



UNIVERSIDADE
CATÓLICA
PORTUGUESA

INSTITUTO DE ESTUDOS POLÍTICOS

The Effect of Religious Extremism on Nigeria
National Security: An Appraisal of Boko
Haram

Author: Damilola Selma Dawodu
Student No: 104521003

MA in Governance, Leadership and Democracy Studies

Supervisor: Lieutenant - General António Luciano Fontes Ramos
Institute of Political Studies of the Portuguese Catholic University

January 2023
Lisbon, Portugal

Abstract

Religion plays a dominant role and serves as a driving force of human action or inaction in Nigeria. In some instances, it has been exploited to serve a motive that does not align with the proper functioning of society, what is called religious extremism. One form of such religious extremism has produced Boko Haram, whose activities have threatened Nigeria's national security. Studies have tried to unearth the causes and impact of the sect on the national security of the country. This study contributes to that debate by evaluating the impact Boko Haram has on Nigeria's national security, and the strategies, challenges, and solutions to address the menace.

Qualitative research approach, specifically historical research methodology was used in this study to illuminate the phenomenon of Boko Haram and national security in Nigeria. Data was sourced primarily from secondary and primary data with a focus on states in Northern Nigeria between 2011-2022 years.

The study found that the failure of the state to provide basic amenities, extreme poverty, illiteracy, and radicalization are the primary reasons for the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria. The study also found that the activities of the sect has impacted the socio-economic and national security of the country. The kinetic and non-kinetic approaches are the dominant strategies employed by the government to fight Boko Haram.

The major recommendation is that the Nigerian government should provide economic opportunities and infrastructural facilities to reverse poverty, promote an inclusive social development and discourage the youths from venturing into terrorism. Also, sensitization programmes must be carried out to alert for the consequences and educate the youths against

joining the sect. Focus should also be on expanding the deradicalization programme to support the repentant terrorists. The government should also demonstrate the political will to end terrorism in Nigeria.

Key concepts:

Religion; Religious Extremism; Terrorism; Islamic Terrorists; Boko Haram; National Security; Northern Nigeria; International Community

Word Count Dissertation (excluding abstract, titles, footnotes, annexes, and reference): 25,069

Word Count Dissertation (including footnotes): 32158

Word Count Dissertation: 297

Dedication

I dedicate this thesis to God Almighty my creator, my source of guidance and strength throughout this academic journey and this thesis is a testament of your love and faithfulness, and I offer it up to you in humble gratitude and thanksgiving. I also dedicate this work to my dear husband, Adebowale Dawodu, My Love, whose encouragement has been my guiding light and making sure I give it all it takes to finish this programme. To my children, Oladipo and Davida, who have been affected in every way by this quest. Thank you for being my rock and inspiration. My love for you all can never be quantified. God bless you.

Acknowledgment

First and foremost, I am deeply grateful to my supervisor, Professor Lieutenant-General António Luciano Fontes Ramos for his invaluable guidance, support, and encouragement throughout my master's thesis journey. His expertise and insights were instrumental in helping me to successfully complete my research. I am truly grateful for the time and effort he dedicated to my work, and I am honored to have had the opportunity to learn from such an esteemed professional. Thank you for being an amazing mentor and for helping me to achieve my goals.

Secondly, I would like to express my heartfelt appreciation to the Institute for Political Studies, Católica University for providing me with the opportunity to complete my masters thesis. The resources and support provided by the school were instrumental in helping me to successfully conduct my research and complete my degree. I am grateful for the support and guidance of the faculty and staff, who have been extremely helpful and supportive throughout my journey. I am honored to have been a student at the Institute for Political Studies, Católica University and I

will always be grateful for the education and experiences that I have gained here. Thank you for your unwavering support and for helping me to achieve my academic goals.

Lastly, I want to appreciate everyone who contributed to the success of my Masters program from the commencement to its completion.

List of Abbreviations

IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
NIJ	National Institute of Justice
ICAN	International Civil Society Action Network
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
ISWA	Islamic State in West Africa
IED	Improvised Explosive Devices
AQIM	Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb
ISWAP	Islamic State in West Africa Province
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
HDI	Human Development Index
IPOB	Indigenous People of Biafra
OPC	Oodua People's Congress
NDPVF	Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
LCB	Lake Chad Basin
MNJSF	Multinational Joint Security Force
MNJTF	Multinational Joint Task Force
TSCTP	Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
UAE	United Arab Emirates
IGR	Internally Generated Revenue

List of Figures

Figure 1.1: Casualties from Activities of Boko Haram in the Selected States in Nigeria				12
Figure 1.2: Trend of Casualty Figures from Boko Haram activities	-	-		14
Figure 2.1: Active Militant Islamic Groups Across Africa	-	-	-	34
Figure 3.1: Hypothetical Organogram of Boko Haram	-	-	-	44

List of Tables

Table 2.1: Differentiating Religious and Secular Terrorism -	-	-	-	29
Table 2.2: Differentiating Sunni and Shi'a Islamic Traditions	-	-	-	34

Table of Contents

CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY	-	-	-	10
1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY	-	-	-	10
<i>Research questions</i>	-	-	-	15
<i>Research objectives</i>	-	-	-	16
1.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	-	-	-	16
<i>Theoretical framework</i>	-	-	-	16
<i>Methods and materials</i>	-	-	-	17
CHAPTER 2 – RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM IN NIGERIA	-	-	-	19
2.1 CONTEXTUALIZING RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM IN NIGERIA	-	-	-	19
<i>Religion</i>	-	-	-	19
<i>Extremism</i>	-	-	-	21
<i>Religious extremism-</i>	-	-	-	23
2.2 TERRORISM AN OUTSHOOT OF RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM	-	-	-	25
<i>Terrorism</i>	-	-	-	25
<i>Islamic terrorist groups in Africa</i>	-	-	-	30
2.3 WHY ISLAM?	-	-	-	32
<i>Islam and Jihad</i>	-	-	-	35
CHAPTER 3 - ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF BOKO HARAM	-	-	-	38
3.1 TRACING THE ROOTS OF BOKO HARAM IN NIGERIA	-	-	-	38
3.2 THE PRESENT STATE OF BOKO HARAM IN NIGERIA	-	-	-	45
3.3 UNDERSTANDING THEIR DEMANDS	-	-	-	49
CHAPTER 4 - GROWTH FACTORS OF BOKO HARAM IN NIGERIA	-	-	-	50
4.1 RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM (IGNORANCE AND ILLITERACY)	-	-	-	50
4.2 ISLAM AND JIHAD	-	-	-	52
4.3 SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS	-	-	-	54
4.4 POVERTY AND ILLITERACY	-	-	-	55
4.5 THE INFLUENCE OF NONSTATE-ACTORS	-	-	-	57
CHAPTER 5 - UNDERSTANDING NATIONAL SECURITY	-	-	-	59
5.1 HOLISTIC CONCEPTUALIZATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY	-	-	-	59
CHAPTER 6 - LINKING BOKO HARAM TO NATIONAL SECURITY	-	-	-	63
6.1 THE IMPACT ON TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE	-	-	-	63

6.2 ECONOMIC PROSPERITY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT	-	67
6.3 NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS	- -	71
CHAPTER 7 - WAY FORWARD	- - - - -	74
7.1 ASSESSING THE PRESENT STRATEGIES AND SOLUTIONS	-	74
<i>Dialogue and reintegration</i>	- - - - -	76
<i>Military force</i>	- - - - -	78
7.2 UNDERSTANDING THE PRESENT CHALLENGES	- - -	79
7.3 THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY	- -	83
<i>Regional efforts</i>	- - - - -	83
<i>International efforts</i>	- - - - -	85
CHAPTER 8 - ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	- - -	87
8.1 EVALUATING THE OBJECTIVES	- - - - -	87
<i>Objective one</i>	- - - - -	87
<i>Objective two</i>	- - - - -	87
<i>Objective three</i>	- - - - -	88
<i>Objective four</i>	- - - - -	89
<i>Objective five</i>	- - - - -	89
8.2 RECOMMENDATIONS	- - - - -	90
BIBLIOGRAPHY	- - - - -	93
APPENDIX A – INTERVIEW GUIDE	- - - - -	103
APPENDIX B – RESPONSE BY RESPONDENTS	- - - - -	106

1. Introduction and Methodology

1.1 Background to the Study

The driving force of human action or inaction on the African continent in general and Nigeria, in particular, is religion. Religion captures the faith and beliefs (rituals) of a group of people, which are guided by a system of values or ethics and are expected to behave or act in a routinized pattern.¹ Religiosity defines the fabric of the Nigerian psychic, which explains why Nigeria is ranked 16 out of 148 as the most religious country.² As a result, religious institutions play an overarching role in the life of Nigerians. Three dominant religions make up the Nigerian space: Christianity, Islam, and the Traditional African religion. Each of these religions have different levels of extremism, which could be rightly termed as religious extremism.³ This concept connotes the “desire to expand the scope, detail, and strictness of religious law; social isolation, and the rejection of the surrounding culture.”⁴ It tends to be antagonistic of secular viewpoints and other religions,⁵ the result of which could lead to religious violence and terrorism. However, in this thesis, I focus on an outshoot of religious extremism from the Islamic religion in the form of Boko Haram.

¹ Jaco Beyers. “What is religion? An African understanding.” *HTS Teologiese Studies/ Theological Studies*, 66 no. 1 (2010): 1-8

² Sophie Ireland. “Revealed: the world’s most (and least) religious countries based on religious beliefs 2020.” *CEO World Magazine*, May 16, 2020. [Revealed: The World's Most \(And Least\) Religious Countries Based On Religious Beliefs 2020 - CEOWORLD magazine](#)

³ John Onimhawo and Ogbenefavwe Ottuh. “Religious extremism: a challenge to national unity and development.” *Iroro: Journal of Arts*, 12 no. 1&2 (2007): 88-96

⁴ Charles S. Liebman. “Extremism as a Religious Norm.” *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 22 no. 1 (1983): 75–86

⁵ Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi. “Fundamentalism.” In *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, edited by J Krieger. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001

The name Boko Haram was originally called the Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād or generally referred to as the Islamic State in West Africa or the Islamic State's West Africa Province.⁶ The name Boko Haram translates to “Western education or civilization is sinful or forbidden.”⁷ The fundamentalist sect was founded in 2002 by Muhammed Yusuf in northeastern Nigeria, but the sect gained prominence after the extrajudicial killing of its founder by the Federal Government on July 30, 2009. The founder was influenced by his abhorrence of the Western-style educational system in the North with a total rejection of secular education and Christianity as not Islamic. Boko Haram was therefore, birthed with the fundamental objective of preserving and redeeming Northern Nigeria from the grips of Western-style educational system and secularity of the Nigerian state.⁸ The sect aimed to establish Shariah Law in Nigeria. Capitalizing on Terrorism acts provided the fertile ground for the expansion and realization of their ideology and was inspired by the exploits of the Usman Dan Fodio jihad, especially from the background of their Salafist's viewpoint of employing radical and violent approaches to address social justice and inequality.

⁶ Jacob Zenn. *Northern Nigeria's Boko Haram: The Prize in Al-Qaeda's African Strategy*. Washington DC: Jamestown Foundation, 2012

⁷ Ahmed Aliyu, Ravichandran Moorthy and Idris Idris Nor Azizan Bin. “Towards understanding the Boko Haram phenomenon in Nigeria.” *Asian Social Science*, 11 no. 10 (2015): 307-317

⁸ Abdul-Rasheed Sulaiman Lanre. “Terrorism comes with economic underdevelopment: Appraisal of how Boko Haram activities undermine Nigerian Economy during Jonathan's Regime.” *Bangladesh E-Journal of Sociology*, 15 no. 4 (2018): 92 – 109




Figure 1.1: Casualties from Activities of Boko Haram in the Selected States in Nigeria

The birth of the radical Boko Haram sect in 2002 has led to an exponential increase in attacks on religious institutions across the country and targets the group believes are linked to Western-styled institutions. Following two separate bombings in St. Theresa’s Catholic Church in Madala, a suburb in Nigeria’s state capital, Abuja, and then in Jos, Plateau State, the sect became prominent both in Nigeria and the world. Since then, Nigeria has witnessed multiple attacks from the group on numerous state institutions, foreign aid organizations, the United Nations Office, and faith-based institutions. With its headquarters in the Lake Chad region in Northern Nigeria, the group has launched massive attacks across the country. Despite the supposed expansion and upgrade of the country’s Military apparatus, the sect has continued to operate in many areas across the country with States like Borno, Niger, Kaduna among others, losing a great swarm of

territories to the sect, territories under their control. Boko Haram relied on indiscriminate terror to achieve its stated objectives. The impact of the activities of the sect has affected not just the national economy, its effect has transcended Nigeria's borders.

The activities of the Boko Haram sect have a tremendous impact on the country's national security. Figure 1.1 paints a grim picture of how impactful the activity of the sect is on Nigeria's national security. Official statistics reveal that the total number of casualties because of the activities of Boko Haram from the seven most affected states in Nigeria stands at 61,261. This is a staggering number, especially in the context that Nigeria is not at war with a foreign nation. The trend in the cumulative casualty figures due to the activities of the sect is on the increase (see Figure 1.2). The impact of their atrocities has dire consequences on the national security of the country in terms of socio-economic activities, freedom of religious practice, political instability, human development (housing, education, health), and individual/personal safety.⁹ For instance, statistics indicates that the economic impact of terrorism activities on Nigeria from 2007-2019 stands at \$142 billion, which is ahead Libya at \$5 billion and Sudan at \$2 billion.¹⁰ The country also faces severe food shortages because of persistent attacks on farmers and the agricultural value chain. These economic losses have had catastrophic consequences on the nation's ability to guarantee national security, stability, and economic prosperity of the country.

⁹ Chandra Satish and Bonshle Rahul. "National security: concept, measurement and management." *Strategic Analysis*, 39 no. 4 (2015): 337-359


¹⁰ Kamer Lars. *Economic impact of terrorism in Africa 2007-2009, by country*, 2022. Accessed June 17, 2022. url: [Economic impact of terrorism in Africa by country | Statista](#)

Map: Deaths by State

The map depicts deaths by state. Borno state, in Nigeria's northeast, is the epicenter of Boko Haram related violence, which has also spilled into neighboring Adamawa and Yobe states, among others.

Date

May 2011 to June 2022



Deaths

0 35,807

Notes

Hover over a particular state to view additional information.

Specific dates can be viewed using the slider above.


Darker coloring represents a greater number of deaths in that state.

Graph 1: Deaths Over Time

The line graph depicts deaths over time. The red line shows the number of deaths by month, and the orange shows the cumulative total. The number of deaths is a conservative estimate, based on numbers reported by the press.

Key

Orange Cumulative Deaths
Red Deaths Per Month



Notes

Hover over a point in the graph to view the number of deaths on that date.

Specific dates can be viewed using the slider above.

Nigeria Security Tracker produced by the Africa Program at the Council on Foreign Relations (<https://www.cfr.org/programs/africa-program>)

Figure 1.2: Trend of Casualty Figures from Boko Haram activities¹¹

¹¹ Institute for Economics & Peace. *Global Terrorism Index 2020: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism, 2020*. Accessed June 21, 2022. url: [GTI-2020-web-1.pdf \(visionofhumanity.org\)](https://www.economicshome.org/2020/06/21/global-terrorism-index-2020/)

The atrocious activities of the Boko Haram sect have been associated with kidnappings and illegal arms proliferation among others. This has worsened the already tense relationship among the different religions in the country further dividing the country along religious lines. Their activities induced a huge number of internally displaced persons (IDP) with statistics indicating that as many as 3.2 million IDPs are spread across the country.¹² The result is social unrest, increasing poverty levels (70 million poor), the highest number of out-of-schoolchildren (at 10.5 million). Despite the huge budgetary allocation by the government to address this sect, there seems to be no end in sight. The Federal Government of Nigeria has allocated a huge amount for the defense to contain the activities of Boko Haram and other non-state actors perpetrating violence across the country, yet the situation seems to be deteriorating. The latest attacks on catholic parishioners in Owo, Nigeria on 5 June 2022 and the kidnappings of passengers on the Abuja-Kaduna train on 28 March 2022 are evidence of the inability of the national government to curtail this sect called Boko Haram. The impact of the activities of Boko Haram and other non-state actors has thrown the country off the path of progress. This is concerning, a situation that has influenced me to undertake a study to understand the root causes of the origin of Boko Haram and how their activities have an impact on the country's national security. The study will also look at the various strategies implemented by the Federal Government of Nigeria in curtailing this dangerous sect and what gaps exist thereby proffering likely solutions.

Research Questions

My thesis seeks to explore the following research questions:

- a) What have caused the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria?
- b) How has the activities of Boko Haram impacted Nigeria's national security?

¹² Internal Displacement Monitoring Center. *Displacement data: what's behind our data? 2022*. Accessed June 17, 2022. url: [Nigeria | IDMC \(internal-displacement.org\)](https://www.internal-displacement.org/nigeria/)

- c) How have the activities of Boko Haram impacted the socio-economic prospects of Nigeria?
- d) What are the various strategies that have been implemented by the Federal Government of Nigeria to combat Boko Haram terrorism and how effective are these strategies?
- e) What are the challenges in the fight against Boko Haram in Nigeria?
- f) What solutions can be implemented to curtail the impact of Boko Haram activities on Nigeria's national security?

Research objectives

My thesis will seek to explore the following research objectives:

- a) To understand what caused the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria.
- b) To ascertain the impact of the activities of Boko Haram on Nigeria's national security.
- c) To explore the socio-economic impact of the activities of Boko Haram on Nigeria.
- d) To identify the various strategies implemented by the Federal Government of Nigeria to combat Boko Haram terrorism and the effectiveness of these strategies.
- e) To examine the challenges in the fight against Boko Haram activities in Nigeria.
- f) To proffer solutions to curtail the impact of Boko Haram activities on Nigeria's national security.

1.2 Research methodology

Theoretical framework

I propose to explore the causes and impact of the activities of Boko Haram through the Frustration-Aggression theoretical lens.¹³ Berkowitz 1989 improved on the theorizing of the frustration-aggression theory by expanding the argument that frustration and other factors such as insults, anxiety, unpleasant environmental conditions, and circumstances can cause aggression in individuals.¹⁴ The theory serves to provide explanations as to the justification for the activities of the Boko Haram sect. The group believes that their aggressive behavior and terrorist activities are justified because of their frustration with the nation-state of Nigeria which stands in their way of achieving an Islamic state and Shariah law in Nigeria. The theory, therefore, provides clarification of the motives of the Boko Haram group and why they are engaged in their nefarious and unconscionable activities. It could be right to presume that poverty, unemployment, illiteracy which is exacerbated by the ‘almajiris’ meaning “an emigrant” and this system in Northern Nigeria is providing the fuel for aggressive activities of the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria. The outcome of these aggressions is, therefore, manifested in form of bombings, kidnappings, and declaring war on Nigeria ultimately impacting the national security of the country.

Methods and materials

To help me to achieve my research objectives, I believe historical research methodology, which is an aspect of the qualitative research approach, can be usefully implemented. Historical research focuses on systematically investigating past events to provide accounts of what happened in the past. It serves the primary purpose of providing “a clear perspective of the present and facilitate

¹³ John Dollard, Neal Miller, Leonard Doob, O. Mowrer and Robert Sears. *Frustration and aggression* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1939).

¹⁴ Leonard Berkowitz. “Frustration-aggression hypothesis: examination and reformulation.” *Psychological Bulletin*, 106 no. 1 (1989): 59-73

planning for the future.”¹⁵ My research study aligns with the purpose of historical research design, which provides the rationale for its use in this study. The historical research design will help us understand the root causes of the phenomenon, how it evolved into one of the most dangerous terrorist organizations,¹⁶ how its impact is felt in the national security apparatus and other socio-economic indices; and what strategies and recommendations are suggested to address the fallout of the economic activities. I hope to rely on data from official records, government reports and publications, empirical and conceptual studies, and oral interviews. The interviews (see Appendix A) will involve security and military experts that are actively involved in the fight against Boko Haram in Nigeria. In essence, secondary sources of data will be the major source of where information regarding the impact of the Boko Haram phenomenon on Nigeria’s national security and socio-political and economic activities. The focus of the study will be on seven (7) states in Nigeria that has been impacted the most in terms of casualty, which are Borno, Zamfara, Kaduna, Adamawa, Benue, Plateau, and the Yobe States.¹⁷ CFR 2022 makes the argument that 2011 was the defining year that witnessed the “increasing bifurcation of the country on regional and religious lines.” This has, therefore, provided the justification for assessing the impact of the Boko Haram menace during the 2011-2022 years.

¹⁵ R. K. Bhatt and S. C. Bhatt. “Application of historical method of research in the study of library and information sciences: an overview.” *Annals of Library Science and Documentation*, 41 no. 4 (1994): 155-160

¹⁶ Bhatt and Bhatt.

¹⁷ Council on Foreign Relations. *Nigeria security tracker*. Accessed June 21, 2022. URL: [Nigeria Security Tracker \(cfr.org\)](https://www.cfr.org/tracker/Nigeria-Security-Tracker/cfr.org)

Chapter 2 - Religious Extremism in Nigeria

2.1 Contextualizing religious extremism in Nigeria

In contextualizing religious extremism as it relates to Nigeria requires presenting a concise understanding of the core ideas of religion and extremism prior to expatiating on what religious extremism entails. In the next sections that follow, the concepts of religion, extremism, and religious extremism will be explicated as is obtainable in the Nigerian context.

Religion

The roots of religion can be traced back to the creation of mankind and the universe by a supreme being who directs and/or instructs man on how to live on the earth. The man with a promise of an after-life by the supreme being bears total allegiance to the supreme being. This belief in the afterlife and the promise of wealth, success, protection, and a good life even on earth drives mankind to seek this God to understand Him and live according to His doctrine. It is this pursuit that has led man to evolve a water-tight system of belief, rules, regulations, rituals, and practices for the sole purpose of ‘satisfying’ this superior being in the hope of achieving mortality. As a result, man’s attempt has led to several religions that are established seeking out the truth and preaching about this supreme being to the world.

A theologian called James Martineau captured these perspectives of religion as the “belief in an ever-living God, that is, a Divine mind and will ruling the universe and holding moral relations with mankind.”¹⁸ Howerth 1902 also presented the Bishop Butler’s definition as “the belief in one God or Creator and Moral Governor of the world and in a future state of retribution implying

¹⁸ Ira W Howerth. “What is religion?” *Ethics* 13 no. 2 (1902): 185-206

immortality.”¹⁹ Scholars have questioned the rationale of these strict ideas of religion arguing that such perspectives neglect piety, the role of faith and traditional practices in understanding the concept of religion.²⁰ There is, therefore, more value presenting the cardinal tenets rather than attempting a theoretical exposition of an acceptable definition of religion. This study aligns with the argument that the complex nature of the meaning of religion to suggest an additive approach to understanding religion²¹.

The fourteen features that characterize religion “consists of all the features that our cumulative scholarship induces us to attribute to religion.”²² According to Saler 2008, the features are ‘supernature’ (existence of a supernature being); rituals (to maintain social relations with the supernatural); prophylactic or corrective rituals (exorcism of the supernatural); prayer (communication with the supernatural); moral conduct derives from the supernatural; proscriptions (forbidden actions); beliefs and practices concerning the afterlife; differentiating ‘sacred’ and ‘non-sacred’ items; religious specialists (diviners, shamans); oral or written sacred canon; physiological techniques; song, dance, and instrumental music; sacrifice; beliefs and practices respecting soteriological goals; and teachings or propaganda on promoting the religion. Saler notes that these features can be expanded based on the researcher’s conceptualization. Based on this notion of religion,²³ Judaism, Christianity, and Islam are the three religions that satisfy all these features²⁴. Relying on the theoretical argument²⁵ and taking cognizance of the

¹⁹ Ira “What is religion?”, 187

²⁰ Victoria Harrison. “The pragmatics of defining religion in a multi-cultural world.” *The International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 59 (2006): 133–152

²¹ Benson Salern. “Conceptualizing religion: some recent reflection.” *Religion* 38 no. 3 (2008): 219-225

²² Benson, “Conceptualizing religion: some recent reflection”, 222

²³ Michael Bergunder. “What is religion? The unexplained subject matter of religious studies.” *Method and Theory in the Study of Religion* 26 (2014): 246-286

²⁴ Michael. “What is religion?”

²⁵ Jaco Beyers. “What is religion? An African understanding.” *HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies* 66 no. 1 (2010): 1-8. 10.4102/hts.v66i1.341

study context, it is not out of place to include African traditional religion as another likely religion that manifests all the fourteen features.²⁶ These ideas summarize our conceptualization of the meaning and nature of religion.

Extremism

The mention of the word extremism generates an instant notion of violence, negativity, and rejection by an individual or group of individuals. Providing a universal definition of extremism is not the focus of this study but a general understanding of what it entails.

*Extremism connotes those activities that are not morally, ideologically, or politically in accordance with written (legal and constitutional) and non-written norms of the state; that are fully intolerant toward others and reject democracy as a means of governance and the way of solving problems; and finally, that reject the existing social order.*²⁷

Sotlar's view of extremism has been well-received in arguments about the nature and growth of extremism. Of interest are the differing views of how extremism is birthed. A case in point is the report of the conference organized by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) of the U.S. Department of Justice which attempted to explore the growth factors of radicalization which leads to extremism. Besides factors such as an individual's social network, group dynamics, social media influence, and individual grievances, most of the participants agreed that "violent

²⁶ Benson, "Conceptualizing religion: some recent reflection"

²⁷ Andrej Sotlar. "Some problems with a definition and perception of extremism within a Society." In *Policing in Central and Eastern Europe: Dilemmas of contemporary criminal justice*, edited by Gorazd Mesko, Milan Pagon and Bojan Dobovsek, 1-6. Slovenia: University of Maribor, 2004

extremist belief systems or narratives...ideological belief system that justifies violence”²⁸ is the major factor fueling violent extremism across the world.

