that of the plan on the economic and social development of NKAO as the Armenian part. One year later, in May 1990, there was the parliamentary elections in Armenia, when the Armenian All National Movement managed to win. Chauvinists and the radical nationalists that were advocating warfare came to power. This resulted in military actions, because Yerevan<sup>50</sup> decided to concentrate on arming and establishing military informal units, not on the mediation process or negotiations.

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<sup>49</sup> Armenia needs to integrate migration into sectoral and national development strategies. <https://www.oecd.org/dev/migration-development/armenianeedstointegratemigrationintosectoralandnationaldevelopmentstrategiessaysnewjointoecddevelopmentcentrecrc-armeniareport.htm> [Last accessed on 15/03/2021]

<sup>50</sup> The capital of Armenia



(Graph 2) Military expenditure (% of GDP) – Armenia.<sup>51</sup>

The position of Azerbaijan was always based on the norms of international law, on the Constitution of the USSR and other legal acts (part 2.3). But the situation became more dramatic not only because of the choice of Armenia to use warfare instead of negotiations. The political elite of Azerbaijan and absence of a strong political leadership are also the reasons of tragic pages of the history of Azerbaijan. For instance, Ayaz Mutallibov, the last First Secretary of Azerbaijan SSR and the first President of Azerbaijan, had all chances to demonstrate strong leadership during difficult times for Azerbaijan, but did not managed and resigned in 1992.

Not only some Azerbaijani leaders of that times had a lack of leadership and that of effective management. Mikhail Gorbachev, the last leader of Soviet Union, is responsible for many deaths of Azerbaijani people. Raising national and independence movement in Azerbaijan was suppressed by using military aggression against civilians on 20 January, 1992.

<sup>51</sup> Military expenditure (% of GDP) – Armenia. The World Bank Data. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?locations=AM> [Last accessed on 07/07/2021].

This day when the Soviet troops entered Baku<sup>52</sup> and it resulted in 147 deaths is known as *Black January*<sup>53</sup>. As the Defence Minister, Dmitry Yazov, stated later, the use of armed forces in the capital of Azerbaijan was intended in order to prevent the overthrow of the Soviet power in the republic. This violent aggression against Azerbaijani people made the independence movement stronger. The Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan SSR adopted the resolution about the act of aggression on 22 January 1990 and declared that such measures as imposing the emergency rule in the capital and military deployment are evidences of violence against citizens. Suppression of independence and national movements occurred not only in Azerbaijan, but also in Georgia, Lithuania, Tajikistan, Byelorussia, Latvia and Kazakhstan. The Soviet Union authorities demonstrated lack of strong leadership and failure of national policies.

Talking about multiculturalism, many liberal theorists express the opinion: (...) antidiscrimination laws fall short of treating members of minority groups as equals; this is because states cannot be neutral with respect to culture. In culturally diverse societies, we can easily find patterns of state *support* for some cultural groups over others (Song, 2020: 4).<sup>54</sup>

The suppression of movements in Soviet Republics and violations of their rights demonstrated inability of Soviet Union to treat equally all nations. The resistance of national and independence movements was challenging and tragic, but not useless. The Presidents of Belarus, Ukraine and Russia signed important Belavezha Accords on December 8, 1991, declaring the end of the Soviet Union era by its founder governments. And on December 26 of the same year, «...the Soviets of the Republics of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union formally established the dissolution of the Union as a subject of international law: the multinational Bolshevik state ceased after 73 years» (Marcili, 2016:162). But the new era of

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<sup>52</sup> The capital of Azerbaijan.

<sup>53</sup> (Azerbaijani: *Qara Yanvar*).

<sup>54</sup> S. Song, 2020. "Multiculturalism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. P.4.  
<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/multiculturalism/> [Last accessed on 15/03/2021]

independence of Azerbaijan and Armenia from Moscow did not resolve the conflict. The dispute became even more complicated for analysis and for mediation process, because there was a shift from crisis to full – scale war between two countries. Moreover, after 1991 the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan became international one.

### **2.3. – 1991 – 2016. Failed peace.**

“We want peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. We want peace in the Caucasus region. We want peace in Southern Caucasus. And, therefore, we are putting up with this difficult situation. But patience has its limits”

(The Former President of Azerbaijan,  
Heydar Aliyev, July 18, 2002).<sup>55</sup>

The dissolution of the USSR not only gave independence to its former republics, but also raised nationalism within the diplomatic frontiers of new governments (Marcili, 2016:162). In the post – Soviet Union environment, linguistic, geographical, ethnic, historical, cultural and religious differences prompted people to reject their belonging sanctioned by the separation of the Soviet Socialist Republics’ Union. Hence, some enclaves within new independent countries were established. Transnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Nagorno – Karabakh are examples of this phenomenon that generated situation of «frozen conflicts». This kind of disputes includes active military battles that has been brought to the end, but there is no peace agreement that resolves the conflict. *De facto* these entities were independent from governments they belong to, in reality – they have a lack of international recognition and their existence is against several legal acts and historical order. Therefore, «frozen conflicts» can start again legally at any moment, destroying the international order and stability of particular region.

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<sup>55</sup> Retrieved from [https://www.azer.com/aiweb/categories/topics/Quotes/quote\\_aliyev.heydar.html](https://www.azer.com/aiweb/categories/topics/Quotes/quote_aliyev.heydar.html) [Last accessed on 05/03/2021].

New era of independence did not bring a peace establishment in the region. During the collapse of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan just began to develop its military power, while Armenia already had developed and well – trained military units. As it was mentioned in the part 2.2, Armenia preferred a military resolution of the dispute and had a superiority in military facilities from the beginning of the Nagorno – Karabakh conflict.

Years	Azerbaijan*	Armenia	NK
1991-2016	Ayaz Mutallibov (30.08.1991-06.03.1992) (14.05.1992-18.05.1992)	Levon Ter-Petrosyan (11.11.1991-03.02.1998)	Robert Kocharyan (29.12.1994-20.03.1997)
	Abulfaz Elchibey (16.06.1992-01.09.1993)	Robert Kocharyan (04.02.1998-09.04.2008)	Leonard Petrosyan** (20.03.1997-08.09.1997)
	Heydar Aliyev (03.10.1993-31.10.2003)	Serzh Sargsyan (09.04.2008-09.04.2018)	Arkadi Ghukasyan (08.09.1997-19.07.2007)
	Ilham Aliyev (31.10.2003-present)		Bako Sahakyan (19.07.2007-21.05.2020)

(Table 6)<sup>56</sup> The President of Azerbaijan/Armenia/the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (self-proclaimed and not recognised) (1991-2016). Years in brackets=years in office.

As it was already mentioned in 2.2., Azerbaijan had a lack of strong leadership during the first years of war. The term «leadership» is connected with «political trust» in this case. The term «political trust» is «generally defined as citizens’ confidence in political institutions, is an important indicator of political legitimacy – the belief in the righteousness of these

<sup>56</sup> Table 3 is created by me using all sources from Bibliography section about the history of Azerbaijan, Armenia and the conflict in Nagorno – Karabakh.

\*Yaqub Mammadov and Isa Gambar are not included in this table, because they were only acting Presidents of Azerbaijan with temporary duties in 1992.

\*\*Usually he is not included in the list of the NK Presidents, because he was only acting President.

political institutions and the regime of which they are part» (Turper, Aarts, 2017:416). Trust in political institutions or leaders shapes the behavior of citizens in accordance how it influences on democratic governance health. Everyone has a clear distinction in what and why he or she trusts. Such kind of differentiation can help in disentangling conceptual confusions in works on topic of political trust. Moreover, this approach can help to create new ideas towards determinants of trust in politicians and political institutions. Of course, trust refers to expected results from a trustee, but it does not mean that all expectations can be absolutely clear to the trustor's mind (Marcinkowski, 2016: 6 - 7).

Increasing sporadic clashes, armed conflict in the Nagorno – Karabakh region, acts of aggression against Azerbaijanis – and people were disappointed by Ayaz Mutallibov, the last First secretary of the Azerbaijan SSR and the first president of the state. Khojaly massacre occurred on February 26, 1992, irrevocably changed the opinion of the nation about Mutallibov. He demonstrated inability to manage war issues and to implement effective measures to protect the government: “(...) The Parliament forced President Mutallibov to resign; however, after a month of de - facto anarchy he returned to office, remaining President until May, when he fled the country having been overthrown in a d'état and replaced by Abulfaz Elchibey” (Hoch, 2020: 22).

The Khojaly tragedy was the worst massacre of the war in the Nagorno – Karabakh region. 613 people were killed by Armenians over the night of 25 – 26 February, 1992. Armenian paramilitary units and armed forces with a full support of the former 366<sup>th</sup> Motorized Infantry Regiment of USSR moved in to seize the Khojaly town.<sup>57</sup> Two days after the massacre, the helicopters with journalists managed to reach Khojaly despite the Armenian

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<sup>57</sup> Justice for Khojaly. How it happened. <https://justiceforkhojaly.org/content/how-it-happened-0> [Last accessed on 05/03/2021].

intense firing. Local and foreign reporters<sup>58</sup> witnessed what happened in completely civilian settlement.<sup>59</sup>

Armenia did not admit that Armenians killed Azerbaijani civilians in Khojaly, making statements that it was Azerbaijanis that committed the massacre themselves. But, Serzh Sargsyan, who was the Defence Minister that times and prime – minister and president of Armenia later, told in his interview to Thomas de Waal: (...) Before Khojaly, the Azerbaijanis thought that they were joking with us, they thought that the Armenians were people who could not raise their hand against the civilian population. We were able to break that [stereotype]. And that's what happened (de Waal, 2000).<sup>60</sup>

Even after the end of the war in Nagorno- Karabakh, Armenia do not want to take responsibility for committing genocide against Azerbaijanis in Khojaly, calling it «fabricated».<sup>61</sup>

The second President of Azerbaijan, Abulfaz Elchibey, was elected in 1992. He was the first anti – communist leader in the state and struggled against the regime since he was young. He was even prisoned because of his political views in 1975. One of the first decisions of the president was a withdrawal of the 4<sup>th</sup> Soviet Army from Azerbaijan and to establish the national Navy of the state. Regarding the situation in Nagorno – Karabakh, some days after elections, the army of Azerbaijan started the counter - offensive operation named *Goranboy*. By the fall of 1992 the control of over 40% of Nagorno – Karabakh was established by Azerbaijan. The country would have taken more territories if the Defence

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<sup>58</sup> Justice for Khojaly. International NGO Assessment.

