

ENEMY AT THE GATES MACAO, MANILA AND THE “PINHAL EPISODE” (END OF THE 16TH CENTURY)

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Abstract

At the end of the 16th Century the authorities in Canton allowed a Spanish vessel to stay in the port of ‘Pinhal’. She had been sent by the governor of Manila with the likely aim of opening a direct channel of communication and trade between Guangdong and the Philippines. Macao reacted immediately, vigorously albeit cautiously, considering this a threat to its role as intermediary in China’s contacts with the exterior. It was the climax in the heightening tension between the Portuguese, who had reached the Far East almost a century earlier, and the Spanish who had recently settled on the island of Luzon. Although a brief, inconsequent period, it nevertheless assumed great importance within the framework of the disputes between the Portuguese and the Spanish in Asia, but also of the relationship between them, China and Japan.

This article attempts to analyse the ‘Pinhal episode’ in the light of the unstable, complex political and diplomatic context of the time and of the region, presenting an attempted reconstitution of the events in view of the available sources and linking this unusual event to various issues involving Macao’s role and function and the effects of Castilian competition on access to several routes, ports and markets of the Far East.

Resumo

Nos finais do século XVI, as autoridades de Cantão autorizaram a fixação de um navio castelhano no porto de “Pinhal”, que fora enviado pelo governador de Manila com o objectivo provável de abrir um canal directo de comunicação e de comércio entre o Guangdong e as Filipinas. Este facto suscitou de imediato uma viva, embora cautelosa, reacção por parte de Macau, que viu ameaçado o seu papel de intermediário nos contactos da China com o exterior. Foi o clímax do crescendo de tensão entre os portugueses, chegados às águas do Extremo Oriente quase um século antes, e os castelhanos recém-instalados na ilha de Luzón. Tratou-se, contudo, de um episódio breve e inconsequente,

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mas que assumiu uma grande relevância no quadro das disputas entre portugueses e castelhanos na Ásia, mas também do relacionamento entre ambos, a China e o Japão.

Este artigo tenta analisar o “episódio do Pinhal” à luz do instável e complexo quadro político-diplomático da época e da região, apresentando uma tentativa de reconstituição dos eventos à luz das fontes disponíveis e relacionando este insólito evento com diversas questões envolvendo o papel e a função de Macau e os efeitos da competição castelhana no acesso a diversas rotas, portos e mercados do Extremo Oriente.

要約

16世紀末、広東の官憲たちはピニャル港（東涌）へのカスティーリヤ船の停泊を許可した。その船はマニラ総督が広東＝フィリピン間の直接の修好通商を目的として派遣したものであると考えられる。この事実は、中国＝外国間の接触における仲介者としての役割を脅かすものであるとして、慎重ではあるが素早いマカオ側の反応を引き起こした。それは1世紀近くも前に極東の海へ到達していたポルトガル人とルソン島に定住をはじめたままいないカスティーリヤ人との間の緊張が最高点に達した時期であったと考えられる。本稿では、些細で一貫性がないながらも、アジアにおけるポルトガル人とカスティーリヤ人間との紛争と、それをめぐる中国や日本との関係図において重要であると思われるエピソードを紹介する。

本稿は上記「ピニャル港のエピソード」について、不安定で複雑なこの地域の政治外交図に焦点を当てて考察するものである。そこではこの問題に関する諸史料を用いて状況を再構築するとともに、マカオの役割に関する諸問題や様々な極東の海路、港、市場への接近におけるカスティーリヤ人と（ポルトガル人）の競争の結果等をともに論じる。

Keywords:

Pinhal, Macao, Manila, Philippines, China, Japan, Canton

Pinhal, Macau, Manila, Filipinas, China, Japão, Cantão

ピニャル（東涌）、マカオ、マニラ、フィリピン、中国、日本、広東

Introduction

In 1598, the governor of the Philippines, D. Francisco Tello de Guzmán, sent a ship to Canton captained by D. Juan Zamudio, who managed to get permission from the Chinese authorities to settle somewhere on the coast,

thereby unleashing the chain of events that came to be known as the “Pinhal episode”. The purpose, the circumstances and the effects of this mission remain somewhat shadowy as does its significance in the context of Portuguese-Spanish rivalry in the Far East. The sources that refer to it are contradictory and the information is fragmentary. Added to this is the complexity of the issues involved and raised by the episode. C. R. Boxer even called it “the Pinhal imbroglio”.² The topic has never stimulated much interest on the part of historians except for the minor problem of the exact location of the Spanish settlement; in other words, identification of the toponym.

Although it was a relatively brief and inconsequential episode lasting just under two years, it does, however, assume extraordinary importance in the context of Portuguese-Spanish relations in Asia and in the wider context of the European presence in the Far East. This importance derives not only from the fact that it constitutes the climax to a long process of increasing Spanish intervention in the region but also because it concerns a privileged and, in a certain way, paradigmatic moment of a disappearing age – that of the Iberian monopoly of the waters of the Indian Ocean in relation to other European powers.

The purpose of this article is to re-evaluate the “Pinhal episode” through a brief description of the complex panorama in which it occurred, to review various points relating to the chronology of the events in the light of different sources and, finally, to propose an explanation for various issues that are relevant for the history of Macao and the Portuguese and Spanish presence in the Far East.

1. The new peninsular political order along the line of the anti-meridian of Tordesillas

On 11 April 1581, less than a month after the Cortes of Tomar, the new Viceroy of India, D. Francisco Mascarenhas, left Lisbon for Goa. He had orders and papers which gave him total freedom to replace the commanders and the holders of the principal posts in the *Estado da Índia* in accordance with a list of trusted noblemen which the new monarch had provided. To eliminate any hesitation or resistance, D. Francisco carried with him a large number of signed blank charters to satisfy the more reticent and award them privileges and favours. There was even a contingency plan: should Goa refuse to receive him and, implicitly, to recognise Philip I as king: he should

2 Charles R. Boxer, *The Great Ship From Amacon*, Macao, 1988, p. 62, n. 119.

withdraw to Mozambique and wait there for new instructions from the kingdom.³

None of this turned out to be necessary. Nevertheless, on the far side of Cape Comorin, recognition of the new political order did not occur with no setbacks. In Malacca, the captain of the fort, D. João da Gama, graciously welcomed Leonel de Lima, who arrived there in October with letters from Philip I, but only swore allegiance to Philip as king after receiving news that this had been done in Goa without hesitation.⁴

In Tidore, the Portuguese garrison was only informed of the acclamation in March 1582 but by way of the Philippines since the ships from India had not arrived. Not wishing to compromise himself too much, dependent as he was on Spanish support and which he came to request in fact not long afterwards, the captain of the fort, Diogo de Azambuja, preferred to wait for the arrival of his successor. As his successor only reached the Moluccas in 1583, it was only in this year that Philip I was sworn in as king. Such informal contacts between the captain of Tidore and the authorities in Manila permitted the Spanish to obtain up-to-date information about the local political situation. Although they were formally forbidden from landing on the islands by the Treaty of Zaragoza, the Spanish immediately put the new information to good use and tried to conquer Ternate three times between 1582 and 1585.⁵

The situation in Macao was somehow identical. Far from the decision-making centres of Portuguese power in Asia, with communications subjected to the pendulous rhythm of the monsoons, Macao also learnt of the new political situation in the kingdom via the Philippines.

The Moluccas, like Macao, lay along the line of the anti-meridian of Tordesillas, a kind of twilight zone. Here the agreements and dictates of European politics collapsed owing to the technical inability to calculate longitude exactly and became diluted in the multipolar context of local interests where the impact of orders from above, even though clear and precise, was delayed, muted and often surrendered to the practice of business and to the rhythm of the monsoon.

The similarities, however, end there. The Portuguese attitude to the Spanish presence was substantially different in the two regions. In the Moluccas, the situation had been precarious for some time for the Portuguese, who had been driven out of Ternate and forced to take refuge in the rival sultanate.

3 Diogo do Couto, *Da Ásia*, Dec. X, I, ix, Lisbon, 1974, pp. 61-67.

4 Couto (1974), Dec. X, II, i, pp. 149-151.

5 Manuel Lobato, *Comércio, conflito e religião – Portugueses e Espanhóis nas ilhas Molucas de 1512 a 1618*, Lisbon, 2003, multicopied, pp. 326-328; Couto (1974), Dec. X, III, vi-iii, pp. 307-316.

The clove trade via Malacca was in the hands of Javanese traders, the *viagem* of the Moluccas was virtually paralysed since there was no one who wanted to contract it and the fort's isolation led to a voluntary request being made to Manila for its support. In fact, it was not by accident that, after the Dutch arrival, it fell to Manila and not to Malacca to take the initiative to reconquer a position in the region and to assume the responsibility of disputing the clove trade with the Dutch.

In a different way, the Portuguese presence in Macao was reasonably safe and enjoyed a wide economic horizon, thanks to the growing importance of the trade that was centred on the city and which, in the last quarter of the 16th Century, was the most extensive and richest in the whole of the *Estado da Índia*. Here, there was greater zeal for exclusive rights and distrust of any eventual attempts at Spanish penetration was much more noticeable. As Consuelo Varela says, in the Moluccas, the Spanish and Portuguese were in the minority and, when faced with a common enemy, were all 'Spaniards'; in Macao, where the Portuguese governed the territory, they were openly declared enemies.⁶

There were also intrinsic differences. The Moluccas Islands were small units ruled by local commanders, united around rival sultanates which, although they imposed their hegemony locally, were accessible, permeable and interdependent. The power of these kingdoms, especially Ternate and Tidore, was upheld by the value of their spices in the Asiatic and European markets and, above all, by their links to various merchant communities in the Indian Ocean and to other sultanates in the Malayan-Indonesian world. Portuguese, Spanish and later English and Dutch ships could land, deal, agree exclusive trade rights, meddle in local alliances and settle in a lasting and permanent way.