Worthy of note is the general notion that not all extremists exhibit violent characteristics. This position gains support from an argument that seems to dichotomize radicalization and extremism by presenting several reasons²⁹. An extract of the differences is presented thus: while radicalization favors pragmatic political violence, extremists favor violence as a legitimate method of pursuing their goals. Another difference as presented by Bötticher 2017 shows that while extremists are largely anti-democratic, anti-human rights, and constitutionalism, radicalism is more acceptable to these issues. Extremists are actively engaged in provocation and aggression against the establishment rejecting totally to co-exist in mainstream society, radicalism on the other hand shows opposite tendencies. Radicalism is more egalitarian and less elitist while extremism is totalitarian and dictatorial. Based on this argument, it can be inferred that there exists a path from radicalization to extremism which is hastened in the consistency of messaging by the radicalized group or movement especially if the society and context provides the fertile ground for the expansion of the messaging.

The implication is that individuals can be radicalized and become extremist as a result of their religious leanings and ideological belief systems that inadvertently support violence. In some instances, these religious belief systems are exploited to favor a group of individuals as a justification for their extremist views and actions. Unfortunately, the Islamic religious belief

²⁸ National Institute of Justice. *Radicalization and violent extremism: lessons learned from Canada, the U.K. and the U.S.* Washington, DC: Office of Justice Programs, 2015, 4

²⁹ Astrid Bötticher. “Towards academic consensus definitions of radicalism and extremism.” *Perspectives on Terrorism* 11 no. 4 (2017): 73-77

system has been exploited as such by many groups and individuals across the world which perhaps explains the growing number of extremists that rely on their biased explanation of Islam to perpetuate evil across the world. Therefore, understanding religious extremism is germane to exploring the context of this study, which is the effect of Boko Haram on the national security of Nigeria.

Religious Extremism

The link between religion and extremism is complexity,³⁰ which must be explicated to be better appreciated. There seems to be agreement that religion has a weak influence on extremism as the more religious an individual is, the less likely that he or she might be involved in extremism.³¹ This research suggests an inverse association between religiosity and extremism. As a result, a marriage of convenience exploring ‘religion’ and ‘extremism’ is germane. Such a conceptualization is valuable and relevant to this study. In the words of the International Civil Society Action Network [ICAN], religious extremism is defined as the “rigid interpretations of religion that are forced upon others using social or economic coercion, laws, intolerance, or violence. It is accompanied by non-fluid definitions of culture, religion, nationalism, ethnicity, or sect which move citizens into exclusionary, patriarchal, and intolerant communities.”³²

In making his contribution, Liebman 1983 posits that religious extremism is either a process or an institution that has three distinct dimensions of expansion i.e., religious laws, social isolation,

³⁰ Hamdy Hassan. “Religion as a security threat: Case studies of extremist Christian movements in Africa.” *Journal of Religion in Africa* 51 (2021): 426–451

³¹ Peter Mandaville and Melissa Nozell. *Engaging religion and religious actors in countering violent extremism*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2017. Accessed July 26, 2022. url: [SR413-Engaging-Religion-and-Religious-Actors-in-Countering-Violent-Extremism.pdf \(usip.org\)](https://www.usip.org/publications/sr413-engaging-religion-and-religious-actors-in-countering-violent-extremism)

³² International Civil Society Action Network. *Extremism as Mainstream: Implications for Women, Development & Security in the MENA/Asia Region*, 2014. Accessed July 26, 2022, 2. url: [What-the-Women-Say-Extremism-Brief-Spring-2014.pdf \(icanpeacework.org\)](https://www.icanpeacework.org/publications/what-the-women-say-extremism-brief-spring-2014)

and cultural rejection³³. Religious extremists seek to expand their religious laws irrespective of how the people who hold contrary views receive them and they are antagonistic and reject outrightly present-day cultural practices. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) also provides a simple but elaborate definition of religious extremism as the belief and actions that individuals or groups show to support violence to achieve their stated religious goals³⁴. Their definition posits that the aim of religious extremists is to achieve targeted religious goals via violence and intimidation. The behavior, attitude, and belief of religious extremists are, therefore, outside the norm of other religions and beliefs. Such behaviors manifest in form of violence. Mustapha 2021 therefore, concurs that religious extremist support propaganda that “contradicts and antagonizes the ideals of other religious views and those of secular establishments like modern nation-states.”³⁵ The implication is that religious extremists take extreme actions and unjust behaviors that are based on their understanding of their religion irrespective of the belief of other religions. Religious extremism is not distinct and limited to the Islamic religion as it has been shown to be present in other religions.³⁶ However, post the four coordinated terrorist attacks carried out by al-Qaeda in the US on September 11, 2011, more people are exclusively linking or equating religious extremism to Islam,³⁷ a situation that has created more tension in the world today.

³³ Charles S. Liebman. “Extremism as a religious norm.” *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 22 no. 1 (1983): 75-86

³⁴ United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. *Preventing violent extremism through education: A guide for policy makers*. place de Fontenoy, Paris, France: UNESCO, 2017. Accessed July 26, 2022. url: [Preventing violent extremism through education: a guide for policy-makers; 2017 \(unesco.org\)](https://unesco.org/preventing-violent-extremism-through-education-a-guide-for-policy-makers-2017)

³⁵ Salihu Mustapha. “Dynamics of religious extremism and terrorism in the Lake Chad Basin: An exploration of the ideological variations between Boko Haram and ISWAP.” *Journal of Power, Politics & Governance* 9 no. 1 (2021): 33-44, 35

³⁶ International Civil Society Action Network. *Extremism as Mainstream: Implications for Women, Development & Security in the MENA/Asia Region*, 2014

³⁷ Ngaboawaji Daniel Nte, Baba-Ahamadu Abdulaziz, Awwal Isah and Featherstone Clairmant. “Religious extremism and the challenges of de-radicalisation in Nigeria’s North East Region.” *The Indonesian Journal of International Clinical Legal Education* 3 no. 1 (2021): 77-110

In Nigeria, the situation is not different. The country is divided along religious lines with Moslems dominating the northern part of the country while Christians are the majority in the southern part of Nigeria. The religion that has more links to religious extremism in the country is Islam with Boko Haram recognized as a terrorist organization that bases its existence from the teachings and tenets of the Islamic religion.^{38 39} Relying on the arguments by Mandaville and Nozell 2022, religion provides the mobilization for the religious extremists, creating an opportunity for them to present their version of an ideal state of international politics with their actions, behaviors, and rhetoric's legitimized based on their version of the Islamic teaching.⁴⁰ Three cardinal characteristics further qualify Boko Haram as a terrorist organization. These characteristics include totalitarianism and intolerance to opposite views; anti-status quo to the political, economic, educational, and socio-cultural system of a country, and the use of violence against innocent people.⁴¹ These features succinctly capture the operational activities of the sect; hence the tag of an extremist group is appropriate in describing Boko Haram.

2.2 Terrorism an outshoot of religious extremism

Religious extremism as earlier indicated connotes the extreme actions and behaviors of individuals or groups of individuals to achieve their purpose as a result of the religious belief they have. It is the religious belief that provides the fire for the actions they take and the activities they undertake. Terrorism is the major tool that religious extremists use to achieve their ideals.

³⁸ Ngaboawaji Baba-Ahamadu, Awwal and Featherstone. "Religious extremism"

³⁹ Salihu. *Journal of Power, Politics & Governance*

⁴⁰ Mandaville and Melissa. *Engaging religion and religious actors in countering violent extremism.*

⁴¹ Bak, Mathias, Tarp Kristoffer Nilaus and Liang Christina Schori. "Defining the concept of 'violent extremism': delineating the attributes and phenomenon of violent extremism Geneva Paper 24/19."

Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2019. Accessed July 26, 2022. URL:

[*2y10xuCSaBlvYTDbinjPokvyDO2XLpn5jG4va93JVUzppqj08EDHwnC \(gensp.ch\)](https://www.gensp.ch/en/2019/07/24/2019-07-24-geneva-paper-24-19)

Religious terrorism has become the most dominant model used by religious extremists to achieve their agitations. This sub-section focuses on terrorism as an outshoot of religious extremism.

Terrorism

Defining what terrorism means has always been a challenge which has made it difficult to agree on a universal meaning of the concept. What might constitute terrorism to a certain group may be regarded by the other group as “freedom fight” and vice versa. These characteristic approaches make providing a universally acceptable definition of the concept a challenge.^{42 43} Scholars have argued that the concept has origins in the Latin word ‘terror’, which means to tremble or cause someone or something to tremble or dread. It could also mean great fear, dread, alarm, panic; object of fear, cause of alarm; or terrible news.⁴⁴

There are many historical examples of acts that can be considered as terrorism, but the time of “terror” during the French Revolution is commonly considered as a classic referential example of using terror as a tool to achieve concrete ideologic or political aims. Its scope has evolved from individual and collective actions or the abuse of state power by governments in the 1930s to the activities of nationalist/radicalist in the 1960s, and the actions of powerful non-state actors against the state (West) in the 1980/1990s.⁴⁵ The term gained particular relevance with the events of 9/11 considered as “hiperterrorism” and with President George Bush declaration of “war on

⁴² Anastassiya Mahon. “Defining terrorism: how ambiguous definitions and vague classifications open doors for power acquisition.” *Journal of Global Strategic Studies* 2 no. 1 (2022): 84-97

⁴³ Kshitij Prabha Boko Haram. “Defining terrorism.” *Strategic Analysis*, 24 no. 1 (2000): 125–135

⁴⁴ This definition of terrorism is provided by the Online Etymology Dictionary accessed on url: <https://www.etymonline.com/word/terror>

⁴⁵ Alex Schmid. “Terrorism – the definitional problem.” *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law* 36 no. 2 (2004): 375-419

terror”, making the combat against terrorist networks a central tool of the American strategy. Since the events of 9/11, the term has become popular in academic and political discourse.

Despite the challenge of defining terrorism, attempts have been made to present a concise explanation of what the concept involves. The US Federal Bureau of Investigation defines terrorism as “violent, criminal acts committed by individuals and/or groups who are inspired by, or associated with, designated foreign terrorist organizations or nations (state-sponsored).” The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) International Platform on Terrorism Risk insurance provides several definitions of what constitutes terrorism in selected countries. In Australia, terrorism is defined as “Action done or threat made, with the intention of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause, with the intention of coercing or influencing by intimidation the government of Australia or the Australian States or Territories, or a foreign country, or intimidating the public.” In United Kingdom, terrorism is defined as “Acts of persons acting on behalf of, or in connection with, any organization which carries out activities directed towards the overthrowing or influencing, by force or violence, of her Majesty’s government in the United Kingdom or any other government de jure or de facto.”

Clarifying the concept further, OECD cites Germany as defining terrorism as “Acts committed for political, religious, ethnic or ideological purposes suitable to create fear in the population or any section of the population and thus to influence a government or public body.” The 2004 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 did not attempt to make a clear definition of terrorism, but presented a group of actions that can be consider as terrorism such as “criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an

international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act ...”. Academic scholars have also attempted to define terrorism. For instance, Ashford defines terrorism as “a form of political action that uses violence against individuals to create terror.”⁴⁶

Prior to 2011 in Nigeria, no law existed regarding terrorism. However, the Terrorism Prevention Act (TPA) 2011 and Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act of 2013 were promulgated. Rather than providing an exhaustive definition of terrorism, the Act provides a definition of the actions that constitute terrorism, following the Security Council approach. A terrorist act is “an act which is deliberately done with malice aforethought and which may seriously harm or damage a country or an international organization... [when it is intentionally done] to unduly compel a government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing any.”⁴⁷ In Portugal for instance, terrorism is regarded as acts that as a result of their “serious and violent nature, undermine the normal functioning of democratic institutions, the legal exercise of citizens' fundamental rights, freedoms and guarantees, and democratic legality.”⁴⁸

In summary, terrorism could imply the usage or threat of usage of violence by an individual or groups to create fear, anxiety, and terror in the society for the sole purpose of exerting influence and control over the political space and the state in order to drive home their so-called demands and ideals without respect to their target’s human rights. The focal element is to create terror in the minds of their targets with the hope of propagating their agenda and ideals and condition their attitudes. However, in the context of religion, terrorism typifies politically motivated violence

⁴⁶ Sue Ashford. “Terrorism.” In *Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics (Second Edition)*, edited by Ruth Chadwick, 334-342. US: Academic Press, 2012

⁴⁷ Emelda Ejeh, Bappah and Yusuf Dankofa. “Nature of terrorism and anti-terrorism laws in Nigeria.” *Nnamdi Azikiwe University Journal of International Law and Jurisprudence* 10, no. 2 (2019): 186-192

⁴⁸ Ministry of Justice. *Decree-Law No 137/2019 of 13 September 2019*, 2019. Accessed August 9, 2022. URL: [LeiOrganicaInglesFINAL_DL-137_2019.pdf \(policiajudiciaria.pt\)](#)

because of an absolute belief that a “superior being” sanctions, commands and rewards any violence perpetrated to achieve the supposed doctrines of the faith. This superior being forgives and rewards the executioners of the violence in this life and the afterlife. The faith that the individual or group provides the legitimacy to carry out these nefarious activities in so far as it is sanctioned by the superior being. In the light of this explanation, it is appropriate to suggest that not all terrorist activities are religiously inclined or motivated. We rely on the seminal work of Hoffman⁴⁹ who attempted to differentiate between secular terrorism and religious terrorism (see Table 2.1). Religious terrorism employs an unconstrained choice of weapons and tactics in their violent pursuit of their ideals. Their aim is not to appeal to a broader audience, but they focus exclusively on those in the same religious faith or those sympathetic to such a religious faith.

Table 2.1: Differentiating Religious and Secular Terrorism

Environment	Quality of Violence	Scope of Violence	Constituency Profile	Relationship to Existing System
Religious	Unconstrained scale of terrorist violence	Expansive target definition	Narrow, insular, and isolated	Alienated “true believers”
	<i>Result:</i> Unconstrained choice of weapons and tactics	<i>Result:</i> Indiscriminate use of violence	<i>Result:</i> No appeals to a broader audience	<i>Result:</i> Completely reconfigured social order
Secular	Alienated “true believers”	Focused target definition	Inclusive, for the championed group	Liberators
	<i>Result:</i> Completely reconfigured social order	<i>Result:</i> Relative discrimination in use of violence	<i>Result:</i> Appeals to actual or potential supporters	<i>Result:</i> Restructured or rebuilt society

⁴⁹ Bruce Hoffman. *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 94–95

Source: Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*


This dichotomy helps to present the foundation upon which the arguments in this study are explored. The implication is that religious terrorism gains its support from the religion of those supporting the terrorist activities. The link between religious extremism and terrorism to say the least has been noted in academic debates. For instance, throughout history, religious extremism has been linked to movements such as the Christian Crusades, the Order of Assassins (founded by Hasan ibn al-Sabbah) and the Thuggee cult (worshippers of the Hindu goddess Kali) among others. However, in recent years, Islam has been increasingly equated with terrorism especially considering the activities in the Arab World.⁵⁰ The Arab World seems to be ‘exporting’ terrorism around the world.⁵¹ This is obviously not true because most Muslims are very peaceful, however there are radical fringes that portray a different image. They consider secular governments, non-believers, and the West as their major adversary. For instance, Al Qaeda have expanded its tentacles around the world with operations in the Western world, Africa and elsewhere, influencing other groups of lesser influence like the Abu Sayyaf (Philippines) and Laskar Jihad (Indonesia) movements. However, groups such as ISIS among others are gaining international footholds in numerous countries. Their presence has influenced the emergence of terrorist groups such as Boko Haram in Nigeria, which has declared their support to ISIS and ISWAP. Taking into context the scope of this study, the focus is on Boko Haram as a terrorist group in Nigeria.

⁵⁰ Saer El-Jaichi and Joshua A. Sabih. “Preventing Harm: Refutation of Militant Jihad in ‘Revisionist Literature.’” *Perspectives on Terrorism* 16 no. 1 (2022): 46-59

⁵¹ Meirav Mishali-Ram. “The Evolution of Transnational Jihad: Identities, Grievances, and Legitimacy Crisis in Arab States, Terrorism and Political Violence” (2022): 10.1080/09546553.2022.2074294

Islamic terrorist groups in Africa

Terrorism is not distinct to Nigeria as there exist numerous terrorist groups across the African continent (see Figure 2.1). As the Figure 2.1 indicates, the African Center for Strategic Studies (2022) have provided an extensive list of the various Islamic-linked terrorist groups that are active across the continent, which include Boko Haram (Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon), Al Shabaab (Somalia and Kenya), al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (Algeria, Mali and Burkina Faso) among many others.



Updated: January 2022

Note: Compiled by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, this graphic shows violent events involving the listed groups over the 12-month period ending December 31, 2021. Data on attacks or fatalities does not attempt to distinguish the perpetrators of the events. Group listings are intended for informational purposes only and should not be considered official designations. Due to the fluid nature of many groups, the listed affiliations may change.

Sources: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED); Daniel Byman; HumAngle; International Crisis Group; SITE Intelligence Group; The Soufan Group; Stanford University's Mapping Militants Project; Stratfor; Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium (TRAC); and Aaron Y. Zelin.

Figure 2.1: Active Militant Islamic Groups Across Africa – January 2022⁵²

The Center has identified the Sahel, Somalia, the Lake Chad Basin, Mozambique, and North Africa as the epicenter of the activities of Islamic terrorist across Africa. The activities of these militant Islamist groups have increased 10 percent in 2021 compared to 2020 with an estimated deaths directly linked to these groups at 12,700.

In Nigeria, the dominant terrorist group is Boko Haram (a.k.a. Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'Awati Wal Jihad). Its splinter group, the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) (a.k.a. Wilayat Gharb Afriqiyah) together with the Ansaru (a.k.a. Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan) has wreaked havoc on the country. The groups have impacted not just Nigeria but other countries such as Chad, Niger and Cameroon. The groups have used the following instruments or methods or attacks which include but not limited to assassinations, kidnappings, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), bombings (which include children and female bombers), coordinated military-style attacks, ambushes among many others. The groups have also taken over major highways in the North with the construction of illegal checkpoints. The attacks have also extended into internally displaced person (IDP) camps, churches, schools, military and police formations and commands and markets among others. Their activities have worsened the religious divide with its attendant effect on the national security of Nigeria.

⁵² Africa Center for Strategic Studies. *Surge in militant Islamist violence in the Sahel dominates Africa's fight against extremists*, 2022. Accessed August 2, 2022. URL: [Surge in Militant Islamist Violence in the Sahel Dominates Africa's Fight against Extremists – Africa Center for Strategic Studies](#)

2.3 Why Islam?

The emergence of Islam in the 7th century was revolutionary in nature and resulted into an Islamic religion founded by Prophet Muhammad.⁵³ The prophet received angelic revelation on the Mountain of Light to enlighten the people against societal vices, paganism, and idol worshipping. These revelations are contained in the holy Quran. The followers of Islam believe in a One God (Allah), in resurrection and the last judgement. It teaches believers to live a life of righteousness (in line with the Quran) as they are accountable to Allah on the judgement day. The Quran spells out all the legal and ethical principles that governs the life of an Islamic believer. As argued by Mohammad, the city of Medina was established and governed in line with the Quran.⁵⁴ The Prophet's successors (the four Caliphs), continued in his legacy as this epoch was acknowledged as the most pristine period of the practice of Islam. "The principles and practices followed by Muslims in this era are known as the *Sharia*."⁵⁵ In the Islamic religion and Sharia, "sovereignty resides in God (Allah); thus the organs of the state have to act within the limits of the divine law, i.e., *Sharia*."⁵⁶ Sharia can therefore, be equated to the constitution of an Islamic community which is at variance with the secular notion of state supremacy in Western democracies.

The teachings of Islam especially regarding the concept of Jihad are generally misconstrued by non-Islamic believers across the world. Jihad in Islam implies the "struggle or exertion of one's power in Allah's path against that which is evil; its goal is to destroy evil, to spread belief in Allah and to make His words supreme in this world."⁵⁷ Islam frowns against secular wars (*Harb*) but permits Jihad as Muslims will not shy away from war "if their honor demands it *and* a

⁵³ Noor Mohammad. "The doctrine of Jihad: An introduction." *Journal of Law and Religion* 3 no. 2 (1985): 381-397

⁵⁴ Noor. "The doctrine of Jihad: An introduction."

⁵⁵ Noor. "The doctrine of Jihad: An introduction", 384

⁵⁶ Noor. "The doctrine of Jihad: An introduction", 384

⁵⁷ Noor. "The doctrine of Jihad: An introduction", 388

righteous Imam commands it.”⁵⁸ To fight a Jihad, Islamic followers can perform it by the heart, the tongue, the mind and the sword (which has birthed Islamic terrorism). In essence, Jihad is a religious act that comes into force after a Caliph (Imam) calls it into force. How the Caliph or Imam derives its power and authority is, therefore, fundamental as evidenced by the Sunni and Shiite branches of the Islamic religion. Sunni makes up 87-90% percent of all Moslems worldwide.⁵⁹ They Sunnis belief that the Prophet Muhammad died without naming a successor which explains why the first four Caliphs, Caliph Abu Bakr (632-634), Caliph Umar (634-644), Caliph Uttman (644-656) and Caliph Ali (655-661) derived their authority from the election by the Moslem community, electoral committee or consultation.⁶⁰ Table 2.2 presents a simple dichotomy in the Sunni and Shi’a traditions of Islams.

Table 2.2: Differentiating Sunni and Shi’a Islamic Traditions

Sunni Muslims	Shi’a Muslims
Historically accept all four caliphs as successors to Muhammed, including the caliph Ali, Muhammed’s son-in-law and cousin	Historically reject the first three caliphs before Ali as being illegitimate successors to Muhammed.
Only the prophet Muhammed and the holy Quran are authorities on questions of religion. The Shi’a succession of imams is rejected.	As the first legitimate caliph, Ali was also the first in a historical line of imams, or leaders within Muslim communities.

⁵⁸ Noor. “*The doctrine of Jihad: An introduction*”, 388

⁵⁹ PEW Research. *Mapping the global Muslim population: A report on the size and distribution of the world’s Muslim population*, 2009. Washington DC: PEW Forum on Religion & Public Life

⁶⁰ Noor. “*The doctrine of Jihad: An introduction*”

Historically, leaders within the Islamic world have been political leaders and heads of governments rather than religious leaders.	Imams serve as both political and religious leaders.
There is no strictly organized clergy. For example, no single religious leader can claim ultimate authority, and nonclergy may lead prayers.	Imams have strict authority, and their pronouncements must be obeyed. Imams are without sin and appoint their successors.

Based on these differences, the Shi'a recognize Imams as possessing the final authority on how a jihad is declared or prosecuted. However, this does not imply that the Sunni tradition of Islam is incapable of declaring a jihad. Unlike the Sunni, the authority of the Imam or the Caliph in the Shi'a tradition cannot be questioned. This, therefore, places in the hands of Imams the final authority on such issues, which in all cases has aroused Moslems in support of Islam. Perhaps this explains the link between Boko Haram and its sister terror groups to the Shi'a Islamic tradition. Boko Haram, ISWA and Ansaru seem to derive their so-authority from their interpretation of the Quran as headed by their Caliph. Religious terrorism, therefore, gains its strength from the religious teachings as espoused by the leaders of the terrorist groups. In the context of the study, I argue that militant terrorist groups such as Boko Haram, ISWA and Ansaru claim to justify its terrorist activities from their interpretation of the Islamic religious teachings. Boko Haram and its sister terrorist groups belief they are fighting a Jihadi against Western education and democracy.

Islam and Jihad

In this study, I align with the arguments that fighting a Jihad is not about attacking the weak in the society, communities that are not bearing arms against Islamic adherents, or against those that are practicing their own religion.⁶¹ Jihad is sanctioned by Islam but as captured as follows:

Truly God defends those who believe. Truly God loves not every disbelieving traitor. Permission is given to those who are fought because they have been wronged. Surely, God is able to give them victory—those who have been expelled from their homes unjustly only because they said: “Our Lord is God.” And if it were not that God repelled some people by means of others, then monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques, wherein the Name of God is mentioned much would surely have been pulled down. Verily, God will help those who help Him. Truly, God is powerful and mighty— those who, if We give them power in the land, establish worship and pay the poor-due and enjoin kindness and forbid iniquity. And to God belongs the outcome of [all] affairs. (Al-Hajj 22:38-41)⁶²

This verse gives Moslems the right to fight but as Royal AAL Al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought notes, these rights have been clearly expatiated as the subsequent verses reveal. It is some aspect of these verses that have been quoted out of context by Islamist terrorist to perpetuate their heinous crimes against humanity. Royal AAL Al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought cautions that to better understand the concept of Jihad, these verses must be read holistically:

Fightin the way of God against those who fight against you, but begin not hostilities. Lo! God loveth not aggressors. / And slay them wherever you find

⁶¹ Royal AAL Al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought. *Jihad and the Islamic law of war*, 2009. Accessed August 2, 2022. url: [Layout 1 \(rissc.jo\)](#)

⁶² Royal AAL Al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought. *Jihad and the Islamic law of war*

them and drive them out of the places whence they drove you out, for tribulation is worse than slaughter. And fight not with them at the Inviolable Place of Worship until they first attack you there, but if they attack you (there) then slay them. Such is the recompense of disbelievers. / But if they desist, then lo! God is Forgiving, Merciful. / And fight them until tribulation is no more, and religion is for God. But if they desist, then let there be no hostility except against wrongdoers. / The forbidden month for the forbidden month, and forbidden things in retaliation. And one who attacketh you, attack him in like manner as he attacked you. Observe your duty to God, and know that God is with the pious. (Al-Baqarah 2:190-194)

Warfare is ordained for you, though it is hateful unto you; but it may happen that ye hate a thing which is good for you, and it may happen that ye love a thing which is bad for you. God knoweth, ye know not. / They question thee (O Muhammad) with regard to warfare in the sacred month. Say: Warfare therein is a great (transgression), but to turn (men) from the way of God, and to disbelieve in Him and in the Inviolable Place of Worship, and to expel His people thence, is a greater with God; for persecution is worse than killing. And they will not cease from fighting against you till they have made you renegades from your religion, if they can. And whoso becometh a renegade and dieth in his disbelief: such are they whose works have fallen both in the world and the Hereafter. Such are rightful owners of the Fire: they will abide therein. (Al-Baqarah 2:216-217)

God forbids you not, with regard to those who fight you not for (your) religion nor drive you out of your homes, from dealing kindly and justly with them: for

God loveth those who are just. / God only forbids you, with regard to those who fight you for(your)religion, and drive you out of your homes, and support (others) in driving you out, from turning to them (for friendship and protection). It is such as turn to them (in these circumstances), that do wrong. (Al-Mumtahanah 60:8-9)

Tell those who disbelieve that if they cease (from persecution of believers) that which is past will be forgiven them; but if they return (thereto) then the example of the men of old hath already gone (before them, for a warning). / And fight them until persecution is no more, and religion is all for God. But if they cease, then lo! God is Seer of what they do. (Al-Anfal 8:38-39)⁶³

Taking together, the argument is that “these verses make it clear that Muslims fight because they have been wronged; because they have been persecuted, which is seen as worse than killing; because they have been made to renounce their religion; and because they have been driven out of their homes. Muslims must fight their enemies not because of who they are, but because of what they have done to them and continue to do to them.”⁶⁴ Ignoring and/or misinterpreting these verses have provided Islamic terrorist with the justification to embark on Jihad against unarmed civilians and other religions in the name of fighting a religious war. The consequence of such a war is the focus of this study.