[https://justiceforkhojaly.org/international\\_ngo\\_assessment](https://justiceforkhojaly.org/international_ngo_assessment) [Last accessed on 05/03/2021].

<sup>59</sup> Justice for Khojaly. International Media Reports. [https://justiceforkhojaly.org/international\\_media\\_reports](https://justiceforkhojaly.org/international_media_reports) [Last accessed on 05/03/2021].

<sup>60</sup> A President, an Interview, and a Tragic Anniversary. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2012/02/24/president-interview-and-tragic-anniversary/9vpa> [Last accessed on 05/03/2021]

<sup>61</sup> Khojaly denialism continues, despite hard proof and survivor testimony. <https://republic-underground.com/khojaly-denialism-continues-despite-hard-proof-and-survivor-testimony/>. [Last accessed on 05/03/2021].

Minister of Azerbaijan, Rahim Qaziyev, had not demonstrated mismanagement, controversy and corruption while making key decisions. Mistakes on the battlefield, in domestic and foreign policies influenced the decision of Azerbaijani people about his impeachment. National referendum held on 29 August 1993 stripped Abulfaz Elchibey of his presidency. Country was in a difficult situation and it was significant to have a leader that can have comprehensive approach of external and internal factors regarding the domestic policy and the conflict in the Nagorno – Karabakh region. It is very important to mention that during the presidency of Elchibey, some international organizations started to adopt resolutions on the dispute and discuss it. For instance, the UN Security Council adopted several resolutions and it was important for Azerbaijan, because the state could apply to international documents as one more proof of its occupied territories (Table 3). Talking about leadership in Armenia during the first years of independency, there was a political stability and the President of Republic, Levon Ter – Petrosyan, was in office until February 1998, despite he was accused of rigging elections of 1996 (Astourian, 2001).

<b>№</b>	<b>Purpose</b>	<b>Date</b>
<b>822*</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Cessation of hostilities</li> <li>- Withdrawal of all Armenian forces that occupy the Kelbajar district (+other occupied districts)</li> </ul>	30/04/1993
<b>853**</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Immediate cessation of all hostilities</li> <li>- Withdrawal of all Armenian forces that occupy the Agdam district (+other occupied districts)</li> </ul>	29/07/1993
<b>874***</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The preservation of the ceasefire</li> <li>- Cessation of all hostilities</li> <li>- Reaffirmation of resolutions 822 and 853</li> </ul>	14/10/1993
<b>884****</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Reaffirmation of resolutions 822, 853, 874</li> <li>- Confirmation of occupation of Zangelan and Goradiz districts by Armenia</li> </ul>	12/11/1993

(Table 7)<sup>62</sup> UN Security Council resolutions on the Nagorno – Karabakh dispute.

There was a crucial point when the level of dispute's intensity between Azerbaijan and Armenia had been increasing and the threat of the civil conflict emerged in Azerbaijan. The state needed strong leader that could establish stability in the country and to implement new tools to succeed in liberation its occupied territories.

Heydar Aliyev became the new leader of Azerbaijan in 1993. It is important to mention that he was the First Secretary of Azerbaijan SSR until December 1982, some years before the beginning of the dispute. His efforts resulted in significantly increased rates in social, cultural and economic growth rated in Azerbaijan SSR.

<sup>62</sup> Table 3 was created by me using UN Security Council Resolutions 822, 853, 874 and 884 as the main source [Last accessed on 15/04/2021].

\* UN Security Council Resolution №822. <http://unscr.com/files/1993/00822.pdf>

\*\* UN Security Council Resolution №853. <http://unscr.com/files/1993/00853.pdf>

\*\*\* UN Security Council Resolution №874. <http://unscr.com/files/1993/00874.pdf>

\*\*\*\* UN Security Council Resolution №884. <http://unscr.com/files/1993/00884.pdf>

He returned to political power on 15 June, 1993, after being selected the Chairman of Azerbaijani National Assembly. The high level of political trust let him assume temporary powers of president. And, finally Heydar Aliyev became the Azerbaijani President on 3 October 1993. There were many great reforms towards development of civil society, protecting human rights and freedoms. Moreover, he managed to rebuilt and transform relations with many countries and international organizations. He understood the high importance of it in order to establish the peace in Nagorno – Karabakh and wanted to liberate territories in the future.

New realities always demanded new reforms and significant changes in military sector as well. The President of Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev, created special Defence Council on November 1993 in order to:

(...) provide him direct oversight of military affairs and to curtail the loss of considerable Azerbaijani territory outside Nagorno – Karabakh. The new council, which reports to the president, also strengthened Aliyev's control over military and security affairs, which previously had been directed by Prime Minister Huseynov (Curtis, 1995:145).

Actually, this reform as well as the Law of Defence approved later by the Parliament of Azerbaijan, helped the country and its forces in 1994 to regain some parts of territory that was occupied by Armenians one year before. Trying to express the Armenian perspective, scholar S. Minasyan admits that:

(...) Therefore, Baku has only one option left – to threaten Armenia with a resumption of fighting, to step up militarization and widen a regional arms race, to publicly demonstrate the constant growth of its military spending based on revenues from the sale of energy, and to initiate repeated attacks and cease-fire violations along the front line (Minasyan: 2016, P.133).

The 1994 year is marked in the history of the conflict as signing the agreement on ceasefire, so – called *Bishkek*<sup>63</sup> *Protocol*. This protocol ended the First War in the Nagorno – Karabakh region and froze the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. 20% of Azerbaijani territory had been occupied by armed forces of Armenia.

Unfortunately, Armenia violated the Bishkek Protocol's principles several times (Table 5).<sup>64</sup> The most serious violations resulted in April War occurred in 2012. I want to analyse this war from the point of various political actors in the *Chapter 3*.

All violation's cases were during the Ilham Aliyev's term of office. He was elected<sup>65</sup> to be the President of Azerbaijan after the death of the former president and his father, Ilham Aliyev. The conflict in the Nagorno – Karabakh region was resolved in the end of 2020, also during Aliyev's term of office.

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<sup>63</sup> The capital of Kyrgyzstan.

<sup>64</sup> Not all the cases of ceasefire agreement' violations are presented in the table. I have chosen ones that evoked active discussion of different political actors (chapter 3).

<sup>65</sup> 2003 Presidential elections in Azerbaijan.

<b>2008 (Mardakert Clashes)</b>	<b>2012 Border Clashes</b>	<b>2016 April War</b>
04/03/2008	25/04/2012 -04/06/2012	01/04/2016 – 05/04/2016
<p>Began as the result of protests after the 2008 Armenian elections.</p> <p>Fights between ethnic Azerbaijani and Armenian forces.</p> <p>Result: The resolution 62/243 by UN General Assembly about immediate withdrawal of all Armenian forces.</p>	<p>5 Azerbaijani soldiers were killed. Several wounded.</p> <p>Results: Monitoring mission of the OSCE to the Tavush province for investigation.</p>	<p>Results:</p> <p>The victory of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan liberated some territories.</p>

(Table 8)<sup>66</sup> Violations of ceasefire Agreement by Armenia.

It is clear that every attempt of Azerbaijani government and people to raise awareness about occupied territories was considered by Armenia as a threat. Also, the developing of military sector is seen by Armenians as the danger for all country. Actually, it is not only one sphere constantly developed by the Republic, but Armenia always emphasizes and admits high standards of Azerbaijani military facilities. Armenia was an initiator of forceful armed resolution instead of negotiations with a focus on peace establishment. But significant number of Armenians residing abroad, propaganda and rejecting negotiations process were main tools to deceive world and other actors of the dispute. With a passage of time the conflict had experienced a shift to more complicated one (as it was described in Kaldor's theory about New Wars – *Chapter 1*) and other countries and international organizations

<sup>66</sup> Table 5 is created by me using all sources from Bibliography section about the history of Azerbaijan, Armenia and the conflict in Nagorno – Karabakh.

were also involved in the dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia. In the next chapter I will present other agents of the conflict and will analyze why their mediation attempts in a region failed.

## **Chapter III**

### **Political actors and failed attempts of the conflict's mediation (1991 - 2016)**

New Wars imply a great diversity of political actors on different levels. For instance, there can be states, organizations, or even individuals.

The process of the establishment of the new world order has galvanized actors and this is very clear in the case of the Nagorno – Karabakh conflict, that started in 1989. In the beginning it was just a dispute between two republics of the Soviet Union – Azerbaijan and Armenia. Independence of both republics in 1991 did not solve the conflict, but made it even more complicated. The same happened in many other regions, as we can observe by the example of the Abkhaz – Georgian conflict that was already mentioned in the first chapter of this dissertation.