Macao, on the contrary, was the port of entry into China. And China, as the Portuguese had learnt during more than half a century, was an immense, powerful, opulent and highly centralised kingdom where links with the outside world were subject to tight regulation by the authorities and all contact with foreigners was strictly controlled. It is true that the official policy of closure to the outside (*haijing*) which marked the first half of the 16th Century was attenuated in 1567 with the partial opening of the ports of Fujian to allow Chinese junks to leave. However, as far as foreigners were concerned, the rules remained unchanged.⁷

6 Consuelo Varela, "Los problemas de frontera en el Maluco" in Maria da Graça Ventura (ed.), *A União Ibérica e o Mundo Atlântico*, Lisbon, 1997, p. 350.

7 Manel Ollé, "Perspectivas comparativas en la expansión en Asia Oriental de Portugal y España en el siglo XVI" in Jorge dos Santos Alves (org.), *Portugal e a China*, Lisbon, 2001, pp. 230-231.

Macao was a notable exception to this rule as if it was a victory of the spirit of pragmatism which enabled the convergence of diverse interests over the strictness of regulations and political demands. Macao was a spontaneous and informal trading centre which managed to ensure its survival and continuity thanks to a strategy of accommodation to the diverse interests at stake, conciliating what frequently appeared irreconcilable: the autonomy of the local elites, the expectations of the consortiums of Portuguese-Chinese-Japanese merchants, the positions and politics of the Crown, the interests of the Portuguese nobility in the king's service, the aspirations of the Company of Jesus in China and Japan, and finally the reservations, oscillations and expectations of the provincial authorities of Guangdong and, above them, of Beijing.

2. The apogee of Macao

In the 1580s, Macao was a rapidly growing city. What had started with a group of merchants in the 1550s moved from being a small, tolerated trading post to becoming a trading centre, accepted and recognised, albeit informally, by the Chinese authorities. It was a trading centre of growing size where the local level, with its small coastal trade, and the regional dimension, covering Japan, Ryukyu, the province of Guangdong and South-east Asia (mainland and islands), and the global horizon met and crossed the long-distance routes that joined the Indian Ocean, the Middle East and Europe to the west, and America and Europe, once more, to the east. During this decade, Macao finally achieved political maturity with the creation of a Senate Council which became the representative body of the social forces of the town. This new statute obtained official recognition from the Crown for its elected councils and the title "City of the Name of God of Macao" [*Cidade do Nome de Deus de Macau*] was awarded as well. It was also at this time that the authorities in Guangdong summoned the Bishop and the Captain to an audience, thereby conferring a degree of formal recognition on the city, and attributed a degree equivalent to that of a mandarin of the second class⁸ to the Senate procurator.

Macao grew not only in terms of its population but also in terms of its business turnover and number of trading partnerships. Its monopoly over China and Japan seemed to be guaranteed and trade to Southeast Asia was growing apace. Macao's status was consolidated both with the provincial Chinese authorities and within the official sphere of the *Estado da Índia*,

8 Luís Filipe Barreto, *Macao: Poder e Saber – Séculos XVI e XVII*, Lisbon, 2006, pp. 151-155.

without interfering overmuch with its autonomy. The Iberian Union gave a new burst of life to commercial links with Manila despite the fact that it was recognised by all that the separation between the zones attributed to Portugal and to Spain remained in effect even after Philip II had ascended to the Portuguese throne. Once again, trade overruled the treaties conceived and signed in Europe.

There were, however, shadows hanging over this cheerful panorama. The relationship between Macao and Manila was made of rivalry and complicity.⁹ Macao welcomed and fomented the trade in contraband goods with the Philippines provided that this did not interfere with its privileged position in the silk and silver trade and, above all, as long as the Spanish did not try to take away from the city its role as exclusive interlocutor in contacts with the Chinese authorities. It was an unsustainable position since Manila was a trading partner but also a powerful rival in terms of the main merchandise destined for the Chinese market - American silver, which crossed the Pacific Ocean in large quantities and which competed with the silver the Portuguese bought in Japan. In addition, the euphoria caused by the acclamation of Philip I considerably increased the risk of direct interference by the Spanish in the underlying source of Macao's fortune: its exclusive access to China and Japan. In the first few decades, the two cities adopted a strategy of conflict and only established a mutually advantageous conviviality in the medium term.¹⁰

The Portuguese quickly realised that their initial fears had been justified. The Spanish repeatedly tried to enter China and contact the provincial authorities, sometimes with trade proposals, sometimes with requests to be granted a port like Macao. These initiatives as well as the sending of Franciscan, Augustinian and Dominican missionaries caused a short circuit effect which disturbed the existing balance and put the city's very existence at risk.

The success of Macao owed much to the role played by members of the Company of Jesus who allied missionisation to trade and diplomacy not only in China but also in Japan. The arrival of missionaries from rival orders, generally not coordinated with the Portuguese agents already in the country, was a dangerous factor for disturbance as was later proven in Japan.¹¹ From early on, therefore, the Jesuits were the main opponents of Spanish interfer-

9 Jorge Manuel Flores, "Macao: o tempo da euforia" in A. H. Oliveira Marques (org.), *História dos Portugueses no Extremo Oriente*, Lisbon, 1, II, 2000, pp. 194-197.

10 Benjamim Videira Pires, *A viagem de comércio Macau-Manila nos séculos XVI a XIX*, Macao, 1994, pp. 7-14.

11 João Paulo Costa, "A rivalidade luso-espanhola no Extremo Oriente e a querela missionológica no Japão" in Roberto Carneiro *et al.* (org.), *O século cristão do Japão*, Lisbon, 1994, pp. 477-512.

ence and they were the first to act to obtain, on one hand, rigorous application of the royal prohibitions relating to the separation of Portuguese and Spanish spheres of influence and, on the other, a ban on the entry into China of embassies or legations from the Philippines. Working in their favour was their knowledge of local realities and also of Chinese language and diplomacy. This was the reason why as early as 1582 the Macao Jesuits sent a mission to Zhaoqing and obtained from the provincial authorities a triple success: the release of the Spaniards imprisoned during one of their incursions into China, consolidation of Macao's position and, finally, an authorisation, unheard of until that time, for Jesuit missionaries to take up residence inside China.¹²

One of the instruments that Macao used to defend its interests was an appeal to Goa and to Lisbon to ensure that the royal provisions which closed Spanish access to China, Japan and the Moluccas Islands were complied with – an appeal that was not permanent or continuous and was moulded to the needs of the city. Thus, there were no protests when Bartolomeu Vaz Landeiro, one of the richest and most powerful merchants of the Macanese oligarchy, began sending his junks to the Philippines as from 1583-84, thereby inaugurating the Macao-Manila route, or when at about the same time the *San Martin*, a ship outbound from Manila and heading for Peru, arrived in Macao, or even when D. João da Gama sailed at his own expense and at his own risk for Acapulco in 1589. In 1585, Philip I confirmed yet again the ban on contact between the Portuguese and Spanish spheres of influence, which he sent to the authorities in Goa and to those in Manila¹³. In the following years, these provisions were repeatedly reiterated, at an almost annual rate, but to no great effect. The unfolding of events depended on the ability of each agent in the field to act, the balance of forces and the local political and economic contexts and not on orders coming from Madrid. This is why, when the governor of Manila decided to send a frigate directly to Canton in 1598, Macao had to resolve the issue with the means at its disposal.

3. The *conquistadores* in Asia

The settlement of the Spanish in the Philippines, first in Cebu and after 1571 in Manila, brought Spanish America to the gates of Asia. Until this date, the pace of penetration of Portugal and Castile had been unequal, with

12 Manel Ollé, *La Empresa de China – De la Armada Invencible al Galeón de Manila*, Barcelona, 2002, pp. 115-120.

13 Letter to the viceroy D. Duarte de Meneses, 26.4.1586, in J. H. Cunha Rivara (ed.), *Archivo Portuguez Oriental*, Nova Goa, 1857, 5, III, p. 1117-1119.

the friction that had occurred at the contact points of the dividing line being reasonably resolved from a legal point of view by the Treaty of Zaragoza. In practice, though, the Portuguese were forced to maintain permanent vigilance over the Spanish expeditions to the Moluccas which, until the 1560s, had been little more than fiascos. However, Miguel López de Legazpi's expedition changed this state of affairs as a more permanent base was established in the Philippine archipelago right in the centre of the Macao-Malacca-Nagasaki axis and, therefore, became a focal point for permanent tension. As of this moment, Spain had Asiatic possessions and interests. The inability of the Portuguese to force Legazpi's ships to withdraw and to enforce the Zaragoza agreement clearly shows the Spanish desire to openly dispute Portugal's exclusive access to Asia and also how impossible it was to apply at a local level decisions taken in Europe.

Fascination with Asian opulence and euphoria at the success of the *conquistadores* in America shaped and conditioned the thinking and actions of the Spanish in the first decades after the taking of Manila. The enthusiasm to apply to Asia the recipe of Cortés and Pizarro in Mexico and Peru is noticeable in some figures, both secular and ecclesiastical. This recipe was based on an unshakeable belief in European military and civilisational superiority and in the inevitability of the triumph of the Catholic religion over Asiatic heathenness. From this came some proposals to conquer various mainland kingdoms in Southeast Asia as well as Japan and China itself. These projects were intercalated or mixed in with projects for missionary penetration and for simple Portuguese-style trading. Facing a new scenario which they did not fully understand and which only slowly did they acquire knowledge of and practice in, the Spanish vacillated and were split between military megalomania and diplomatic-commercial realism. Men such as the governor, Francisco de Sande, the Jesuit, Alonso Sánchez, and Luis Pérez Dasmariñas all belong to the first group while governors such as Guido de Lavezaris and Antonio de Morga lie firmly within the second.