⁶³ Royal AAL Al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought. *Jihad and the Islamic law of war*

⁶⁴ Royal AAL Al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought. *Jihad and the Islamic law of war*, 15

Chapter 3 - Origin and history of Boko Haram

In this section, an attempt will be made to discuss the origin and history of Boko Haram in Nigeria. A concise discussion of what they stand for and the present state of the sect in Nigeria will be shown. This will also cover the impact that the sect has on the human, economic and socio-political environment in Nigeria.

3.1 Tracing the roots of Boko Haram in Nigeria

Boko haram is a religious extremist group or sect that has posed national security threat to countries such as Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad. The name Boko Haram is derived from the Hausa language⁶⁵ which translates into ‘Western education is forbidden’. The Arabic version of Boko Haram is called Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad which means ‘people who are committed to the propagation of the teachings of Prophet Mohammad (SWT) and Jihad’.⁶⁶ The sect Boko Haram preach against Western or secular education regarding it as a sin. They teach against everything secular and forbids Moslems against attending Western education. They do this by relying on the verse in the Koran which translates into “Anyone who is not governed by what Allah has revealed is among the transgressors.”⁶⁷ The implication is that anyone that is a non-Moslem is a transgressor, an infidel that must be eliminated through Jihad. They, therefore, forbid Moslems in taking part in secular activities that are associated with the Western world.⁶⁸ The question is, how did this terrorist organization come into existence?

⁶⁵ Hausa’s are one of the dominant languages spoken in Northern Nigeria. Most of them are Moslems. However, a minority percentage of them are Christians. They are also minority tribes in Northern Nigeria that are of the Christian religion. Unfortunately, these Northern Christians are the most affected by the activities of Boko Haram.

⁶⁶ Ahmed Aliyu, Ravichandran Moorthy & Nor Azizan Bin Idris. “Towards Understanding the Boko Haram Phenomenon in Nigeria.” *Asian Social Science*, 11 no. 10 (2015): 307-317

⁶⁷ Daniel Egeigba Agbiboa. “Why Boko Haram exists: the relative deprivation perspective.” *African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review* 3 no. 1 (2013): 144-157

⁶⁸ Janine Di Giovanni. “The deadly mission of Boko Haram.” *Newsweek Magazine*, May 20, 2014. [The Deadly Mission of Boko Haram \(newsweek.com\)](http://www.newsweek.com/boko-haram)

Scholars have been unable to pinpoint the exact period that Boko Haram came into existence.⁶⁹ The sect has roots in the teachings of Sheik Ibrahim El-Zakzaky, the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood.⁷⁰ The Sheik was anti-democracy, anti-Western education and anti-secularism; a teacher that attracted the likes of Muhammad Yusuf, who was an adamant follower of the Sheik in the 1980s. Ten years later, a splinter group arose under the leadership of Lawan Abubakar.⁷¹ Muhammad Yusuf⁷², an indigene of Girgir village from Yobe State followed the group that was led by Lawan Abubakar to Maiduguri, Borno State where the group established its presence. The Muslim Youth Organization under Lawan Abubakar was nonviolent until Muhammad Yusuf took over its leadership.⁷³ Yusuf then pledged allegiance to the Jama'atu Izalatil Bid'ah Wa Iqamatus Sunnah (Izala Society). The Izala Society⁷⁴ was then headed by Sheik Ismail Idris.⁷⁵ There arose a leadership dispute in the Izala Society, which led Muhammad Yusuf to form his own group in 2002 under the name Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'Awati Wal Jihad (the present-day Boko Haram).⁷⁶ Initially, the group was focused on teachings and Islamic doctrines. However, a group led by Mohammed Ali were not satisfied with only the teachings and doctrines and decided to move to Kanama, a village in Yobe State near to Niger border to establish a community that will be guided by Islamic injunctions as the present system was un-Islamic.⁷⁷

⁶⁹ Ahmed, Ravichandran & Nor. "Towards Understanding the Boko Haram Phenomenon in Nigeria."

⁷⁰ The group was also known as Tashayyu (Shiism). It attracted a large following of youths because of its teachings against the Nigerian State.

⁷¹ Ahlulsunna wal'jama'ah hijra or Shabaab group (Muslim Youth Organization).

⁷² Yusuf was born on January 29, 1970 and was an ardent follower of Salafi radicalism. He was also a protégé of Ibn Taymiyyah from Harran, Turkey

⁷³ Lawan Abubakar had proceeded to Saudi Arabia for further studies.

⁷⁴ The Izala Society is a Salafist movement (Sunni Society) that is dominant in Nigeria, Chad, Ghana, Niger and Cameroon. It aims to remove all forms of innovation and reestablish the Sunnah (deeds of the Prophet).

⁷⁵ Bello, Abdulmajeed Hassan. "Boko Haram: The greatest security threat to the sovereignty of Nigeria." *International Journal of Management and Social Sciences Research* 2 no. 2 (2013): 66-72

⁷⁶ The group was based in the Alhaji Muhammadu Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri, Borno State, North-East Nigeria

⁷⁷ Nkechi Anyadike. "Boko Haram and national security challenges in Nigeria: causes and solutions." *Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development* 4 no. 5 (2013): 12-23

The break-away group led by Mohammed Ali called on Moslems to rise against secularism and replace the Western-backed government with an Islamic system of government that will be in line with Shariah.

The watershed event that triggered the group to arms was the eventual extrajudicial killing of the factional leader in Kanama, Yobe State by the Nigerian Army.⁷⁸ The disoriented group regrouped in Maiduguri under the leadership of Muhammad Yusuf at the Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri, Borno State. Over the years the group continued to receive support from influential politicians and businessmen in the state and beyond. The support they received helped them carry on with their teachings and to also complete their mosque.

The group under Muhammad Yusuf also supported the then Governor Senator Ali Modu Sheriff during his governorship campaigns. This saw increased membership drive especially the youths in states such as Borno, Yobe, Bauchi, Gombe, Niger, Kano and Kaduna State. With Senator Ali Modu Sherrif as Governor of Borno, the group was emboldened, constituting “itself into a ‘state within a state’”⁷⁹ by establishing alternative governance structures. Mohammed characterized three phases in the evolution of Boko Haram.⁸⁰ In the first phase (Kanama phase: 2003-2005), Muhammad Ali⁸¹ had declared war against the Nigerian State but the group was overpowered by

⁷⁸ The group had skirmishes with the villagers in Kanama because of the rights to fish at the community pond. In the attempt to douse the tension, the group overpowered the Nigerian Police. Thereafter, the Nigerian Army were called in which led to the extrajudicial killings at the place of operations including their leader, Mohammed Ali.

⁷⁹ Ahmed, Ravichandran & Nor. “Towards Understanding the Boko Haram Phenomenon in Nigeria.”

⁸⁰ Kyari Mohammed. “The message and methods of Boko Haram.” In *Boko Haram: Islamism, politics, security and the state in Nigeria*, ed. Perouse de Montclos and Marc-Antoine (Ibadan: IFRA-Nigeria, 2014), 9-32.

⁸¹ Muhammad Ali was believed to have fought with the mujahedeen in Afghanistan. It is also believed that it was Ali who initiated Mohammed Yusuf into militant jihadi. However, Sheik Ja’afar Mahmud is credited as cementing Yusuf’s belief in the jihadi militancy.

the Nigerian State. The second phase (2006-2009), which began with the collapse of Kanama was characterized by extensive indoctrination, preaching, membership drive and radicalization. During the period the group launched attacks on towns such as Yunusari, Geidam, Damaturu, Damboa, Bama, Gwoza and many more.⁸² The period witnessed low-level confrontations with the Nigeria security forces and the villagers that were not in support of their activities.

The third phase (post-2009) began after the killing of its leader, Muhammad Yusuf in 2009 by the Nigerian security forces. Prior to his killing on 30th July 2009, the group launched a massive attack in Bauchi on a police station on 26th July 2009 which led to the killing of 39 Boko Haram members after a 5-day confrontation ensued between the group and the Nigerian security forces culminating in the killing of Boko Haram leader, Muhammad Yusuf in Maiduguri.⁸³ The US Senate Committee on Intelligence also reported that the sect suffered 700 casualties in the ensuing confrontation with the Nigerian state. It was in the post-2009 that reorganized and regrouped under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau in 2010 Boko Haram sought to avenge the death of their leaders and members. In the attempt by the Nigerian security forces to crackdown on their activities, the sect became more deadlier with massive attacks across Northeast Nigeria. Their attacks extended to the Federal Capital Territory (Abuja) with the bombings of the headquarters of the Nigeria Police Force in June 2011 and then the Abuja United Nations headquarters in August of the same year.


⁸² Mohammed. "The message and methods of Boko Haram."

⁸³ US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence Committee on Homeland. "Boko Haram: Emerging threat to the U.S. homeland." Washington DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, 2011. Accessed August 8, 2022. url: [CPRT-112HPRT71725.pdf \(govinfo.gov\)](https://www.govinfo.gov/records/CPRT-112HPRT71725)

Over time the sect has become more organized with different levels of authoritative hierarchy. According to Mohammed⁸⁴, the group is headed by a spiritual leader and commander-in-chief (Amir ul-Aam) who assumes the overall administrative and spiritual responsibility of the group. The spiritual leader has first and second deputy commanders (Na'ib Amir ul Aam I & II) respectively who are also guided by the Shura Consultative Council (decision making council). The state operational commanders/leaders (amir) report to the Shura Consultative Council with local cell commanders reporting to the state operational commanders and strategists. The cell commanders supervise the local cell operatives in the communities across the states where the sect has their activities (see Figure 3.1). The sect strives for a two-way communication from the local cells to the spiritual leader and vice versa to build confidence and achieve its target operational goals.⁸⁵ The group has continued to expand to other states and countries in the West African sub-region with operational bases spread out across the region. In the next section that follows, an attempt will be made to highlight their demands. In the next section, I will illuminate the present state of the sect in Nigeria with a focus on the consequences of their activities.

⁸⁴ Mohammed. "The message and methods of Boko Haram."

⁸⁵ The sect has maintained a dynamic and decentralized organogram since the events post-2009. It is more malleable with the capacity to undertake activities as the circumstanced demand.



Key: —→ flow of directives and instructions
 - -→ Flow of information and suggestions

Figure 3.1: Hypothetical Organogram of Boko Haram
 Source: Onuoha, Freedom. "(Un)willing to die: Boko Haram and suicide terrorism in Nigeria."

3.2 The present state of Boko Haram in Nigeria

It is worthwhile to know that the Boko Haram sect has suffered tremendous losses from the fight with the Nigerian security forces. In the period after the demise of its leader in 2009, Sheik Muhammad Yusuf, Ababukar Shekau assumed leadership of the sect as its spiritual leader and command-in-chief. Between the period of 2011-2012, there arose a dispute between Shekau and Khalid Al-Barnawi and Mamman Nur on three points: his despotic attributes, extremism and operational capability.⁸⁶ The disputes continued until a rival group called Ansaru⁸⁷ (Jama'at Ansari Al-Muslimin fi Bilad Al-Sudan) was formed under the leadership of Al-Barnawi. Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) distanced itself from Shekau tacitly supporting Ansaru. Feeling left out, Shekau turned to AQIM arch-rival, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in March 2015 to pledge allegiance to the group. ISIS renamed Boko Haram as the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP)⁸⁸ recognizing him as the leader of the group. Within a year, ISWAP began to experience internal tussle especially regarding the tactics employed by Shekau, which also targeted Moslems. This power tussle resulted to some top commanders of Boko Haram forming a new faction under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Barnawi, the son of Muhammad Yusuf, founder of the sect⁸⁹. These new group was recognized by the leadership of ISIS as the official cell of ISWAP.⁹⁰ Shekau maintained control over Boko Haram. Three factions of the original Boko Haram sect now operate in Nigeria: Ansaru, Boko Haram and ISWAP.⁹¹

⁸⁶ Madeline Velluro. "Violent Islamist groups in Northern Nigeria." Washington DC: United States Commission on International Religious Freedom. Accessed August 7, 2022. URL: [Factsheet: Violent Islamist Groups in Northern Nigeria \(uscifr.gov\)](https://www.uscifr.gov/factsheet-violent-islamist-groups-in-northern-nigeria)

⁸⁷ Ansaru means "Vanguard of Aid and Protection for Muslim's in Black Africa"

⁸⁸ Velluro. "Violent Islamist groups in Northern Nigeria."

⁸⁹ Abu Musab Al-Barnawi was also the former spokesperson of Boko Haram. He was declared leader of ISWAP in August, 2016.

⁹⁰ Velluro. "Violent Islamist groups in Northern Nigeria."

⁹¹ Ansaru is loyal to al-Qaeda while ISWAP is loyal to ISIL

After Ansaru was formed, the group went somewhat dormant following intense reprisals by the Nigerian security forces and the arrest of its leader. However, Ansaru regained its relevance with spirited attacks on civilians (mostly Christians and government officials) particularly in Kaduna State, where it has its major operations.⁹² The estimated strength of the Ansaru group is 400 fighters.⁹³ ISWAP on the other hand is estimated to have about 4,000-5,000 fighters.^{94 95} The focus of their attacks is on military formations and security operatives rather than civilians. ISWAP has also been reported to have links with ISIS-Greater Sahara, another breakaway ISIS faction that is operational in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso.⁹⁶ However, there are reports of the group targeting civilians in recent years. The group is increasing its operations to other states in Nigeria with numerous attacks, which is increasingly targeting civilians. In areas where they hold sway, strict regulations are enforced in line with Quranic injunctions. The group has also been reported to have outstripped Boko Haram in terms of capacity and extensive operational activities.⁹⁷ The in-fighting among the groups further led to the killing of Boko Haram leader, Abubakar Shekau in May 2021.^{98 99} The death of Shekau was a big blow to Boko Haram which resulted in many of the fighters surrendering to the Nigerian security forces with a few remnants still active around the Lake Chad region. All these groups can be referred to as Boko Haram

⁹² Other militant groups have denounced the approach used by Ansaru as too slow (long-term), which is affecting the morale of its fighters.

⁹³ Vellturo. "Violent Islamist groups in Northern Nigeria."

⁹⁴ Vellturo. "Violent Islamist groups in Northern Nigeria."

⁹⁵ Congressional Research Services. "Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province." Washington DC: The Library of Congress. Accessed August 3, 2022. URL: [IF10173.pdf \(fas.org\)](#)

⁹⁶ Congressional Research Services. "Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province."

⁹⁷ Congressional Research Services. "Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province."

⁹⁸ There are reports that indicated that Shekau detonated the suicide vests he was wearing when ISWAP commanders attempted to capture him. It was also reported that other commanders of ISWAP were killed in the process. It is believed that the new leader of ISIS, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi approved his capture.

⁹⁹ African Union. "Nigeria: ISWAP claims Abubakar Shekau was killed on direct orders of ISIS, 6th June 2021." Accessed August 8, 2022. URL: [Shekau-killed.pdf \(caert.org.dz\)](#)

based on their cardinal objectives, a position adopted in this study. What therefore, differentiates the group is their operational objectives.

As the preceding arguments indicates, the groups all aim to establish an Islamic Caliphate in Nigeria through Jihad. To help them achieve that, several options to prosecute the Jihad are open to them. Firstly, the groups are engaged in bombings of places especially churches, schools and public buildings among many others. Military formations and command posts are not left out in their attacks. The aim of these attacks is to undermine the national security of the country. The groups have been involved in massive kidnappings across the country. The major incident of kidnapping by the group was the abduction of the Chibok Girls in Borno State. This ushered in the era of school abductions across some selected states in Northern Nigeria. In 2014, 276 girls were abducted from the Chibok Secondary School in Borno State with another set of 110 from Government Girls' Science and Technical College, Dapchi, Yobe State in 2018. Also, 344 students at the Government Secondary School, Kankara, Katsina State were also kidnapped in 2020. Post-2020, an additional 1,000 plus have also been kidnapped from schools (including teachers and students) across Northern Nigeria with an estimated ransom payment of N220 million (\$526,000).¹⁰⁰ The most affected states in ranking are Katsina, Zamfara, Niger, Kaduna, and Kebbi States respectively.

The groups have adopted the following operational strategies to prosecute their jihad.¹⁰¹ Direct confrontation with the security agencies in the country. This involves deploying many fighters to engage the military and security and paramilitary operatives (ambushes and targeted ops). A

¹⁰⁰ SB Morgen. "Chart of the week: School abductions in Nigeria." Accessed August 8, 2022. URL: [Chart of the week: School abductions in Nigeria – Nigeria's leading geopolitical intelligence platform \(sbmintel.com\)](https://sbmintel.com/chart-of-the-week-school-abductions-in-nigeria-nigeria-s-leading-geopolitical-intelligence-platform/)

¹⁰¹ Ahmed, Ravichandran & Idris. "Towards understanding the Boko Haram phenomenon in Nigeria."

recent case is the attack on the Kuje Prison in the nation's capital which led to the release of their operatives and other inmates numbering 1,000. ISIS aligned with Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the attack.¹⁰² The group has been known to adopt the strategy of drive-by-shooting using motorbikes to elude capture. This has proved successful especially in the rural areas of the country. It has also been used in targeted assassinations especially for individuals they consider enemies. Boko Haram is also known to use improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Several public places have been impacted by this strategy. Suicide bombings using motorbikes, vehicles, humans (especially children and women), tricycles have been extensively used by the group. As earlier indicated, the group conducts kidnappings across the country as one of their modus operandi.

The question then arises regarding how the groups fund their operations. Scholars^{103 104} have argued that in the early days of Boko Haram, the group relied on daily levies and membership dues to fund their operations.¹⁰⁵ The group has also received funding from top government functionaries, businessmen, politicians and organizations within the country¹⁰⁶. A recent report by the United Arab Emirate convicted six Nigerians¹⁰⁷ for sponsoring Boko Haram. The group has also been receiving international donations and support from groups outside the country. These groups alleged to be funding Boko Haram include al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

¹⁰² Ishaq, Khalid and Alys Davies. "Nigeria Kuje prison break: More than 400 missing from Abuja jail." BBC, July 7, 2022. [Nigeria Kuje prison break: More than 400 missing from Abuja jail - BBC News](#)

¹⁰³ Onuoha, Freedom. "Boko Haram and the evolving Salafi Jihadist threat in Nigeria." In *Boko Haram: Islamism, politics, security and the state in Nigeria*, edited by Perouse de Montclos and Marc-Antoine, 158-191. Ibadan: IFRA-Nigeria, 2014

¹⁰⁴ Agbiboa, Daniel Egeigba. "Understanding the religious terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria." *African Study Monographs* 34 no. 2 (2013): 65-84

¹⁰⁵ These groups were mostly peasant farmers, traders, commercial motorcycles etc.

¹⁰⁶ Such individuals alleged to be sponsors of the sect include Senator Ali Ndume, Alh Bunu Wakil, Mohammed Damagun (proprietor of Daily Trust Newspaper) among many others.

¹⁰⁷ The six Nigerians that were convicted in the UAE were designated sponsors of the sect by the United States Department of State: Abdurrahman Ado Musa, Salihu Yusuf Adamu, Bashir Ali Yusuf, Muhammed Ibrahim Isa, Ibrahim Ali Alhassan, and Surajo Abubakar Muhammad.

(AQIM), Musilimi Yaa'maa (Islamic group based in Algeria), Al Muntada Trust Fund and the Islamic World Society. The group has also relied on criminality like robberies (local banks), illegal arms trafficking, human trafficking etc. in funding its operations. Another major source of funding exploited by the group is from the proceeds of kidnappings. For example, the government was reported as paying about N60,000,000 (\$142,000) for the release of the Chibok Girls.¹⁰⁸ Another report¹⁰⁹ estimates that seven of the Abuja-Kaduna train kidnapped victims paid N800,000,000 (\$1,890,000) for their release from their captors.¹¹⁰ These humongous fees have been used by the sect to fund terror across the country. To throw more light on this, I will present ideas that depict what the sect hopes to achieve, which is their demand.

3.3 Understanding their demands

To understand the demands of Boko Haram, we need to understand Wahhabism.¹¹¹ Wahhabism advocates a pure form of Islam based on the Quran and the Hadith as the ultimate authority in Islam rather than the subsequent commentaries that provide explanations. The name Wahhabi¹¹² was derived from the name of a Moslem scholar (Muhammad bin Abd al Wahhab) who lived in the Arabian Peninsula between 1703-1791.¹¹³ Wahhabi aims to reintroduce Islamic practices and teachings as obtainable in the 7th century by Prophet Muhammad (SWT) and his companions. It

¹⁰⁸ This is based on a recent documentary aired on BBC titled 'Nigeria's Banditry: The Inside Story.' The documentary was also aired by Trust TV and was fined N5,000,000 by the Nigerian government.

¹⁰⁹ Bukarti Bulama (@bulamabukarti). "Families of the 7 victims of the ABJ-KD train attack released Saturday told Daily Trust that they paid N800m random," Twitter, July 11, 2022, 9:03 a.m.

<https://twitter.com/bulamabukarti/status/1546404887428321282?t=-YCzXrVcQALdK6fIBZ88Mg&s=19>

¹¹⁰ Of the seven victims, six were Nigerians while one was a Pakistani. The Nigerians were reported to have paid N100,000,000 each (\$235,000) while the Pakistani paid N200,000,000.

¹¹¹ Salafiyya, which means 'to follow' is synonymous with Wahhabism.

¹¹² Is a form of Sunni Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia and Qatar. However, it is used to indicate a Sunni Islamic movement outside of Saudi Arabia.

¹¹³ Christopher M. Blanchard "The Islamic traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya." Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress. Accessed August 8, 2022. URL: [The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya \(fas.org\)](https://fas.org)

aims to purge Islam of any practices and teachings that are contrary to the teachings of Prophet Muhammad (SWT). Adherents of this group have been known to oppose Moslems who are non-Wahhabis calling them enemies of Islam. Christians are called infidels while moderate Moslems are called apostates. Militancy was not initially associated with Salaffiya until the resistance war by the mujahideen against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. This saw increased radicalization and mobilization across the Moslem world attributed to Wahhabism with the notion that it is spreading terrorism and intolerance across the world.¹¹⁴

Wahhabism has therefore, provided the fuel for militant and terrorist groups that have sprung up across the world as its teachings have been distorted by these groups.¹¹⁵ Boko Haram also benefited from these teachings to seek to establish a pure form of Islam in Nigeria. Their idea was to reintroduce into the Nigerian society a pure form of Islam as the final religious authority that will supersede the Western system of governance as presently constituted. The group believes it can achieve this through a Jihad via martyrdom.¹¹⁶ Therefore, their primary objective is to establish a Caliphate using violence, carnage, and terrorism across Nigeria. The militancy of the group expanded drastically post-2009 after the killing of its leader, Muhammad Yusuf. Their initial goal was to revenge the death of their spiritual leader and commander-in-chief but as the years progressed, the group have expanded its goals towards the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate throughout Nigeria. This implies overthrowing the present democratic government to be replaced with a pure form of Islam. In the next section, I will attempt to present a detailed definition and nature of the concept of national security.

¹¹⁴ Saudi Arabia and wealthy individuals across the Arab world have been alleged to be sponsoring Wahhabi teachings, which is increasing militancy.

¹¹⁵ Osama bin Laden and the Taliban were greatly influenced by the Wahhabi form of Islam

¹¹⁶ This explains why Boko Haram uses suicide bombers in the pursuit of their objectives.

Chapter 4 - Growth Factors of Boko Haram in Nigeria

In this section, an attempt will be made to present evidence regarding the factors that have influenced the growth of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Four factors will be considered that I believe have contributed to the growth of Boko Haram in Nigeria. These factors pertain to religious extremism (ignorance), Islam and Jihad, socio-economic factors, poverty and illiteracy and the influence of nonstate actors.