The Nagorno – Karabakh dispute became an international one, and various actors were involved in it because of different reasons. Some political actors had the goal to establish peace in the region, others followed their own interests, even profiting from the perpetuation of warfare. It is important to mention that the conflict included all levels of actors. Different countries, international organizations as well as individuals (mostly – representers of diaspora) were actively involved in the dispute, as we will see. For instance, the UN and OSCE, both Armenian and Azerbaijani diasporas living in different countries, former Soviet Union republics. But not all of them were motivated to establish peace in the region, many actors just followed their political and economic interests, as described by Herfried Münkler (2003). For example, the arms supply to Armenia from Moscow had raised many questions regarding Russia as the mediator of the conflict.

The aim of this chapter is to present different actors that were involved in a conflict and analyze their attempts to mediate the conflict. Moreover, it is important to give answers to two questions in this dissertation:

- 1) *Why did mediation attempts in the Nagorno – Karabakh region fail?*
- 2) *Why only warfare, but not mediation attempts, helped to resolve the conflict in 2020?*

In order to present different political actors, I separated them in two groups:

- a) **location** (3.1/3.2/3.3/3.4/3.5/3.6/3.7).

This group was created to test if there is any correlation between support of the particular side/goals of the political actors and their distance from the Nagorno – Karabakh region.

- b) **religion** (3.1/3.2/3.4).

This group was created in order to demonstrate that the dispute was territorial, not religious, as it was stated by some Western scholars and many Armenians.<sup>67</sup> Moreover, I had a goal to show that the particular religion was not the indicator of support of the particular side<sup>68</sup>.

As we can see from the exposition of the two groups, some political actors were analysed from both location and religious aspect (3.1/3.2/3.4). International organizations selected for this chapter are out of this division (except the OIC), because they are out of religious and local context and have particular aim to set the international agenda.

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<sup>67</sup> As for example, Tchilingirian. This will be developed in parts 3.2 and 3.4.

<sup>68</sup> I have chosen political actors majority of whom are Muslims or Orthodox Christians.

Using Igarapé Institute's typology and Levinger's theory, described in the second chapter, I will analyze why attempts of political actors to establish peace in Nagorno – Karabakh were unsuccessful.

### **3.1 – Former Soviet Union Republics' efforts.**

As it was mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the conflict in the region started some years before the end of the Soviet Era, when both Azerbaijan and Armenia were not independent states. It became easier to understand the opinion of other Republics in the end of the USSR's era, when newly established governments obtained basic democratic rights. For instance, the right to form their own opinions that are not dependent from the Soviet Union system anymore. In this part I want to analyse attitude of Georgia, Ukraine, Belorussia, Moldavia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan towards the dispute in Nagorno – Karabakh and attempts of these republics to establish a peace in the region. There is only one time stage of mediation attempts for Belorussia, Moldavia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan: *1991 – 2016*.

Talking about Georgia and Ukraine, it would be fair to separate all mediation attempts in the Nagorno – Karabakh conflict into three stages:

*1) 1991 – until the conflict with Russia (2008 for Georgia, 2014 for Ukraine);*

*2) 2008/2014 – 2016.*

None of former Soviet Union Republics<sup>69</sup> recognized Nagorno – Karabakh as sovereign government. Only Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Transnistria recognised Artsakh.<sup>70</sup> It is very important to mention that all four unrecognized states formed an international

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<sup>69</sup> Even Armenia.

<sup>70</sup> But independence of Transnistria is not recognized by any United Nations member state, while Abkhazia and South Ossetia have its recognition from some of UN members.

organization named Community for Democracy and Rights of Nations in 2006. And the special agreement about creating this establishment was signed in 2001, some years before conflict between Georgia and Russia in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The organization was established in order to reach commonwealth and to create political cooperation among four unrecognized states. Unfortunately, political ambitions and world recognition were more important for member governments than mediation process and the rule of law on their territories.

Moreover, independence of all former Soviet republics brought not only transition processes towards democracy, but also new challenges and tasks. That is why mediation of the Nagorno – Karabakh dispute was not the main task for Belarus, Moldavia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Some of the countries from the list even had their own territorial or ethnic conflicts.

I placed Ukraine and Georgia to specific group, because they were more concerned about the conflict after their own territorial disputes with Russia. Moreover, Georgia could become one of the key actors and mediators of the conflict, because it is a neighbouring state for both Armenia and Azerbaijan. But territorial problem around Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as issues in domestic policy were priorities for the state.

During Soviet times the Russian language was one of the official languages for all republics. That helped to conduct many meetings on the Nagorno – Karabakh problem as well as common historical past. Newly established states, former Soviet republics were also aware of cultural features, mentality and cultural psychology of Azerbaijan and Armenia. All these dimensions let former republics understand important mediation principle: (...) when agreement cannot be reached on other sensitive issues, the mediator should also help the conflict parties and other stakeholders build into the agreement options or mechanism for

these issues to be addressed at a later time (United Nations Guidance for Effective Mediation, 2012:21).

GUAM<sup>71</sup> organization<sup>72</sup> created for Democracy and Economic Development in 1997 conducted all their sessions in Russian until 2014. But the conflict between Russia and Ukraine made it to be scrapped in favour of the English language. Organization was more effective in a free-trade agreements and deepening relations among its members, but not in mediation efforts, despite strong willingness to support each other's territorial integrity.

According to the Igarapé Institute's typology of dispute's prevention described in the second chapter, we can clearly understand that former Soviet Union republics managed to implement all kinds of conflict prevention:

- **operational** (*Mediation and Facilitation/Use of Force: Peacekeeping/Political Mission/Special Envoy/National Reconciliation and Dialogue/Migration and Refugee Response*). The Bishkek ceasefire agreement was signed in the capital of Kyrgyzstan in 1994 by representatives of Armenia, Azerbaijan, unrecognized Nagorno – Karabakh Republic and Russian representative of the OSCE Minsk <sup>73</sup> Group demonstrates strong cooperation, political and cultural connection between former Soviet Republics.
- **structural** (*Sustainable Development/Rule of Law, Justice and Citizen Security/Health Policy/Urban and Rural Development/Infrastructure Development: Communications, Transportation and Energy, Cultural Heritage Protection*). Belarus, Moldavia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Georgia and Turkmenistan were consulting closely both Armenia and Azerbaijan on the mediation

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<sup>71</sup> Abbreviation from first letters of member states – Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova.

<sup>72</sup> Uzbekistan was also the member of organization, but left it in 2005.

<sup>73</sup> The capital of Belarus

process' design. During the visits of any representatives from Armenian or Azerbaijani side, republics were trying to suggest ideas for resolving the conflict.

- **transnational** (*Cooperation Against Illicit Arms Trade and Violence and Terrorism/Migration Cooperation and Coordination*). All former Soviet Republics were always against warfare and was aware of specific approaches to negotiation. None of the Republics mentioned in this part were engaged in illicit arms trade.

Republics clearly understood the inability to resolve the conflict in the Nagorno – Karabakh conflict because of their domestic issues, but actively participated in creating peace proposals and in organization of negotiations.

### **3.2. – Turkish position and view on the dispute.**

Turkey is the country that expressed and did not changed its position towards the Nagorno – Karabakh dispute since the beginning of the conflict, but the active participation in mediation process for this country started only after Azerbaijan and Armenia won their independence. Despite being a neighbour of both states, foreign policy towards them was completely formed after the Soviet Union's dissolution as well. So, I can identify only one stage of mediation attempts: *1991 – 2016*.<sup>74</sup>

Sharing language, ethnic and religious similarities with Azerbaijan, Ankara has much wider implications in their relations with Baku. For instance, both countries were at the roots of establishment of the Turkic Council. This intergovernmental organization was created in 2009 in order to unite such full members as Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The Hungary plays the role of observing state in this organization. Despite the fact that political cooperation is not only one area of partnership, Armenians have their own

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<sup>74</sup> If I analysed the territorial conflict until its end, it would look like *1991 – 2020*. But in this dissertation I am interested in the period until 2016.

opinion towards the creation of this organization. They think that Turkic Council was established in order to unite capacities of Turkic speaking states and to gain Turkish strategic influence in Central Asia. Also the organization is considered by Armenia as the effective instrument to trigger instability in some regions of Russia, because Muslim population has been growing in Russia, mainly in Tatarstan and the North Caucasus. But this opinion is controversial, taking into account some facts. First of all, there are many areas of cooperation: educational, youth and sports programs, economic cooperation. Secondly, the activities of the organization are not conducted only in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Uzbekistan or Kyrgyzstan.<sup>75</sup> Finally, growing Muslim population is typical not only for Tatarstan or the North Caucasus. There are many Muslim regions in Russia that are located far from each other and growing Muslim population there – is not something new for the state and these locations as well.

Turkey is also one of the NATO member states, and this fact presented a challenge for Moscow as well as strong commitment to the position of Azerbaijan:

(...) Russian considers the entire South Caucasus region as its exclusive zone of influence. The interference of external actors in this region is not acceptable to the Kremlin. This is all the more so since the external actor is a NATO member that intends to establish a military base in Russia's immediate neighbourhood. On the other hand, Russia is not interested in a deterioration of its relations with all the parties involved: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey (Isachenko, 2020:2).

There were also many discussions towards the religious discourse in the framework of the Nagorno – Karabakh conflict. Armenian political scientist Tchilingirian in his *Religious Discourse on the Conflict in Nagorno – Karabakh* (1998) firstly expresses the opinion that both conflicting sides do not consider the dispute to be religious:

(...) Since the beginning of the «Karabakh movement» in 1988, the Armenian – Azeri conflict has been portrayed, particularly by the Western media, as an ethnic rivalry

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<sup>75</sup> Economic Cooperation. Turkic Council Official Website. [https://www.turkkon.org/en/isbirligi-alanlari/economic-cooperation\\_2](https://www.turkkon.org/en/isbirligi-alanlari/economic-cooperation_2) [Last accessed on 15/05/2021]

between «Christian Armenians» and «Moslem Azerbaijanis». And through the years both sides have persistently rejected such characterization (Tchilingirian, 1998:2-3).