Until the end of the 16th Century, when the arrival of the Dutch from the *Provincias Rebeldes* and their English rivals began to drastically restrict options for intervention in the Far East, the Spanish tried to apply their American model in Asia. Military conquest, accompanied by the inevitable missionary action and followed by pacification of the areas conquered, appropriation of the means of production and control of the population using the *encomienda* model was the recipe that was successfully used in the Philippines despite the difficulties and contradictions of the first few years.¹⁴ However, the archi-

14 Patricio Hidalgo Nuchera, *Los Primeros de Filipinas – Crónicas de la conquista*, Madrid, 1995, pp. 39-59.

pelago did not possess the wealth of the golden *el dorado* of Mexico, nor the silver of Peru nor spice production comparable to that of the Moluccas or Banda. Nonetheless, it occupied an enviable geographical position opposite the immense Middle Kingdom, accessible to the Empire of the Rising Sun and only a short distance from the Spice Islands. Furthermore, Manila had an excellent port in a sheltered bay and was fully integrated within the regional trade networks. The fact that it constituted a Spanish enclave within a hemisphere of alleged Portuguese exclusivity was merely a political detail with reduced impact. However, very different were the potential effects of the expansionist temptations of this new Asiatic centre in various directions: the Moluccas Islands, Japan, the mainland kingdoms of Southeast Asia and, above all, China.¹⁵

Despite the undeniable attraction that such plans for conquest enjoyed in the imagination of nobles and soldiers, they faced real difficulties such as ignorance of local conditions, the insecurity and weakness of Manila, difficulties encountered pacifying the Philippine archipelago and the distance that separated them from New Spain from where soldiers, reinforcements and supplies came. To complete the unfavourable panorama for such adventures was the inevitable opposition of the Portuguese, led by Macao. To their longstanding mistrust of the Spanish was now added the risk of commercial competition, the danger of missionary quarrelling and fears about their diplomatic inadequacy in the special context of the Chinese space.¹⁶ Belief in the prosperity foretold by the union of the two peninsular crowns rapidly dwindled because of the fear that uncontrolled interference would endanger the tenuous balance of Macao's position, so arduously obtained through decades of patient toil and pragmatism. In a certain way, the "Pinhal episode" signals rupture and an end to this growing tension.

The first explicit reference to a project to conquer China is made by the Augustinian, Martín de Rada, and dates from 1569, prior therefore to the taking of Manila. The conquest of this sultanate enabled the Spanish to gain access to an excellent source of information about China: the community of overseas Chinese who had settled in the city (known locally as *sangleys*). A short time later, the conflict with the Chinese pirate, Lin Feng, was the first, and an exceptional, opportunity to establish contact with the Chinese authorities and to try to gain their sympathy. The initial intention was to try to obtain a trading post on the coast, similar to Macao, as is stated in

15 One the rise and fall of the plans for the conquest of China, see Manel Ollé (2002), cited in note 12.

16 Manel Ollé, "Competencia Macao-Manila en el contexto inicial de la monarquía dualista, 1581-1593", *Illes i Imperis*, Barcelona, 2000, 3, pp. 5-21.

the instructions given by the governor to the embassy that in 1575 sailed on board an imperial Chinese junk to contact the authorities of Fujian.¹⁷ It was about this time that the possibility arose that a site in the bay of Amoy would be granted so as to allow the Spanish to settle in the region. However, the diplomatic ineptitude of the new governor, Francisco de Sande, shortly afterwards rendered this unviable¹⁸. On the other hand, this governor conceived and developed various proposals for conquest, thereby inaugurating the tortuous and contradictory path which intercalated the use of military force with diplomacy and trade, and which would become the norm until the end of the century.

When news of the union between the crown of Portugal and the crown of Castile in the person of Philip I arrived, Alonso Sánchez, a Jesuit, headed for Canton and, after contact with the provincial authorities, presented himself in Macao with the news of the acclamation. During the years that followed, Sánchez would become the most fervent supporter of a grandiose plan for the conquest of China, which he tried to push forward not only in Manila but also with the king in Madrid. However, the defeat of the *Invincible Armada* made the plan unfeasible.

The position and status of Macao together with its malleability and ability to accommodate and respond to challenge, based on the eminently practical nature of the alliance between merchants and Jesuits, squashed Spanish pretensions despite the fact that Manila was the centre of political power and possessed enormous potential in terms of human, material and military resources, all of which came to it from its umbilical cord connection with Mexico. By the end of the 1590s, the projects of the proud *conquistadores* were nothing more than paper tigers after Alonso Sánchez's plans were refused in Madrid and the bellicose pretensions of the military faction were thwarted when faced with the conditions in the field. Francisco de Sande's venture into Brunei produced no fruit, the attempts at intervention in the Moluccas were foiled and the expeditions to Cambodia had no lasting effect. All that remained was the simple trading of goods, albeit contraband goods, with Macao – this was in fact later consolidated – and firmly establishing the link to New Spain with the *Manila-Acapulco Galleon*.¹⁹

Thus there was a slow process of accommodation to the realities of Asia and, simultaneously, clarification of the objectives and intentions of the Spanish presence in the Philippines. In fact, this suffered from a fundamen-

17 Gaspar de San Agustín, *Conquistas de das Islas Filipinas*, Madrid, 1975, Liv. II, cap. XXII, pp. 439-441.

18 Ollé (2002), pp. 64-72.

19 William L. Schurtz, *El galeón de Manila*, Madrid, 1992, pp. 143-160.

tal confusion between two models – on one hand, the prolongation of the conquest of Mexico and Peru and, on the other, a Portuguese-style approach based on commerce and port-to-port trading. Curiously, while the Spanish assisted at the failing impetus of the former and adapted strategies to carry out the latter, the Portuguese on the other side of the line aspired to develop the opposite.²⁰

4. The voyage of D. Juan Zamudio: facts and intentions

In April 1599, the Viceroy of India, D. Francisco da Gama, Count of Vidigueira, passed on in a letter to the king some news he had received from Macao: the previous year a Spanish ship coming from Manila had docked at the port of Lantao²¹. The captain, D. Juan Zamudio, sent his men “to Canton to bribe the mandarins with gifts, trying to get a port and permission to trade”²² in flagrant contradiction to the royal prohibition. The Portuguese in Macao invited them to enter the city but the Spanish replied that they were only going to take on supplies of munitions and other goods and that they had official permission from the governor of the Philippines for the mission, with the alleged approval of the king. A Macanese delegation immediately set out for Canton in an attempt to frustrate the expectations of the newcomers through a request for their immediate expulsion. Either because the silver offered as a bribe by D. Juan Zamudio appeased the mandarins’ reticence,²³ or because they viewed the pretensions of Macao as an inadmissible intrusion,²⁴ the result was favourable to the Spanish who received permission to establish themselves provisionally in the “port of Pinhal” on the same terms as the Siamese, but they would have to pay 50% more in taxes than the Portuguese and other foreigners. They were not authorised to settle there,

20 Paulo Jorge de Sousa Pinto, *Portugueses e Malaios – Malaca e os sultanatos de Johor e Achém*, Lisbon, 1997, pp. 85-94.

21 One of the islands of present-day Hong Kong.

22 “A Cantão subornar os mandarins com dádivas, para lhes concederem porto e comércio”; Letter from D. Francisco da Gama to the King, April 1599, Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal (Lisbon), *Reservados*, cod. 1976, fl. 98 v.

23 Hernando de los Ríos Coronel, in a letter to Antonio de Morga, states that D. Juan Zamudio spent 7 thousand pesos not only to obtain the necessary authorisations but also to obtain protection against the hostility of the Macanese; Antonio de Morga, *Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas*, Madrid, 1997, chap. VI, p. 151.

24 The order issued by the *haidaofushi* (deputy superintendent of coastal defence) states clearly that if the Spanish were expelled, “those people from Macao will become more arrogant” (“os de Macau ficarão mais soberbos”). Instituto dos Arquivos Nacionais/Torre do Tombo (Lisbon), *Miscelâneas Manuscritas do Convento da Graça*, tomo VI D, fl. 133.

nor to build any warehouses or to step foot on the mainland and they had to leave with the next monsoon after trading was completed. This, at any rate, is what is stated in the contemporary Portuguese translations of four dispatches, probably sent to the Viceroy D. Francisco da Gama with the monsoon of 1599²⁵. Here arises a flagrant contradiction with Spanish sources, beginning with Antonio de Morga, who states that the official provisions of the Chinese authorities granted them the port of Pinhal, “so that then and power they were allowed to come and settle according to their will, with order and permission thereto.”²⁶ We shall return to this question later.

Despite the tight restrictions and the ephemeral nature of the authorisation, the episode set an alarming and very dangerous precedent, with unpredictable contours and effects not only for Macao but also for the official interests of the *Estado da Índia*. In first place, it meant that the Spanish did in effect intend to set up a trading post on the coast of China and start up a direct link between Manila and Guangdong, bypassing Macao. Secondly, it meant that such an intention did not worry about overturning the direct and specific orders from Madrid that repeatedly forbade the Manila authorities from entering into direct contact with China without using Macao as intermediary. Finally, it meant that the Chinese authorities could be persuaded to accept a Spanish presence in their ports and that this, although provisional, could with time become definitive.

The effect of D. Juan Zamudio’s mission sounded the alarm in Macao but it was equally harmful for the *Estado da Índia*: the price of goods in Canton rose to such an extent that the merchandise usually purchased by the regular galleon which sailed annually for India could not be bought, thereby causing the supply of copper for the Ribeira shipyard and the artillery foundry in Goa to fail as well as inducing sizeable losses in the customs houses of Malacca and Goa. According to the Viceroy, D. Francisco da Gama, these losses were estimated at one hundred thousand *pardaus*,²⁷ or 30,000\$000.²⁸ It should be pointed out that this sum exceeded the overall annual revenue from the Malacca customs house, which reached this amount in only one

25 These are: an order from the *haidao*, a sentence from the *guangzhoufu* (prefect of the city of Canton) and two documents confirming these from the *dutang* (provincial governor). IAN/TT, *ibid.*, fls. 133-134.

26 “En que entonces y siempre pudiesen venir y surgir, y poblar por propio suyo, con chapas y provisiones bastantes para ello”, Morga (1997), chap. VI, p. 145.