4.1 Religious extremism (ignorance and illiteracy)

As discussed in earlier sections, religious extremism describes a situation where a religious group elevates itself over and above other religious groups. Such groups are characterized by totalitarianism and intolerance, destruction of the present system in favor of their extremist governance structures and the use of violence.¹¹⁷ Religious terrorists are avowed anti-democratic and anti-progressive elements who radicalize their followers to employ unprecedented violence to achieve their ill-defined objectives. This point is succinctly captured by Juergensmeyer 2003:

They have come to hate secular governments with an almost transcendent passion ... dreamed of revolutionary changes that would establish a godly social order in the rubble of what the citizens of most secular societies have regarded as modern, egalitarian democracies The logic of this kind of militant religiosity ... has contained a fundamental critique of the world's post-Enlightenment secular culture and politics (232).¹¹⁸

¹¹⁷ Mathias Bak, Nilaus Tarp Kristoffer and Schori Liang Christina. "Defining the concept of 'violent extremism': delineating the attributes and phenomenon of violent extremism Geneva Paper 24/19."

¹¹⁸ Mark Juergensmeyer. *Terror in the mind of God: The global rise of religious violence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 356.

In Nigeria, Boko Haram has followed this path by seeking to overcome the democratically constituted government to impose Shariah law in every state in the country. To achieve this ignoble objective, the sect exploits the youths to join this cause. What is fascinating is that the ranks of Boko Haram continue to increase primarily because of their radicalization campaigns amongst the youths. They are successful because of the ignorance of the populace. A study commissioned by United States Institute of Peace indicates that youths in Northern Nigeria are attracted to religious terrorism because of their ignorance concerning the Islamic teachings regarding violence.¹¹⁹ The study also found that because of their lack of deep knowledge of the religious teachings makes them to rely more on Imams for religious guidance rather than the Quran. This has provided Boko Haram with the opportunity of recruiting and radicalizing the youths into a fighting force in Nigeria. This, they achieve through their numerous camps spread across the country especially in Northern Nigeria.

4.2 Islam and Jihad

The idea that terrorism derives its legitimacy from religion was touted in the seminal paper by Rapoport, 1984.¹²⁰ Rapoport explored the link between religion and terrorism using Hinduism, Islam and Judaism religions and argued that religion and terrorism happens to have some form of relationship. The focal theme of his argument was that Hinduism, Islam and Judaism have the capacity for terrorism but what differentiates them is tied to the groups' purpose, organization, methods and above all, the public's response.

His ideas have provided the foundation of academic debate exploring religion and terrorism. Islamic religion has therefore, been exploited to give legitimacy to terrorism by terrorist groups

¹¹⁹ Freedom Onuoha. "(Un)willing to die: Boko Haram and suicide terrorism in Nigeria."

¹²⁰ David C. Rapoport. "Fear and trembling: Terrorism in three religious traditions." *American Political Science Review*, 78 no. 3 (1984): 658–677

like Boko Haram. To buttress the importance of the link between religion and terrorism in Nigeria, I wish to draw our attention to the Maitatsine movement¹²¹, which was the first recognized religious militancy sect in Nigeria post-independence. This group was associated with Usman Dan Fodio¹²² in the 19th Century, an Islamic leader that established the Sokoto Caliphate that was modeled according to the Sharia law.¹²³ Muhammadu Marwa, who formed the Maitatsine movement was an Islamic preacher that was recognized by the British colonialist as an extremist who sought to promote his own version of a pure Islamic religion. Marwa believed that Islam was polluted because of the present governance system introduced by the colonial administrators in Nigeria.

The Human Rights Watch captured the religious teachings of Marwa in their 2012 who “denounced the affluent elites as infidels, opposed Western influence, and refused to recognize secular authorities.”¹²⁴ The youths¹²⁵ at the time were also attracted to Marwa and the Maitatsine movement because he was known to condemn “the hypocrisy and ostentation of the *nouveau riche* and promised redemption and salvation to God’s righteous people.”¹²⁶ The activities of the sect led to confrontation with the security forces which lead to death of many of the members including Muhammadu Marwa. The Maitatsine movement provided evidence of the link between

¹²¹ Maitatsine means “the one who curses’.

¹²² Usman Dan Fodio waged a Jihad against the supposed present corrupt system of the Northern Hausa’s at his time. He also sought to purify the society by instituted Sharia as the supreme law of the land.

¹²³ Daniel Egeigba Agbibo and Benjamin Maiangwa. “Nigeria united in grief; divided in response: Religious terrorism, Boko Haram and the dynamics of state response.” *African Journal on Conflict Resolution* 14 no. 1 (2014): 63-97

¹²⁴ Human Rights Watch. *Spiralling violence: Boko Haram attacks and security forces abuses in Nigeria, 2012*. Accessed August 21, 2022: URL: [Human Rights Watch \(hrw.org\)](https://www.hrw.org)

¹²⁵ The youths then were very poor locals who were called commoners or the ‘talakawa’

¹²⁶ Raymond Hickey. “The 1982 Maitatsine uprisings in Nigeria: A note.” *African Affairs*, 83 no. 331 (1984): 251–256.

Islam and terrorist activities in Nigeria. The rise of Boko Haram is attributed to the earlier influence of the activities of both Usman Dan Fodio and the Maitatsine movement.

As earlier argued, Boko Haram arose because of the dissatisfaction with the present system of governance and their desire to establish a pure form of Islam or Sharia as the supreme law of the land using extreme violence without recourse to the status quo. A case in point is the study¹²⁷ involving 140 youths, their relatives and peers who were directly or indirectly involved in Boko Haram activities. The study found that youths joined the sect because of the “deep grievances around government inadequacies and security abuses.”¹²⁸ These inadequacies include lack of youth participation in political activities, poor infrastructural activities, lack of opportunities for participation in business, social exclusion and lack of policies to eradicate poverty.¹²⁹ As a result, “Today’s terrorists don’t want a seat at the table, they want to destroy the table and everyone sitting at it.”¹³⁰ Jihad, based on the interpretation of the Islamic religion is therefore, the tool that groups such as Boko Haram are using to attract the youths to its cause and it is this that has influenced the growth of Boko Haram in Nigeria.

4.3 Socio-economic factors

The current socio-political and economic realities in Nigeria are increasingly pointing to a failed state.¹³¹ Rotberg and Campbell 2021 characterize a failed state as lacking “security, [a state that]

¹²⁷ Mercy Corps. “*Motivations and empty promises*” *Voices of former Boko Haram combatants and Nigerian youth*, 2016. Accessed October 5, 2022: URL:

[Motivations and Empty Promises Mercy Corps Full Report.pdf \(merciyocorps.org\)](https://www.mercycorps.org/~/media/Files/Reports/Motivations_and_Empty_Promises_Mercy_Corps_Full_Report.pdf)

¹²⁸ Mercy Corps. “*Motivations and empty promises*” *Voices of former Boko Haram combatants and Nigerian youth*

¹²⁹ Akinyetun Tope Shola. “Youth political participation, good governance and social inclusion in Nigeria: Evidence from Nairaland.” *Canadian Journal of Family and Youth*, 13 no. 2 (2021): 1-13

¹³⁰ Matthew Morgan. “The origins of the new terrorism.” *Parameters*, 34 no. 1 (2004): 30–31

¹³¹ Robert I. Rotberg and John Campbell. “Nigeria is a failed state.” *Foreign Policy News*, May 27, 2021. [Buhari's Nigeria Is a Failed State \(foreignpolicy.com\)](https://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2021/05/27/nigeria_is_a_failed_state)

is unsafe, has weak rules of law, is corrupt, limits political participation and voice, discriminates within its borders against various classes and kinds of citizens, and provides educational and medical services sparingly. Most of all, failed states are violent.... and the inability of the Nigerian state to provide peace and stability to its people.” The reality is that a failed state is incapable of performing her basic security and developmental functions and can be said to have lost control over its territory and borders. Therefore, the Rotberg and Campbell 2021 characterization succinctly captures the present state of the Nigerian state.

I further argue by relying on the failed state theory¹³² that in Nigeria, there is rampant poverty and unemployment across the country. This is particularly relevant when we consider how a failed state impacts on the level of education, employment opportunities, income distribution and wealth creation and poverty. For instance, Nigeria ranks low on the Human Development Index (HDI) at 0.539 as at 2020.¹³³ Unemployment in Nigeria is at 33.3 percent with youth unemployment as high as 53.4 percent especially if we consider that the youth make up 70 percent of the total population.¹³⁴ All these glaring statistics are pointers to the state of the Nigerian state vis-à-vis the failed state hypothesis. This has, therefore, created a vacuum and opportunity for groups such as Boko Haram to exploit because of the inability of the Nigerian state to provide basic infrastructural facilities, healthcare and educational facilities, good governance, and democratic dividends for its populace. As a result, Boko Haram has been able to penetrate the local communities to woo the youths to join its cause.

¹³² Robert I. Rotberg. “Failed states, collapsed states, weak states: causes and indicators.” In *State failure and state weakness in a time of terror*, ed. Rotberg I. Robert, 1-26. USA: Brookings Institution Press, 2003

¹³³ United Nations Development Programme. *The next frontier: Human development and the Anthropocene - Briefing note for countries on the 2020 Human Development Report*, 2022. Accessed October 5, 2022: URL: [NGA.pdf \(undp.org\)](#)

¹³⁴ National Bureau of Statistics. *Unemployment statistics*, 2022. Accessed October 5, 2022: URL: [Home | National Bureau of Statistics \(nigerianstat.gov.ng\)](#)

4.4 Poverty and illiteracy

To help in understanding why Boko Haram has improved in the last years, I focus on the link between poverty, illiteracy, and terrorism. Nigeria ranks second as the poverty capital of the world after India with 39 percent of the population (83 million) living in extreme poverty.¹³⁵ In terms of the level of poverty¹³⁶ across the geopolitical zones of the country, the North-East where Boko Haram is most active ranks highest in terms of the level of poverty (71.86 percent) followed by North-West (64.84 percent), North-Central (42.7 percent), South-East (42.44 percent), South-South (21.28 percent) and South-West (12.12 percent).¹³⁷ Based on this statistics, there is a huge divide between North-South in terms of levels of poverty. The number of the poor in the North surpasses the South which creates the fertile ground for the recruitment of fighters for the sect.

Another interesting statistic is the number of out-of-school children in primary education. The latest figures show that children between the ages of 5 to 14 years who do not attend primary school despite it being free stands at over 10.5 million in Nigeria.¹³⁸ The average attendance rate according to the UNICEF report is 61 percent while in Northern Nigeria, the percentage is lower at 53 percent. The practice of the ‘almajiris’ contributes to these alarming statistics regarding out-of-school children. The North, therefore, has a huge number of illiterate youths who are attracted to the Boko Haram sect, which promises them employment and livelihood. Their lack of education and high levels of poverty have exposed them to undue influence from the sect, a fact confirmed by the study commissioned by United States Institute of Peace.¹³⁹ It is known that

¹³⁵ World Poverty Clock. “Nigeria.” Accessed August 22, 2022. URL: [World Poverty Clock](#)

¹³⁶ Adeyeye, Paul. “Nigeria’s poverty crisis and the Nigerian Living Standards Survey.” *Dataphyte*, June 4, 2020. [Nigeria's Poverty Crisis and the Nigerian Living Standards Survey | Dataphyte](#)

¹³⁷ Report of the Nigerian Living Standards published by the National Bureau of Statistics

¹³⁸ Latest report from UNICEF. [Education | UNICEF Nigeria](#)

¹³⁹ Freedom Onuoha. “(Un)willing to die: Boko Haram and suicide terrorism in Nigeria.”

the sect conduct regular campaigns to recruit the youths by offering them financial rewards, sense of belonging, status and prestige.¹⁴⁰ As earlier submitted, Boko Haram exploits the unsuspecting youths to join their cause because of their lack of understanding of the Quran.¹⁴¹ All these factors have contributed to the growth of the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria.

Their lack of education and high levels of poverty have exposed them to undue influence from the sect, a fact confirmed by the study commissioned by United States Institute of Peace.¹⁴² It is known that the sect conduct regular campaigns to recruit the youths by offering them financial rewards, sense of belonging, status and prestige.¹⁴³ As earlier submitted, Boko Haram exploits the unsuspecting youths to join their cause because of their lack of understanding of the

4.5 The influence of nonstate-actors

Providing a comprehensive and acceptable classification of nonstate actors is rather challenging.¹⁴⁴ Nonstate actors do not represent states yet are important in international politics. They cover such groups as inter-governmental organizations, international non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations among others. However, in this study the focus is on the nonstate armed groups. Nonstate actors may be defined “as distinctive organizations that are (i) willing and capable to use violence for pursuing their objectives and (ii) not integrated into

¹⁴⁰ Ewi, Martin and Salifu Uyo. “Money talks: A key reason youths join Boko Haram.” Accessed August 22, 2022. URL: [Money talks: A key reason youths join Boko Haram \(frantic.s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com\)](https://frantic.s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com)

¹⁴¹ Because they are illiterate, they ‘almajirica’ are unable to read the Quran but rely on their Imams for interpretation. They are therefore, exposed to misinterpretation of the Quran and therefore, exploited accordingly.

¹⁴² Freedom Onuoha. “(Un)willing to die: Boko Haram and suicide terrorism in Nigeria.”

¹⁴³ Ewi, Martin and Salifu Uyo. “Money talks: A key reason youths join Boko Haram.” Accessed August 22, 2022. URL: [Money talks: A key reason youths join Boko Haram \(frantic.s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com\)](https://frantic.s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com)

¹⁴⁴ Claudia Hofmann and Ulrich Schneckener. “Engaging non-state armed actors in state and peace-building: options and strategies.” *International Review of the Red Cross* 93 no. 883 (2011): 608-621

formalized state institutions such as regular armies, presidential guards, police, or special forces. They, therefore, (iii) possess a certain degree of autonomy with regard to politics, military operations, resources, and infrastructure.”¹⁴⁵

To further expatiate on what constitutes a nonstate actor, it must have considerable size with a large following across countries and is giving some level of legitimacy by governments to international politics.¹⁴⁶ In Nigeria, the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), Odua People’s Congress (OPC) and the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF)¹⁴⁷ are some of the recognized nonstate actors. While IPOB is agitating for the creation of the state of Biafra, the OPC aims for the creation of the Oduduwa Republic. NDPVF on the other hand seeks to fight for the control over the oil wealth that is found in the Niger Delta. The irony of this is that the North too wants control over the leadership of the country, which has explained their dominance in the political activities. Boko Haram, therefore, exploits this opportunity to seek to create its own egalitarian society based on the teachings of the Quran. They believe that Nigeria belongs to them hence they are actively engaged in the recruitment drive to attract young Moslem boys and girls into their fold to engage in violence to institute Sharia law across the country. And because of the earlier reasons provided, the evidence seems to suggest that the sect is succeeding in terms of youth mobilization and radicalization to achieve their ill-conceived and ill-defined

¹⁴⁵ Hofmann and Schneckener. “Engaging non-state armed actors in state and peace-building.”

¹⁴⁶ Elliott R. Morss. “The new global players: how they compete and collaborate.” *World Development*, 19 no. 1 (1991): 55-64

¹⁴⁷ IPOB operates in the South East region while OPC and NDPVF operate in the South West and South-South respectively. IPOB and NDPVF have been known to be violent as evidenced by their activities (kidnappings, assassinations, economic sabotage such as bombings of oil facilities, markets, government buildings etc). The violence attributed to OPC is not as prominent as those championed by IPOB and NDPVF. Worthy of note is that all the actors do not have religious coloration except political agitations and control.

objectives.¹⁴⁸ This has therefore, led to the increasing number of youths joining the set to fight a jihad to establish a pure system of government based on the Shariah.

Chapter 5 - Understanding National Security

In this section, the focus will be on presenting a holistic view of the concept of national security. The focus is not just on national security in terms of military power but also on other aspects of national security such as human security. This is appropriate given the role that Boko Haram has on the social and human activities in the country. The section will also highlight the important aspects of national security as is obtainable in the Nigerian context.

5.1 Holistic conceptualization of national security

What comes to mind when we talk about national security is the notion of military force. A country's national security is synonymous with the maintenance of its territorial integrity from external aggression.¹⁴⁹ In this limited view of the concept of national security, the focus is on how states use coercive or military force to tackle any known or anticipated threat to its territorial integrity, mostly with support from its allies. The focus is on military prowess, an expansive national defense budget, the power of its military, paramilitary, police and intelligence architecture. This notion of national security was brought to the fore post-World War II which

¹⁴⁸ Onapajo, Hakeem. "Children in Boko Haram conflict: The neglected facet of a decade of terror in Nigeria." *African Security* 13 no 2 (2020): 195-211

¹⁴⁹ Mitchell Alan Kaplan. "The socioeconomic and political ramifications of climate migration in the 21st century" In *Technological development and impact on economic and environmental sustainability*, ed Yilmaz Bayar, Mahmut Unsal Sasmaz and Omer Faruk Ozturk (IGI Global Publishers, 2022), 352

characterized the East-West divide in two opposing blocs expressing themselves primarily through substantial military capabilities. The idea was to deter foreign threats by building on military power of the nations in cohort with the armies, which explained the astronomical rise in the development of military arsenals.

However, as the cold war faded and societies advance, other threats other than the external aggression of nations or groups have led scholars to question whether understanding national security only in terms of military power will be appropriate in the new context.¹⁵⁰ The 21st century is characterized by issues such as global warming, globalized economic system (e.g. interconnected supply chain), terrorism, global health pandemics (e.g. Covid-19), cybersecurity threats (hacking and stealing of national trade secrets), artificial intelligence among many others. These issues in some instances have an even greater impact on the survival of nations and the international balance of power.¹⁵¹ A good case in point is the after-effect of the Covid-19 pandemic on the massive disruption in the global supply chain. An extended view of national security was therefore suggested by Chandra and Bhonsle 1983 to mean

the preservation of the independence, integrity and sovereignty of the state against external and internal adversaries, the promotion of economic growth with equity, ensuring food, energy and water security, ensuring human development with particular emphasis on education, health, housing, sanitation etc, the creation of a knowledge-based society with a focus on science and technology, the deft management of the multifaceted challenges which are a feature of globalisation such as terrorism, proliferation and climate change, the provision of good

¹⁵⁰ Satish Chandra and Rahul Bhonsle. "National security: concept, measurement and management." *Strategic Analysis* 39 no. 4 (2015): 337-359

¹⁵¹ Richard H. Ullman. "Redefining Security." *International Security* 8 no. 1 (1983): 129–153.

*governance where the rule of law and the efficient delivery of services is assured in a non-discriminatory fashion, and effective institutional mechanisms to manage national security (340).*¹⁵²

In this context, national security encompasses both the ‘hard and soft’ aspects, which involves military prowess, the promotion of economic prosperity, human capital development and the provision of good governance, rule of law and ensuring equity. Focusing on military and the maintenance of territorial integrity of nations without incorporating these perspectives implies a limited view of what constitutes national security. This perspective is appropriate especially considering the insights from the 2014 Human Development Report which look at human security as involving issues such as economic security (basic level of income), food security (access to basic food), health security (access to basic healthcare facilities and drugs), environmental security (access to sustainable environment, clean water and air), personal security (freedom from threats of violence, crime, ethnic and religious crisis), community security (maintenance of identity of nationalities within a country) and political security (respect for basic human rights).

As summarized by Haq 1995¹⁵³, national security encompasses not just the security of countries but also the security of individuals and people within that country. It also involves not just the accumulation of military power but also the growth and development of nations. It is also not just about the territorial integrity of countries but also the security of individuals and people in their homes, places of work and worship, in their neighborhoods, communities and localities,

¹⁵² Satish Chandra and Rahul Bhonsle. “National security: concept, measurement and management.”

¹⁵³ Hahbubul Haq. “New imperatives of human security.” *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues* 4 no. 1 (1995): 68-73

that is where they reside. This view of national security has been captured in the National Security Strategy of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 2019. The fundamental mission of the policy document is “to apply all elements of national power to ensure physical and human security, a just society, peaceful co-existence, national unity, prosperity and sustainable development while promoting Nigeria’s influence in regional, continental and global affairs.”¹⁵⁴ The country’s national security revolves around four cardinal objectives (i) to protect Nigerians and the territorial integrity of the country (ii) to promote the prosperity and sustainable development of the country (iii) to promote national unity and peaceful co-existence of the different ethnic nationalities in the country (iv) to promote and protect the country’s regional and international interests. It is this holistic view of national security that is adopted in this study. I believe that the new threat of terrorism has expanded the scope of what constitutes national security. With the attendant impact that the activities of Boko Haram have on the social, economic, political and wellbeing of Nigerians, it is most appropriate to adopt this perspective of national security as it better illuminates the Boko Haram-national security link in Nigeria. In exploring this relationship, we take cognizance of the impact that the activities of Boko Haram have on the economic, political, social and livelihoods of Nigerian citizens and, consequently, on the overall security of the country.

¹⁵⁴ Federal Government of Nigeria. “National Security Strategy 2019”, xvii

Chapter 6 - Linking Boko Haram to National Security

In the previous section, I presented a holistic view of what constitutes national security in the context of the Nigerian National Security Strategy of 2019 to enable a careful evaluation of how the activities of Boko Haram impacts national security. As a result, this section explores how Boko Haram activities impact the following broad aspects of national security: territorial integrity and independence, economic prosperity and sustainable development, national and international interests.¹⁵⁵ The focus is therefore on these three aspects of national security.

6.1 The impact on territorial integrity and independence

The formal concept of territorial integrity can be traced to writers such as Heffter in the 19th century who linked the concept to the integrity rights granted to states.¹⁵⁶ In earlier legal perspectives of territorial integrity, the focus was limited to the relationships between states. However, recent debates have expanded the scale of those responsible for impacting a state's territorial integrity to include non-state actors.¹⁵⁷ Unfortunately, Boko Haram falls outside the realm of non-state actors that seek self-determination using political and legal means placing them at par violent groups that seek forceful approaches to the realization of their goals of territorial control over an existing or recognized territory. Additionally, the protection of a state's territorial integrity implies guarantees that such a state will exist within its defined territory (or boundary) without interference. Activities of Boko Haram including their international

¹⁵⁵ In trying to assess this impact, I intend to support my analysis with the result of a qualitative study involving four security experts in the fight against Boko Haram in Nigeria. Their views are incorporated into my discussion to either support or dispute my research conclusions. They chose to remain anonymous (giving the nature of the topic); hence, they will not be acknowledged openly in this thesis. One was in the rank of a Brigadier General serving in the Nigerian Army and the other was at the Nigerian Intelligence Training School. The other two respondents did not acknowledge their rank or place of work on record.

¹⁵⁶ Christian Marxsen. "Territorial integrity in international law – its concept and implications for Crimea." *Heidelberg Journal of International Law (ZaöRV)* 75 (2015): 7-26

¹⁵⁷ Christian. "Territorial integrity in international law – its concept and implications for Crimea."

affiliations can be likened to the violation of the territorial integrity of Nigeria. Such arguments have therefore, provided the rationale for exploring how Boko Haram activities impact on Nigeria's territorial integrity.

Prior to 2014, Boko Haram had no control over any territory in Nigeria.¹⁵⁸ However, it was in August 5th of 2014 that the sect declared an Islamic caliphate in the city of Gwoza¹⁵⁹ in Borno State, North-East Nigeria.¹⁶⁰ According to the video¹⁶¹ released by Agence France-Presse (AFP), a French international newspaper, Abubakar Shekau remarked that: “Thanks be to Allah who gave victory to our brethren in (the town of) Gwoza and made it part of the Islamic caliphate... By the grace of Allah, we will not leave the town. We have come to stay.”¹⁶² The sect also announced dozen other villages and towns it has captured as part of its caliphate in the same year. Higazi 2020 reported that Boko Haram informed the inhabitants of the captured villages and towns “they were now in *Daular Musulunci* (Islamic State) and no longer in Nigeria.”¹⁶³ Higazi writes further that with Boko Haram in control of those territories, “the villagers were not permitted to ‘go to Nigeria’, and if they attempted to do so – and were caught – they would be

¹⁵⁸ Patricio Julia-Heim and Julia McQuaid (2015). “Diagnosing the Boko Haram conflict: grievances, motivations, and institutional resilience in Northeast Nigeria.” Accessed October 10, 2022. URL: [Diagnosing the Boko Haram Conflict: Grievances, Motivations, and Institutional Resilience in Northeast Nigeria \(cna.org\)](https://cna.org/2015/08/10/diagnosing-the-boko-haram-conflict-grievances-motivations-and-institutional-resilience-in-northeast-nigeria/)

¹⁵⁹ Gwoza was a predominantly Christian town in Borno State. The sect was reported to have killed over 100 civilians in village prior to declaring it as part of its Islamic caliphate.

¹⁶⁰ Foyou Viviane E., Ngwafu Peter, Santoyo Maribel and Ortiz Andrea. “The Boko Haram insurgency and its impact on border security, trade and economic collaboration between Nigeria and Cameroon: An exploratory study.” *African Social Science Review*, 9 no 1 (2018): 66-77

¹⁶¹ Zaimov, Stoyan. 2014. “Boko Haram declares 'Islamic Caliphate' in captured Christian town in Nigeria.” *The Christian Post*, August 25, 2014. [Boko Haram Declares 'Islamic Caliphate' in Captured Christian Town in Nigeria | World News \(christianpost.com\)](https://www.christianpost.com/news/boko-haram-declares-islamic-caliphate-in-captured-christian-town-in-nigeria/)

¹⁶² Zaimov, Stoyan.

¹⁶³ Adam Higazi. “The structure and organization of Boko Haram up to 2015.” In *Transnational Islam: circulation of religious ideas, actors and practices between Niger and Nigeria*, ed. Apard Elodie [Ibadan: IFRA-Nigeria, 2020], 201-204.

killed. Similarly, Boko Haram did not permit strangers to ‘cross over’ from Nigeria to *Daular Musulunci*.”¹⁶⁴

In all the towns and villages that Boko Haram held sway, their focus was on establishing and implementing Sharia law without regard to the constitutional and legal rules already existing. In such instances, individuals in those towns were drafted and trained to implement the Sharia laws including payment of taxes, establishment of administrative and political offices among others. The Nigerian government has attempted to assure the world that Nigeria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is non-negotiable. The government has also repeatedly made concerted efforts to deny the claim by Boko Haram of control of Nigerian territories across Northern Nigeria. As a result, the Nigerian government have made concerted efforts to retake some of these territories from Boko Haram with significant success in some states across Northern Nigeria. Despite the government denial, Boko Haram still maintains control over a large swathe of territory in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States. The states where Boko Haram is active has expanded to include Niger, Kaduna, Zamfara, Sokoto and Katsina States.¹⁶⁵ Boko Haram control of the territorial areas in Nigeria has a devastating impact on the country and its fight against the menace. It has undermined the integrity and standing of the nation in international relations and politics which has led to tension and mistrust among the regional and international players.