But later, in the same article, Tchilingirian expresses position of Armenia towards Nagorno – Karabakh and use religious discourse as a proof. Also the author mentions the Islamic context of the war for Azerbaijanis in the same article. This is a contrary idea to the beginning of the paper. And Tchilingirian's opinion about religion as a factor of Karabakh issues is not uncommon for Armenians. But it is difficult to blame Azerbaijan for lack of tolerance to different religions, for example to Orthodox Church: the 40<sup>th</sup> OIC's anniversary was named «inter – civilizational dialogue: Insight from Azerbaijan» and was held on November 11, 2009. It was «aimed to promote the state policy on religion in Azerbaijan, and to promote the support for inter-religious and intercultural dialogue on the international scale and spread the practice of tolerance» (Nuruzade, 2016:5). It is important to mention that there were not only representers of the Muslim world, but also leaders of Georgian, Russian Orthodox Church, figures of the Vatican Constantinople and leaders of the Armenian Apostolic Churches.

Talking about Turkey as the important political actor, Armenia also thinks that common religion with Azerbaijan is an important factor of support as well. But it is not only one claim of Armenians.

Despite the fact that Turkey was one of the first states to recognise Armenia's independence, there were no establishment of diplomatic relations because of two reasons (Libaridian, 2004:245). The first was the precondition from Turkish side to stop any activities for international recognition of the Armenian Genocide. Turkey denies it and one of the reasons is the fact that most of resources cited by historians about the Armenian genocide are not reliable, including accounts of Western diplomats and Armenian survivors. The second issue was directly connected with the conflict in Nagorno – Karabakh. Turkey did not

recognize the Republic of Artsakh and condemned Armenian actions against Azerbaijan in Nagorno – Karabakh. Turkey – Armenia relations gradually worsened after the Khojaly Massacre<sup>76</sup> in 1992. Later all these dimensions resulted in closing the border with Armenia and blockade, economic and political one. Many experts believe that reopening borders with Turkey would help Armenia to improve economy:

(...) «Even with the border closed, Turkey is Armenia’s fifth largest trading partner via Georgia, with an annual trade turnover of more than \$200 million. The country manager of the World Bank in Armenia, Aristomene Varoudakis, cites figures predicting that when the border with Turkey re-opens, imported goods will be cheaper and their volume will increase by 13 percent over five years; transportation costs will be cut by 20 percent. Armenia will benefit from sharing an open border with a country that since 1996 has had a customs union with the European Union for trade in non – agricultural products» (De Waal,2010:3).

Turkey was one of the key actors in territorial conflict, but this state had clear position and supported Azerbaijan since the beginning of the dispute. One of the important rules of mediation is to «identify the level of inclusivity needed for the mediation to start and required for a durable peace that addresses the needs of all affected by the conflict» (UN Guidance for Effective Mediation,2012:26). Probably, if Armenia had improved relations with Turkey and had solved issues of the historical past, Turkey would have prevented full-scale warfare in 2016 and 2020. But when one of the sides of conflict has its own dispute with political actor, it is not possible for individual, state or organization to be a mediator. According to the CRRC<sup>77</sup>, 70% of Armenian people opposed involvement of Turkey in the dispute resolution because of its relations with Azerbaijan (Abilov, 2015:51).

Also, Russia wanted to prevent Turkey from entering its zone of influence and was trying to control Turkish mediation efforts.<sup>78</sup> Finally, Turkey could have been more focused on working with Armenian diaspora living in Turkey. There are many Armenian Orthodox

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<sup>76</sup> Mentioned in the second chapter

<sup>77</sup> The Caucasus Resources Research Center

<sup>78</sup> Part 3.3

Churches in Turkey, as well as there are some newspapers and channels that are in Armenian language. Having some tools and chances to mediate conflict before large warfare, Turkey focused on other tasks. Moreover, other political actors were trying to weaken mediation position of Turkey instead of building partnership with it in peacebuilding process.

According to the Igarapé Institute's typology of conflict's prevention, I can identify that Turkey managed to succeed in two kinds of conflict prevention:

- **operational** (*Mediation and Facilitation/Use of Force: Peacekeeping/Political Mission /Migration and Refugee Response*). Turkey was the initiator of the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform in order to establish cooperation among neighbouring states. In 2009 Turkey and Armenia even signed some protocols on normalization of relations. However, due to various internal and external reasons this initiative failed.
- **structural** (*Sustainable Development/Rule of Law, Justice and Citizen Security/Health Policy/Urban and Rural Development/Infrastructure Development: Communications, Transportation and Energy, Cultural Heritage Protection*). Turkey explained the support of Azerbaijan as a commitment to the rule of law, particularly supporting the UNSC Resolution 874 .

### **3.3. – Russia as the one of the key actors in the Nagorno – Karabakh conflict.**

Russia is a critical actor in the Nagorno – Karabakh conflict, but definitely one of the key agents in the dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia. In order to understand, why many experts tend to mention critical role of Russia, it is significant to identify main stages of its relations with Azerbaijan and Armenia. There has always been a strong correlation between political relations with both conflicting sides and mediation attempts of Russia.

Political scientist Anar Valiyev in his article *Azerbaijan – Russia relations after the Five – Day War*<sup>79</sup>: *Friendship, Enmity or Pragmatism?*(2011) suggests to divide relations between Russia and Azerbaijan into three stages. And his typology also can be used while identifying main stages<sup>80</sup> of mediation attempts by Russia in Nagorno – Karabakh:

1) 1992 – 2000, it covers all the presidency of Boris Yeltsin, when relations between Azerbaijan and Russia swung from neutral one to near hostile. Dimensions of instability in relations are in the fact of Russian political support and arms supply to Armenia (Valiyev, 2011).


2) 2000 – 2008, this stage covers two terms of presidency of Vladimir Putin. Russia became constructive and pragmatic partner for Azerbaijan. Economic interests of both states overtook political ambitions, and even business elite of Russia began to actively cooperate with Azerbaijan. Putin also managed to find common ground with Heydar Aliyev, the former President of Azerbaijan, and with Ilham Aliyev, current President of Azerbaijan. Hence, two states reached mutual understanding and realised an importance of new economic opportunities. It is quite interesting that partnership between Azerbaijan and Russia during these years did not change stable relations of Moscow and Yerevan. The main reason is that Armenia became dependent from Russian military and economic aid.

While making statements about the dispute in Nagorno – Karabakh, Russia emphasized the importance of peace establishment and negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

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<sup>79</sup> War between Russia and Georgia in 2008

<sup>80</sup> I presented all mediation stages, but analysed only period until 2016 in this dissertation.



(Graph 3)<sup>81</sup> (polls conducted in Azerbaijan) (Valiyev, 2011:3).

It is obvious that the level of trust to the Russian government among Azerbaijanis significantly decreased after the Russo – Georgian War and occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

3) 2008 – 2018, the war between Georgia and Russia occurred in 2008, as well as the fact of recognition of Ossetia and Abkhazia, made a dramatic shift in relations between Azerbaijan and Russia. Despite the fact that Russia acted aggressively only against Georgia, neighbouring state, a «fear» of Russian aggression re – emerged in Azerbaijan (Graph 3). Probably, not to lose such a strong partner as Azerbaijan, Russia started to be more active in mediation attempts for Nagorno – Karabakh. Moreover, Russian state representatives' visits became very frequent to the conflict zone. Relations of Russia with Armenia was still stable, and Yerevan emphasized that Moscow is a strategic partner for the state.

4) 2018 – 2020<sup>82</sup>, The Armenian «Velvet Revolution» occurred in 2018 raised several issues regarding possible implications for relations between Russia and Armenia. There is a tendency for revolutions in former Soviet Republics to influence their relations with Russia in a significant way. «Velvet Revolution»

<sup>81</sup> Graph retrieved from «Neither Friend nor Foe: Azerbaijanis' Perceptions of Russia» by A. Valiyev, 2011. P. 3.

<sup>82</sup> This stage is identified by me.

was not the exception. Nikol Pashinyan that became a new Prime – Minister, swept old Armenian elites out of power and demonstrated the motivation to improve relations with Europe, to loosen ties with Russia and also to strengthen relations with Iran. But it was difficult to achieve all these goals fast, because Armenia was still dependent on Russia in security and economic issues. Pashinyan was trying to prove that the Revolution did not have the context of geopolitics and promised to stay in the CSTO<sup>83</sup> (Collective Security Treaty Organization). Russia was always worried about the impact of western political actors on Armenia's foreign and domestic policy, that is why statements about development of relations with Europe made Kremlin change strategy. For instance, Russia raised tariffs for natural gas in Armenia. Regarding Russian relations with Azerbaijan, Moscow has strengthened ties with Baku and signed contracts in various spheres. As the result, during the 2020 war in Nagorno – Karabakh, Russia expressed the full reluctance to intervene in the region and to be against Azerbaijan. The ceasefire agreement of the 2020 Nagorno – Karabakh ended the 2020 war and was signed not only by leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia, but also by the President of Russia. The creation of conditions for effective post – conflict mediation including deployment of peacekeeping forces and safety guarantees for transportation is the better decision than selling military facilities or shaping opinion on the base of personal interests.

Using the typology of conflict prevention, Russia (as well as Turkey) has been using all types of dispute prevention not only in the time of territorial conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, but also in the post – conflict period. It is important to mention that

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<sup>83</sup> Azerbaijan was also in this organization, but made a decision about withdrawal in 1994 and not to extend the 5 – year Collective Security Treaty.