27 Letter from D. Francisco da Gama to the king, cited in note 22.

28 A value obtained by converting the silver *pardau*, of 300 *reis*, commonly mentioned by the Viceroy D. Francisco da Gama in his correspondence, as in a letter to D. Cristóvão de Moura (of c. 1598) in which 4 *pardaus* is equivalent to 3 *cruzados* (1\$200). IAN/TT, *Miscelâneas Manuscritas do Convento da Graça*, tomo II E, p. 14.

year (1597) throughout the whole period of Portuguese domination.²⁹ The rise in the price of silk, according to the Council of Goa's calculations, was around 50%.³⁰

D. Juan Zamudio's expedition had been ordered by the governor of the Philippines, D. Francisco Tello de Guzmán (1597-1602), and authorized by the recently established *Real Audiencia de Manila* [Royal Audience of Manila]. What were the true objectives of the mission? The versions given by Portuguese and Spanish chroniclers do not coincide either in regard to the motives behind the enterprise or in regard to its outcome: Antonio de Morga states that the purpose was to seek contact and trade with the viceroy of Canton and to supply the warehouses in Manila with saltpetre and metals, and he describes the withdrawal of the ship after this has been accomplished; however, Diogo do Couto says that the outcome sought was to set up a *feitoria*, or factory, as a rival to Macao, which the mandarins had authorised, and he describes how the captain of the *viagem* of Japan, D. Paulo de Portugal, rendered this unfeasible after a short while, having expelled the Spanish by force of arms.³¹ A letter from the governor, Francisco Tello, specifically states:

“(...) I sent D. Juan de Zamudio to the city of Canton in a ship of his own and at his cost, well prepared to purchase some merchandise like iron, saltpeter, copper, tin and hemp, which were greatly needed here, and also to start the voyage which is convenient to be made from these islands to China; and in order to better understand the mood of the Chinese by D. Juan, he should try to open a port in Canton using the best possible ways”.³²

Zamudio's expedition to China could, therefore, have been nothing other than a simple commercial initiative. After all, the Spanish had negotiated little more than two decades earlier the possibility of obtaining a trading post in Fujian, which had then been quashed by Francisco de Sande

29 Manuel Lobato, *Política e comércio dos Portugueses na Insulândia – Malaca e as Molucas de 1575 a 1605*, Macao, 1999, p. 227, board II.

30 Letter from the Council of Goa to the king, 1599, in Rivara (1857), 1, II, p. 71.

31 Morga (1997), pp. 145-146; Diogo do Couto (1974), Dec. XII, II, xi, pp. 243-250.

32 “(...) Despaché al capitán D. Juan de Zamudio a la ciudad de Cantón en navío suyo a su costo bien aderezado a comprar algunas cosas, como san hierro, salitre, cobre, estaño y cáñamo, de que había gran falta en este campo y a dar principio al viaje que conviene se haga de estas islas a China y para que entendida mejor por D. Juan la disposición de los chinas, procurase por buenos medios se abrir puerto en Cantón.”; Letter from Francisco Tello de Guzmán to the king, 6.7.1601, Archivo General de Indias (Seville), *Filipinas*, 6, R. 9, n° 174, fl. 1-1v.

in favour of the military option and a project to conquer China. With illusions about ventures of this kind shattered, it is possible that the moment had come to revive the old dream of a *Spanish Macao*.

However, in the late 1590s, the Spanish presence in Asia no longer suffered from the inexperience and ingenuousness that had been characteristic of the first few years and, consequently, the motives of 1598 could not be the same as those of 1575. The objectives of D. Juan Zamudio's expedition, therefore, were more profound and of a strategic and political nature, and encompassed the deteriorating relationship between the Spanish and the Japanese, Toyotomi Hideyoshi's threat to the Philippines and the plan to conquer the island of Taiwan/Formosa.

5. The Japanese factor

For some time relations between Manila and Japan had been deteriorating. In 1592-93, the new lord of Japan, the *daimyo* Toyotomi Hideyoshi, launched his armies in the conquest of Korea, which could possibly be followed by the conquest of the Ryukyu Islands, Formosa and Luzon. In Manila, the threat was real and the Korean campaign was understood as the first step to imminent invasion of the Philippines. To further aggravate Spanish fears, Hideyoshi sent a mission to Manila at around the same time bearing a message which was little less than an ultimatum demanding the submission of the Spanish³³. Leading the mission was one of the most tenacious supporters of the conquest of Luzon and the war on the Spanish. He was a singular character, a Japanese adventurer named Harada Kiuyemon who had been in Manila and had been a Christian, receiving the name of Pablo at his baptism³⁴. He therefore knew the tangled ways of the city and of Spanish power in the Philippines and he tried to persuade Hideyoshi's court that it would be easy to conquer the archipelago with a few hundred soldiers. He did this by manoeuvring behind the scenes so as to influence the counselors of the *kanpaku*³⁵ to advance with the enterprise.³⁶

The situation remained tense during the following years although diplomatic initiatives on both sides kept the peace and kept the spectre of

33 José Montero Y Vidal, *Historia General de Filipinas*, Madrid, I, 1887, p. 96. Cf. Juan Gil, *Hidalgos y samurais*, Madrid, 1991, pp. 36-42, and sources mentioned and transcribed therein.

34 San Agustín (1975), Liv. III, chap. XII, p. 643.

35 Title of regent adopted by Hideyoshi between 1585 and 1591. After this date he used the title of *taiko*, "retired regent".

36 Manel Ollé, *La invención de China*, Wiesbaden, 2000, p. 91. Cf. Francisco Colín, *Labor evangélica, ministerios apostólicos de los obreros de la Compañía de Jesús*, Barcelona, 1900, II, p. 48.

a military engagement at bay. For the Spanish, Nipponese war-mongering began to feel like the sword of Damocles hanging over the Philippines so that, in spite of signs that things were calming down, they did not stop taking adequate defensive measures to guarantee the safety of the archipelago. In other words, they were just awaiting for an opportunity to launch an attack.

On 17 October 1596, the *San Felipe*, outbound from Manila and heading for Acapulco, ran aground on the coast of Japan. Hideyoshi seized the cargo (valued at around 1,300,000 pesos) and arrested the passengers among whom were several mendicant friars.³⁷ What had started out as a simple navigational accident turned into a tragic episode, culminating in the public execution of various missionaries the following year. The execution was transformed into “martyrdom” and widely used as a propaganda weapon by the Franciscans against the exclusivist pretensions of the Company of Jesus in Japan. It was also one more point of contention in the deteriorating relations between Spanish and Portuguese since the latter were accused of, in collusion with the Jesuits, having negatively influenced the *taiko* in his decision.³⁸ In fact, the financial difficulties that Japan, struggling with a second military campaign in Korea and with the devastating effects of earthquakes in the central region of the archipelago, was experiencing were decisive factors in the seizure and confiscation of the cargo. However, the harsh sentence was essentially politically motivated as it was an unequivocal sign of the power of the *taiko* and a warning that the edict of 1587, which outlawed Christianity, was still in force. This warning was particularly directed at the mendicant friars and bore an undeniable anti-Spanish stamp to it since the decision seems to have been set in motion by the unfortunate declarations of Francisco de Olandia, the ship’s pilot, who, in an attempt to impress the Japanese with information about the power of his king had said that Spanish overseas conquests were preceded by sending in missionary friars who prepared the terrain for the military intervention.³⁹ The tension between Osaka and Manila thus reached new heights.

While Manila wept for its martyrs and counted the losses of the confiscated merchandise, news arrived that Hideyoshi was stepping up military preparations for the invasion of the Philippines. In fact, he was preparing for the second campaign against Korea but in Manila it was taken for granted that the previous threats were about to be fulfilled. The governor, D. Francisco Tello, sent an embassy to Hideyoshi, led by D. Luís Navarrete Fajardo

37 Emilio Sola, *Historia de un desencuentro – España y Japón 1580-1614*, Alcalá, 1999, pp. 72-82.

38 Boxer (1988), p. 59.

39 Charles R. Boxer, *The Christian Century of Japan*, Berkeley/London, 1951, pp. 165-166.

and by the Portuguese D. Diogo de Sousa, but the results did not allay his fears. The Spanish were convinced that the first step the Japanese would take on the way to the Philippines would be to conquer the island of Formosa. The governor's plans, therefore, were an attempt to anticipate this by occupying the island before Hideyoshi could do so, since he considered that it would be extremely difficult to guarantee the security of Cagayán (Northern Luzon) if the Japanese established on Formosa.⁴⁰

It is about this time that the figure of Luis Pérez Dasmariñas appears on the scene. His father, Gómez Pérez, a Galician from Betanzos, had been governor of León and *corregidor* in Murcia, Lorca and Cartagena in the 1580s. His name had been indicated to the King, Philip II, by Alonso Sánchez, the great mentor behind the plans to conquer China, for the post of governor of the Philippines. The monarch accepted the suggestion and made him a Knight of the Order of Santiago. He arrived in Manila in 1590 but died at the hands of his Chinese crew three years later during an expedition to conquer Ternate. Luis Pérez, who had come with his father to the Philippines, was a knight of the Order of Alcántara and had vast military experience gained in Flanders.⁴¹ So he was a veteran soldier who substituted the father in the government of the Philippines (between 1593 and 1595) and whose actions were marked by military campaigns in Northern Luzon, Mindanao and Cambodia. Dasmariñas was one of the great enthusiasts of projects for territorial conquest in Asia in partnership with his friend, the cosmographer Hernando de los Ríos Coronel, who would be heard of later because of his plans to discover islands in the Pacific.⁴²

In June 1597, a War Council was summoned and the problem of the Japanese threat was put to discussion. Dasmariñas presented a detailed plan which included the reasons why the Spanish should advance immediately on Formosa.⁴³ Even before the Council had ended its discussions, which was on 22 June, the governor, D. Francisco Tello, wrote to the king complaining that the Council opposed the plan to occupy the island, alleging lack of men and resources, but, despite this, he would nominate as its "general of the coast" D. Juan Zamudio (who was in fact a member of the War Council) and he had already started preparing an armada for when