My submissions above have been supported by empirical evidence, albeit qualitative in nature (see Appendix B). Interviews were conducted involving four senior security and military experts

¹⁶⁴ Higazi. “The structure and organization of Boko Haram up to 2015.”

¹⁶⁵ Sunday Ojo John. Governing “ungoverned spaces” in the foliage of conspiracy: Toward (re)ordering terrorism, from Boko Haram insurgency, Fulani militancy to banditry in Northern Nigeria.” *African Security*, 13 no 1 (2020): 77-110

that are active in service. Questions were asked regarding the impact that terrorism has on Nigeria's territorial integrity and independence. As a result, the following responses present the views of the interviewees.

...safety of lives and property which is no longer guaranteed, loss of lives, that is physical security in the region over the years have completely been affected...

(Respondent 1)

The Boko Haram insurgency has taken a huge toll on the internal security architecture of Nigeria which is usually a reflection of the external security of any nation... (Respondent 2)

We had looters where people who looted Gadhafi armoury, brought all arms to the Sahara Desert to sell. The insurgents from Nigeria go there to buy their arms and returned to Nigeria to establish their own army...eh... And with that, they...I mean... started attacking communities in the North-Eastern part of Nigeria. And that is why you see that at a particular time, more than half of Borno State were under Boko Haram...and...eh... the Northern part of Adamawa State at a particular time was under Boko Haram. The Eastern part of Borno was in the hands of Boko Haram... A few local governments in Bauchi State were also in the hands of Boko Haram. This is around 2014... unfortunately, part of them have now moved from parts of Borno and they are now in the forest of Kaduna State. The group is called the "Ansaru". They are now occupying one of what we call ungoverned spaces in Kaduna state... (Respondent 3)

...you can see that...eh...the Boko Haram insurgency is threatening the sovereignty and territoriality of Nigeria (Respondent 4)

In assessing the views of the interviewees, **Respondent 1** affirmed that physical security is not guaranteed because of state failure while **Respondent 4** clearly submitted that the activities of Boko Haram has threatened the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Nigeria. An interesting point was made by **Respondent 2**, who focused more on internal security of the country, which is greatly impacted by the Boko Haram activities. Meanwhile **Respondent 4** identified areas where Boko Haram had control over territory, specifically in 2014 at the peak of the insurgency. The empirical evidence, therefore, supports my arguments that the activities of Boko Haram have affected the national security of the country in terms of undermining its independence and territorial integrity. The evidence confirms that the sect has control over a relatively large swathe of territory in the Northern part of the country. The evidence also shows that their activities have threatened the internal security of Nigeria. In the next section, I will explore the evidence with respect to the economic prosperity and sustainable development of the country.

6.2 Economic prosperity and sustainable development

Terrorism has continued to increase globally with its attendant impact on global economies. The Sahel has become the dominant region in the world with increasing terrorist activities with a 1,000+ percentage increase in casualties between 2007 and 2021.¹⁶⁶ Based on the Global Terrorism Index 2022,¹⁶⁷ Nigeria ranks 6th as the most terrorized country in the world behind Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Burkina Faso and Syria. Nigeria's ranking has worsened from the 8th

¹⁶⁶ Institute for Economics & Peace. "Global terrorism index: measuring the impact of terrorism." Accessed October 14, 2022, 2022. URL: [GTI-2019web.pdf \(economicsandpeace.org\)](https://www.economicsandpeace.org/gti-2019web.pdf)

¹⁶⁷ Institute for Economics & Peace. "Global terrorism index: measuring the impact of terrorism."

place in 2011 to 6th in 2022. In economic terms, this has translated to a loss of 2.6 percent, 2.7 percent, and 2.4 percent of Nigeria's GDP in 2017, 2018 and 2019 respectively.¹⁶⁸ Between 2007 and 2019, the country has lost a total of \$142 billion¹⁶⁹, a staggering amount in all respects. This has translated to increased levels of poverty and inequality, lack of economic opportunities, poor infrastructural facilities and amenities, declining illiteracy levels and general social decay. A case in point is the report by the World Bank in 2015 highlighting the economic cost in Northeast Nigeria due to the activities of Boko Haram. This report does not consider other theatre of operations of the sect such as Zamfara, Katsina, Kaduna and Sokoto States, which are in Northwest Nigeria.

The 2015 report by the World Bank highlights the effect that the activities of Boko Haram have on the economy of the North.¹⁷⁰ The report noted that the North-East which is the center of Boko Haram activities lags other regions in Nigeria and with Boko Haram, the economy of the region has been worsened post-2011. The Bank estimates that the region has lost about N1.66 trillion in GDP (equivalent of US\$8.3 billion). The report also estimates GDP loss in the following states: Taraba (N49.1 billion); Gombe (N280.9 billion); Adamawa (N314 billion); Bauchi (N86.3 billion); Borno (N708 billion); and Yobe (N222.3 billion). The report also puts damage to infrastructure to the tune of US\$9.2 billion. These amounts are staggering especially in the context of the prevalent poverty in the region. The effect has affected food production and agricultural production. It has also undermined the private sector, especially small and medium scale enterprises. The fiscal policies of the various state governments have also been worsened

¹⁶⁸ Doris Dokua Sasu. "Economic cost of terrorism as share of GDP in Nigeria 2017-2019." Updated September 29, 2022. [Nigeria: economic cost of terrorism as share of GDP | Statista](#)

¹⁶⁹ Kamer, Lars. "Economic impact of terrorism in Africa 2007-2019, by country." Updated August 31, 2022. [Economic impact of terrorism in Africa by country | Statista](#)

¹⁷⁰ World Bank. North-East Nigeria: "Recovery and peace building assessment." Accessed October 14, 2022. URL: [World Bank Document](#)

with increasing debt profile in almost all the states affected. As a result, the region has been thrown into extreme poverty, hunger and starvation and the destruction of the social fabric of society.

The cost to the region is not just economic, but human as well. Besides the loss of lives as indicated in an earlier chapter, the activities of the sect have resulted to internally displaced persons (IDPs) across northern Nigeria. For instance, a report by the US State Department reveals that in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States alone, the activities of the sect have led to over 2.2 million IDPs.¹⁷¹ This agrees with the estimates by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees¹⁷² that there are 2.1 million refugees currently in Nigeria and 778k in Cameroon, Chad and Niger as of 2020. By 2021, the total number of displaced people because of activities of Boko Haram has risen to 3.2 million.¹⁷³ The high number of IDPs in areas where Boko Haram activities are dominant have created complex social problems in those areas. Food security is also the consequence of the massive numbers of IDPs in Nigeria. Incidences of exploitation in the camps pervade with its attendant effect on the health and psychological wellbeing of the IDPs. The social fabric of the society in those areas has been upended with its multiplier effect on the social decay of the victims of the conflict.

In summary, the impact of Boko Haram on the country's economy as discussed above has worsened the level of poverty because of the economic opportunities that have been lost. The

¹⁷¹ US Department of State. *Country report on terrorism 2019: Nigeria*, 2022. Assessed October 14, 2022. URL: [Nigeria - United States Department of State](#)

¹⁷² United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Nigeria Emergency*, 2022. Assessed October 14, 2022. URL: [UNHCR - Nigeria emergency](#)

¹⁷³ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center. Profile – Nigeria, 2022. Accessed October 14, 2022. URL: [Nigeria | IDMC \(internal-displacement.org\)](#)

impact has also extended to the destruction of lives, livelihoods, and infrastructure. This view is succinctly captured by the response of an interviewee (**Respondent 3 and 1**) who remarked that

...you don't have free access that you used to have to your farm...you don't have free access that you used to have to your business places...eh... Definitely, you have been affected, you know... for fear of being kidnapped and being extorted for ransom. And people have now abandoned their homes, farms, and businesses... Borno State, used to be known for the red beans and for dry fish. But now these ones have been seriously affected because the fishing industry has practically collapsed, because the entire water area has been taken over by Boko Haram... Nasarawa State and Benue State are known for production of yams unfortunately because of the activities of Boko Haram...joined unfortunately by the militant Fulani herdsmen who at times used to collude with Boko Haram... unfortunately, yam production in Nasarawa State and Benue State have been... been curtailed
(Respondent 3)

*...it has also impacted on human security and when we say this, we are talking about access to livelihood, employment opportunities, access to education. All the industries in the region have been destroyed. Schools have been shut down... you will know that they are rich in fishing activities but that was completely affected due to the issue of insecurity, and then like farming... The issue of oil restoration has also been ongoing in the lake Chad areas, and this has been abandoned over the years because of this insurgency as well... **(Respondent 1)***

Additionally, social vices abound in Boko Haram controlled territories. When we look at this vis-à-vis the result of the qualitative study (see responses below), then we can conclude that indeed,

the activities of Boko Haram bears significant impact on the economic prosperity and sustainable development of Northern Nigeria. Consider the response by **Respondent 2** who remarked that “*The Boko Haram crisis has greatly infringed on the socio-economic life of the country, notably in areas such as agriculture, food security, interstate trade, hospitality businesses, tourism, interstate transport, religious activities...name them...*” This response aligns with the findings established in literature on the devastating impact of terrorism on socio-economic development of Nigeria. **Respondent 4** did not only speak about the economic cost, but the respondent alluded to the casualties of terrorism in Nigeria thus:

It has resulted in the death of over 50,000 Nigerians and the displacement of more than 3 million others, especially in the Northeast region... The persistence of the insurgency is occasioning food insecurity in Nigeria... It has heightened the rate of out of school children in the northern part of the country, which has implications for human resource development... This is heightening poverty and increasing the rate of crime across the country (Respondent 4)

6.3 National and international interests

In this section, I will attempt to show the link between Boko Haram activities and its impact on Nigeria’s national and international interests. The discussion will revolve around the notion of national cohesion and how the activities of Boko Haram impact the country’s regional and international interests.

In terms of the impact of Boko Haram on national cohesion and religious harmony, I believe much is to be desired. Boko Haram’s avowed mission to establish an Islamic state based on the Sharia is at variance with the beliefs of other groups. They are highly intolerant to other religious groups, particularly Christians, with their activities as perhaps being the most important factor

threatening the very survival of the Nigerian states.¹⁷⁴ Perhaps this explains their hatred for other beliefs and their insistence of the supremacy of their belief over others.¹⁷⁵ The murderous attacks on places of cult and institutions of modern development, such as schools, have a profound impact on the possibility of convivial relations in the country. This explains why the sect has targeted Christians in both Northern and Southern Nigeria. One of the many attacks is the Owo church massacre in Ondo State, Southwestern Nigeria. On a fateful day of June 5, 2022, the Boko Haram sect attacked the Catholic church and killed an estimate 80 worshippers. This is one among many of the activities of the sect against Christians especially the northern Christians. For instance, Human Rights Council 2022 reports that in the last 12 years, 43,000 Christians have been killed by Boko Haram and Fulani herdsmen while 17,500 churches have been attacked in the corresponding year.¹⁷⁶ The activities of Boko Haram are therefore, creating religious division among the different religions in the country. There is therefore a high level of mistrust resulting to a complete lack of national cohesion.

Boko Haram activities also has a significant influence on Nigeria's position in regional and international relations. In the eyes of the regional actors, Nigeria is perceived as incapable of guaranteeing the security of lives and property of its citizenry; hence its inability to drive security in the subregion. This is particularly true giving that the sect operates in multiple countries especially in the Lake Chad region. Their activities can be conveniently referred to as

¹⁷⁴ Ewere Nelson Atoi and Yakubu Kume Babale. "Religious intolerance and the quest for progressive change in Nigeria." *A Journal of Contemporary Research* 19 no 1 (2022): 230-250

¹⁷⁵ Tarela Juliet Ike. "'Its' like being a Christian is tantamount to victimisation': A qualitative study of christian experiences and perceptions of insecurity and terrorism in Nigeria." *Cogent Social Sciences*, 8 no 1 (2022): 1-16

¹⁷⁶ Human Rights Watch. *Written statement* submitted by European Centre for Law and Justice, The / Centre Europeen pour le droit, les Justice et les droits de l'homme, a non-governmental organization in special consultative status*, 2022. Accessed October 14, 2022. URL: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3979908/files/A_HRC_49_NGO_166-EN.pdf

transnational crimes especially if we consider their allegiance to international terrorist organizations such as ISIS. The general notion that the Nigerian government has failed to deploy the needed resources to tackle the menace of Boko Haram has therefore, reduced Nigeria's standing in the comity of nations. A pointer to that is the massive reduction of foreign direct investment (FDI) to the Nigerian economy.¹⁷⁷

Based on the preceding arguments, I can conclude that in terms of its impact on national and international interest, the activities of Boko Haram have affected the country's national cohesion and religious harmony. It has created mistrust between the two major religions as their attacks seems to focus on Christians (the church). The impact has also undermined the country's international standing in the comity of nations. The results of the qualitative study support these submissions (see respondents' responses below). **Respondent 1** clearly showed that the direct effect of the activities of the sect is the deepening of the division between the Christian and Moslem faithful in Nigeria. Distrust between the two major religions have been entrenched. This is especially true giving that much of their attacks in their formative years targeted Christians and the church (see **Respondent 3**). However, the evidence also shows that the mistrust is not just between the Christian and Moslem faith, but even between different teachings of Islam.¹⁷⁸

...at one point the Boko Haram group were attacking churches, killing Christians and the rest. There is this believe or consensus that the insurgency was one of the grand agenda of Islamisation... so, obviously at the end of the day it was created...you know... that...eh...division between Christians and Muslims at one time...So, but certainly it does create that suspicion...that distrust... the most

¹⁷⁷ This is attributed to many factors but chief of which is the general insecurity in the country.

¹⁷⁸ Boko Haram attacks other Moslems who they say do not have 'diluted' teachings of Islam

crucial impact is the distrust. This has further deepened that distrust between adherents of Christianity and Islam (Respondent 1)

...the bulk of the arms of Boko Haram were all gotten from the fringes of the Sahara Desert... when they first started churches were their primary targets, there was this very notorious attack in Abuja at a particular church in the early 2000, when a lot of people were killed, it was called the Christmas day bombing. Their initial target were the churches then later it extended into the mosque... the type of Islam being practised in some of the mosques do not conform to their own strict interpretation of Islam according to their own interpretation... (Respondent 3)

In conclusion, the activities of Boko Haram have been shown to impact on the country's national security. The evidence in literature and the result of the qualitative study supports this conclusion that their activities have an impact on (a) the territorial integrity and independence of Nigeria; (b) on the economic prosperity and sustainable development of the country; and (c) the national and international interests of the country. In the next chapter, I will suggest the way forward in the fight against terrorism and Boko Haram in Nigeria. I will assess the present strategies and identify the challenges and suggest likely solutions to this quagmire. Lastly, I will look at the role of international community in tackling the Boko Haram menace in Nigeria.

Chapter 7 - Way Forward

As indicated in the previous section, I intend to assess the way forward in the fight against religious terrorism in Nigeria. The major aim of this section is to evaluate how far the government has gone in the fight against religious terrorism to proffer solutions to the menace. The section will also serve as the foundation for the recommendations contained in the next section.

7.1 Assessing the present strategies and solutions

The strategies employed in the fight against Boko Haram by the Nigerian government can best be described as the carrot and stick approach.¹⁷⁹ The carrot approach connotes the use of dialogue and negotiation (positive reward) while the stick approach (negative reward) covers the use of military force. In essence, the strategies in the fight against Boko Haram can be divided into: (a) dialogue and reintegration; and (b) military force. This latter strategy is the dominant strategy that has been employed by the Nigerian government in the fight against Boko Haram in Nigeria. This aligns with the findings in this study involving high ranking security and military officers knowledgeable in the fight against Boko Haram. One of the views of the respondent was captured as follows:

The kinetic is the military approach, while the non-kinetic is talking about the sociological approach to it... Mobilizing the community and get the community support, that is what consist of the non-kinetic approach... The military leads the kinetic approach which is the military approach, and they also involve in lots of non-kinetic operations in the North. If you have had the opportunity of going down to the North, you would have seen arears whereby the military are the ones running schools

¹⁷⁹ Israel, J. Udoh, Michael O. Oladejo and Hyacinth H. Orapine. "Assessing the Effectiveness of "Carrots and Sticks" Approach on Terrorists" Strength and Sustainability: A Mathematical Deterministic Model." *International Journal of Research and Innovation in Applied Science* 4, no 2 (2019): 11-27

and in fact the military have become the de facto government and that is part of the non – kinetic approach that the military is doing because, it is essentially winning the minds of the people... unfortunate thing is, the government has focused so much on the kinetics which is the military. it became very clear to the government that this thing goes beyond the military solution, and it cannot provide a lasting solution to the problem. (Respondent 1)

This confirms the position that the military (stick approach) is the dominant strategy in the fight against Boko Haram.

Dialogue and reintegration

Despite the supposed victory declared by the government against Boko Haram, the sect continues to wreak havoc on the Nigerian state and its social fabric.¹⁸⁰ There seems to be renewed attacks on military and civilian infrastructure, the latest being the successful attack on the Abuja-Kaduna train and the attack on the Kuje Prison in the FCT where hundreds of Boko Haram fighters were successfully released. This shows that the military strategy alone is insufficient in curtailing the activities of the Boko Haram sect, which has led to calls to consider the carrot strategy. In clarifying the carrot approach, Udoh et al. 2019 argues that the strategy involves “providing goods and services, or valuable opportunities to persons or groups that refrain from terrorism.”¹⁸¹ The implication is also that for the terrorists¹⁸² that refrain from carrying out terrorist activities, those that abandon the cause of Boko Haram and are seeking amnesty from the government

¹⁸⁰ Saskia Brechenmacher. “Achieving peace in Northeast Nigeria: the reintegration challenge.” Updated September 5, 2018. [Achieving Peace in Northeast Nigeria: The Reintegration Challenge - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace](#)

¹⁸¹ Udoh et al. “Assessing the effectiveness of “Carrots and Sticks” approach on terrorists’ strength and sustainability: A mathematical deterministic model.”

¹⁸² The Nigerian government calls them repentant Boko Haram members)

benefit from this strategy because of the promise of integration and support from the Federal Government of Nigeria.

In 2015, the government took the bold step of embarking on a dialogue with the sect which led to the creation of the Operation Safe Corridor.¹⁸³ The major aim of the programme was to “rehabilitate repentant Boko Haram militants and reintegrate them back into their respective communities as productive law-abiding citizens.” The programme focus was on the deradicalization of the repentant fighters and their rehabilitation and reintegration into the society.¹⁸⁴ Specific activities in the programme included vocational training, civic education, deradicalization and psychological support offered to the repentant fighters. This position agrees with the view of **Respondent 4** who remarked that *Beyond the military, government is also using other strategies such as: de-radicalisation and the re-integration of repentant BH fighters into the community*. This clearly shows that the government continues to engage the sect using other strategies besides military strategy. For instance, in 2017, with the support of the International Organization for Migration, the Nigerian government adopted a plan of action for the demobilization, disassociation, reintegration and reconciliation for the repentant fighters and those impacted by their actions.¹⁸⁵ As a result of these programmes, a reported 606 former Boko Haram fighters went through rehabilitation while 95 and 150 participated in 2018 and 2019 respectively.¹⁸⁶ However, these programme is not without criticisms as will be discussed in a subsequent sub-section. To support this conclusion, the contribution expressed by **Respondent 2**

¹⁸³ Center for Democracy and Development. “Stakeholders' dialogue on government approaches to managing defecting violent extremists.” Accessed November 16, 2022. URL: [Stakeholders' Dialogue on Government Approaches to Managing Defecting Violent Extremists \(africaportal.org\)](https://www.africaportal.org/stakeholders-dialogue-on-government-approaches-to-managing-defecting-violent-extremists/)

¹⁸⁴ Micheal I. Ugwueze, Elias C. Ngwu and Freedom C. Onuoha. “Operation Safe Corridor programme and reintegration of ex-boko haram fighters in Nigeria.” *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 57 no. 6 (2022): 1229–1248

¹⁸⁵ Saskia. “Achieving peace in Northeast Nigeria: the reintegration challenge.”

¹⁸⁶ Olagunju, Doyin. “How does ‘Operation Safe Corridor’ work?” Updated 3, 2020. [How Does "Operation Safe Corridor" Work? | Zikoko!](#)

will suffice: *The strategy to involve the...the local communities in the solution processes has not yielded much result for obvious reasons of genuineness and corruption.*

Military force

Besides the provision of positive rewards to Boko Haram fighters, military force (negative reward) is another strategy that has been implemented by the Nigerian government. Through the government's counterinsurgency programme, military force has been directed against the Boko Haram fighters. The term counterinsurgency describes the "military, paramilitary, psychological, social and economic undertakings that are carried out by the government to foil insurgency."¹⁸⁷

Military campaigns against the sect were therefore, conducted. Initially, the military forces conducted stop and search operations with patrols in the conflict zones. However, when the government realized that the sect was in control of territory estimated to be 30,000km² (equivalent to the size of Belgium), massive military campaigns were therefore, carried out.¹⁸⁸ A state of emergency was declared in the theatre of war in 2013 (Yobe, Adamawa and Borno). Successive military campaigns were tagged: "Operation Flush, Operation Restore Order (1,2 and 3), Operation Deep Punch, Operation Boyona, Operation Ruwan Wuta II, Operation Gama Aiki Operation Zaman Lafiya, Operation Last Hold, Operation Lafiya Dole (now renamed Operation Hadin Kai), Operation Tuka Takaibango."¹⁸⁹ Other military activities included the establishment of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF)¹⁹⁰ to support the military efforts. The 7th Division of the Nigerian Army was also created, with its mission of decimating Boko Haram.¹⁹¹ These efforts

¹⁸⁷ Aliu Oladimeji Shodunke. "Boko Haram and counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria: Explicating the military ordeal. *African Journal on Terrorism* 11, no. 2 (2021): 61-90

¹⁸⁸ Aliu Oladimeji Shodunke. "Boko Haram and counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria: Explicating the military ordeal.

¹⁸⁹ Aliu Oladimeji Shodunke.

¹⁹⁰ The CJTF comprises of hunters, youths, farmers and locals in the areas the sect were operating

¹⁹¹ James Adewunmi Falode. "The nature of Nigeria's Boko Haram war, 2010-2015: A strategic analysis." *Perspectives on Terrorism* 10, no. 1 (2016): 14-52

have been successful to a great extent in decimating the fighters but without eliminating the scourge on the society.¹⁹² More efforts are therefore, required to address the monster of terrorism in Nigeria. Perhaps the views of **Respondent 3** will help in understanding why the scourge continues:

Boko Haram don't communicate, Boko Haram is not a group that dialogue. They listen to only one voice and one voice alone and that is the force of violence. That is the only voice they listen to. Only arms, they don't listen to religious leaders. They don't listen to the president of the country, who is a Northern Fulani man, they don't listen to religious leaders, they have no regard for religious leaders, they have no regard for political leaders. The only language they listen to is in language of force. So, there is no other strategy again that is going to work, it is only the language of force and violence (Respondent 3)

7.2 Understanding the present challenges

In this sub-section, I intend to distil the challenges that the government continues to face in its fight against Boko Haram terrorists in Nigeria despite the numerous strategies that have been implemented. On face value, it may seem that the government is winning the war but the reality on the ground is that much more effort is required. In a qualitative study, several challenges were identified that have impacted on the success of the war against Boko Haram.¹⁹³ The chief among this challenge was corruption.¹⁹⁴ The study found that “many top-ranking military officers were

¹⁹² Oyewole, Samuel. “Boko Haram and the challenges of Nigeria's war on terror.” *Defense & Security Analysis*, 29 no. 3 (2013): 253–262.

¹⁹³ Babayo Sule, Abdulkadir Ahmed, Abubakar Alhaji Umar, Aminu Yahaya Muhammad, Isah Gambarawa Kabir. “The challenges of the fight against insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria.” *Journal of Techno Social* 11 no. 1 (2019): 7-15

¹⁹⁴ The corruption is not only with the top-level military and security experts but also with the rank and file. For instance, in 2014, 15 military officers were alleged to have provided arms and ammunition to the sect to prosecute its war.

discovered to have been involved in the corrupt practices involving the money earmarked for fighting the insurgency in the Northeast.”¹⁹⁵ In 2015 alone, \$2.1 billion budgeted for the Boko Haram war was alleged to have been stolen by the then National Security Adviser.¹⁹⁶ Nigeria’s Vice President has been quoted as saying that over \$15 billion of arms, ammunitions and others have been squandered in the previous administrations.¹⁹⁷ These corruption cases has contributed to stifling the funding available to the state in the fight against the sect. **Respondent 1** remarked that *...so funding is one of the challenges that is undermining the effectiveness of the military operation in the North East.*

Other challenges identified by Sule et al 2019 include the porous nature of our borders, hostilities of the communities affected by the conflict, lack of synergy amongst the countries affected by the conflict, poor inter-agency collaboration and partnership, poor remuneration of security personnel in theatre of operations, poor logistics and techniques and the politicization of the terrorism fight. In terms of the porous nature of our borders, Nigeria has about 1,500 illegal entry points in the Northern part of the country alone.¹⁹⁸ This gives room to massive inflow of terrorist fighters from countries such as Chad, Niger, Libya etc. As earlier indicated, the communities where Boko Haram has operational bases generally mistrust the security forces which has led to withholding of vital security information that may be required by the security forces to crush the

Worst of all is the military’s involvement in. In 2014, 15 Nigerian military officers were found guilty of this unthinkable crime.