**structural** (all subcategories), **operational** (*Mediation and Facilitation*) and **transitional** (*Exchanges and Cooperation in Science, Technology and Culture*) tools of conflict prevention are still implemented by Moscow in order to avoid new ceasefire violations in future:

(...) peacekeeping is based on the assumption that an agreement has been reached between the two sides in a war; the task of the peacekeeper is to supervise and monitor implementation of agreement. The principles of peacekeeping as developed in the post – war period are consent, impartiality and the non – use of force. Peace – enforcement, on the other hand, which is authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, is basically war – fighting; it means intervening in a war on one side. The distinction is considered important because war – fighting is assumed to involve the use of maximum force, since Clausewitzian wars tend to extremes (Kaldor. 2012:132-133).

Instead of making decisions based on Armenia’s policy interests, the government of Armenia has chosen tactics of submissiveness to Russia, and even the Revolution of 2018 did not change the situation. As the result, short – term gained achievements for Armenia resulted in negative repercussions for the state’s future. Security and economic dependance from Russia sharply demonstrated submissive trends in Armenia. Azerbaijan has chosen economic partnership with Russia instead of unhealthy economic reliance on Kremlin, also promoting Azerbaijani interests in the international realm.

Russia is one of the key actors of the conflict and could have prevented new ceasefire violations. Following Kremlin’s interests, inability to shape particular stable position towards the conflict and the lack of mediation focus resulted in the fact that the dispute had been lasting more than 30 years.

### **3.4. – Iranian opinion towards the dispute.**

Iran is a neighbouring country for both Armenia and Azerbaijan. While Armenia only shares borders with this Islamic Republic, it is difficult to say that Azerbaijan is just a neighbouring country. Iran and Azerbaijan have also longstanding cultural, religious and

historical ties, and «the Islamic Republic, as the world's only Shiite regime, can hardly turn its back on a fellow Shiite – majority state at war with a Christian enemy» (Khoshnood, Khoshnood, 2021: 2).

In the part of this chapter about Turkey I proved that religion is not the main dimension for the political actor to support particular side. The case of Iran confirms this statement again. Because it is still quite difficult to identify the position of Iran towards the dispute in Nagorno – Karabakh, despite all connections between Azerbaijan and the Islamic Republic. The opinion of Iran had been changing several times, because of the shifts in geopolitical landscape that were not connected with the Nagorno – Karabakh issues. It is important to present main stages of relations between Azerbaijan and Iran, because they also reflect mediation stages and opinion of Iran that were changed several times.

- 1) 1988 – 1994, the President of Iran, Akbar Hashemi – Rafsanjani clearly stated that Armenia is aggressor that occupied territories of Azerbaijan (Khoshnood, Khoshnood, 2021:2). But at the same time Iran tried to mediate the fight between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In 1992 Armenia, Iran and Azerbaijan signed the Joint Statement of the Heads of State<sup>84</sup> in Tehran (**operational prevention - Mediation and Facilitation**). According to this legal act, both sides of the dispute agreed to organise negotiations at the top level in order to establish peace in the region. Unfortunately, this statement prevented the conflict not for a long time. As the result, the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, stated that it was Armenia that violated the ceasefire and oppressed the Muslim population of Nagorno – Karabakh. In 1994 the former President of Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev,

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<sup>84</sup> Joint Statement of the Heads of State in Tehran.  
[https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/ArmeniaAzerbaijanIran\\_JointStatementHeadsOfState1992.pdf](https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/ArmeniaAzerbaijanIran_JointStatementHeadsOfState1992.pdf) [Last accessed on 18/05/2021]

visited Tehran and Khamenei told about the religious duty for the people of Azerbaijan to defend their country. It would be easy to agree with some Armenians that talk about religion as a dimension for support Azerbaijan and to give as the example Iran, if I did not analyse all stages of relations between the Islamic Republic and Azerbaijan:

(...) If a conflict is motivated by multiple factors (let's assume: politics, economics, culture) in which religion stands as only one – not the foremost – of relevant factors in explanations, it becomes extremely hard and appellative to reduce this conflict *per se* to being religious. Therefore, for a conflict to be *only* religious there must be religious *causes* (motor of agency and behaviour) at play, independently of what this comes to mean, and not only religious *justifications* (vehicle for outrage) (Costa, 2019:179).

But as we know from the second chapter of this dissertation, the conflict in Nagorno – Karabakh is originally political and territorial one. So, according to the theory of Renatho Costa, the dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia cannot be considered as the religious one. The next phase demonstrates the predominance of geopolitical dimension over the religious one for Iran while shaping opinion towards the Nagorno – Karabakh conflict. Even after statements that included the support of Azerbaijan, Iran supplied Armenia with the weapon in order to help the Armenian population of Nagorno – Karabakh. Moreover, Iran was the only one energy supplier of Armenia when Turkey and Azerbaijan isolated it.

2) 1994 – 2016, Azerbaijan established strong partnership with Israel and the USA.

For instance, cooperation of Baku with NATO in a framework of Peace program or Azerbaijani support of the USA – led operations in Afghanistan even drove Tehran to sign JCPOA<sup>85</sup> agreement about nuclear non - proliferation in 2015. But when the USA re – imposed sanctions against the Islamic Republic, Azerbaijan suspended gas and oil deliveries to Tehran. But strong cooperation of Azerbaijan with Israel dissatisfied Tehran even more. And as the response, Iran warmed its

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<sup>85</sup> Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

relations with Armenia. Such presidents of Iran as Mohammed Khatami, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hassan Rouhani were in Armenia many times with official visits. Moreover, Iranian – Armenian trade had grown significantly. Armenia as the member of previously mentioned CSTO, gave Tehran a connection with Russia, whose support and goodwill was important for Iran in maintaining the status quo in Central Asia. Despite these geopolitical changes and the lack of particular opinion towards the Nagorno – Karabakh dispute, Iran still continued cooperation with Azerbaijan in culture, technology and science **(transitional prevention)**. The Islamic Republic always emphasized the importance of peace establishment while making official statements, despite the difficulties in relations with Azerbaijan and establishment close ties with Armenia **operational prevention** (*Mediation and Facilitation*).

Iran managed to create interesting motivation in shaping foreign policy approach regarding the regional countries. The state followed to improve relations with both Azerbaijan and Armenia, but still was hesitant to be involved in the Nagorno – Karabakh dispute. As we know this territorial conflict was between Christian Armenia and Muslim Azerbaijan, and maybe it would be more logical for Iran to support Azerbaijan, if the dispute was not only territorial, but religious one. But such factors as the lack of neutral behaviour or the lack particular opinion made Iran lose the possibility to be key actor of the conflict. Moreover, Iran was supplying Armenia with military facilities, what is against basic principles of mediation and also against conflict prevention typology presented in this chapter. Even the fact that country shares borders with both conflicting sides did not help Iran to mediate the conflict because of its subjective behaviour.

### **3.5. – The EU and its countries' efforts in mediation in the Nagorno – Karabakh region**

The European Union (EU) is the organisation with a significant impact on the world stage that enjoys trust of all states in the South Caucasus. But this organization as well as its countries had not managed to establish the peace in Nagorno – Karabakh region. This political agent is the exception among all actors presented in this chapter, because it is difficult to identify main stages of mediation not only for the EU, but also for its countries. I can only argue that the organization and European countries managed to be included into mediation process after the end of the Soviet Union era. But the Europe Union was established only in 1993, when the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan was already in active phase. And the resolution of this conflict was not one of priority tasks for the EU, despite the fact that one of organization's objectives is to strengthen stability, prosperity and security of the neighbouring countries. Regarding all European countries before the creation of EU, the situation is almost the same: countries were more focused on domestic policy issues than on attempts to mediate the conflict.

As it was already mentioned before, it is challenging to identify phases of mediation attempts for EU. One more reason is a fact that some countries had clear position towards the conflict: instead of being motivated to resolve the dispute, some states were trying to promote the image of Azerbaijan like this state is aggressor, not defender of occupied territories. It can be easily explained by high number of Armenian diaspora living in particular countries. The theory of New Wars by Kaldor mentioned in the first chapter is related to information war conducted by French Armenians. The fact that relations of France with Turkey had also become worse is a result of Armenian diaspora actions as well. New War journalism is one of the biggest obstacles on the way to mediation:

(...) At the same time, media discourses in general, and perhaps war journalism in particular, are embedded in a national foreign policy context. The effect of the warring parties' propaganda on media reporting depends to a large degree on this context. The polarized propaganda discourse that depicts the conflict in black-and-white has, not surprisingly, the


greatest impact on the involved parties' media, and consequently a lesser impact on the media of uninvolved countries (Nohrstedt, 2009:108).

Huge media influence also helped France to convince many people living in this country that Armenia tried to defend its territories, while Azerbaijan acted as aggressor because of the Turkish influence. As the result, according to statistics, Azerbaijani people did not want to see France as the mediator of the conflict (Graph 4). Moreover, there were many scandals, when France was one of co – chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group<sup>86</sup>, and Azerbaijani side was trying to convince OSCE to exclude France from mediators list. Armenia was always thankful for support to the French government and mediators from France in the Minsk Group.

Not only France, but also Greece that have difficult relations with Turkey, supported Armenia in the conflict with Azerbaijan, emphasizing the Turkish influence on a conflict. That is why it is difficult to say that France and Greece were using **operational** tools for the dispute prevention (*Mediation and Facilitation*). But regarding the relations with Armenia, both countries were actively involved in using **transitional** instruments for conflict prevention. For instance, organising exchanges and cooperation in science, culture or technology (predominantly for the Armenian diaspora living in France or Greece).

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<sup>86</sup> I am writing about it in the part *International organizations*.



(Graph 4)<sup>87</sup> As we can clearly see from the graph, France was preferred to be «not involved at all» country in the mediation process by Azerbaijanis.