40 José Sicardo, *Christiandad de Japón...*, Madrid, 1698, p. 40.

41 San Agustín (1975), Liv. III, chap. IX, p. 629.

42 Juan Gil, *Mitos y utopías del descubrimiento – 2. El Pacífico*, Madrid, 1989, pp. 135-142.

43 Described by Pablo Pastells in his "Historia General de Filipinas" in Pedro Torres y Lanzas (ed.), *Catálogo de los documentos relativos a las Islas Filipinas...*, Barcelona, 1925, III, pp. LXXVIII-LXXXII.

such might be necessary.⁴⁴ According to Morga, Zamudio actually left for Formosa on a reconnaissance mission⁴⁵ which seems to have lasted about two months, from August to October 1597.⁴⁶

This trip was, therefore, a prelude to the expedition that would take him to “Pinhal” the following year. Since the Spanish assumed Hideyoshi’s invasion of Luzon to be imminent, Morga’s version that claims that the search for “saltpeter and metals” was the purpose of this voyage acquires more verisimilitude. Another purpose might be noted: that of contacting the authorities in Canton to warn them of Japanese intentions and, invoking a common threat, request preventive Chinese military action in Formosa.⁴⁷ In fact, the chronicler, Gaspar de San Agustín, attributed to the mission a uniquely diplomatic function and strips it of any commercial intention.⁴⁸ The death of Hideyoshi on 18 September 1598 dissipated the threat and lightened the pessimistic scenario. However, the military lobby in Manila did not give up its intention to maintain intact the anti-Japanese military and naval force, not only because Japanese piracy broke out again in the bay of Manila the following year but also because of the fear that the return to Japan of the army of 100 thousand men used in the Korea campaign could cause social turbulence and that a part of this contingent, seeing their expectations frustrated, would not resist the temptation to advance on the Philippines.⁴⁹

6. Luis Pérez Dasmariñas and the expedition to Cambodia

The “Pinhal episode” was therefore not merely a small issue involving Macao, Manila and Canton. In addition to the Japan factor, a parallel event should also be considered which, by coincidence, overlapped the events described: the expedition of D. Luis Pérez Dasmariñas to Cambodia, which happened at the same time as D. Juan Zamudio’s expedition. The two ventures would have had no connection were it not for the fact that Dasmariñas’ armada, which left Manila in July 1598 with two ships, a galiot and an expeditionary force of 200 men, ran into a storm which scattered the fleet. It had

44 Letter from D. Francisco Tello de Guzmán to the king, 19.6.1597, in E. H. Blair (ed.), *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898*, Cleveland, 1904, vol. X, p. 46.

45 Morga (1997), chap. VI, p. 129.

46 Serviços de Juan Bautista da Noli, in Gil (1991), p. 117, n. 219.

47 Sicardo (1698), p. 40. Cf. Sola (1999), p. 84. Morga (1997), chap. VI, p. 129, describes the mission but places it on the reconnaissance voyage of the previous year.

48 San Agustín (1975), Liv. III, chap. XVIII, p. 675.

49 Letter from D. Francisco Tello de Guzmán to the king, 7.12.1599, in E. H. Blair (ed.) (1904), vol. X, p. 212.

set sail from Manila in answer to the alleged request of Prauncar (Barom Reachea II), King of Cambodia, who had requested that Spanish reinforcements and missionaries be sent. It was a turbulent period in the history of this region and one in which the intervention of Siam stands out as do the actions of adventurers such as Juan Juárez Gallinato, Blas Ruiz de Hernán González and the Portuguese Diogo Veloso who, with the tacit approval of Malacca and Manila, tried to control power in Lovek, the capital of the kingdom, through interference in local dynastic disputes.⁵⁰

The Spanish fleet never reached its destination. Dasmariñas' ship went aground off the coast of Guangdong, exactly at the time when the effects of D. Juan Zamudio's establishing himself were being felt in Macao. It is possible, in fact, that one of the dispatches from the authorities in Canton makes reference to this ship.⁵¹ He seems to have landed somewhere in the neighbourhood of Macao, but faced with the bad local reception, he must have decided to move to the port of Pinhal where D. Juan Zamudio was. The Canton authorities, namely the *haidao*, granted him authorisation to move to Pinhal and Spanish sources further state that they were transported in Chinese ships. The Spanish, in fact, managed to obtain authorisation to buy a junk and supplies for the new arrivals since the Portuguese in Macao were increasingly hostile.⁵²

Dasmariñas' intention was to make contact again with the other ships in the armada and send a request for help to Manila asking for support and reinforcements to enable him to continue with the original voyage plan. This never came to pass. Various unforeseen events irreversibly thwarted the captain's plans and the episode ended with a return to Manila about two years later. What happened in the meantime was a series of successive misfortunes which are reported in various sources but in a confused, and at times contradictory, manner.

Shortly after his arrival in Pinhal, Dasmariñas realised that he was in a difficult situation and relations with Macao were extremely tense. His presence in the region was viewed by both the city's merchants and D. Paulo de Portugal, the captain, as a dissimulated attempt to penetrate into China. This

50 Charles R. Boxer, "Portuguese and Spanish Projects for the Conquest of Southeast Asia, 1580-1600", *Journal of Asian History*, 1969, III, pp. 130-131.

51 The "confirmation of the sentences issued by the *haidao* and *guangzhoufu*" ["confirmação das sentenças do Aitao e Conchufui"] states that "from now on they should not return here on the pretext of a broken rudder or mast like they did on this occasion" ["(...) daqui em diante não tornem cá mais com achaque de dizerem que lhe quebrou o leme ou mastros como agora fizeram por esta vez"]. Cf. note 25.

52 "Relação da condição do Reino do Camboja" by D. Francisco Tello, s.d., in E. H. Blair (ed.) (1904), vol. X, p. 232-233.

served to feed even more the fears caused by the arrival of D. Juan Zamudio not long before. Distrust of the Spanish and of their real intentions increased as did the fear that this situation would encourage new attempts to settle in the vicinity of Macao.

The first friction occurred shortly after his arrival when the emissaries he had sent to Macao to obtain help were arrested by D. Paulo. Then the men he had sent to Canton to try to get support from the Chinese authorities were confronted with a delegation from Macao. The delegation tried once again to discredit the Spanish, claiming in front of the mandarins that they were thieves and pirates⁵³. Dasmariñas was unaware of, or minimised, the delicate situation of Macao and the problems that his arrival caused the city not only in relation to trade but also concerning to the peculiar relationship the Chinese authorities had with foreigners. During his stay in these parts, he did, however, become fully aware of what was at stake, as is shown by his actions in the months that followed.

By the end of 1598, Luis Pérez Dasmariñas had apparently managed to repair his frigate. Attempts to acquire a ship in Macao were unsuccessful since they came up against the firm opposition of the Captain, D. Paulo de Portugal. D. Paulo was aware that the Spanish wanted to continue with their voyage to Cambodia and so he reaffirmed the official position i.e. that “which conquest belongs to our trade and its accomplishment by the Spanish is against the Royal service and the orders of the Viceroy of India”, strongly urging them to return to the Philippines with D. Juan Zamudio.⁵⁴ D. Juan went back at the beginning of the following year, accompanied by a request for help in the form of men and ships. The governor, D. Francisco Tello, however, seeing that there were neither men nor ships available to continue the voyage to Cambodia, ordered Dasmariñas to return to Manila.

In Macao, the postponement of Dasmariñas’ departure was taken to be a felony and unleashed a process of open hostility towards him and his companions in Pinhal. The Dominican friar, Diego Aduarte, who had been in Cambodia with Gallinato and Diogo Veloso and who had later been part of Dasmariñas’ armada, says that in Macao a public warning was posted which forbade any help being given to the Spanish on pain of serious penalties and that if any of them came into the city they would be arrested.⁵⁵ Francisco de

53 Morga (1997), chap. VI, p. 148.

54 “(...) A qual conquista é do nosso comércio, e contra o serviço de El-Rei e mandado do Viso-Rei da Índia fazerem-na castelhanos”; Letter from D. Paulo de Portugal to Luis Pérez Dasmariñas, 25.12.1598, AGI, *Filipinas*, 6, R. 8, nº 120.

55 Diego Aduarte, *Historia de la provincia del Santo Rosario de Filipinas*, Saragoça, 1693, vol. I, chap. L, p. 221.

Castilla, who was at the time in the city trying to acquire a ship, reported the impossibility of such a purchase, and added:

“Since they knew about the departure of D. Juan, they reinforced the guard, so it is not possible to sell anything, not even under the cover of the ill men, for they were all arrested as will be anyone following. I talked with the captain and he told me that, since Your Lordship did not leave with D. Juan, they refuse to supply even water and they will try to harm you as much as possible, and that let be clear that if they could, they would set you on fire”.⁵⁶

During virtually the whole of 1599, while he awaited help from the governor of Manila with whom he continued exchanging missives and avoiding the order to return, Dasmariñas stubbornly remained in Pinhal although he was totally blockaded by the Portuguese. It is interesting to note though that he had allies in Macao who sought to supply him secretly with provisions and silver. It was primarily this metal that he desperately needed to be able to furnish himself with what was necessary to withstand the Portuguese blockade while awaiting help from the Philippines. The most important help that Dasmariñas found in Macao was given by Father Manuel de Aguiar, governor of the Bishopric between 1597 and 1599, and the Augustinian, Friar Miguel dos Santos, who held the post from 1599 to 1607.⁵⁷ This was secret support because the hostility against the Spanish had reached such proportions that nobody dared to publicly demonstrate the least sign of consideration. Father Manuel de Aguiar even confessed to Dasmariñas that he “needed to speak against all the Spanish in order to carry on my life and not cause any suspicion”.⁵⁸ Friar Miguel dos Santos was particularly cautious: no Spaniard should try to go to Macao because “there are spies everywhere and a tragedy can happen in a very easy way”; only a handful of people, namely the Franciscans, the Dominicans and a few others, were to

56 “Desde que supieron que se fue D. Juan pusieron mayores centinelas de las que tenían, de modo que no lo pueden vender ni encubierto los enfermos que vinieron presos y así han de hacer a los que por delante vinieren. Y hablé con el capitán y dijome que ya que V. S. se no fue con D. Juan, que no le han de dar ni agua, sino que habían de procurar hacerles mucho daño, y que se desengañasen que si pudieren, que les han de poner fuego”; Letter from Francisco de Castilla to Luis Pérez Dasmariñas, 1599, AGI, *Filipinas*, 6, R. 8, n° 131.