¹⁹⁵ Sule et al. “The challenges of the fight against insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria.”

¹⁹⁶ Precious Hepzibah. \$2.1billion arms procurement fraud in Nigeria: its impact on national security, peace and sustainable economic development in Jonathan’s Administration 2011-2015. *International Journal of Arts & Sciences*, 9 no. 02 (2016): 225–248

¹⁹⁷ Felix Onuah. “Nigeria’s Vice President says \$15 billion stolen in arms procurement fraud.” *Reuters*, May 2, 2016. [Nigeria's vice president says \\$15 billion stolen in arms procurement fraud | Reuters](#)

¹⁹⁸ Vanguard. “Nigeria has over 1,499 illegal entry routes - Interior Minister.” Vanguard News, June 19, 2013. [Nigeria has over 1,499 illegal entry routes - Interior Minister - Vanguard News \(vanguardngr.com\)](#)

Boko Haram fighters. These affected communities may also have this disposition for fear of attacks by the terrorist fighters. This challenge came out as a salient theme in the results of my qualitative study. Specifically, **Respondent 2** remarked that the *government has done little...for Nigerians to feel that sense of belonging to give their all for the Nigerian state.*

Likewise, the motivation and morale of the security forces has been hampered because of the poor remuneration. This point has been reechoed by Obasi (2015), a senior adviser with the International Crisis Group.¹⁹⁹ Police officers posted to fight Boko Haram have embarked on strikes to demand better arms and ammunition and to also protest the nonpayment of their benefits and allowances. Additionally, these security forces have consistently complained that the Boko Haram fighters overpower them with better equipment and arms and ammunitions. The view of **Respondent 1** captured this position: *If you look at the kind of weapons the Boko haram are displaying, they are so sophisticated and that is one of the challenges the military is facing.*

In making their contribution, Oyewole 2013 acknowledged the impact that the military campaigns exert on the local population especially in terms of collateral damage, which has become a recurring problem.²⁰⁰ The Human Rights Watch has also made allegations against the Nigerian military regarding human rights abuses against civilians.²⁰¹ Maintaining a balance between military campaigns versus human rights protection is another major challenge especially that the Boko Haram terrorist live among the general population. A resultant effect of this is the sanctions placed by foreign powers on access to sophisticated military arms and ammunitions.

¹⁹⁹ Obasi, Nnamdi. “The soldiers are less motivated than the Boko Haram insurgents.” Crisis Group. January 18, 2015. [“The soldiers are less motivated than the Boko Haram insurgents” | Crisis Group](#)

²⁰⁰ Samuel Oyewole. “Boko Haram and the challenges of Nigeria's war on terror.” *Defense & Security Analysis*, 29 no. 3 (2013): 253–262.

²⁰¹ Jamiu, Abiodun. “Nigerian Air Force bombardments have in its wake civilian casualties: Is there an end in sight?” HumAngle Media. May 3, 2022. [Nigerian Air Force Bombardments Have In Its Wake Civilian Casualties: Is There An End In Sight? - HumAngle Media](#)

For instance, this view was expressed by a respondent thus: *You know there is this fear about Human right concern and because of that, the American government said there are somethings they cannot sell to us...unfortunately, because of sanctions we have not been able to buy the needed weapon from the west... we need more helicopters, the latest weaponry (Respondent 3).*

The author²⁰² further noted other challenges in the fight against the Boko Haram sect to include the general believe by the populace of a conspiracy by the elitist to forge the sect as an instrument of political control which has led to the erosion of trust and confidence in the government to handle the crisis. There are instances of extra-judicial killings of captured leaders of the sect for fear that the elite (the actual sponsors of the sect) will be exposed by those captured.²⁰³ The unwillingness of the people, therefore, can be rationalized because of these supposed infractions by the military and Nigeria's political leadership.

The other aspect of the challenge in the fight against Boko Haram in Nigeria concerns limiting the capacity of the group to funding and financing of their operations.²⁰⁴ Specific challenges noted include the failure to operationalize CT and CTF policies,²⁰⁵ inability of regulatory authorities to block the numerous channels used by the terrorist groups to fund their operations, the unwillingness of the stakeholders to eliminate the scourge because of the benefits they derive from it (called the 'Cui-bono and Cui-prodest effect') and the absence of an organized counterterrorism framework. This position was captured in the views of *Respondents 1* who stated that: *If you look at the convoy the Boko Haram comes out with, those vehicles don't run*

²⁰² Samuel Oyewole. "Boko Haram and the challenges of Nigeria's war on terror."

²⁰³ Samuel Oyewole.

²⁰⁴ Maza, Dingji Kangdim, Koldaş Umut and Aksit Sait. "Challenges of combating terrorist financing in the Lake Chad Region: A case of Boko Haram." *SAGE Open* 10 no. 2 (2020): 1-17

²⁰⁵ Maza et al.

on water they run on fuel. This is evidence of the inability of unwillingness of the military and the government is stifling the funding of Boko Haram.

Another interest point raised regarding the challenge in the fight against Boko Haram concerns the amnesty programme of the Federal Government. The Center for Democracy and Development identify the challenges with the amnesty programme to include the “opacity of key issues such as the modalities for the implementation of the programme, sundry issues such as where defecting Boko Haram members will be reintegrated, and frustrations of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and other victims affected by the Boko Haram insurgency.”²⁰⁶ Empirical studies have collaborated these findings, extending the challenges to include the inability of the amnesty programme to factor in the concerns of the local communities²⁰⁷ which has led to the rejection of the programme.²⁰⁸ Lastly, the politicization of the Boko Haram fight and the mistrust between the Federal and State governments have also impacted on the effectiveness of the fight against the sect. All these are the challenges faced by the Nigerian state in the fight against religious terrorism in Nigeria. The next section looks at the role of the international community in the fight against Boko Haram terrorist in Nigeria.

7.3 The role of the international community

In this section, I will focus on the role of the international community in supporting the fight against terrorism in Nigeria. This presentation is not exhaustive but is meant to provide a

²⁰⁶ Center for Democracy and Development. “Stakeholders' dialogue on government approaches to managing defecting violent extremists.”

²⁰⁷ Ugwueze et al. “Operation Safe Corridor programme and reintegration of ex-Boko Haram fighters in Nigeria.”

²⁰⁸ Owonikoko, Saheed Babajide. “Take them to Government House or Aso Rock”: Community receptivity to reintegration of Operation Safe Corridor’s deradicalised Ex-Boko Haram members in Northeastern Nigeria.” *Cogent Social Sciences* 8 (2022): 1-26

summary of what role and strategies international institutions and nation states contribute to the fight against terrorism and Boko Haram in Nigeria. The discussion will look at the role of both the regional partners and the international collaborators highlighting.

Regional efforts

In 1994, the Federal Government of Nigeria created a task force called the Multinational Joint Security Force (MNJSF) to address issues of banditry and armed robbery around the Lake Chad Basin (LCB). Initially the taskforce was made up of only Nigerian troops who worked in cohort with troops of countries in the LCB.²⁰⁹ The MNJSF became fully multinational in 1998 when the Chadian and Nigerian troops joined the taskforce. However, as consequence of the activities of Boko Haram in 2009 which heightened in 2014, the taskforce was remodeled and renamed the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in 2015 with the mandate to “create a safe and secure environment in the areas affected by the activities of Boko Haram and other terrorist groups, in order to significantly reduce violence against civilians and other abuses, including sexual- and gender-based violence, in full compliance with international law.”²¹⁰ The expanded taskforce comprised of troops from Niger, Chad, Cameroon, Nigeria and the Republic of Benin.

Unfortunately, the task force has been unable to deliver effectively on its mandate. Studies have shown that the task force has been unable to contain the porous nature of the borders between the participating countries which has led to the free flow of arms and ammunitions.²¹¹ MNJTF

²⁰⁹ Wakili Olawoyin Kayode, Olawale O. Akinrinde and Peter Irabor. “The Multinational Joint Task Force and Nigerian counter-terrorism operations in the Lake Chad Region.” *The Copernicus Journal of Political Studies* 1 (2021): 115-135

²¹⁰ Multinational Joint Task Force. *About the force*, 2020. Accessed November 17, 2022. URL: [About MNJTF – Multinational Joint Task Force \(mnjtfmm.org\)](https://mnjtfmm.org)

²¹¹ Omolara Akinyemi. “Globalization and Nigeria border security: issues and challenges.” *International Affairs and Global Strategy* 11 (2013): 1–8

has been bedeviled with high-level mistrust and suspicion,²¹² coupled with a fundamentally flawed bilateral relationship²¹³ which ultimately impacts on the level of cooperation and coordination of activities especially with regards inter-agency cooperation and coordination.²¹⁴ All these factors have undermined the performance of the MNJTF which serves as the regional powerhouse in the fight against the terrorism.

International efforts

The impact of a terrorist in a remote part of the world has the potential of impacting the global supply chain and disruption activities thousands of kilometers away from the crisis zone. As a result, the international community recognizes what terrorism can do to the world economy; hence collaboration, partnerships and collectivism has become the hallmark of the world system. United States of America leads in international efforts to combat the monster of terrorism in all its ramifications. Nigeria has therefore, benefited immensely from the support of the US in terms of funding, trainings, logistical support, humanitarian assistance and diplomatic support. The US Department of State²¹⁵ noted that between 2016 and 2020, the Department spent \$6 million on education and training (the International Military Education and Training) of the Nigerian military. Within the same year, Nigeria received military support to the tune of \$1.8 million to support maritime security, professionalizing the military and counterterrorism activities. This position was identified as a theme in the qualitative results of this study. **Respondent 1** expressed

²¹² Isaac O. Albert. "Rethinking the functionality of the Multinational Joint Task Force in managing the Boko Haram crisis in the Lake Chad Basin." *Africa Development* 42 no. 3 (2017): 119-135

²¹³ Adetayo Olamide Sowale and Foluso Orogun Olanike. "Bilateral relations and the challenges of Multinational Joint Task Force in West Africa." *African Social and Educational Journal* 10 no. 1 (2021): 162-174

²¹⁴ Kayode Wakili Olawoyin, Olufemi Akinrinde Olawale and Peter O. Irabor. "The Multinational Joint Task Force and Nigerian counter-terrorism operations in the Lake Chad Region." *The Copernicus Journal of Political Studies* no. 1 (2021): 115–135

²¹⁵ U.S. Department of State. *U.S. security cooperation with Nigeria: fact sheet*, 2022. Updated April 14, 2022. [U.S. Security Cooperation with Nigeria - United States Department of State](#)

the view that: *...training support and this is being provided by the USA, UK and they are trying to improve the countries armed forces.*

Between 2017 to 2020, Nigeria also benefited from the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) to the tune of \$10 million to cover professional training, military equipment, and advisory support services. The US also sold attack helicopters and other military gear worth over \$1 billion and many other support activities. Other roles embarked upon by the international community include the designation of Boko Haram and Ansaru as terrorist organization by the UK and the U.S. in 2013.²¹⁶ The designation implied that more resources will be deployed to tackle the menace. Countries such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) also contributed to convicting terrorist financiers in the Kingdom.²¹⁷ For instance, the U.S. sanctioned six Nigerians that were indicted in the United Arab Emirates for sponsoring Boko Haram.²¹⁸ Nigeria has continued to enjoy support and assistance from many countries such as France, the European Union development partners such as the USAID, the UN among many others. Their focus continues to see that Nigeria overcome the challenges associated with terrorism.

In the last section, a summary of the thesis will be presented. The evidence will be evaluated vis-à-vis the objectives as clearly stated in the introduction section. Recommendations will also be suggested based on the results of the qualitative study and the evidence in the empirical literature.

²¹⁶ Campbell, John. *Boko Haram: origins, challenges and responses (Policy Brief)*, 2014. Accessed November 17, 2022. URL: [Boko Haram: Origins, Challenges and Responses \(ethz.ch\)](https://ethz.ch/boko-haram)

²¹⁷ Unfortunately, none of those indicted by the Kingdom has been prosecuted successful in Nigeria

²¹⁸ Sahara Reporters. "US sanctions six Nigerians convicted for sponsoring Boko Haram terrorism | Sahara Reporters." *Saharareporters.com*. March 25, 2022. [US Sanctions Six Nigerians Convicted For Sponsoring Boko Haram Terrorism | Sahara Reporters](https://saharareporters.com/us-sanctions-six-nigerians-convicted-for-sponsoring-boko-haram-terrorism/)

Chapter 8 - Analysis and Recommendations

In this concluding chapter, the focus of the discussion will be on presenting the conclusion to the study in line with the objectives stated in the introduction. Each of the objectives will be evaluated based on the empirical evidence both in literature and the qualitative study. Thereafter, the recommendations will be made based on the empirical evidence.

8.1 Evaluating the objectives

Objective one: To understand what caused the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria

The objective aimed at understanding what caused the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Based on the findings, there are multiple factors responsible for the growth of religious terrorism in Nigeria. They span from the failure of the states to provide for its citizenry to the high levels of poverty in the country, especially in the rural areas in Nigeria. Other factors include illiteracy among the teeming youths in the country especially in Northern Nigeria which is the epicentre of the conflict. Political mischief, exploitation and manipulation for political power has also been identified as the causes of the growth of religious extremism in Nigeria. Radicalization which is based on a misguided religious philosophy is the primary driver of the growth of religious extremism in Nigeria where people are misled to take up arms against other sections of the society. Social and political vulnerabilities naturally facilitate the process of radicalization, just like radicalization makes it more difficult to correct those anomalies.

Objective two: To ascertain the impact of the activities of Boko Haram on Nigeria's national security

In this objective, I intended to understand how the activities on Boko Haram impact on Nigeria's national security. Based on the evidence as captured, the activities of the sect impacted on the

national security of the country in many ways. Their activities have undermined the territorial integrity and independence of the country. At a point in time, the Boko Haram sect, controlled half of Borno State²¹⁹ in North East Nigeria where they formed their alternative government, rules and regulations for the locals. Their activities have also threatened the national unity and peaceful coexistence of the different ethnicities and religions in the country. This has created mistrust and misunderstanding between the two major religions especially as they are consistently and over time targeting churches and places of worships of other religions in the country. This has therefore, threatened the sovereignty and territoriality of Nigeria.

8.1.3 Objective three: To explore the socio-economic impact of the activities of Boko Haram on Nigeria

The objective three sought to explore the socio-economic impact of the activities of Boko Haram on Nigeria. Empirical evidence revealed that the activities of Boko Haram has devastated the economies of the states in Northern Nigeria such as Adamawa, Yobe, Borno, Katsina, Zamfara, Taraba, Sokoto and Gombe States. Food production and agro-based activities, entrepreneurial activities, trade and commerce, tourism and hospitality, industrial activities, interstate activities, infrastructural facilities and educational activities have been grounded. This has further worsened the various states' Internally Generated Revenue (IGR) capabilities. The human cost of war is enormous giving the huge number of casualties recorded since it began. The consequence is high number of internally displaced person (IDPs) spread across numerous camps in Northern Nigeria, likewise high level of crime such as kidnapping, extortion, rape etc. with a multiplier effect on the social fabric of Northern Nigeria.

²¹⁹ This is the birth place of Boko Haram in Nigeria

8.1.4 Objective four: To identify the various strategies implemented by the Federal Government of Nigeria to combat Boko Haram terrorism and the effectiveness of these strategies

This objective also sought to identify the various strategies implemented by the Federal Government of Nigeria to combat Boko Haram terrorism and the effectiveness of these strategies. According to the empirical results, the ‘carrot and stick’ (non-kinetic and kinetic) approach are the two major strategies to fight religious extremism in Nigeria. Of the two, the ‘stick’ approach is the dominant strategy in Nigeria. The evidence also indicates for the non-kinetic approach, the military is involved in provision of basic amenities for the local populace such as hospitals, road reconstruction, rehabilitation of schools etc. to win the hearts of the locals. Deradicalization, re-integration and amnesty programmes have also been employed in the non-kinetic approach. For the kinetic approach, the focus is on massive and coordinated counter-terrorism efforts involving local vigilantes and the entire military and security apparatus. Their effectiveness is doubtful as the deradicalization programme of the government has been largely unsuccessful while minimal gains have been recorded with the military exercises across Northern Nigeria.

8.1.5 Objective five: To examine the challenges in the fight against Boko Haram activities in Nigeria

In terms of the objective five, this study proposed to examine the challenges in the fight against Boko Haram activities in Nigeria. Based on the findings, corruption in the military and the security architecture was one of the major challenges in the fight against Boko Haram in Nigeria. Other notable challenges is the lack of coordination and synergy amongst the security forces, the porous nature of the borders where terrorist have free and easy entry, poor remuneration of the security personnel, poor logistics and old state of military gear and equipment, inability to prosecute and jail caught terrorists and the inability to stop the flow of funds to the sect. Other

include poor funding of the military operations and the inability to source for high-tech military gear and equipment from the West. Likewise, challenges were found with the way the radicalization, reintegration and amnesty programme were conducted including the neglect of the locals and the politicization of the fight against Boko Haram.

8.2 Recommendations

In this section, I proffer possible solutions to the problem of religious terrorism in Nigeria with the hope that these recommendations will curtail the impact of Boko Haram activities on Nigeria's national security.

- 1) The Nigerian government needs to reverse the declining level of poverty especially in Northern Nigeria. As an important root cause of Boko Haram, providing economic opportunities and infrastructural facilities will discourage the youths from venturing into terrorism. The newly established North East Development Commission should be adequately funded to execute its mandate of reconstruction of the region. Other mandates such as massive financial support to early-stage business ventures should also be prioritized as this will help address the root cause of terrorism in Nigeria. Social programmes and targeted financial assistance especially for the victims will go a long way in addressing the high levels of poverty in the region.
- 2) The radicalization programme of the Boko Haram sect seems to be successful because of the high level of illiteracy among the youths in the region. Their rejection of the Western style education contributes to this situation. Addressing this requires massive investment in the educational sector in Northern Nigeria. The almajiri schools that were established by the last administration and were abandoned by the present administration must be restarted and expanded to cover all the states in the North. Reorientation programmes must also be conducted in mosques, schools and public places to educate the locals

- against joining the sect. Teachers should be trained and instructional materials provided in all primary and secondary schools. The aim should be to reduce the level of illiteracy and ignorance in the North, which should be a long-term programme of the government.
- 3) Politicians and other interest groups have been accused of sponsoring the sect in Nigeria. These accusations must be investigated and legal actions and prosecution of those found culprit speedily carried out. In essence the political establishment and state apparatus should demonstrate the political will to investigate, prosecute and jail all responsible for the escalation of religious activities in the country to serve as a deterrent to those planning such evil in the country.
 - 4) The government should also expand on the non-kinetic approach in tackling Boko Haram in Nigeria. Specific actions should include the involvement of the local community and religious leaders of the two major religion in designing and deploying reintegration and deradicalization programme for the repentant Boko Haram members as it is the local communities that they will be residing. Lines of communication should also be opened with the sect leaders to reemphasize the need for a peaceful resolution of the crisis and the need for them to drop up their arms struggle and give peace a chance. Other actions could be the provision of health facilities and social support programmes in the local communities. The essence is to win the hearts of the locals to help with the intelligence and cooperation to defeat the Boko Haram sect.
 - 5) The government should adequately fund the military aspects of the campaign. The Western governments should be co-opted into the fight like was done with ISIS and Al Qaeda. Such partnerships and world coalition will bring in the needed financial, material and intelligence resources to defeat the sect in Nigeria. Diplomatic efforts therefore, should be carried out especially in easing the sanctions on hardware military gears that will help support the fight against Boko Haram. The government on its part will have to

demonstrate transparency and accountability in the aid received by foreign donors to support the fight against the sect. human rights violation allegations against the security forces must be investigated and those found culpable prosecuted with the government also demonstrating a strong commitment and leadership in ensuring that the rights of the locals especially the minorities in those locations that operations are being conducted will be respected and upheld.

Bibliography

Books

- Ashford, Sue. "Terrorism." In *Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics (Second Edition)*, edited by Ruth Chadwick, 334-342. US: Academic Press, 2012
- Higazi, Adam. "The structure and organization of Boko Haram up to 2015." In *Transnational Islam: circulation of religious ideas, actors and practices between Niger and Nigeria*, edited by Aparad Elodie, 201-204. Ibadan: IFRA-Nigeria, 2020
- Hoffman Bruce, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 94–95
- Juergensmeyer, Mark. *Terror in the mind of God: The global rise of religious violence*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003
- Kaplan, Mitchell Alan. "The socioeconomic and political ramifications of climate migration in the 21st century" In *Technological development and impact on economic and environmental sustainability*, edited by Yilmaz Bayar, Mahmut Unsal Sasmaz and Omer Faruk Ozturk, 63-80. USA: IGI Global Publishers, 2022
- Mohammed, Kyari. "The message and methods of Boko Haram." In *Boko Haram: Islamism, politics, security and the state in Nigeria*, edited by Perouse de Montclos and Marc-Antoine, 9-32. Ibadan: IFRA-Nigeria, 2014
- Onuoha, Freedom. "Boko Haram and the evolving Salafi Jihadist threat in Nigeria." In *Boko Haram: Islamism, politics, security and the state in Nigeria*, edited by Perouse de Montclos and Marc-Antoine, 158-191. Ibadan: IFRA-Nigeria, 2014
- Rotberg, I. Robert. "Failed states, collapsed states, weak states: causes and indicators." In *State failure and state weakness in a time of terror*, edited by Rotberg I. Robert, 1-26. USA: Brookings Institution Press, 2003
- Royal AAL Al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought. *Jihad and the Islamic law of war*, 2009. Accessed August 2, 2022. url: [Layout 1 \(rissc.jo\)](#)

Sotlar, Andrej. "Some problems with a definition and perception of extremism within a Society."

In Policing in Central and Eastern Europe: Dilemmas of contemporary criminal justice, edited by Gorazd Mesko, Milan Pagon and Bojan Dobovsek, 1-6. Slovenia: University of Maribor, 2004

Journals

Agbiboa, Daniel Egeigba and Maiangwa Benjamin. "Nigeria united in grief; divided in response:

Religious terrorism, Boko Haram and the dynamics of state response." *African Journal on Conflict Resolution* 14 no. 1 (2014): 63-97

Agbiboa, Daniel Egeigba. "Understanding the religious terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria."

African Study Monographs 34 no. 2 (2013): 65-84

Agbiboa, Daniel Egeigba. "Why Boko Haram exists: the relative deprivation perspective."

African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review 3 no. 1 (2013): 144-157

Aliyu, Ahmed, Moorthy Ravichandran, & Idris, Nor Azizan Bin. "Towards understanding the

Boko Haram phenomenon in Nigeria." *Asian Social Science*, 11 no. 10 (2015): 307-317

Anyadike, Nkechi. "Boko Haram and national security challenges in Nigeria: causes and

solutions." *Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development* 4 no. 5 (2013): 12-23

Atoi, Ewere Nelson and Babale Yakubu Kume. "Religious intolerance and the quest for

progressive change in Nigeria." *A Journal of Contemporary Research* 19 no 1 (2022): 230-250

Bello, Abdulmajeed Hassan. "Boko Haram: The greatest security threat to the sovereignty of

Nigeria." *International Journal of Management and Social Sciences Research* 2 no. 2 (2013): 66-72

- Bergunder, Michael. "What is religion? The unexplained subject matter of religious studies." *Method and Theory in the Study of Religion* 26 (2014): 246-286
- Beyers, Jaco. "What is religion? An African understanding." *HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies* 66 no. 1 (2010): 1-8. 10.4102/hts.v66i1.341
- Chandra, Satish and Bhonsle Rahul. "National security: concept, measurement and management." *Strategic Analysis* 39 no. 4 (2015): 337-359
- Ejeh, Emelda, Bappah A and Dankofa Yusuf. "Nature of terrorism and anti-terrorism laws in Nigeria." *Nnamdi Azikiwe University Journal of International Law and Jurisprudence* 10, no. 2 (2019): 186-192
- El-Jaichi, Saer and Sabih, Joshua A. "Preventing Harm: Refutation of Militant Jihad in 'Revisionist Literature.'" *Perspectives on Terrorism* 16 no. 1 (2022): 46-59
- Foyou Viviane E., Ngwafu Peter, Santoyo Maribel and Ortiz Andrea. "The Boko Haram insurgency and its impact on border security, trade and economic collaboration between Nigeria and Cameroon: An exploratory study." *African Social Science Review*, 9 no 1 (2018): 66-77
- Haq Hahbulbul. "New imperatives of human security." *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues* 4 no. 1 (1995): 68-73
- Harrison, Victoria. "The pragmatics of defining religion in a multi-cultural world." *The International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 59 (2006): 133–152
- Hassan, Hamdy A. "Religion as a security threat: Case studies of extremist Christian movements in Africa." *Journal of Religion in Africa* 51 (2021): 426–451
- Hickey, Raymond. "The 1982 Maitatsine uprisings in Nigeria: A note." *African Affairs*, 83 no. 331 (1984): 251–256.