The rest of the European countries were deeply concerned by the situation in Nagorno – Karabakh, but never – deeply involved in resolution. Such **operational** measures for conflict prevention as the humanitarian help for both Azerbaijan and Armenia or initiating negotiations demonstrated initiative, but had not stimulated Armenia to follow legal acts adopted by international organizations. It is great that democracy existing in the states of the EU let them have a great diversity of political parties, but it is not appropriate when any political party supports separatism and does not respect principles of international law and legal acts about territorial integrity. For instance, ultra – nationalist political party «AfD» from Germany visited Nagorno – Karabakh<sup>88</sup> and showed the full support to Armenia. Not all the people are aware of the fact that this party is anti – Islam and far right, as well as of fact that this organization does not reflect the opinion of all German people, the Germany authorities and the EU. Maybe that is why most of the European countries and the EU had not

<sup>87</sup> Retrieved from the Caucasus Research Resource Centers “Nagorno – Karabakh: Prospects for a Difficult Reconciliation (Azerbaijan)”. <http://crrc-caucasus.blogspot.com/2012/08/nagorno-karabakh-prospects-for.html> [Last accessed on 28/05/2021].

<sup>88</sup> It was against the Azerbaijani law.

managed to be key agent in the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Mostly probably the lack of trust into the EU's objectivity was shaped by such cases.

Portugal is a great example of the state in the EU that supports basic principles of organization and international law. But there are some organizations and political activists that supported separatists' regime, non – recognized states' formation and occupation.

The OSCE Lisbon summit held in 1996 is famous for discussions around the Nagorno – Karabakh problem. Chairman – in – office admitted that «no progress has been achieved in the last two years to resolve the Nagorno – Karabakh conflict and the issue of the territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan» (OSCE, 1996:15).<sup>89</sup> The representers from Armenia were not agree with all principles described in document and argued that Armenia defended its territories.

Portugal was always on the side of international law and did not recognized Artsakh as independent state. The country always expressed the importance of peace establishment in the region and that of negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The former President of Portugal, José Manuel Durão Barroso, visited both countries several times not only to emphasize the significance of partnership in different sectors, but to call both conflicting sides to conflict resolution. But partnership with Azerbaijan in a trade or discussion about the Southern Gas Corridor with Azerbaijan were more productive than discussions about the territorial problem. It was always more beneficial for Portugal not to lose stable friendly relations with both conflicting sides and to make statements about the importance of peace, but not to be actively involved in the dispute resolution.

Particular organisations or political activists in Portugal are more active towards the Nagorno – Karabakh problem than state's officials. Mentioned in the first chapter Gulbenkian

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<sup>89</sup> OSCE Lisbon Summit 1996. Lisbon Document 1996. <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/1/0/39539.pdf> [Last accessed on 28/05/2021].

Foundation that originally was created in order to promote new forms of entrepreneurship, rapid urbanization or to implement new approaches in Education and Health, donating money to separatism – supporting foundations like Hayastan All Armenian Fund<sup>90</sup>. The current President of the Gulbenkian Foundation, Isabel Mota, made a statement that «the challenges in 2020 were many, especially in Armenia and the Armenian communities in the Middle East»<sup>91</sup>. Humanitarian help is one of the effective tools in mediation, but when it is sent to the foundation that supported attacks of Azerbaijani cities that are located out of conflict zone, there is the doubts about Gulbenkian Foundation awareness of situation in Nagorno – Karabakh.

Political actors can be not only organisations or countries, but also individuals. Diogo Pinto, the Portuguese advocate and activist, served as the Director of EuFoA (European Friends of Armenia) between 2016 and 2018. The organisation was created not only to develop partnership of Armenia and the EU in business, politics and culture, but also to raise awareness of the EU about the Armenian position towards the Nagorno – Karabakh conflict. Pinto broke the law of the Azerbaijani Republic, because several times he travelled to Nagorno – Karabakh in order to publish opinions and to give interviews, while the region was occupied by the Armenian military forces.<sup>92</sup>

Being one of the most successful establishments in the history of world politics, the EU showed inability to resolve the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. There are some reasons, why mediation attempts and operational tools of the dispute prevention were not effective:

- 1) The EU and its countries were involved in the mediation process only after the dissolution of the USSR, when the conflict was already in the active phase.

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<sup>90</sup> Was mentioned in the Chapter 1.

<sup>91</sup> 100,000 USD Donation to Hayastan All Armenian Fund for Humanitarian Support. <https://gulbenkian.pt/en/news/100000-usd-donation-to-hayastan-all-armenian-fund-for-humanitarian-support/> [Last accessed on 28/05/2021].

<sup>92</sup> Conclusion made on the base of the UN Security Council resolutions.

- 2) The partnership with Armenia and Azerbaijan was more important for the EU and its stability than the focus on the conflict resolution.
- 3) The level of political education of people from most of former Soviet Republics is not so high as that of people from the EU. Azerbaijani and Armenian people correlated some radical political parties, activists and their opinion with the EU and its states.
- 4) Some countries like Greece or France shaped their opinion towards the conflict under the influence of the Armenian diaspora. In some cases it depended on domestic policy's priorities. Mediator does not use these methods while trying to resolve the conflict.

### **3.6. – The opinion of USA.**

Talking about such political actor as United States, we need to analyse and divide its mediation attempts into three time stages:

- 1) before independence of both republics (before 1991);*
- 2) 1992 (Freedom Support Act) – ceasefire agreement of 1994;*
- 3) ceasefire agreement of 1994 – April War (2016).*

The United States of America recognised independence of Azerbaijan and Armenia in the end of 1991. And since 1992, this political actor not only established diplomatic relations with both republics, but started to be involved in the conflict resolution processes. Before independence, the dispute between these republics «was considered to be purely a USSR domestic matter» (Pashayeva, 2016:8).

The USA was one of eleven<sup>93</sup> states scheduled to attend a special conference on the Nagorno – Karabakh problem to be held in Minsk under the CSCE's<sup>94</sup> auspices. The USA's policy towards Nagorno - Karabakh dispute was constrained according domestic lobbies and politics that act on interests in comparison with global interests and role of the US in the world.

Since Azerbaijan has substantial resources of energy, interests of the US were in protection of Azerbaijan's stability and integrity. On the other hand, some domestic constraints prevented the administration of US from acting like the neutral political actor in the dispute resolution. Armenian diaspora is one of dimensions that influenced this fact.

It is very important to mention that role of Armenian diaspora is very influential in Armenian domestic politics:

(...) It is estimated that the Armenian Diaspora accounts for about 5.5 million individuals, which by far exceeds the number of Armenia's residents (3 million). About two – thirds of the aggregate annual family incomes of 1 million Armenians who live in California may be 15 times higher than the entire GDP of the Armenian economy (Minoyan, Freinkman, 2005: 1).

In 1992, because of Armenian lobby's influence, the US Congress decided to pass Freedom Support Act<sup>95</sup> that prevented government from sending humanitarian help to Azerbaijan. This fact had the negative impact on relations between Azerbaijan and US during a long period of time.

The US managed to play the role of mediator only after ceasefire was brokered in the Nagorno - Karabakh region. For instance, ambassador John Maresca, who was US representative in the Minsk Group of OSCE, made a peace proposal towards Nagorno - Karabakh conflict in July 1994. This proposal was based on principle of associated statehood.

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<sup>93</sup> The USA, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Sweden, France, Germany, Russia, Italy.

<sup>94</sup> Conference on Security and Co – operation in Europe.

<sup>95</sup> H.R.4547 - Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of 1992 [Last accessed on 15/05/2021] <https://www.congress.gov/bill/102nd-congress/house-bill/4547>

It meant that Nagorno - Karabakh would be legal formation with self-governance within sovereign state of Azerbaijan. Talking about rights, Karabakh would have chance to have local security system with self - defence forces, but without offensive military forces. Armenia would obtain rights to maintain links of transit kind via the Lachin corridor with Nagorno - Karabakh, while Azerbaijan would have transit to the Nakhichevan region via Armenia (Maresca, 1994). Such organizations as UN Security Council and the OSCE should be guarantors of this agreement implementation. Unfortunately, peace proposal was not successful. Each side of the conflict stated that entire Karabakh belongs to it and cannot be agree with any compromise. It is important to admit that in case of this conflict US missed a lot of opportunities to take part in resolution before and after ceasefire. The USA was one of three co – chairs of the Minsk Group along with Russia and France and despite the existence of influential and strong mediation team, did not manage to help in conflict resolution. We can identify all reasons using the Igarapé Institute’s typology of dispute’s prevention described in the previous chapter:

- **operational** (*Use of Force: Peacekeeping*). The government was even one of three co – chairs in the OSCE Minsk Group, but the role was almost passive<sup>96</sup>. The first reason of unsuccessful attempts is the fact that US considered Russia to be major political actor in Nagorno - Karabakh as well as mediator in terms of security. Moreover Russia has common historical past with Armenia and Azerbaijan, could conduct negotiations in Russian language that was one of the official languages in both republics during Soviet times. Another reason is «common perception over the years of this conflict as “frozen” and not “a high priority” conflict. It has therefore not received appropriate attention from external powers, the international media, or the mediators themselves» (Pashayeva, 2016:7);

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<sup>96</sup> Part 3.8. International organizations.

- **structural** (-), but there was a high possibility of «Health policy» and «Sustainable Development» in 1992. It did not happen because of previously mentioned Freedom Support Act;

- **transnational** (-). The fact that the USA is located far from Nagorno – Karabakh, does not have common historical past or language background with Azerbaijan or Armenia made it difficult to use such tools as «Disaster Resilience Cooperation» or «Cultural and Educational Exchanges» in order to establish the peace in Nagorno - Karabakh. But it is important to mention that the USA achieved the realization of different cultural and educational programs in Azerbaijan that are not connected with Nagorno – Karabakh problem.