57 Manuel Teixeira, *Macau e a sua diocese*, Macao, 1940, vol. II, pp. 88; idem (1956-61), *ibidem*, vol. III, pp. 9 e 542; id. (1976), *ibid.*, vol. XII, p. 47; Casimiro Nazareth, *Mitras Lusitanas no Oriente*, Goa, 1924, p. 370.

58 “(...) Necessário falar já contra todos os espanhóis para poder viver e não me terem por suspeito”; Letter from Manuel de Aguiar to Luis Pérez Dasmariñas, undated [1599], AGI, *Filipinas*, 6, R. 8, n° 138.

be trusted to send messages and help; the Chinese Christians, not at all, and the Jesuits, never.⁵⁹

During several months, Dasmariñas sent repeated requests for help to both prelates. However, the results were meagre: a few dozen taels of silver and a few provisions. They claimed they were not even able to exchange for silver the gold items he had sent since Macao was completely out of the metal so that “they are already cutting on their salt-cellar and spoons”. The reason for this was simple: the ship from Japan had not come that year.⁶⁰ In fact, there was no official *viagem* in 1599, probably due to the disturbances caused by the death of Hideyoshi.⁶¹

The Spaniards remained in Pinhal until November. Dasmariñas received no reinforcements from Manila nor any substantial support from his allies in Macao. On the contrary, he was under great pressure to withdraw to the Philippines. He had lost part of his men, others were sick and weak and some were probably even on the verge of revolt. One of the possible reasons for the delay in his departure could have been the need to fully comply with the bureaucratic formalities of the port such as the payment of customs dues according to the size of the ship, as was customary in China. Friar Diego Aduarte, who was in charge of this mission, describes the events starting with his trip to Canton and ending with the final authorisation to leave after a long, complicated process.⁶²

The Spanish left Pinhal on 16 November with a frigate and a junk, heading for Manila.⁶³ According to the testimony of various members of the crew, among whom Dasmariñas himself, the ships encountered unfavourable winds after some 15 to 20 leagues and, once again, landed on the coast of China.⁶⁴ After taking counsel, the captain decided that the frigate, which was in better shape, should set out again for the Philippines while he himself

59 “(...) Tudo está cheio de espias e ligeiramente pode acontecer uma desgraça”; Letter from Fr. Miguel dos Santos to Luis Pérez Dasmariñas, 17.5.1599, AGI, *Filipinas*, 6, R. 8, n° 124; idem, 7.6.1599, AGI, *ibid.*, n° 125; idem, 24.7.1599, AGI, *ibid.*, n° 127; idem, undated [1599], AGI, *ibid.*, n° 139; letter from Manuel de Aguiar to Luis Pérez Dasmariñas, undated [1599], AGI, *ibid.*, n° 132.

60 “(...) Já cortam os saleiros e colheres”; Letter from Manuel de Aguiar to Luis Pérez Dasmariñas, 22.4.1599, AGI, *Filipinas*, 6, R. 8, n° 122; letter from Fr. Miguel dos Santos to Luis Pérez Dasmariñas, 23.4.1599, AGI, *ibid.*, n° 123.

61 Boxer (1988), p. 61.

62 Aduarte (1693), chap. L. pp. 214-219.

63 Testimony of Juan Moreno in “Información de la guerra que nos hicieran en Macán”, AGI, *Filipinas*, 6, R. 8, n° 134, fl. 6.

64 “Información de la guerra que nos hicieran en Macán”, cited in the previous note. This contains a series of testimonies and confirmations recorded by the scribe, Juan Ruiz de Olalde Vergara, and destined to constitute an *auto*, or legal action, against the conduct of the Portuguese in Macao to be presented eventually to the *Real Audiencia*.

would stay on the junk so as not to abandon the crew and wait for a better moment to return to Manila. He ended up settling on Lampacau,⁶⁵ near Macao.⁶⁶

Dasmariñas said he did not wish to return to Pinhal in order not to offend the Portuguese despite being authorised to do so by the local authorities and having been advised by the *sangleys*, the Chinese merchants from Manila, to do so. To curb the hostility of Macao and to prove that he had no intention of harming the interests of the city, he sent a letter to the governor of the Philippines, requesting authorisation for Portuguese merchants to send a ship to Manila by way of compensation for the damage caused and for the adversities suffered. It was agreed that the ship that came from there to rescue him would trade only in Macao and not use the *sangleys* as intermediaries.⁶⁷ Apparently, these intentions were communicated to the Portuguese and Dasmariñas must have made an informal agreement with D. Paulo de Portugal, each pledging their word. This at any rate is what comes across from the letter the Portuguese captain wrote to him in which he guarantees him safety and support.⁶⁸

In practice, however, it turned out very differently. On 17 January, a heavily armed Macanese fleet appeared alongside the Spanish ship, bringing with it D. Paulo de Portugal and the main dignitaries of the territory. Using a messenger as intermediary, the Spanish were instructed to sail for Macao, first politely, then under the threat of the use of arms in the face of Dasmariñas' unrelenting refusal to surrender. There was an exchange of artillery fire which lasted several hours and from this resulted deaths and damage on the Spanish side as well as the loss of the goods which they had unloaded onto land. The junk managed to disengage itself from the trap and flee the Portuguese, staying well away from Macao and ending up taking shelter in the bay of Guanghai.⁶⁹ Dasmariñas had been previously warned that D. Paulo de Portugal was preparing an armada to arrest him and send him in chains to Goa, but he had not given any credit to this information since he trusted the Portuguese captain's agreement and his word. The Spaniards returned a short time later to Manila but the exact date is unknown.

65 Island located to the south-west of Macao next to the mouth of the Xijiang. Today it is the mainland due to the silting up of the coast.

66 Testimony of Gaspar de los Ríos Coronel in "Información de la guerra que nos hicieran en Macán", fl. 4.

67 Testimony of Luis Pérez Dasmariñas in "Información de la guerra que nos hicieran en Macán", fl. 1; testimony of Pedro de Salas Marrón, *idem*, fl. 4v.

68 Letter from D. Paulo de Portugal to Luis Pérez Dasmariñas, 13.12.1599, AGI, *Filipinas*, 6, R. 8, n^o 134.

69 Bay located to the southwest of Macao, north of the island of Shangchuan (Sanchoão).

Thus the “Pinhal episode” came to an end. In 1603, the King communicated formally to the *Real Audiencia* in Manila his non-approval of the licence they had granted to D. Juan de Zamudio.⁷⁰ Curiously, on the same date, the monarch asked the governor of the Philippines to form a *junta*, or council, with the *Audiencia* and the regular and secular prelates to deal with the missionary work in China and a return to the port of Pinhal.⁷¹ With the arrival of the Dutch in the Indian Ocean and the globalisation of the conflict between the Hapsburg Empire and the northern European powers, the project for the return to Pinhal faded away, even though not entirely. In 1627, the Dominican, Melchor de Manzano, apparently looked again at the information compiled by Dasmariñas and drew up a project for the Spanish from the Philippines to utilise the port of Pinhal, a project which the King came to hear about and which was sent to the *Audiencia* in Manila for analysis.⁷²

7. *Lüsong and Folangji*

The reaction of the provincial Chinese authorities towards the arrival of the Spanish and the prospect of their settling on the coast is an important issue to understand better the “Pinhal episode”. The entry of foreigners into China was subject to close vigilance and submission to a protocol which entailed compliance with a complex series of rules and proceedings in accordance with the official policy of *haijing*. Macao, as mentioned above, was an exception, albeit not officially recognised as such, to the norm that rejected any permanent settlement of foreigners. In the case of the Spanish, the diplomatic initiatives in the 1580s, the attempts to introduce mendicant missionaries without going through Macao and the confusion surrounding the true identity of the men from Manila – clearly separate from the Portuguese until 1581, then suddenly becoming subjects of the same king but even so remaining bitter rivals – certainly created a strong negative impression on the administrative and military apparatus of Guangdong. The authorities’ aim had always been to control the movements of foreigners and their space for manoeuvre so the lack of coordination between Manila and Macao created new fears of potentially uncontrollable disturbances. European naval power, always feared, was a permanent factor of uneasiness for the coastal authorities and a danger that had to be reduced and controlled.

70 *Real cédula à Audiencia de Manila*, 15.10.1603, AGI, *Filipinas*, 329, L. 1, fs. 56-59.

71 *Real cédula to the governor D. Pedro de Acuña*, 15.10.1603, AGI, *Filipinas*, 329, L. 1, fs. 54v.-56.

72 *Memorial by Friar Melchor de Manzano*, 17.9.1627, AGI, *Filipinas*, 329, 80, n° 129; *Real cédula à Audiencia de Manila*, 2.10.1627, AGI, *Indiferente*, 451, L. A11, fs. 16-17.

However, the risks arising from the arrival and presence of the *lüsong*, as the Spanish from the Philippines came to be known in China to distinguish them from the Portuguese or *folangji*,⁷³ could be minimised and used to good advantage in the security of the Chinese coast itself. This new foreign presence could be useful as an instrument in the strategic management of the Europeans in the coastal zones of Canton since the enmity between them both would dilute and weaken any potential threat to the integrity of Chinese sovereignty. However, it is well known that divisions existed within the mandarinat as to the position to adopt towards the Europeans. This oscillated between being completely open and, purely and simply, closed and even extended to the dismantling of Macao. It all depended on the moment in time and the individuals who occupied the posts with greater provincial responsibility⁷⁴. What prevailed in the case of Macao was a type of half-way situation of an eminently pragmatic nature since the lack of any formal definition of the status of the city permitted the flourishing of business without upsetting the norms as well as neutralisation of the Portuguese naval power which, on various occasions, was used to enhance the safety of the coast and shipping. Why not apply an identical formula to the *lüsong*?