- Hofmann, Claudia and Schneckener Ulrich. “Engaging non-state armed actors in state and peace-building: options and strategies.” *International Review of the Red Cross* 93 no. 883 (2011): 608-621
- Howerth, Ira, W. “What is religion?” *Ethics* 13 no. 2 (1902): 185-206
- Ike Tarela Juliet. “‘Its’ like being a Christian is tantamount to victimisation’: A qualitative study of christian experiences and perceptions of insecurity and terrorism in Nigeria.” *Cogent Social Sciences*, 8 no 1 (2022): 1-16
- Liebman, Charles S. “Extremism as a religious norm.” *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 22 no. 1 (1983): 75-86
- Mahon, Anastassiya. “Defining terrorism: how ambiguous definitions and vague classifications open doors for power acquisition.” *Journal of Global Strategic Studies* 2 no. 1 (2022): 84-97
- Marxsen, Christian. “Territorial integrity in international law – its concept and implications for Crimea.” *Heidelberg Journal of International Law (ZaöRV)* 75 (2015): 7-26
- Mishali-Ram, Meirav. “The Evolution of Transnational Jihad: Identities, Grievances, and Legitimacy Crisis in Arab States, Terrorism and Political Violence.” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, (2022): 10.1080/09546553.2022.2074294
- Mohammad, Noor. “The doctrine of Jihad: An introduction.” *Journal of Law and Religion* 3 no. 2 (1985): 381-397
- Morgan, Matthew. “The origins of the new terrorism.” *Parameters*, 34 no. 1 (2004): 30–31
- Morss R. Elliott. “The new global players: how they compete and collaborate.” *World Development*, 19 no. 1 (1991): 55-64
- Mustapha, Salihu. “Dynamics of religious extremism and terrorism in the Lake Chad Basin: An exploration of the ideological variations between Boko Haram and ISWAP.” *Journal of Power, Politics & Governance* 9 no. 1 (2021): 33-44

- Nte, Ngaboawaji Daniel, Abdulaziz, Baba-Ahamadu, Isah, Awwal and Clairmant, Featherstone. "Religious extremism and the challenges of de-radicalisation in Nigeria's North East Region." *The Indonesian Journal of International Clinical Legal Education* 3 no. 1 (2021): 77-110
- Ojo John Sunday. Governing "ungoverned spaces" in the foliage of conspiracy: Toward (re)ordering terrorism, from Boko Haram insurgency, Fulani militancy to banditry in Northern Nigeria." *African Security*, 13 no 1 (2020): 77-110
- Onapajo, Hakeem. "Children in Boko Haram conflict: The neglected facet of a decade of terror in Nigeria." *African Security* 13 no 2 (2020): 195-211
- Prabha, Kshitij. "Defining terrorism." *Strategic Analysis*, 24 no. 1 (2000): 125–135
- Rapoport, David C. "Fear and trembling: Terrorism in three religious traditions." *American Political Science Review*, 78 no. 3 (1984): 658–677
- Salern, Benson. "Conceptualizing religion: some recent reflection." *Religion* 38 no. 3 (2008): 219-225
- Schmid, Alex. "Terrorism – the definitional problem." *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law* 36 no. 2 (2004): 375-419
- Shola, Akinyetun Tope. "Youth political participation, good governance and social inclusion in Nigeria: Evidence from Nairaland." *Canadian Journal of Family and Youth*, 13 no. 2 (2021): 1-13
- Ullman, H. Richard. "Redefining Security." *International Security*, 8 no. 1 (1983): 129–153.

Reports

Adeyeye, Paul. “Nigeria’s poverty crisis and the Nigerian Living Standards Survey.” *Dataphyte*,

June 4, 2020. [Nigeria's Poverty Crisis and the Nigerian Living Standards Survey |](#)

[Dataphyte](#)

Africa Center for Strategic Studies. *Surge in militant Islamist violence in the Sahel dominates*

Africa’s fight against extremists, 2022. Accessed August 2, 2022. url: [Surge in Militant](#)

[Islamist Violence in the Sahel Dominates Africa’s Fight against Extremists – Africa Center for Strategic Studies](#)

African Union. “Nigeria: ISWAP claims Abubakar Shekau was killed on direct orders of ISIS,

6th June, 2021.” Accessed August 8, 2022. url: [Shekau-killed.pdf \(caert.org.dz\)](#)

Congressional Research Services. “Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province.”

Washington DC: The Library of Congress. Accessed August 3, 2022. url: [IF10173.pdf](#)

[\(fas.org\)](#)

Federal Government of Nigeria. “National Security Strategy 2019.” Accessed August 22, 2022.

url: [ONSA-UPDATED.pdf \(ctc.gov.ng\)](#)

Institute for Economics & Peace. *Global terrorism index: measuring the impact of terrorism*,

2022. Accessed October 14, 2022. url: [GTI-2019web.pdf \(economicsandpeace.org\)](#)

National Bureau of Statistics. *Unemployment statistics*, 2022. Accessed October 5, 2022: url:

[Home | National Bureau of Statistics \(nigerianstat.gov.ng\)](#)

National Institute of Justice. *Radicalization and violent extremism: lessons learned from Canada,*

the U.K. and the U.S. Washington, DC: Office of Justice Programs, 2015. Retrieved from

[Radicalization and Violent Extremism - Lessons Learned From Canada, the U.K. and the U.S. Meeting Summary, July 28-30, 2015 | National Institute of Justice \(ojp.gov\)](#)

- Onuoha, Freedom. “(Un)willing to die: Boko Haram and suicide terrorism in Nigeria.” Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, 2012. Accessed August 8, 2022. url: [\(Un\)Willing to Die: Boko Haram and Suicide Terrorism in Nigeria | Al Jazeera Centre for Studies](#)
- PEW Research. *Mapping the global Muslim population: A report on the size and distribution of the world’s Muslim population*, 2009. Washington DC: PEW Forum on Religion & Public Life
- United Nations Development Programme. *The next frontier: Human development and the Anthropocene - Briefing note for countries on the 2020 Human Development Report*, 2022. Accessed October 5, 2022: url: [NGA.pdf \(undp.org\)](#)
- United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. *Preventing violent extremism through education: A guide for policy makers*. place de Fontenoy, Paris, France: UNESCO, 2017. Accessed July 26, 2022. url: [Preventing violent extremism through education: a guide for policy-makers; 2017 \(unesco.org\)](#)
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Nigeria Emergency*, 2022. Assessed October 14, 2022. url: [UNHCR - Nigeria emergency](#)
- United States House of Representatives Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence Committee on Homeland. “Boko Haram: Emerging threat to the U.S. homeland.” Washington DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, 2011. Accessed August 8, 2022. url: [CPRT-112HPRT71725.pdf \(govinfo.gov\)](#)
- US Department of State. *Country report on terrorism 2019: Nigeria*, 2022. Assessed October 14, 2022. url: [Nigeria - United States Department of State](#)
- Velluro, Madeline. “Violent Islamist groups in Northern Nigeria.” Washington DC: United States Commission on International Religious Freedom. Accessed August 7, 2022. url: [Factsheet: Violent Islamist Groups in Northern Nigeria \(uscirf.gov\)](#)

World Bank. North-East Nigeria: *Recovery and peace building assessment Vol. 1*, 2015.

Accessed October 14, 2022. url: [World Bank Document](#)

Online resources

Bak, Mathias, Tarp Kristoffer Nilaus and Liang Christina Schori. “*Defining the concept of ‘violent extremism’: delineating the attributes and phenomenon of violent extremism Geneva Paper 24/19.*” Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2019.

Accessed July 26, 2022. url: [*2y10xuCSaBlvYTDbinjPokvyDO2XLpn5jG4va93JVUzppqj08EDHwnC \(gcsfp.ch\)](#)

Blanchard, Christopher M. “The Islamic traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya.” Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress. Accessed August 8, 2022.

url: [The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya \(fas.org\)](#)

Bulama, Bukarti (@bulamabukarti). “Families of the 7 victims of the ABJ-KD train attack released Saturday told Daily Trust that they paid N800m random,” Twitter, July 11, 2022,

9:03 a.m. <https://twitter.com/bulamabukarti/status/1546404887428321282?t=-YCzXrVcQALdK6flBZ88Mg&s=19>

Giovanni, Janine Di. “The deadly mission of Boko Haram.” *Newsweek Magazine*, May 20, 2014.

[The Deadly Mission of Boko Haram \(newsweek.com\)](#)

Human Rights Watch. *Spiralling violence: Boko Haram attacks and security forces abuses in Nigeria, 2012*. Accessed August 21, 2022: url: [Human Rights Watch \(hrw.org\)](#)

Human Rights Watch. *Written statement* submitted by European Centre for Law and Justice, The / Centre Europeen pour le droit, les Justice et les droits de l'homme, a non-governmental organization in special consultative status*, 2022. Accessed October 14,

2022. url: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3979908/files/A_HRC_49_NGO_166-EN.pdf

Internal Displacement Monitoring Center. Profile – Nigeria, 2022. Accessed October 14, 2022.

url: [Nigeria | IDMC \(internal-displacement.org\)](https://www.internal-displacement.org/nigeria/)

International Civil Society Action Network. *Extremism as Mainstream: Implications for Women, Development & Security in the MENA/Asia Region*, 2014. Accessed July 26, 2022. url:

[What-the-Women-Say-Extremism-Brief-Spring-2014.pdf \(icanpeacework.org\)](https://www.icanpeacework.org/What-the-Women-Say-Extremism-Brief-Spring-2014.pdf)

Ishaq, Khalid and Alys Davies. “Nigeria Kuje prison break: More than 400 missing from Abuja jail.” BBC, July 7, 2022. [Nigeria Kuje prison break: More than 400 missing from Abuja jail - BBC News](https://www.bbc.com/news/health-61811111)

[jail - BBC News](https://www.bbc.com/news/health-61811111)

Julia-Heim Patricio and McQuaid Julia (2015). “Diagnosing the Boko Haram conflict:

grievances, motivations, and institutional resilience in Northeast Nigeria.” Accessed

October 10, 2022. url: [Diagnosing the Boko Haram Conflict: Grievances, Motivations,](https://www.cna.org/~/media/Files/2015/08/Diagnosing-the-Boko-Haram-Conflict-Grievances-Motivations-and-Institutional-Resilience-in-Northeast-Nigeria.pdf)

[and Institutional Resilience in Northeast Nigeria \(cna.org\)](https://www.cna.org/~/media/Files/2015/08/Diagnosing-the-Boko-Haram-Conflict-Grievances-Motivations-and-Institutional-Resilience-in-Northeast-Nigeria.pdf)

Kamer, Lars. “Economic impact of terrorism in Africa 2007-2019, by country.” Updated

August 31, 2022. [Economic impact of terrorism in Africa by country | Statista](https://www.statista.com/chart/10221/economic-impact-of-terrorism-in-africa-by-country/)

Mandaville, Peter and Nozell, Melissa. *Engaging religion and religious actors in countering violent extremism*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2017. Accessed July

26, 2022. url: [SR413-Engaging-Religion-and-Religious-Actors-in-Countering-Violent-](https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2017/09/SR413-Engaging-Religion-and-Religious-Actors-in-Countering-Violent-Extremism.pdf)

[Extremism.pdf \(usip.org\)](https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2017/09/SR413-Engaging-Religion-and-Religious-Actors-in-Countering-Violent-Extremism.pdf)

Mercy Corps. “*Motivations and empty promises*” *Voices of former Boko Haram combatants and Nigerian youth*, 2016. Accessed October 5, 2022: url:

[Motivations and Empty Promises Mercy Corps Full Report.pdf \(mercy corps.org\)](https://www.mercycorps.org/~/media/Files/2016/09/Motivations-and-Empty-Promises-Mercy-Corps-Full-Report.pdf)

Ministry of Justice. *Decree-Law No 137/2019 of 13 September 2019*, 2019. Accessed August 9,

2022. url: [LeiOrganicaInglesFINAL DL-137 2019.pdf \(policiajudiciaria.pt\)](https://www.policiajudiciaria.pt/~/media/Files/2019/09/LeiOrganicaInglesFINAL_DL-137_2019.pdf)

- Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. *Definition of Terrorism by Country in OECD Countries*, 2022. Accessed August 1, 2022. url: [TerrorismDefinition-Table.pdf \(oecd.org\)](#)
- Rotberg, I. Robert and Campbell John. “Nigeria is a failed state.” *Foreign Policy News*, May 27, 2021. [Buhari's Nigeria Is a Failed State \(foreignpolicy.com\)](#)
- Sasu, Doris Dokua. “Economic cost of terrorism as share of GDP in Nigeria 2017-2019.” Updated September 29, 2022. [Nigeria: economic cost of terrorism as share of GDP | Statista](#)
- SB Morgen. “Chart of the week: School abductions in Nigeria.” Accessed August 8, 2022. url: [Chart of the week: School abductions in Nigeria – Nigeria's leading geopolitical intelligence platform \(sbmintel.com\)](#)
- World Poverty Clock. “Nigeria.” Accessed August 22, 2022. url: [World Poverty Clock](#)
- Zaimov, Stoyan. 2014. “Boko Haram declares 'Islamic Caliphate' in captured Christian town in Nigeria.” *The Christian Post*, August 25, 2014. [Boko Haram Declares 'Islamic Caliphate' in Captured Christian Town in Nigeria | World News \(christianpost.com\)](#)

APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW GUIDE

THE EFFECT OF RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM ON NIGERIA NATIONAL SECURITY:

AN APPRAISAL OF BOKO HARAM

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW

Name of Agency/Institution/Establishment

Appointment/Position Held.....

Male/Female

Ethnic Group

Occupation

Designation.....

Post.....

Age

Date.....

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. In your opinion, what is the cause of the boko haram insurgency? Kindly elaborate.

.....

2. How has the Boko Haram insurgency affected the security internal and external security system in Nigeria in your opinion?

.....

3. What about religions harmony? What about political stability?

.....

4. Can you identify the social and economic impact of Boko Haram? Kindly enumerate.

.....

5. One of the most prominent public policy responses to the Boko Haram violence is the use of the military. What in your opinion make the use of the military so common?

.....

6. What other strategies could you think are being used?

.....

7. If you could identify public policy measures that you think will most effectively address the Boko Haram violence, what would it be and why?

.....

8. What would you say the government of Nigeria has done to implement some of the counterinsurgency measures you identified?

.....

9. In your opinion, would you say that the various measures taken by the Nigerian government to address the Boko Haram challenge has been generally effective, and why, or ineffective, and why?

.....

10. In what ways will the implementation of the various public policy measures recommended

for dealing with the Boko Haram insurgency reduce the negative impacts of the Boko Haram violence on the people? Kindly elaborate.

.....

11. Can you list the challenges in the fight against BH as well as the Challenges in the fight against terrorism in Nigeria?

.....

12. What are the role of the international community in supporting the fight against terrorism in Nigeria?

.....

13. What solutions can be implemented to curtail the impact of Boko Haram activities on Nigeria's national security?

.....

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND RESPONSE!!!

APPENDIX B
RESPONSE BY RESPONDENTS

INTERVIEWEE ONE

Interviewer: Good afternoon, sir. As I have explained earlier, my name is Damilola Selma Dawodu, a student from Catolica university, institute of political studies and I would like to get your opinion on the Effect of Religious Extremism such as the Boko haram sect on Nigeria National Security.

Speaker 2: I would want the interview to be anonymous, but I work with the Nigerian Army.

Interviewer: ok sir, I will keep your identity anonymous what is your rank in the army

Speaker 2: In terms of Rank, I am a Brigadier General.

Interviewer: Thank you so much. Can I ask for your age?

Speaker 2: Yeah, I'm my fifties, early fifties. You can say between 50-55 years old

Interviewer: Thank you for that information, my first question is, In your opinion, what is the cause of the Boko haram insurgency and can you Kindly elaborate?

Speaker 2: Well, there is no 1 Causal factor to the Boko Haran Insurgency. There are multiple causal factors. Yeah, there are issues of failure of the states. The states lack the capacity and the monopoly of violence One of the core and paramount responsibility of every state is the provision of safety and security of its citizens. Marx weber elaborated on that, the legitimate application of violence. If they still have that monopoly of violence, Boko Haram wouldn't have been able to blossom to the extent it has. That's one way to look at it. Okay. You also look at the issues of the

issue of poverty in that local environment. That's where you have illiterate youths, that don't have access to education. Don't have any visible means of livelihood, so because of that, they can easily be lured into these kinds of things

Interviewer: *Okay.*

Speaker 2: *The overriding poverty, irrespective of whatever factors, like causal factors that you may have come across that I have said, is radicalisation. A situation whereby a certain group of people are being misled based on certain belief system that makes them believe that what they're doing is the right thing to do and they believe in that cause. Yes, like I say, there is poverty, mass illiteracy, by the failure of the state. But the issue is at the end of it is radicalisation. People who have been radicalized, belief in radical ideas. This is an important driving factor, even though there is, poverty, but you are not exposed to that radicalisation, you won't do what you're doing. So there are lots of youth in the north that are living the same poverty stricken environment, subjects to same kind or exposed to the same kind of poverty variable but they refuse to believe in that ideology. Yes. Irrespective of Poverty and all, radicalisation is the most deciding factor.*

Interviewer: *Okay, so we have poverty, illiteracy, failure of safety. The most important deciding factor is radicalisation.*

Speaker 2: *Yes, all the other factors, I will qualify it to say that they are primary drivers of the conflict, but the ultimate deciding factor is radicalization*

Interviewer: *Okay. All right. Thank you for that. So how has the Boko Haram insurgency affected internal security and external security system in Nigeria from your own point of view.*

Speaker 2: *This has really affected the security in Nigeria in 2 Ways. The first is in Terms of safety of lives and property which is no longer guaranteed, loss of lives, that is physical security*

in the region over the years have completely been affected. People can no longer move around freely as they are being killed, kidnapped, maimed, properties are being destroyed. So, it has impacted on that to the extent that public sector has gone down to the lowest in the region over the years. This is one way it has impacted on physical security. It has also impacted on Human security and when we say this, we are talking about access to livelihood, employment opportunities, access to education. All the industries in the region have been destroyed. Schools have been shut down. There has been mass exodus of teachers from the region. Okay. Industries have collapsed, Access to livelihood completely affected, the human security in the region has really gone down

Interviewer: *Thank you. And how has this affected material resources as well such as natural resources and resources generally in this region.?*

Speaker 2: *It has affected them, there is this conflict whereby where there is no security, there can hardly be development. Like I earlier said, it has affected the security of lives and property, so it has seriously affected material resources in the region for example if you are talking about economic activity , people can no longer go to farm because of the fear of security as they could be killed or kidnapped by the terrorist forces in the region.*

Like in some years back, you remember the case of farmers that were murdered in their farm by Boko Haram?

Interviewer: *yes, in Borno state year 2020, They were Rice farmers.*

Speaker 2: *If you know that region well, you will know that they are rich in fishing activities but that was completely affected due to the issue of insecurity, and then like farming, for example, because the Boko Haram Insurgence use improvised explosive device (ied) and fertilizers is one of the resources used in manufacturing these IEDs, so there was a period that there was a*

complete ban of the use of fertilizers in the region particularly in Borno State. For you to bring in Fertilizers, you must be licenced by the government and also authorized by the military as these are the materials, they use to make these explosives. And you can see that for you to farm, you will need fertilizers but due to the insecurity in this region, there was ban on the sales of fertilizers.

These are the kinds of issue in which insecurity has affected material resources. The issue of Oil restoration has also been ongoing in the lake Chad areas, and this has been abandoned over the years because of this insurgency as well. Some years back, if you remember, some scientists who were involved in the process of these oil restoration were kidnapped by the Boko Haran sect and at the end of the day, the Oil restoration in that region had to be abandoned. So, these are ways in my opinion how insecurity has affected resources, both natural and Human in that region.

Interviewer: *Thank you for that. Could you kindly explain how this insurgency has impacted religion harmony, between Christians, Muslims, and probably other practising religions as well?*

Speaker 2: *Well, it has because when the whole insurgency started, at one point the Boko Haram group were attacking churches, killing Christians and the rest. There is this believe or consensus that the insurgency was one of the grand agenda of Islamisation. I remember when I was writing a book, I stumbled on a paper presented by Oritsejafar, who was one-time CAN president Christians was. Yeah, of course. Any countries. He tries to argue in that presentation that Boko Haram is utterly it the reincarnation of the Uthman Dan Fodio Jihad. so, obviously at the end of the day it was created that divide between Christians and Muslims at one time. Even though at one time, we began to understand that it was not just targeted against Christians as their killings was now targeted on Muslims., attacking mosques and the rest.*

So, but certainly it does create that suspicion that, distrust and it has whereby some Christians, I won't say all Christians tend to believe that the problem is just out to target Christians and the rest, and that challenge is there.

Interviewer: *Okay. Thank you. can you please identify like the social and. Well, you've already mentioned some of them before, like the economic impact, which is like the famine and all that you said before, can you please elaborate on the social impacts on of these urgency in Nigeria?*

Speaker 2: *Yes. Like we just said, the most crucial impact is the distrust. This has further deepened that distrust between adherent of Christianity and Islam. We can say that there is mass dislocation of families for internally displaced people particularly from the North East, moving to other countries and relying for resources in this other part of the country. There are lots of IDP camps There are cases of refugees that have crossed over to places like Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Based on dislocation, lots of IDP camps were created, and a lot of families were dislocated, you will find a family whereby the parents are killed, and the only ones left are the children. This made for the creation of a lot of orphans, widows, which up to today, the state government is struggling on how to support these people. Then you look at the other vices that came with this, like the People in IDP camps, there is no proper food or medication to take care of them. Lots of exploitation takes place in this camp because there is no food to go round, so some women were using their bodies for sale and some men capitalizing on that and to lure women into intimate relationships because they had to survive. So, all these are some of the social issues that has impacted the social life of the people in the region. And of course, like I told you, schools were destroyed, child ren could no longer go to school as some of the schools were converted to IDP camps. Education was completely affected.*

Interviewer: Thank you. So, the next question is one of the most prominent public policy responses to Boko Haram violence is the use of the military. But in my point of view, I think the use of military is too much to combat the Boko Haram sect, they should have started with probably the police because they are the ones to protect the civil society. Why is it common for Nigeria to use the use of military since it's not like we have like an external war is just the war within ourselves. Why have Nigerian government resorted to use military to combat the sect?

Speaker 2: well, there's always procedure before there's a calling, there must be evidence show that police lack the capacity to deal with the problem and it was obvious looking at the threat assessments, the police were not capable of handling the problem. That was the way the first instance the military had to be brought in. prior to this coming up of the Boko Haram, some years back, there was the kanama issue, where a group similar to Boko Haram and the current Boko Haram is an extension of that Movement. Even then, the police could not handle that movement, it was the military. The kind of weapon they had were sophisticated weapon and they are experts in handling the weapons and that was why the military was called in. The level of threats they posed was more than what the police could contain.

Interviewer: The level of threats they posed was more than what the police could contain.

Speaker 2: Yes, the level of threats they posed was more than what the police could contain.

Interviewer: Ok and since you confirmed that the level of threat was more, hence the intervention of the Military. So, what other strategy do you think could have been used apart from the military?

Speaker 2: Yes. You know, fighting insurgency, terrorism and the rest is not something that you can find a lasting solution to. The only approach is essentially, Kinetic, and non-kinetic.

The kinetic is the military approach, while the non-kinetic is talking about the sociological approach to it. What you need to do to address the issue and then, the issue of radicalisation and the issues of poverty. Okay. Mobilizing the community and get the community support, that is what consist of the non-kinetic approach. The military leads the kinetic approach which is the military approach, and they also involve in lots of non-kinetic operations in the North. If you have had the opportunity of going down to the North, you would have seen arrears whereby the military are the ones running schools and in fact the military have become the de facto government and that is part of the non – kinetic approach that the military is doing because, it is essentially winning the minds of the people. If you want to get information's about the insurgency without winning the heart and mind of the people, you will not be able to get that. Where the military is in the forefront of the kinetic approach, it is also concurrently pursuing a non-kinetic operation essentially to will the heart of the people, so, that is why you see them building schools, making bridges and the rest.

The initial strategy or approach is kinetic and non – kinetic, but the kinetic is supposed to be implemented by either ministry departments, agencies of government but the unfortunate thing is, the government has focused so much on the kinetics which is the military. it became very clear to the government that this thing goes beyond the military solution, and it cannot provide a lasting solution to the problem. But essentially, the non – kinetic is supposed to be pursued by the ministry, like ministry of Humanitarian affairs, ministry of information, ministry of information and other ministries as well as all the humanitarian department agencies. Unfortunately, in terms of the quality response, much focus is on the kinetic approach instead of the non- kinetic approach.