### **3.7. – Views of former Soviet Union Republics that later became a part of the European Union (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania).**

The case of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is unique. Three former republics of Soviet Union that won their independence and later became the part of the European Union. The democracy index of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 2020 were identified as «flawed democracy» and accounted for 7.84, 7.24 and 7.13 respectively (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2020).<sup>97</sup> In comparison with other former Soviet Republics it is a great result. All three states could be effective mediators in the Nagorno – Karabakh region. Having experience of Soviet historical past and that of European political model, they could suggest new ideas for conflict resolution instead of conducting warfare. I can identify two stages of mediation attempts for three countries:

*1) 1990 (the year of winning the independence) – 2004 (the year of joining the EU)*

During the shift from communism to democracy three countries even established the Baltic

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<sup>97</sup> Out of 10 points

Assembly that not only promotes intergovernmental cooperation between Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia, but also attempts to find a common opinion towards many international issues. But all decisions and recommendations of this assembly are only advisory;

2) 2004 – 2016 (*April War in Nagorno - Karabakh*). In a framework of the EU and the Baltic Assembly, three countries made several statements and peace proposals<sup>98</sup> (advisory) regarding the resolution of the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Regarding the Igarapé Institute's typology, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were interested in all kinds of conflict prevention:

- **structural** (all subcategories).
- **operational** (*Mediation and Facilitation*).
- **transitional** (*Exchanges and Cooperation in Science, Technology and Culture*).

Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia had all chances to help Azerbaijan and Armenia in a conflict resolution after joining the European Union, but members of the Baltic Assembly had a priority of solving issues inside their state and inside the Europe Union. The process of European and transatlantic integration was also more important for three countries. Moreover, location of these governments was far from the conflict zone. Hence, it was not the security issue of great importance for Latvia, Estonia or Lithuania.

### **3.8. – International organizations (UN and its institutions, OSCE).**

Kaldor in her *Old and New Wars* (2012) emphasizes that globalization was the dimension which have brought the presence of international agencies in disputes (Kaldor, 2012:5). They can range from non – governmental organizations (Human Rights Watch, Save the Children) to international institutions (EU, OSCE, UN).

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<sup>98</sup> Declaration concerning proposals related to the solution of the problem of Nagorno - Karabakh [Last accessed on 15/05/2021] [https://www.baltasam.org/images/front/pdf/8\\_Karabah\\_EN.pdf](https://www.baltasam.org/images/front/pdf/8_Karabah_EN.pdf)

International organizations carry various roles, but many of them (for instance, UN) have been established in order to mitigate conflicts internally and between states. Actions of these organisations are based on universal principles and international law in order to promote cooperation and peace. Hence, even domestic disputes rarely remain state's internal affairs, and are frequently subject of intervention by regional or international actors.

International organization is «an institutionalized arrangement among members of the international system to solve tasks which have evolved from systematic conditions» (Hanrieder, 1966:297). Therefore, organization is able to reflect aspirations, preoccupations and attributes of its members. The definition by Hanrieder outlines the key premise of all international organizations. The power and sovereignty of international institutions, their roles and objectives are given by member states. As the result, the efficiency and quality of international organization can be considered as the reflection of efficiency and quality of the partnership between its member states.

Many international institutions that have structural complexity, actively engaged in a peacebuilding process. There are two approaches for organizations to establish the peace. Leading states and institutions prefer to use top – down way that includes hegemonic and monolithic processes (Mac Ginty, 2010:391). Another way was identified by through theoretical debates among political scientists. It is expressed in the creation of hybrid peace for states that are war – torn. This approach is bottom – up and includes indigenous and exogenous forces.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union brought not only the independence to Azerbaijan and Armenia, but also the possibility to involve different international organizations in their territorial dispute in Nagorno – Karabakh.

The United Nations, organization that was founded after the Second World War, was established in 1945 in order to establish stable partnership among various nations and to

promote the progress in social sphere. Keeping peace in the world is also one of key purposes of the institution that has various principal organs, such as General Assembly, Security Council, International Court of Justice, etc. There are many UN Entities that had been making efforts for resolution of the conflict in Nagorno – Karabakh without using military warfare: UN in Armenia, UN in Azerbaijan, International Organization for Migration (IOM), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

Talking about the initial proceedings towards the situation in Nagorno – Karabakh, it is important to mention two letters from leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia to the President of the Security Council. Letter with the statement of the President of Azerbaijan dated 9 May 1992 and transmitted through Azerbaijani representative, warns about «the grave situation in Nagorny – Karabakh as a consequence of the intensifying attacks of Armenian forces»<sup>99</sup> (UN Security Council, 1992). In this letter the representative of Azerbaijan also states about the destruction and occupation of the Shusha city, expressing the opinion that violation of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and sovereignty is serious threat for peace. Two days later, the representative of Armenia transmitted the letter from the President of Armenia to the President of the Security Council. According to this letter, there was a request of emergency meeting of the UN Security Council in order to discuss the escalation of the dispute in Nagorno – Karabakh, the threat expressed in potential outside intervention, continuing economic and political blockade of both Nagorno – Karabakh and Armenia.<sup>100</sup>

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<sup>99</sup> Retrieved from «Letter dated 9 May 1992 from the permanent representative of Azerbaijan to the UN addressed to the President of the Security Council». <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/142136?ln=en> [Last accessed on 15/05/2021]

<sup>100</sup> Retrieved from «Letter dated 11 May 1992 from the permanent representative of Armenia to the UN addressed to the President of the Security Council». <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/166136?ln=en> [Last accessed on 18/05/2021]

Regarding the Igarapé Institute's typology, UN institutions' reaction on described initial proceedings and the conflict itself was expressed in only one kind of conflict prevention:

- **operational** (*Mediation and Facilitation, Peacekeeping, Political Mission*). In 1993 the UN Security Council adopted several resolutions (822, 853, 874 and 884) that confirmed the occupation of Nagorno – Karabakh by the Armenian forces.

The adoption of the resolution 60/285 named «The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan» in 2006, clearly demonstrated the position of the UN and its institutions. Despite the main purpose to establish the peace in the region, the UN General Assembly stressed the support of territorial integrity for Azerbaijan.<sup>101</sup>

Later, in 2008, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 62/243<sup>102</sup> based on UN mission in 2005. This legal act reaffirms previous resolutions and confirms that territories of Azerbaijan are occupied by Armenia (on the base of fact – finding mission by OSCE Minsk Group).

(*Migration and Refugee Response*). UN General Assembly adopted the resolution 48/114 named «Emergency international assistance to refugees and displaced persons in Azerbaijan» that recalls previous resolutions and confirms the fact of displacement of Azerbaijani people from their land.<sup>103</sup>

The UN and its institutions adopted many resolutions and had various discussions towards the establishment of peace in Nagorno – Karabakh. According to them, Nagorno – Karabakh belongs to Azerbaijan, and Armenia occupied these lands. But all resolutions and other legal acts had advisory character. Moreover, all the mediation attempts of the UN were

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<sup>101</sup> Resolution 60/285, «The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan».  
<https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1493339?ln=en> [Last accessed on 18/05/2021]

<sup>102</sup> Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 14 March 2008. <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/478/35/PDF/N0747835.pdf?OpenElement> [Last accessed on 18/05/2021]

<sup>103</sup> Resolution adopted by UN General Assembly on 23 March 1994.  
<https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/180200?ln=en> [Last accessed on 18/05/2021]

based only on universal principles and international law and did not take into account cultural and historical dimensions of the dispute. That is why all attempts of the UN to mediate the conflict through negotiations failed.

There is another important political actor that was involved in the territorial conflict many years – the Organization for Security and Co – operation in Europe (OSCE). The institution that was established in 1973 is the largest intergovernmental security – oriented organization in the world. In order to resolve the conflict in the Nagorno – Karabakh using mediation tools, there was the establishment of the Minsk Group in 1992. Three co – chairs: Russia, France and the USA that were supposed to encourage resolution through peaceful methods, were accused of not being effective. 28 years of mediation attempts by the Minsk Group were not so successful as 44 days warfare of 2020 that resolved the territorial conflict. First reason is the fact that one of co - chairs, Russia, were a strategic partner for Armenia, and mediator should be neutral towards both conflicting sides and be focused only on peaceful resolution of the dispute. Secondly, all three countries of the Minsk group have large diaspora of Armenians that were conducting information war abroad. Finally, the OSCE decided not to implement more effective mechanisms suggested by conflicting sides. For instance, there were suggestions about the replacement or addition of co – chairs. The USA, Russia and France were following their interests and were not interested in new co – chair that could undertake initiation. The Madrid Document<sup>104</sup> adopted in 2007, included only basic principles and recommendations for Azerbaijan and Armenia. Supporting equal rights, territorial integrity and non – use of Force, the Minsk Group have not suggested particular measures to ensure stability and peace in the region.

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<sup>104</sup> OSCE Minsk Group, Madrid Document. <https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/0b80bb/pdf/> [Last accessed on 20/05/2021]

According to the Igarapé Institute's typology, OSCE and its Minsk Group used only one kind of conflict prevention:

- **operational** (*Mediation and Facilitation, Peacekeeping*). Madrid Principles based on the most important principles of mediation were created in order to fasten peace process between Azerbaijan and Armenia, but «only 6 out of 14 have been agreed upon and are made public» (European Movement International, 2013:5).

Some of conflict prevention's tools were not clear even for political actors:

(...) With regards to OSCE field presence, the Personal Representative Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk is based in Tbilisi, Georgia. In a 2010 article it is mentioned that Ambassador Kasprzyk monitors the ceasefire and established Line of Contact with five assistants. They visit both sides of the front-line, gather information and file reports. It is however unclear to what extent there is presence of any the other actors involved in OSCE Minsk group in Azerbaijan, Armenia and/or Nagorno-Karabakh. Both the OSCE Yerevan Office as well as the OSCE Baku Office explicitly mention online that they do not deal with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (European Movement International, 2013:5-6).