Spanish actions and intentions aimed at *conquista* certainly did not go unnoticed by the authorities. They were probably fully aware that the Spanish possessed more military resources, greater naval power and greater aggressiveness in their relationship with Asian powers than the Portuguese whose activities, in Far Eastern waters, were limited to trade. They certainly knew that only a short distance separated Canton from Manila in contrast to the distance from Malacca and Goa; in other words, they knew that the Spanish centre of power was perilously close to China. The troubled relationship between the Spanish and the Japanese was also a risk factor to be taken into the equation as the military adventures of Hideyoshi were well known. They therefore had to act cautiously and thoughtfully. But the American silver that flowed into China via the *sangleys* of Manila and which in 1598 came literally knocking on the door of Canton was a powerful factor which pressed for a position of greater malleability and openness. And lastly, only advantages were to be gained from having a counterbalance to the weight of the Portuguese presence and Macao on the coasts of Guangdong. In the light

73 Jin Guo Ping and Wu Zhiliang, "Os 3 mosqueteiros marítimos vistos pelos chineses", *Review of Culture*, Macao, 2004, 11, pp. 167-168.

74 Jorge dos Santos Alves, "Natureza do primeiro ciclo de diplomacia luso-chinesa" in A. Vasconcelos de Saldanha e J. dos Santos Alves (org.), *Estudos de história do relacionamento luso-chinês*, Macao, 1996, pp. 189-191.

of this, the contents of the dispatches of the *haidao* and the *dutang* after the arrival of D. Juan Zamudio on Lantao⁷⁵ can be better understood.

Spanish sources guarantee, sometimes in a more veiled way, sometimes more explicitly, that both D. Juan Zamudio and Luis Pérez Dasmariñas obtained formal authorisation to remain or to return to the port of Pinhal.⁷⁶ In fact, some provincial functionaries were openly in favour of the Spaniards. Dasmariñas recounts how he received a visit from the *zongbin*⁷⁷ in Pinhal who, with extreme courtesy, invited him to eat and to share “a very delicate drink they call tea” and who issued “an order and *chapa* favourable to my dispatch”.⁷⁸ In fact, some Spanish sources paint a very colourful picture of the exceptional manner in which the mandarins from Canton welcomed the Spaniards, thereby causing the Portuguese in Macao amazement and envy.

As the Spanish presence in Pinhal dragged on and as a result of continual contact, it is possible, however, that the position of the authorities, or at least of some of those in charge, changed. The humiliations which Friar Diego Aduarte was subjected to and the harshness of the treatment he received at about this time when he tried to obtain a licence in Canton for the Spanish ships in Pinhal to leave all point in this direction.⁷⁹ This sudden change may be explained, at least partially, by the arrival in the city of a functionary from the court, a *visitador* from Beijing. These were regular occurrences and made for moments of more formal rigour in dealing with foreigners. In the present case, the arrival of the eunuch from Beijing led the *haidao* to hurriedly order the immediate removal of all foreigners from the city, “because he feared the eunuch from the King’s House would find them and be surprised about these foreign people in China, an issue they are quite strict about”.⁸⁰

75 See note 25.

76 Morga (1997), p. 145; Testimony of Luis Pérez Dasmariñas in “Información de la guerra que nos hicieron en Macán”, fl. 1; Letter from Francisco Tello de Guzmán to the king, 6.7.1601, AGI, *Filipinas*, 6, R. 9, n° 174, fl. 1v.

77 Military chief or regional commander.

78 “(...) Una bebida muy regalada que usan, chamada cha”; “(...) un mandamiento y chapa en favor de mi despacho”; Luis Pérez Dasmariñas, “Breve y sumaria relación de las cosas de China”, undated, AGI, *Filipinas*, 19, R. 1, n° 1, fl. 4v.-5v.

79 See note 62.

80 “(...) Por recar que o capado da casa do rei os achasse e estranhasse gente estrangeira na china, cousa em que eles têm tanta regra”; Letter from Fr. Miguel dos Santos to Luis Pérez Dasmariñas, undated [1599], AGI, *Filipinas*, 6, R. 8, n° 139; inf. confirmed by Aduarte (1693), chap. L, pp. 214.

8. The reaction of Macao: convergences

Macao's reaction to the "Pinhal episode" can be understood as a sort of climax to a long drawn out period of expectation which had lasted since 1582 when Alonso Sánchez's mission made people aware of the new ambivalent reality: Philip II was now also King of Portugal and this acted as a powerful driver for Spanish pretensions to gain entry into China. It also reveals their feeling of exasperation towards what the city considered to be the Spaniards' impunity in relation to their non-compliance with, if not disdain for, the royal provisions. To further aggravate the situation, the Portuguese realised that the initial dispatches of the *haidao* and *dutang* were not being complied with since Dasmariñas remained in Pinhal for almost a year after Zamudio's departure. What had been provisional authorisation threatened to become permanent. The friendliness shown by some members of the Cantonese provincial administration towards the Spanish would also not have gone unnoticed and the risk of there being a Spanish trading post in the vicinity of Macao, fed by American silver, became increasingly real.

One element, however, was decisive for the Spanish failure: the convergence of interests of Macao's political centres, namely, the merchant elite who dominated the Senate, the Company of Jesus and D. Paulo de Portugal, captain of the *viagem* of Japan and *ouvidor* [magistrate]. The interests of the first two had been aligned for a long time towards the dual Sino-Japanese scenario in a perfect symbiosis between merchant trading and missionary work and this alliance had become stronger since the threat of interference from the mendicant orders had endangered the Company of Jesus' monopoly and consequently threatened the very foundations underlying the success of Macao⁸¹. The mendicant orders acted more or less involuntarily as pawns of the Spanish side. It was not by chance that the greatest support Dasmariñas received in Macao, even though of dubious practical value, came from the Augustinian Friar Miguel dos Santos, governor of the Bishopric, whose term of office was marked by various conflicts with the Jesuits. Curiously, 1598 is the year of the death of Philip I of Portugal and the accession to the throne of Philip II, who substantially attenuated the rulings of his father in relation to maintaining the *status quo* in the Far East and the exclusive rights of the Company of Jesus in the region.

The third element which allowed Macao to successfully confront the challenge of 1598-1600 was D. Paulo de Portugal, the Captain. He was a great-grandson of Vasco da Gama and the son of D. Francisco de Portugal,

81 Barreto (2006), pp. 136-139.

who had been a nobleman and knight on D. Sebastião's council and the king's *estribeiro-mor* [equerry], treasurer and *vedor da fazenda* [Chancellor of the Exchequer]. He had accompanied D. Sebastião on the expedition to Alcácer Quibir and died in 1579 in Fez.⁸² D. Paulo was cousin to the viceroy of India, D. Francisco da Gama, in whose company he had travelled to the East in 1596. He sailed for Macao in 1598, furnished with three *viagens* of Japan, after lesser postings such as the captaincy of a galiot from Mombassa to Goa.⁸³ He married D. Luísa da Silva, daughter of D. João da Silva Pereira, captain of Malacca (1585-1587), and died in the city in 1606 at the time of the Dutch siege.⁸⁴

D. Paulo de Portugal's first contacts were not auspicious. He had arrived in Macao with orders from the Viceroy, who wanted to regulate the trade that was done in Canton for the benefit of merchants from India who paid taxes to the *Erário Régio* [Royal Treasury] in Malacca and Goa. The orders stipulated that these merchants could not be stopped by those of Macao from going to Canton and should, on the contrary, have priority over the silk destined for Japan which made up the bulk of the purchases of the Macanese merchants.⁸⁵ It fell therefore to the captain to execute these orders, to the detriment of Macao's expectations, although the true effectiveness of their application is unknown. Furthermore, D. Paulo had come furnished with three *viagens* to Japan which he had bought along with a ship to undertake them. He had therefore made a huge investment which he hoped to recover quickly. Thus, the arrival of the Spanish in Pinhal ruined several expectations: the merchants from India did not manage to purchase silk in Canton, thereby causing a loss to the Treasury of the *Estado da Índia*, the rise in prices also harmed the Macao merchants and D. Paulo himself, and to cap it all, no silver came from Japan in the year 1599. Thus, the traditional mistrust between the Macao merchants and the captain of the *viagem* was, in this context, substantially mitigated. What is more, D. Paulo received authorisation from his cousin, the Viceroy, to enforce compliance with the royal ban on the entry of the Spanish into China⁸⁶. For once, the interests of the Crown, Goa, the captain of the Japan *viagem* and the Macao/Company of Jesus mercantile consortium coincided. The Spanish had to return to Manila quickly,

82 Ivone Correia Alves, *Gamas e Condes da Vidigueira – Percursos e genealogias*, Lisbon, 2001, p. 218.

83 Letter from D. Francisco da Gama to the king, 1599, BNP, *Reservados*, cod. 1976, fl. 22.

84 António Caetano de Sousa, *História Genealógica da Casa Real Portuguesa*. Coimbra, 1953, vol. X, p. 359.

85 Couto (1974), Dec. XII, I, xvii, pp. 129-131.

86 Couto (1974), Dec. XII, II, xi, p. 250.

without any delays or evasive manoeuvres, by persuasion or by force of arms if necessary, even if this risked disturbing the delicate relationship with the provincial Chinese authorities.