Interviewer: *Okay. Thank you for your response. And so, what would you say the government of Nigeria has done to implement some of the like counterinsurgency measures you identified? like you said, it should be kinetic and non-kinetic, but they use more of the kinetic measures. And like from what you said, it's not enough. If it cannot provide a lasting solution. So, what other solution would you say the government of Nigeria has done like to implement this apart from military?*

Speaker 2: *Well, honestly, If I tell you I know any major or specific program the government has implemented in order to address the insurgency, that I doubt much, I can't really say but I know there are some poverty alleviation programme ,then the establishment of the North East development commission which is a major effort by the government as that is solution to the root causes of this problem . The establishment of the Northeast development commission as they were against the way some of the developmental challenges in the region gives these drivers of conflict in the region. So, it is necessary that the Northeast development commission should be running a lot of programs that will help reduce the potentials of the insurgence. I don't really know how effective the commission is, but I know that it is one of the major non -kinetic response the region. Apart from that, there are other isolated programs run by some ministries in the region. There is the program of deradicalization, even though it is being run by the military, as they started the agency on their own but there are other agencies that are also there, and they focus essentially on the factors oh how the sects can surrender from the insurgence.*

Interviewer: *Thank you, From all these that you've mentioned, all these taken by the North East Development Commission ,Various ministries that you mentioned. Do you think this has been really effective in combating the sect or has it been ineffective or is it because this is a gradual process, we cannot measure the effectiveness just yet.*

Speaker 2: *It has been effective but not to the extent that we want. But, you know, the kind of Insurgency we are dealing which is ideologically driven insurgency based on radicalisation or extremism .So, to me, one of the major problem is to determine how you get those programs that are non-kinetic and kinetic ,because these people are very hardened guys, so you need to combine applying maximum force first and then that will make these people to have a rethink. After that, you can now dangle the carrot and that is where all these developmental approaches and then you are likely to see that they will begin to think. You must have heard of this approach carrot and stick.*

Interviewer: *Yes. Carrot and stick approach*

Speaker 2: *And you know what that means, sorry to say.*

Interviewer: *Yes, it is the metaphor of the carrot and stick is used to describe the combination of punishment and reward that can be used to induce a desired behaviour.*

Speaker 2: *In my own thinking, the best way to go about it is to change it to stick carrot because these are hardened criminal , based on their ideology, they need a level of pain to be inflicted on them for them to think that this think we are doing does not have any meaning or it does not take us anywhere.so instead of carrot and the stick , it should be stick and the carrot. So determining on how you now apply this is the issue but these things are done in isolation but in reality you are dealing with a conflict and in order to make it work, you need to apply this appropriately .when force is used and then you dangle the carrot, it will make them to have a rethink but when you just dangle the carrot , it won't work alone. Even as they are being killed, the more you kill them, the more they come out, so you need to combine these two at the same time so that you will not be able to have that maximum effect. And so that's why sometimes these things are not really working out very well. Okay.*

***Interviewer:** Okay. Thank you, sir. Please Can you list the major challenge in fighting the Boko Haram sect, what is the major challenge being faced by the army and by Nigerian governments in combating the sect?*

***Speaker 2:** Yes, one will be the issue of resources, that the challenge of resources is one that is very clear on the path of the military. But on the other side, again, you should know that the military do not have solution to radicalisation. The others, the government is supposed to address that. One of the major issues of the military is deradicalization. They need to get platforms that are effective. If you look at the kind of weapons the Boko haram are displaying, they are so sophisticated and that is one of the challenges the military is facing. Another challenge the military is facing is the issue of is access to funding on the path of the Boko Haram which the military does not have control over. Remember I told you that despite all the factor I said, the overriding factor is radicalisation. Another essential factor also to radicalism is access to funding. Because you cannot raise insurgency without funding, no matter how you are radicalised this issue with our funding no matter how less. If you don't have access to weapons, resources to fighters to, buy fuel battle. If you look at the convoy the Boko Haram come out with, those vehicles don't run on water they run on fuel. So funding is one of the challenges that is undermining the effectiveness of the military operation in the Northeast. Boko haram is always having access to funding to finance their operation. If the government is able to block all the sources of funding, then they can't operate. That's the gospel truth but the military does not know how to block the fundings of Boko Haram, how can they block or how can the source of funding, access be blocked. The government, they cannot pinpoint how they're being funded as a country has not been able to say how they are being funded. Over the years, the government can't not say how the sect fund their operation.*

Interviewer: *I was going to ask; how are they being funded? Can't the government block it or find a way around it?*

Speaker 2: *Honestly, it is something that is still baffling a lot of Nigerians. Not quite long, Dubai, United Arab Emirates Some guys were arrested, Nigerians that were accused of providing funding to the sect. They were tried and jailed but unfortunately in Nigeria, no one has been identified as a financier, investigated, and maybe subjected to trial. I will tell you that government have not been effective in that area and if you go into the literature, you see clearly that if you use that for grievances, are necessary social condition for civil war. That is radicalization is a necessary is a condition but not sufficient condition for what Boko Haram are doing in regards to funding. The best is to block that source of Funding and that is one major headache for the military.*

Interviewer: *The Sufficient actions is to get access to their funding.*

Speaker 2: *Even if government have an idea of those doing the funding, they should get them arrested except if the government is covering them.*

Interviewer: *Okay. And what do you think is the role of the international community in supporting the fight against terrorism in Nigeria.*

Speaker 2: *At the bilateral level UK, USA and other nations particularly in terms of providing support on intelligence, sharing intelligence. That is one area in which they can support us. Two in terms of providing training support and this is being provided by the USA, UK and they are trying to improve the countries armed forces. We have been used to conventional warfare, when this issue came onboard, it was a real challenge. Our training has been focussed on conventional warfare, warfare, and then later peace keeping operations*

When this came, it was entirely a new baby, in more than 10 years the armed forces have been able to respond to attacks. Without international assistance, this wouldn't have been possible. Apart from encroachments, the Kano fighter jet, were bought from the U.S.A and even from other international community.

Interviewer: *Okay. Thank you so much. I really appreciate your time, sir. Thank you for agreeing to do the interview. I really appreciated it.*

INTERVIEWEE TWO

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. *In your opinion, what is the cause of the Boko haram insurgency? Kindly elaborate.*

The Boko Haram insurgency initially started as a religious protest and movement against the western style of education in Nigeria particularly in the North. The agitations were devoid of violence until the founder of the group Moh'd Yusuf was arrested and later extra judicially executed by state authorities in 2009. That execution of Yusuf marked the beginning of violent agitations by the group that subsequently metamorphosed into an insurgency. The insurgency was easily fanned by the many fuels and fault lines that laid and are still lying bare all around the Nigerian state. The high level of illiteracy, religious intolerance, high level of abject poverty, political mischief and manipulations, crisis entrepreneurs etc, all further deepened the crisis to its current formidable level.

2. *How has the Boko haram insurgency affected the security internal and external security system in Nigeria in your opinion? The Boko Haram insurgency has taken a huge toll on the internal security architecture of Nigeria which is usually a reflection of the external security of any nation. The under trained, underfunded and underpopulated Nigeria Police Force (NPF) which has as its constitutional responsibility the job of maintaining law and order displayed glaringly its inability to contain the internal security crisis. This led to the drafting in of the military following the 2012 declaration of a State of Emergency by the then government of Goodluck Jonathan to curtail the insurgency in the North East.*

The prolonged crisis has gulped huge budgetary allocations and spendings on the military. The sustained insurgency and terrorism has over the last decade depleted the Nigerian military

arsenal. The crisis today has given rise to a hydra head of internal security issues which are almost grinding the Nigerian state to a halt.

3. *How has it affected the human and material resources? What about religions harmony? What about political stability?). The Boko Haram crisis has greatly infringed on the socio-economic life of the country, notably in areas such as agriculture, food security, interstate trade, hospitality businesses, tourism, interstate transport, religious activities, etc*

4. *Can you identify the social and economic impact of Boko haram? Kindly enumerate. The Boko Haram crisis has greatly infringed on the socio-economic life of the country, notably in areas such as agriculture, food security, interstate trade, hospitality businesses, tourism, interstate transport, religious activities, etc*

5 *One of the most prominent public policy responses to the Boko Haram violence is the use of the military. What in your opinion make the use of the military so common? In my opinion, the military in Nigeria today is over stretched having been tasked to provide solution to almost every problem in the country ranging from internal security challenges to that of emergencies and disaster management. Election security in Nigeria must be carried out by the military for Nigerians to feel safe to come out and participate. All these tell result of incompetence and failure of almost all the internal security agencies in the country particularly the NPF*

6. *What other strategies could you think are being used? The strategy to involve the local communities in the solution processes has not yielded much result for obvious reasons of genuineness and corruption.*

7. *If you could identify public policy measures that you think will most effectively address the Boko Haram violence, what would it be and why? The authorities of*

government in Nigeria today are all democratically elected. Democracy by the rule and definition is government of the people, by the people and for the people themselves. The various authorities in Nigeria most importantly need to imbibe the democratic culture of citizens participation in the political process. Equally important, Nigerian authorities need to imbibe in its leadership practice the principle of accountability to the people they govern. This will spur the sense of stake and inclusiveness in Nigerians to stir up the patriotism needed as one united entity to defeat the monster threatening Nigeria's survival

8. *What would you say the government of Nigeria has done to implement some of the counterinsurgency measures you identified?*

With regard to the issues raised on the sense of belonging of Nigerians to the Project Nigeria, government has done little in this regard for Nigerians to feel that sense of belonging to give their all for the Nigerian state. There exists still, the mass of ungoverned spaces in the country. Nigerians in various communities still live without government impact on their lives.

9. *In your opinion, would you say that the various measures taken by the Nigerian government to address the Boko Haram challenge has been generally effective, and why, or ineffective, and why? The Boko Haram crisis as highlighted earlier was fanned by factors which cannot be defeated by the use of force alone. Thus, it is imperative for the government to simultaneously tackle these issues by the use of other non-kinetic means*

10. *In what ways will the implementation of the various public policy measures recommended for dealing with the insurgency reduce the negative impacts of the Boko Haram violence on the people? Kindly elaborate. As the Nigerian Knowledge is light. Therefore, education is the key to the liberation and lighting up of any society. The government in Nigeria needs to invest hugely in the educational sector of Nigeria. The unending back and forth of the*

government with ASUU should immediately end in favor of the universities for the sake of education of the Nigerian student. Job and wealth creation by government will take most of the today jobless youths off the streets and gainfully engage them, thus reducing youth restiveness in Nigeria. The government needs to prioritize the basic amenities of the citizens of Nigeria including infrastructure development. These are naturally combative to the issues of insecurity

11. Can you list the challenges in the fight against BH? Please include Challenges in the fight against terrorism. ...The challenge in the fight against Boko Haram are Lack of manpower in the side of the military. Inadequate technology or intelligence acquisition. Inadequate equipment and The Porous border of the neighbouring countries. Use of captives as human shield to deter troops from attacking their location

INTERVIEWEE THREE

Interviewer: Good afternoon, sir, as previously discussed, I I'm writing on the effect of religious extremism on Nigerian national security and an appraisal of Boko Haram for my dissertation project at the Catolica university, institute of political studies and I would like to have your opinion on the subject matter.

Speaker 2: Right. So, what do you want to know about it?

Interviewer: First of all, let me just confirm if you would you like the interview to be anonymous or can I put your name or leave it as anonymous?

Speaker 2: Anonymous.

Interviewer: Okay, thank you, sir Can you please let me know your appointment or position held or the establishment you work with?

Speaker 2: I am the commandant of the intelligence service training school.

Interviewer: Can I know your ethnic group?

Speaker 2: I am Yoruba by tribe

Interviewer: Okay. And if you permit me, can I ask for your age.

Speaker 2: I am 57 years

Interviewer: *Okay. Thank you so much, so let me go to the first question I have is regarding Boko Haram, which is what my thesis is on. So, in your opinion, what do you think is the cause of Boko Haram insurgency? Could you kindly elaborate from your own understanding?*

Speaker 2: *Okay. It's basically the result of a misguided religious philosophy. And what do I mean by misguided religious philosophy, this belief that the economy problem, political problem, the social ill of the society is as a result of people in quote not being good Muslims. Forget about the fact that the country is not made up of only Muslims as far as they are concerned, as far as Boko Haram is concerned, all the problems that we have in Nigeria is because people are not Muslim enough. They have their own narrow interpretation of what a good Muslim is.*

Interviewer: *Yes*

Speaker 2: *So, to them, it is because people are not good Muslims enough according to their own interpretation of Islam. They have their own strict interpretation with is strict to the fact that no western education. So, when you are into Western education, you have lost your true Islamism. So basically, as far as they are concerned, they want to revert people back to their own interpretation of what Islam is supposed to be, forget about the fact that whether people are Muslims or not. And that is the origin of the word "Boko Haram". "Boko" means western education and "Haram" means forbidden. As far as they are concerned, anything that had to do with western education or Western civilisation is a taboo to their own strict interpretation of Islam and that's where the problem starts from.*

Interviewer: *Ok, Thank you. Can you tell me how this Boko Haram insurgency has affected the security, like the internal and external security system in Nigeria?*

Speaker 2: *Yeah. Because of the collapse of the government of Gadhafi, which unfortunately was aided by the West, by the Americans, and it has enabled a lot of terrorist organisations in getting*

arms, the bulk of the arms of Boko Haram were all gotten from the fringes of the Sahara Desert. We had looters where people who looted Gadhafi armoury, brought all arms to the Sahara Desert to sell. The insurgence from Nigeria go there to buy their arms and returned to Nigeria to establish their own army. And with that, they started attacking communities in the north-eastern part of Nigeria. And that is why you see that at a particular time, more than half of Borno state were under Boko Haram. The Northern part of Adamawa state at a particular time was under Boko Haram. The Eastern part of Borno was in the hand of Boko Haram. A few local governments in Bauchi State were also in the hand of Boko Haram. This is around 2014 time. Now because they have been pushed back and with the availability of small arms and large weapons which were procured from the fringes of the Sahara Desert. These insurgents, these terrorists, these Boko Haram were able to attack and kill thousands of Nigerians, kidnapped thousands of schoolchildren. And so, it has adversely affected the security of Nigeria. And unfortunately, part of them have now moved from parts of Borno and they are now in the forest of Kaduna State. The group is called the “Ansaru”. They are now occupying one of what we call ungoverned spaces in Kaduna state. The areas around the Birnin Gwari LGA local government. Now they have pushed it further Northwest, into the fringes of Zamfara state and Kebbi State. So, in other words, the activities of Boko Haram have adversely affected the security of the northern part of the country.

Interviewer: *Okay. So, from your explanation, it is majorly in the northern part of the country where they've really established their ground.*

Speaker 2: *Yes, you are correct.*

Interviewer: *Okay. And just to probe further, how do you think this has also affected human and material resources?*

Speaker 2: *Oh, sure. Because when you don't have free access that you used to have to your farm, you don't have free access that you used to have to your business places. Definitely, you have been affected, you know, for fear of being kidnapped and being extorted for ransom. And people have now abandoned their homes, farms and businesses and people who are supposed to be those people who are supposed to be able to go to their homes, go to their businesses because of this fear. I've decided not to go. And they are back seated in the cities.*

Interviewer: *Okay. And regarding religious harmony as well. How do you think it has affected religious harmony?*

Speaker 2: *Yes. Initially, when they first started churches were their primary targets, there was this very notorious attack in Abuja at a particular church in the early 2000, when a lot of people were killed, it was called the Christmas day bombing. Their initial target were the churches then later it extended into the mosque, so both the Christian churches and the mosque were attacked, and a lot of people killed. There was a time, even in Borno state. People avoided going for early morning mosque prayers because these insurgents were laying in ambush waiting for those, they feel are not practising their own form of Islam and they kill them. In Kaduna State, there was a time in which Mosques were being attacked, they were carrying improvised explosive ordinance and to those places and detonating them and killing people, because as far as they are concerned, the type of Islam being practised in some of the mosques do not conform to their own strict interpretation of Islam according to their own interpretation.*

Interviewer: *Thank you. And how has it affected political stability as well?*

Speaker 2: *It's a very serious problem. For instance, let me give you an example for this year as Nigeria is preparing for election in 2023 and local government of Kaduna State, they sent a message saying that they don't want any political campaign. They don't want any election in those areas. Now let's go back to Borno State. Right from 2011, the elections, the insurgents and*

because of the activities of the Boko Haram, you will notice that I use the word insurgents, Boko Haram terrorists interchangeably.

Interviewer: *Yes*

Speaker 2: *As far as I am concerned, they are the same thing , insurgents, Boko Haram terrorists , Ansaru, so don't get confused as far as I'm concerned its one rope that tie everything together. So in Borno states around 2011 time, election takes place only in a few local government of the state. People have been driven away, people have become in Cameroon, in Chad. So, elections could not take place in in those places. Only a handful of local governments, a fraction and I don't have the number even now and even next year 2023 election. Election will only take place in a fraction of the local government in the state. Rather the INEC which is the Independent National Electoral Commission, we have to conduct election in IDP centres Maiduguri town, that is the state capital, it has largely affected the activities of insurgents or Boko Haram, largely affected political activities in those parts of the country because one; politician cannot go to the area to even campaign, Two; people have left most of those, especially in Borno. Now this issue is now extended to Kaduna where the Boko Haram have warned people from coming to campaign in their area. Areas in which they are controlling like gwari local government is a very extensive local government in Kaduna State.*

Interviewer: *Yes. Thank you, sir. can you identify the social and economic impact of Boko Haram. You already mentioned some before but what is the social impact of the Boko Haram, please explain further?*

Speaker 2: *The Economy is very simple. Like in Nigeria. It's very rural that Nigeria is agrarian and since Boko Haram impacted that areas, agricultural has ceased. Has almost completely ceased. In other words, farmers cannot go to their farm again for fear of being killed or being*

kidnapped. In some areas where farmers risk it, they are now made to pay taxes to the insurgents. If you, for instance, if you are able to harvest like ten bags of grain. They will charge you; I don't know the number, but they will charge you a particular number you have to give to them, maybe two or maybe three maybe four, maybe five or more but yes, they task them on that. Borno State, used to be known for the red beans and for dry fish. But now these ones have been seriously affected because the fishing industry has practically collapsed, because the entire water area has been taken over by Boko Haram. And you see, all this has led to increase in the price of food stuffs. Nasarawa State and Benue State are known for production of yams unfortunately because of the activities of Boko Haram joined unfortunately by the militant Fulani herdsmen who at times used to collude with Boko Haram, unfortunately, yam production in Nasarawa State and Benue State have been bee curtailed. Because I have introduced something to it now and I don't want you to get confused, since I have brought the Fulani's inside now. In Nigeria, the insurgence or terrorists are of 2 types, the ones that are Boko Haram and the ones that are Fulani's. Unfortunately, their path have coalesced. There are some communities you will see. It is only the Fulani militants that are terrorising the people. In some others, it is Boko Haram that are terrorising the people.

It is both the Fulani and Islam that are terrorising, like in Kaduna State. In Kaduna State, in Southern part of Kaduna, in Birnin Gwari area,. It is the coalition of Boko Haram or Ansaru and the Fulani's that are terrorising the community. In Borno State and Yobe state, it is Boko Haram that are terrorizing the community. In Benue State and Nasarawa State, bulk of the terrorist there are Fulani's because they joined hands with the Boko Haram and sometime, it is difficult to differentiate them. It has been confirmed that the terrorist used the Fulani's to achieve their own gain in terrorizing. There is no way you will talk about Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria without talking about the Fulani's.

Interviewer: *Are the Fulani's you are referring to the nomads?*

Speaker 2: *Yes, they are the Nomads. Before you go on, let me clarify one other thing, the Boko Harams originally originated from Borno State and from originally, they are made up of one tribe the "Kanuri". The Kanuri's formed the original centre crux of Boko Haram but as times goes on, they have been able to bring in the Hausas, the Fulani's and bring in the Ebiras. The Ebiras are from Kogi state which is part of the North. So, basically, they are Kanuri's, Hausa, Fulani's and Ebiras, these are the core of Boko Haram in Nigeria. These are the tribes that formed the Boko Haram. They were incorporated into Boko Haram by the Kanuri's.*

Interviewer: *ok, thank you. My next question is that one of the prominent public policies responses to Boko Haram violence is use of military. I think military should be the last resort Nigeria should use to deal with the sect because we have the police which deals bringing order in the civil society. So why is it that the military is the common weapon we use to fight this sect in Nigeria? Because we are not at war. It is still the people in the country that we are fighting against, it's not like we're fighting with outsiders. So why do they always have to resort to the use of military to fight the Boko Haram's?*

Speaker 2: *Right from day one, immediately after the Killing of Muhammed Yusuf, the original founder of Boko Haram. The Boko Haram Followers moved into the fringes of Sahara, where there is availability up to today of lotted arms from the Gadhafi armoury. They moved there, bought lots of arms, came back home and declared a Jihad against Nigeria, they declared war against Nigeria. Right from the beginning the problem was beyond the capacity of the Nigerian police from day 1. It became more than what could be handled by the Nigerian Police. Unfortunately, up to today, the issue has become a military issue as it is totally beyond the capacity of the Nigerian police.*

Interviewer: *Okay. Thank you. What are the strategies do you think will be used apart from the military?*

Speaker 2: *As at now, realistically, there is no other way to resolve the problem because Boko Haram don't communicate, Boko Haram is not a group that dialogue. They listen to only one voice and one voice alone and that is the force of violence. That is the only voice they listen to. Only arms, they don't listen to religious leaders' religious leaders. They don't listen to the president of the country, who is a Northern Fulani man, they don't listen to religious leaders, they have no regard for religious leaders, they have no regard for political leaders. The only language they listen to is in language of force. So, there is no other strategy again that is going to work, it is only the language of force and violence.*

Interviewer: *Okay. So, if you could identify the public policy measures that you think will be most and most effective in addressing the Boko Haram violence, what would they be?*

Speaker 2: *Okay. How to handle and resolve to how to resolve the situation?*

Interviewer: *Yeah, exactly.*

Speaker 2: *It is very simple. The only solution is for the International Community for the African Union to assist Nigeria and Nigeria armed forces by selling to us or giving towards the most sophisticated arms, like planes, bombs destroy the sect in their forest. That is the only solution. The only solution as far as I'm concerned, is military. Unfortunately, because of sanctions we have not been able to buy the needed weapon from the west. For the west to sell to us the attack helicopters, the latest in weapons to use to bombard them and to destroy them completely. The only solution is Military and no other solution.*

Interviewer: *Okay. And what do you think the government of Nigeria has done to implement some of these counterinsurgency measures, like you mentioned such as military.*

Speaker 2: *We've been trying our best within the very limited political environment we find ourselves. The federal government has been trying its best in procuring the little weapons we can for the military, unfortunately because of the sanctions, the military couldn't get the required weapons and platforms, such as helicopters and fighter that Nigeria needed to include this war.*

Interviewer: *Okay. So, because of the sanctions, they could not get the necessary ammunition to fight the war?*

Speaker 2: *Yes, the necessary platform to fight the war.*

Interviewer: *Like you said, the Nigerian government has tried their best, but because of sanctions, they were unable to get the necessary ammunitions or equipment to fight the war. In regard to the measures taken and the ammunitions they have right now in fighting this sect. How effective do you think it has been, from your own opinion, has it been effective or ineffective?*

Speaker 2: *You see, we can't say they are ineffective. They're not enough. They are effective, but they're not enough. So that is why we need more helicopters, the latest weaponry. Of course, most of these are supposed to be gotten from the USA but because of these sanctions, from the USA government, we couldn't get these weapons. You know there is this fear about Human right concern and because of that, the American government said there are somethings they cannot sell to us.*

Interviewer: *And in regard to international community, in supporting the fight against terrorism, what is their role? What do you think they've been able to do so far?*

Speaker 2: *The international community are aware that, yes, Nigeria is having such challenge from this insurgency. But this concern has not translated to the support to the Nigerian government through the bringing in of arms for us. So yes, they are concerned about it but the concern has not been translated to the provision of the needed weapons and arms that we need to fight them. Let us leave it as support, even though the international community are very concerned, it has not translated into the physical support that we need.*

Interviewer: *for my last question, how do you think we can overcome this war against Boko Haram? Do you think it's something that will linger for a very long time? Or once we get the required support, do you think Nigeria will be able to handle the situation overtime or has the insurgence come to stay?*

Speaker 2: *Hmmm...it's a very tough one. The insurgency is not going to go away. Why do I say that? In as much as the Nigerian Army don't have the required tool, they need to fight this insurgency, sincerely, this insurgency is going to remain. I wish there could be a coalition like it happened in Syria, where ISIS was destroyed. If we can have a world coalition like the one that led to the destruction of ISIS in Syria, if we can have the same coalition in Nigeria, we are going to destroy Boko Haram. I doubt if we are going to have that and because we are likely not going to have that, we are likely going to see Boko Haram fester for a very long time in Nigeria. The efforts of the Somali government have not been able to defeat al-Shabab. So, we are most likely going to continue to live with Boko Haram and insurgency and terrorism in Nigeria for the foreseeable future.*

Interviewer: *Thank you so much for your time. I really appreciate it*

INTERVIEWEE FOUR

1. *In your opinion, what is the cause of the Boko Haram insurgency? Kindly elaborate.*

For answers to this question, I will refer you to a work - https://www.academia.edu/7368629/Terrorism_in_Nigeria_Implications_of_Boko_Haram_Movement_in_the_West_Africa

2. *How has the Boko Haram insurgency affected the internal and external security system in Nigeria?*

- a). The Boko Haram insurgency is threatening the sovereignty and territoriality of Nigeria.*
- b). It has resulted in the death of over 50,000 Nigerians and the displacement of more than 3 million others, especially in the North East region.*

3. *How has it affected human and material resources?*

- a). The persistence of the insurgency is occasioning food insecurity in Nigeria.*
- b). It has heightened the rate of out of school children in the norther part of the country, which has implications for human resource development*

4. *What about religions harmony?*

Not too sure.

5. *What about political stability?*

- a). The insurgency also threatening the legitimacy of political regimes in Nigeria.*

6. *Can you identify the social and economic impact of Boko Haram?*
- a). *Economic dislocation due to dwindling income. This is heightening poverty and increasing the rate of crime across the country.*
- b). *It is impacting negatively on school enrolment with implications for human resource development.*
7. *One of the most prominent public policy responses to the Boko Haram violence is the use of the military. What in your opinion makes the use of the military so common?*
- a). *The military has the mandate to counter insurgencies. That makes its use common*
8. *What other strategies could you think are being used?*
- Beyond the military, government is also using other strategies such as:*
- a). *De-radicalisation*
- b). *Re-integration of repentant BH fighters into the community*
9. *If you could identify public policy measures that you think will most effectively address the Boko Haram violence, what would it be and why?*
- a). *Addressing the root causes of the insurgency – poverty, illiteracy and unemployment*
10. *What would you say the government of Nigeria has done to implement some of the counterinsurgency measures you identified?*
- a). *Increased budgetary allocation to the security sector*
- b). *Engaging in bilateral and multilateral diplomacy – MNTF, Nigeria-Cameroon Border Security Committee, etc*
- c). *Strengthening the capacity of the military*

11. *In your opinion, would you say that the various measures taken by the Nigerian government to address the Boko Haram challenge has been generally effective, and why, or ineffective, and why?*

a). The measures have been generally effective, However, there is need for a combination of measures

12. *In what ways will the implementation of the various public policy measures recommended for dealing with the Boko Haram insurgency reduce the negative impacts of the Boko Haram violence on the people? Kindly elaborate. Can you list the challenges in the fight against BH? Please include Challenges in the fight against terrorism.*

a). A major challenge is the intractable nature of the insurgency and the effective collaboration of terrorist groups across the world.

13. *What is the role of the international community in supporting the fight against terrorism in Nigeria?*

a). Providing some logistical support to Nigeria.