Most of international organizations as UN, OSCE used principles of Western style democracy that «will not work in developing countries» (Kühne, 1996:92). The dispute in Nagorno – Karabakh demanded not only the implementation of international law and universal principles for peace establishment, but also the understanding of cultural psychology, historical background and relations with other political actors. Moreover, recommendations, resolutions and statements of international organisations had advisory character, so they could have been implemented only after the positive reaction on them from both sides of the conflict. Countries involved in the peace process were following their interests and not focused on the dispute's resolution.

All conditions important for the mediation process were not taken into account, that is why we witnessed violations of ceasefire and full – scale warfare in the Nagorno – Karabakh

dispute. Hence, it is not unexpected case that the territorial conflict was resolved in 2020 only after military fight between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Various tools of conflict prevention cannot guarantee successful mediation of the dispute. When political actors involved in the conflict have a goal to establish peace, but not to follow their own interests, the resolution of the dispute is more than real. Actors of the Nagorno – Karabakh conflict are not exceptions, because most of them were focused on their own aims. Even international organizations that were created in order to manage conflicts and interstate relations, demonstrated their inability for successful mediation. Advisory character of legal acts and particular interests of some member states or individuals made the mediation attempts of international organizations ineffective.

## Conclusion

The dispute in Nagorno – Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan is one of examples of New Wars according to the Mary Kaldor's theory. Newly established independence of both republics and re – arranged geopolitical system did not help to resolve the conflict through peaceful methods. Moreover, tendencies of the new world order had made conflicts even more complicated. The territorial conflict in Nagorno – Karabakh was resolved in 2020 as the result of full – scale warfare, but not as the result of successful mediation attempts.

After analysing mediation attempts of different agents, it is clear why they were not effective mediators in the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

**Firstly**, all *political actors were involved in the conflict as mediators only after the dissolution of the USSR*. When both Azerbaijan and Armenia were still Soviet Republics, the conflict in Nagorno – Karabakh was not international one. Hence, only authorities of the USSR had access to key decisions and information about the dispute. The conflict had already been in its active phase for some years, when other states, organizations or individuals started the peace establishment process.

**Secondly**, instead of being focused on peace in the region, some *political actors followed only their own interests* in politics. For instance, Russia had been shaping its opinion towards the conflict on the base of foreign and domestic policy of Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan. When Armenia started to improve relations with the West after the Velvet revolution, Russia had chosen Azerbaijan as important strategic partner and did not intervene in the 2020 Karabakh war to help Armenia.

**Thirdly**, *many agents did not have enough political power on a global scale*. For instance, former Soviet Republics just won its independence and was focused on their own

domestic and foreign policy. It could not let them work only on the Nagorno – Karabakh problem.

**Fourthly**, it is quite difficult to say that Russia or Iran were mediators in 1991-2016. Towards the typology of conflict prevention, mediator fights against usage of violence and supports disarmament demobilization. As we know from the third chapter, both Russia and Iran *supplied Armenia with military equipment and weapon* on different stages of the Nagorno – Karabakh conflict.

**Moreover**, the dispute in the Nagorno – Karabakh that can be considered as a New War, included the *information warfare* that was conducted by the Armenian diaspora. For example, it influenced the opinion of the USA towards the conflict and prevented the States from sending humanitarian help to Azerbaijan. Armenian diaspora still has a great impact on image of Azerbaijan in France, trying to create the reputation of aggressor. Propaganda and false narratives had not facilitated the mediation process, but had become one more reason, why conflict became more complicated for analysis.

We can even consider diaspora as one more political actor that is very controversial. Living outside the country, it can be identified as non-state agent, but in reality it promotes ideas of particular country (like in cases of Azerbaijani and Armenian diasporas).

**Finally**, *peace proposals made by different agents had only advisory character*. Hence, this kind of measures were considered by both sides only as the recommendation, but not as the compulsory action to be implemented. Even the UN Security Council Resolutions adopted in order to establish the peace in the region and to confirm occupation of Nagorno – Karabakh by the Armenian military forces had not made Armenia to immediately withdraw its forces. Moreover, several times Armenia tried to argue this resolutions or just was ignoring them. This dissertation raised an important issue that the advisory character of legal acts adopted by international organizations delays the peaceful resolution of modern conflicts.

Reasons given above had been keeping the dispute frozen more than 30 years, but did not facilitate resolution of the conflict. And only the large – scale warfare actions of 2020, not mediation process, resolved the territorial conflict. Armenia made several strategic mistakes, and one of the most serious one is attacking Azerbaijani territories located not in Nagorno – Karabakh<sup>105</sup>. Several provocations and ceasefire violations by Armenia were a signal of total rejection of negotiation processes. Taking into account Azerbaijani military superiority and its impossibility to have any negotiations about peaceful resolution of the conflict with Armenia, Azerbaijan started to advance rapidly and liberate territories one by one, always invoking legal acts and various resolutions adopted by international organizations. ***Military strategies and goals of full – scale warfare of 2020 were clearer and more decisive than mediation measures that had not been, transformed into successful strategy.*** That is the main reason, why war resolved the territorial dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

*Talking about correlation between location of the particular political agent and its opinion towards the dispute, I cannot give the clear answer.* New Wars erased limits and influence areas, and such tendencies of globalization as big diasporas or information wars can have impact on views anywhere. On the other hand, the beginning of the conflict was a period of Soviet times, when Azerbaijan and Armenia did not have access to the new world order's implications. As we know, political agents did not have access to the mediation process during the first years of the dispute. So, maybe correlation between location and actor's opinion existed on the first stage of the conflict (located far = no information = no opinion).

*There is also no correlation between religion of agent and its view,* because many political actors were following their own interests influenced only by goals in foreign and domestic policy. For example, if connection existed, Iran would always support Azerbaijan

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<sup>105</sup> For instance, the city of Ganja was attacked by missiles.

and would never sell military facilities to Armenia because of the common religion. Moreover, as it was explained in the third chapter, the conflict in Nagorno – Karabakh can be related to territorial and political disputes, but not to religious ones.

It is very important to mention that only territorial conflict was resolved in 2020. There are still some tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia. It is quite difficult to predict the situation in Nagorno – Karabakh in future because the agreements of 2020 might not be the end of the conflict (though maybe the end of a major war). The role of both Russian and Turkish peacekeepers is quite controversial. Armenia criticises the presence of Turkey, accusing this state in joint military exercises with Azerbaijan in shadow of Russian peacekeepers. Azerbaijani people remember about Russian political support and arms supply to Armenia and cannot completely trust Russian peacekeepers. On the other hand, both Turkey and Russia were actively involved in the dispute's mediation after 1991, what we cannot say about other states. International organizations' efforts were not successful because all their recommendations had only advisory character, while Azerbaijan and Armenia were interested in effective mediation.

There is a big issue regarding war crimes<sup>106</sup> committed in the Nagorno – Karabakh region. While Azerbaijan arrested<sup>107</sup> perpetrators of war crimes and denounced their actions, Armenia has not arrested its soldiers that also committed crimes during the Second Karabakh War.

Another problem is inability of Armenia to hand over all maps of minefields located in Karabakh region. These maps would speed up the reconstruction process in Nagorno –

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<sup>106</sup> Amnesty International. Armenia/Azerbaijan: Decapitation and war crimes in gruesome videos must be urgently investigated. [Last accessed on 30/06/2021] <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/12/armenia-azerbaijan-decapitation-and-war-crimes-in-gruesome-videos-must-be-urgently-investigated/>

<sup>107</sup> Azerbaijan charges four soldiers over war crimes. [Last accessed on 30/06/2021] <https://oc-media.org/azerbaijan-charges-four-soldiers-over-war-crimes/>

Karabakh and would save lives of people. Unfortunately, many civilians died as the result of landmine explosion after the 2020 war in Karabakh.

Peaceful coexistence of two nations that had been fighting more than 30 years is a new challenge for both Azerbaijan and Armenia. It is significant for Armenia to denounce crimes of the past that were committed during military warfare and to realise the importance of partnership with Azerbaijan and Turkey. The alliance with these states will increase economic indicators and decrease the dependence from Russia. The leading advisor at the Center of Analysis of International Relations, Orkhan Baghirov, notes that rapidly increased military expenses as well as losing military ammunition and equipment, negatively affected the economy of Armenia (the Center of Analysis of International Relations, October 2020). Taking in to account this fact as well as pandemic situation in the world, Armenia has a great chance to increase economic activity and to affect the Armenian level of GDP.

Talking about responsibilities of Azerbaijan, it is important to grant equal rights and freedoms for both Azerbaijani and Armenian population of Nagorno – Karabakh. Azerbaijani government is strongly determined to reintegrate Armenian population of Nagorno – Karabakh into its own social, political and economic environment. Moreover, on November 10, 2020, Azerbaijan, Russia and Armenia signed trilateral statement that is calling for opening of all communication and transportation in Nagorno – Karabakh. This legal act gives opportunity for the decreasing tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenian as well as for economic partnership.

The conflict in Nagorno – Karabakh is a great lesson for everyone. International organizations should rethink mediation tools and advisory character of legal acts that is usually make the conflict more complicated. Even such legal acts as UN Security Council Resolutions did not help to resolve the conflict and make Armenia to withdraw military

forces from Nagorno – Karabakh. The fact that only large – scale warfare stopped the war should stimulate organizations to transform their mediation instruments.

Various countries should be focused not only on domestic issues, but also on frozen conflicts that can easily destabilize security even out of conflict zone. Peace in the world, not only peace at home, should be a priority for each political actor in the world.

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