Although he was the highest authority in Macao as he was the representative of the royal power, D. Paulo de Portugal found his movements were limited by the city's powerful merchant community and there are clear indications that on at least two occasions he was forced to act against his will. The first was at the time of the military action against Dasmariñas and his men on 17 January 1600. In fact, the letter he had written a month earlier to the Spanish captain mentions he agrees with Dasmariñas' withdrawing by February and he even goes on to say that "it is better for you not to move far from this city [Macao], because the supplies you ask for your vessel will depend on that, and we shall dissimulate although the appearances show other way".⁸⁷ The reasons that might have led him to break his word are not clear but the possibility should not be excluded that he was persuaded by the city residents to act immediately, in much the same way as he had been convinced by the same people to give up the military action he had prepared against D. Juan Zamudio immediately following the latter's arrival.⁸⁸ In fact, Dasmariñas must have been caught unawares, despite having been warned about the preparations the Portuguese were making against him, since "even if 20 or 30 men would tell him so, he could not believe such actions from a Christian knight like the Captain-Major, moreover he had his word and signature allowing us to stay with all safety and trust on that port until middle February of the said year".⁸⁹

The second occasion occurred shortly afterwards during an event that was one of the outcomes of the Spanish adventure in Pinhal. In 1601, a Dutch ship captained by Jacob van Neck dropped anchor off Macao. Curiously, one of the sources that mentions the incident says that the Dutch were outbound from Tidore and heading for China in search of Pinhal and that they had approached Macao believing that they were in Pinhal since they did not know the coast.⁹⁰ What happened next is well known: the men who were

87 "(...) Será bom não se alongar muito desta cidade [Macao], pois há-de depender dela o aviamento que V. M. pretende para o seu navio, porque nos iremos dissimulando com isso, ainda que as aparências mostrem outra cousa"; see note 54.

88 Couto (1974), Dec. XII, II, xi, p. 249.

89 "(...) Aunque lo dijesen veinte ni treinta hombres, no podía creer tal de un caballero como el capitán mayor y cristiano y particularmente teniendo su palabra y firma de poder estar con toda seguridad y confianza en aquel puerto hasta mediado Febrero del dicho año"; Testimony of Juan Moreno in "Información de la guerra que nos hicieran en Macán", AGI, *Filipinas*, 6, R. 8, n° 134, fl. 6v.

90 Jacques de Coutre, *Andanzas asiáticas*, Madrid, 1991, p. 156.

sent ashore to reconnoitre were immediately imprisoned by the Portuguese and, later, summarily judged and executed in Macao. Captain Van Neck ended up abandoning them to their fate since he could do nothing more than withdraw to a safe port. One of the few survivors, Martinus Apius, later returned to the Netherlands and wrote a report of the event in which he tells how the city residents had managed to deceive the Chinese authorities and persuade the captain to sign the death sentence of 17 captive Dutchmen. This happened although he did not want to do so as it exceeded his authority and he had no orders from the Viceroy allowing him to do so.⁹¹ The swift, harsh and ruthless reaction of the residents to this intrusion was a direct result of the Pinhal episode and of a feeling of exasperation in the face of what they considered to be direct threats to the interests of the city.⁹²

This first Dutch contact with Macao was an important factor that conditioned the relationship between the Portuguese and the Dutch in Asia and ended the initial period that had been marked by a degree of bonhomie and cordiality. From this point on, the Dutch VOC, established in 1602, increasingly and relentlessly launched attacks on Portuguese shipping and positions in a process that only came to an end in 1661.⁹³

Epilogue – Notes on the location of Pinhal

As stated in the Introduction, interest in the “Pinhal episode” has primarily centred on identification of the locale somewhere on the coast of Guangdong, not very far from Macao and the Pearl River Delta. Although a minor issue, it should not be left aside, though it must be said that the confusing and contradictory nature of the available information does not allow a clear conclusion to be reached.

The attempts to identify “Pinhal” have wavered between three main hypotheses. The oldest is that of Albert Kammerer, who suggests a point somewhere east of the mouth of the River Xijiang, to the south-west of Macao and in the vicinity, therefore, of Lampacau.⁹⁴ This is the hypothesis exposed

91 Martinus Apius, “Incidente em Macau, 1601”, *Review of Culture*, Macao, 2004, 12, pp. 61-67.

92 Leonard Blussé, “Brief encounter at Macao”, *Modern Asian Studies*, 22, 3, 1988, pp. 647-664.

93 Leonard Blussé and George Winius, “The origin and rhythm of Dutch aggression against the Estado da Índia, 1601-1661” in Teotónio de Sousa (ed.), *Indo-Portuguese History – old issues, new questions*, Nova Delhi, 1985, pp. 73-83.

94 Albert Kammerer, *La découverte de la Chine par les Portugais au XVI^e siècle*, Leiden, 1944, p. 147.

more recently by Francisco Roque de Oliveira.⁹⁵ Jin Guo Ping, working with Chinese sources, reaches the same conclusion but argues that the Portuguese “Pinhal” and the Spanish “Piñal” were two close but not equivalent places at the mouth of the same river.⁹⁶ Charles Boxer, following J. M. Braga, rejects this possibility and proposes a place on the east coast of the island of Zhongshan between Macao and the *Boca Tigris* or mouth of the Pearl River.⁹⁷ There is yet a third hypothesis, presented by B. Videira Pires, according to which the place is simply the island of Lantao in present-day Hong Kong, an idea that is followed by Rui Loureiro and others.⁹⁸

The toponym appears in Portuguese documentation as “Pinhal” and in the Spanish as “Piñal” or “Piñar”. Nothing points to it not being but one and the same place. Already at the time its location was not clear to anyone who did not know the local geography or had no practical knowledge of the region. Diogo do Couto, for example, does not know the exact distance from the port to Macao; Morga claims it was 12 leagues from Canton.⁹⁹ The governor of the Philippines, D. Francisco Tello, reported to the king that the port was close to Canton and in his “Relação da condição do Reino do Camboja” he said it lay 8 leagues from the city.¹⁰⁰ Nowhere is its location, particularly its position relative to Macao, clearly defined. It is indisputable that it was a port of some importance and size where Siamese merchants and, probably, other foreign communities used to stay, which means therefore that it was not strange that the authorities in Canton had sent D. Juan Zamudio’s ship there. It had, in fact, been frequented like Lampacau by the Portuguese for several decades. A letter from 1564 tells of a journey made by Jesuit missionaries to “Pinhal” to visit and to confess the Portuguese who were there and it says that it lay some 10 to 12 leagues from Macao although it does not explain in which direction.¹⁰¹

The changes to the estuary and coastline caused by silting, which led, among other things, to the disappearance of Lampacau as an island, aggra-

95 Francisco Roque de Oliveira, *A construção do conhecimento europeu sobre a China, c. 1500-c. 1630*, Barcelona, 2003, pp. 55 e 233.

96 In *O Pinhal Yu, el Pinal Kao*, cited in Rui d’Ávila Lourido, “Portugueses e Espanhóis em Macau e Manila com os olhos na China”, *Review of Culture*, Macao, 2003, 7, p. 30 and n. 42.

97 Charles R. Boxer, *Fidalgos no Extremo Oriente*, Macao, 1990, pp. 59-60.

98 Benjamim Videira Pires (1964), “Os três heróis do IV Centenário”, *Boletim Eclesiástico da Diocese de Macau*, nºs 724-725, vol. LXII, p. 694; Rui Manuel Loureiro, *Em busca das origens de Macau*, Lisbon, 1996, p. 127, n. 6.

99 Couto (1974), Dec. XII, II, xi, p. 246; Morga (1997), p. 145.

100 Letter cited in notes 32 and 76; “Relação da condição do Reino do Camboja” by D. Francisco Tello, undated, in E. H. Blair (ed.) (1904), vol. X, p. 231.

101 Loureiro (1996), pp. 118-121.

vates the problem of identifying the exact location. However, the hypothesis that “Pinhal” lay somewhere inside the Pearl River estuary between Macao and the *Boca Tigris*, as Boxer proposes, is more likely than the others. The hypothesis defended by Videira Pires must be excluded since it is reasonably clear from the overall information available that Lantao and Pinhal were different places. In favour of Kammerer’s thesis is the information contained in the map attached to Jorge Pinto de Azevedo’s memorial (1646),¹⁰² which shows an island called “Pinhal” opposite the mouth of the Xijiang without, however, including any other details.

There are, however, three reasons that point in a different direction. The first is that the Spanish would have acquired every advantage from settling in a sheltered place that was protected, as far as possible, from the predictable (and later confirmed) attacks by Macao. Thus, “Pinhal” must have lain to the east of the city and not to the west, which would have meant greater isolation, greater vulnerability and greater likelihood of failure for the Spanish who did not have at their disposal a stable community in the region who could guarantee them support and make the settlement feasible. It was not by chance that the military action against the Spanish took place in Lampacau and not in Pinhal. Here, already in 1598 as mentioned above, the Macanese had discouraged D. Paulo de Portugal from acting for fear of the reaction of the mandarins in Canton. Yet in Lampacau there seem to have not been fears of this type or, if there were, they were considered a risk that was worth taking.¹⁰³

The second reason results from a simple deduction made from events reported in the pages above and concerning the episode of the departure of Dasmariñas from Pinhal for Manila in November 1599. After he came aground again on the coast, the Spanish captain explicitly states that he did not want to return to the other port although he allegedly had authorisation from the provincial authorities to do so. He preferred to remain somewhere near the mouth of the Xijiang in Lampacau. Now, if “Pinhal” had been in the vicinity of this island, there would have been no reason whatsoever for him not to return there.

Finally, the matter of the distance to Macao and to Canton must be considered. Here it is merely a question of calculations. The sources quoted above say that Pinhal lay between 8 and 12 leagues from Canton, while the 1564 map says that it was 10 or 12 leagues from Macao, with Canton being

102 Biblioteca da Ajuda (Lisbon), 54-XI-21, n° 9. Reproduced in an appendix to Artur Teodoro de Matos (ed.), “Advertências’ e ‘queixumes’” de Jorge Pinto de Azevedo a D. João IV em 1646”, *Povos e Culturas*, Lisbon, 1996, 5, pp. 431-545.

103 See note 88.

20 to 30 leagues away. Now, the maritime league used at the time varied according to the calculation of the size of the terrestrial globe and the application of a measurement in leagues to each of its 360 degrees. It is possible, if not probable, that the league used in these sources was a rough calculation of approximately 18 per degree, or in other words, a little over 6 km. Thus, it is possible that Pinhal lay somewhere between a third and a half of the way from Macao to the metropolis of Guangdong. This is a likely scenario when compared to actual distances.